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Historically Speaking

Marathon at 2,500

ugust 12 marks an accepted date for By BG John S. Brown Greeks recently conquered by Persia rose the 2,500th anniversary of the Battle in revolt. and the tiny city-state of A U.S. Army retired of Marathon, although the actual date attempted to assist, but the Per- may instead be September 12, depending upon how one sians utterly crushed the . Darius resolved to crush interprets the Lacedaemonian lunisolar calendar. The most Athens and Eretria as well and to bring the European Greeks notable commemoration will probably be the Athens into his orbit. Had he succeeded, he would have snuffed out Marathon this year, and other marathons around the world the democratic experiment, independent Hellenic civiliza- will undoubtedly take notice as well. Ironically, the ardu- tion and Greek national identity with a single stroke. ous 26-mile race is based upon an athletic performance by After preliminary operations in Thrace and , the legendary Philippides that may not have actually oc- Darius launched a naval expedition directly across the curred. The battle itself did occur and is rightly regarded . Securing—or devastating—islands en route, as among the most decisive in history. Marathon is ar- the Persians sacked Eretria and landed an army more than guably the first major battle for which we have a reliable twice the size of what Athens could muster in the sheltered record, provided largely by the world’s first actual histo- Bay of Marathon. Hippias recommended the spot, both be- rian, . cause it provided an ideal beachhead for the shallow galleys Much was at stake at Marathon. Athenian , of the time and because nearby plains offered maneuver based upon an emerging middle class, was new, untested room for , an arm with respect to which the Persians and fragile. Hellenic culture was just beginning to set itself were much superior. The 26-mile distance from Athens apart as a purveyor of reason, analysis and humanism, and offered yet another advantage. If the staunchly democratic as a foundation for what later came to be called Western civi- hoplites ( soldiers) of the Athenian army marched to lization. Greece itself was a geographical composite of Marathon, the city itself would be exposed and subject to squabbling tribes and city-states more so than a national betrayal by lingering confederates of Hippias should an- identity. The former Athenian Hippias, displaced in a other Persian army capable of securing it show up. popular uprising, took up with the mighty and growing Per- Nine thousand Athenian hoplites did in fact march on sian Empire. He committed to becoming its vassal should the Marathon, joined en route by another thousand from the tiny Persian king, , reinstate him. Inspired by the city of Plataea. The allied Greeks took up positions on high Athenian example and related to Athens by blood, Ionian ground overlooking the Persians. They tied in with natural and man-made obstacles to confine Persian egress from the beaches and to limit the Persian options for cavalry maneuver. For five days, the two sides faced each other, both wary of the im- pending battle. The Greek hoplites were more heavily armored and more effective at close quarters than the Per- sians but were outnumbered by more than two to one and likely to be out- flanked if they descended to the open plains. The Persians had huge advan-

Hoplites of wield on a painted from the collection of the Athens Archeological Museum. Outnumbered two-to-one, the Greeks defeated Persian invaders at the Battle

Grant Mitchell of Marathon 2,500 years ago.

August 2010 I ARMY 85 The hoplites crashed into the Persian line and began hor- rific execution with their stout long spears and nimble short swords. On the flanks, lightly armored Persian subject troops were no match for the ferocity and mass of the Greek assault and soon fled. In the center, the Persians had better luck against thinner Greek ranks, but this produced a trap as the rapidly advancing Greek flanks swept away the op- position to their front and then turned in on the center. The result was a classic double envelopment, pressing the trapped Persian center into an ever smaller space. More than 6,000 Persians died, as compared to 192 Athenians. The surviving Persians hastily reembarked and fled by sea. The victorious Athenians then force-marched back to Athens, reaching the city before the Persians at sea could. Legend holds that Philippides sped ahead of the returning Athenians, reaching the city in time to tell of the triumph and hearten the inhabitants to hold out until their victori- ous army returned. A variant holds that Philippides had al- ready made a run to and from before the battle,

Ken Russell Salvador fought in the battle itself and, exhausted by the final 26 , the general who orchestrated the Athenian miles, died on the spot. Decisively defeated and checked at victory at Marathon, offered a inscribed with his all points, the Persian host withdrew across the Aegean. name as a sacrifice to the temple of Zeus at Olympia. en years later, the Persians returned with an even tages with respect to numbers, archery firepower and cav- Tgrander army, but they faced a different Greece. alry, but would forfeit these in an uphill assault into the re- Democracy was firmly ascendant in Athens, and its citi- stricted terrain occupied by the Athenians. Time could have zens had used the time to construct a formidable navy favored the Athenians, as the Spartans had committed to re- rowed by free men. Other Greeks rose to the Athenian ex- inforce them once a critical religious festival of theirs was ample. Spartans valiantly defended , and over. Having fixed the Athenian army at Marathon, the Per- Greek city-states mobilized in ever larger numbers to op- sians reembarked a portion of their force after dark on Au- pose the invading Persians. Athens won a spectacular gust 11, intending to sail to Athens, link up with Hippias’ naval victory at Salamis; a year later, a vast coalition of confederates and overwhelm residual resistance. Elite Per- Greek armies won a smashing victory at Plataea. Hellenic sian cavalry seems to have been part of this contingent. civilization was saved. Democracy was saved. Greek na- The Persian move did not go unnoticed. The Greeks, in- tional identity was born. as we know it spired by the (general) Miltiades, resolved upon an was also born. immediate attack. They were still heavily outnumbered, Marathon became a textbook exposition for the princi- but the odds were more even and Persian cavalry less of an ples of war and the first in a long series of battles that de- issue. If they dawdled, Athens might fall behind them. Per- scribe the military history of the Western world. Indeed, sian archery remained an issue, so the Greeks resolved to many historians see an emergent Western way of war in race through the last 200 meters of their advance. Frontage the hoplite battles of ancient Greece: citizen-soldiers, uni- was also an issue, so the Greeks thinned their in formly shared risks, applied technology and a search for the center from eight to four ranks, leaving it eight ranks the singular decisive battle. We owe much to the deep on the flanks. The Persians had not expected the of Marathon, remembered imperfectly through the 2,500 much smaller Greek army to attack and were surprised years that distance them from us. Today’s marathoners are when the phalangites rolled over the ridge in battle array but a few of the many echoing their footsteps. ( and raced downhill upon them. Archery fire fell briefly and, by and large, ricocheted off Greek shields and armor. Recommended Reading: Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World, BG John S. Brown, USA Ret., was chief of military history at the Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: DaCapo Press, 1987) U.S. Army Center of Military History from December 1998 to October 2005. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, Grene, David, trans., Herodotus: The History (Chicago: in Iraq and Kuwait during the Gulf War and returned to The University of Chicago Press, 1987) Kuwait as commander of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Divi- Hanson, Victor Davis, The Western Way of War: Infantry sion, in 1995. He has a doctorate in history from Indiana Uni- Battle in (Berkeley, Calif.: University of versity. His book, Kevlar Legions: Army Transformation California Press, 2009) 1989–2005, is forthcoming.

86 ARMY I August 2010