IN

------.. _.- ~ Training Developments- COL DUDLEY M. ANDRES Armor Aviation COL GARY P. BERGERON Combat Developments COL ROBERT W. DeMONT

UNITS The Lightning Brigade COL NEAL T. JACO 1ST AIT/OSUT Brigade (Armor) COL ROBERT L. PHILLlnEr3 'To disseminate knowledge of the military arts and sciences, 4th Training Brig: 3de with special attention to mobility in ground warfare, to promote RT professional improvement of the Armor Community, and to COL DONALD L. SMA preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of 194th Armored Brigade Armor in the Army of the United States." COL FRED W. GREENE, 111 - ...._.-.. ...- published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army DY iviajor Jonn n. neymans, Lanaaian rorces, ana Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. Unless Mr. Michael Green otherwise stated, material does not represent policy, thinking, or endorse- ment by any agency of the US. Army. Use of appropriated funds for printing of this publication was approved by the 31 Armor Conference '83-Looking Ahead Department of the Army, 22 July 1981. ARMOR is not a copyrighted publication but may contain some articles which have been copyrighted by individual authors. Material which is not under 40 Economy of Force-The Cavalry Connection copyright may be reprinted if credit is given to ARMOR and the author. by Major Thomas A. Dials Permission to reprint copyrighted material must be obtained from the author.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES Individual sub- scriptions to ARMOR are available through the U.S. Armor Association. Post Office Box 607. Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121. Telephone (502) 942-8624. Domes- tic: $12.00 one year, $21.00 two years, $30.00 three years. Foreign: $18.00 one DEPARTMENTS year, $30.00 two years. Single copies, $2.00. 2 Letters 47 Professional Thoughts CORRESPONDENCE Address all cor- respondence to U.S. Army Armor Center, 5 Commander's Hatch 50 Recognition Quiz Answers ATTN: ATZK-MAG. Fort Knox, Kentucky, 40121. (Telephone: AUTOVON 464- 7 Driver's Seat 51 OPMSEPMS 2249/2610 or commercial (502) 8 Master Gunner's Corner 52 Books 624-224912610.) 9 Recognition Quiz 53 Steel on Target SECOND class postage paid at Fort Knox, Kentucky and additional mailing office.

ARMOR may be forwarded to military personnel whose change of address is caused by official orders (except at APO COVER addresses) without payment of additional postage. The subscriber must notify the post master. Since 1970, in a little known example of allied training cooperation, USPS 467-970 Canada has hosted German and British armor units in maneuver and July-AuguSt 1983 VOI XCII, NO. 4 gunnery training exercises at Canadian Forces Bases Shilo and Suffield. uear air. Captain Houle cites the many close air tanks are not supposea IO operare inatvia- The 1983 Armor Conference was a good support assets available to ground forces ually. A logical solution is to park turret- one because it was a working conference in the recent Southeast Asia conflict. It is down, dismount, and observe. Sound, but on the present and future-not just a doubtful that Captain Houle is old enough not exactly my idea of a gunnery training rehash of past glories. to have served in that war, but I did three program, which is what we are supposed I have a suggestion that you may wish to tours. For that reason I think it behooves a to be doing in the first place. pursue. We talked about the future armor member of the ground force community to To further point out the fallacy of Major force as the Close Combat Force Heavy point out the reality of close air support to Blackburn’s concept, I draw attention to (CCFH); the heavy brigade the heavy the Captain. During this conflict Marine his claim that current main gun targets are force. I think heavy is the worst possible Air assets, trained and dedicated to close so far away that only luck, not skill, is adjective. Heavy connotes fat and expen- support of Army and Marine ground for- involved in hitting them. Yet the table in sive. Our naming armor forces heavy is ces, were placed under the command of figure 1 shows that all HEAT-TP-T like naming a boy Sue and not expecting the Air Force, subsequently being used for engagements are at 800-1.100 m. and him to have trouble. missions other than their primary one. I TPDS-T are no more than 2.000 m, with Our ARMOR Magazine is dedicated to don’t want to start a controversy or a feud most being even below 1,600 m. If an mounted combat-mounted forces in M7, with the Air Force, but the fact remains M60A7 crew cannot hit at those ranges M2,M3, attack helicopters, etc. The oppo- that Air Force close air support leaves with anything other than luck. then there is site of heavy is light. The opposite of much to be desired. something terribly wrong with someone’s mounted is dismounted. Enemy machines Captain Houle doesn’t have to sell us. gunnery program, and the commander have become the principle target of we are already believers: what he should had better look at getting back to basics mounted forces because their machines be doing is educating his Air Force col- like Tables I thru VI, and not worry about give them power and strength which must leagues and the Air Force generals on the challenging his crews. be destroyed or neutralized. value of good and timely close air support. Don’t get me wrong, now. Table Vlll is I remember my days in the Combat Over the years, if the Air Force had really not perfect. More realistic targets are fine. Developments Armor agency discussing been serious about close air support the The idea of moving targets towards the heavy and light combat. It was a hopeless attack helicopter might not have been firer is a great idea (not untried, in fact), pit. Yet, we are designated heavy forces. developed. but let’s not get so wrapped up in tactics I feel that with all the resources of the that we forget what we are trying to train Armor Association and the Armor Center MARTIN L. STEITZ for. Table IX is for tactics. Table Vlll is for and School we can come up with a better P.O. Box 612 gunnery. descriptive title of what we go to Congress Sneads Ferry, NC We can train tactics anytime. Gunnery for funds with than heavy. on the other hand is expensive, both in I watch other arms and services in my manpower and resources. Let’s set our DOD job pick their forces and equipment Disagrees With Changes priorities and learn to put steel on target, names and titles very carefully. There are to Table Vlll then worry about tactics. After all, a pla- a lot of attack things-no other heavy but toon of tanks maneuvering is just like a ours. Dear Sir: platoon of M88s, except that the M88’s Thanks again for a great Armor Confer- I most strongly disagree with Major make less noise when firing their weapons. ence and hope I have provided some food Blackburn’s argument for changing Table But our taxpayers (myself included) have for thought. VIII. He has missed the trees for the forest. paid a heck of a lot for some pretty nifty Table Vlll is a part of an overall gunnery fire control equipment in order to differen- DALE K. BRUDVIG program. Each table, I thru IX, is a pro- tiate an MBT from a 50-ton ram. In my Colonel, Armor gressive step, a building block, to be mas- opinion, we should learn to use that Office of the tered before going on to the next step. No equipment. Undersecretary of Defense one ever claimed that Table Vlll judged Washington, DC “Battlefield Proficiency.” Table Vlll is a CHESTER A. KOJRO standardized measure of a tank crew’s Captain, Armor ability to shoot quickly and accurately. Ft. Knox, KY Close Air Support Having met the standard, a crew is then ready for the next challenge: Table IX, Pla- Dear Sir: toon Battle Run. Add-on Armor Comments “Fight Early: an A-70 Pilot‘s Perspec- What Major Blackburn’s article proposes tive,” by Captain Edward H. Houle, USAF is basically an individual tank crew’s Table Dear Sir: was an excellent article. I agree with his lX. Each crew would go out, seek out pos- In reference to the recent article on concepts, however, ground forces would sible targets, identify them as friend or foe, Israeli add-on armor (See “The Puzzle of have been served better had this article engage accordingly, occupy defensive Israeli Add-on Armor” January-February been published in Air Force Magazine. and offensive firing positions, etc. A very 1983 ARMOR Magazine, Ed.), some inter- Ground force commanders have always ambitious program indeed, especially if esting theories were certainly presented. recognized the value of close air support, the crew might or might not be able to hit However, it would seem to me that the and have been willing to use it. Doubts the broad side of a barn while inside it. simplest solution-ordinary steel “boxes”- over the value of air power by ground for- I also question the scoring and realism is the most obvious, particularly when ces have centered around the ability of of such a senario. If a tank commander close examination of one of the Centur- strategic bombing and or interdiction uses terrain properly and can’t be engaged ions pictured reveals a definitely hollow

2 ARMOR july-august 1983 fixed, rigid A-frame affixed to the front of that promotion boards be utilized as reen- model of the M1970 orT-70 before 1967. Is some Centurion hulls. An edition of BORN listment boards because of the rank of the it not possible that this improved model IN BATTLE magazine first showed an A- convening authority and because of the (the T-64) was put into production as early frame-equipped Centurion operating in convenience of holding the board at the as 1966 or even 1965? Is it not also possi- conjunction with an engineer platoon, same time so that the soldiers desiring ble that the first batch of T-64‘s was fitted which led me to speculate that it was used reenlistment can be screened after all per- with the T-62’s 115-mm main gun, until as some sort of battering ram. sonnel going for promotion have been that new “Rapira 3” 125-mm gun became Another item of interest is a picture boarded. available and was refitted? This theory has which appeared in a recent issue of TIME been substantiated by several unclassified magazine which showed an Israeli M60A3 BRUCE B.G. CLARKE sources including Jane’s Armor and with what appeared to be an extended Lieutenant Colonel, Armor Artillery 1981-1982 and The Soviet War front slope, or, more likely, part of the 2/11 th Cavalry Machine. It appears that Mr. Zaloga may mine clearance roller attachment. have made the decision to base his theory In my opinion, the US.Army can learn a solely on the information provided by Mr. great deal from the Israeli Armor Corps Suvorov. because of their recent experience and Congratulations to Mr. Burniece and Mr. success. Anything they do should warrant Requests Regimental Recognition Hoven on their excellent article “Soviet our attention. Heavy Tanks.” (ARMOR March-April Dear Sir: 1983). I would, like to add a few comments The membership of this organization JEFF SPENADER to their discussion. The simularities eagerly awaits each issue of ARMOR which Specialist 4, between the British Chieftain MBT and the is distributed to all. read from cover to Friedberg, Germany T-64, while present to some degree, do not cover, and obviously used to our seem to be quite as remarkable as advantage. reported. The British influence on Soviet We have become particularly interested tank design will probably become appar- in the back covers and have formed a dis- ent with the introduction of the awaited play of all the back covers. We of the 1st future Soviet tank. The widely reported Reenlistment Boards Battalion, 127th Armor, New York Army “acquisition” of Chobham armor by the in 2/11th Cavalry National Guard, request that we be consi- Soviets, combined with some of the infor- dered for recognition in a future edition on mation which had previously been att- Dear Sir: the back cover of your fine magazine. ached to the T-80 MBT would seem to The following reenlistment board I realize that you must receive many indicate that a remarkable similarity will procedures are used by the 2d Squadron, such requests, however, we do have a exist between the future Soviet tank and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment to ensure request that we be placed on your list for the new British Challenger MBT. The T-64, that all soldiers receive full consideration recognition. when they apply for reenlistment. Our on the other hand, appears to be closely related to the American T-95 MBT which procedures may not be the “best,” but we FRANCIS J. BOWERS was developed between 1954 and 1961. feel that they are innovative and provide a Captain, Armor The T-95 mounted a variety of smooth- concept that other units may want to NYARNG adopt. bore main guns each firing APFSDS ammunition as well as having the latest The reenlistment board is used to help (Armor intends to continue its lineage ser- form of composite armor. This similarity is the Squadron reenlist only “quality sol- ies with Reserve Component units in the indeed remarkable. The ideas and con- diers,” and to establish a standing reen- future. Ed.) listment list, based on the merits of each cepts brought out by Mr. Burniece and Mr. soldier appearing before the board. It is Hoven. Le., the “T-85” with a welded turret conducted in much the same manner as a (an early look at the future Soviet tank?), promotion board, in terms of courtesies, the possible tank mounting of the 130-mm introductions, etc. However, the board Discussion of T-64 Continues cannon (along with the following possibil- screens more than just the individual’s ities of 130-mm APFSDS ammunition), recent duty performance. Dear Sir: and the possible role played by the T-64 in In order to enhance and specify the I am writing to offer some clarification as the Soviet tank plan; constitute the type of reenlistment guidelines set forth in interim well as some comments in regards to the thinking that is demanded to stay abreast change 121 to AR 601-280 the Squadron March-April 1983 ARMOR. I would like to of an ever-changing situation. has established a point system for reen- thank Mr. Zaloga for his remarks concern- listment boards and amplified the results ing my comments on the T-64 main battle JAMES M. WARFORD by publishing standing lists for P3 soldiers tank (MBT). Mr. Zaloga. however, failed to Captain, Armor desiring reenlistment. The point system discuss one very distinct possibility. While Ft. Hood, TX includes aptitude scores, military educa- Victor Suvorov states in his book The Lib- tion, civilian education, SOT scores, erators that his unit was the first to be awards, nonjudicial punishments, and equipped with the T-64 in 1967. adherence waiver‘s required, as well as the soldier’s to this year as being the debut of the Stratified Armor and military bearing, appearance and attitude. “actual T-64“ is nothing more than specu- The Light Tank A composite score is developed and a lation. Several sources including Interna- standing reenlistment list based on P1, P2, tional Defense Review have reported that Dear Sir: and P3 soldiers is published. Once this is the predecessor of the T-64 was identified In view of the general nonsuccess of the completed it is easy for the Reenlistment before the first public appearance of the so-called “light” tank, since WW II, the NCO to schedule good soldiers for reen- T-64 in 1965. This vehicle, known as the design of a “light” tank, based on the listment, because he merely has to follow M1970 or T-70 tank, has not only been needs of a rapid reaction force (RRF) that

ARMOR july-august 1983 3 &king a “lighi“ tank, but how it is made. camp was sent to a tank battalion to direct we are subjected to a combined air and A tank is a compact package of crew, them to bring fire on hostile tanks. When tank attack, too much time is required for armament, powertrain, fuel and ammuni- the officer returned he stated he had deli- the gunners to re-man their guns. tion, all boxed in armor. If the overall vered the message. When asked what he “17. The infantry still does not use all its weight is too high, armor is reduced or had said, he stated he had told the tanks to heavy weapons to the maximum. equipment is removed. The smaller the ‘Get on the beam.’ Other cases have been “18. Much more emphasis must be volume, the less armor weight is required, noted where junior officers, in telling a pla- placed on military courtesy, on dress, and and a lighter tank evolves. When this prin- toon or squad to make a movement, would on cleanliness. If a man is so lethargic that ciple is applied, however, to a “light” tank, say ‘Get over there and attack the enemy he fails to salute, he is so lethargic that he the result is an overall inadequately pro- in flank,’ instead of saying, ‘Move to such will fail to recognize an enemy. If he gets tected vehicle. and such a position and attack in such and himself dirty, he loses self-respect. Disci- The answer lies in stratified armor; Le., such a direction.’ pline is based on obedience. The best way critical elements (crew) have the highest “4. There is an almost universal failure to insure obedience is from the bottom. If degree of armor protection and the less to repeat orders back after they have been men salute properly, pay attention’to their important elements (weapons, powertrain, received. This failure is apt to, or almost dress, wear the clothes ordered, they will fuel, ammunition) have less armor protec- certain to, result in grave errors. carry out orders in battle. If they fail in tion. A priority system must be used. “5. On the defensive, there is still a ten- these respects, they will be negligent in The crew is the heart of the vehicle, the dency to occupy linear positions instead battle and will be killed to no effect. easiest to harm, and the most difficult to of occupying a group of coordinated, sup- “19. The self-propelled tank destroyer is replace. Therefore, a well-protected crew porting infantry cells. of very little value because it is less heavily is mandatory. The weapon system is the “6. There is far too little emphasis armored than a tank and has no greater next in importance and requires only placed on the hardening of men. I am sure mobility. The tactics of attempting to slightly less armor protection than does that all soldiers and officers should be able pursue tanks, at least so far as this country the crew. The powertrain ranks third in to run a mile with combat pack in 10 is concerned, are utterly inapplicable to importance and is armored accordingly. minutes.. . the realities of war. The tank destroyer If the crew is killed, the vehicle is out of “7. We are too slow in putting out mine- should use its mobility to find a position, action. If the weapon system is destroyed, fields and in wiring in positions for all- preferably on a reverse slope from which it the vehicle can be returned for repair. If around defense. More training should be can bring fire to bear when the tanks cross the powertrain is destroyed, the vehicle devoted to mine laying and mine removal. the fire range. Having found this position, can be abandoned and perhaps recovered “8. Emphasis must be placed on the fact it should withdraw to cover or a shadow, at a later time. that being surrounded is no reason to quit leaving dismounted observers on the Should the total weight still exceed that fighting. Troops must never surrender. crest. When the tanks aproach it should allowed, equipment, ammunition, fuel and “9. Junior officers lack self-confidence. re-occupy its position and be ready to fire. other components are given a lower level I believe that this can largely be inculcated In duels between tank and tank destroyers, of protection. Equipment is reduced when- through close-order drill because then it is the question of who gets in the first hit. ever possible rather than reducing armor. officers state facts and correct errors, the Usually there is only one shot fired. The Stratification of armor avoids the problem act of doing this produces self-confidence above criticism will be less applicable in of trading off on/y armor protection to on the part of the officer and confidence in Europe or in any other country where reduce weight. This same concept may the officer in the men. there is foliage. In this country there is well be applied to main battle tanks. “10. There is a tendency to deploy too none. The light tank has come a long way early and advance by rushes when not “20. Emphasis must be placed, in the since the WW I French Renault FT, but the under fire. The old axiom ‘hit the dirt’ is U.S., on maintaining intervals and distan- need for such a vehicle in today’s RRF being overplayed. Men should not lie ces between vehicles. No vehicle should, environment makes it imperative that down until they have received casualties. at any time, be within 75 yards of any other designers follow the stratification of armor “11. Owing to ourstill imperfect training vehicle. If this is prescribed as a minimum principle if they are to produce a viable, condition, we must take plenty of time to distance and interval, it will develop into light tank that is air transportable and cap- set up an attack. It takes at least 2 hours to normal intervals of 100 to 125 yards and able of holding its own against similar, or prepare an infantry battalion to execute a normal distances of 100 yards. If vehicles even larger, vehicles in combat. properly coordinated attack. Shoving are ever allowed to close up while on them in too soon produces useless losses. marches or maneuvers, they will do the ALFRED T. BOWEN “12. Security detachments must get out same in battle and it will entail their Major, Armor farther and must stay out at night. One destruction. Leavenworth, KS radio car well off the road, but where it can “21. More emphasis must be placed on see the road or where a crew member can preventive maintenance particularly oiling, observe the road from close quarters, can greasing, and tire pressure. send information which will be vital. “22. Violation of distance and interval Sidi Bou-Zid Follow-Up “13. The courage of our troops is still regulations or speed regulations must be too negative. They are fairly willing, in immediately punished by revoking the Dear Sir: most cases, to be killed but they are not license of the driver and reducing him to Regarding the Sidi Bou-Zid article sufficiently intent on killing. In the ,first the grade of basic private. (November-December 1982 ARMOR), the actions, new troops must receive aggres- “23. Officers who fail to maintain disci- lessons learned from the fighting in Tuni- sive leadership by all grades including pline, dress, distance, and speed regula- sia were published and distributed by general officers who must be seen in the tions should be fined to the limit under the Headquarters,Army Ground Forces, to the front line during action. 100th Article of War beginning the first day commanding generals of the various “14. In my opinion, our artillery goes they enter the service.” Commands and Centers in the U.S.. into positions too far back. It must be The message was found among the including the Chief of the Armored Force. taught that in order to inflict losses, it must papers of my father, First Lieutenant David The following deficiencies were noted: take losses. Forward positions are espe- W. Houston, N68 Tank Battalion, 6th “1. Battalion and company commanders cially necessary against tanks. Armored Division, 3d Army. fail to use runners and frequently fail to “15. Our ability to fight at night, as have runners with or near them. opposed to moving into position at night JACKIE R. HAMILTON “2. Little if any use is made of the for a dawn attack, is pitiably bad. We must Captain, Armor walkie-talkie radio. be taught to attack at night, executing the Bowling Green, KY

4 ARMOR july-august 1983 I stated in my opening article that we need to make everything but casualties can result. better use of our national capability in science and tech- Technology has created greater combat potential; there nology to improve our training. fore, technology must provide the training to exploit that Technology has been applied vigorously to solving bat- potential. tlefield related problems, but the use of technology to solve The training interaction which technology can give us training related problems has not kept pace. Early efforts will allow us to train the way we plan to fight: fully inte- to apply technology to solve training related problems grated, executing complex procedures by using checklists concentrated on lowering the cost of training, so we could instead of memory, and accomplishing basic maneuvers maintain the same proficiency in the face of dwindling in a wide variety of situations. Repetitive training, made monetary resources. Training at tasks more frequently economically feasible through simulation, will enable and more effectively to reach and maintain higher indi- crews and platoons to reach the levels of precision required vidual and crew task proficiency was also emphasized. by realistic armor standards. Simulators will allow the But that was not enough. programming of more realistic combat situations for this An old training concern has been brought into sharp training than has ever before been possible. focus-the need to train for tasks that are too dangerous or Our training must move away from the narrow, predict- too expensive to accomplish in peacetime. Mobility, agility, able, shooting gallery-type exercises of the past (although survivability, and lethality have all been increased by the these have a place for marksmanship training) toward introduction of new weapon systems. The task that was battletype exercises. That requires the application of sim- too dangerous or too expensive has become even more ulator technology, for you can’t shoot live rounds at one dangerous and more expensive. We are moving farther another to get realistic combat training. The Multiple and faster and shooting more lethal and costly rounds- Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) goes a day and night. It is in the area of these dangerous and long way toward achieving this realism, but does not take expensivebtrain tasks that we must look to new ways of into account all the fadors that would enter into a real accomplishing our training mission. battle engagement. It is simply too easy to get a hit, and If we do not changeand improve-our way of training, MILES does not require the crew to do everything that we will waste our increased combat potential and that must be done in a real battle situation. cannot be allowed to happen. This increased combat effec- In our search for technological solutions to training tiveness remains only a potential unless and until soldiers problems we are looking at both short- and long-term solu- are trained in exploiting the attributes of the new equip tions. For the former, we are using the MILES as a basis ment in battle. In almost every case, that exploitation is to for turning the tank into a full-crew interaction simulator be achieved by harmonious interaction of crew members, (FCIS). To do this, two things are necessary-adding the crews, platoons, companies and battalions. We must train capability for the loader to perform his combat tasks and for battletype interactions, complicated by stress and interact with the rest of the crew, and adding an objective other battle factors. By adding, through simulation, the gunnery evaluation capability to refine the MILES capability of training interaction from crew interaction engagement. We are now involved in building and testing through intraplatoon and, platoon-versus-platoon and such a combination. larger units, the capability of realistic battle action with For the long-term solution, we are looking at a tank-

ARMOR july-august 1983 5 appended, precision gunnery training system. One such U-COFT and other simulators. They do, however, provide development project is called the Tank Weapon Gunnery the inkesting and repetitive training for those tasks in Simulation System (”WGSS) that not only incorporates which soldiers experience rapid skill decay. Current video all aspects of the gunnery problem but also provides an disc, microcomputer, and video arcade technology can fill objective evaluation and a record of engagements. The those needs. Trainers for gunnery tasks have been deve project may require a completely new technological devel- loped for testing and could be fielded by late fiscal year opment, but it is more likely to be a product improvement 1984. or a modification of an existing laser device. In any case, Many platoon leaders, and their platoons, have been lost we want to carry the FCIS concept as far as we can afford- in battle before they gain battle experience. Tactical exer- ably go. TWGSS, and a loader interaction device, should cises provide some of the necessary training, but they are do this. Tanks so equipped can be used for the whole range 50 difficult and expensive to set up and run that they can- of training from engagement of targets on ranges (or even not be conducted often enough. Additionally, the wide var- in motor pools) to intensive combined arms battles against iety of possible battle situations cannot be adequately a freeplay opposing force. practiced in these exercises. An alternative way to train When we say “range” in connection with TWGSS/FcIs, with as many of the expected battlefield factors present as an entirely new vista opens. The TWGSS can be used for possible is needed. An example of this type of training gunnery training on “standard” ranges when the targets would require the platoon leader to maneuver the platoon are equipped with detectors, but such a range is not under both direct and indirect fire, use the platoon and required. Any terrain where targets can be set up in a company communication nets, cope with NBC conditions, Threat scenario will do. More importantly, the FCIS with read maps and navigate, react to changes in orders, fight either MILES or TWGSS will be used in controlled force his own tank as well as direct the fire of other tanks, and on-force engagements in any environment, from a “pos- so on. tage stamp” to a larger maneuver area Terrain will be Th~arereal-lifeproblemsandweareworlcingwiththe selected for its suitability for teaching exploitation of Army Research Institute to explore the technology and mobility and agility, not for tiring safety considerations. define the requirements to meet them. The training prob Along these lines, we are also exploring the applications lems we expect to solve with such a device center on the of new technology to training in the areas of targets, command and control of the platoon on the ‘‘dirty“ battle stand-alone simulators, and “tabletop” trainers. A brief field. Computer voicegeneration and recognition circuitry account of what is being done in these areas follows: will be necessary to enable the platoon leader to interact Targets. Some improved targets have been fielded and with his simulated tank commanders and his company an interim thermal target is in the process of being fielded. commander. Such a trainer could be expanded to four sta- We are aiming for targets that are more realistic in looks, tions to bring each of the tank commanders into play. action, and in their reaction to j5-e In addition to improved Helmet-mounted visual systems would permit this to take stationary and moving targets for gunnery ranges, there is place around a table. The immediate result will be a pla- the field of “intelligent” targets for tactical training in both toon leader more competent and confident in his duties scenariocontrolled and freeplay exercises. The initial pm and one able to use field tactical exercises to confirm and duct to permit this is the visual modification kit (VIS- further hone his expertise. The result will be survival and MOD). The VISMOD changes the appearance of a U.S. victory on the battlefield. vehicle to that of a Threat vehicle such as the 2’72, BMP or MILES has given us an improvement in our tactical the BRDM. VISMODS based on the M551 are now in use training capability. But from this quick look at training at the National Training Center, and VISMODS based on device developments, you can see that we anticipate even the M113 and M880 are being fielded for army-wide use. greater improvement as new technology moves from the They can maneuver the way a Threat vehicle would, pm lab, off the assembly line, and into the field. The soldier, vide battlefield visual cueing, ie,Threat, not U.S. vehicle, the trainer, and the commander will have a wide spectrum and permit training to shoot for areas of vulnerability of equipment to overcome time, range, cost, and boredom when the targets are close. We are also expecting robotics problems in current tactical and gunnery training. This technology to be especially productive in developing eva- equipment will also make training more challenging, sive, freemoving, programed-action targets for gunnery interesting, and effective, and will permit it to be con- ranges. With the products of current target technology, ducted more frequently in classrooms, in the motor pool, VISMODS, and the future robotics, we will be able to put on the range, and in the field. together realistic opposing force scenarios. We must all strive to increase our combat readiness by Simulators. A significant effort has been made in this using enhanced technology to improve training. As I said area with the Unit Conduct of F’ire Trainer (U-COFT), in my first article, the bottom line remains steel on target which will be fielded in fiscal year 1985. The U-COFI’uses but that can’t be a cop-out for lousy training when the steel computer image generation and training scenario control islimited. to create a system of standard, but progressive, tank com- Forge the thunderbolt^ mander and gunner exercises. The U-COIT will be fielded at battalion level for sustainment of gunnery proficiency and represents a major step forward in off-theequipment training. It also represents a major step forward in creat- n ing forcewide gunnery standardization by measuring and certifying gunnery proficiency levels. It will also reinforce the need for the precise execution of procedures,just as the tank itself does. Tabletop Trainers. Simulators in this category are cheaper to build and maintain than the U-COFl’ and can be used at company level for frequent, even daily, training. But, they do not have the variety of exercises, nor the completeness of function possessed by the more complex

6 ARMOR july-august 1983 CSM John W. Gillis Command Sergeant Major US. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox

Whaf Is Our Number One Problem?

A few days ago, I found myself taking one of those ments resuited in the National Color being third in line, infamous Army surveys where the selection to do so is a not the position of honor. Once again, if you consider only result of being unfortunate enough to have the wrong the members of the Color Guard, you could question the numerals in the last part of your social security number. quality of the junior noncommissioned officer. However, a Like many others who have been around for a while and first sergeant was responsible for training the Color who have taken many of these surveys, I found the ques- Guard. That may cause the quality of the senior noncom- tions familiar and my answers almost automatic. Moving missioned officer corps to be questioned. rapidly through the survey, I came to the question: “In To take this even further, it was assumed that this first your opinion, what is the number one problem in your sergeant had received training on how to Post the Colors. unit?’ I found my pencil moving automatically to the As he obviously had not (from his senior noncommis- answer I knew would be on the sheet and started to sioned officer trainer), the quality of the senior NCO could blacken in the circle that stated my answer to be the qual- definitely be questioned. ity of the junior noncommissioned officers. After all, that At another indoor formal social event that included only had been my answer in the past, and for what I had master sergeants and above, the Posting of the Colors was always considered good logical reasons. also incorrect. Additionally, many were not wearing name This time however, I hesitated. I thought about all the plates with their dress blue uniforms, and several had their surveys where I had answered this same question this US. and branch insignia, as well as their decorations, same way and wondered why it was still true. After much incorrectly placed on their uniforms. additional thought, I decided it was not true! I then moved When conducting E5 and E6 promotion boards, I require my pencil to another answer that is always included with the noncommissioned officer of the individual appearing this question and blackened in the circle that stated my before the board to appear with his soldier. In many cases, answer to be the quality of the senior noncommissioned particularly on the E6 promotion boards, this is a senior officers. Let me relate some examples of why I answered noncommissioned officer. I initiated this because of the this question the way I did. many uniform discrepancies of those appearing for pru- At a recent ceremony that included Retreat, I was stand- motion recommendation. Without fail, if the junior non- ing behind a group of military spectators. Directly in front commissioned officer appearing before the board has a of me was a young sergeant. As Retreat was sounded, the uniform discrepancy, you can look over at his senior NCO sergeant hesitated for a moment, looked quickly to both leader and find the same discrepancy, sides, then observing the senior noncommissioned officer What I have stated through the examples above must be in front of him at the position of parade rest, assumed that taken in the proper context. It relates only to the question position himself. Because this sergeant did not know that cited within the survey. The quality of the Army’s Non- the correct position when Retreat is sounded is that of commissioned Officer Corps is not in question as it has attention, the quality of the junior noncommissioned been determined to be better than ever before. The point I officer could be questioned. However, the fact that he did have tied to make is that if your answer to the number not know the correct position raises the question of the one problem in your unit is the quality of the junior non- quality of his trainer, the senior noncommissioned officer. commissioned officer, you should ask why. You may dis- The example he followed does the same. cover that your dissatisfaction with that quality is because I recently attended an indoor social event that included the quality of their training is not all it should be. You may the Posting of the Colors. The Color Guard consisted of all find that the necessary attention to detail required in their sergeants with a staff sergeant as the Color Guard Ser- training has not been sufficiently provided by their train- geant. The Color Guard entered in single file with the ers. If you determine that to be the case, then maybe some National Color being the first Color in line, the proper of us have been pointing our finger in the wrong direction honor position. However, when they formed on line, in and should point to ourselves. . .the senior noncommissi- front of the individual receiving the Colors, their move. oned officers. . .the trainers! It’s worth thinking about.

ARMOR july-august 1983 7 Thomas P. Currie Master Sergeant, USA Master Gunner, Readiness Group, Atlanta

Improving Performance of the M219

Many M48A5 tank crews lack confidence in their M219 mechanical faults, but still does not feed well, two addi- coaxially-mounted machinegun. As a result, some tank tional steps will often solve the problem. Rotating the commanders elect to use their own or the loader’s pintle machinegun about 15 degrees clockwise from vertical will mounted M60 machinegun in preference to the coax. slightly improve the feeding angle. Raising the level of the Although the pintlemounted machineguns are excellent ammunition in the ammunition box reduces the effort for area targets, they lack the steady mounting and preci- required to pull the ammunition into the gun. This can be sion sights needed for effective point target engagements. done by building up a temporary filler for the ammunition The continual preference for the M60 results in inadequate box when only a limited amount of ammunition is being training of gunners and loaders in using and maintaining loaded, such as on a tank range. Two layers of cardboard the coax machinegun. from 7.62-mm ammunition cartons can be used for this In a few units this problem has reached the level where purpose. Some masking tape is then used to cover the gaps crews are failing to even mount the M219. Admittedly the in the top layer. A more durable platform of plywood, M219 is not as reliable as the M240 machinegun mounted fiberglass, or plastic can be fabricated, but care is needed on M6O-series tanks or the M60 pintlemounted machine in designing such a platform to insure that it will fit guns on the M48A5. However, its superiority against point through the limited space available above the M48A58 targets (especially moving point targets), combined with curved ammunition box. the fact that it is the only machinegun on the M48A5 that When M219s are properly maintained, lubricated, can be fired from under armor with the hatches closed, mounted, and loaded, the majority of them will fire make it an essential part of the tank’s armament. Crews acceptably. must train to use the M219 effectively. Technique of fire is also important with the M219. Like Proper maintenance is the first step in improving the nearly all machineguns that fire from the open bolt, this performance of the M219. Barrels and barrel jackets must weapon is designed to fire 20- to 25round bursts. Short be free of carbon fouling if the gun is to fire dependably. bursts, especially the 3- to-5 round “sighting” bursts that Soaking the barrel and jacket in carbon removing com- many tankers learned to use on the .50-caliber M2, cause pound (CR) must be routine after-firing maintenance for excessive wear and almost always produce stoppages. this weapon. Whenever M219’s are drawn from a multi- Excessively long bursts can cause overheating and other user facility, they should be carefully checked for carbon problems in the M219, but this error is neither as common fouling before firing. Adequate, but not excessive, lubrica- nor as serious as the short burst. Basically, the gunner tion of the receiver and cover is also important. With the should hold the trigger until he has seen four or five tracers M219 properly maintained and lubricated, there are still fired. Loaders must know how to apply the proper imme several steps that the tank crew can take to further &ate action procedures listed in the tank operator’s man- improve its performance. ual to remedy stoppages in the M219. The M219 must be solidly mounted in its bracket so it The decision as to which weapon to use for any target will not move when being fired. Lock washers on the must, of course, be made by the tank commander. Like mounting collar bolts are essential. An improvised tool wise, it is the tank commander’s prerogative to cease fire consisting of a short piece of %-inch Allen wrench, which with one weapon and reengage with another during an is used with a regular %-inch socket and ratchet is much engagement. Thus, even in the event of a coax ma- more efficient for tightening the collar mounting bolts chinegun stoppage, the TC can always switch to his own than the regular %-inchAllen wrench included in the tank or the loader’s pintlemounted machinegun. This flexibility basic issue items. is one of the strengths of the M48A5 tank and crews must Many M219s have feeding problems. Armorers should be encouraged not to give up that flexibility by abandon- carefully check the feed and holding pawl springs and all ing the M219 just because it requires a little tender loving moving parts for nicks or burrs. If the machinegun has no care.

8 ARMOR july-august 1983

The First by Colonel Thorn

In direct contrast to the lightning- be set up at once. We will have of organization or equipment.” Two of like thrusts of U.S. armored divisions material.”’ these units, the 192d GHQ Tank Bat- across France and Germany during In October 1940, General Chaffee talion (Light), and the 194th GHQ the last year of WW 11, the first U.S. wrote to Major General William Tank Battalion (Light), along with tank action was a slow, difficult, retro- Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, repeat- the 17th Ordnance Company (Armor- grade movement on the opposite side ing his plea for “prompt formation of ed ), would soon become the Provi- of the world in the Phillipines. efficient GHQ Reserve Tank Battal- sional Tank Group, U.S. Army Forces In July, 1940, there was only one ion~.’’~It was his proposal to use 18 in the Far East (USAFFE). Reserve tank battalion, the 70th scattered National Guard tank com- After the formation of USAFFE in General Headquarters (GHQ)Reserve panies to provide personnel for the August 1941, General Douglas Mac- Tank Battalion (Medium) stationed at immediate formation of 4 tank battal- Arthur, then commanding, had asked Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. It ions, with training of cadres for 10 for an armored division. However, the was sadly lacking in personnel. more battalions to begin soon. Provisional Tank Group was to be the When news came to Major General General Chaffee’s work resulted in only armor in USAFFE and its Adna R. Chaffee that the War the first of these additional battalions nucleus was never augmented al- Department planned to use many being formed about 1 month later though a medium GHQ tank battal- similar units as special task forces, when, on 25 November 1940, the 192d ion had been completely equipped and although they had made no provision GHQ Tank Battalion was inducted was on 48-hour standby for departure for their organization, the “Father of into Federal service at Fort Knox, for the Phillipines when its orders the Armored Force” could foresee that Kentucky. Three more battalions were cancelled on 10 December 1941. without authorization for these were soon organized the 193d at Fort Furthermore, the Group would have reserve units, his armored divisions Benning, Georgia, on 6 January 1941; little time for training before embark- would be chopped to pieces to supply the 194th at Fort Lewis, Washington, ing for the Phillipines. The 192d GHQ them and he dispatched a letter of on 22 January 1941; and the 191st at Tank Battalion from General Sylves- protest to Chief of Staff Marshall. Fort Meade, Maryland, on 3 February ter’s 1st Tank Group at Fort Benning, “So, already they are contemplating 1941. Georgia, had carried out a defensive breaking up our divisions to fritter Inasmuch as these battalions were role in the 1941 Louisiana maneuvers. them away for small purposes,” he only expected to be in Federal service The 194th GHQ Tank Battalion had wrote indignantly. “G-3 has set up no for 1 year, no attempt was made to come from the West Coast where it additional GHQ Reserve tank battal- standardize them or to make them had been taking part in minor ions so far. At least four more should conform with any established tables maneuvers with, what was at that

10 ARMOR july-august 1983 ,ction in WW II oley, USA (Retired) time, Fourth -Army. Both battalions the new radios, to remove the right limited reconnaissance work as far had worked during this maneuver sponson gun to make space, and to north as Lingayen and Baguio, the period with early models of the MI spot weld armor over the gun port. Philippine summer capital. light tank. The 194th was assigned to Fort The Provisional Tank Group, The first of the units to arrive in the Stotsenberg adjacent to Clark Field, USAFFE, was organized on 21 Far East, the 194th tank battalion in Pampanga Province. Before the November 1941. Eight days later on and 17th Ordnance Company (Ar- group commander arrived, this unit 29 November, the 17th Ordnance mored), reached Manila on 26 Sep undertook limited reconnaissance in Company (Armored) was assigned to tember 1941. One tank company of North Luzon. It did not accomplish the group at Fort Stotsenberg. this battalion and a part of the any firing problems nor cross-country On 27 November, a general alert battalion headquarters company had driving as no ranges, fuel, or ammu- had been sounded for all forces in the been detached to Alaska. Upon nition were released for these purposes. Philippines, but for some reason or movement to Port of Embarkation, The group commander, Brigadier through the oversight of someone, the this battalion (as was the 192d later) General, (then Colonel) James R. N. tank units were not included in the was reequipped with new M3 light Weaver, with Headquarters and warnings. However, the commanding tanks and half-tracks. The armament Group Headquaters Detachment and officer of Clark Field had been of these new tanks was strange to the the 192d GHQ Tank Battalion (Light) ordered by Far East Air Force (FEAF) personnel. The M3 had for its main arrived in Manila on 20 November to execute two alerts, one by day-one battery the 37-mm gun with a -30 1941. The headquarters detachment by night, before 2 December, and the caliber machinegun coaxially mount- consisted of 10 enlisted men, no tanks, tank group had been asked to partici- ed in the turret. The two fixed spon- two half-tracks, two 2-way radios, two pate, and on 1 December moved into son guns (fired by remote control by %ton command and reconnaissance battle positions for the defense of the driver) and the antiaircraft (C&R) cars, one sedan, and no Clark Field. machinegun were all new to the trUcks.4 These units were also sta- The general change in commands crews. This light tank was heavier tioned at Fort Stotsenberg and were which became effective about 22 and longer, had better flotation, and housed in tents pending completion of November, may have contributed to was equipped with radio facilities that semipermanent housing to be built of the disrupted communication chan- were different from those of the M1. sawali, a siding for houses and build- nels: FEAF, North Luzon Force, So little time and direction had been ings made by the natives who wove South Luzon Force, and The Philip possible before departure that the unit %inch reeds onto a bamboo frame. pine Division, all had new command- had thought it necessary, in installing The only training at this time was ers. On 28 November, when General

ARMOR july-august 1983 11 01 a cnieI or scan, KWO oincers in me wnicn were guuu uiiiy iui cuuiiei sei- G3 section and one in the G-2 section. vice. The general situation was not withdrawal with a series of leapfrog In the chain of command, the Pre clear, but reports indicated that two actions. visional Tank Group was a separate companies of the 11th Philippine Later that day the tanks were tactical command under the com- Army Division were engaged north of deployed to the north and west of manding general, USAFFE, and was Damortis. Elements of the 26th Rosario but the rapidly developing associated with the General Reserve Cavalry were enroute from Rosario to situation caused the Commanding only for administrative reports. The the point of contact but, as witnessed General of the 71st Philippine Army major unit of this reserve was the Phi- by the writer, the horse troops were at Division to order all elements south of lippine Division. the mercy of enemy fighter-bombers. the Bued River bridge, which was An enemy motorized unit was burned in the face of advancing Jap Clark Field Attacked! reported approaching Damortis and anese tanks and cyclists. (See “26th On 8 December, (7 December in the General Wainwright asked the tank Cavalry in the Philippines, ARMOR US.) when the news of the Pearl commander, “What can you do?’ Jan-Feb 1983. Ed.) Harbor attack was received, the crews Resupply gas had not yet arrived, The 192d at this time was deployed were at their tanks, and at 0830 the but the company fuel resources were to the east of Highway 3, and on 24 word was passed that Japanese pooled and a single tank platoon was December, because of the dire straits planes were 40 minutes away. Final gassed up and sent to contact the of the North Luzon Force, the 194th checks were made as the men stood enemy reportedly moving on Damor- Battalion (less Company C) was sent by, but no attack came. However, at tis. This platoon was commanded by from the south of Manila to the west 1230, while the noon meal was being Lieutenant Morin. flank of the arterial highway. served, a surprise attack was made on About this time a British ship, Clark Field. Bombers at about 20,000 First Tank-versus-Tank Action which had been unable to reach Sing- feet accurately blasted Air Force The platoon did not encounter apore, put in to Manila and from its installations throughout the Stotsen- opposition as they moved north out of holds came potential augmentation berg area. The tank weapons were of Damortis and they continued on to for the tank group. Some 40 Bren gun no use until the strafers came in low Agoo. There they met an enemy tank carriers were made available and the immediately after the bombing. In unit on the road and the first U.S. initial plan called for organization of this action Technical Sergeant tank-versus-tank action occured in two companies. Bren machineguns Temon “Bud” Bardowski, B/192d is WW 11. The enemy tanks were of low were not available, but ordnance was credited with the first enemy plane silhouette, had no turrets, and with to arm the carriers with either .5@ brought down by a U.S. armored unit sloped sides so that penetration was caliber or -30-caliber Browning in WW II. (The htarmored soldier to difficult to achieve. On the other machineguns. Had this organization die in combat in WW I1 was Private hand, their 47-mm gun was quite been completed, the tanks would have Brooks of Company D, 194th. (Brooks effective against our tanks with their been strengthened by a much-needed Field, the main parade ground at Fort perpendicular sides and high profiles- economy force capable of carrying out Knox, KY is named in his honor. Ed.) points that had caused their rejection both reconnaissance and security After the attack, the tanks were by our allies before the war. Lieuten- roles. Notice of the impending enemy redeployed, with the 194th moving ant Morin’s tank, which had left the landings in the Lingayen Gulf area, about 3 kilometers northeast and the road in an attempt to maneuver, was and subsequent moves of the tanks, 192d spreading out to more fully pre hit and caught fire. This was the iirst halted this augmentation. Eventually tect the relatively unbroken terrain to U.S. tank lost in tank-versus-tank all carriers were armed-Those oper- the south of the Meld. action in WW 11. It was later deter- ating with tank units, with salvaged There were two more air attacks, on mined that the crew survived and was guns from tank casualties. About 20 10 and 13 December, but the group captured, making them the first of the carriers were kept with the tank losses amounted to only one half- armored force POWs in WW II. The group and the remainder were sent to track destroyed and two men wounded. other four tanks were all hit but were the Philippine Army divisions and to During this time, tankers brought in able to pull out, one under tow. How- the 26th Cavalry. The latter group of the first prisoners of war, who were ever, they were all lost later in the day Bren carriers, commanded by a Vet- apparently Japanese naval aviators. to bombings and mechanical mishaps. erinary Officer, did noble work With landings imminent in South- The assistant driver of the platoon throughout the Bataan campaign. ern Luzon, the group headquarters sergeant’s tank, Private Henry Deck- Those carriers that were retained by moved to Manila and the 194th &, B/192d, had been decapitated the tank units did good work in emer- moved to an area north of Manila when a direct hit penetrated the for- gency supply runs and on cross- after having sent reconnaissance and ward deck at the ball and socket joint country reconnaissance patrols over liaison groups to the areas of Muntin- of the bow gun mounting. This man doubtful terrain before committing lupa, Nasugbu Bay, Balayan Bay, was the first armored soldier killed in tanks to action. It was soon found Battaangas Bay and east and north tank-versus-tank action in WW 11. that the heat-baked ground that gave around Lake Tad. Hits on enemy tanks with our 37-mm the appearance of good driving condi- After the tank group commander guns had been observed during the tions was only a crust that would not arrived, General Wainwright entered fight, but many of the shots were seen support the 4ton Bren carriers. Rosario. Movement of any kind was to ricochet off the sloping armor. hampered due to unopposed enemy Later, the situation around Damor- Tankers Move to Lingayen Gulf air activity, for after the airstrikes on tis decayed to such a degree that it At a staff conference at USAFFE 8 December, FEAF, on Luzon, con- was imperative that tanks be used to Headquarters on the evening of 21

12 ARMOR july-august 1983 was anticipated the enemy would were available. This point was of con- C/192d in a back-and-forth fight land a sizable force at first light. The cern to unit commanders due to the through the town, bagged eight Jap 192d was ordered to move up High- many malfunctions caused by broken anese medium tanks and prevented a way 3 for such supporting moves as complete rout of American and Fil- the battalion commander might Since the Orange Plan (the preWW ipino troops in the area. direct after his contact with the com- II operational plan covering the Phil- Another, more tragic, incident manding general, North Luzon Force ippines) was in effect, the mission occurred north of the Agno River (General Wainwright). assigned the Provisional Tank Group when, due to lack of coordination When the group commander arrived was to cover the withdrawal of the between units, 10 tanks had to be in the Lingayen Gulf area, he found Filipino-American Forces into the abandoned due to blown bridges and the company which had been dis- Bataan peninsula. There, the troops a hard-pressing enemy. patched before midnight, stranded at were to make a stand and await rein- The first phase of the hal action Rosario, out of gas. The tank com- forcements from the States. But the before the withdrawal into the pany commander reported that con- Philippines had already been written Bataan peninsula came in covering tradictory orders had prevented his off and the reinforcements never the Calumpit bridge position. At this refueling at Gerona and that his mis- came. junction, the last troops of the South sion had been changed to that of pro- Luzon Force joined the route of the viding cover for the rear elements of Tankers Prevent a Rout North Luzon Force. The Calumpit the 11th Philippine Army Division. The withdrawal plan called for a bridge was blown during the night of This instance of changed orders was retrograde movement to delaying 31 December-1 January. After the to be the case on several occasions in positions on four successive phase destruction of the bridge, the 192d the next few weeks due to the confu- lines (map 1, Lingayen Gulf to Clark was passed through the 194th, now sion and lack of coordination between Field). The tanks carried out this mis- reduced to about 30 tanks. Because of units of untrained troops and staffs. sion amid much confusion. Because of this reduction, Company A of the It is only fair to explain that all Phil- the tropical nature of the terrain, all 192d was attached to the 194th and ippine Army divisions were compara- units were instructed to plan each this force was to cover the retirement tively untrained and understrength. delay position to occupy all north- fkom the Calumpit junction to the Many of the troops had gone through south roads and at the same time they Layac Junction position. 5 months of Philippine military train- were to reconnoiter for exit routes that The attached company, in one ing but some had not even had this would tie in with Highways 3 and 5 instance, attempted a makeshift background. Also, some of the units (the two north-south axial roads). counterattack in the vicinity of Gua- that were now moving to contact with Tanks occupying positions on the gua with elements of the 11th Philip well-trained Japanese divisions, had main routes were ordered to pay par- pine Army Division. The infantry not been mobilized until after the dec- ticular attention to enemy mecha- elements at one time mistook our laration of war. nized units, and were given detailed tanks for the enemy and laid down No steel helmets or individual instructions on how to cover turns in very accurate mortar fire. They entrenching tools were available to the highway and to coordinate their repeated this tactic on the group

ARMOR july-august 1983 13 were reorganized, companies of the 194th being reduced from 17 to 10 tanks; platoons from five tanks to three. This same reduction was shortly to be imposed upon the 192d. Tank overhaul and maintenance was done by the 17th Ordnance Company (Armored) that carried out third- and fourth-echelon maintenance using ordnance stocks on South Bataan that had not been released before 8 December. For the first time since hostilities began, crews were fed from their own kitchens, but this luxury was dampened due to the ford reduction in supplies on 6 January, which placed all troops on half rations. Tanks Not Used Properly During this period, the lack of knowledge among the infantry com- manders of the characteristics, capa- bilities, and limitations of tanks was noted when requests were made for tanks to seek out and destroy snipers, flush Japanese troops hm sugar cane fields, and to make sorties in front of the MLR into areas that had been extensively mined by our own troops. The beach defense of the East coast was assumed on 28 January, and with it came contingency missions for the tank units: the 192d overwatched the north half of the East coast and was on call to support the western half of the I1 Corps front; the 194th was assigned the southern half of the beaches and was to provide sec- ondary support to the western half of 11 Corps. The difliculty in supporting any frontline unit was accentuated by commander's jeep as he attempted to the East Coast road and one attemp the narrowness of new trails. The old establish some sort of coordination. ted foray in the west (ICorps sector.) trails leading off the coast road were The tank company, by trail and cross- The covering action on the east was to dead-end avenues, originally having country travel, and with the eventual aid I1 Corps in pulling back after a been cut for timber operations. loss of three tanks, rejoined the 194th main effort was made by the Japanese On 1 February, composite platoons on Highway 7 at a point west of in the Abucay Hacienda area. of tanks and half-tracks were assigned Guagua The new and last main line of re- to each of three airfields that had On the afternoon of 5 January, C sistance (MLR) was along the Pilar- been built on the peninsula in antici- Company of the 194th supported by Bagac Road. pation of the reconstitution of local air four self-propelled 75s, ambushed an The action in the I Corps sedor was force units that were to have assisted enemy unit of about seven or eight an attempt to open up a road to extri- the beleaguered troops. hundred infantry, and caused losses cate the 1st Philippine Army Division Upon the request of the I Corps of about 50 percent. This group that had been cut off north of Bagac Commander, the 192d (less one com- worked continuously during the by a sizable infiltration of Japanese pany) was dispatched to the westem withdrawal at retrieving tank gas units. In this attempt, the lack of sector to support foot troops in erasing cached along the route. closein infantry protection and the three enemy pockets: The Tu01 pocket One other firefight marked the cleverly concealed Japanese road formed by the infiltration of Japanese covering action just before entry into mines caused the loss of two tanks units on the I Corps front before the Bataan. This engagement, with few and the eventual withdrawal of the MLR had been cleared and definitely casualties, lasted from 1430 to about foot troops, without their heavy established, and the Aglaloma and 1700 when the enemy withdrew. It is equipment, over a circuitous beach Anyasen pockets formed through the of particular interest only because it trail. uncoordinated Japanese landings in marked the first use of smoke by Jap Also, during this period, the bulk of their attempt to cut the main supply anese units. the tank units gained their first res- route (the West Coast road). The period from 6-26 January was pite since 8 December, in a bivouac The difficulties typical of these marked by further covering actions in area south of Pilar. The tank units actions can best be described by quot-

14 ARMOR july-august 1983 jungle wnerein tanK movement IYU, mecanK DaLLLilivn cvrnrnanuers LU ilia umipassiuii. IUU iuuvb had to be limited to the space were given the following order: “YOU obey his orders, await his plea- cumulativeley cleared by repeated will make plans, to be communicated sure, possess your souls in charges of a few yards each, Lt. to company commanders only, and be patience. The days are very long. Hay’s gallantry, persistence, and prepared to destroy within 1 hour Hours crawl by like paralytic complete disregard of personal after receipt by radio, or other means, centipedes. danger, in an entirely new phase of the word “CRASH, all tanks and “Moreover, the whole atmos- of tank warfare, preeminently combat vehicles, arms, ammunition, phere of prison, even the most contributed to the ultimate suc- gas, and radios: reserving sufficient easy and best-regulated prison, is cess of the tanks and troops trucks to close to rear echelons as odious. Companions quarrel which they supported.”G soon as ac~omplished.”~ about trifles, and get the least In the Tuol pocket, the tank- Decision To Surrender Is Made possible pleasure from each oth- infantry combination worked very At about 2230, 8 April, Major Gen- er’s society. You feel a constant effectively against the Japanese dug eral E.P. King, commanding Luzon humility in being fenced in by in around banyan trees, and Lieuten- Forces, announced that further re railings and wire, watched by ant Bianchi of the infantry company sistance would result in.the massacre armed men and webbed about was awarded the Congressional of the 6,000 sick and wounded in the with a tangle of regulations and Medal of Honor. Also in this action, area and of the 40,000 civilian refu- restricti~ns.”~ one US.tank was lost when its crew gees now congested closely about; ~ was. blinded by a Japanese flame that he was not in touch with any Footnotes troops that were still resisting behind thrower (the first used in the cam- 1 Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forging the Thun- paign) and the tank became wedged the closely drawn lines; that there derbolt, p. 195, Mllltary Service Publishing between two trees, which necessitated were less than 25 percent effective of Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1947. 2 Ibid. p. 195. abandonment. those in being; that at most he could 3 Ibid. p. 194-196. not expect to hold more than one more 4 Operations of the Provisional Tank Group, After the clearance of the pockets in United States Army Forces in Far East, the I Corps sector, the tank group day; that upon his, and his only, 19p1-1942. instituted a plan for a comprehensive responsibility, he would send a staff 3 Report of Operations of North Luzon Force and I Philippine Corps in the Defense of North instruction in tank-infantry tactics officer with a flag of surrender across Luzon and Bataan from 8 December 1941. 9 among Philippine Army troops, but the lines the next morning. When April 1942. fi Operations of the Provisions! Tank Group, this was limited, due to gas rationing asked by the tank group commander United1941-1942. States Army Forces in Far East, and lack of personnel. Although if any help was in prospect, General movement was at a minimum due to King could answer only, “No.” The 7 Ibid. 8 Winston Churchill, “A Roving Commis- lack of gasoline, ammunition was destruction of the main ordnance sion”, The Reader’s Digest, July, 1940. adequate and ordnance personnel dump was to commence at 2340. contributed to the effectiveness of the Troops were to destroy all arms and tanks by converting considerable ammunition and cease resistance at armor piercing (AP) 37-mm to high 0700,9 April 1942. explosive (HE) and cannister. These After the surrender, the tank group shells were much more useful in the commander and his staff were quiz- absence of enemy armor. After the zed several times by the Japanese and entry into Bataan, enemy tanks were from these investigations it was never observed in strength-never learned that the: more than three at one time-usually Japanese had feared most the less, and these only in April during artillery and the tanks. the last days of Bataan when US. Tanks, by their cordon coastal artillery and AT weapons had been guard, had caused the Japanese to virtually reduced to inaction. cancel an invasion from Manila Bay. On 3 April, the Japanese started Japanese had overestimated our their all-out offensive and as enemy tank strength by from 33 to 900 per- activity increased on the I1 Corps cent (158 to 1,080). COLONELTHOMAS DOOLEY, front, the 194th took on its contin- The Japanese had about 200 tanks, USA, (Ret.) was commissi- inferior to ours in armor, but better oned from Texas A&M in gency mission as its primary mission 1935. Prior to WW I1 he and moved its companies to support adapted to tropical terrain and better served with the 1st Cavalry the frontline units to the west of the armed with a very effective 47-mm Division. During the Philli- East Coast road. The 194th was later gun. (Report and recommendations pine campaign he was aide- supported by one company of the on armored equipment was radioed to de-camp to General Jona- 192d. The activities of the tank units the War Department, by direction, than Wainwright and was a in the next five days, with the resul- sometime after the withdrawal to POW from 1942 to 1945. He tant confusion of untrained, half-fed, Bataan.) attended the Armor Officer malaria-ridden troops attacked by a These were the actions and circum- Advance Course in 1948 and stances that brought the members of later was Chief of Staff, US. superiorly-equipped, better-trained, Army Armor Center, Ft. better-organized enemy, can hardly the Provisional Tank Group, USAFFE, Knox. KY until his retirement be given in detail. Suffice it to say that to that state, which is so ably de in March 1969. the tank units supported the infantry scribed by Mr. Winston Churchill as:

MMUR july-august 1983 15 Improving Combat Crew Survivability by Donald R. Kennedy Photos courtesy FMC

There has been much criticism of the new U.S. armored from any azimuth, ” or that overhead protection must be vehicles in the open media. Some is perhaps justified, but such that the probability of penetration by the fragments for the most part, it often contains overstatements made from a specified largdiber artillery shell detonated by writers armed with a few random facts1 The writers overhead at X meters shall be no more than Y percent. often cite extreme and infrequent examples to make a pub In the case of the main battle tank, the protection from lic case for killing the new vehicle programs instead of frontal, flat-fire attack must be very heavy to prevent the making the constructive case to obtain needed support and opposing tank gun’s high-velocity, kinetic-energy (KE) guidance to make our new vehicles the best in their class. penetrator from defeating the hull or turret from the azi- The current public controversy over the Bradley fighting muths most likely to be involved during battle. Because vehicles (BFV) attacking their cost, their size, their the armor system weight is so great for such levels of pre vulnerability, and their “explosive” aluminum armor is an tection, the remainder of the tank’s protection is specified example of such unwarranted overreaction. to be sufficient to prevent or minimize the probability of It is one of the objectives of this article to present the real penetration by less powerful threats. The Bradley and situation concerning the vulnerability and survivability M113 ApCs are not, for example, designed to “ride into issues. battle alongside tanks.” They are designed to transport This discussion concerns friendly armor vulnerability infantry and provide protection for the occupants from . . .in this instance, what might happen to the crew and small arms and shell fragments. The Bradley provides an troops in an armored combat vehicle if the armor system is under-armor capability for fighting opposing infantry, penetrated and, more importantly, what measures can be and when in protected positions, defending against tanks. taken today to ensure maximum survivability of both the Clearly it is not possible to provide immunity to every- crew and the vehicle in the event of such a penetration. thing in the antiarmor designer’s bag-of-tricks. Therefore, Most armored combat vehicles employ armor systems the questions are: What happens when the threat defeats designed to provide protection from a specified threat and the armor system? Is it necessarily a catastrophe? from a specified direction of attack. For example, an We have all seen photographs of tanks and AFCs armored personnel carrier’s (APC) armor system might be knocked out in combat. Often there is little if any visible specified to require “95% probability that an X-caliber damage, sometimes a small hole is visible resulting from a armor-piercing projectile traveling at a velocity of Y meters penetration by either a highexplosive, antitank (HEAT) per second (or from a range of 2 meters) will not penetrate (shaped-charge) or KE munition. The question is: What

16 ARMOR july-august 1983 mechanism and the materials it introduces into the target. Armor Paces the Defeat Mechanisms Briefly, the effects produced behind armor by HEAT (and At the outset of the WW 11, armor systems were limited to a similar, but reduced, extent by KE) mechanisms to protection against projectiles, ranging from .50-caliber include the following: armor-piercing (AP) to a maximum of 37-mm, depending The production of an expanding cone of fragments on the type of vehicle and the developing country. Tank originating from both the armor and the penetrator. The armor thicknesses increased rapidly as the threat fragments are in a wide range of sizes from dust to large munitions became more powerful, both as a result of the chunks, with velocities from a few hundred to several adaption of high-velocity antiaircraft cannon to antitank thousands of feet per second (ft/sec). In a normal (perpen- guns, (e.g., German 88mm PAK, U.S. 90-mm), and, of even dicular) attack, the cone may typically have an included greater significance, the introduction of the shaped charge angle of 90-110 degrees. The fragments can be likened to by the German Army in 1940.4 The Germandeveloped the subsurface burst of an explosive grenade within the Panzerfaust, the British PLAT, the U.S. 2.36-inch Bazooka, vehicle with the quantity of fragments being a direct func- and many similar weapons based on the shaped-charge tion of the size (caliber) of the armor-defeating mechanism principle, later made it possible for the infantryman to and the diameter of the tale made by the penetrator on the defeat heavy armor. The direct result was increased thick- interior wall.7 The thickness of the armor does not neces- ness and complexity of armor systems to defeat the sarily correlate with the quantity of metal produced behind shaped-charge threat. The increasing weight and cost of the armor. The Bradley and M113 mors,for example, are the combat tank was the natural consequence of the con- different; the effects produced by a given weapon behind tinued race between the armor designer and the antiarmor the Bradley’s armor may be less than those produced by munitions designers. the same weapon behind M113 armor. During the Korean War, the Naval Ordnance Test Sta- Depending on shaped-charge liner material (such as tion (NOTS) (now the Naval Weapons Center (NWC)) at copper, steel, aluminum, etc.), size and type of ammuni- China Lake, CA, developed from scratch and fielded in the tion, and point of attack (e.g., belly, side, top), the penetra- remarkable time of only 19 days, a 6.5inch air-to-surface tion event may be accompanied by pressure, thermal, lum- ballistic (free) rocket with a large HEAT warhead capable inous, and gas producing events that may have severe of defeating nearly 2 feet of armor! The 6.5-inch antitank effects on-exposed personnel.7 aircraft rocket (ATAR) was designed to defeat what was The internal explosion overpressures may range from then the heaviest known armor in the world, the Joseph as little as a third to as much as three or more atmospheres Stalin III heavy tanks, which were reportedly enroute to (e.g., 5-50 pounds per square inch with durations up to a Korea on the Trans-Siberian railroad. However, the JS-III 100 milliseconds, which can result in trauma ranging from was apparently not introduced into the Korean theatre ear drum damage to major injury. The lungs and other and the number of North Korean T-34/85 tanks was body cavities are particularly affected by excess over- rapidly depleted. pressure. The suddenly-developedpressure may also throw the occupants about the interior of the vehicle’s crew com- The Beginning of Behind-armor-effects Research partment with possible injuries resulting from collisions Although the JS-IIIwas never encountered by U.S. or with hard objects within the ~ehicle.~ NATO forces in combat, it became the target basis for the The air temperature within the vehicle was observed Western World’s antitank developments for nearly 2 to rise by as much as 300°F above the ambient, and to take decades. as long as 3 minutes to return.7 The scientists at NOTS who had observed the develop The events producing the pressure and temperatures

ARMOR july-august 1983 17 tenth of a second. The initial pressure pulse, resulting from the shockwaves produced by the flight of the spalled armor and penetrator debris across the vehicle’s interior, may be high but of very short duration (e.g., less than one millisecond). There is current debate whether such dura- tion overpressures are in fact harmful to man. When mate tials are involved that can be rapidly oxidized with the liberation of heat energy, the oxidation, or combustion of the dust and impact-vaporized metals may take place over tens of milliseconds to produce both high temperatures and pressures. Materials that can be readily oxidized include both iron and aluminum, the two principal mate rials of construction of armored vehicles. Although the Figure 1. Flash radiograph of armor penetration by typical HEAT aluminum oxidation is more noticeable in practice, both jet (center, left to right). Bulge in face of armor (left) is beginning metals may produce significant effects that need to be con- of wall ring release. Jet tip has velocity in the order of 8,000 sidered in the design of survivable armor systems. Smallcaliber, copper-lined, shaped charges, typical of explosion). This point is emphasized because of the great the PG-7, and similar shoulder-fired antiarmor munitions, amount of incorrect public information concerning “bum- produce little of the side effects of pressure, temperature ing aluminum,” which was given much space in the press rise, and intense light described above. However, because following the HMS Sheffield sinking in the Falklands in of their inherent penetration capabilities, these small the spring of 1982.9 The Sheffield was in fact constructed munitions can easily penetrate many of the armor arrays of mild steel throughout.10 The fire, which eventually on todays armored vehicles, including the sides and rear of resulted in the loss of the ship, was fed by the explosives of the latest main battle tanks. Depending on the point of the undetonated warhead. The burning aluminum was entry, jets from even the smallest shaped charges can provided by the airframe of the Exocet missile, which ignite fuels, hydraulic fluid, and ammunition within the undoubtedly gave rise to the initial and apparently correct vehicle. The typical “brewed-up’’vehicle is often the victim statement made by the captain of the Sheffieldconcerning of a fuel, ammunition, or hydraulics fire from a small- his observation of burning aluminum. Nearly a year later, caliber HEAT attack. However, when a readily oxidizable some military writers are still making statements about metal is introduced, either by the armor or the penetrator, the aluminum superstructure of the Sheffield and worse the fuel and ammunition-fire raising capability is yet, trying to make analogies to aluminum armor in the enhanced, and the effects become much more significant. M113 AF’C, M2 infantry fighting vehicle and M3 cavalry ’ When large-caliber shaped charges (100 to 150-mm) are fighting vehicle. used against light armor, the behind-armor antipersonnel effect will be at very high levels . . . .regardless of the The “Vaporific Effect” materials involved. The principal source of behind-armor The metal combustion event referred to above is known antipersonnel effect is the fragment spray comprised of to the terminal ballistician as the “vaprific effect.” Alum- materials from the armor and the remaining part of the inum, when oxidized under the proper conditions of penetrator. Generally, steel fragments are more harmful to temperature and pressure, releases nearly 20,000 calories the crew than aluminum fragments because of their rela- of heat per cubic centimeter (callcc) of oxidized material. tive densities. These extreme “overmatch” situations are This compares with about 1,500 to 2,000 cal/cc in the deto- the cases fkequently described by the uninformed press, nation rate of typical military explosives. The differences who often fail to mention the fact that they are referring to lie in the rate of energy release and the degree of comple such an extreme example.’ A large caliber HEAT penetra- tion of the oxidation process. Aluminum combustion is tion can be quite violent. However, it is this author’s opin- usually incomplete due to the development of a coating of ion that even such extremes. can be made more survivable aluminum oxide that inhibits its continued oxidation. if the crew compartment is properly designed and the crew Hypervelocity events, such as the shaped-charge jet- members are provided with appropriate local protection formation and penetration process enhance the efficiency (i.e., personal armor). of the aluminum combustion process. Both steel and alu- For the record, aluminum armor plate does NOT burn. minum armors can produce a vapor explosion under cer- Fuels, propelling charges, hydraulic fluids, and other tain conditions (e.g., extreme overmatch of weapon vs. organic materials do bum. Aluminum in a molten state armor). can bum. In a finely divided form (e.g., powder, flake, rib M113s in Vietnam were attacked by Soviet made PG- bon, etc.), many materials, including aluminum and steel 7s (the “$150” antitank rocket referred to in the media) yet (even corn), can bum in a short duration event, that is no “aluminum vapor effects” were ever reported because similar to an industrial dust explosion, (e.g., grain silo the PG-7 is small and its effects behind armor are mostly

18 ARMOR july-august 1983 confined to fragments. However, larger antitank weapons, 1974, both the Army15 and Navy16 became interested in which are designed to engage heavily armored tanks, can DuPont’s proprietary filament “Kevlar,” particularly for produce an aluminum vapor effect if used against a lightly use behind aluminum armor. The Navy undertook to line armored vehicle. The enemy will use what he has in hand. the interior of the aluminum superstructure of its Perry- If the target even looks like a tank, he may fire a tank- class frigates, primarily as a precaution against so-called killing weapon. “cheap kills” by fragmentation m~niti0ns.l~“Kevlar,” is a Historically, various antiarmor and antihard-target high-modulus, aromatic fiber, and in an appropriate weapons have been specifically designed to exploit the matrix and weave has been demonstrated to be a superior vaporific effect. These include the US. Army Dart anti- spall liner material. The early ballistic tests performed by tank guided missile warhead developed in the 1954-1958 FMC demonstrated that about onehalf inch thickness of period;ll the US. Air Force’s AGM-65 Maverick missile the Kevlar material placed in contact behind M113A1 shaped-charge warhead developed in the late 1960’s; the APC aluminum alloy armor plate, captured more than 90 Air Force’s Hard Structure Munition, also developed in percent of the spall fragment spray produced behind alum- mid-1960-1970 period; Sweden’s FFVO28 mine, and Swed- inum armor when a 66mm M72 LAW shaped-charge en’s most recently introduced, FFV-developed AT# anti- warhead was statically detonated in contact with the tank rocket.I2 All have in common an aluminum alloy armor (figure 2). The Army subsequently funded FMC to liner, although in different configurations, depending on perform a research and development program to develop the specific requirements of each munition. The Swedish spall-suppression liner systems for aluminum-armored A T4light antitank weapon is currently advertised as “the fighting vehicles, such as the M113Al (figure 3). ideal mass weapon with unique beyond-armor effect,” and Tests recently completed at Yuma (AZ)Proving Ground is described as being capable of igniting diesel fuel even in demonstrated the ability of a prototype spall-suppression a cold Swedish urinter, and having beyond-armor effects of liner system to withstand the rigors of 6,000 miles of cross- “over-pressure within the vehicle, mechanical damage country travel in an M113AI‘APC. The prototype system resulting from secondary fragments, immediate eye sight has also been subjected to a thorough program of ballistic reduction and long-term blinding of the occupants, as well tests including static detonations of nearly 200 each 1.5, as heat effects. . . ” They also note “overpressure measured 3.2, and 5inch HEAT antiarmor rounds. during tests” of “approximately one bar” (i.e., about 15 psi), and “light intensities over 100 times stronger than Fuel as Annor sunlight result(ing) from the flash, blinding the occupants It has been demonstrated in the recent Lebanon fighting for several minutes.”12 The 84mm caliber weapon pene that both crew and vehicle combat suMval can be signifi- trated 395mm of homogenous armor in demonstrations in cantly enhanced by removing fuel from crew spaces and late 1981. The AT-4 is the first known weapon to openly relocating it in multiple cells, preferably within the exter- advertise its capability to produce the vaporific effect in a nal armor system. Diesel fuel has an excellent resistance to combat vehicle. both kineticenergy and HEAT penetrations and has a The A T-4 may be the first of the next generation of anti- HEAT jet resistance equivalent to about threequarters the tank weapons specifically designed to produce enhanced same thickness of mild steel.18 Armored external fuel cells antipersonnel effects behind the defeated armor. The for the M113Al APC have been developed by the manu- introduction of new weapons such as the A T4 and their facturer and have demonstrated their high efficiency in significance to the combat vehicle crew are among the stopping both 12.5mm armorpiercing and M28 Superba- main reasons for increasing our efforts to enhance crew zooka HEAT rounds. The external cells are a preferred ,

ARMOR july-august 1983 19 Figure 2. (Top) Spall pattern behind unlined M113 armor produced (Bottom) Near total spall suppression behind spall lining. Same by 90-mm HEAT rount. Panel is over 3 feet behind the armor. type of round, Same distance behind armor. option on the majority of M113 offshore sales. Thus far, fuel is placed behind aluminum armor and the armor is the U.S. Army has not undertaken a retrofit of its active penetrated by an ordinary copper-lined HEAT jet. In the M113 fl& U.S. APC,part of the diesel fuel supplied to the engine is Diesel fuel was originally seleded to replace gasoline as used to cool the injectors and is returned to the fuel cell in a the fuel for combat vehicles because of its significantly heated state. After a period of running, the remaining fuel reduced fire hazard. The Army was satisfied that cold die in the cell becomes heated, sometimes beyond its flash sel fuel could not be successfully ignited even by the HEAT point of 70°C. However, even a small quantity of a low- charge, and that such fires would not be catastrophic, as flashpoint material such as gasoline, may be inadver- compared to gasoline fires. However, various events have tantly introduced should the fuel transport vehicle or pipe since demonstrated this to be a sometimes incorrect real- line be used to convey multiple materials, as is common world finding. Researchers at NOTS in the early 1950’9, practice. As little as 2 percent gasoline in diesel fuel re demonstrated on many occasions, including tests in 1952 duces the flashpoint from its normal 7OoC down to 15OC. at Aberdeen Proving Ground, that aluminum-lined shaped It was also known as early as 1967, that penetration by charges would explosively ignite diesel fuel, regardless of PG7s at the left rear comer of the MI 13, would often gua- the fuel temperature, and whether the cells were full or rantee a catastrophic fuel fire (i-e., a “brew-up” in partially filled, exposed, or behind armor. The previously today’s parlance) if the gunner hit his mark. mentioned new Swedish AT-4 antiarmor weapon is cited In the recent Falkland Island’s combat, the same situa- as having the same capability.13 tion continued to occur in aluminum-hulled vehicles with Easy ignition has also been demonstrated when diesel internal fuel cells. One example is a report that states

20 ARMOR july-august 1983 designs in combat, a luxury not available to most v designers until too late to do anything about basic c faults. The U.S.developed M1 A brums tank incorporates of the lessons in the survival “handbook” Considi attention has been paid to the ammunition stowa that in a catastrophic event, the explosive effect is di away from the crew ~ompartment.2~Howevei Abrums, like the new Bradley vehicles and older ve in the current inventory, will continue to require pi improvements to further reduce their vulnerabilik enhance both crew and vehicle combat survivabilitj duct improvements suggested to reduce vulnerabil the IFVs and APCs include relocation of the fuel to nal cells, relocation and better proteded stowa ammunition and, of even greater importance, the opment and provision of individual armor with asso lifesupport systems for the crew. Armoring the Crewman Figure 3. Antispall protection lining in an MT13 APC. Although the relocation of fuel and ammunitiox “. . .following the “brew-up’’ of an LVTP-7 amphibious the installation of spall liners and Halon fire or expl AF’C of the Argentine forces invading the Falklands (from suppression systems, etc., can do much to enhana which none of the 20 troops aboard escaped) as a result of vehicle and crew survival in combat, there is an ever a single HEAT round from a Royal Marines Curl Gus- urgent need to provide the crew with much improvt tau. . ..”I9 The case was made in the latter-cited article for sonal protection. Personal armor and lifesupport sy the installation of Halon fuel fire suppression systems in will permit operation both within and outside the v combat vehicles to help counter such fires.2%21, 22, 23, 24 The in a combat environment. U.S. Army has installed Halon systems in all of its new The principle of modular armoring dictates that tLaya- vehicles and is retrofitting some of the older ones. tem’s most vulnerable and critical elements (i.e., the crew) Moving fuel from the internal vehicle location not only be provided with local armor to protect them if their basic reduces a major hazard but makes more behind-armor protection system (i.e., the vehicle armor shell) is defeated. space available for the stowage of other critical but non- Clearly, the basic vehicle armor shell cannot keep out all of hazardous materiel (e.g., potable water for combat opera- the threats on the battlefield and some antiarmor threats tions in arid or contaminated environments). can’t be kept out no matter how much armor is carried. When external, self-sealing fuel cells are penetrated by (The l@in diameter, 100-lb Maverick missile shaped- bullets and fragments, the fuel cell will usually trap the charge warhead, which was deployed successfully by the impacting material without significant loss of fuel or rais- IDF in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, is a good example of the ing a fire. If the threat is a major one, such as a large KE latter. Also, the new Swedish A T4 should be able to pene penetration, or a HEAT jet, a properlydesigned and trate any current lightly-armored system and produce located cell will still act to reduce the penetration. If the cell severe antipersonnel effects behind The use of a is nearly empty, it will have the same effect as spaced spall liner, separation of the fuel and ammunition from the armor. If full or nearly full, and the penetrator passes crew, and similar vulnerability-reduction procedures, can through the liquid, the cell will fail by hydraulic rupture do much to linearize and diminish the potential catastre and the fuel will be discharged off the vehicle. In a phic effeds of such penetrations. However, there will con- properly-designed system, the partially-atomized cloud of tinue to be sufficient residual effeds to constitute a danger fuel should be rapidly consumed in a harmless fireball well to the crew unless they are locally “armored” with a proper away from the vehicle. combat crewman’s uniform. The ideal external fuel system would have multiples of Personal armor is certainly not a novel concept. Man cells between a thin outer armor shell and a thick inner has worn body armor for centuries. In WW I, tank crews hull. The cells would be arranged along a manifold att- were provided with protective personal armor to counter ached by valves that would be automatically actuated by bullet splash and shell splinters that entered through the the penetrator-induced hydraulic surge, so as to isolate any gaps in their vehicle armor.28 The main concern was to cell destroyed by a penetrator. protect the crew from eye and head injuries. There was also a significant chemical threat, and the crews were pre General Methods for Vulnerability Reduction vided with gas masks to protect against war gases and the The guiding principles of how to design the combat ve gasoline and enginegas contaminated interiors of the WW hicle to minimize its vulnerability to weapons effeds, and I tanks. at the same time ensure the survival of the crew are well Although modem combat vehicles are built much better established. The lessons of isolation, separation, redun- than WW I and I1 models, the stresses and speed of mod- dancy, and localized armoring of critical elements were ern combat may actually have made the crew more prone first learned in naval combat.25 These naval principles to injury. It may be necessary to protect the men from were later applied to the first tanks introduced into modem vehiclecaused injuries as from damage that may be combat (originally “land~hips”)~~and have been followed caused by enemy action. by the more successful armored vehicle designers. Perhaps The U.S. Army has developed new helmets based on the most notable current success is that of Israel’s General “Kevlar,-”new fire resistant Nomex combat crewmen uN- Tal in his development of the Merkuuu and modified Cen- new NBC uniforms,30 improved face masks,31 turions,M60s, and M113s (known as Zelda in the IDF.)2* photochromic goggles for eye protection from intense light General Tal has had several opportunities to prove his (e.g., nuclear flash),32and liquid-cooledgarments to permit

ARMOR july-august 1983 21 aent steps. ine neea nere is ror a cooramazea errort u) oanieneia. develop a combat vehicle crewman’s uniform combining We know what must be done to improve crew survivd in such features as fire protection (e.g., Nomex), a modest our present and future fleets of combat vehicles. We know ballistic protection (using a properly matrixed flexible that fuel and ammunition must be placed so as to mini- “Kevlar”), NBC protection, and an integrated helmet pre mize the hazard to the crew and other men in the vehicle. We viding total protection to the eyes, ears, nose and mouth, know how to line vehicles to linearize the effects of pene and at the same time providing a communications link, trators. We have seen the IDFs success with such deliber- breathing air, and when required, cooling or heating. (See ate efforts to ensure personnel survival in combat in NBC and the Armor Crewman, ARMOR, SepOct 1981, p. Lebanon. We have also seen the example in the Falklands 39. Ed) where 20 Argentine soldiers were killed in a US.-built vehi- The integrated combat vehicle crewman’s uniform cle that stored its fuel inside the crew compartment. should make the wearer comfortable in all extremes of Implementation will not be inexpensive. Materials that temperature and humidity so that he will want to wear the can survive in the ballistic and fire environment are costly. protection provided for his combat survival. Provision But, compared to the incredible cost of a man, in particular should also be made that will permit the crew to exit the one who is badly hurt and may require extensive, imme vehicle in a hostile environment (e.g., NBC) and to main- diate, and long-time institutional care, the cost is low. The tain their basic cooling, breathing, and communications, Army is keenly aware of the deficiences in our armored for at least an hour. fighting vehicles and has already incorporated some of the The combat vehicle crewman’s uniform should also look corrective measures. Others are in various stages of plan- good so the crewman can take pride in his appearance. We ning, research, and development. “he procedure followed know that such personal protection measures work from in all new systems is an orderly program of product the number of racing drivers who have survived high improvement that includes retrofits when necessary. speed crashes and fires. Improvements in the older M113 systems are still being incorporated because the vehicles are expeded to remain Conclusions in both US and NATO inventories well into the next cen- It is the author’s sincere hope that an integrated effort tury. The choice is clear. Time is now the enemy.

Footnotes 1 William Boly, “The $13 Billion Dud”. California Magazine. February Defense Review, 8/1980, p. 1242 1983 (a critical attack on the Bradley vehicle) 24 “Combat Effectiveness Through Tank Crew Protecton,” ARMADA 2 Born in Baffle,Defense Update No. 31, November I%!& publisher Eshel Magazzne, 6/1981. p. 65. G.m.b.H., Cologne West Germany, (Israeli source). 2, J.E. Backofen, Battelle, Armor Technology-Part II,” ARMOR, Born in Battle, Defense Update No. 32, December 1982 September-October 1982, p. 3537. 4 J.E. Mnek, The Fall of Eban Emael-Prelude to Dunkerque, published Philip Gibbs, “Amanng Deeds of British ‘Willies’:One Climbs by Luce, 1979, Lib. Cong. No. 74110765. Redoubt, Kills Men in It,” New York Times, September 18, 1916, the first 5 D.R Kennedy, NOTs Technical Memorandum No. 462 “Investigations report of tanks in combat, reference to LTC E.D. Swinton’s comment “they of the Effeds of Shaped Charges Beyond Defeatable “Armor,” 27 June are.. .steel land ships of immense power and wonderful capacity,” Colonel 1952, Naval Ordnance Test Station, Inyokem, CA. Private communica- Swinton is one of the acknowledged inventors of the modem combat tank. tions, Prof. F.R Thomanek. Director, Emeritus, MBBchmbenhausen, to Dr. B.D. Trott, et al, Battelle Columbus Laboratories, “Design of D.R Kennedy, May 1982, re German use of zinclined shaped charges in Ammunition Storage Compartments,” paper presented at the 4th Sympe wy 11. sium on Vulnerability and Survivability, 14-15 March 1979. ’ V. Spector, Spectronix Lkd., Israel, “Ultra-Fast Detection and Suppres- 2R Bashford Dean, Helmets and Body Armor in Modern Warfare,origi- sion System in Armoured Vehcles,” paper presented at 8lst Annual nally issued 1919, updated to include WW I1 supplement, 1977, publisher C. N.F.P.A Meeting, Washington, D.C., May 1977. Puglese, Tuckahoe, NY, Lib. Cong. 77-81893. 8 Private communications, F.P. Watkins, Chemical Defence Establish- D.C. Holliday, “A Tip of the Hat,” National Defense, August 1980, p. ment, Porton, U.K., to D.R Kennedy, in meeting at MVEE, Chobham, 64 (combat vehicle crewman’s uniform.) Enggland, October 1980. XI “Cooler’ Material Eyed for Protective Clothing,” Army Research “Use of Aluminum by Shipbuilders a Blunder, British Naval Writer Development, and Acquisition Magazine, November-December1980, p. 27, Says,” San Jose Mercury, May 26, 1982 (NBC clothing). In Derek Wood, et al. “Britian’s Type 42 Destroyer,” Intemtional .I1 Article, ATmy RD&A Magazine, July-August 1980, p. 23, describing Defense Reuiew. 6/1271, pp. 4146. XM-30 Protective Mask. 11 D.R Kennedy, Dart,” AFMOR! September-October 1981. ‘r2 I.K.W. Overtonk London, “The Protection of Exposed Personnel from 12 Mark Hewish. “FFVs Lghtweight AT4-First of a New Family of Nuclear Flash,” International Defense Review 5/1977, p. 893. Swedish Anti-Armor Weapons,” Znternational Defense Review 5/1982, p. Article “Liquid-Cooled Garment Concept Demonstrated.” ARMOR, 612. January-February 1981, p. 62. 11 Joseph E. Backofen, Jr., Battelle Columbus Laboratories. Ohio, Note: All references are unclassified and unlimited “Armor Technology,” ARMOR, MayJune 1982 14 D.R. Kennedy, a winning entry in,the U.S. Armor Association’s Tank Design Contest, 1862 MBT-10. The MFn Battle Tank ofthe Future (Aerojet DONALD R. KENNEDY is General Corporation Ordnance Division.) an independent consultant to 15 Dr. Joseph Prifti. “Ground Combat Vehicle Liners For Improved Crew/Vehicle Survivability,” briefing presented at U.S. Army Materials the Department of Defense and Mechanics Research Center, Watertown, Mass., July 1977. and its contractors in specialty 16 Julian S. Lake. RADM USN (Ret), “Warship Survivability,” Interna- areas of defense technology. tional Defense Reuiew, 6/1981 p. 721. He is a specialist in nonnu- ‘7 M.C. Gill Corp., “Gill Builds Kevlar Armor for Nay” The M.C. Gill Doorway, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1980. a special issue on alhhc armor. clear explosive ordnance with I* Dr. J. Prifti, AMMRC, “Ballistic Liners Improve M113 Survivability emphasis on antiarmor mech- Rate,” Army Research. Deuelopment. and Acquisition Magazine. July- anisms and has been involved August 1980, p. 7. in HEAT munitions research 19 Dr. John White, 111, BatteUe Columbus Lahratores, “Shaped Charge Jet Interactions With Liquids,” aper presented at the Sixth International and development since 1950. Symposium on Ballistics, “OctoL 27-28.1981. Mr. Kennedy has been invit- 20 Article in International Defense Review 8/1981,p. 1086, re “Crew Bay” crew compartment fire and explosion suppression system by Graviner, ed by the Director of MBB- Salisbury, U.K. Schronbenhausen to attend 21 R. Meller, Geneva, “SAFE-a Fire and Explcsion Suppression System the 100th anniversary of the for Combat Vehicles,” International Defense Reuiew. 1/1979, p. 75. discovery of the shapedcharge R.J.L. Dicker, Geneva, “Countering the Crew Compartment Expb sion.” International Defense Reuiew, 5/1979, p. 818. effect in Germany. R.J.L. Dicker, Geneva, “AFV Fuel Fire Suppression,” International

22 ARMOR july-august 1983 In tion I Mem, 1982, fare Stead autor vehicle uesigrier in a pusiriun UJ oner mission anu slxering syswms, cne mu vug veiucies, we can maym pm- his user a measure of choice in the figure can rise to 1.75 or higher with- point three significant levels of width of his vehicle and, thus, in the out a tendency to proceed in a straight armored vehicle NGP. The lowest of type of terrain it will cross. To discuss line becoming evident. This means for these, which we might call the light this, we need to set up and define, instance, that, theoretically and in armored vehicle level represented by maybe redefine, a pair of buzzwords. terms of this factor alone, the width of M114 (still in Canadian service as I first visited Detroit Arsenal the M113Al could be reduced from Lynx), and the British combat vehi- shortly after somebody there, Joe Wil- 2.69 meters to 1.90 meters, or of the cle, reconnaisance (tracked) (CVR (T)) liams, I think, had coined the term British Scorpion from 2.18 meters to family, is 0.3 to 0.35 bums This mobiquity-the ability to go every- something under 1.75 meters. Very matches lightly-packed snow and where. Since then, I always under- roughly, allowing the L/C ratio to rise very soft wet ground short of a true stood this term to refer specifically to in this way allows a width reduction bog-wet paddy, for instance. It can, the ability to cross soft terrain, in of 20 to 25 percent for a given weight in fact, creep up to 0.45 or even 0.50 other words, to nominal ground pres- and ground pressure. bars with little discernible loss of sure (NGP). If I am wrong, I apolo- Turning now to ground pressure, mobiquity and considerable payoffs gize, but ask the reader to accept this we must first be clear that the ability in other characteristics. The second or definition. to cross soft terrain is often limited by medium armored vehicle level is 0.5 to The other word we then need to two quantities other than the NGP. 0.6 (+) bars. As I have suggested, it is define is that of trafficability,which I One is the limited shear strength of hard to define a cutoff point in terms see as the proportion of prepared some soils, notably alluvial soils (fig- of terrain between this and the first routes a vehicle can use. This evi- ure 2). Here we are concerned not with level. This second level is represented dently is dictated in the first place by the microcosmic effect of pressure but by M113A1, M2/3 Bradley, AMX-1OP weight, the critical factor often being with the macrocosmic action of vehi- and, very significantly, the Soviet the loadcarrying capacity of bridges. cle mass on the whole area affected by BMD and BMP and the Swedish But the trend, now perhaps most pro- that mass. In plain words, the whole Pby302. The third level, say 0.75 to nounced of all in the U.S., towards bank, or whatever, collapses and the 0.85 bars, features main battle tanks much lighter armored weapon plat- vehicle falls with it. The second effect (MBTs), including Soviet tanks from forms at once opens up the kind of is compounded by dynamic loading T-54 onwards6and, almost needless to route where width becomes limiting, and peak ground pressure. NGP is say, the West German Murder. The and combines with technological calculated in static terms (masdarea corresponding terrain is again hard to advance to offer some choice over of track on ground), so it would be define; it includes packed snow, and width. reasonable to apply to it the normal most of ARMOR’S readers will know The problem is accented by the way dynamic loading factor of 2 in esti- from experience what it means in trafficability marches with almost mating instantaneous pressures terms of mud and soft ground. every other aspect of mobility, from between a moving tank and the The key point is this. The Soviets, fitting into an aircraft, to roaring ground. The actual pressures peak at who do their homework excellently down a turnpike, to weaving along a the points of contact of the road- and have to cope with snow or liquid forest path. Mobiquity conflicts with wheels (figure 3), typically with the mud for around 6 months of the year, these, entailing increased width, rol- highest peak under the front road- from fall to the end of the spring ling resistance and unsprung weight, wheel. Let us suppose, conservatively, thaw, are evidently prepared to trade along with increased liability to track that the peak pressure under the front off NGP to at least the same extent as throwing and track damage. It thus roadwheel is 150 percent of the NGP. everybody else. This suggests that behooves the user to consider which Then, under dynamic conditions, the NGP can fairly be allowed to rise to he wants, bearing in mind that a soil bearing pressure required to around 0.8 bars. track can be widened by fitting grous- ensure that the track link under the By contrast, if the philosophy of ers, while neither track nor hull, once front roadwheel will not dig in is some trading off low ground pressure for designed, can be narrowed. three times the NGP. So, quite apart reduced width is carried to the from the problem of measuring or extreme, there is evidently a danger of Technical Aspects estimating soil bearing pressures in allowing the opposition’s vehicles free At the root of the “vicious spiral of the field, NGP provides no more than play in terrain that one’s own cannot tank design” lies a relationship orgi- a second-order yardstick in determin- enter. The Soviets, and their satellites nally borrowed from naval architec- ing whether or not a given vehicle will and Third World clients, have the ture and known as the L/C ratio (fig- cross a particular piece of real estate. widetracked version of light combat ure 1). This ratio determines the This situation is well, if uncon- transport vehicle (the mashina tran-

ARMOR july-august 1983 23 “mobility versus trafficability” argu- ment, but it does have a bearing on the user angle. The second category consists entirely of unprepared sur- face. It comprehends snow, soft and/or driven sand, wetlands, exclud- ing true bog (whose bearing pressure tends to zero), and mud, whether nat- ural or the result of vehicle movement. The width-critical category consists mainly of prepared routes, from mountain passes and forest paths to farmland pails; but it also includes a significant proportion of ground shaped by man for other purposes, L=lengthaftrWk C = distance between floodbanks for instance, and some on ground track center lines natural formations like desert escarp W = track width ments and wadis (dry watercourse beds), or the moraines and the like Figure 1. encountered on the bergschrund (cre- vasses at the head of a glacier). By no portmaya lokhhaya boyeraya (MT- engagement of armor with attack means least important, it includes LB)) with an NGP of 0.28 bars, and a helicopters and indirect-fie antiar- urban terrain. Width is closely asso- number of dedicated soft-terrain vehi- mor weapon systems on the one hand, ciated with the ability to use natural cles to fall back on. But, as already and the resurgence of handheld and cover, at operational, tactical, and stressed, they seem to be in no doubt crew-served antiarmor systems on the minor tactical levels alike. about allowing the NGP of their other,8 will enhance this tendency. Ken Macksey’s particular point primary armored vehicles to rise to And the process of shifting back to a was that there is a great deal of soft western levels and beyond. The main higher gear to regain their tempo on going on the NATO center between positive point in the Soviets’ rather emerging from a belt of bad going will the inner German frontier (IGF) and negative attitude toward the ground inevitably reduce the density of the the Rhine. Over a relatively small is the avoidance of difficult terrain; Soviet advance guards and lay them area like this there is no great prob their commanders up to regimental open to containment and destruction. lem about analyzing the terrain and level are-I now believe rightly7- Thus, the risk entailed in sacrificing classifying it under one of the three thought to have difficulty in coping the ability to cross soft ground is, above categories. This is exactly what with the intricacies of European ter- from NATO’s point of view at least, a the Swedish military authorities have rain; and the risk of being slowed somewhat academic one. done for the limited and rather unus- down or funneled by bad going cuts ual temtory of Sweden; and because right across the principles of their Types of Terrain they know they will only fight there, operational and tactical concepts. In If we define a weight class, say they can base their military vehicle any event, those who try to get an from 15 tons up to 18 tons military policy on this analysis. But with edge by using marginal terrain have load classification (MLCBO), we can intervention outside Europe increas- always been apt to emerge from it in a consider terrain as gradient-critical, ingly becoming the most probable measure of disarray. Current and NGP-critical or width-critical. Steep conflict for NATO’s major armies, future possibilities of the lethal ness does not directly affect the such an analysis becomes prohibitive in time and cost. In any event, I am convinced that the military “usabil- ity” (to borrow an ugly but valuable term from the Soviets) of marginal terrain turns not on its detailed physi- cal characteristics, but on the user’s I subjective judgment of it as an ele ment in his evaluation of the tactical risk as a whole.

User Judgment In training, the penalty for getting a vehicle stuck is no more than a rebuke, maybe some loss of face, and ! a great deal of hard, dirty work. For 4 the defender in war, it is very possibly death, probably capture, or, at best, evasion and escape. Even in training, one very seldom sees experienced veh- icle commanders deliberately travers- ing a side slope likely to throw a track, or continuing to nose their way for- ward when they find the going get-

24 ARMOR july-august 1983 of a rise of some 25 percent in NGP from the level now customary for MLC2O-ish vehicles would further reduce weight. More importantly, the combined effect of all these trends could reduce width from the 3.5 meters or more of today’s MBTs to something not too far from the limit of 2.0 meters (+0.5% max) which is finding increasingly wide interna- tional acceptance for commercial vehicles. The way may lie open to an armored vehicle fleet with the stra- tegic mobility and trafficability now associated with softskins plus first- rate tracked vehicle performance. The only price to be paid for this may be the nugatory advantage of low NGP. This is why “mobiquity versus traf- Figure 3. ficability” is a user argument worth I having-now. ting softer. Nor do tactical command- an externally mounted gun with the ers as a rule order them to do these crew in the hull. This configuration things. The reason is simple. The only will allow its weight to be reduced cer- way to find out whether a slope or a tainly to MLC40 and very possibly to soft spot is negotiable is to try it. Even MLCBO, and will dispense with the if the first vehicle succeeds, there is no large turret ring. Existing technology guarantee that subsequent ones will, has reduced the trunnion reaction of even on the rare occasions when it high-pressure guns by as much as 75 makes sense to “track” the leader. The percent.9 At the same time modem use of gradient-critical and NGP- transmission/steering systems are critical terrain is a high-risk expe- allowing an increase of 15 to 20 per- dient, which sensible and experienced cent in acceptable L/C ratio and thus tankers will only resort to as a result reduction of the width required for a of a conscious decision that the tacti- given vehicle mass. Exploitation of cal payoff justifies the risk. these trends, coupled with acceptance Width is a different kettle of fish. The width of a bridge or a gap can be measured sometimes from air photos, References sometimes by mounted or foot recon- 1 “The Future of Armoured Warfare,” second naissance patrols, sometimes by the Fuller/Liddell Hart Memorial Symposium of the RICHARD SIMPKIN joined crew of the lead vehicle. An occa- Royal United Services Institute for Defence Stu- the Royal Tank Regiment dies, held in the Carver Hall, Royal Armoured sional encounter with most of the Corps Centre, Bovington Camp, on Odober 14, (British) in 1940. and saw kinds of objects likely to limit width- 1982. service in the Middle East. He gateposts, projecting walls, small British designers always seem to allow L/C graduated from Staff College ratios to run away. Centurion’s was 1.941 and in 1951, and the Royal Mil- trees and the like-is one an armored this tank showed a marked reluctance to steer vehicle is likely to win. A lead vehicle when most of the load was on the end roadwheel ita,ry College of Science in stations, as when crossing a gully. 1953, specializing in vehicles. with an over-width dozer blade can Swedish L/C ratios tend to be low. Stank’s He was responsible for user clear a route of isolated obstructions is right down at 1.11:1, because ita gun is laid by slewing on the tracks; an eighties S tank could trials of the Chieftain, and almost at normal movement speed. have an extra roadwheel, giving a WC ratio or worked with the Scorpion And if the width of the deck or car- around 1.35:1, and still steer accurately enough. and Swingfire development. 4 Attempts to smooth out the ground pressure riageway is limited, vehicles can be profile, like the overlapping roadwheels of (e.g.) He was promoted Brigadier guided by hand. In sum, restriction of the Wehrmacht’s Pzkwd Panther, bring in their in 1968 and placed in charge vehicle width confers a usable advan- wake a host of problems ranging from added of equipment policy for the weight and mud-packing. direct-fire battle and all tage; low NGP offers one which is ’ I use bars to avoid the solecism of using en- unlikely to be fully exploited and is at timeters (not in the SI system) without resorting aspects of mobility. He to unfamiliar units. (1 bar x 0.9806 kgf/cm2 x 10 headed the British team on best risky. N/cd x 14.5038 lbf/in’) the project definition and S tank’s NGP is up at 0.94 bars. operational requirements of I never believed this before; but I have Conclusion researched this topic in some depth for my book the Anglo-German MBT pro- Two advances in armored vehicle Red Armour, which will be with my publishers gram, where he was closely by the time this article appears, and I now think concerned with the exploita- technology appear to offer an exciting that the assertion contains a large grain of truth. bunch of convergent trends for 1990’s Not so much because of advances in light tion of Chobham armor. After ATGMs as of spectacular improvements in the retiring he set up a language designs. Optronic and optical improve performance of HEAT warheads against com- consultancy in 1971, and ments (notably image processing and pound armors. divides his time between that the “optical slip ring”) will allow the In the U.S. with the soft recoil mode of the ARES Super 75, in Sweden (on UDES XX20) and writing books. primary armored-vehicle weapon with the Bofors muzzle brake and increased platform (the MBT successor) to have recoil length.

ARMOR july-august 1983 25 Ed. Note: The following article is a ing Unit, Suffield (BATUS) at Cana- composite derived from articles and dian Forces Base (CFB) Suffield, Al- Allied Armor Tri photos supplied by the authors. berta, and the German Army Training by Major Jol Major Heymans supplied the British Establishment Shilo (GATES)at CFB Army material and photos and Mr. Shilo, Manitoba. Since the agree Canadian Forces, Green supplied the German Army ments were signed some 30,000 Ger- 1,039 squaremile range was taken material and photos. (British Army man and more than 60,000 British over by the Defense Research Estab equipment photos courtesy Defense troops have trained in Canada. lishment Suffield. In 1971, the l@year Research Establishment, Suffield, BritishICanadian agreement was BATUS signed permitting the United King- CFB Suffield is located in southeast dom (UK) forces to use about three Alberta about 150 miles southeast of quarters of the range for armor, Since the early 1970s, Canada has Calgary; and 100 miles north of the artillery, and infantry training pur- been host to the British Army and the border with Montana. The rolling ter- poses. The site is currently adminis- Budeswehr who each lease thousands rain is almost treeless. Military units tered by the Chief of Research and of acres of prairie upon which to con- have been in the area since the Development within the assistant duct combined arms training. The Northwest Rebellion of 1885 through Deputy Minister (Material) group of first agreement was signed with the WW 11. In 1941, the Canadian and the Department of National Defense. British governments opened a joint The first BATUS commander experimental station for biological arrived at Suffield in midJanuary and chemical defense tests, but 5 1971 and the equipment began arriv- years later the British ended their ing the next month. The first battle part of the agreement. In 1947, the group to undergo training at BATUS Self Propelled Guns, 8 Simitar’s, 13 always causes a flurry of note taking! ling in Canada Ferret’s, and 100+ Soft Skinned Following the briefings, the group i. Heymans, Vehicles. takes to the field for 2 weeks. Seven battle groups train at Suf- The first phase consists of 2 days I Mr. Michael Green field between May and November and 1night of branch-specific (armor, arrived that summer. BATUS was each year. Each group remains for 1 artillery, infantry) training. During originally designed to support a battle month of intensive training that this time each squadron and com- group consisting of one tank squad- includes live-fire and maneuver pany commander has an opportunity ron (U.S.company equivalent), one exercises. to train his unit separately. It may be infantry company and an artillery Each battle group’s advance party the unit’s ’first time in the field for battery. Two years later, the battle arrives 2 days before the main body quite a while so they practice map group was expanded to include two and signs for the vehicles and equip reading, tactical driving, formations, tank squadrons with 15 Chieftain ment to be used. When the main body battle drills and unit SOPS.Addition- tank: each, two infantry companies, arrives the vehicles are equipped and ally, the entire battle group takes part a close recce troop, an additional crews assigned The group is then given in an afternoon of firepower demon- artillery troop, an engineer troop, a the required orientations and brief- strations that includes all weapons. long range antitank missile troop, ings before commencing their train- After this opening phase comes the and antiaircraft missile detachment, ing. These briefings cover such topics first of three 1-day maintenance peri- and a flight of reconnaissance heli- as highway safety (the British drive ods. Maintenance is vital, for all of the copters. The augmented battle groups on the “wrong” side of the road at equipment receives heavy use in all are comprised of more than 1,000 men home), Canadian customs and “out of kinds of weather. The BATUS per- and include 42 Chieftains, GDeAPC’s, bounds” areas in the nearby town of manent party is credited for their 4 MI09 SP Howitzers, 7 Abbot 105mm Medicine Hat. This latter topic excellent maintenance efforts during the 5-month “slack” period from December to April which ensures that the first battle group amving in May can. draw a full complement of opera- nand. vemcies... ana.. eqmpment. Following the maintenance day, the battle group commander takes control, and for the next 3 or 4 days establishes and practices SOPSwith a view to shaking down the battle group for the all-out operations that will follow. This 10-daytraining period involves live firing and maneuvering in realis- tic defensive and offensive scenarios. Commanders at all levels are pro- vided the opportunity to integrate and coordinate live tank, artillery, infan- try small arms, and support weapons fire onto objectives represented by hard or remotely-controlled popup targets. Stringent safety measures are A Royal Electrical & Mechanical Engineer (REME) FV434 mounting a HlAB crane waits in readiness to recover bogged or damaged vehicles at Suffield during the enforced at all times. British Army Training exercises there. Long approach marches and night operations in all types of weather add the vehicles are handed over to the lion annually for fuel and about $24 to the overall training experience. incoming battle group. This is also million for ammunition which equates Two maintenance days are sche the first time that the troops have an to about 2,000 tons of tank, artillery, duled during this period. Daily re opportunity to relax, take hot baths, mortar, and small arms ammunition supply enables the battle group to clean their clothes and eat hot meals. for each battle group. practice logistical support, including But the pace is far from slow as all Under the agreement the Canadian ammunition resupply. During this hands labor to complete the vehicle government does not charge the Brit- period, crews can expect to fire up to a cleanup because a 4-day rest and ish government a rental fee for using full basic load of a mixture of service recuperation period lies ahead. Group the training area, but neither can the and practice ammunition. tours of Banff, Calgary, and Edmon- British activities result in any The BATUS staff meanwhile has ton are laid on and a few troops man- expense to Canada. been working as exercise controllers- age to get as far afield as Vancouver, Britian chose to train its troops in watching, guiding and assessing the some 800 miles away. When the battle Canada because of the lack of large unit’s effectiveness. They critique the group departs, a few soldiers are training and impact areas in the UK unit after each phase of the operation selected to remain behind and take and Europe. At CFB Suffield the Brit- during the l0-day period. part in “Adventure Training” that ish Army has a training area equal in Upon their return to the base camp, includes canoeing and mountain size to the country of Luxemburg, the battle group is debriefed and climbing before rejoining their units allowing the freedom to maneuver extensive maintenance and equip in Europe. and conduct livefire exercises that is ment cleaning is undertaken before British forces spend about $17 mil- unparalleled for the British Army anywhere else in the world. Although BATUS enjoys neither the sophistication of a live “enemy” opposing force, the instrumentation nor the mechanical targets on the scale found at the US. Army’s Nation- al Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, it does satisfy the needs of the British Army. The initial contract has been renewed for 10 more years. GATES Although the Canadian bison is nearly extinct it is a viable symbol of Canada and is perpetuated in bronze in many Bundeswehr messes in West Germany. There, the bronze sta- tuettes stand as a symbol of unity and fi-atemity between the two nations. CFB Shilo is located about 125 miles west of Winnepeg in the Pro- vince of Manitoba in central Canada about 50 miles north of North Dakota.

~~ It is the home of the Royal Canadian German panzer grenadiers and a field artilleryman discuss thelive-fire exercise results Artillery. The Federal Republic of Shilo.

I 28 ARMOR july-august 1983 are unsuitable for armor training. A German corporal stares intently into the distance as his Leopard I negotiates the rolling Shilo terrain is similar to that of prairie at Shilo. northern Germany with open plains, small bluffs, light scrub and forested nearby community. “They (the Ger- armor and armored infantry units areas. mans) help keep Shilo viable and its (panzer grenadiere) could better train When the Bundeswehr received impact on the community is much as combined arms on the almost permission in the mid-1960s to winter larger than many of us realize,” he unlimited ranges, so the switch was test their Leopard 1 main battle tank, added. made. Together these units engage in they opened negotiations that led to a The Shilo facility is also used by the night exercises during the final 10-year lease agreement that was Canadian Militia (Reserve Forces) week‘s training, but without live fire signed in 1974. Negotiations are now forces who provide artillery support because of safety restrictions. underway for a 10-year extension of during the final battalion-sue exer- The Germans now maintain two that lease. cise, that is conducted in each train- Leopard 1 battalions (30 tanks each), The Bundeswehr, like the British ing period called “Black Bear.” and one armored infantry battalion Army, does not pay rental fees to use Armor and artillery units were the (25 Marders) along with 16 American Shilo. first sent to Shilo from Germany but M113s, three Leopard-chassis recov- They do, however, pay for terrain after a few years it was decided that ery vehicles, and 183 wheeled vehicles damage, fire protection, road resurfac- ing, troop accommodations, the use of base facilities and a German school for the dependent children of their permanent party personnel. The German-armored pop-up targets used for gunnery training emit smoke puffs to simulate enemy tank gunfire. The German government spends between $3-5 million annually for food, fuel and support services at Shilo. To date they have poured about $25 million into the Canadian econ- omy as well. The permanent party and transient troops funnel another $3 million into the local economy each year. Local stores stock German foods for the troops. The German soldiers buy large quantities of Canadian and Indian souveniers to take home. “The impact of the Germans is felt com- A British Chieftan in company with an APC maneuvers on the limitless expanses Of mercially and is appreciated,” said Suffield during a recent training exercise. The range affords the British Army its only Ken Burgess, Mayor of Brandon, a unrestricted training area in the world. ARMUR july-august 1983 29 “---I--I- I. ---*..-- -11. “A-Y, ..IY11 cross-country traveling confined to the actual maneuver training area. Both British and German troops appreciated the immense advantages they derive from their Canadian based training exercises.

for support. About 30 percent of the At the end of the second week there tracked vehicles are returned to West is a weekend break in training and Germany annually for depot-level the troops go sightseeing. German maintenance, or replacement. families in Winnipeg take many of The Germans use the Shilo facility them into their homes and on local from May through Odober for their tours. Over the weekend, the perman- MAJOR JOHN H. HEYMANS was commissioned into the training rotation but maintain a per- ent party pulls maintenance on the 8th Canadian Hussars (Prin- manent party of 40 men who serve a vehicles and readies them for the cess Louise’s) in 1962 and 3-year tour of duty. This force is aug- third and final week of training. served with his regiment and mented by a rotating support force of This week consists of combined with the UN Force in Cyprus 180 men who spend 9 months at Shilo arms battle runs from platoon to in 1966 and in 1974. Later, he and return to Germany for 3 months company-size units with live artillery served as a staff officer in each year. support. Exercise “Black Bear,” the Headquarters, Mobile Com- The Bundeswehr sends about 5,500 final phase consists of a reinforced mand and in Headquarters, tank and armored infantrymen to armored battalion firing live ammu- Canadian Contingent, UN Middle East. He is a 1973 Shilo in eight groups for the rugged nition and runs for the final 3 days of graduate of AOAC at Fort %week course. More than half of the the training session and a separate Knox and is a graduate of the enlisted men are 15month conscripts session is run each day. Canadian Forces Staff Col- and their Shilo experience supple The Canadian militia artillery lege. He was an instructor at ments their home training. Lieuten- units that support the Germans are Canadian Combat Arms ant Colonel Nikolaus Frankenstein, a also undergoing summer training at School and the Canadian commander of the Germans at Shilo, Shilo during this time. Forces Staff School and has said, “It isn’t very often (in Europe) Following “Black Bear” the vehi- served as the Canadian Liai- that recruits in an armored unit have cles are once again brought up to son Officer to the USAARMS a chance to fire their heavy weapons. operational readiness and turned over since July 1981. We are very grateful to the Canadian to the incoming unit. government and people for this It is at the formal conclusion of opportunity.” each unit’s training period that the The combat elements of a German coveted bronze bison statuettes are armor. brigade are airlifted from presented to the departing unit by the Cologne to Winnipeg in German Air German permanent party at Shilo. Force transport planes and are then Some Bundeswehr units have five or bused to Shilo. six bisons to show for their visits to Upon arrival, the troops take over Canada. their accommodations and their The intensive training at both Suf- equipment. Following safety briefings field and Shilo have raised some they begin training immediately with questions in the minds of Canadian ’ zeroing and basic firing schedules. environmentalists as to the ecological On Monday and Tuesday of the damage done to the areas. Of great first week they begin singletank bat- concern is the fire danger posed by MICHAEL R. GREEN is a tle runs followed by two-tank battle the livefire exercises. Because the graduate of San Francisco runs. These exercises continue until range areas are restrided to training, State University and is a free- Friday. A 1-day maintenance period no urban or farming development is lance writer and photo- is scheduled during this first week. damaged or disturbed by the military grapher, specializing in mod- This training schedule continues activities and the areas remain essen- ern military technology. He through the second week. The Ger- tially “wild.” Joint studies are, how- has been published in West- ever, underway to determine the exact ern Prospector Magazine and mans use five ranges, all named for the Japanese military hobby German cities: Aachen, Berlin, amount of damage done to the ecol- magazine, Tank Magazine. Cologne, Dielinghofen, and Essen. ogy during training and how that

30 ARMOR july-august 1983 Commander’s Report MG Fredric J. Brown, 111, Commander, USAARMC We are at an important time. In preparing for this nately equalled, if not in many cases exceeded, by the Armor Conference, I reviewed the reports of past Armor Russians. Conferences. When we assembled in 1973, before the We need to carefully consider the support that we can Mideast War, we were just starting to bring the TOW provide our rapidly improving force. It is hard to think of Cobra on line and had just begun full production of the another army that is literally converting doctrine, organi- M60A2. We were debating the product improvement of the zation and equipment simultaneously as our army is. M60A1, especially image intensification, and the Source We have an obligation as we look ahead to address far Selectidn Evaluation Board was working on the M1. We more seriously the challenges that face the Reserve Com- were just about to begin a 12-weekofficer basic course and ponent of the armor force. The most vital part of our armor to institute the basic NCO course for our noncommissi- force for the long term, the National Guard and Reserve oned officers. We were about to convert the 45K turret training divisions, are the foundation for future mechanic, who had been trained to maintain all tank mobilization. turret systems, to the 45N,P,R, who would be trained on The cost of sustaining proficiency is going up dramati- specific systems. We were moving. cally and one of the things that we all need to consider is Today we have the momentum and are, in fact, acceIer- the extent to which we have, not just a conceptual, but a ating. We have institutionalized a superb “hands-on-do- practical parallel of tankcrew training to aircrew training. it” basic course for our young officers. And in the units In other words, our concerns go beyond hours, dollars and that I have visited both before and since assuming this gallons, to the very real problems of sustainment and position, I have found that more often than not the platoon transition training. It may be that what we currently asso- leader is the most competent individual in the platoon, ciate with aircrew training, in terms of standardization which should cause us to reflect on what we’re doing in our programs, transition training, and flying hour programs, basic and advanced NCO courses. We have identified is virtually around the corner for the MI, M2 and M3. what we need to teach by task, condition and standard, Lastly, as we think ahead and plant the seeds of pro- and we are graduating technically competent platoon gress for our successors, we face an enormous and very leaders who have occupied every position on the tank. stiff competition for resources for future systems develop That is an achievement of great significance. The applica- ment. But the plate is simply not as large as the menu. We tion of our knowledge of training requirements at the need, therefore, to be very thoughtful as we project our Armor School, and even more crucially, the demonstration systems requirements. of our combat skills at the National Training Center to We’ve tried to lay out for you, in a series of White Papers measure our proficiency is also a significant achievement. for panel deliberations, a straw man-very, very much in The analytical process, from the scenario oriented recur- draft-addressing the matters of developing, training and ring evaluation system (SCORES) to the mission area maintaining our force. In the future, we’ll have one on analysis (MAA) of the battlefield, and its evolutionary manning our force, based upon our panel deliberations. application to the Airland Battle, has given us a very real Several of the responses to these trends that I have des- asset-an offensive orientation which we must exploit. cribed are laid out in these White Papers. One of our find- The mobility, agility and survivability characteristics of ings is the essential need for a unified Close Combat Vehi- the MI enhance our ability to exploit our offensive capabil- cle program. A program that focuses not only on the future ities. And I would suggest to you that we also need to think close combat vehicle (FCCV),or family of vehicles, but one about the implication of simplified test equipment and that flows logically and progressively from what we have Skill Performance Aid-Training Manual (SPA-TM). And today through interim evolutionary capabilities into the I’ll be the first to say that we here at the Armor Center future. And it must be a program that recognizes that ifwe have yet to develop how we can best exploit that capabil- fight today, we will do so primarily in M48A5s and ity. It is no longer a problem of attaining and developing a MGOAls, and we need to use our best talents to make that new capability-the capability is there, and our challenge the most capable force that we possibly can. is to determine how to get the most from it. Today, our The challenge has been fairly given us by Lieutenant momentum is accelerating. General Richardson to improve officer and NCO tactical What challenges do we face as we look ahead to tomor- and technical competence. A way to do it is laid out in the row? For one thing, the momentum that we talk about Training White Paper. The Paper is intended to be as here, as we move from the concept to reality, is unfortu- applicable and appropriate for the Guard and Reserve

ARMOR july-august 1983 31 training divisions as it is for the Active Component. We capabilities. need to look at that very closely in our deliberations. Lastly, I wear my armor insignia with great pride. We I propose that one of the primary roles of the Armor have the green light to exploit the position of Chief of School must be not just to train our officers and noncom- Armor to improve the readiness of our force. And I look to missioned officers how to fight, but also how to train to you, the commanders of both Active and Reserve units, to fight, whether the training area is down on the west side of tell us how. We are listening very carefully to how you Hopkinsville, or on the postage stamp area outside Baum- believe the Armor Center can better support you. holder or Kitzingen. Our obligation to properly serve you is So that’s the challenge of looking ahead and, hopefully, to train, educate and discipline our officers and noncom- we’re going to stimulate considerable discussion. We are missioned officers to exacting standards so that you, as going to listen carefully to your reaction to what we pro- field commanders, can make whatever changes you deem pose. Then, together with you, I forsee a year of testing, necessary based upon your estimate of your situation and discussing, working and retining the issues. And, as mission. But, we want you to receive an officer or non- appropriate, this time next year-it will be decision time. commissioned officer who you know has been trained to a I hope that from the panel reports tomorrow afternoon very specific and precise level of capability. we will be able to go on to the next step of working in all We need to take a very hard look at the interface those areas of concern with the various Active and between the crew and organizational maintenance Reserve units. responsibilities. I can tell you that little of the advances in So that’s where we are going. I am absolutely delighted maintaining our combat equipment, as shown in the sup with the diversity of thought that we have in the Armor port package for the MI, is being taught today at the Force today. Armor School. We have a fair challenge to teach these Let’s get with it!

Keynote Address GEN William R. Richardson, Commander, TRADOC General Starry, General Brown, fellow soldiers, ladies acted rather than reacted. and gentlemen, as an infantryman and a long time advo- Not only great men, but great battles can also be cate of the combined arms team, I come before you with watersheds of change. Two particular ones highlight the great respect and admiration for tankers and cavalrymen. impact of new technology and its crucial impact on the The rich tradition of cavalry and armor in our army is early cavalry. admired by so many of us not born in your branch. You The Battle of Crecy in 1346 changed the role of cavalry have carried your colors magnificently for 205 years. You forever. The accuracy of the archers proved deadly and and those who have preceded you are a great credit to our ended the reign of the heavy cavalry. After this battle the profession. I am proud to be associated with you. use of armor by both men and horses gradually shrank in Change is now coming so quickly in this decade that if size and importance. It was also during this battle that we don’t know how to respond to it, we will be accused by gunpowder weapons were used for the first time. those who follow us of not taking the responsibility that is The second significant battle that I’ll mention involved ours to make things happen the way we want them to. Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo in June of 1815. It was Let’s face it, the American Army should not, better yet, will another watershed in the history of cavalry, partly not be satisfied until it is in control of its destiny on the because of the failures of the French cavalry to break the battlefield. British infantry squares, but also because the introduction History is replete with stories of those who have of mass conscript armies by Napoleon meant that there initiated change and of those who reacted to it, or, put was neither the time nor the resources to properly train the another way, those who seized the initiative and took peasants as cavalrymen. In this instance, it was a societal charge to make things happen, and conversely those who change that impacted on the French Army. The lesson for have been seized by it and were left in the dust us is that it highlights the critical role that training must Perhaps nowhere is this more siwcant than in the play in preparation for battle. To relegate it to other than annals of military history, and more to the point of this the highest priority in peacetime or in a mobilized state is conference, in the history of armor and cavalry. to court disaster. The introduction of the horse and chariot in the tenth With the dawning of the 20th Century came an even century B.C. is usually cited as the origin of the cavalry. greater change for the military, for this brought the advent Although the first written report of cavalry in battle is of the tank. Once again, after a slow start, some forward- from the Persians in the sixth century B.C., this use of looking leaders came to the fore to control their environ- horses in battle must have represented at least a small ment and use the tank to its advantage. The pamer lead- Future Shock to opposing armies who were not used to ers on the German side and the Pattons and Gaffeys on fighting against mounted opponents. Even then the caval- the American side in WW 11, followed by those Israeli ryman was already earning a reputation as an commanders in 1967 and 1973, brought a new dimension innovator-as a thinker ahead of his time and his to mobile warfare. They formed for us the opportunity to contemporaries. seize the initiative and fight for the sole purpose of win- It was Alexander the Great who perfected cavalry tac ning a battle, rather than fighting to avert defeat. tics by realizing the synergistic effect of the proper caval- Today we are witnessing and are a part of the awesome ryhnfantry mix. Alexander recognized the value of the impact of change brought about by improvements in tech- combined arms team and used it to his advantage. He nology and modernized fighting machines. Truly we are in

32 ARMOR july-august 1983 ims penoa 01 tranmnon in me iws is mxornmg another one of those historical crossroads, like Crecy and mous potential which army aviation can provide to the Waterloo. It is a time that demands men of vision, of skill, offensive spirit has yet to be fully developed. We are not and with strength of character, who can get us ready for going to just sit on our side of the FEBA and try to take out tomorrow‘s battle. enemy tanks like a fire support element. We must indodri- Today we need leaders who can figure out how to win nate our armor and cavlry-oriented aviators with the view when outnumbered. We need leaders who are willing to that cross-FEBA operations will be the nom, and that we take calculated risks. We need leaders who are so expert at are simply not going to win if we don’t exploit the capabili- fighting that their own self-confidence breeds a similar ties of those fine helicopters we are building and figure out impact throughout their units. how to beat the enemy on his temtory. That must be our In August of last year, the army published FM 100.5. reason for being, and army aviation with infantry and You and I, our allies, and even the Soviets know that armor will help make that happen. manual as the army’s keystone how-to-fight manual. It In TRADOC, we are putting a full effort behind our top also carries the full message of the Airland Battle. two priorities: training today’s Army to go to war and Now, in the minds of many, Airland Battle is synony- finish writing the doctrine, tactics, techniques and proce mous with deep attack or the attack of the enemy’s follow- dures that flow from FM 100-5. Here at the Armor School, on echelons. This is a misunderstanding and is due in General Rick Brown has also put training at the top of his large measure to our efforts to get commanders at all lev- list. One of the most important parts of his stewardship as els, especially those from division and up and the US. the Chief of Armor is to train your leaders to acquire a feel tactical air force, to understand that we must think of for the tactics of the battlefield so that the US. Army will fighting the enemy where we can find him, not just in start breeding some of the finest tacticians we can possibly front of us at the forward line of troops (FLOP, but also put in command of our units. Implicit in that-no, let me 70-150 kilometers beyond, where he is preparing to gener- correct that-explicit in that is to inculcate in young offi- ate the mass and momentum to reinforce his forward cers a resolution to be superior on the battlefield, to be the echelons engaging us at the FLOT. truly skillful tacticians the army needs. It is true that we must delay the forward movement of All of us must work toward building an army of the enemy’s follow-on echelons by attriting his forces with excellence-an army whose true competence is measured missiles and aircraft so as to reduce his presentation rate by its junior and senior leaders. We cannot be content with at the FLOT, and to find the windows of opportunity for mediocrity. our forces to strike him with both fire and maneuver, and Young officers can only acquire tactical and technical we need to know how to do that. competence by constantly training their units in battle What I fear is that these efforts have overshadowed the tactics and tank gunnery. You must be compulsive about vital and deadly battle at the FLOT and the critical and wanting to train your unit out in the field. You must have a substantial threat to our rear areas. You must know that great desire to take your platoon, company, or battalion to we have to fight all three. the field to practice, practice, and practice in how to move, We were very careful when we wrote FM 1W5to make shoot, and communicate. You can always find excuses for this point crystal clear. Here is what we said not going to the field and to put your troops in a classroom “The objective of all operations is to destroy the oppos- instead, but you won’t get a feel for ground, for time and ing force. At the foundation of the US. Army’s operations space, and for command and control in the classroom. You are the principles of war and their application to classical cut your teeth and gain your confidence out there where and modern theories. The Army’s basic operational con- it’s tough, cold, and dark but it can be fun. cept is called Airland Battle Doctrine. This doctrine is To see your tank-infantry team move successfully based on securing or retaining the initiative and exercis- against a position is a marvelous experience. It will whet ing it aggressively to defeat the enemy. Destruction of the your appetite for more. And that’s what is missing today- opposing force is achieved by throwing the enemy off bal- a yearning to train to perfection. It’s always been my belief ance with powerful initial blows from unexpected direc- that good trainers are good tacticians, and good tacticians tions and then following up rapidly to prevent his are good trainers; and, more importantly, if you are a good recovery.” tactician, you are thinking offensively all the time. Let me put it another way. With the 1976 version of FM At the National Training Center we built an OPFOR 1W5, we fell into the trap of thinking too defensively. that is twice the strength of the friendly battalion task Unfortunately, many saw such defensive thinking as an force. While the training for our CONUS heavy battalions excuse to delay the enemy. What they thought it meant has been a splendid experience,the friendlies have lost far was to draw back, pound the enemy with artillery and air more engagements than they have won. We simply must strikes, and hope for the best. turn that around. Today we are saying that maneuver is the dynamic The leadership that the Armor School is developing element of combat at every echelon, and firepower pro- today must unquestionably provide the purpose, direction, vides the destructive force essential to successful and motivation in combat. You can lead the way for the maneuver. We are trying to get across to students that army in tomorrow’s fight. You have the potential. You Airland Battle means the spirit of the offensive. So in the have the tools, all you need is the will. If you demonstrate 1980s, let’s start using the words defeat and destroy. For it, the field of battle is yours. that is what battle is all about. And if you don’t want to General George S. Patton said it well: ‘‘Wars may be play that game, you should never have joined up. We were fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the trained to fight and win, and if we don’t quickly learn how spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that to do that with the tools at hand, we, the Army, will lose. gains the victory.”

ARMOR july-august 1983 33 Lessons for Armor Leaders GEN Donn A. Starry, Commander-in-Chief, USREDCOM The world has turned over many times during my 40 mander’s job as he saw it. We went over things again, and years of service. Some sorting out of what changes and again, and again until we got them right. That taught us what doesn’t change is important for us to remember. that we were not ever going to do anything right the Gust I was commissioned in 1948. We had just finished a war time. That’s why we train. that had changed the world. Inflation was thought to be We even had livefire exercises, against each other! Of under control. Unemployment was high. There were labor course, we only used our coaxs and painted the tips of our troubles in some industries and, in the heartland of bullets to record hits. We shot off phone boxes, blew off Europe, Moscow was gathering its strength and seemed some antennas, and chipped some vision blocks-but it everywhere successful. Colonial empires were breaking up. was great sport! And we learned individual and organiza- Militarization was spreading in the Third World. North tional leadership lessons. The example was set by our Korea was girding up to come south in a few years. It was leader. He was the first to do everything, and he expected a world of growing resource interdependencies. We had everybody to be as good as he was. uncertainty about nuclear weapons and their role in future Out unit had good organizational leadership because we warfare. Where have you heard all that before? The world had been together for so long. We never lied to one another. may have turned over many times in the past 35 years, but No matter what we discussed good or bad, the truth came today’s problems are strikingly similar, and in some cases out. We knew each other well, developed professional com- extensions, to those that were around when I began my petence, became good soldiers, and had good outfits. We commissioned service. Not only are the larger problems were committed to our units. There was no question that likely to continue, but many other things are likely to we were the best platoon, the best company, the best bat- remain the same. talion in the regiment. Our battalion commander had the Let me offer a few words that might be meaningful to courage to do things that he had to do. For example, I you as you try to look ahead. In my 35 years as an officer, I remember an incident where we only had two platoons of have been in two outfits that were very good. The reasons operational tanks out of the battalion because we could not they were good have formed the basis for what we’ve tied get spare parts. So, Lieutenant Colonel Abrams went to do with the Army and armored forces in the last 510 down to Heidelberg, walked into the office of General years. One was a tank battalion in an infantry division in Thomas T. Handy, the theater commander, and Germany back in 1949-1953. It was the 63rd Tank Battal- announced, “Sir, the only tank battalion in your theater is ion, and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Gen- deadlined this morning.” As a result, the depots provided eral) Creighton Abrams. Later, in the early 196Os, I was the parts, and we were suddenly mobile again. It took guts the executive officer and commander of a tank battalion in to do that. I am sure that when he walked through that the 3rd Armored Division commanded by M. G. Abrams. door he didn’t know but what he might be thrown out Both battalions were made up of volunteers. The draft had through that door-or even out of the Army. But he had stopped in 1947 and it was not started again until a year or the courage to do it. He didn’t write a letter or send a staff so later. In 1961, the total strength of the 3rd Armored officer, he did it himself and confronted the boss with the Division was composed of 93 percent volunteers, for rea- problem. sons I have never understood General Abrams, was very Those were the lessons we learned from our experiences proud of that and used to talk about that alot. in that battalion. Perhaps one reason we were so good was that we stayed In the other unit, the 32d (later 132d Armor) Tank Bat- together for long periods of time. When the Korean War talion that I was in during the early 196Os, we were stabi- started, everything was stabilized in the 63rd Tank Battal- lized for the Berlin crisis. The circumstances were quite ion and we settled down to business. The battalion had similar to those a decade earlier. When I arrived, the 3d been created a year before from the cadre offerings of the Armored Division had an enormous sports program going regimental tank companies of our division. We cleaned as directed by the corps headquarters but no worthwhile house and 72 substandard men out of one company were military training was being done. The new corps com- sent home. When I left in 1953, there were still tank com- mander, LTG Frederic Brown stopped that at once and our manders and platoon sergeants who had been tank com- new division commander Major General Abrams sent us a manders and gunners when I had arrived. We were four-word message: “Get back to work!” That’s what we together in some cases more than 3 years. did. We started with individual training and worked up to General (then Lieutenant Colonel) Abrams had absolute unit training. We wound up with a good outfit because the standards in the 63rd Tank Battalion. They went like this: guys stayed together for so long, and because the lessons captains could sometimes turn in an acceptable perfor- learned earlier in the 63d Tank Battalion still applied. mance; first lieutenants, never; second lieutenants were Someone once asked Colonel Abrams to compare the the dregs of the earth, and the NCOs could do no wrong. 63d tank battalion and the 37th Tank Battalion he com- He graded everything against his own standards and they manded in WW 11. He said, “I don’t know really, because were so high that it was very tough to meet them. we can’t take them both to battle. But, I’ll tell you what- He tested individual platoons on their training exercises. this outfit can do more things better than the 37th. The He could do that because he knew every job and every 37th trained for one mission and as the war went on, they weapon and when he was finished you knew that you had got less and less good at that mission.” Then he noted that been thoroughly examined. That was the battalion com- it took much more ammunition to kill a tank towards the

34 ARMOR july-august 1983 wiumrs ~~ariwrigup in me rnwmng in rrom 01 soimers ana canaor; ieaaersmp-incnwaud ana orgamzanonA. whom they didn’t know, and who didn’t know them, or We know they work. We must contrive some way to make know one another-and they were supposed to get out and them relevant to the United States’ role in that Third fight a battle that morning. They were not very successful! Wave World. AirLand Battle is an attempt to do the What happened had nothing to do with the ethic of the Army’s part of that. AirLand 2000 is an attempt to carry it officers corps. The institution did that to itself-we did it to through the next step. accommodate personnel managers. Let me finish with a couple of quotes. One is from the Throughout this, I have tried to convince you that some Greek, Xenophon. He wrote, “There is a small risk that a things don’t change much. But other things do change, leader will be regarded with contempt by those he leads, if and there has been a revolution in progress. If my conclu- whatever he may have to preach, he first shows himself sions about what makes the good units good, and the not- best able to perform.” so-good units not so good are right, how do we apply those The second quote is from my friend Jimmy Morrison, lessons to the future? We have been slow to apply these taken from his review of The Horse Soldier. He wrote “The lessons in times gone by and even slower to understand cavalry. . .a combat arm which in the face of starvation the changing world to which those lessons apply. budgets, and the unending hostility of its sister branches, Beginning in the 1950’s, white collar workers outnum- established and maintained standards of professional bered blue collar workers for the fkst time in history, com- excellence that are still unmatched. . .the cavalry. . .the puters were born; sputnik went up; mass circulation mag- story of once progressive leaders who eventually turned . azines began to die out; jet airplanes came on strong; the reactionary and condemned their branch to oblivion by pill liberated some parts of the society. That era ended in attempting to defy change. The cavalry had been a way of the Berkeley riots and the death of John Kennedy. Those life, transcending the bow-legged colonels and the hay- were all manifestations of change in many arenas-in the burners. It had uniquely personified the spirit of mounted supply and demand of energy; production of goods; social warfare, a way of thinking, and fighting, which though structure including the family; in the corporate structures, born of the cavalry, was independent of the means of and the management techniques within them; and the transport. Spirit was what counted.” communications world began to explode. All these, and It is that spirit-the leader spirit, the soldier spirit, the more, Alvin Toffler described in his book The Third Wave. unit spirit that is the heart and sould of our profession; In his latest book, Previews and Premises, he puts it all in that will never change.

Training- Armor For some time, the Armor Center has recognized the training are systematic analysis, close integration of need to capitalize on the full potential of the wideranging related actions and programs, and field validation. These system improvements throughout the Armor Force. This efforts have produced evolutionary changes in the follow- can be achieved by using a systems approach to training ing major aspects of training armor units to reach and development. The primary features of this approach to sustain top performance.

ARMUR july-august 1983 35 confront gunners and crews with “shooting gallery” or provides leaders a tool to “adjust” and “operate” ARTEP “bowling alley” situations. The old tables teach gunners training, including help on “how to” prepare for and con- and crews how to fire gunnery tables-not how to fight duct an ARTEP. The MTP accommodates combined arms and win on the modern battlefield. The existing tables and forceon-forceexercises against a Threat-oriented opposing ranges were good when they first appeared, but they do force (OPFOR). not meet the needs of today’s crew, in today’s tanks, pre The MTP presents situational training exercises (STX) paring for tomorrow’s battle. based on the following eight missions that are critical to The Armor Center is completely reworking the FM 17-12 all units, and have been tailored for armor platoons: series tank gunnery manuals and tables. The first step Tactical road march Deliberate attack involved analysis of current U.S. tank capabilities, our Occupation of an as- Hasty and deliberate armor doctrine, and the Threat we face. The results of this sembly area defense analysis are 12 tables with engagement ranges, ammuni- Movement to contact Forward passage of lines tion allowances, and times allowed for engagements that Hasty attack Rearward passage of lines are related to demanding, but achievable, performance The MW supports the ARTEP, and both training doc standards and current US. tank capabilities. Even the uments compliment the gunnery and tactical training Threat’s ability to acquire and hit US. tanks is considered initiatives of the FM 17-12 series and supporting training as it relates to exposure times and movement of the thing devices. tank. Recent and upcoming improvements in this area affect The new gunnery tables exploit the array of newer train- the Basic and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer ing devices. The “table top” gunnery trainer, unit conduct- Courses (BNCOC and ANCOC) and the Master Gunner of-fire trainer (U-COIT), and full crew interaction simula- program. tor (FCIS) are integrated into the overall gunnery The BNCOCs for 19E, 19K and 19D soldiers are being program. Current subcaliber devices will continue to be upgraded to emphasize training in tank commander (TC) integrated when situations or ammunition limitations and scout squad leadership duties. All three courses will WZIITant.. share the three key features. Tables I thru XII in the draft F’M 17-12 are structured High training standards throughout, especially for TC progressively resulting in qualification firing for crews on and leader tasks. Table VIII, sections on Table XI, and platoons on Table 0 “Training the trainers to train” through teaching ses- XI. sions in a unit setting. A similar process has been applied to upgrade tactical 0 Letting young NCOs see and experienceways to make training. The tactical exercises in the new family of man- training effective in a collective setting using the STX. uals will also be based on analysis, integration, and The ANCOCs will also be upgraded and standardized. validation. They will include advanced gunnery subjects, master The proposed multipurpose range complex (MPRC) is gunner qualification, and a core of common subjects deve designed 6 support trangobjectives in concert with the loped by the Sergeants Major Academy. Armor instruction newer literature and training devices. The MPRC provides in ANCOC will also include an STX related to platoon- a diverse target array that challenges the crew, section, level leadership. and platoon. It challenges them to demonstrate the capa- The three Master Gunner Courses, (19E, 19K and the bilities of the tanks and their own gunnery and tactical Zweek M60A3 transition) are working well. To keep them proficiency. The result is training that is flexible, challeng- that way, their programs of instruction are undergoing ing, and effective. The MPRC is adaptable to full-caliber, detailed analysis. One of the objectives is to further stand- sub-caliber, and simulation exercises. It accommodates ardize the instruction wherever possible. At the same time, combined arms exercises with tanks, fighting vehicles, the Armor School is researching ways to fill recently- attack helicopters, supporting fires, and U.S. Air Force perceived needs of soldiers who have already completed close air support aircraft fighting as a team. master gunner training. These needs include master These gunnery and tactical proficiency programs are gunner refresher training and better ways to field updated designed to be complementary and to help crews and units information. gain and maintain their full battlefield capabilities. Efforts at the Armor Center to train the force are ink The door has been opened to tasks previously thought grating the factors that impact on training effectiveness. “untrainable” or “not feasible for training,” and training This integration, coupled with careful analysis and field remains within the constraints imposed by availability of validation, will have a profound effect on the whole char- fuel, ammunition, time, equipment life, training support, acter of training armor. and safety considerations. Proposals outlined here will be validated using the Fort The Armor Center has worked closely with the Training Knox test agency and FORSCOM units.

DeveI o p i n g Armor The Directorate of Combat Developments at the Armor Bradleys are coming off the production line, and our Center is responsible for the organization, operational cavalry fighting vehicles (CFVs) will go to Fort Hood for concepts, and equipment in tank and reconnaissance testing this fall. Improvements that will increase the units. Over 1,049 MI Abrams have been produced, the Abram’s fightability and survivability are being exam- - 36 ARMOR july-august 1983 analyzed. able to present the Soviet commander with both real and 0 New trucks are being developed. imagined contingencies beyond his ability to cope. We Rapid refuel and resupply vehicles are being should capitalize on flexibility to compress the time avail- examined. able to him, and to permit us to regain or retain the 0 New dodrine is being fleshed out. initiative. Mid- and far-term analysis of force needs are being Furthermore, if we employ a family of Future Close proposed, and test bed developments are being organized. Combat Vehicles that have similar signatures, whether We have begun the work to field close combat forces real or projected, plus some other deceptive measures, we beyond the year 2000 by taking a total systems approach can limit the enemy’s understanding of our intentions and to modernizing the force. Equipment is becoming more seriously complicate his operational and tactical planning. complex and costly, soldier skills more difficult and sup He cannot tell what he is up against because, properly port systems more varied and essential. developed, all vehicles will look the same. Global considerations and army missions are identified, FCCV is really a family of vehicles with a common the Threat estimate is made, and historical lessons are chassis capable of performing various functions. This sin- researched. Then, technological opportunities are com- gle chassis may be either light or heavy, depending upon bined with organizational and operational concepts and the amount of strap-on, variable armor it carries. The analyzed. The result is a list of force deficiencies pertaining FCCV can be viewed as a mobile proteded space which to doctrinal, training, organizational or materiel func can be left as is, or fitted for specific battlefield functions. tional areas. Ranking these deficiencies and associated Weapon modules will provide a soft or a hard kill capabil- corrective actions into priority lists, plus providing a strat- ity. A chassis configured for an assault could conceivably egy for implementation, results in the Close Combat carry multiple means of attack, but would at least be cap (Heavy) Development Plan, which will be integrated with able of killing in two ways. All vehicles, regardless of their other plans by the Training and Doctrine Command into primary function, should have a soft kill capability. Com- one master strategy document, the Battlefield Develop mand and control modules could include normal com- ment Plan (BDP). This BDP is the army’s force moderni- mand and control as well as the means to manage subor- zation blueprint. dinate robotic vehicles. Depending upon its function, a The MI tank and the M3 CFV chassis will be with us for vehicle would have an appropriate command and control a long time and budget realities dictate that corrections to module placed in it. tank and cavalry force deficiencies will have to be product Reconnaissance modules could include the capability to improvements to existing equipment. However, we also control unmanned aerial vehicles or to manage robotic need to offer incentives to develop the technology required vehicles. Automatic processing and reporting of intelli- by the future force. The Army Tank Program Analysis gence, various sensor suites, or other capabilities would (previously called the Tank Fleet Analysis), which is being also be modular, with all vehicles possessing some min- conducted at Fort Knox, will tell us how many and what imum reconnaissance capability. type of tanks we need in our fleet. The Armor Center is Indirect-fire vehicles might have arrays of fiberoptically examining options available in the mid-term through a guided missiles, self-guided top attack missiles or other Tank Armament Review Group follow-on analysis, and indirect-fire weapons. All modules would be installed or M60 and MI product improvement programs will be removed at the lowest possible command level to enhance pursued. flexibility and “tailoring” for specific missions. The Armor Center has devised a test bed program stra- The FCCV family will also have common spectral sig- tegy that will encourage early developer and user coopera- natures, regardless of module or function, to prevent the tion in heavy force issues. Instead of studying develop enemy from identifymg or stressing any single system. ments to death, we want to examine real performance and Vehicles may carry a crew of zero to 10 or more men; a capabilities. The Tank Test Bed, as part of this strategy, as zero-man version would, of course, be robotic. The organi- based on an MI chassis, is designed to exploit automatic zations of the Close Combat Force must permit redun- loader technology, and mounts an external 120.mm can- dancy and there must be redundancy within the vehicle non. Another program, the Surrogate Research Vehicle, itself to prevent the loss or absence of a crewman from has as its primary purpose the analysis of target acquisi- seriously degrading individual vehicle effectiveness. The tion, man-machine relationships, and crew member size FCCV will have integral NBC protection and should be and positioning. An MI chassis and a specially designed capable of operating for 72 hours without logistic support. turret will be used to examine crew sizes of 1 to 4 men, Robotics are important in our FCCV concept. We see controls that permit firing from all positions except the robotic vehicles augmenting, or in some cases, replacing, driver’s, the submarine type environment created with all manned systems on the future battlefield. Robotics also crew members below the turret ring, and the requirement offer potential improvements in training and combat sup to view the outside environment through video displays. port for the heavy force, and the Armor Center is involved Testing will commence in July of this year. in several robotics programs. In the future we will be fleshing out the Airland 2000 Another element of our testing and development stra- concept and developing the Future Close Combat Vehicle tegy is the Loading Research Vehicle, a new test bed sys- (FCCV) family. A common thread in both Airland Battle tem that will allow us to build our family of vehicles on test and Airland 2000, and certainly a key attribute of the chassis and examine major system variables. We could defeat mechanisms of Airland 2000, is flexibility. We see examine the tradeoffs that would permit a commander to ourselves fighting anywhere, in a brigadesized force, in a rely on the speed and strategic mobility of light armor, or decentralized fashion, with synchronous operations. allow him to opt for a heavy blanket of armor protection.

ARMOR july-august 1983 37 future vehicle family, its supporting systems, and flexible transition the force through the mid-term in preparation organizations that optimize our ability to execute and for the far-term. There are many issues presently confront- exploit the intentions of the Airland ZOO0 concept. ing us and we invite your comments and suggestions in We’re developing a strategy that will permit us to pro- meeting them.

Armor Manning Issues The following is a summary of the results of the panel the requirement for policy decisions to increase turn- discussion concerning the manning of the Armor Force. around-time (TAT) for armor soldiers, especially at grades The first issue addressed by the panel was how to E5 and E6. Short TAT had an especially adverse impact enhance the technical and tactical qualifications of Armor on Forces Command TOE units and TRADOC TDA officers. After several alternatives were discussed, the organizations. In order to reduce the effects of short TAT, panel recommended that additional specialty designation additional stabilization requests have been generated. not take place until after attendance at CAS3, and that Currently, there is no method available to measure the officers desiring to remain competitive for lieutenant effects of increased stabilization. colonel and colonel command positions should strive for The panel recommended adoption of a policy to limit repetitive troop duty in order to remain technically and assignments in TDA positions to one normal tour at tactically proficient. The panel concluded that the current grades E5 and E6, thus precluding back-to-backnon-MOS selection system placed the best people in command. or special duty tours. The panel felt it is essential that The issue of branch qualification of armor officers is at NCOs remain in tactical units as much as possible in order present a rather vague concept, especially at grades above to enhance development of MOSrelated skills. In addition, captain. The concept for branch qualification would the panel recommended that the major commands be solic- include consideration of assignment experience as well as ited to support reduction of the number of stabilized posi- military education. A precise definition of qualification for tions. In order to reduce the significant impact of recruiter each grade would have to be developed. The determination duty on CMF 19, the panel recommended that qualified, of qualified, or not qualified would be provided to selection knowledgeable and motivated retirees be used to fill those boards. The Armor Center will recommend a change to duty positions. Finally, the panel recommended that selec- DA Pamphlet 600-3 that clearly defines armor branch tion boards should give more consideration for advance qualification at each grade level. ment to those individuals returning promptly to TO&E The issue of armor officer requalification training stems units from assignments in career-enhancing TDA from the requirement for officers to maintain armor exper- assignments. tise in the technical and tactical arenas. To requalify these The Armor Center currently conducts requacation officers, a system specific course at Fort Knox is being training for NCOs returning to TOE positions from developed that will include hands-on training in gunnery USAREC duties. At issue is whether this training should and maintenance as well as the latest developments in the be expanded to include all NCOs returning from TDA doctrinal arena. All SC12 majors and senior captains will assignments; e.g., drill sergeants, instructors, etc., and the attend the course prior to reassignment to a TOE unit. The panel strongly supported the concept of expanding this panel recommended implementation of this program. program to include all NCOs returning from TDA The panel noted that success on the battlefield will be assignments. The panel recommended that Directorate of determined in part by the quality of the soldiers that are Training Developments (DTD) establish a package to be enlisted and retained in the armor force. Projections of the used in resident and exportable programs. The concept armor personnel strengths based on current enlistments entails requalification of tank commanders, either TDY show that there will be a high percentage of mental cate enroute, or within Wdays of assignment to the TOE unit. gory IV soldiers at skill level 3. The Army Research Insti- Should tank commanders fail to recertify then they would tute is currently conducting a study to determine the train- be candidates for reclassification or elimination. ability of a soldier, linked to high school graduate versus The recommendation for the Reserve Components (RC) non-high school graduate, in each mental category. Histor- was the establishment of an interim resident course at ically, the high school graduate is found to be twice as Fort Knox for the RC training divisions pending receipt of successful in the completion of his first term enlistment as the M6OA3/Ml at their home station. Following receipt of the non-high school graduate. Furthermore, the decision- the new equipment, home station training and testing making ability of tank commanders (TC) in the mental would be conduded. In addition, the training divisions category I through IIIA is considered to be significantly could conduct requalification training for the RC tank higher than that of the TCs in the lower mental categories. commanders during the annual two week active duty The Armor Center has requested that the NTC provide training. data to support the Armor Force’s desire to enlist only Presently, there is no enlisted career progression model mental category I-IIIA soldiers. The Armor Center has that provides guidance to soldiers on the proper manage provided input to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command ment of their careers. The panel accepted the need for an (USAREC), the Training and Doctrine Command enlisted career development pattern. The basic concept (TRADOC) and the Selective Service stating that we do was modified to eliminate the recruiter or drill sergeant not want to access any more category IVs than will be opportunity at the E5 level. In addition, attendance at the attrited by the end of their first term enlistment. primary noncommissioned officers course will be sche The next enlisted personnel issue discussed concerned duled beyond the first enlistment to reduce the waste of

38 ARMOR july-august 1983 I ne iviiilii~~iaii~xuepar~iiieii~ ia ueepiy iiivuivcu ui w~iaiiceciimna aiiu mxvicea UL ~iieupeiawi, = weu = force modernization initiatives. Military Occupational organizational maintenance levels. Specialty (MOS) 45E and 63E courses have recently been Requires an accurate, and available, combat pre revised MI training has been integrated into the scribed load list (PLL). Advanced NCO (ANCOC), Armor Officer Basic (AOB) Relies heavily on the technical competence of the and Pre-Command (PCC) courses; training on the Bradley maneuver company (fighters) and the company mainte Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS) has been integrated into nance team (fixers) personnel. the MOS 63T and 45T courses; and aviation maintenance These doctrinal changes are kingassessed to determine training is being provided to aviators attending the Armor what changes should be made to resident and field train- Officer Advanced Course (AOAC). Training on the M1 ing programs. Clearly, though, maintenance discipline and BFVS will soon be integrated into the AOAC and and the technical competence of the fighters and fixers JOPMC and the baseline vehicle for the MOS 45N course must be enhanced. The skills performance aids (SPA) for- will become the M60A3 in January 1984. Additionally, mat of technical manuals and the highly proceduralized changes to the Army’s Maintenance Management System nature of test equipment being issued in support of MI and have been coupled with these modernization initiatives. M3 vehicles are assets that can be focused on now to Interim changes 1,2, and 3 to TM 38750 have formalized ensure that maintenance is consistently structured and most of the Supply Maintenance Assessment and Review performed with precision. The SPA and Simplified Test Team (SMART) messages and these have subsequently Equipment-Ml/FVS represent breakthroughs that must been incorporated into the maintenance management be fully used. instruction presented by the Maintenance Department. Peacetime and wartime maintenance must be brought Division 86 doctrine for the MI tank battalion consoli- closer together. The training that soldiers receive in service dates all maintenance assets in a maintenance platoon at schools should duplicate the way units function in the field battalion level. Armor doctrine prescribes dedicated com- and in combat. This will require: pany maintenance team support to a maneuver company, Clarification of, or changes to, armor doctrine pertain- with each team being habitually associated with the same ing to employment of company maintenance teams. company. This doctrine, however, is not being consistently 0 Battle damage assessment and repair training in resi- practiced in the field. Feedback indicates that the follow- dent courses followed by practice of these techniques in the ing methods, and perhaps others, are being used. The field. company maintenance teams are: Development of load plans for the company main* 0 Attached to the maneuver company. nance team. Placed under operational control of the same company 0 Enhanced recovery training, including garrision, day, on a habitual basis. night, and combat recovery using smoke and other Placed under operational control of a company, not obscurants. necessarily the same one. Enhancement of the Army’s ability to predict repair Consolidated at battalion level by function. part needs during combat. The successful employment of the forward support doc- Missionessential maintenance operations to ensure trine requires soldiers in the company maintenance teams minimum combat serviceability criteria are not and the maneuver companies to fully understand the mis- jeopardized. sion, capabilities, and limitations of each other. It Assessment of maintenance authorization criteria to 0 Places increased emphasis on recovery. ensure that doctrine, organization, and peacetime and 0 Is contingent on battle damage assessment and repair wartime maintenance requirements are fully considered to expertise. ensure that tables of organization and equipment are deve 0 Requires disciplined performance of preventive main- loped that will enable the Armored Force to fight in the

ARMOR july-august 1983 39 - __ - - ___ - __ ------. - .. - ._ eight Career Management Field (EMF) 63 Advanced Indi- 0 Publication of two technical manuals, one for the MI vidual Training Courses, which graduate skill level 1 and the other a general TM covering field exdentrepair apprentice mechanics. Training is conducted for Military methods applicable to combat, tactical, and support vehi- Occupational Specialities 63E, MI automotive mechanic; cles, that should be available in September 1983. 63N, M60 automotive mechanic; 63T, Improved TOW and 0 Enhancement of maintenance training for NCOs and Bradley Fighting Vehicle (ITV/BFV) Automotive officers to increase their technical competence will include Mechanic; 63D, self-propelled field artillery automotive hands-on training on the actual equipment to be comple mechanic; 63Y, tracked vehicle automotive mechanic; &E, mented by training in forward support doctrine, mainte MI turret mechanic, 45N, M60 turret mechanic, and 45T, nance management, recovery, supervision and quality ITV/BFV turret mechanic. control of maintenance. The Armor School, and the Ordnance Center and School 0 Development and validation of situational training are involved in a joint initiative that will result in the exercises for maintenance/logistic. transfer of several CMF 63 skill level two and three courses Increased communication with the field. fiom Aberdeen Proving Grounds to Fort Knox. Priority is A draft white paper that addresses organizational main- being given to the M1 courses followed by the M60 course. tenance, and discusses the above issues and initiatives, This training will ease the interaction between the fighters was distributed during the conference. The Maintenance and fixers and will promote viable units in the field. White Paper will be used as a reference document for com- Other initiatives being pursued include: pletion of current initiatives, as a guide for future actions, Development, validation, and ultimate export of certi- and as vehicle for communication with the field.

Closing Remarks MG Frederic J. Brown, 111, Commander, USAARMC I want to report to you today about my plans as I From my Commandant’s hat, I hope you have sensed address the “hats” that have been vested in the position of new directions from Knox: in terms of honing the Armor the Commanding General, Fort Knox. I should begin by School to be an institution that is training well not only saying that I was extraordinarily fortunate in coming discipline, standards, and how to fight, but how to train to back to Fort Knox, to an operation that’s been exceedingly fight. We have laid out a way, most certainly not the way. well done over the years. It’s a solid operation involving That is a fundamental responsibility of the chain of some very competent people-military and civilian. command. I am, also, tremendously respedful of the accumulated A second point that is vital from the standpoint of the expertise that we have been able to bring together for this school is the necessity to improve the war fighting capabil- Conference. I’m acutely aware of the contributions that ity of our force today. During the conference, I have sensed have been made to the evolution of our army by some great the concern of our Reserve Components (RC), particularly professionals here present. I make the same comment with National Guard commanders with M48A5s and MGOAls, respect to members of industry who are here. I think you about the training of their personnel. As Commandant, I hold a very important relationship with us. We must be a assure you that I fully acknowledge and accept the team working together to produce the best Armor Force responsibilities to support you in your day to day responsi- possible for the resources expended. bilities to be prepared as a wartime commander. It is We’ve talked about some difficult issues during this con- obvious that we need to figure out a better way to continue ference. If I’ve posed the questions right in the White Pap doing so at the school. ers, you should be at the stage of having your feet up on Let me talk for a minute about my Chief of Armor hat. I the table and thinking. I look forward to your responses in think that I owe it to the field commanders to do all that the weeks and months to come. can be done from Fort Knox to support the creation and First, let me doff my hat as Commanding General, Fort sustainment of viable organizations in the field. I’m not Knox. This is a large TRADOC post with a very sizable really sure as to how we can most responsively execute dollar inventory and all of the challenges of running a that responsibility. By virture of the functional reviews in major installation. So, it keeps us well occupied and it is the personnel system, I have become increasingly involved important to our force. We all want a competent branch in the personnel policies and space for officers and non- “home” of which we can be proud. But, I want to put that commissioned officers. I have deliberately stayed out of hat aside for the moment. assignment of faces because I simply do not have a data As commandant of the Armor School, as the Chief of base on which I can, with good conscience, recommend the Armor, and as the proponent of Close Combat, Heavy assignment of our officers and NCOs. But, in terms of a (CCH), I really look at the combat army through 3 differ- fundamental concern about policies to ensure that we have ent lenses. adequate grounding of our officers and NCOs in the

40 ARMOR j uly-august 1983 intricacies of- lighting our combat arm, 1 am deeply reason goes back to proponency of UGH. The attack heh- concerned. copter is an integral part of the combined arms team. And, I must tell you that after successful MI fielding, the next given the criticality of the employment of attack aviation most serious problem that I can see is the M60A1 and the with the heavy combined arms team, I want an attack M48A5 battalions (largely Reserve Component). My con- capability here for instruction and CCH doctrinal work. cern is: Are we doing all that we need to do to provide Also for this reason I am working to develop the capability viable tank battalions and cavalry squadrons in support for, and the case to establish, a CCH Precommand Course of our wartime mission? I think it highly likely that in at Fort Knox. time, the personnel functional review will be expanded into I must add here that the proponency for Close Combat an organization functional review to work that problem Light (CCL) will go to Fort Benning, and we will do all out. that we can to support Benning as it evolves CCL. As Chief of Armor, I deeply appreciate the support from I have raised my concerns about the support of CCH General Cowles and the Armor Association in giving us fighting ability with the Ordnance School. What I'm say- the mandate to look together on how we can support the ing is that within the battalion environment it is very hard regimental system. to split organization and unit maintenance. Each must be Now, as the proponent for Close Combat Heavy (CCH) done better separately, and in combination. We are work- I'm concerned about the adequacy of our support to the ing that out smoothly due in large measure to the positive M1, M2, M3, and AHH individually and in combination; support of Jack Rozier, Commanding General of the Ord- about the advice that I wish we could be able to give in nance Center at Aberdeen, Maryland. terms of the best combinations. I think that I need to be As for Health Services Command, I have yet to open the watching, honing, advising, providing anything that I can offensive on that front. But I just know that 91 Bravos to support unit commanders in the fielding of this abso- (Aidmen) in a tank company need to get more information lutely vital CCH capability. And I might say that I'm about Halon, bum injuries and similar armored vehicle equally conscious that we need to do precisely the same in type injuries. the inactive duty training and active duty training envi- I am also about to get into a discussion with the Chemi- ronment for the M48A5 working with the M113, because cal Corps. We've got some very tough problems in the that is the majority of the force that we are going to be nuclear, biological, and chemical (NCB) areas; among fighting with for the immediate future. them are vehicle decontamination and NBC reporting. A second CCH area is laid out in the exploratory work Finally, when everything else is said and done, our great- on future close combat vehicles. It has manifested itself in est strength is us-the officers, the noncommissioned a search to drive technology to give us flexibility and officers and the individual soldiers who make up our great innovation. The initiative of the American of all grades is branch. And here, as I did recently with the Chief of Infan- something that can never be equalled by the Russians. try and the Chief of Artillery, we have to sit down together The moment they allow that, they will have lost their con- and look at the personnel question. The fundamental pur- trol over their system. So, to the extent to which we can pose of an army is to fight, and the personnel system has capitalize on that innovative capability, we will possess an got to be supportive of the fighting army. advantage that can be exploited. And, as we think through In sum, I think this is an exciting time. I sense that we that technology and its application to the Airland Battle, I are, in fact, moving attuned with, and hopefully, in think there is much that we ought to be looking for and advance of, that which we need to be doing for our moving into, as the arm of mounted combat. mounted arm. I can assure you that the lines of communi- Next, I have been told that we at Knox will be assuming cation are open. If anything, it is going to be the suction of proponency for the heavy brigade. It's going to be chal- a slight vacuum because we're looking to get from you lenging. I think, however, as we discuss the Airland Battle idem as to how we can better support you. The greatest and, particularly, the deep battle, there is a great deal of help that I can offer to all of us is to be the nerve center, the work that needs to be done. message center, and to dedicate the necessary resources to As you know, the decision has been made to establish an programs to improve our ability to fight. And I pledge to Aviation Branch at Fort Rucker. The consolidation of you that sort of dedicated, outward-looking effort from Aviation at one place, with unity of command and focus of Fort Knox. effort, is an absolutely necessary step. We are fully sup We are delighted that so many of you could come back to porting this consolidation. the Home of Armor for this conference. You have helped us Now, I must also tell you that I'm doing everything that these past several days. We solicit your cooperation and I can to bring attack aviation aircraft to Fort Knox! The comments in the future. Thank you. General Officers Attending Armor Conference Manning Armor BG Robert J. Sunell MG Zack C. Saufley MG James P. Maloney LTG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. LTG William R. Desobry (Ret.) MG Robert Erffmeyer MG Carl H. McNair. Jr. BG James L. Dozier LTG Robert J. Baer (Ret.) MG Wilbur J. Bunting MG Stephen E. Nichols BG Ronald W. Zeltman MG Lawrence Schlanser (Ret.) BG Roy C. Gray Training Armor Others Attending MG Willie L. Scott LTG Julius W. Becton. Jr. LTG Donald H. Cowles (Ret.) MG James C. Smith (Ret.) Maintaining Armor MG Neal Creighton LTG David E. Grange, Jr. MG Carl E. Vuono MG John R. Galvin BG Robert E. Wagner LTG William J. Livsey MG Billy G. Wellman MG Dale A. Vesser BG John M. Kirk LTG Jack N. Merritt BG William H. Harrison BG Thomas W. Kelly BG John W. Foss MG Melvin J. Crain BG James F. lngram MG George S. Patton (Ret.) BG Thomas F. Cole MG John S. Crosby BG William A. Jackson BG Edwin S. Leland, Jr. MG Kenneth E. Dohleman BG Robert D. James Developing Armor BG Douglas S. Smith MG James N. Ellis BG Kenneth C. Leuer MG John W. Woodmansee, Jr. MG Robert C. Forman MG Francis R. Gerrard BG Kenneth L. Reith MG Duard D. Ball MG Lewis Stephens MG James J. Lindsay BG William C. Roll Economy of Force-the Cavalry Connection by Major Thomas A. Dials

As the army reorganizes under the Army 86 concept, the The organization and functions of cavalry have long divisional armored cavalry squadron will lose its tanks been subjects of doctrinal debate. It would seem a safe and become a light reconnaissance unit. The reduction of observation that the last time there was general agree combat power in this critical unit will have far-reaching ment, the source of the cavalry’s mobility was fueled with implications for the heavy division. The absence of a cred- oats rather than diesel fuel. We have organized cavalry ible economy-of-forceunit in the division may well be the with gun jeeps and armored cars, light tanks and armored fundamental flaw in the Army 86 heavy division. This cars, specialized scout vehicles and standard personnel article addresses the critical relationship of economy forces carriers, varying combinations of light and medium tanks to the principle of mass and the capability of the Army 86 and assault vehicles, mortar squads, infantry squads-the heavy division to wage decisive combat. The elimination permutations are almost endless. With all our experience, of the main battle tank from the divisional cavalry organi- we haven’t gotten it right yet reconnaissance troops, tank zation so reduces the effectiveness of the squadron that its troops, combined arms platoons, H-Series, J-Series, 3x5 defensive capability against Warsaw Pact armored units platoons, conceptual cavalry platoons, and scout platoons. is questionable. This article proposes some alternative Where are we going, and where will it end? organizations that will increase available combat power To organize cavalry units, one must first define what it and overall unit effectiveness. is that cavalry does. The task then becomes to structure “I have travelled a heap of late, and had occasion the force to accomplish its mission. This twwk.ep process to retire into some very sequestered regions, but nary is not as straightforward as it would seem; cavalry units hill or holler, nary mountain gorge or inaccessible (troop and platoon) have been reorganized no fewer than ravine, have I found but what the cavalry had been four times (including the impending Army 86 reorganiza- there, and ‘just left.’ And that is the reason they can’t tion) since 1970. Either the armor community has improp be whipped, for they have always ‘just left,’ and took erly defined the role of cavalry, or it has been unable to a horse or two with’em.”’ determine the proper force structure to execute the func- Bill Arp, Confederate humorist tions of cavalry.

42 ARMOR july-august 1983 cavalry squadron. Several implkjing publications have motley handful that Geary multipled into the rebel hordes since been fielded by Training and Doctrine Command that haunted [Secretary of War] Stanton”.6 (TRADOC), including a coordinating draft of a new FM By defeating Banks at Winchester, Jackson precipitated 17-95 Cavalry, which details the employment of the light McDowell’s withdrawal from the approaches to Richmond squadron. Like Bill Arp, I too have travelled a “heap” of in order to pursue the Valley Army. As a result, McClel- late and have found support for the light squadron to be lan’s forces were isolated on the Peninsula, and Lee and almost nonexistent among my contemporary armor offi- Johnston were able to concentrate their efforts success- cers. In my opinion, a consensus exists that there are fun- fully against this threat to the Confederate capital. Jack- damental flaws in the organization and doctrinal concept son’s campaign bought the Confederacy time to reorgan- of the light cavalry squadron. ize and counterattack Maellan’s stalled forces, ending Almost 10 years ago, General (then Major General) the Peninsula Campaign and, in affect, prolonging the Donn A. Starry asked some very basic questions about war for three more years7 Cavalry. Deception, both intentional and unintentional, was the What is cavalry? key to success in the campaign. There were no elaborate What does it do? Why do we have it? River The Cavalry Scout Ad-Hoc Committee (CSAC) was formed at the Armor Center to address these issues. For 18 months the committee labored, and produced a superbly- documented study defining the doctrine of cavalry combat. Not surprisingly, the study concluded that cavalry per- forms two basic functions: reconnaissance and security. Cavalry “finds the enemy with the least force possible” and provides security with “a force tailored to leave the largest residual of combat power in the main body.” Gen- eral Starry concluded that cavalry “should be a force uniquely tailored to satisfy the definition of economy-of- force . . . Cavalry is an ‘economy-of-force’force”.4 hrganization of the divisional armored cavalry squadron into the “tankless” light cavalry squadron under Division 86 stems principally from the following: “The heavy division [will], as a rule, operate as part of the heavy corps, and the corps [possesses] an armored cavalry regi- ment that, in its Corps 86 design bas] considerably more combat power than [has] the current regiment. With this additional combat power in the corps regiment, the divi- sional cavalry squadron [will] no longer be called upon SO frequently for economy-of-force mission^".^ Figure 1. Disposition of forces in the Shenandoah Valley, 31 If one defines cavalry as an ‘economy-of-force’ force, May 1862. then the above statement presents the doctrinal commun- plans and feints, it was simply “hit and run.” The Valley arm, but for now the limitations of current rotary-wing Army possessed such a mobility advantage over the &craft in poor weather and limited visibility dictate that Union forces (Jackson’s infantrymen boasted of them- the cavalry retain its ground orientation.s selves as “foot cavalry”) that the Federals were unable to The mobility dilemma arises from the question of how to gather timely intelligence as to Jackson’s movements. insure a mobility advantage for cavalry units having the Therefore, they were unable to prevent the piecemeal same equipment as infantry and tank battalions. In my engagement of their numerically superior forces. Decep opinion, the problem is a matter of perception. We tend to tion is the key to surprise. think of tactical mobility in terms of road marches and The lessons of the Valley Campaign are timeless. Jack- assaults over open ground. In these situations, ground son was a brilliant, aggressive leader who out-thought and cavalry has forever lost the advantage of the horseman out-fought his opponents. Superior tactical mobility was over the foot soldier. Fortunately, the subject is far more fundamental to his success as commander of an economy complex than a mere question of speed. force. The Valley Campaign teaches that an advantage in Reconnaissance and security missions are generally maneuver is, perhaps, the greatest combat multiplier of all. executed in areas where the battlefield has not yet deve The Mobility Dilemma loped into the more familiar linear form characteristic of An ancient adage states that to execute its economy role, major battles. In this ill-defined environment, cavalry a reconnaissance unit must possess a mobility advantage retains most of its mobility advantage over other types of over line units of roughly five to one. Technology has units simply through its organization. Scouts and tanks, pushed the cross-country speeds of main battle tanks operating as a team, yield a clearer picture of the battle (MBT’s) to the point that the primary limiting factor has field than any other type of unit can obtain. The com- become the ability of the crewmen to withstand the physi- mander who “sees the battlefield” more clearly, reacts cal punishment of riding in the vehicle, not the mechanical more quickly and maneuvers his forces more effectively to system itself. The helicopter is the only current system engage the enemy. Cavalry employs scouts to locate the that can sustain the requisite mobility advantage without enemy and to determine his strength and disposition, and crew-damaging physical punishments. Should we then combined arms in order to fight through or around him. In convert all cavalry units to air cavalry? Air cavalry has short, cavalry units gain a mobility advantage because more than proved its worth in training in Europe, particu- they waste less time developing the situation. larly in countering the “quick-breaking battle” character- The 3d Cavalry Group’s operations along the Franco- istic of the offensive armor battlefield. Air cavalry may German border in November 1944 clearly illustrate this well be the next transition point for the reconnaissance principle. On the night of 16 November, Task Force Polk (3d Cavalry Group and attachments) began moving across the Moselle River toward the German frontier. The 3d Squadron, operating on the left flank, aggressively pushed toward the border, its advance marked by several sharp engagements. Employing two reconnaissance troops (Troops A and C), the tank company (Company F), engineer and tank destroyer (TD) platoons in the lead.

“ . . .the squadron pushed forward early in the morn- ing. Troop C . . .proceeded to MACH thence across the German border. The 2d Platoon ...reaches MAIMUHLE while another platoon advanced to PERL. Heavy enemy small arms and artillery fire forced the reconnaissance troops to withdraw. The tanks were then brought up and blasted their way into MAIMUHLE. Troop A, reinforced with tanks and TD’s. . .encountered stiff enemy resistance in the vicinity of MANDERN, but the town itself was by-passed and the force fought its way to MERSCH- WEILERg” During the day’s action, 53 German prisoners were taken and 15 enemy confirmed killed. By nightfall, the lead ele ments of TF Polk were continuing their reconnaissance inside the Third Reich. Cavalry maintains the initiative through superior tactical mobility. The CSAC Study’s recommendation for a cavalry pla- toon organization which included four MBTs, caused con- cern that the platoon would be unable to carry out its reconnaissance role. “The current main battle tank, the M60A1, lacks the mobility and stealth to accompany the ~couts.”~The scout either becomes a fighter, providing his own support, or spends all his time finding trafficable routes for the tanks. These concerns certainly merit some consideration. Given the quantum improvements in the MI A brams, the mobility argument loses most of its valid- ity. The tank, however, remains large and heavy and is incapable of negotiating small bridges and other restric- tions. The presence of the MBT in the divisional cavalry IFigure 2.3d Cavalry Group operations, 17-18 November 1944. does, however, offer commanders one unarguable advan-

44 ARMOR july-august 1983 Lack of stealth is a specious argument against the MBT, penalty in fighting the corps battle. A far more reasonable deriving from the erroneous assumption that cavalry pla- assumption is that the corps will retain the ACR to meet toons ought to perform reconnaissance in the same its own requirements, leaving the division to form its own manner as scout platoons. Stealth certainly plays a role in economy forces. cavalry operations (as it does in all military operations), but generally it is not the paramount consideration. Scout platoons perform reconnaissance by stealth in order to survive, but cavalry platoons are organized to fight for m intelligence. The fight for intelligence is violent, offensive I 1 in nature, and highly fluid. It requires high tactical mobil- ity, aggressive maneuver, and sustained, all-weather com I I 1 bat power. Only one weapons system so dominates the battlefield as to provide the edge needed to win the intelli- &, Fl m1 pl gence fight: the main battle tank. Economy of Force - Catalyst for Decision 6 CFV 4 MBT Mass is a prerequisite for the execution of decisive com- Figure 4. Army 86 (J-Series) regimental cavalry troop. bat. No armed force, either in history, or at present, is so large as to be able to be strong everywhere. There are The light cavalry squadron will certainly play a role in always areas where, because of scarcity of assets, the any divisional economy force, but its employment will be commander must accept risk in order to gain the decisive severely constrained by the lack of MBTs and the conse advantage. This principle is applicable at every level of quent lack of combat power. The division will be forced to command from platoon to army group. Economy of force draw assets from its line battalions to form the shell of the current armored cavalry squadron. What cannot be reco- vered under the Division is the training edge inherent in habitual association and battle drill achieved in the cur- @ rent cavalry organization. Armored cavalry must train as it fights-combined arms down to the platoon level. Light I cavalry is a solution that only exacerbates the problem for the division commander. It provides an economy force that must draw on the strength of its parent unit to accomplish the same function with less efficiency. Weak economy forces are a liability, sapping the strength of the main force and inhibiting decisive combat. 5 CFV 4 MBT False Economy Figure 3. Current (H-Series) armored cavalry troop. The emasculation of the divisional cavalry has enabled force planners to place more tanks in the maneuver battal- is an axiomatic function, for without it there can be no ions. Although an increase of combat power in the “teeth” mass. Napoleon clearly understood this relationship and of the division is desirable, I believe that the net effect will the central role that cavalry plays as an economy force: be to diffuse combat power throughout the division area of “Without cavalry, battles are without result.”2 operations. This diffusion will be necessary to compensate In the US Army’s operations bible, FM 100-5, we are for the reduced capability of the cavalry. The weakening of given the following division of responsibilities on the battlefield 0 Generals concentrate the forces. Colonels control and direct the battle. 0 Captains fight the battle. 1/1 The division commander is an organizer; he structures I the battle through an integrated concept of engineer obstacles, fires, and maneuver to divide the total enemy I force into smaller increments, which his subordinate commanders can then defeat in detail. The development of this operational concept is beyond the scope of this paper, but the potential for error, or the introduction of unforeseen 6 CFV circumstances, is extremely high. The fluid, high-mobility armor battlefield produces a Figure 5. Division 86 (J-Series) divisional cavalry troop. high degree of uncertainty in the conduct of combat opera- tions, placing a premium on flexibility. The commander the division’s organic economy force is the fundamental must preserve as many of his options as possible to deal flaw in an otherwise impressive war machine. with the unexpected. He must tailor his forces so that he What is it that makes the tank so crucial to cavalry retains the capability to decisively influence the battle. operations? It is certainly not my intent to downplay the Cavalry, as an economy force, is a major factor in provid- role of the scout. He is the raison d’etre of cavalry. The ing this flexibility. presence of the MBT increases the effectiveness of the In my view, the assumption that the heavy division scout; the application of the tank’s combat power enables generally will be able to rely on the corps armored cavalry the scout to move more freely over the battlefield. Cavalry

ARMOR july-august 1983 45 A mobility advantage over the enemy. Sufficient combat power to defeat enemy reconnais- sance and security forces. The light cavalry squadron perhaps will retain a mobil- ity advantage, but it most assuredly will lose the capabil- ity to defeat Warsaw Pact security forces, composed as they are of main force detachments. Figures 3 through 5 contrast the current armored cavalry troop structures (both divisional and regimental) with the proposed organi- zations under Army 86. Possible alternatives are shown in 5 CFV figures 6 and 7; it should be noted that these options 3 MET Figure 6. Alternative cavalry troop #1 represent no increase in manpower levels over the Amy 86 organizations. If one accepts the premise that cavalry, as an arm,is an economy force, it then follows that the organization of both regimental and divisional elements should be similar and at troop and platoon level, identical. Squadron organi- zation may vary somewhat because of the increased com- bat power available within the division and its organic combat support and service support organizations. Though the scale may be reduced, the operational requirements for conducting divisional economy of force missions are essentially the same as for the corps. --5 CFV 4 MET Cavalry is the catalyst of decisive combat. Its capability Figure 7. Alternative cavalry troop #2 to generate mass through economy-of-forceis absolutely essential to the heavy division. The nature of modem platoons are able to “punch” through light reconnissance armored warfare dictates that modem cavalry must be elements to establish contact with the enemy main body. heavy cavalry. “The very essence of cavalry lies in the Napoleon teaches a lesson and provides an example of the offensive. . .The service of reconnaissance, therefore, must importance of powerful cavalry elements-“it is impossi- necessarily be carried out in an offensive sense”.10Combat ble to fight anything but a defensive war, based on field power is the essential ingredient of the offensive; the tank fortifications and natural obstacles, unless one has practi- is the quintessence of offensive combat power. Without the cally achieved panty with the enemy cavalry. For if you tank, the divisional cavalry is ill-suited to carry out its role lose a battle, your army will be lost.” In the disastrous on the battlefield. retreat from Moscow, with his onceproud cavalry reduced ~~ to 500 sabres in the Sacred Squadron, Napoleon’s army Footnotes was lost.2 1 Ellis, John, Cavalry, The History of Mounted Warfare. New York B. htnam’s& Sons, 1978, p.158. The capability of our current armored cavalry organiza- Hohenlohehglefingen, Prince Kraft zu. Letters on Cavalry. Trans. tions to defeat the reconnaissance and security elements of LFN. L Walford, R.A. Longon: Edward Stanford, 1911, pp. 56, 139. any potential adversary is an advantage we should not Rosenburg, Ralph G. LTC. “Increased Combat Power.” ARMOR. November-December 1980, pp.3@34. surrender without careful consideration. Armored cavalry 4 Starry, Donn A. ‘‘ModemArmor Battle III Cavalry.” ARMOR. March- can accomplish all of the reconnaissance functions of light April 1975, pp. 58. Romjue, John L A History of Amy 86. Ft. Monroe, Viia:U.S. cavalry and, when required, force the enemy’s main body Army Training and Dochine Command, 1981, Vol. I and ?. p. 7. to deploy and fight, revealing its strength and intent. The fi Tanner, Robert G. Stonewall m the Vallev. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Compan Inc., 1976 pp. 32332.5: 24@241. current armored cavalry organization provides far more Battreall, R. R. El. and Ri’ggins, Joe L MAJ. “Flying Tanks.” than reconnaissance and warning of enemy movement. It ARMOR. July-August 1980, pp. 5659. gives the commander the crucial moments required to “ US. Department of the Army. Headquarters, 3d Cavalry Group (Mechanized). After Action Report, (1 August 1944-9 May 1945). Washing. react to the unexpected thrust. The loss of this capability is ton: The Adjutant General, p. 144. a crushing blow to the heavy division. 9 Bunce, Peter L. SSG. “The Reconnaissance Dilemma” ARMOR. March-April 1976, pp. 1820: The Cavalry Connection 1’’ Bemhardi. Frederich von, GEN. Cavalry. Trans. MAJ. G. T. M. Does the Army 86 heavy division have the capability to Bridges. New York George H. Doran Company, 1914, p. 40. conduct economy-of-force operations? Certainly, but that mission capability is much less than the current division’s. MAJOR THOMAS A. DIALS, Line battalions (tank and infantry task forces) can be was commissioned in Armor employed in an ecomony role, but they suffer an inherent from the University of Ken- organizational limitation-line units are designed to con- tucky in 1970. He has held various positions in both reg- centrate combat power over relatively narrow frontages. imental and divisional cavalry These units lack the requisite command and control and units in the United States,the training necessary to operate over the extended frontages Republic of Vietnam, and and depths required of a true economy force. Economy USAREUR. He recently served forces are most effective when specifically organized to as the XO. 3d Squadron, 7th carry out that function. Cavalry, Schweinfurt. Ger- In order to survive on the armor battlefield, the heavy many. Major Dials is a gradu- division must be able to rapidly mass its forces to achieve ate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the United locally favorable force ratios. Credible economy forces are Kingdom Long Armour-lnfan- a prerequisite for the conduct of successful combat opera- try Course, and the Armed tions in this environment. There are two primary charac- Forces Staff College. teristics essential for a credible economy force:

46 ARMOR july-august 1983 The Regimental System and the Trainer

The newly introduced “Regimental System” is one of the (i.e., basic training, advanced individual training, one sta- most exciting programs that has entered the manning tion unit training) that is standardized throughout the arena of the US. Army and may be the most important army? transition to date. With the highly-trained and sophisti- A regimental unit is going to train its own replace cated force we currently possess, it seems that the regimen- ments during wartime when every man is needed to man tal approach to organizing the Army for training and the combat battalions within the regiment? future wars is the ideal way to employ today’s tough, A unit, that has a continuing training mission for its combat-ready Army. already seasoned members, reverts to the all important It is generally said that soldiers fight for their country, basics (the foundation) and devotes men, money, and flag and way of life. This is certainly true as a group, but resources to train IET soldiers? when viewed from the pragmatic foxhole position of the We ensure that all recruits receive the same level of individual soldier, he tends to fight hardest for those he MOS training as his comrades before him? knows, trusts, loves and, if necessary, dies with. Consider We ensure that all commanders interpret an MOS almost any Medal of Honor winner who “rallied” his unit producing program of instruction as it was intended and to fight against seemingly impossible odds at the risk of that modifications or adjustments are not made to the his own life, or the soldier who threw himself on a hand training program based on local conditions, or the local grenade that landed in the midst of his comrades. In either commander’s opinion? case, the soldier didn’t think of America or his mother’s The answers to these, as well as other questions, rests applepie when placing his own life in jeopardy. He with the training center as it presently exists. Fort Knox thought of the lives of his comrades. To put it simply, an and the 1st AIT/OSUT Brigade, Armor, will be used as an army fights for its country; soldiers fight for those they example. However, the following scenario could be applied respect and trust; from their commanders to their peers. to other training brigades as well. (See ‘Determinationin Battle,’by MG T. S. Hart, ARMOR, Training IET soldiers to become qualified 19E/K armor MayJune 1980. Ed.) crewmen or 19D cavalry scouts has developed over the This can be taken one step further and applied to a unit years into a “fine art.” Currently the US. Army has the as a whole. In other words, through time and intimacy best trained IET soldiers, produced by the most sophisti- with a specific unit there exists three entities a soldier will cated training systems in the world. Examine what is fight for: his country, his comrades-in-arms, and his unit already available to ensure standardization and quality of (including its particular traditions). training for CMF 19 soldiers: Soldiers must be motivated through their emotions to An independent Test and Evaluation Branch that fight harder and longer than the enemy if success is to be tests all soldiers to the same exacting standards required realized. This translates to a term we all understand- by field units. Loyalty. The idea of loyalty is so simple that it sometimes A multi-million dollar complex containing numerous eludes us as a basic reason for why things are done. classrooms equipped with instructional aids simulating Currently, a soldier during a 20-year period, serves in an basic-level armor technology; average of 6 to 8 units. This translates into approximately A committee of instructors who teach approximately 3 years of service with each organization. Each unit has its 50 percent of all armor and cavalry subjects on a technical own way of doing things from standing operating proce level and who teach the same way every time. dures to customs and traditions within the unit. It usually A trainee Personnel Branch dedicated to accomplish- takes the newly joined soldier 6 months to “learn” a unit. ing all IET soldiers’ administrative needs. This means 3 to 4 years of time during a 20-year career Rather than sacrifice an established system that works, that a soldier spends just becoming familiar with, or we should consider how it can best be modified and used to acclimated to his new “home.” meet tomorrow’s needs today under the Regimental The regimental system as currently envisioned should System. solve, or at least significantly reduce the acclimation prob Currently, there are sixteen basic armor training com- lem. A soldier in an armor regiment should serve with that panies and nine basic reconnaissance training troops regiment for a longer period (6 to 12 years) before having to organic to the 1st AIT/OSUT Brigade, Armor. These leave that organization for a nominative assignment, or companies and troops presently supply all CMF 19 due to promotion. Thus, assignment to a regiment will replacement/personnel for armor and cavalry units allow a soldier to stay with a parent unit regardless of deployed worldwide. The Regimental System once where he physically serves. He will also know before rota- initiated will not change the total number of replacement tion between regimental battalions how his unit trains, personnel needed, but will realign existing manpower into what the regimental mission is, and how it will be exe more efficient units. Logically, then, instead of disman- cuted. But what should be done to enhance the regimental tling a proven training system, it should be realigned to system during initial entry training (IET)? support the new Regimental System. A proposal has been made that would give each regi- Considering the annual projeded regimental replace ment responsibility for training its own replacements. ment requirements and the number of personnel each This idea must first be examined by asking how: OSUT company/troop graduates each year, it would be A regiment will conduct a training program for IET appropriate to align each OSUT armor company or

ARMOR july-august 1983 47 resmenm nes mom tne very Degruung. umentiy, a SOI- estamimea regmenw mil ensure complete ana stanaara- dier is trained by professional soldiers who know only that ized training, as well as provide for quality assurance. the students they graduate from training may end up with The Regimental System is a “Better Mousetrap” for a them in future units. Basic psychology should enhance myriad of reasons. What is remarkable is the fact that we this proposed alignment because when people do some will be adopting a new concept system that has minimal thing for themselves, they tend to do a better job. implementing costs and offers countless benefits. If Second, the cadre assigned to each training company implemented, the proposed system would not cause disrup should be selected by the regimental command sergeant tion either to field units, or the training base. All the major and approved by the regimental commander. The requirements needed to improve training and increase effi- %to Syear assignment rotation of cadre trainers can still ciency already exist. be used and will fall within normal career progression pat- As an old Army axiom states: “If it works-do it”. This terns. Therefore, the personnel chosen to be the regimental proposal will work. training company troop drill sergeants and tankhack commanders belong to the regiment and will feel person- JAMES A. FOX ally responsible for the quality of training. Selected per- Command Sergeant Major sonnel can be trained to assume their duties by using insti- 1st AIT/OSUT Bde, Armor

We Need Realistic NBC Training

Warsaw Pact forces can be expected to employ NBC In order to defeat the threat, we must train like him. weapons on a terrifying scale, and their use to neutralize Soviet troops are accustomed to spending long periods of NATO strong points, communications centers, road and time in NBC conditions. “NBC conditions” means just rail lines, and airfields is emphasized in Soviet tactics. that! They employ real, diluted chemical agents in their This is designed to gain an insurmountable advantage for exercises. Casualties occur, but, the Soviets believe in the the Soviets in the opening phase of the battle. Presently motto, “Hard in Training, Easy in Combat.” Warsaw Pact the Soviets are believed to be employing chemical weapons forces use real equipment in exercises to give their soldiers in Afghanistan, and it would seem that they may be refin- maximum training benefits. Chemical alarms, detectors, ing their NBC tactics and equipment. decontamination kits, Geiger counters, and markers are On the other hand our attitude toward NBC training is used extensively in all FTXS. Their soldiers are given somewhat lax. Oh sure, commanders say that their com- training in identifying agents, marking them, working mand is high on it, but can they really bank on that train- around and in them, and a variety of other tasks to make ing to pay off? them competent in an NBC environment. Also, unit-level Most of the time we take a ho-hum attitude toward this training is given high priority. Decontaminating vehicles, part of the training schedule. There is too much simulation equipment, and personnel are done during these exercises. with nonexistent troops and equipment, lack of support for The greatest difference between their NBC training and the training schedule, and leaders do not enforce the train- ours is that they do it more realistically. There is no substi- ing. Ask your officers and senior NCOs how often they tute for realistic combat training. have participated in NBC training with the unit. How How many times have you participated in an NBC exer- often has guard duty, charge of quarters, staff duty non- cise? Does your squad/platoon/troop know how to go commissioned officer, details, and compensatory time, through a decontamination point? Do your chemical per- thinned the ranks of your troop so that only a few of the sonnel know how to set one up? How well can your crews soldiers get the training? Also, doesn’t it seem that the decontaminate their vehicle and other equipment in order same soldiers are always there, while the same ones are to continue with the mission? If you can honestly say always gone? Add these factors up and you can see why “yes” to those questions, congratulations! You may sur- NBC training is not stressed as it should be. In the short vive your first chemical attack and still kill the enemy. term, we can always cover up for our deficiencies, but we Our soldiers need to be taught the fundamentals of NBC are only short-changing ourselves if we do. Our lack of warfare and the fact that they must learn to live and fight good quality NBC training may cause us to lose the “First in an NBC environment. They won’t reach that level if battle of the next war,” especially if NBC weapons are NBC training is not the most demanding training we can used. make it.

48 ARMOR july-august 1983 The Case for Professional Reading No subject receives more attention from the Army’s can add a full measure of richness to his career. officer corps than military professionalism. If reading is so important, what, then, should military Professionalism always has been one of the most popu- professionals read? lar topics of conversations among military people, and the First, they should read periodicals. All officers, for various thoughts and ideas on the subject number in the instance, should subscribe to and read their own branch thousands. journals. Each branch service school publishes one. These Two decades ago, Lieutenant General Sir John Win- journals contain the latest in branch thinking on many throp Hackett, a British Army officer, delivered a series of and varied professional subjects. They are staffed with three lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, on the profes- well-trained and knowledgeable editors and writers who sion of arms. (His lectures were later reproduced by the turn out fine professional products. These journals also U.S. Army and distributed as an official pamphlet.) His provide an excellent forum for the airing of differing pro- was a most telling presentation, and he made a number of fessional opinions. excellent points about military professionalism. However, officers should not restrict their reading to General Hackett did not define a military professional in their own branch journals; they should make every effort so many words because “the man-at-arms is Merent to peruse other branch journals as well. Thus, an armor things at different times to the same people,” but he made officer, in addition to reading ARMOR Magazine, should clear his concept of a military professional’s fundions and try to read, at the least, Infantry, Field Artillery, Air duties: to bear arms; to lay down his life, if need be, for the Defense, Engineer, United States Army Aviation Digest, group; to develop his skill in the management of violence and Military Intelligence. They should also look at Amy to the utmost; and to act as the true subordinate of prop Trainer and ARMY. erly constituted authority. Field grade officers, usually have more time to devote to In effect, he was saying that mere path-taking does not professional reading. Accordingly, they should make it a make a military professional any more than does a fancy point to also read MILITARY REVIEW and PARAME uniform. Rather, it is an individual’s mental approach to TERS.And since they are often concerned as well with the the profession of arms that determines his professional- conduct of joint operations, they should look at the periodi- ism, his desire to develop to the utmost his skill in the cals that are produced by and for the other armed services. management of violence. Three excellent publications are: Air University Review, In many respeds, the U.S. Army provides its officers Naval Institute Proceedings, and MARINE CORPS with ample opportunity to develop a sense of military GAZETTE. professionalism-service schools, unit and staff assign- Officers should consider joining the American Military ---.nts,1111 ever-increasing command responsibilities, and var- Institute, and subscribing to their quarterly journal called iec1 duties around the world. At some point in their careers, MILITARY AFFAIRS published for them by the history OBficers are also given special instruction in effective department of Kansas State University. SP eaking and creative writing. They are then judged with Finally, in the periodical field, there are several commer- thieir contemporaries on their effectiveness as speakers cially produced publications that deal with military and anid writers. strategic affairs, that provide valuable sources of informa- But at no time is an officer ever judged on his effective- tion such as: AEI FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ne‘ss in reading, or rated with his contemporaries on his REVIEW, ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY, ARMED kntowledge of current, professional, military thinking. In FORCES JOURNAL INTERNA TIONAL, DEFENSE fa(et, it sometimes seems that the Army goes out of its way AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIGEST, DEFENSE WEEK, to discourage professional military reading in the appar- INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, MILITARY en t belief that an officer who reads a great deal- TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONICS, NATIONAL Pa lrticularly a combat arms officer-must be some sort of DEFENSE, and NATO’s FIFTEEN NATIONS. academic intellectual and, therefore, should not be consi- Then there are books, which may be even more impor- dered a member in good standing of the profession or tant to the military professional. Dozens of excellent ar ms. military-oriented books are published each year in the U.S. This is unfortunate, because there is so much being writ- and abroad. The service school libraries issue periodically teln today that can stand any officer in good stead, be he updated reading lists, and these lists are usually available YOlung, old, experienced or inexperienced-material that on request. In most cases, unit and post libraries may use

ARMOR july-august 1983 49 armies, feeling that these should be read afterthe "star- Osgood, Robert, Limited War Revisited. ters" have been allowed to do their work. Preston, Richard A., Men in Am. Company Grade Officers Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modem World. Alger, John I.,The Quest for Victory: The History of the Princi- Taylor, Maxwell D., Swords and Plowshares. ples of War. Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism, Baynes, J.C.M., Mor&. van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War:Logistics from Wallenstein Baynes, J.C.M., The Soldier in Modem Society. to Patton. Brodie, Bernard, From Crossbow to H-Bomb. Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War. Dupuy, R. Ernest and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the Military Classics United States. Caesar, Julius, The Battle of Gaul (a new translation by Anne and Foner, Jack D., The United States Soldier Between Two Wars. Peter Wiseman). Griffith, Paddy, Forward Into Battle. Clausewitz, Karl von, On War. Hicken, Victor, The American Fighting Man. Delbruck, Hans, History of the Art of War Within the Framework Higham, Robin and Carol Brandt, The United States Army in of Political History (three volumes translated into English as of Peacetime, 1775-1975. this date). Hittle, James D., The Military Staff. Douhet, Giulio, The Command of the Air. Keegan, John, The Face of Battle. Earle, E. M. (editor), Makers of Modern Strategy. Leckie, Robert, The Wars of America. Fuller, J.F.C., Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage. Influence Upon History. MacDonald, Charles B., Company Commader. Fuller, J.F.C., A Military History of the Western World (three Macksey, Kenneth, History of Land Warfare. volumes). Marshall, S.LA., The Officer as a Leader. Herodotus, The History of Herodotus (two volumes). Montgomery, Bernard Law, A History of Warfare. Jomini, Antoine, Summary of the Art of War. Pyle, Ernie, Brave Men. Liddell, Hart, B.H., The Great Captains Unveiled. Weigley, Russell F., History of the United States Army. Liddell, Hart, B.H., Strategy. Williams, T. Harry, The History of the American Wars from Livy, The War with Hannibal. Colonial Times to World War I. Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Art of War (two volumes). Field Grade Officers Machiavelli, Nicolo, The Prince and the Discourses. Aron, Raymond, On War. Mahan, Alfred Thayer, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, Bell, J. Bowyer, The Myth of the Guerrilla. 1660-1 783. Borklund, Carl W., Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to Polybius, The Histories of Polybius, (two volumes). McNamara. Saxe, Maurice, Comte de, Reveries or Memoirs on the Art of War. Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age, Spaulding, D.L, et. al, Warfare. Collins, J. Lawton, War in Peacetime. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Dupuy, Trevor N., The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Upton, Emory, The Military Policy of the United States. Foner, Jack D.. Blacks and the Military in American History. Vegeiius, Flavius Renatus, The Military Institutions of the Gavin, James M., War and Peace in the Space Age. Romans. Goodpaster, Andrew J., For the Common Defense. Willoughby, C.A., Maneuver in War. Howard, Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience. Wright, Quincy, A Study of War (two volumes). Huntington, Samuel P., The Common Defense: Strategic €'re grams in National Politics. ALBEFtT N. GARLAND Janowitz, Moms, The Professional Soldier:A social and Political Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.), Infantry Portrait. Fort Benning, GA Recognition Quiz Answers 1. AMX-13 DCA (French). Twin 30-mm self-propelled speed, 19.7 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 500-km maximum antiaircraft gun; crew, 3; maximum road range, 300 km; maxi- road range, 750-hp diesel, 105-mm main gun, 7.62-mm coaxial mum road speed, 60km/hr; combat weight, 18.9 tons; power- machinegun and 12.7-mm AA machinegun. to-weight ratio, 14.53 hp/ton. 5. MTLB (USSR) (Multipurpose Vehicle) It has a 2-man 2. RATEL-20 (S. Africa) (1FV)This 18.7 ton armored vehi- crew and carries 9 passengers as an APC. and weighs 13.1 cle is crewed by 3 men and carries 7 passengersat a maximum tons loaded. It has a 20.16 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 61.5- road speed of 105 km/hr. It is diesel engined and is armed with km/hr maximum road speed, 6-km/hr maximum water speed, a 20-mm main gun, a 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun and a 7.62- 400-km maximum road range, 240-hp diesel, and a 7.62-mm mm AA machinegun. mac h ineg u n . 3. T-59 (China) (MBT) Essentially the same as the USSR 6. AMX-1OP (France) It has a 5-man crew; mounts 2 HOT T-54 MBT. It has a 4-man crew and weighs 39.7 tons loaded. It launchers on power-operated turret, and weighs 15.2 tons has a 14.44 hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 48-km/hr maximum loaded. It has a 20-hp/ton power-to-weight ratio, 65-km/hr road speed, 400-km maximum road range, and a 520-hp die- maximum road speed, 600-km range, and 276-hp diesel. sel, and is armed with a 100-mm main gun, two 7.62-mm Prepared by SSG David L. Merryrnan, Intelligence NCO, machineguns and a 12.7-mm AA machinegun. Threat Branch, DCD, USAARMC, Ft. Knox, KY. 4. TYPE 74 (Japan) (MBT) It has a 4-man crew and Following are corrections for May-June 1983 Recognition weighs 41.9 tons loaded. It has a 53-km/hr maximum road Quiz Answers: (1)M48 is an M48A1. (3) M47 is an M46.

50 ARMOR july-august 1983 Officer Personnel Actions Clarified This is the final article in this series. Officer Evaluation Reports report simply because they are present. They are taken at The following notes were compiled from the after-action face value. About 10 percent of OERs received have Inter- reports submitted by promotion and selection boards, from mediate Rater comments. members of the DA Secretariat who run the boards, from The Senior Rater’s part is viewed in its entirety to branch assignment officers, and from OPMD experts on obtain a single idea of what the rating says. All three the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). elements must be considered together. By matching the 0 Boards check Part Ij, “Reason for Submission,” same words with different profiles, entirely different eva- because it tends to indicate the flavor of the report. luations emerge. The longer the rated period, the more weighty the Many company grade officers perceive that the box evaluation. checked in the Senior Rater’s profile is the most important 0 The Duty Description (Part 111) is extremely impor- aspect of the rating. It is definitely not. Again, all three tant. Remember that the single armor officer on any board elements must be viewed together. may not even see all the armor files! Even if he does, he The use of small type makes reading difficult. has only one vote. It is important to explain to board Remember that a board member will read the OER on a members from other branches exactly what the officer microfiche reader. does because they may not have as good an appreciation Senior Raters, please check the OER for neatness, for what the duty entails as does the commander. Be spe spelling, and grammar. A poorly prepared OER makes an cific, especially if the officer is working in his additional unfavorable impression. specialty. It is suggested that some statement about the 0 Senior Raters, when counseling officers on their officer’s function, the number of people he leads or super- OERs, at the very least give them an idea of what your vises, and the types and number of vehicles for which he is profile looks like. Many officers are surprised when they responsible be included. finally see the senior rater’s profile. 0 Negative comments have a negative impact. If some 0 If several OERs are written by the same Senior Rater, thing needs to be said, then say it, but say it clearly. There for officers of equal rank (e.g., all captains), and they are are no magic words for writing OERs. Negative comments received at DA on the same day, then all the potential on professional ethnics hit hard, but deservedly so. evaluations are computed and the same profile is entered Make qualitative statements on how the officer on all the reports (i.e., the same profile totals, not the same performed his duties (e.g., “best platoon leader in my box checked). company”). The Senior Rater’s profile cannot be inflated. There 0 Cite what the officer’s key duties were, and explain are still some Senior Raters who believe it can be inflated, how well they were performed. and they think they are doing their officers a favor by Some raters are still trying to put potential remarks in putting them all in a high block. This could not be more the performance narrative (Vc). This results in an admin- incorrect. When all or most rated officers occupy the same istrative nightmare and the report may miss a board. block, regardless of its location, that only means they are 0 It is definitely not necessary to fill up the performance running with the pack. This type of rating has little credi- narrative or potential blocks. Be concise. bility, and the rating is normally not taken at face value. 0 Do not leave remarks open for interpretation. Be The rater also surrenders his capability to single out his precise. most outstanding officers. 0 Platoon leaders do not command ground platoons in If, when starting the profile, and there are only a few armor, they lead them. Statements such as “He com- rated officers in the profile, your rating philosophy should manded his platoon in an outstanding manner” detract be explained, e.g., “Although I have placed Captain Jones from the rater’s credibility. in block 111, this does not imply anything negative. I Only make comments in part Ve, “Potential narra- intend to put the top 20 percent of all captains I will rate in tive,” that are appropriate to current grade and duty. the top three blocks.” It is a waste of time and OER space to recommend the If it is felt the profile has become disporportionate, rated officer for attendance at an advanced course or Branch recommends the Evaluation Officer at MILPER- CAS3. All officers will attend OAC and there is no such CEN (DAPC-MSE) be contacted either in writing or by thing as attendance ahead of contemporaries. All officers telephone (AUTOVON 221-9570) to discuss restarting the in BYG 1976, and later BYGs, should attend CAS3. profile. They will provide the necessary guidance to insure Gimmicks (underlining, words in upper case, big it is done correctly. Raters are cautioned not to try to adjust words that no one understands, trendy words like “stud”) the profile on their own unless they restart. In other words, have an amazingly negative effect in the eyes of board do not fill lower blocks just because it is felt that too many members. Boards infer from such remarks that the offi- officers are in higher blocks. By the way, that constitutes cer’s performance cannot speak for itself. When,gimmicks substantive cause for an officer to appeal the report. are used, the rated officer may suffer. Branch needs feedback on how it is serving Armor Intermediate Rater comments do not add weight to a Officers; please let us know.

ARMOR july-august 1983 51 aebatabie. ringron s answer paralieis Loionel Letiros NORTH RUSSIAN EXPEDI- The principles that Patton followed are ‘official’ history of Vietnam from cease fire TIONARY FORCE, 1918-1919, by solid and sound, as relevant today as they to capitulation. Dennis Gordon. The Doughboy Historical were 40 years ago. Not surprisingly, these Society, Missoula, MT. 1982. $11.95. principles are ones that many great and FRANKLIN Y. HARTLINE ordinary people have lived and continue to Lieutenant Colonel, USA Here we have the story of the hapless live their lives by. This is the author’s Defense Systems Management College ANREF/Allied incursion into North Russia intended point/theme of the book, but it is at the end of WW I. Gordon briefly traces really never fully developed. the complex political background to this Overall, the book is good if viewed as an RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC little known chapter in American military entertaining piece rather than a “hand- WEAPONS, by Major Frederick Myatt. history and records the testimony of the book.” The short stories are excellent and Arc0 Publishing Inc., New York. $9.95. participants themselves, officers and present yet another view of the famous enlisted men. Most of the 42 chapters are, General Patton. A view that many junior This is a compact, fully illustrated guide- thus, personal accounts of that campaign officers can feel very comfortable with as it book of 78 of the most important rifles, in which they fought an unknown enemy may give some insight of how and why carbines and submachineguns used in this for unknown reasons in a strange and hos- their superiors say and do things. century. It is part of the Salamander mil- tile land. The obvious lessons of this “Fro- JAMES M. DUNN itary guide series and, as is the case with zen Vietnam” for our own times were over- Captain, Armor others in this series, contains excellent looked or long forgotten. Fort Knox, KY photographs, supplemented with brief his- A few inaccuracies do not prevent this tories of each weapon and includes tables little book being a good account at the TANKS AND OTHER AFVs IN of basic characteristics and capabilities. personal level of this forgotten war. THE BLITZKRIEG ERA, by B. T. Photographs include not only the wea- White. Blandford Press, England. 1972. pons, but also their ammunition and many BILL HANSEN $9.95. were taken in the field showing them being Armor School Library carried and used in combat. Fort Knox. KY This is a superb little book filled with It is a must for gun enthusiasts and col- technical information and colorful pictures lectors, as well as for the general military of armored fighting vehicles during the historian. PATTON’S PRINCIPLES: A first two years of WW 11. It covers 80 differ- HANDBOOK FOR MANAGERS, ent types of tanks, armored cars, recon- DONALD J. BUTZ by Porter 13. Williamson. Simon 8 naissance vehicles, etc., with development Ordnance Systems 8 Technology Sec., Schuster, New York, 1979. $4.95 background, technical characteristics and Battelle Columbus Laboratories their use in combat. Nations represented This book is more entertaining than it is include France, Italy. Germany, Soviet informative. The author was a lieutenant Union, Great Britain, Poland, Czechoslo- who served with the general, on his staff, vakia, Belgium, Finland, Holland, South THUNDERBOLT: HISTORY OF in the early years of the U.S.As. participa- Africa, India and the Irish Free State. THE 11TH ARMORED DIVISION, tion in WW 11. The author has taken infor- This extremely useful book should be in by Hal D. Steward. The Battery Press, mation and memories from a host of indi- the personal library of anyone interested Nashville, TN. 1981. $22.50. viduals connected with the general, in the weaponry of this period. combined these with his own experiences This book fills an important gap in our to produce in essence“The Patton Quotes.” ROBERT A. DOUGHTY histories of our Armored Divisions. The The author uses a writing technique that Lieutenant Colonel, USMA Division was activated at Camp Polk, LA in is different from the general run of such West Point, NY 1942 and deactivated in Gmunden. Austria books. He presents the principle and then _____~ three years later. It took part in the relief of goes into the historical background/con- SILENCE WAS A WEAPON: THE Bastogne, the breakthrough of the Sieg- text of how the principle was said and/or fried Line, the race to the Rhine and across offered by General Patton. Through these VIETNAM WAR IN THE VIL- central Germany into Austria. It once short glimpeses of history, the reader is LAGES, by Stuart A. Herrington. Presi- advanced over 36 miles in 24 hours, cap- given an insight into the complex nature of dio Press, California. 222 pages. $15.95. turing 32 towns and more than 10,000 pri- the famous general. These short stories soners, including a division commander help to keep the quote/principle in per- This account of advisory duty in Hau and his headquarters. spective, the most often overlooked Nghia province from 1971 to the cease fire What makes this book particularly inter- element when quoting an individual. is recommended for those trying to under- esting to today’s armored soldiers is that The subtitle, “A Handbook for Man- stand the Vietnamese war. The author was the 11th fought through the same cities agers” was an error. It would lead a pro- a district Phoenix advisor during the diffi- and dorfs where our present units are spective buyerheader to believe that these cult years of ebbing American power in stationed-Darmstadt, Hanau. Budingen. principles will help them in some way to southeast Asia. Gelnhausen. Fulda. Coburg. Bayreuth and manage better. Patton lived these princi- The book lacks some strategic scope, Grafenwohr. It’s good to know that you’re ples. To him they weren’t for on-the-job but compensates with its first person sin- living on land that your armor predeces- application. A manager can manage things gular approach. It concentrates on the po- sors captured. and people but a leader/commander leads/ litical struggle in the villages and offers commands people. Patton was a leader/- many insights concerning South Viet- JIM BYERS commander. The application of these nam’s collapse following America’s failing Colonel (Ret.), Armor principles is a personal thing, to say the crusade. Alexandria, VA

52 ARMOR july-august 1983 Some would return to the days when might made right. Louder voices lament the futility of it all. But, the loudest doomsday cries arising above the din proclaim that free people, their representative govern- ment, and a strong military force are themselves a threat to peace! While the pendulum of public opinion swings left and right in response to the winds of rhetoric, we who are soldiers must remain as steadfast to our mission in peacetime as we would in wartime. Our strength to do so lies in our stamina of the spirit and in our firm conviction that our course is marked by the high calling of duty, honor, and country. To negotiate that route we must be farsighted, clear-headed, and steady of nerve. While many despair, our vision of the future must define not only the dangers but the opportunities as well. We must impart to those around us a sense of hope that has been bought with the price of our vigilance. For those whose minds are muddled from the steady onslaught of the doomsayers, we must clearly articulate the case for perserverance on the path of freedom. To those who cower before the menace in the east, as well as to those others who threaten us, we must provide unmistakable evidence of our nerve. Should the clouds darken, many will desperately look about for a sign of light. Let the courage of oursoldiers, fueled by their indomitable and steadfast spirit in peace and war, shine in the darkness and light the way. Good Shooting.