->.'~ ./ The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 45

The Habermas-Gadamer Debate more immanent critique which would seek to interrogate and actualize historically specific traditions containing a utopian content? In what follows I shall 1) pointoutwhy HabermasfOCllsed onhermeneuticsin thefirst place; by Jack Mendelson 2) locate hermeneutics vised-vis other positions within the philosophy of social science; 3)situate Gadamer's perspective in relation to his hermeneu­ tic forerunners; 4) evaluate some of the main arguments which emerged in the exchange between Habermas and Gadamer and examine the above set ofquestions in more detail.

The full implications of the Habermas-Gadamer debate have yet to ~ drawn. In 1967, in the context of a discussion of the methodology of soCIal Habermas'Turn Towards Hermeneutics science Habermas criticized Gadamer's hermeneutics. His criticisms precipi;ated a confrontation which included replies and counter-replies by Even to the casual observer substantial affinities appear between . the two main figures as well as contributions by Karl-Otto Apel, Albrec~t hermeneutics and critical theory. For like critical theory, hermeneutics has,;I Wellmer, and Paul Ricoeur. 1 Butthe discussions ofthis intellectual event m developeda critique ofinstrumental reason. Dilthey's work, to besure, W il English thus far have been eitherlargely exege~cal or hav~ fail~d t~ put2the largely confined to a methodological critique of positivism, although eve issues in their proper context and to assess their broader Implicatlons. In here one can find passages which anticipate Lukacs by relating th particular, the meaning ofthe debate for Marxism and ~tical t~~ory has to fragmentation of the modem sciences to that of society.J And Heidegge bemade clear. Ithinges most fundamentallyonthe relationofCrItical theory and Gadamer explicitly joined the critique of scientism and objectivism t to the livin traditions which revail in the societies in which criti ue arises an attack on a scientific-technological civilization. On the epistemologica and which it see s to transform. level hermeneutics, like critica,1 theory, has attempted to show the limits of To anticipate several keyquestions which the debate raises and to which the objectifying methods of natural science while defending the legitimacy Ricoeur and Misgeld have alluded: does critical theory misunderstand th.e ofother types of discourse (albeit 'understanding,' not critique). In fact, a political-culturalconditions ofthe possibility ofits own effectivenes~when It somewhat similar strategy of argumentation appears in both traditions seekstoelaborate andground itsown ideals in theform ofanesotenctheory insofar as they both counter science's objectivistic self-understanding by of communication? Is the rigor of this form ofargumentation purchase~at reflecting on its conditions of possibility and locating these in pre-scientific the price ofits relevance to political praxis? Isit possible that a theory w~lch activities ofsocial life. AsApelhas pointedout, his andHabermas'strategyof departs from a society's living po~itical tra~itio.ns. and.forms of practlc~l assigning quasi-transcendental status to certain fundamental types ofaction reason to develop its norms on the level of IIngulstlc phIlosophy will find It can be traced back notonly to Marx and pragmatism but also to Heidegger.4 that much more difficult to gain addressees and make itselfheard? Wouldn't This shared fOClls on the critique of positivism has been linked to a a truly hermeneutically-enlightened critical theory tend instead to develop a similar critique ofidealism. In Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamerone finds thedemand thatthesubjectofknOWledge begraspednotas a transcendental ego but as an empiri~lsubject 'in whose veins real blood flows.' Certainly 1. Habermas' original statement appeared in Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften this simultaneous critique of positivist materialism and transcendental (Frankfurt, 1970). The exchange between Habermas and Gadamer along with essays b~ A~.I, idealism helps explain the similaritywhich hasoften been observed between Bormann, Bubner, and Giegel have beeneoUeeted in Hermeneutik und Ideo/~glekrltlk Heidegger and a 'humanistic' young Marx. However, the strain of (Frankfurt, 1971). See also A. Wellmer, Crilical Theory ofSociety, trans. JohnCummIDg (New Feuerbachian essentialism and anthropology in Marx's 1844 Manuscripts York, 1971), pp. 31-51; Karl·Otto Apel, Transformalion der Philosophie (Fra~kfu~, 1973~: was also crucial since it tended to obscure the divergence between vol. 1, pp. 9-76; andPaul Ricoeur, "EthicsandCulture: Gadamerand HabermasID DJ8logue, Philosophy Today (Summer, 1973). Heidegger's static ontological approach and the critique of essentialistic 2. This applies especially to Theodore Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenome~ology:' ontology implicit in Marx's developing position. Philosophy Today (Fall, 1970). Dieter Misgeld, "Critical Theory and HermeneutIcs: The In any case, given these underlying affinities, it is striking that prior to Debate between Habermas and Gadamer," in J. O'Neill, ed., On Crilical Theory (New York, 1976) and Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory ofJiirgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) have done a better job analyzing the debate, although they too have not adequately 3. W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. B. Groethusen, Vol. I. See also Andrew Arata, , contextualized it nor drawn out its implications. "The Nco-Idealist Defense ofSubjectivity," Telos, 21 (Fall, 1974), 115. 4. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie. op. cit. 44 The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 47 46

Habermas critical theory had a generally negative relation tothe hermeneutic did not lead Horkheimer and Adorno to incorporate hermeneutic concepts tradition. One need only compare Adorno's attitude toward Heidegger to into critical theory, Habermas' toward Gadamer in ordertosee how critical theory's attitude has In general, it is characteristic ofHabermas that he approaches theoretical problems by opening up critical theory to insights from competing philoso­ S changed. This is due in part to the differences between Heidegger and 8 Gadamer - there is a great deal more in the latterworth critical appropria­ phical andscientific traditions, Thisstrategy alreadyseparates him from the tion. But more importantly, it reflects changes in critical theory itself. Frankfurt School since they tended to remain in the categorial orbit of One ofHabermas' basic goals has always been to rethink the concept of !Jerman idealism and Marxism and to treat their contemporary competitors critique and critical theory in the hopes of renewing the theory's original m an almost thoroughly negative way. Habermas' more open attitude - his emancipatory intentions. This project entails both the self-critique of decision to proceed by means ofimmanent criticism ofa variety ofalterna­ Marxism and the critique of instrumental reason. On the one hand, tive approaches - reflects a certain dissatisfaction with the procedure ofhis orthodox Marxism has combined a materialist metaphysics, pre-Kantian predecessors. After all, by the 1940s and 19505, after any hopes for the reflection theory of knowledge, technological model of praxis, and strict proletarian movement had been dimmed by the darkness of fascism, economic determinism into a mode of thought which is better suited to Stalinism, and the culture industry, Horkheimer and Adorno had reached a legitimate authoritarian states than to criticize them.6 This assessment theoretical and political cui de sac,' they were not only isolated from both implies that the restoration of Marxism as a genuinely critical theory practice and the prevailing scientific universe of discourse, but had also requires the overcoming ofthe objectivistic degeneration it has undergone. developed a philosophy of history which was unable to locate non-esoteric On the otherhand, in late capitalist societies technocratic ideologies serve to ruptures and addressees due to the supposed sway of virtually universal 9 legitimate domination by portraying particular interests and goals as processes of reification. Certainly at that time there were good historical technical necessities.7 Thepositivist conceptofscience with its paradigm ofa reasons for this bleak outlook. Habermas' contention, however. is that the unitary scientific method is a key componentofthis ideology. Itabsolutizes a theory had reached this cui de sac not only for purely historical but for model of theory-formation and practical application which is suited for categorical reasons, i.e., that it was to some extent a result of defective technological knowledge but excludes other modes ofcognition. Therefore, concepts, procedures and assumptions. Therefore. he has considered it in the western context an epistemological grounding ofcritical theory which necessary - while continuing to carryout the projectofcriticizing Marxism attacks the prevailing philosophy of science would assume the political and instrumental reason - to rethink the foundations ofcritical theory as meaning of a critique of ideology. well, by devoting more attention to the methodological issues which have Given this situation, Habermas has turned to Gadamer's theory of arisen in other important theoretical traditions such as hermeneutics. 10 verstehen (interp.retive__understanding) t>ecausehe 6eiieves. thaf]tcanbe _ In addition to their epistemological role, hermeneutic concepts have used ootlito.c::ounter positivism and to clarify the grounds and methods ofthe_ entered Habermas.' theory on a somewhat deeper level as well. :Perhaps -historical-social sciences, including those of critical theories like Marxism ~at separateS_him most from the Marxist tradition in general is his attempt and psychoanalysis. A hermene\ltically~iriforIiied theory of'historical to. ~uild her.m~aJlI;:i!1.fu.,~analytic philosophy. On 2-52. thedualism oflabarand interaction, see A. Wellmer, ''TheLinguisticTurnofCriticalTheory," 7. Habermas, Towarda RationalSociety. trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1970), pp. 62-122. in O'Neill, ed., On Critical Th~ory. and Axel Honneth, Opt cit. See also Trent Schroyer, The Critique ofDomination (Boston, 1973). Mendelson The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 49 reflexes of an economic base. This theoretical constellation affected the emancipation to a dubious, eschatological notion of a reconciliation with concept ofsocialism by leading to a technocratic vision in which the goals of nature in the form ofa new science and technology. 16 Such a vision not only political freedom andsocialist democracy were subordinatedto the develop­ remains abstract and moralizing, it is also ill-suited for generating a critique mentofthe productiveforces accordingtoa centralizedplandesignedby the of the authoritarian elements in the orthodox concept of socialism. party and state bureaucracy. 12 ~bermas, therefore, attempts to reintroduce If it was ever to revitalize its emancipatory intentions, critical theory categories of inters'!Qjectivity which are no long~r m~~~_~p!p.!l~menaof needed a concept of intersubjectivity elaborated as a realm ofcomiffiiiiiCa­ prOduction, and which permit the developmentohnon-objectivistic theory tionanomeamng In which Its own grouDaSand normaftve idealS COuld be orhTstoij"and the reconceptualization ofthe possibilities ofradical transfor­ lOcated, along WiTh a vision of a liberated future recognizable to collective mation. On the normative level, Hab~n:n~_ be.Uev..es_tIt.!!. these same su'il~~!s. Only in this waycan o'iie hope tolink theory to practice in prO&sses ca~~J,..Can be uRfolded so as.!Q...J1eld, in conjunction wi1li~ orenlightenment. Thequestion, however, is whetherand underwhat condi­ denved from modem natural law, Arendt's theory ofthe vita activa, and his tions are the concepts ofhermeneutics, constitutive ofHabermas' now well­ ownearlyconceptofthebourgeoispUblic reaIiii a VISion ofa dOftttnation­ known categoricaldistinction between laborand interaction, adequate tofill free society that links the overcoming of the capitalist economy to political this gap. To answer it these concepts must be examined in their own right, freedom and democracy. 13 Hermeneutic concepts can thus play an first on the abstract terrain of epistemology and the methodology ofsocial important role in the creation of a non-reductionistic social theory and a science. genuinely liberatory vision of the future. While the major figures ofthe Frankfurt School were ofcourse aware of Hermeneutics and the Philosophy ofSocial Science many of these problems, by the 19408 they had moved in a somewhat different direction, toward a philosophy ofhistory in which the domination The central issue in coot.mpon..., pbUOSOphy of socill !!cieQg: lJas ofnature becamethecentraltheoretical axis. 14 AsWellmerhaspointedout, ~ai.nty been the question of ezcp!anatio!l versus !Nsmretj¥e "wier­ in a peculiar way the categorial framework of Dialectic of Enlightenment standtn~~ 7 In the 1930s the logical pOSItivists (underthe influence ofRussell reveals an unfortunate continuity with that of orthodox Marxism. 1S The alrcr'Wlttgenstein's logical atomism) pursued a logical-epistemological effort to dominate nature takes on a superordinate status similar to that of program of demarcating the one meaningful 'language of science' from the production process in Marxism. Categories referring specifically to meaningless pseudo-sentences and reconstructing that language with the social relations and interaction do not seem to be granted the relative help ofmathematical logic. 18 This approach, however, has been supplanted autonomy and crucial importance they merit. This deficiency implies that for the most part by Karl Popper's attempt to reconstruct the 'logic of the critique of instrumental reason, like the critique of political economy scientific discovery,' i.e., to develop a normative model of scientific which it sought to correct, never adequately secured its categorical method. 19 For Popper, the goal of erecting a single, unified language of foundations or satisfactorily grasped the conditions of its own possibility. science gave way to the effort to codify certain methodological principles This would help to explain why the FrankfurtSchool's theory culminated in and to elevate a particular conception of the logical structure of scientific a view of a totally administered world which left it without addressees. theories to normative status. In any case, both positions claimed that natural Indeed, the failure to fully thematize the categories ofintersubjectivity had science provides a model of scientific rationality which the social sciences made it difficult, ifnot impossible in principle, to see the possibilities ofand and history ought to emulate if they are to be considered scientific at all. basis for group formation and collective action within late capitalism. Popper argued that all sciences must seek to develop testable general laws Finally, the unwarranted primacy given to the instrumental relation to which can beused to predict andexplain phenomena, andCarlHempel gave nature might help to account for theFrankfurtSchool'seffortto link human this requirement its precise andcanonical form in his deductive-nomological model of explanation. 20 But owing to the impact of Wittgenstein this 12. Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society; Carmen Sirianni, "Workers' Democracy and Leninism: The Transition to Socialism in Russia, 1917-1921," unpublished dissertation; and 16. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society. pp. 85-90. See Joel Whitebook. "Habermas and Jean Cohen, "System andClass: The Subversion ofEmancipation,"Soci4J Research (Wmter, 1978). the Problem of Nature." Telos. 40 (Summer. 1979) for a good discussion of this issue. 13. Jean Cohen, "Habermas' Political Crisis Theory," unpublished lecture. 17. In formulating these problems I have benefited from a series of lectures given by Trent 14. TheotherpoleofHorkheimerand Adomo'sworK atthis timewas Adomo'smicrological Schroyer and Albrecht Wellmer at the New School for Social Research in Spring. 1973. analyses of cultural forms. See Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics (New 18. See A. J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (New York. 1972). York, 1977); and Andrew Arato's essay in Arato, E. Gebhardt, cds., The Essential Frtlnkfun 19. Karl Popper. The Logic ofScientific Discovery (New York, 1965). School Reader (New York. 1978), pp. 185-224. 20. Carl Hempel, Aspects ofScientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of 15. A. Wellmer, "The Linguistic Turn," p. 245. Science (New York. 1965). 50 Mendelson The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 51 neo-positivist perspective is no longer characteristic of analytic philosophy sciences, the constitutive subjectivity therefore cannot be restricted to the as a whole. Wittgenstein's later philosophy has implications for the philosophy knower when it comes to the realm of social life. This shows that the trans­ of social science which diverge fundamentally from the positivist view he c~mkntaLapproacb breaks d9WA when-extengeTruth and Method (New York, 1975).

______~ __-='~~=_=_.=__=_=_===__=_.==_~~-~~=o~- _ The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 53 52 Mendelson took it up in a positive way. Dasein's "throwness" was not a source oferror transposition and reexperiencing would enable the knower to transcend his to be overcome but rather t e condition t osslbilit of historical historically-specific life situation. Thus, Dilthey ultimately remained knc.>wledgc::. There ore, Gadamer sees his own work as an attempt to work oriented to the model ofa neutral observer an(t~~!e~oped a f~~a1!lentaUy out the implications of Heidegger's ontological analyses for the process of SiiiiiemiJlatiVe concejiUit k'em~ U'he reconstrueliOii oran alien historical understanding. Gadamer wants to formulate a "theory of meaning liberated from any linkage to the interpreter's own history. hermeneutical experience" which will "do justice to the historicality of Gadamerextends his attack to a related elementofSchleiermacher's and understanding."32 Dilthey's hermeneutics. Both tended to define the ultimate aim ofinterpre­ W~!le G!d~me~ brought Heidegger's ontological insights into a tation as the reconstruction ofthe psychic state orworldview oftheauthorof closer, CfltlcaTrelation to the methodology ofthe human sciences. he never­ the text (or of the historical actors involved in an event). For Gadamer this theless analyzed verstehen in the context of"philosophical hermeneutics" ­ has the effect ofreducing the text to a mere expression ofthe inner life ofits an essentially o~o~ic~~de of inquiry. His basic concern was not to authorrather than a claim to truth which addresses itselfto the interpreterin defend a particular methodology of social science but to d~n6e "what the present. Gadamer wants to show that the genuine object of interpreta­ ~~ccurs~.:.iP,Jl.99~~anding.He rejected a specificatIy meth03010grcaI tion is the meaning of the text Itselr(Or of lllenisfOiiCifevent), and that approac~cause it lias te~to obscure the universal scope of the ~!pretatioi1involvernonn~1T~roKtiQijJir,psYd!I~~~~t~sbut the inte: "hermeneutical phenomenon" by isolating the interpretive practices ofthe ration ofthe ob.ect into a totality which contains th~ interpreteris'welland human sciences from the broader processes of understanding in human I s ap~ication to t e presenC1n- tliis prOCess of integration the posslbitlty existence.33 ~r. Gadeer the hermeneutic phenomenon is universal; it ffi"at t e text expresses 'A' truth which still resonates in the present is em.braces ~ctlVltieS of understanding which permeate a1l our experiences. maintained. Romantic hermeneutics and historicism tend to factor out the PhIlosophical hermeneutics, following Heidegger, focuses on this funda­ twth:J:laim oiThe text.!>es~~se of their e~_e!t~~1I!.~B.~..~~~(~~en. But m~ntal and encompassing quality of understanding as a mode of human for Gadamerinterpretation ofhistorical tradition "always mediates truth, in bemg. Nevertheless, because he elaborated his ontology of understanding which one must try to share."29 The dualism expressed in the title Truth and b~ means ofan attack on the philosophical self-understanding ofthe human Method refers to the failure of scientific methodology to provide room for sCiences (aswell as oncontemporaryaesthetic consciousness andphilosophy those "experiences of truth" in which an element oftradition speaks to us. oflanguage). Gadamerilluminated some ofthe implications ofHeidegger's Since Gadamer believes that the task for today is "tofree ourselves from radicaliz~d herme?eutics for the problems ofmethodology. He hoped that the dominant influence of Dilthey,"30 Heidegger'sexi~te.!!t!IlU')!!~!121I!~­ by dra~m attention ~~ the ontological riori of -ding and the nology appears to him as a first and cruc@ step in this process. Heidegger p~rvasl~eness ~£ traditIon he £Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 34. Misgeld, op. cit. (New York, 1962), pp. 26-7,62.

===---===:-::-======-=====~ =.~_=~ .=.=-==:-_. ._--__-__- -._-.'h. __••. _ The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 55

Thus, according to Gadamer there is an unfounded prejudice at work in meaning which can be realized by future interpreters insofar as they investi­ historicism; it is the Enlightenment's prejudice against prejudice itself. gateiffrom differingperspectives. Inprinciple the object is continuallyopen Historicism adopts ihiSj;rejiiCli'CeWTiiTe disengaglnjfifTrom-ffie1rnlighten­ to new retrospections which depart from varied hermeneutical situations. ment philosophies of history which romanticism criticized. Instead, histori­ Gadamer demands that the historical embeddedness of the knower be cism embraces the notion ofobjective historical knowledge as a grasping of made conscious through "effective historical consciousness." The way to distant objects from within without imposing the alien standards of the protect against the imposition of arbitrary fore-meanings is to make them present and views this as the final step in the liberation of historical conscious and examine their origin and validity while remaining open to the consciousness from dogmatism. But for Gadamer, historical hermeneutics possibility that they will prove empty in the encounter with the text. This is must overcome this prejudice against prejudice and thereby "open the way not equivalent to the extinction ofself demanded by historicism. Instead, it to an appropriate understanding ofour finitude. "35 A universal self-reflec­ is tile call for a conscious assimilation ~:?ne's Own fore-meanings in orderto tion orabsolute reason which would enable us to stand over and against our avowtlie IZtY.!~Jmy. Qf..bidden pJ:eJlJd~ "37 . heritage is impossible: "History does not belong to us, but we belong to One'sinterpretationofa particularsubject Q!atter stands in a tradition of it.... The focus ofsubjectivity is a distorting mirror. The self-awareness of previou~interpretations ofthe same subject. The totality ofsuch "effects," the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits ofhistorical life. That and, ultImatelY,thc"whole.JJistQri.cal process linking sulUt:£UlDd abject, is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgements, coo~.tit9t~tthe..hwp-tmc:Jltjs;p.lliill!atjQQof the_k~r. Effective history is the constitute the historical reality of his being."36 cham of past interpretations through which the preunderstanding of the Thus, the Enlightenment's antinomy of reason versus prejudice is interpreter is already linked with his object. If it is not to fall re to an abstract. According to Gadamer so is the opposition of reason to authority illusory immediacy, historical understandin m own and tradition proclaimed by the Enlightenment. For our acceptance of involvement in "effective"'.:hlstory. rom IS perspective, ..the true historical authority is usually not based on blind obedience but on recognition of the o~ect IS not an o§.$£La.f.l!!I, 6.!!tlhe uni~ ~f.Sll~~cr..!~A!.~e....~t~e;: (the text other'ssuperior insight, as in the case ofthe teacher, expert, orparent. This a? tlie mterprete~-J.M.): a r~ati.~.)Q~E~p~~ "~Chic~exi~U:)()!~~!hc;.!~~ty of recognition is not the negation of reason but is itself a kind of knowledge. h!~t<:>~nd!hereal~ty,ofhistorIcal understandi?g.":lA The task ofmte..preta­ And traditions are continually being sustained not by their sheer weight or !lon is not simply to reconstruct the distant htirizon out of which the lext longevity but by acts of creative affirmation. In the case of prejudice, spe~ks bu! to attain "a hi er unive !!!in:.!bJ&t Q.v£rwmes.ngt,enluur gwn authority, and tradition a moment ofinsight and self-determination inheres P,~~!~,~!liElJX ..~U!Cl s~<",~, ~t,?Jthec:>t~~"39 In other words, interpretation in what is usually presented as its opposite. must IDvolve the graspmg ofaD tilsloncal totality which embraces both the Gadamer uses the concept of 'horizon' to further specify the knower's text as w.. ell as it.s. effe.ctive-histo.ry.. in Wh... i,Ch. tho.e..k.no.weris em.bed...d.ed:t.bj~r involvement in tradition. Being in a hermeneutical situation embeds the a.~;w2~ie.,s:.tt.Q~~~t£2n~i!!!!SJ,~s..pn$.ltW'V"h!>-~9Q- t!te"Jle~U$~ Jl~ i­ interpreter in a specific horizon, i.e., a standpoint which affords a certain tl~~~< The asslmtlation of this totality in effective-historical consciousness ~ range ofvision. In the human sciences the presence ofsuch horizons can be allows us to see the present within the right circumstances and thereby ,< seen in the questions posed to tradition by the scientist. Gadamer points out allows us to "listen to the past in a way that enables it to make its own . ~''': how the great works in the human sciences always betray the hermeneutical meaning heard," though itcan never eliminate the work of prejudice per ~ situation in which they were written, since the preoccupations ofa particular se; nor is it meant t~, since(clnJnterpr~tation.not animated by fore-meanings '1' epoch enter into the concepts and concerns of historical scholarship. The would be valueless~) . , ~ preconceptions of a particular age enable its historians to interpret To describe the achievement of effective historical consciousness particular aspects oftradition or to see meanings which were inaccessible to Gadamer speaks of a "fusion of horizons." The horizon of the object and other ones. Thus, the temporal gulf between s~ct and object is not an that ofthe subject are moments in a nexus oftradition which embraces them obst!lcle to know~e-bt!!JijjO~~~allrproducti~e;ii.:iJIOwnbe meaning of both. Through effective-historical consciousness the two horizons which tIut9.QjcrC~..l0{ir~~...~J!l~r,ge. The historIcally-emergent variety of fore-struc­ were initially distinguished in the consciousness of the otherness of the tures enable various unsuspected meanings of the object to come to light. object now become fused in the unity ofa historical horizon. However, the Likewise, the object of interpretation must be understood in a correlative way. It is not a single meaning-in-itself but rather a source ofpossibilities of 37. Ibid., p. 238. 38. Ibid., p.267. 35. Gadamer, Truth and Method, op. cit., p. 237. 39. Ibid., pp. 271-2. 36. Ibid., p. 245. 40. Ibid.

.==------~~=______.-_--~ ~-=:=:_--m--=--_~::.====_---· m m_' • __ - The Habermas-Gadamer Debatt! 57 56 .' Mendelson

problem remains that the interpretatio~.~~.sI'!~t~!op atthe achievc:r,nent of The Habermas-Gadamer Debate awareness...of.effective::history. For thi~Js.()nfYJlie, Iratmlwort wmhn which thejnterpretationofthe text itselftakesplace. Whatdoesthis interpretation What is the significance of all this for critical theory? As I mentioned consist of ifit is not a mere reconstruction ofthe author's intentions? What above, Habermas has built into his own work a hermeneutically-informed histo~cal understandi~g I happens to the meaning of the text when it is integrated by effective- theory Of as well as conceptsofintersubjectivityon historical consciousness into an objective totality? Whatdoesitmeantofuse the level ofSOCIal theory and phIlosophy ofhistory. However, in Zur Logik the past with the present? For Gadamer this leads to the "fundamental der Sozialwissenschaften he raised a number of powerful objections to \ Gadam~r's )lermeneqtic ~~m"- the p'~blem of "application." , - theory, the .general theme of which was that G,.adamer had absolutlZ~d h.c:..rm~~tlc un~~~~in~_at_!!t~ t;~~.~ Gadamer argues that un~dingaI~l!1!!.!2!vWh~..E-~of __ of critique. t~-!l1e,.pJ:~,§C;Dl.§!t'!.a.!i.2!L'?tth.t: Qadamer s counterargu'iiieiiiS, on the Otlier llanO: refiectediliC"aOii'&lS he the text interpreter. The reproductive inter­ h~elieved.thatin thisway hewas defending the anchoring ofhuman cases of verstehen, concern is dire~~d noUowaIds_tlte_otbQIL9.ri..&inal eXistence m practical reason, dialogue, and the assimilation of tradition mean~gbuttowa~ te!t~ak,~,~.on.!h.e,e~esent. against a critical theory which seemed to him toshow signs ofsuccumbing to intended the claim tha! the 4 understanding IS commumcation - openmg oneself to wnat the object the scientific idolatry of objectifying methods characteristic ofpositivism. !!abe~as says. This provides a further meaning of the "fusion of horizons." The first of all defended an epistemologicalaeeroach to herme­ ag~~~~G~~~~!~.on~<>.r.o.gi~1~me. limited horizons ofinterpreterand text arefused into a sharedmeaningwith neutics Gadameraistinguished between which both are concerned. As in dialogue, interPretation inxobtes-the Wliat the human SCIences "really aie" ana their false methodological self­ understanding, and argued that his philosophical hermeneutics did not attempt to participate in a meoog;noito 1~!.C1ts£sycholo&c&2pgins. intend to make methodological prescriptions but merely to criticize the T1ie-iiunoTUiiths which misinterpretation of those hermeneutic processes which take staifif"behiriaTi.' . . .."., _"'.,..... ~..__·.....,·...... ~~.h"_-·· place m any case. With this aim in mind, Gadamer attempted to counter­ '·~i"II!"D1ferpreter must understand the text in a new and different way in pose to the sphere of method certain "experiences of truth" in which the he~e~eutic ph~no~enon pre~nts order to apply it to the concrete present situation. Like the translator, he itself in a way not yet restricted by the must bring the text into an intelligible relation with his own cultural milieu. prejudices ofSClenttsm. Accordmg to Habermas, however, this opposition experi~nce The past must be conveyed into and applied to the present. In this process between hermeneutical and methodical knowing is stated too our preunderstandings are transformed. Here the practical meaning of abstractly. For while hermeneutics correctly criticizes the objectivistic self­ verstehen becomes apparent. Because it is immanentlylinked toapplication, understanding ofthe human sciences, it is not consequently freed from the verstehen is itselfa moment in the historical process which serves to mediate concern with methodologyin general. Forhermeneutics "becomes, we fear, Accord~8..!0 tradition, i.e., to preserve and transform it. Interpretation is a moment in eithereffective.within the sciences, ornotatall."42 Habermas, th~ ~~t~.~..!!!IS p~oblem Gl!.~~er's the life ofeffective-history. Our current horizon is constantly being formed liC!..,in Heideggerian-ontolOgiCilT self­ w~~...d.9~~!J~n

~----.."..------~-_ .....~------....------· 60 .Mendelson The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 61

authoritarian fashion. The teacher's authority is recognized by the student science which together with Christianity formed an overall tradition­ who acknowledges his superior knowledge. This is not a case of blind con~ext. So it ~as itself rooted in tradition. But the real meaning of the obedience but indeed rests on a kind of recognition and knowledge. But Enltgh~enment s concept ofreason was not that it negated all tradition and Habermas points out that this framework of authority which mediates authonty. Instead, this concept implied that any authority which contradicts tradition contains the threat ofsanction as well as the possibility ofreward, ~eason hasnoclaimonourobedience. Theideaofrationalityisthereforenot and he refers tothe processesofidentification onthe partofthestudentwith Just anotherpreconception butone ofa "seconaorde?wTi1c1ic("reem~ our the teacher or parent which lend them authority. The point is that even the a~titu~e.toward ~~liefsandnomis iii g~6~i!r:'Reasoiirereistomeatmity of recogniti0n._ of an authOlity which does not seem to be.ba~in_~ men to Judge cntically, not to a naive claim to be outside of all tradition. _authoritarian fashion may be rooted not only in knowledge but also in force Thus, this concept of reason is not simply another prejudice. Instead, it and,fearl:Gadamer'shemeneiiucsseems-tObeuna6leto'inaketIiiS~~as_of}I1akillg_illu~~~imsfor the power ofreflection, as rationalist illusion that functions as a prejudice for the Enlightenment. ~ell asofreinstating that abstract opposition which he had criticized-already Wellmer agrees with him on this point, but questions whether the 10 Truth and Method. Gadamerclaimed that Habermas is dogmatic since he Enlightenment is to be assessed solely in terms of this self-(mis)under­ assumes that reflection always shakes life-praxis.56 But reflection need not standing. Wellmer distinguishes between the Enlightenment'sdogmatic and naive self-interpretation and its genuine critical intentions. The Enlighten­ ment critique of religion was itself rooted in the tradition of empirical 54. G~damer, "On t~e Scope and Function of Henneneutical Reflection," pp. 26-8. 55. Ibid., p. 38. O. Mtsgeld, op. cit., pp. 178-9, points out that, when Gadamersays 'beinlis never fully manifest,' this implies ror him that there are realms of human life which can never 52. Habennas, "OerUniversalitatanspruch derHenneneutik," HermeneUlik und Ideologie­ become reflected, and therefore the attemptought not to bemade. Certain fundamental orders kritik, p. 156. ofhuman life are insusceptibleofrational control: they cannot beproduced but only respected. 53. Wellmer, Critical Theory ofSociety. 56. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Henneneutical Reflection," p. 34. frielldelson The Habennas-Gadamer Debate 63

always be a steptoward dissolving priorconvictions. Authority andtradition addressee penetrates and dissolves the latter. Its normative ideal is the arenot always wrong; yet, l:!!lp_~l11lascansee in them only dogmatic powers, complete elimination of systematic blockages to communication with and therefore, he oppos~sreasonto authority abstractly. Gadamerdoes not oneselforothers. Butitcertainlydoes notclaim to being toconsciousnessall deny the powerofcritical reflection to dissolve what we originally accept on of the addressee's preconceptions - an impossible task. In this sense, the basis of authority, only that it must always do so. In his later "Replik," Habermas agrees that we are "more being than consciousness." Gadameralso pointedto love anddevotion as possible relations toauthority However, it may be thatGadameris referring not to the addressee but to iii order to argue that Habermas' emphasis on coercio~ is. a .one:-sided, the critical theorist. Perhaps he is arguing that critical theory's claim to be dogmatic prejudice.57 a~le to c~t~cize ideologies implies the claim to have purged itselfofall links - These last arguments of Gadamer are rather difficult to accept. WIth .tradltlon so as to evaluate it from the outside or from above. It is I:!!!'ermas2i_~n.Y.een_tho~_.in~vitll~l~ereu!!.~rstandings the. hfe-process of society and contributing to successful processes of incultu~e, al!.d._~hose which derive.simplY-from one's participll:tion false enh~htenm~?t.To be sure~ Gadamer's criticism can be taken as a warning systemat!~l!Y_~~s!-orte!:fonns_of preconcepfionswliicl1' are anchored in_ agamst a cntlcal theory whIch refuses to recognize its hypothetical status in communication: Critical theory hopes to elicit a self-reflectiomn which the t~is way. This is certainly Gadamer's deepest fear about critical theory, as it - ·---::::f\----a :;i.L~,.:,;,t7t1.·:1 t, ' I . , w~ll. \ nr,.vJ7.T't '-".)J"." \"""-, . ... 'It. ' be further shown below. In any case, Habermas explicitly denies that . 57. Gadamer, "R~plik,.. op. cit., p. 305. In his fine discussion ofthis debate, Misgeld argues cnttcaltheoryisguiltyofthe rationalist illusion that Gadamerclaims, and he that recognition ofauthority is an "invariant feature ofhistorical understanding" which occurs insists that it remains bound to the tradition it reflects on. Therefore, he "whenever we affirm that a text of the historical past says something to us which we could not believes that Gadamer's objection does not apply to him and does not really quite have learned in our contemporary environment or simply by discovering it on our own... grasp the crux of their'disagreement. See Misgeld, op. cit., p. 167. Ifthis were the meaning of recognizing authority then certainly it . There is one further possible meaning ofGadamer's argument. Perhaps would be nonsense to counterpose reason to it. But in what sense is authority involved here at all? It is a case of recognition of the superior knowledge of the speaker, but this is based on a It could be interpreted as an objection to general theories perse. 60 Gadamer's b~ause recognition of the validity or insightfulness of what he says, not the authority of his person. argument may idlply that a historically-specific preunderstanding is There is no "surrender of reflection" when we read a text which has something to say to us in this way. 59. Habermas, "Der Universalitatanspruch der Hermeneutik," p. 158. 58. Gadamer, "Replik," op. cit., p. 312. 60. This is the level on which McCarthy tends to discuss the issue. McCarthy, op. cit., p. 261ff. Mntdelson The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 65 always atworkin ourefforts toconstruct ~heori~, andbecauseno amoun~of the other structures with which it is entwined. 62 At the same time, such a reflection can completely purge us of thIS honzon, a general theory which the~~ would become critique of ideology to the extent that by grasping claims to have overcome the limits to its range of applicability which this tradItIon as but one moment of an objective context, it would be able to preunderstanding implies, would be impossible. Habermas himself uses an penetrate its ideological functions. Such a theoretical frame of reference argument like this against positivism and functionalism in ord~r toshow that would tr~nscend the limits of verstehen and make possible a type ofcausal supposedly general laws or universall~-relevantp~tte~ vanables a~ally expla?at~?? ~abermas has explicated the logic of "explanatory-under­ express historically-specific contents, which are only illegItimately generalized. standlOg 10 hIS analyses of psychoanalysis which he believes provides a It might be that one could tum the tables and now a~pl~ this argum~nt methodological model for critical social theories as well. againstotherportionsofHabermas' work, e.g. ~ commumcationorevolution In response Gadamermaintained that hermeneutics by no means assumes theory. However, within the terms of thIS. debate Gadam~r cannot the coincidence of an action's meaning with the actorTs-motives. "Neiffiec­ consistently object to critical theory because ofIts level ofgenerality for the ideologIes nor unc()n~cI~~-;mO!I~~srepJ;.e.s.~l!ll!fiQ1,1liaarfrQ!"li~nner:te"jitics: simple reason that this theory's claim to general applicability is no greater IifSfead, they fall wlthlO ItS scope, SlOce hermeneutics, too, sees that than his own (and Heidegger's) theories of verstehen. In a sense, both "~aning can be ex~riencedeven when it is not intended."63 Gadamer's hermeneutics and critical theory lJ.l_l!Jf.~1lJ.1iy~~:'-c,laims__\lVIli.~~~_~k to strategyorargument here is to defeiitftneumveriiaJity of hermeneutic subsume one anOiiierand which are.mutually.contested. understa?ding by.accusing Habermas ofdefining its limits too narrowly and ----Habermasrefects-the claim to universality which philosophical herme­ by assertlOg that It can encompass the phenomena which Habermas thinks neutics makes in accordance with its ontological self-understanding and transcend it. In the case ofunconscious motives and ideology, it seems that demands that hermeneutic understanding be mediated through critical both Gadamer and Habermas are right in a sense. Gadamer is right to tlieory. There are two steps to his argument: . - . contest Habermas' identification of his position with Winch's since he a) The objective context within which our heritage is appropriated attacked the idea that the author's intention served as a criterion for the real contains more than just "cultural tradition." It is also formed by structures meaning of a text or action throughout Truth and Method. In this sense, oflaboranddomination. Itis true that laborand power, like all social forms, hermeneutics represents an advance over Winch (and phenomenology) and arelinguistically-mediated, andlanguage is therefore a kind ofmeta-institu­ could serve to justify social scientific approaches which do transcend the tion on which all others depend. "But this meta-institution of language as subjective meanings ofactors. Thus, Gadamersees hermeneutic interpreta­ tradition is evidently dependent onsocial processes which are not merg~in ti~ o~fllrringnot only when we understand texts but when we see through normative connections."61 Tradition as a network ofsymbols and meamngs preJudIce!!_ or unmaskafaIse consciousness. Reflection and critique are for is dependent on actual conditions which are more than just structures of h~Jn9.~ts ofunderstanding. Thus, he thinks that theopposition between symbols. Therefore, tr~n is not a comprehens~ve categ~ but_~u.st ~ hermeneuti.cs and Ideology~crlffiiUeis misleading.64 But Habermas is rig grasped in ~elation ~o_~t~e~~Q!l1en.t$-of th~t.~xt. ?? ~IS..b.~SIS when hePOlOts out that the psychoanalytic approach tounconscious motives "11abermas accUSed Gaoamer (like WlOch) .of a kind of.linguIStiC I~~alism and neurotic behavior employs a theory for the pU_lpose ofexplanation, and insofar as lie abso!utiieiiIanguage and fails to grasp those otnermomentsof this differentiates its procedures from ordinary processes of understanding the social life context which form the objective conditions under which meaning. From the perspective ofthe methodology ofsocial science this is a worldviews are empirically constituted. G~_~ewor~~~capable crucial distinction, and Gadamer nowhere deals with it satisfactorily. When Qlde.ali.M-!ith ideologies and uncol!~~~~~!!1~t)!e.s,I.e:;- cases where ~e he asserts that ideologies, too, can be "understood as a false form of ~e ac~a1 ~f subjective me-amogs oIactors veil or distort structure SOCIal linguistic consciousness,"65 then he disregards the difference between the relations or their actual motives. From the POlOt of VIew of the lOgIC ofthe un~erstanding ofsymbolic c.onnections and the explanatory-understanding social sciences, Gadamer's hermeneutics still reflects the}!!J1!~_()f a purely whIch can understand meamngs only to the extent to which it explains their verstehen sociology.- .. ------genesis on the basis of theory. .. .. b)-Given these limits, Habermas goes on to argue that sociology With respect toHabermas' references to work and domination Gadamer cannot confine itself to verstehen procedures, but requires a theoretical denied that "these concrete, so-called real factors are outside the realm of reference-system. Effective-historical consciousness would have to become a theory ofsociety which would integrate the history oftradition with thatof 62. Ibid., p. 289ft. 63. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," p. 30. 64. Ibid., p. 31. 61. Habennas, "Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften," p. 287. 65. Ibid., p. 30. The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 67 hermeneutics."66 He further objected to Habermas' identification of and professional responsibility find no counterpart on the social level. The language with "culturaltradition." Instead, he spokeoflanguage asa "limit­ critical social theorist has no right to "treat" social consciousness as "ill"or less medium which carries everything within it." Accordingly Habermas defective, for there are no doctors and patients here, only social partners. also narrows unduly the scope of understanding since "everything in the Gadamer points to the potentially elitist and authoritarian implications of world is included in the realm of 'understandings' and understandability in the analogy. After all, who decides who is the victim ofdistorted communi­ which we move."67 Gadamerasserted that Habermas' separation ofculture cation and false consciQ.u.s!1~s§? To speak ofdelusiQn in the social rell.!!t!.iito from other "real" factors illegitimately narrows the universality of the p~sueP0se the sole ~ssession oftfie ~$~!_con~n. Butthis is itselfa kind hermeneutic dimension. Hermeneutics does not deny that labor and politics ofdelusion. GadamerTnvokes the danger of a critical theory become social are moments in the formation oflinguistic horizons, but claims that they are technology which applies its external criteria ofrationality tosocial life in an meaningful for us and therefore understandable insofar as they enter our authoritarian way. 69 world. Thus. hermeneutics does not absolutize culture in the way that ThisGadamerian objection can be linked toBurkeand Hegel's critiques Habermassuggests. Itrespects the separation ofthe realm ofmeanings from ofthe French Revolution and ofthe Jacobins in particular.70 It rests on the fundamental economic and political realities. But "the mirror of language legitimate insight that a revolution which seeks a total transformation, a reflects everything that is," and therefore hermeneutics reaches into these negation of every aspect of prerevolutionary life, can be achieved only contexts which condition the "linguisticality" of the human experience of through terror. Thus, Gadamerseekstodefend theclaim thatgenuine social the world. Gadamer denies that hermeneutics claims idealistically that the life is possible only on the basis of a margin of consensus and agreement Jinguistically-articulated consciousness determines the material being of which must always be presupposed by reflection and praxis - and never life-praxis. It only claims that there is no social reality that does not bring abstractly negated on the basis of a.false c.laim t.. o superiority. ~~ciallife-; itself to representation in language. the-symmetrkaJ..rc1atioll-betweenpartners in a game is a more apnnooer1 In a sense Gadamer is again correct. Labor and domination are than that ofdoctor~patient.Everyone IS on relatively equal terms in the 'understood' in the broad sense that they are comprehended by human gallle..in that there are no privileged knowers. There is, however~anlmder­ beings, and this comprehension is articulated in social life as are all other lying consensus which expresses the ontological primacy of tradition and experiencesofthe world. In this sense, language is a universal medium. But which is the condition ofall misunderstanding. For Gadamer we can never Habermas wanted todistinguish between those aspects ofthe social context confront this consensus with the demand for a thorough legitimation since which are structures of symbols - cultural forms - and those aspects we are always immersed in it. which, while symbolically-mediated, are more than that and which, Here again, Habermas was able to argue that Gadamer tends to therefore, pose limits to the universality of language. Ofcourse, work and absolutize tradition. To be sure, there is such an underlying consensus. But domination do enter into language and, in the process ofbeing interpreted, it is necessary to distinguish between the objectivity oflanguage in general­ can affect language's constitution. But as Ricoeur points out, it is necessary which critique makes no claim to surmount - and thefalse consensus which todistinguish between those phenomena which arrive in language and those comes about through coercion and systematicallydistorted communication. which only come to language.68 In this sense, Habermas' distinction retains Since consensus is a normative concept for critical theory, it is able to '-_ its importance. distinguish between a true consensus and a pseudo-consensus. Not every r 7 Finally, Gadamer attacked the analogy Habermas erected between factual agreement is a real supporting consensus. J psychoanalysis and critical social theory. To be sure, he admitted the As for Gadamer's attack on the psychoanalysis-social theory analogy cogency of Habermas' methodological account of psychoanalysis. But he and his fears of the terroristic implications of an overly rationalistic argued, first, that the doctor-patient relation and the emancipatory powerof revolutionary politics, this serves as a proper warning to an authoritarian psychoanalytic theory constitute a special, not a general function of version of critique which enthrones its own ideals as absolute. But reflection which cannot be extended to the social realm. For the broader Habermas has always stressed that c!:!ti~l!t!~e.~ry.provesits v~idi~ on!,--~~ social context is no longer defined by the institutionalized asymmetry addressing itself to.vichms.-of.domination .. and elicTting-aself~refiectionin between doctor and patient. The conditions of institutionalized social roles which the victim recognizes himself in the theory. Oadamer's criticism may

66. Ibid., p. 31- 69. Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," pp. 41-2; and 67. Ibid., p. 25. f uReplik," op. cit., p.304ff. 68. Paul Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 162. 70. Joel Whitebook helped me see this continuity. L_ 71. Habermas, "Oer Universalitatanspruch der Hermeneutik," p. 152ff. ": 68 .?1t{ende!son Tile Habermas-Gadamer Debate 69

have been the impetus for concretizing this further in a model for the theory.74 According to Habermas this change implies that the young Marx's "organization of processes of enlightenment" (which, to be sure, is still strategy of immanent critique can no longer be relied upon. In his early pretty abstract) in which Habermas took pains to protect against an authori­ writings Marx had been able to derive a normative foundation from the tarian interpretationofthe analogy.72 ForGadamertheidealofthegoodlife claims which bourgeois society made for itself in concepts like freedom, forbids claiming insight into the other's self-delusion. But critical theory justice, equality, democracy, etc. By using these norms as a critical standard insists that it can do this providing it addresses itself to the other in a non­ so as to release their utopian content he was merely "singing bourgeois authoritarian and non-manipulative way. Clearly the analogy between society its own tune" when he criticized its failure to live up to them. But, psychoanalysis and critical social theory is.not.perfect, and certailljgstitu­ with the new technocraticideologies which attack practical reason perse, the fional safeguards are missing on the---'evel of'social'-Criticism. 73 But strategy ofimmanent critique founders: "The new ideology is distinguished Habennas, more than other Marxist theorists~· is-aware-Of thedangerous from its predecessor in that it severs the criteria for justifying the organiza­ implications of a critique which fails to see its own hypothetical character tion ofsocial life from any normative refutation ofinteraction, thus depoliti­ and his attempts to provide safeguards against this possibility should not be cizing them. "75 Eitherthese new ideologies have no utopian content against underemphasized. which to measure reality, orelse theirimmanent vision when unfolded issues in a kind of nightmare of cybernetic self-regulation. 76 Thus, Habermas d~ms itnecessaryto_r~t~in~~normative grounds of critique. -. __._--.- To the extent that we stay within the limits of the debate, Habermas' To make Habermas' strategy still more plaUSIble, If should be pointed \/ position can and should be defended. On the issues of epistemology versus' out thatthe history ofMarxist theory also provides good reasons for tackling - 1- ontology. the relation of reason to authority. and the need to mediate this problem. For by the time of Marx's later theories, and still more 3 verstehen through an explanatory-understanding guided by theory, Habermas' evidentlyin SecondInternationalMarxism, the concept ofsocialism came to arguments seem valid. But the controversy with Gadamerhassome implica­ be defined notso much as the radicalization and realization ofthe bourgeois tions for Habermas' approach which did not emerge explicitly in their concepts of freedom and democracy but as the overcoming of private confrontation. In particular the question ofthe relation ofcritical theory to property and the anarchy of the market through state ownership and tradition needs to be raised in a somewhat different manner. centralized planning.77 The authoritarian potential ofsuch a view should by Gadamer has emphasized the anchoring of all forms of understanding, now be obvious to everyone. Given this development, one ofthe strengths reflection, and criticism in the nexus oftradition. However, in recent years, ofHabermas' concept ofcommunication free ofdomination is that it firmly Habe~sJ()Cllsed on the development,ota theoretically-grounaMand links the need to overcome capitalism to the effort to realize the ideals of methodologically-securedpreunderstanding in ilierorm ofgejjerattij~ories freedom and democracy in all areas oflife. This is an ideal which would be - firs!;JiI~~~n.igition.·a:n(rmorereceiiny o(soaalevolutioll.lwantto incapable ofletigimating.single-partydictatorships in the way that orthodox concentrateonthe theoryofcommunication. The motives for moving in this Marxism now does. direction were diverse. Among other things, Habermas hopes to use the On the other hand, the Frankfurt School by the 1940s began to orient ( co~atjol1 theory to dev~ a theory of the linguistic constitution of itself to the vision of a "reconciliation with nature" and to reconceptualize 2 } ex'p_~~!~_, a co!!sensus theory of truth. and a~exElication of the basic and criticize Western historyfrom this vantage point. Habermashas argued, categones ofcritical analyses ofdistorted communication. I do not want to correctly I believe, that this goal is illusory and therefore a critique basedonit queStion the necessity ofa communication theorywith regard to any ofthese will remain moralizing and eschatological. Even Marcuse's attempt to use problems. For it is in relation to a fourth motive that the hermeneutic the level ofdevelopment oftheproductive forces as a measure ofwhatought criticism becomes most relevant. ':i'\ Habermas attempts to use his communication theory to explicate and j~i!YJhe 74. Actually, Habennas' characterization ofstructures of legitimation in liberal capitalism '1 ) normative basis ofcti.tiraJ theQry, i.e., to unfold aviSfonOf8"free fluctuates. While in Strukturwandel der {}ffentlichkeit (Berlin, 1962) he emphasized modem s.Q~!~ty using ..ling~!st~c-E~~~ries. He argues for the need for such a natural law,in Toward aRational Society and in L~gilimation Crisis, he argued that the political grounding by refemngto the change in the structure ofbourgeois ideology. system "finds its justification in the legitimate relations of production," i.e., by reference to Crudely put, Habermas sees this as a movement from modem natural law equivalence exchange (p. 22). And yet later in Legitimation Crisis (p. 75ff.), Habennas and equivalence exchange to technocratic ideologies such as systems presents a richer and more complex characterization oflegitimations during liberal capitalism. On this issue see Jean Cohen, "Why More Political Theory?" Telos, 40 (Summer, 1979). 75. Habennas, Toward a Rational Society. p. 112. 72. Habennas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston, 1973), pp. 30-1. 76. Habennas, Th~ory and Praetiu. p. 268ff. 73. See McCarthy, op. cit.• pp. 211-213. 77. Sirianni,op. ca.

----..,..---....I!.-.-_.-.-.~-._-.:::L======., . . ,J" 70. Mellde/soll The Habermas-Gadamer Debate 71 to be is problematic. For Marcuse himself has shown that technology and This argument cannot really be directly attributed to Gadamer himself, science have become ideological in advanced industrial societies. But, ifthis but is ratheran inference drawn from his position. Gadamertends tosimply is the case, then their level ofdevelopment cannotalso serve unambiguously defend "practical reason" as the antidote to scientism and technological as a critical standard against which one can assess the failures ofthe current rationality. Habermas is right to point out that this is not enough. After the mode of social organization.78 Enlightenment critique of religion and the insights of Marx, Freud, and Thus, there are good reasons within the history ofcritical theory as well Nietzsche it is necessary to admit that practical reason and the area of for trying to explicate the contents and provide grounds for the normative common convictions which sustain it can be ideological and therefore need standpoint of critical theory. But, from a Gadamerian point of view, there to be examined and criticized through the lens ofa theory. Practical reason also seem to be good reasons to be suspicious of the renunciation of the needs to be defended not oply against technological reason but also at times method of immanent critique. For after all, the communication theory is against its own limitations; Gadamer and other Heideggerians, however, meant ultimately to have a practical impact. Itis supposed to guide interpre­ while acknowledging the importance of reflection and criticism (and tations ofthe history ofindividuals and groups so as toenable these subjects Gadamer's model for criticism is clearly the hermeneutic attack on positiv­ to overcome a false consciousness and recognize the illegitimacy of their ism) tends ultimately to fall back on a kind of pre-Enlightenment, quasi­ institutions. The theory aims at becoming a material force by elaborating a Aristotelian defense ofllermeneutic understanding and practical reason per vision in which large numbers ofpeople catch a glimpse ofa possible future se. Therefore, the modeloftheoretically-informed immanent critique which freedom. But the communication theory is elabor!1ted on a self-consciously I am counterposing to Habeimas' communication theory is really a third theoretical level and thus departs from the arena of the traditions which alternative which goes beyond Gadamer's hermeneutic idealism. prevail in everyday life. Is it possible that this will subvert its political Habermas might count~r that he has already shown that the transition effectiveness? Eventually this theory must address itself to those who are from liberal tolate capitalism leads toa drying upofthe sourcesofimmanent enmeshed in these traditions. The theoretically-secured standpoint would critique. But his thinking on this issue seems somewhat inconsistent. In a then have to resonate with groups oflisteners whose pre-understandings are remarkable early work Habermas made enormous strides in unfolding the 81 very differnt indeed, and this does not seem to be an easy gap to close. utopian contents of the bourgeois concept of political freedom. The Dieter Misgeld suggests the problem here: since the encounter between conceptofthe democratic public realm which he developed there feeds into theoretically-grounded norm and addressees will take place in a tradition­ his later formulations concerning "communication free of domination." bound situation, "would he (Habermas-J.M.) not encounter the hazards of However, already in that early work Habermas was documenting the decay having to translate back into contexts ofcommunicative experience a theory of the ideals of modem natural law - both on an institutional and on the formulated on the basis ofabstracting from this experience."79 Might it not ideological level. It is this process which, he claims, undermines the be more politically fruitful to seek out traditions, institutions, and experi­ possibility ofimmanent critique oflate capitalist societies. However - and enceswhich contain a more tangible intimation ofthe ideal- in a language this is the inconsistency or ambiguity I referred to above - his analyses and form more amenable to successful processes of enlightenment? of late capitalism demonstrate not only the rise of technocratic conscious­ Gadamerinsists again and again thatcommunication presupposes that there ness and the attenuation of democratic ideals but also the persistence of are common convictions that can be discovered and developed into a those ideals and ofpractices and institutions embodying them. In Legitima­ broaderagreement.80 Ifthis is the case, then presumably it must apply tothe tion Crisis structures of formal democracy are said to play a definite relation of critical theory to its addressees. Gadamer's fear is tbat critical legitimating function for a state which intervenes on behalf of particular theory harbors autb9ritarian lendeDc~and enthrones itself as free of interests and yet must conceal this fact. To be sure, this is a pseudo-public ideolo.gy. ButHabermasstrives toguard against any such "monological self­ realm of mystifying symbols, spectacles, and rituals which must itself be certainty" by building in the need to_eJicitaJ;orroborating self-reflection on legitimated by a kind of second-order legitimation in the form of the part of th~esseesofth.e-theory. However, the questionremains technocratic reference to experts, and so on. Nevertheless - and I don't whether Habermas''8itempt t(;ground his ideals through linguistic theory think Habermas would deny this - the entire apparatus of constitutions, makes such a corroboration unnecessarily difficult to achieve. elections, parties, and parliaments which embodies democratic ideals still has a living presence in late capitalist societies. This tradition or set of .. 78. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. Ill, 119. 79. Misgeld, op. cit., pp. 182-3. 81. Habermas, Strukturwandel der (j!fentlichkeit. See also Jean Cohen, op. cit., Telos, 40, 80. See e.g. Gadamer, "HermeneuticsandSocial Science," CulturalHermeneutics, 2 (1975), and PeterHohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere, and Culture: Jiirgen Habermas and his 315. Critics," New German Critique, 16 (Spring, 1979). . . ~..- ,...... ~rooitions .can therefore still serve as a reservoir of slogans, symbols, and rational form" still holds, and thatthe historical potentialofthe ideal speech Ideals whIch both anticipate a better society and resonate with large situation for becoming the actual organizing principle of a society can only numbers o~ people. Ifthat is the case, then an immanent critique would still come to fruition in a society which comes close to articulating it on the level seem possl.ble. a~d de~ireable to a critical theory which took seriously of more historically-s~¢ic'ahd" conscious traditions, for instance the hermeneutIc IOslghts IOtO the relation of reflection to tradition of western democracies of(he twentieth century. While in a sense the ideal of theoretical to practical reason. 82 ' rational consensus may ~e' ihiirian~nt in language per se and not simply an The issue is not an easy one to decide, and there are other arguments in externalstandard, in mostsdc~ties itis bound to remain unarticulated in the favor of Habermas' approach: actual culture. It become$"politically relevant as an ideal to be consciously 1. The method of immanent critique seems to encounter its limits striven for only in societie~~hich have begun to approach it on the level of w~~n it confronts societies whose prevailing ideologies don't yield a useful theirown cultural traditioDi. Butthe Gadamerianmight then argue thatone cntlcal standar~. After a~l, how does one sing a fascist society its own tune, must then criticize these traditions immanently and notgetsidetracked in an or a bureaucratIc centralIst one? When one criticizes these societies in the esoteric theoretical directi~n. name, say, of democratic socialism is that an immanent or external In any case, for it to become a historically-effective standard the rather critiq~e? A~d ifit is external, then it would seem that the presupposed claim formal criteria ofundistorted communication would have to be articulated to umversalIty of the standard would have to be justified. as a more concrete vision ofnew institutional structures. Gadameremphasizes . ~. If ~n~ takes seriously Max Weber's description of modem that visions ofthe good life always have an element ofindeterminacy which IOdustnal socIetIes as those in which a plurality of ultimate values of cannot be eliminated theoretically but only in the course ofbeing mediated :'gO?S," ~oexist, each adhered to by devoted followers, then the demandfor with particular situations in a fundamentally practical context. 83 This JustIficatIon ofone's own would seem to arise again. Of course it may be relation of the universal to the particular constitutes an unbridgeable gulf tha~ such a justi~cation is impossible and that at bottom the:e are only beween practical reason and theoretical natural science which subsumes the pos~ts, acts. of WIll, and ,decis~~ns which spring from elemental depths of particular under the general. Perhaps Habermas could argue that the one s expenence. Weber s pOSItIon was something like this, and on this basis immanentcritique I have beenexamining is a sortofnextstep in theprocess, he ~~~anded the exclusion of value-judgements from social science. i.e. that once a theoretical grounding for certain values has been secured, POSltIVIS~ has. ~ollowed ~im along this course. But if critical theory is to the work of theory is to concretize this into more down-to-earth demands, attack thl~'p0sltIon a~~n I~eolo~ which.discredits critique while paving the alternatives, and so on. From this point ofview, communication theory and way for a value-free SOCIal sCIence whIch places itself at the service ofthe the immanent interrogation of historically-specific traditions are not powers that be, then it seems necessary that it try to ground its own ideals alternatives but complementary steps in a single process. In this case one and defend the susceptibility of val~es to rational justification. And this is would not seek to abandon the communication theory - which may after one of the ~oals of Habermas' communication theory. all be true - but only to grant it a somewhat different overall role than 3.. FI~ally, Habermas could argue that it is not fair to describe his Habermas has ascribed to it. c~O?~um~tIon theory as laying the groundwork for an external form of Ricoeur has argued that "thereare no otherpaths, in effect, for carrying ~tlclsm. Smce he claims that this theory reveals a norm which is immanent out our interest in emancipation than by incarnating it within cultural 10 all pr?ce~ses of communication, i.e., that is constitutive of linguistic acquisitions. Freedom only posits itself by transvaluating what has already commumcation per se. I find no reason to quarrel with this claim. And it been evaluated." Otherwise, "theself-positing offreedom is condemned to seems quite plausible that the ultimate historical ground of criticism lies in remain either an empty concept or a fanatical demand."84 The question tho~e (~?b~,rmas wo~ld ~ot use this word) experiences of "peaceful inter­ remains open how serious these hermeneutic insights conflict with the more sUbJect~vlty or dO~lOa~on-freedialogue against which the experience of recent trends in Habermas' development. constramt and dommatlon has always stood out in more or less sharp 83. Gadamer, "Repli1t," p. 315. cont~ast. But do~s t~is really s~~ve the problem? Habermas would probably 84. Ricoeur,op. cit., p. 165. Ricoeur tries to mediate between what he sees as an overly admIt that Marx s dICtum that reason has always existed but not always in abstract dualism of understanding and explanation. However, while highly suggestive, his article at times tends to misrepresent the positions he criticizes. For instance, he argues that Habermas' methodological dualism is overdrawn because explanation must be "completed in 82. Habermas' evolution theory adds to the ambiguity by reaffirming the constitutive understanding," in a "resymbolization" which enhances understanding and communication. cha~~~r of~iversalisticp~ciplesfor liberal and latecapitalist societieswhile stiD denying he But this is exactly Habermas' point. He does not simply counterpose explanation to under­ possIbIlity ofunmanent cntlque. See Habermas, Communication and the Evolution ofSociety standing but defends a notion of"elplanatory-understanding" which is to issue in just the kind trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1978), pp. 95-97. ' ofresymbolization that Ricoeur claims is missing.