Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method Revisited: on the Very Idea of a Fusion of Horizons in Intense, Asymmetric and Intractab
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Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method Revisited: On the Very Idea of a Fusion of Horizons in Intense, Asymmetric and Intractable Conflicts Oliver Ramsbotham Abstract: This article is the second part of a two-part paper. The first part was my chapter ‘Hans- Georg Gadamer’ published by the Dialogue Society in Dialogue Theories II in 2016. In the 2016 chapter, I showed how Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ as expounded in his great book, Truth and Method (1960), influenced conflict resolution attempts to overcome cultural clashes and inspired the United Nations millennial ‘dialogue of civilisations’ forty years later. This article begins with a brief recapitulation of the theme of my previous paper,1 but then moves on to a constructive critique of Gadamer’s approach in the spirit of Critical Dialogue Studies that suggests how it can be supplemented and made more effective in circumstances where otherwise it does not yet gain purchase. In the second section I look at attempts to apply Gadamerian hermeneutic conflict resolution to the most difficult cases of intense, asymmetric and as yet intractable conflict. I argue that these attempts are premature because they ignore the chief linguistic feature of such conflicts – radical disagreement. As a result, the aim to transform or prevent actual or potential conflict by promoting hermeneutic dialogue and a fusion of horizons does not yet gain traction. In the third section, I revisit Gadamer’s Truth and Method and trace the refusal to take radical disagreement seriously to the founding assumptions of his philosophical hermeneutics. I emphasise his impressive – and less well known – struggles with the very concepts of ‘the horizon’ and ‘the fusion of horizons’ that result. I end by suggesting how hermeneutic conflict resolution can be supplemented and revised in the light of this so that the ground can be prepared even in the most intransigent phases of conflict for its initiation or revival. Oliver Ramsbotham is an Emeritus Professor of Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford 1 Ramsbotham, O. (2016), ‘Hans-Georg Gadamer’ in Dialogue Theories II, ed. Omer Sener, Frances Sleep and Paul Weller, London: Dialogue Society. 74 Journal of Dialogue Studies 7 From Philosophical Hermeneutics to Hermeneutic Dialogue Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode) is not a book about conflict, but a book about hermeneutics – understanding texts from other times and other cultures. It is about interpretation (Auslegung). In Gadamer’s book interpreting a text is seen as a dialogue between object and interpreter. In the application of Gadamer’s ideas to human conflict and conflict resolution it works the other way – a hermeneutic dialogue is seen as a mutual interpretation of texts. In this opening section I give a brief resume of my former article. For Gadamer’s biographer: To the extent that individuals and cultures integrate this understanding of others and of the differences between them within their own self-understanding, to the extent, in other words, that they learn from others and take a wider, more differentiated view, they can acquire sensitivity, subtlety and a capacity for discrimination. (Warnke 1987, 174) Contributors to the Festschrift presented in 2002 in honour of Gadamer’s hundredth birthday say the same: [Gadamer’s] single most important insight may turn out to be a conceptual scheme that allows us to overcome cultural conflicts as well as clashes of different forms of life. (Arnswald 2002: 35) Writing in 2011, Fabio Petito agreed that ‘the Gadamerian-hermeneutical model of “fusion of horizons” can help us to understand what the process of inter-civilisational dialogue might look like’ (Petito 2011, 14). Much of the first part of Truth and Method is related to the origins of hermeneutics in the West such as the interpretation of sacred texts, and to its development and expansion by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) who introduced the idea of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ and by Wihelm Dilthey (1833–1911) who extended hermeneutics to cover all the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and was influential in his rejection of the idea that the ‘scientific method’ of the natural sciences (objective, neutral, culture-free, universal) could be applied to the social sciences. But for Gadamer the decisive shift in hermeneutics came with the eruption of the ‘existential’ or ‘ontological’ hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger. It is not possible to do justice to Heidegger’s contribution here. But one key element for Gadamer was Heidegger’s extension of the idea of the ‘hermeneutic circle’ to the insight that Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method Revisited: On the Very Idea of a Fusion of Horizons in Intense, Asymmetric and Intractable Conflicts 75 the interpreter is never separate from what is interpreted. The thinker is already a product of tradition, of history, an existing being (Dasein) ‘thrown’ into the world that is at the same time to be interpreted. Heidegger demonstrated the significance of the fore-conceptions that precede and shape experience, and through which the future discloses itself through our never ending and intensely practical discursive engagement with things.2 So it is that most of the ideas that have influenced later attempts to apply hermeneutic dialogue in conflict resolution are found in the latter part of Truth and Method from the point where Gadamer addresses the thinking of Martin Heidegger (2003: Part II: II (254–307)). He calls his own development of the ideas of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Heidegger ‘philosophical hermeneutics’. Truth and Method is a continuous struggle to find a route for human understanding (Ve rstehe n ) between two erroneous – albeit almost irresistible – dead ends. On the one hand, Gadamer continually tries to distance hermeneutics from subjectivist or relativist ideas, hence the unqualified use of the word truth (Wahrheit) in his title. Understanding the other is not just becoming familiar with a different subjective world but addressing an initially rival claim to truth. On the other hand, Gadamer also wants to distance hermeneutics from the objectivist idea that there is a scientific method (Methode) that gives insight to an interpreter independent of any reciprocal relation with what is being interpreted. For Gadamer to apply a simple subject/ object dichotomy of this kind is entirely misleading. We are already part of a history that shapes us (Wirkungsgeschichte), and all our mutual interpretations take place in language within which – however ‘forgetful’ we may usually be about this – our own socially conditioned being is already constituted. Understanding is relational. We do not discover truth from outside as individual investigators. It reveals itself from within as we encounter each other in dialogue.3 So we begin with Gadamer’s notion of prejudice (Vorteilung), the fore-understanding that we as interpreters bring to the text (or object) that we are wanting to understand. For Gadamer hermeneutics begins when we become aware of what interrupts or challenges our fore-understanding: understanding becomes a special task only when natural life, this joint meaning of the meant where both intend a common subject matter, is disturbed. 2 For Gadamer’s account of his own life and influences see his Philosophical Apprenticeships, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985). 3 See Hans-Herbert Kogler for a thoughtful explication and critique of Gadamer’s efforts here: ‘A critique of dialogue in philosophical hermeneutics. Journal of Dialogue Studies 2, no. 1 (2014), 47. 76 Journal of Dialogue Studies 7 (Gadamer 2003, 180) [original italics] This introduces the idea of the horizon (der Horizont – a term borrowed from Nietzsche and Husserl) as that beyond which we cannot see: Every finite present has its limitations. We define the concept of ‘situation’ by saying that it represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of situation is the concept of ‘horizon’. The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. (2003, 302, original italics) a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see. (2003, 306) We only become aware of our prejudices (limits to our understanding) when we are confronted by and acknowledge what does not fit in with or challenges them: A person who does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what manifests itself by their light. (2003, 360) The encounter with a traditionary text can provide this provocation. For what leads to understanding must be something that has already asserted itself in its own separate validity. Understanding begins, as we have already said above, when something addresses us. This is the first condition of hermeneutics. (2003, 299) What is at stake in the encounter is not merely subjective perception, therefore. What is at issue is the object or ‘subject matter’ or ‘thing’ (die Sache) that the encounter is about. This is not within the sole power of either to determine individually: This is not an external matter of simply adjusting our tools; nor is it even right to say that the partners adapt themselves to one another but, rather, in a successful conversation they both come under the truth of the object and are thus bound to each other in a new community. (2003, 379) To sum up: Transposing ourselves consists neither in the empathy