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71-27,638 PETERS, Richard Alvin, 1930- NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, JULY, 1933— JANUARY, 1935. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1971 History, modern University Microfilms. A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan © Copyright by Richard Alvin Peters 1971 THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, JULY, 1933 - JANUARY, 1935 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY RICHARD ALVIN PETERS Norman, Oklahoma 1971 NAZI GERMANY AND THE VATICAN, JULY, 1933 - JANUARY, 1935 APPROVED BY jj . (l/LëUüW V \ DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PREFACE As a result of Rolf Hochhuth's play, The Deputy, in recent years the world has focused a great deal of attention on the relations between the Vatican and the Third Reich. In particular, The Deputy has stimulated interest in Pope Pius XII, and his position concerning the fate of the Jews during the Second World War. The resulting controversy has brought forth a barrage of books, most of which have taken extremely partisan stands on this subject. The vast majority of these publications, however, emphasize the role of the Pope rather than the Reich government, and deal only with the War years. By contrast, except for the Reich Concordat of 1933i his torians have not researched carefully the period which begins immediately after the Concordat and concludes in 1939, the year which saw both the outbreak of the War and the election of Cardinal Eugenio Pacelli as Pope. This is somewhat surprising, especially since Pius XII played an extremely important role in Reich-Vatican relations during this period as the Cardinal Secretary of State under Pope Pius XI. It is the intention here to fill part of this void, i.e., the first two years of the Hitler regime, iii The major portion of this study is based upon the documents of the German Foreign Ministry, the majority of -which were obtained at the Foreign Office Library in London and remain unpublished. In addition, the published Documents on German Foreign Policy have been a great value. Obviously, the Vatican archives are necessary to complete this study but they are unavailable for this period. While the lack of these documents is unfortunate, it is not as serious as it first appears for two reasons. First, the notes which the Vatican sent to the Reich government are found in the German as well as the Vatican archives. Sec ondly, scholars have examined the correspondence between Vatican authorities and the members of the German Episco pate, which is located in the diocesan archives in Germany. Thus, there is a considerable body of knowledge available concerning the Vatican's position toward the religious situation in Germany apart from those found in the Foreign Ministry archives. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that without access to the Vatican archives there is much that we cannot know, especially concerning the events on the "inside" of the Vatican and the formation of Vatican policy toward Germany. We would like to know more, for example, about the relationship between Cardinal Pacelli and Pope Pius XI, and to what extent they agreed or disagreed on Vatican policy. If it is true, as all observers seem to concur, that Pope Pius XI administered Vatican affairs in iv an authoritarian manner, then why did he at the same time allow Cardinal Pacelli to assume so much responsibility in German affairs? There are also questions concerning the role played by other Vatican authorities, but it is impossible to assess their role without the Vatican archives. Thus, when it comes to explaining "why" the Vatican pursued a specific policy this study is limited. It does attempt to explain what is traditional in Vatican diplomacy and the position the Vatican could be expected to take based upon Catholic doctrine. Occasionally, when warranted by logic and the evidence in the German docu ments, a few suppositions are offered concerning the motives behind Vatican policy, but they are not intended to be definitive. On the other hand, in regard to the formation of German policy toward the Vatican, this study is more complete. Even here there are occasional gaps in the archives, but on the whole the German record is well documented for the period covered. At the outset I would like to make it clear that I have made no effort to prove or disprove any particular point of view. In respect to both the Nazis and the Vati can, I feel compelled to neither censure nor exonerate, but only to draw conclusions from the evidence uncovered. I admittedly share the abhorrence of the Hitler regime which is characteristic of nearly all Americans, but I have still attempted to be charitable to the Nazis if the occasion seemed to call for it. Although this study presents no single "thesis," it does ask and attempt to resolve a number of questions. Some of these questions are: (l) the extent of Hitler's involvement in Reich- Vatican relations during this period and to what end; (2) the role of the German Foreign Ministry and its rela tion to the Reich Ministry of Interior in forming policy toward the Vatican; (3) the effectiveness of the Reich Concordat as a legal weapon in protecting Catholic rights; and (4) the significance of the Communist threat in pro viding a common basis for German-Vatican collaboration. Finally, because of the controversy which has surrounded Cardinal Pacelli, an effort is made to determine his role in Reich-Vatican relations while he served as Cardinal Secretary of State. For example, the claims of German officials that Pacelli was a more compromising and an easier man to work with than Pius XI will be examined as closely as possible. This is especially important be cause Pacelli has since been severely criticized for failing to speak out while the Nazis methodically mur dered several million Jews. The question is, did Pacelli reveal attitudes or pursue policies as Secretary of State that would help us to understand better his puzzling silence on the Jewish question as Pope? I have devoted considerable space to the background, which must be understood before one can appreciate the vi complexities of Reich-Vatican relations. Thus, Chapter I introduces the principal characters in both the German Foreign Ministry and the Vatican, while Chapters II and III survey the relations between the Nazis and German Catholics up to the conclusion of the Concordat. I have also found it necessary to integrate into the story of Reich-Vatican relations some of the high points of the Church conflict inside Germany. This is itself a lengthy and complex subject, and an effort has been made to keep the space devoted to these internal events to a minimum. It is nevertheless far too intimately intertwined in Germany's relations with the Holy See to be omitted, be cause the treatment of Catholics inside Germany directly affected the attitude of Vatican authorities toward the Nazis. Fortunately, Guenter Lewy has provided a serious study of this subject in The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany, which has helped immensely. Although this is essentially a diplomatic study, it is unusual in the sense that its scope is broader than the majority of such studies. It is concerned not only with political issues, but also with religious and racial questions, and the ageless problem of Church versus State. During the twenties and early thirties, the Catholic Church had to determine its position toward a movement whose leaders were known to hold views hostile toward Christianity. This was not an easy assignment, and it is V l l not surprising that the Church authorities sometimes appeared confused and inconsistent in determining the proper course to pursue. Unfortunately, there was no confusion on the part or Adolf Hitler, who from the very beginning set out to destroy the independence and author ity of the Catholic Church in Germany. To accomplish this goal he sometimes used the diplomatic approach, as when the Reich government negotiated the Concordat with the Vatican. At other times he relied upon intimidation and terror. But regardless of the political tactics used for the occasion. Hitler's goal remained unaltered. In preparing this study, I am grateful to a number of individuals who in various ways have provided valuable assistance. Among those whom I would like to acknowledge are Mr. K. Hiscocks of the Foreign Office Library in London, Mrs. U s e R. Wolff and her staff at the Wiener Library in London, and Mrs. Auguste Cooper and Miss Anne Lynch, both of Edmond, Oklahoma. Finally, I would like to thank the members of my committee for their time and consideration, and especially Dr. Gordon D. Drummond, who has offered many constructive comments along the way. vxxx TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PREFACE................................................ iii Chapter I. INTRODUCTION ................................ I Part I : Nazi Foreign Policy and the German Foreign Ministry Part II: The Vatican II. GERMAN CATHOLICISM VERSUS NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN THE WEIMAR ERA................. 40 Part I : The Position of the Nazi Party Toward the Catholic Church Part II: The Catholic Response to National Socialism III. JANUARY 30 - JULY 20, 1933: CAPITULATION AND REAPPROACHMENT..........................65 IV. JULY 21 - SEPTEMBER 10: FROM THE SIGNING OF THE CONCORDAT TO ITS RATIFICATION . I04 V. SEPTEMBER II - DECEMBER 3I : THE FIRST APPLICATION OF THE CONCORDAT.............. 128 VI. JANUARY 1, 1934 - MARCH l 4 : A DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS ............... I?4 VII. MARCH 15 - JUNE 29 : THE REICH GOVERNMENT ENCOUNTERS INCREASED CRITICISM .......... 212 VIII. JULY I - SEPTEMBER 30: THE REICH GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO RESTORE CATHOLIC CONFIDENCE.........................244 IX. OCTOBER 1, 1934 - JANUARY I3 , 1935: TO THE SAAR PLEBISCITE.....................275 X.