PIN•Points Processes of International Negotiation Network Perspectives 41/2015

Should we Negotiate with Terrorists?

Time and Reconciliation Dealing with Festering Wounds

Negotiating Crowd Behavior

Diplomatic Negotiation: Essence and Evolution 2 PIN•Points 41/2015

EDITORIAL

Spring 2016 (a season rather than real question of even deeper impor- Spring uprising against a murder- a weather designation!) is an excit- tance to the negotiations is, What ous regime, has constantly evaded ing and dangerous time for crucial are Russia’s aims? Are they fixed or attempts at negotiation in search of political negotiations. Four major are they a function of the reaction a ripe moment. The end of phase negotiating arenas pose enormous at each step, revaluated accord- one of the uprising could be marked questions to process analysis and ing to the response the last step by the failed non-negotiations in deliver important lessons. has gotten. The Western aims are January 2014 at Geneva II, where pretty clear, if flexible. They started the conflict was manifestly unripe The Ukrainian crisis has run over with a desire to maintain Ukraine’s and as a result the Free Syrian Army a series of ceasefire that have im- territorial integrity and to involve it (FSA) and National Coalition of Syria mobilized Ukrainian forces while in association wit the EU and possi- Opposition and Revolutionary Forc- being broken by Russian and rebel bly within NATO, and were whittled es (SOC) were absent. It was folly forces. It is a case of multiparty down to the first, as a way to get to call negotiations to address the negotiations, with different parties Ukraine back on its economic feet. Annan Principles adopted in Geneva participating differently. Behind the (Given the Russian mood, the con- I when the FSA-SOC was too weak Ukrainian government stand the sideration of Ukraine’s (and a fortiori and divided and the Asad regime Western countries playing different Georgia’s) membership was a dumb was still unshaken in its belief that roles: France and Germany are do- and provocative move). But it is not it could hold on and that its people ing the negotiating and the US is clear whether Russia intends to give (those who were left) wanted it to. applying the sanctions on Russia, eastern Ukraine the Crimean treat- with some European support, in an ment (annexation), the Abkhazian Lessons: Negotiations called in effort to provide a cost that will level treatment (protected secession), or the absence of a mutually hurting the playing field and create a stale- the Belorus treatment (predominant stalemate will not draw a good mate propitious for negotiations. influence over the whole country). attendance That point has not been reached And stepping outside the Ukrainian as yet and so the two ceasefires sector, it is not clear whether there Since then, the vacuum of power negotiated at Minsk are selectively is a larger ladder, going from the and order created by the conflict observed only in the sectors that Caucasus to Ukraine to the Baltic lent itself instead to the rise of are less important to Russia and state, who are members of NATO. an authoritarian, dogmatic force the eastern Ukrainian rebels. The Yet these two sets of unknowns of fanatics, the so-called khilafa US threatened to raise the cost about intentions impact the negotia- or Islamic State (IS) and a three- during the second Minsk negotia- tion approach: does the West seek cornered struggle between Asad, tions by indicating it might supply to make an agreement on a stable the FSA-SOC and the Islamicists. some arms to Ukraine. But once the outcome on Ukraine or on Ukraine The West, which had neglected to ceasefire was signed, without wait- as the central piece of a whole sec- support the first group found itself ing for implementation, the US, in tor? Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov allied with the second, which it had its style, said it never meant it, and has indicated that Russia would like qualified as the evil enemy, against so the truce was broken and the key a territorial definition of relations the third. This time it is the West rail town of Debaltseve linking the along the new Armored Curtain. that is uncertain what it wants, or two sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk But is that a lasting relationship or what it wants least. Not only has was taken. just another step, and what would there been a vacuum in the conflict, it look like (Crimea, Abkhazia, or that IS seeks to fill, but also in the Lessons: A threat and an agree- Belorus)? negotiations, as Russia in February ment are only as good as their picked up the challenge and called implementation. The Syrian crisis, suddenly turned its “Geneva” in Moscow. Again, into a major conflict where reli- FAS-SOC did not come, officially, but But if there was waffling on the gious sectarian and regional power the bases of negotiations with the methods on the Western side, the struggles have submerged an Arab Asad regime may have been laid,

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CONTENTS COLOPHON PINPoints Copyright 2015 PIN

PINPoints is the biannual publication 5 GUY OLIVIER FAURE of the Processes of International SHOULD WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS? Negotiation Program (PIN). 7 I WILLIAM ZARTMAN PIN is a non-profit group of scholars CONLICT PREVENTION AND NEGOTIATION and practitioners that encourages and organizes research on a broad 16 VALÉRIE ROSOUX spectrum of topics related to TIME AND RECONCILIATION DEALING WITH FESTERING WOUNDS international negotiation seen as a process. The PIN network includes 21 MARK ANSTEY more than 4,000 scholars and NEGOTIATING CROWD BEHAVIOR practitioners of international negotiation. The organization is 27 MIKHAIL TROITSKIY presided over by a Steering Committee, FOCAL POINTS IN ARMS CONTROL which organizes its many activities and edits the PINPoints. 34 PAUL MEERTS DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION, ESSENCE AND EVOLUTION PIN is a project of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 41 I WILLIAM ZARTMAN ‘Clingendael’, a leading think tank NEW PIN PROJECT 2015: CLOSURE: HOW NEGOTIATIONS END and academy on international affairs, European integration and security issues based in The Hague.

Issue editor: Paul Meerts

Editorial committee: Paul Meerts, Sander des Tombe STEERING COMMITTEE: & Wilbur Perlot

Language editing: Rebecca Solheim

Design and lay-out: Symon Maks - www.maksimaal.nl F. O. HAMPSON O. F. M. ANSTEY M. FAURE G. O. C. ALBIN C.

Contact The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ Wilbur Perlot, PIN Coordinator T. MASSELINK T. MEERTS P. PERLOT W. M. MELAMUD M. Clingendael 7 2597 VH The Hague The Netherlands

T +31 70 374 6681 E [email protected]

V. ROSOUX V. SCHÜSSLER R. TROITSKIY M. ZARTMAN W. I W www.pin-negotiation.org 4 PIN•Points 41/2015

under new auspices. The rise of IS ognition of the de facto move. It and plenty of new questions, many may be in the process of creating a is therefore not an unusual occur- of which have been included in hurting stalemate for the other two rence; its success depends on its the articles of this PIN program sides, much as the rise of Hamas support by a strong power, prefer- publication. created a ripe moment for Israel ably next door. UDI gives the newly and the PLO at Oslo in 1993 and the independent party status; it also en- In the first article, for example, rise of IS may be having the same dangers any dependency relations Guy Olivier Faure puts to forth an effect of the rival governments of and cooperation with the former insightful analysis of the require- Libya negotiating in Morocco. suzerain and risks turning the con- ments for useful negotiations with flict into an international war. But parties that adhere to the “nothing The Israeli crisis reaches the 70th it would be a game-changer, and but the sword” principle. In the first anniversary of the first negotia- that’s what is needed, new Israeli of his two articles, I William Zart- tions and still running. There is no government or not. man expands upon the importance stalemate; Israel is running over of the levels of immediacy when Palestine and building on it; Pal- But the Iranian crisis over non-pro- looking at the role of negotiation in estine is taking it to court. Both liferation constitutes the pinnacle conflict prevention. Valérie Rosoux policies are likely to spin out further, of these world events. Negotiation follows by similarly emphasizing further angering the opponent. The between Iran and the P5+1 (Big the role of time, or, more precisely, interacting escalation is in full swing 5 plus Germany) reached a head. when reconciliation becomes nego- and has been going on for a while; For negotiations analysts it is an tiable. Mark Anstey elaborates in his by giving nothing to the Palestinian impressive case of how much less article on what can be gained from Authority (PA), Israel elected Hamas than what either side demands are the seemingly recent phenomenon in 2006, and Hamas hardened Is- acceptable to itself and to the other of negotiating with crowds. In light rael. Israel would have much rather party? It poses the basic nature of of this ever so complicated world, just have a compliant PA subcon- negotiation: Giving something to Mikhail Troitskiy argues in his contri- tracting security, but the situation get something, and confronts the bution that symbolic references can was untenable. At some point, the negotiators with the operative ver- play a vital role in facilitating the tightening stalemate will begin to sion: How much are we able to give coordination among actors. These hurt but it can also strengthen re- to get how much of what we want to focal points can for instance be solve and lead to further escalatory get? How much is Enough? Sanc- found in arms control negotiations. actions, thus inhibiting the hurting tions have ripened the moment for stalemate. negotiations for Iran, and the threat The articles in this issue remind us of a bomb has long made the mo- of the extensive use and usefulness Lesson: Ripeness is subjective, a ment ripe for the West to negotiate, of international negotiation. In his perception, but it has objective whatever says Israeli Prime Minister dissertation of last year, Paul Meerts referents. Netanyahu. The preliminary result, defended his analysis and recom- announced just before Easter and mendations on how to further this An equalizing move would be a uni- Passover, contains some remarkable use and usefulness of diplomatic lateral declaration of independence principles and precisions and leaves negotiations. In this issue of PIN- (UDI) by Palestine, which would many knots to be tied and holes Points, a summary is given of this be logically consistent with the US to be filled by June. The question dissertation which is now published two-state position, if the US were remains, does it provide a lasting as a book (accessible from the Clin- logical. UDI is not unusual and was relationship or just another step? gendael website).The Montenegro practiced by Kosovo, Bangla Desh, PIN Roadshow in July answers to Israel, and perhaps one could say Lesson: Negotiations involve con- the call for more research attention by Eritrea and the Republics of the cession, compensations and refram- to the processes of the closure of former Soviet Union (and indeed the ing (construction) for the parties to negotiations. In his second con- USA and other former colonies), and meet, uncomfortably, in the middle. tribution, Zartman concludes this attempted by Somaliland, Western edition by providing a foundation Sahara, Nagorno Karabakh, Eastern So stay tuned. The events of the for further PIN-research on how Ukraine, Transnistria, South Ossetia moment are providing analysts negotiations end and how this is and Abkhazia, without de jure rec- with good illustrations of concepts actually determined. www.pin-negotiation.org 5

GUY OLIVIER FAURE SHOULD WE NEGOTIATE WITH TERRORISTS?

With the proclamation of the Islamic has threatened the Jihadists to ever, no ransom has been paid in Caliphate, the new developments in crush them. In fact, many could be any case for the release of hostages. the Middle East raises in the sharp- killed but that will not deterred them As a matter of fact, this is not true est way the issue of negotiating with from going on fighting because they and there has been negotiations such a terrorist entity. Should we view death not as something to be carried out and money handed over, consider compromising with what feared and avoided, but as glori- sometimes astronomical amounts. many people view as an absolute ous martyrdom opening the road In reality, there is nothing shocking evil? Are we not risking selling our to heaven. In all cases, the point is about this, except the fact that gov- soul in the process? However, if we not just to win the war but to win ernments are lying to their citizens, look at history, during WWII West- the peace that normally comes after which is simply unacceptable in a ern democracies never negotiated through constructing a new balance democracy. with Hitler, but they did negotiate in this shaky part of the world. with Stalin. Furthermore, concerning It is essential to negotiate with terror- the Middle East, it seems to be little While denying they have negotiated ists when there is no other available realistic to consider that the only is- almost all states negotiate with ter- option because the point is to save sue to the extreme complexity of the rorists, even the most unlikely states human lives either detained as hos- intertwined conflicts in this part of such as Israel. The norm seems to tages or potential victims of the war the world is a military solution. The be to declare that there have only going on. The ethical issue should US Secretary of State, John Kerry, been discussions and that whatso- not address the type of negotiation 6 PIN•Points 41/2015

counterpart, for we believe that we grate the Jihadists into the peaceful Muslim al-Turkmani. An important cannot always chose with whom to community of the Muslims. It could father figure such as Abu Musab al- make peace and that ultimately we be done in a similar fashion as it Zarqawi should also be part of the should even negotiate with the devil has been achieved in Egypt with the study. if necessary. The real issue should Jama’ah Islamiya (2) Such a task be stated in terms of what we give supposes a whole set of negotiations As for the main stakeholders outside and what we give up among our with the numerous stakeholders of the region, another basic pre-requi- fundamental values. If no serious the region and beyond, knowing site before launching any negotia- interaction is developed with the ter- that local alliances are complex and tion attempt would be to introduce rorists, there is absolutely no chance volatile, the interests intertwined enough coherence in their positions to have any influence on them. and that the double language and so that they can have some lever- ambiguity management are basic age in the evolution of the process. The recent events in the Middle components of the current game. The European Union must sort out East provide an opportunity to ap- its endemic disorder and overcome ply some of these main principles. The Sunni jihadist organization aims its helplessness. The USA is finally The declaration of the establishment to govern an Islamic state of a new realizing that it was much more of the Islamic State in Iraq and al- nature because it cuts across the directly concerned than the current Sham (ISIS), a new self-proclaimed traditional colonial state boundaries. administration would have liked and caliphate is the result of a double Backed by an extreme ideological is getting out of its indecisiveness. action from the Jihadists, a mix of determination, sometimes resulting Russia and China seem to be mostly guerrilla warfare and classical war in “nothing but the sword”, it keeps concerned with enjoying the misfor- along Clausewitz lines. Stretching on with its successful modus oper- tunes of the USA and its allies. from the Mediterranean Sea almost andi of “enduring and expanding”. to Baghdad, it is a lethal and merci- ISIS attracts numbers of Sunni from To negotiate with any chance of less battlefield where intimidation, all over for the sake of defending success requires building up the hostage takings, killings, rapes, the caliphate against the “crusaders conditions that will enable the ne- torture, amputations, stoning, and and kaffirs (3) alliance”. One degree gotiation process to be started. It crucifixions take place. However, it is further than al-Qaeda, it governs may also have required working on also defined by some as the dawn territories and tends to be financially some transformation of the problem of a new nation reuniting peoples self-sufficient through the control of in such a way that the counterparts of two countries artificially drawn oil and gas, taxation, extortion, and are not caught in a zero- sum game by Western powers in 1916 to suit illicit trades providing funding for and that a real ZOPA (Zone Of Po- French and British colonial interests. services and assistance. The basic tential Agreement) exists. It is under idea is to take advantage of the such conditions that peace may be In such a situation and even during current chaos to present itself as restored in this part of the world. the current carnage, two types of the defender of the Muslims of the negotiation opportunities can still be whole world. considered, one tactical and the oth- er strategic. The tactical opportunity Contrary to what President Obama focuses on the detained hostages and a number of American observ- who are threatened with execution. ers said, ISIS does not carry a The point is, once establishing that “nihilist ideology” but a much more ISIS is really willing to negotiate, to complex system of values. Demoniz- (1) Faure & Zartman Negotiating with Terrorists. discuss over the conditions of the ing the enemy is not a very effective New York, Routledge, 2010. release of the hostages. For the way to approach any problem. The Zartman & Faure. Engaging Extremists. Washing- time being, this option has been point before negotiating should be ton, United States Institute of Peace, 2011. conducted with a mitigated success to develop an understanding of the and several Western hostages paid motivations and history of the leader (2) Goerzig, Egypt’s Gamm’a Islamiya: Change through Debate, in Zartman & Faure, Engaging for this shortcoming with their lives. of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (who Extremists, Washington, United States Institute of claims descent from the Prophet Peace, 2011).

The strategic option concerns the Muhammad), and his main advisers (3) “Unfaithfuls”, meaning everyone who is not a longer term. The issue is to re-inte- such as Abu Ali al-Anbari and Abu Sunni such as Shia, for instance. www.pin-negotiation.org 7

I WILLIAM ZARTMAN CONLICT PREVENTION AND NEGOTIATION

Prevention is a paradox. On one General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s Given the omnipresence of conflict hand, conflict is a natural, important (1992) pioneering Agenda for Peace, inherent in human and interstate and useful element inherent in hu- welcomed by the Security Council relations, prevention of its escalation man behavior. As such, it involves and the General Assembly at the into violence through its manage- strongly held, committed, even end of the year. No one has yet been ment and resolution is a fundamental existential motives from which indi- decorated for preventing World War component of the post-World War II viduals and states are not likely to be III, which has not yet happened. and post-Cold War System of World dissuaded. On the other hand, liter- Order. The functioning and yet-to- ally innumerable conflicts have been But most countries do have a national be perfected prevention of violent prevented from escalating to serious hero who refused to be prevented conflict is not just a set of techniques political contention and to violence, from leading a bloody, patriotic for dampening inter- and intra-state as a—if not the—basic component of campaign for independence. National behavior. It is a set of norms and the existing World Order. Statesmen, security through national defense practices that hold World Order to- weathermen and firemen, among requires (and is accorded) about gether and keep relations functioning others, continually talk of prevention, 200 times more to most countries’ normally and effectively, allowing but live on the insufficiency of their budgets for military security than them to move on to other, more crea- efforts. Beginning in January 1992 for diplomacy, the preventive and tive and positive matters. The system the first-ever meeting of heads of preferable alternative to war. The list operates through the individual and state and government of the Secu- of contradictions about prevention uncoordinated activities of members rity Council concluded with a call for could continue. This article reviews of the international community and “analysis and recommendations on elements in a forthcoming treatment through their coordinated actions in ways of strengthening…the capacity of Preventing Deadly Conflict (Polity of the United Nations for preventive 2015), by I William Zartman, with a 1  See also the PIN book edited by I William Zartman, 1 diplomacy” that produced Secretary- focus on negotiation. Preventive Negotiation (Roman & Littlefield 1996). 8 PIN•Points 41/2015

international institutions—norms and Order in the United Nations, upset by of differences through negotiation.”. organizations. Were it not so, inter- new developments and alignments, New challenges range from nego- national politics would indeed be total reestablished by informal interactions tiations on climate change, nuclear anarchy, wasting all time and energy and implicit conventions, and again nonproliferation, and broadened in unregulated conflict and unpre- upset by new power realignments, trade to negotiations with rebel and vented violence. With no authority or leaving it in shambles without firm terrorist groups, with interstate ag- even coordinator to organize those expectations to be again developed gressors, and with true believers on activities and actions, the United in action. Despite these mutations, abortion and capital punishment. Nations Security Council (UNSC) and it illustrates the conflict prevention Two and a half centuries ago, one General Assembly (UNGA) being only capabilities of even the loosest set of the first encyclopedia articles on the tool and toy of their member of behavioral standards and expecta- “Negotiation” began “In common states, states and non-governmental tions even among the most powerful usage, ‘negotiation’ means the art organizations (NGOs) have to do it adversaries. of handling the affairs of state…. themselves. Thus is World Order However, negotiation is not limited to constituted, with the prevention of The same effect obtains in regard to international affairs. It takes place conflict escalation and violence as its other types of conflicts moving down everywhere that are differences key function. the list from high level state security to conciliate, interests to placate, to issues of human security. Environ- people to persuade, and purposes to It is especially in regard to the pre- mental protection, ethnic relations, accomplish. Thus, all life could be vention of conflict over state security human rights, population displace- regarded as a continual negotiation.” and territorial integrity that the World ment, and even democratization and (deFelice 1778). Order operates. Were it not so, the good governance are all subjects anarchy of the state system would be of sometimes intense conflict and NEGOTIATION AND expressed in characteristic wars and conflict escalation but are general PREVENTION aggressions as in the European (and handled by accepted standards of particularly Italian) scene during the practice and resolution negotiated The role of negotiation in prevention Middle Ages and Renaissance. Yet, among nations. These norms are proceeds through levels of immediacy as in other conflict settings, the powerful means of preventing most of conflict escalation. It begins with number of escalated and violent con- conflict escalation in their issue area, longterm prevention, then midterm flicts is minimal compared with the although they are not impermeable gestation prevention, pre-crisis pre- possibilities of threatened security and they demand continual negotia- vention and then post-crisis prevent of one state by another. Exceptions tion for development, refinement, and lest it happen again. In each of these are exceptions. It may be suggested enforcement. Indeed, the new norm levels, negotiation has an important that nothing more complicated than about sovereignty, the responsibil- but different role because each of the cost explains the phenomenon; ag- ity to protect (R2P), begins with its levels of immediacy requires a differ- gression is expensive, more and first pillar as the duty of the state to ent role.. more, and the results are not worth protect its own citizens and moves to it, a common explanation for similar pillar two the duty of other states to The Net of Norms for Longterm social behavior. help it in that endeavor, before going Prevention. The accepted “way we into the rarest and most controversial do things” is the broadest and basic But there is more to it than cost. third pillar, the duty of other states to means of prevention and the basis The development of formal and protect the first state’s population if of the fact that literally innumer- informal regimes regarding global the responsible state does not do so. able conflicts are prevented from security conflicts in the post-World escalating to violence. Negotiation War II world presents a fascinating Diplomacy, writes Sir Harold Nicolson appears in the construction of the record of tested understandings and (1939/1963, pp 4-5) quoting the norms, in their development and tacit negotiations among the world’s Oxford English Dictionary (see also refinement, and in their application leading powers, where mistakes deMartens 1866) “is the manage- to specific situations. Many of these had a potential for catastrophe that ment of international relations by norms emerge from practice: we was repeatedly prevented. A set of negotiation.” Henry Kissinger (1964, prevent territorial or ethnic conflicts norms and expectations was estab- 2) wrote similarly: “Diplomacy in the outside and inside the state because lished in a formal system of World classical sense [is] the adjustment we learn to live within our “skin” and www.pin-negotiation.org 9

with our neighbors, and the cost of picked up by member states and causing trouble. That awareness upsetting consensually established even, in the case of Africa, became is the bedrock of any further action practice is not worth the any benefits formal obligations of members of and it need be engendered early to be obtained. But in many other the regional organization and part lest the gestation opportunity be cases, these implicit consensual of the constitutions of some states. lost; lethargic Western responses to norms are formalized into negotiated Negotiations are underway to extend impending conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, sets of principles. the principles to cover displacement and Liberia in the early 2000s show from natural disaster and climate the importance of early awareness. The striking example is the UN change and to extend the right to This involves the diagnosis stage of Conference on the Law of the Sea non-refoulement to mean the right negotiation. The second element (UNCLOS) that took 12 years to for- to remain in asylum, and then a third in the preventive process is the in- malize a change in the legal norms extended the entire concept to imply troduction of efforts to deescalate, for the prevention of conflict on open the right not to be displaced (Cohen while reversing the impending trend waters. At the other extreme is the 2011; Stavropoulou 2010; Morel through both blocking actions and case of uprooted populations. The 2012). negotiations to buy off or warn off its UN developed a code of conduct continuation. for refugees, administered by the Process Mechanisms of “Early-Early” UN High Commission for refugees Gestation Prevention. Exceptional The development of a stalemate (UNHCR). However, it left internally conflicts do get through the net of through these efforts is the third displaced persons (IDPs) outside its norms to the second level of imme- element of the process, to produce purview. Whereupon the Special diacy, “early-early” gestation preven- a ripe moment that is the necessary Representative of the UN Secretary- tion. At this point the focus shifts condition to negotiation, which often General Francis Deng devised a set of to process mechanisms to interrupt involves ripening before the me- Guidelines for the handling of TDPs the course of escalation and move 2 (Deng & Cohen 1998) and as the the momentum toward resolution. 2  For a fuller discussion, see the PIN work, Escalation Assistant Secretary-General of the The process begins with the devel- and Negotiation in International Conflicts, edited by I William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (Cambridge UN became a missionary on behalf opment of awareness of the danger 2005).and International Regimes (US Institute of of the principles, which were then of a conflict situation’s potential for Peace 2003). 10 PIN•Points 41/2015

diator can proceed with a catalyzed peacekeeping forces, items for dis- THE ELUSIVE QUEST OF negotiation toward management cussion on a later agenda, neutral PREVENTION and then resolution of the conflict. parties’ monitoring. among others. Though necessary, the mutually The third element stands somewhat In a world that is continually reorgan- hurting stalemate is not sufficient in in contradiction to the second under- izing its life and penetrating human itself and needs to be seized, either scoring the delicacy of the operation: society to a greater degree than ever directly or through mediation. In the eventually, parties must be eased before, there is no end to new aspects end, the final stage in the process into contact and cooperation with of conflict that will be seen as appro- mechanisms, resolution, is the best each other, with measures that can priate subjects for prevention. As the way to prevent conflict escalation. If be termed integration. Pull-backs world gets smaller and its population the escalation momentum is handled, from a contested border must be larger, the pressure to reduce anar- procedurally, without any attention to complemented by negotiated agree- chy and aggression mounts, against the substance of the conflict, it will ments on the location of the border rising contrary challenges. return at the next opportunity; the and measures for a border regime threat of escalation should be used that allows permeability and controls. The Search for New Imperatives. In as the impetus for negotiations over This third stage comprises measures the field of immediate concern over the conflict issue itself. often referred to a conflict transfor- the prevention of conflict, it is the mation, replacing the conflict with norms governing security conflicts Methods of “Early-Late” Pre-Crisis cooperation and interdependence that are the first target of new imper- Prevention. If the escalating conflict between the parties. atives, as the first line of prevention. eludes the process mechanisms of The international community has prevention and moves toward the cri- Late (and Earliest) Post-Crisis Meas- undertaken an extraordinary revision sis level of immediacy, these mecha- ures. The course of conflict, often of the norms of sovereignty, through nism may no longer be adequate portrayed as a bell curve, gives a the doctrine of R2P. The established but it is still not too late to make a misleading picture of a conflict that powers of the West, the coalition of last stab at preventing the ultimate disappears into the sand when the the sometimes willing, are the leaders explosion of violence through a dif- deescalation measures are applied, of this revision, as newly aroused to ferent approach. Three elements when in fact efforts to wind down the protect endangered world citizenry; are crucial in negotiations at the conflict and even conflict manage- the emerging powers of the BRICS doorstep of crisis. The first is inter- ment agreements merely send the (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South ruption: immediate, intense efforts conflict into remittance to begin the Africa) rise in constraint, if not oppo- are needed to stop the events in their cycle all over again if they are not sition, as defenders of the old notion tracks. This requires focused and complemented by post-crisis preven- of sovereignty as the protection of pressing negotiation by a third party tion measures. Management implicit- the state; and the lesser countries to halt the self-propelling dynamics ly promises resolution, yet it removes stand by as the grass that gets tram- of the impending crash and give the the pressure for it. Implementation pled when elephants fight (Cardozo escalating parties space and time to is the necessary follow-through of 2013). Norms of responsibility for the reflect and defect from their course. agreements on conflicts prevented, protection of people are not to be ex- Secretary Kerry’s mission to Ukraine but it needs monitoring to make pected to be any more absolute than and Russia to prevent a direct inva- sure the agreements do indeed fol- is the norm of sovereignty as protec- sion of eastern Ukraine worked to low through to completion. Prevision tion of the state, whose debates have suspend the crisis until further nego- is needed to look ahead at possible filled law books and commentaries. tiations could be conducted. recurrences and unanswered ques- It is imperative that the guidelines tions left over from the agreements, for legitimate operation of the norm But interruption needs to be con- even when implemented, and is must of sovereignty be further sharpened, solidated by further negotiation for translate into policies of reconstruc- lest the procedures for conflict pre- separation so that the parties can tion to cover the causes and wounds vention themselves become a subject be kept from irritating contact with of the past conflict. Ultimately, re- for conflict escalation. each other. Such measures, to be mediation needs to be considered in negotiated, include ceasefire that be- order to fully heal those wounds and 3  come conflict management devices, prepare for full reconciliation as the This is further developed in the new PIN work in preparation, Reconciliation as Preventive Diplomacy, neutral zones and military pull-backs, ethos of conflict transformation.3 Mark Anstey & Valerie Rosoux eds. www.pin-negotiation.org 11

In a related area, the persisting EU neighbors was removed by po- if not prevention, and probably too appearance of collapsed states con- litical blackmail by Greece in regard late. But immediate awareness and tinues to pose questions over the to Cyprus, eliminating the most decisive action are becoming urgent responsibility of the international effective inducement to settlement (Edenhofer 2014). Although seem- community in conflicts apparently of the Cyprus conflict; on the other ingly a direct conflict with nature, beyond the cover of R2P. By the third hand the EU rule has been helpful in like earthquake prevention, climate R2P pillar, the international commu- attenuating conflict elsewhere, no- change is really a conflict among nity has the responsibility to protect tably in regard to the Serbia-Kosovo causing human agencies over a reac- populations when the state’s efforts dispute. Intractable conflicts, as over tion of nature to their activities. Here are insufficient in their responsibility Palestine, Kurdistan, Kashmir, and a change in attitudes is necessary to for the need to protect. But what if Baluchistan, need clearer norms and precede a change in normative struc- there is no state? In 2014, condi- strong adherence to the norms (as tures, and the means will have to be tions in Libya, Mali, Central African indeed to the norm of non-conquest) found to pressure and finally perhaps Republic, Northern Nigeria, South by the international community as an enforce compliance in such an area Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq Hon- adjunct of prevention efforts. of global cause and concern. One duras, Guatemala, and Somalia quali- way regimes are formed is by estab- fied, and still others had struggling The attachment of Crimea to Russia lishing an agreement among agree- governments in charge primarily of after its detachment from Ukraine in ing parties, leaving the outsiders to the national capital area. With the 2014, preceded earlier by the detach- join as they will, as in the European state in mush, there are no pieces ment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Union, the Law of the Sea Treaty, the to work with. State collapse leaves from Georgia without any formal International Criminal Court, and the not only large areas ungoverned, and attachment, brought to the fore the landmines ban.4 The path to multi- thus open to all sorts of unregulated conditions for moving boundaries lateral agreements, when blocked conflict behavior, but also rapacious and transferring territories. Cur- directly, can pass through partial gangs in charge of the nominal (and rently, when a powerful state wants or minilateral agreements (Chasek, internationally recognized) state neighboring territory, it can take it, Wagner & Zartman 2014). As some apparatus and also other nodes of a reversion to an age thought to be states feel more and more compelled power (Clunan & Trinkunas 2010). past. In the same year, the horror, to take action and other equally com- The nodes are busy and satisfied in the West at least, at Hamas mis- pelled to resist, conflict stakes rise the way they are—in a pervasive S5 siles on Israeli territory and the con- and hostilities spread to other, often situation, a soft, stable, self-serving demnation of the occupying power unrelated relations. situation. When the hyenas ravage, as merely excessive in its response even the elephants suffer. In state reversed the attitudes downward Other regimes involving the same collapse, the state needs to be re- during World War II when occupa- type of conflict are in shambles, invented, on the job, in a form that tion was condemned as inexcusable laying open the conflicts within their fits local conditions. To deal with this and resistance lauded. The incidents particular areas of focus. The nuclear situation before it happens is a new highlight the fact that there is no arms regime show great cracks in its challenge for conflict prevention. mechanism for legitimizing territorial non-proliferation and test ban con- transfers, since Russian claims to be trols. The regime is a conflict pre- Similarly, the conditions for the rec- protecting Russian speakers and to vention measure, but in the process ognition of a new state need greater be sanctioned by a referendum after it is a bitter subject of conflict, which regularization rather than being left the occupation vitiated the expres- in turn risks destroying its prevention to an ad hoc political process. Po- sion of public support as a justifica- capabilities and opens the door to litical process it will always be, just tion. There has to be a better way to a number of new Nuclear Weapons as the definition of statehood and legitimize transfers and avoid abuses. Capable States (NWCS), particularly the role of recognition has been the in a volatile regions such as the Mid- subject of long debates and longer The conflict with nature over climate exegesis, but states and movements change has already posed a chal- should be left with a clearer notion of lenge to the development of impera- 4  On negotiating international regimes, see the PIN what they have to aim for to qualify. tives for prevention. Norms govern- book edited by Bertram Spector and I William Zart- man, Getting it Done: Post-Agreement Negotiations The condition that new EU members ing behavior in that conflict may well and International Regimes (US Institute of Peace must be free of disputes with other be produced some day, for protection 2003). ANNOUNCEMENT | NEW PIN BOOK 12

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA PRESS.UNIVERSITY 15,2015). I. W.(AUGUST ZARTMAN, OF THE INTIFADATOF THE NEGOTIATING IN THE SHADOW ARAB SPRING: PIN• Points 41/2015

and military adversaries.and military violence; andcoalition building betweenformer political tosustainabledemocracythat leadeither orsectarian state ontheruinsofaliberated state;thenegotiations uprisers andemerging governments inbuilding anew NATO.Collectively, theessays analyze of thechallenges viewed intermsofthenegotiationsit provoked within AfricaSouth while andSerbia, theLibyan uprisingisalso discussed inthecontextofrebellions incountrieslike Tunisia, andYemen. TheArab Springuprisingsare include Algeria,Bahrain, Egypt,Libya, Morocco, Syria, outside theMiddleEast.TheArab countriesdiscussed their findingswithinprevious struggles,bothwithinand negotiation andarmedrebellion—and contextualize demonstrations andnonviolent protest, andpeaceful events—including civil disobedienceandstrikes, mass perspective, theessaysits analyze arange ofissuesand theprospectwith ofviolencealways near. From that shiftingpriorities—and continually and stateswith multilevel” process involving individuals,groups, or adiplomaticexercise.” Rather, isa“dynamically it Arab Spring,negotiationis“notjusta‘nice’practice countryspecific casestudiesthatinuprisings like the The contributorsargue inpreviously unpublished, Clingendael, Netherlands] Processes ofInternational, Negotiation(PIN)Program at Zartman* (SAIS-JHU). [*Indicates group membersofthe d’Europe), SinišaVukovic (LeidenUniversity), I.William (ICG/Tufts University), JohannesTheiss(Collège Arabes), AlyelRaggal (Cairo University), HughRoberts University), Samiraital Pres (Cercle desEconomistes Mezran (Atlantic Momani(Waterloo Council), Bessma (Carleton University), Roel Meijer(Clingendael), Karim Hamidaddin(King’sAbdullah Fen College), Hampson* Heba Ezzat(Cairo University), Amy Hamblin(SAIS), (European-Bahraini Organization for HumanRights), Abdelwahab benHafaiedh (MERC),MaartenDanckaert University), Marc Anstey*(NelsonMandelaUniversity), Samir Aita(MondeDiplomatique),Alice Alunni(Durham CONTENT CONTRIBUTORS www.pin-negotiation.org 13

dle East. Along side, a regime for confidence and security building is used in labor disputes. There the prohibition of biological weapons mechanisms (TCSBMs) expand the has been much progress in slowing need be negotiated to complete the original focus on confidence building down the sort of sudden response ABC (atomic, biological, chemical) alone to encompass the whole range and crisis escalation that started weapons regime. of regime activities into this new World War I, although the June War area, where the operative details of in 1967 was launched by a similar Another area of conflict prevention prevention remain to be negotiated. escalation based on false intelligence that presses for focused negotiation on both capabilities and intentions concerns conflicts over depleting Search for New Mechanisms. A (Parker). IAEA and OPCW inspec- natural resources. Population pres- number of new mechanisms have tions—and Comprehensive Test Ban sure (also exacerbated by climate appeared in recent decades—new Treaty Organization inspections, change in tropical regions) raises institutionss of various degrees of when the treaty is ratified5—are issues over the land tenure system in authority such as the new Law of an important element in assuring much of the developing world, where the Sea (1982), the Framework Con- atomic weapons regimes, although traditional ownership norms conflict vention on Climate Change (1992), they need greater authority against with modern legal systems, with the Guidelines on IDPs, truth and tactics of sovereignty. Had they been no established practices on how to reconciliation commissions, IAEA, UN able to overcome Saddam Hussein’s combine the two; traditional norms SRSGs and PKFs (not provided for in ill-considered diplomatic games, they themselves are unable to handle the Charter), the International Crimi- could have assured the absence of clashes between tribal (collective) nal Court (1998), and the remarkable weapons of mass destruction and re- ownership and longstanding usufruct efforts of the OSCE High Commis- moved the excuse—and possibly the claims. (Boone 2014). The many sioner on National Minorities and the initiation—of the Iraq War (2003); regimes governing the prevention Conflict Prevention Center and the the same goes for North Korea and of depletion of fish and wildlife need UN Assistant Secretaries-General on Iran. to be amalgamated onto a global or Displaced Persons and the Preven- at least species- and geographic- or tion of Genocide.. Another mechanism for interrupting basin- basis, in the image that CITES the spiral of escalation is the aware- on endangered species has created. The existing mechanism that needs ness by the escalator itself that it has Similarly, prevention is called for in most improvement is arguably the UN achieved some success and that it is conflicts over the depletion of water Security Council. Repeated blocking time to pull back or at least to pause. resources, where there are no norms, otherwise consensual action by one Escalation can become a reverse regimes or regulation to govern al- or 2 vetoes is as much a derogation entrapment, an end in itself rather location and contain claims. of the spirit of UN operating principles than a means, with the escalating as is intervention by a single party; party unable to recognize when it Information and Communication the use of coalitions of the willing has started to achieve its goals and Technology (ICT) is a new double- to carry out needed preventive ac- can use its own reverse momentum faced area of concern, both as a tions is a properly creative response. to pull, rather than push, the other subject of conflict and as an agent Reforms of UNSC composition are side to agreement. The dynamics of of prevention (Stauffacher 2014; unlikely, but rules of procedure that the US sanctions campaign against DeNardis 2014). Cyber conflict has would give the forum more flexibility Iran is an eloquent case, as is the become a major arena of covert op- could be helpful in enacting prevent- Russian covetousness campaign over erations among states, as a means of ing measures (although not entirely Ukraine. At the same time sanctions locating intelligence, as a weapon of likely because of the organization’s must stay in place until some results disruption, and as means of security composition). Other UN bodies work occur and not be lifted just to create and defense. Its use as the latter on a decision rule of consensus or of a nice atmosphere. The debate over justifies its use as the former, and so unanimity minus one, an extension of the partial lifting of sanctions against the cycle of conflict escalates. But the abstention rule that could facili- Serbia before 1998 is an example. as a means of prevention, it is both tate positive action., a direct agent in the development of warning, awareness, and timely ac- Imposed suspension (interruption), 5  For further analysis, see the PIN work edited by Mordechai Melamud, Paul Meerts, and I William tion, and a subject of new norms and a standard mechanism for inserting Zartman, Banning the Bang on the Bomb? Negotiat- their enforcement. Transparency, at least a pause in escalatory spirals ing the Nuclear Test Ban Regime (Cambridge 2014). 14 PIN•Points 41/2015

A difficult and daring mechanism a type of situation. Both depend on weakened by modernization, and if would be the revival of the institu- the reciprocity encased in the pre- there it is any effort at a replace- tion of trusteeship to help collapsed vention arrangement. ment it is on the national level as states (Ratner). The odor of revived state nations seek to become the colonialism and the bureaucratic As prevention looks for new material forum for its functions. It doesn’t inefficiency of international organiza- to work with if it is to avoid simply a work. The search for mechanisms tions provide two narrow limits within return to The Lord of the Flies, it can needs a functional replacement on which such a reform would have to look most productively at traditional the subnational level that can up- operate. The third limit would be the local customs for managing conflict. date traditional structures and func- terrain in which the trustee would Traditional societies long developed tion. Efforts such as Infrastructures have to operate; it is simply daunt- their own practices and norms for for Peace including both revived and ingly dangerous for any agency, conflict prevention and escalation; refitted traditional practices and lo- whether the French or American the community served to prevent cal peace committees (LPCs) are an army or a UN trustee, to try to restore conflict in the first place and provide initial step that has been adopted law and order in Centrafrique, Syria, systems of accountability and heal- by the Organization for Security and Iraq, Somalia or Eastern Congo, yet ing. They have found effectiveness Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and attempts are being made.. in Eastern Congo (Autaserre 2003), promoted by NGOs (van Tongenen West Africa (Zartman 2003; 2013; 2013; OSCE 2012; Unger, Kund- Mechanisms of enforcement run Adebayo, Lundy Benjamin & Kings- ström, Planta & Austin 2013; UNDP up against sovereignty in the state ley 2014) and Palestine (Abu Nimer 2013). The next, and necessary step, system. Enforcement of prevention 2003). When the problem is that is to link these grassroots activities depends on the constraints that there is no state to work with, in or to national governance systems so states agree to impose on them- about, the beginnings of answer can that they do not remain autonomous selves. Therefore the mechanism be to think small, at the local level. unrecognized feet separate from the of enforcement lies in the solutions What is needed however is an exist- body politic. negotiated with attention to the in- ing community of some sort within terests of the parties involved, either which conflict prevention can oper- Search for New Agents. Although in specific outcomes to a conflict ate to rebuild social tissue ruptured the state is the prime agent of pre- situation or in general responses to by conflict. Community has been vention, it can benefit from multiple assistants. A notable addition to the agents of conflict prevention in the post-World War II era is the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into an era that was long off bounds (Stein 2000). In the vari- ous issue areas and mechanism of prevention, NGOs have as active a role as do states. Other areas, such as awareness and mediation, have seen a growing civil society role to complement state action with activi- ties the state cannot perform as well. For the most part, states are needed to officialize processes and results, but NGOs can be singularly effective in smoothing ethnic relations, pro- moting human rights, encouraging democratization, facilitating good governance, softening population displacement, promoting attention and attentiveness, providing media- tory functions, and facilitation imple- www.pin-negotiation.org 15

mentation in sum, in working with and satisfy the demands at the same of the UN security and preventive people as opposed to with states. time; frequently the people are the machinery by Russia and China has ones who are engaging in their returned, bereft of ideology but just The most important qualification to side of normal politics (articulating for reasons of power rivalry. Conflict be observed on NGO work alongside and aggregating demands) and the and security as world-shaping inter- states in conflict prevention (Track II government that is waging conflict state matters have reemerged from diplomacy) is respect and coordina- against them. the history files of the last century, tion. Agency can only be public or alongside anomies of terrorizing private, but cooperation can take New knowledge will give better pre- gangs, sometimes with a message, new forms. Increased use of NGOs dictions; nonetheless, human beings sometimes without a cause, such as puts unusual strains on resources. have the ineffable capacity to do Boko Haram, the various al-Qaeda Standby teams for diplomatic as dumb things and practice inspired franchises in the Maghreb, Arabian well as military duty have been set creativity, in addition to following Peninsula, Egypt and elsewhere, up in conjunction with the UNDPA studied regularities of behavior. A ISIS (The so-called Islamic State), Mediation Support Unit, with increas- study of political forecasting showed among others, but also thugs in ing success. The Carter Center’s that experts were wrong 25 percent Honduras and Guatemala for whom International Negotiation Network of the time when they claimed to be prevention is as elusive as solution. (INN) depended on availability and absolutely certain (Tetlock 2005). proved useful on occasion. Blue That means that were right three- In this World in search Hats, along with Blue Helmets, have quarter of the time, an astoundingly of Order, there is a crying been proposed to help post-conflict high figure for an activity subject of situation develop administrative skills popular derision. It all depends on need to focus on on a shortterm basis; police (Blue expectations. New knowledge on negotiation for prevention Berets?) have been also seconded data, regularities and prediction will from national police duties to fill in work on that 25 percent, although it in post-conflict situations and provide will discover new irregularities at the In this World in search of Order, training. The Intergovernmental Pan- same time, and hopefully will reduce there is a crying need to focus on el on Climate Change (IPCC) and the dumbness and increase creativity. negotiation for prevention. Crisis UN Academic Advisory Council on the Prevention is a pressing concern management is only a part that Mediation Initiative bring private ex- as the system of World Order un- comes too late, conflict management pertise to bear on conflict situations dergoes sharp shocks in the early is another part that is incomplete to inform professional practitioners. XXIst century. The norm against without resolution, but prevention conquest has been shaken by Rus- is the frame for the whole picture. Search for New Knowledge. Conflict sia in Ukraine and Israel in Palestine More than periodic toolkits, a change prevention remains an exciting and and the methods of interruption, of attitudes toward the field and the relevant field for the search for new separation and integration have philosophy of prevention is needed if knowledge. The uncertainty of the wobbled. The norm against mass a sound system of World Order is to causal chain and the fallibility of fore- murder of one’s own population be reinvigorated. sight have been highlighted from the has been trashed by Bashir and beginning. Better understanding of Kir in Sudan, Asad in Syria, and what causes conflict to emerge from the mechanisms of awareness, de- References its passive shell and climb the steps escalation, stalemate and ripening of escalation is necessary for more have been left in the bag, unused. deFelice, Fortune Barthélémy. 1778/1976. effective prevention. Such dynamics Ethnic and religious (often mixed) “Negotiations, of the Art of Negotiating,” in as the security dilemma and entrap- wars in Central Africa, Syria, Iraq, I William Zartman, ed, The 50% Solution. Doubleday ment still escape effective interrup- Afghanistan, Pakistan, both Sudans, Nicolson, Sir Harold, 1939/1943. Diplomacy. tion and remedy. While new work is Burundi, Thailand, and Ukraine Oxford. being done on why rebellions arise have moved toward genocide. The Demartens, Charles. 1866. Guide Diploma- (Collier, A&Z) and why people en- non-proliferation, world trade, and tique. Paris. Kissinger, Henry 1964. A World Restored. gage in them (Lichbach, Sambanis), climate change regimes have frayed Grosset & Dulap. the etiology is still not well enough at the edges with large loopholes in Nicolson, Sir Harold. 1939. Diplomacy. understood to counter the causes the middle. The Cold War blockade Harcourt Brace. 16 PIN•Points 41/2015

VALÉRIE ROSOUX TIME AND RECONCILIATION DEALING WITH FESTERING WOUNDS

There is a vast literature on time as understandable; this eagerness be- mass atrocities, changes of attitude, a constraint and/or a resource in ing one of the conditions to prevent emotions and beliefs take time. What the field of negotiation. Practitioners these parties becoming entrenched in is the appropriate pace? and scholars emphasize the crucial never-ending civil wars. influence of time pressure in favour- 1. RIPENESS: NOT TOO SOON ing a political deal between parties On the other hand, timing is also of (Lewicki, Saunders and Barry, 2010). consequence in terms of duration. William Zartman notably emphasized Successes and failures in ultimatum Speediness, as such, is no guarantee the significance of ripeness in the area bargaining have been very well of success in the long run. The hopes of negotiation. This issue should also investigated (Boles et al., 2000). and disillusions resulting from the be addressed with respect to reconcili- Timing of entry is also intensely de- Arab Spring - where political changes ation. To do so, it is worth underlining bated (Anstey, 2010: 254-257). The succeeded one another at a thrilling similarities and divergences between perspective chosen here is rather dif- pace – show that acceleration and these two types of processes (nego- ferent. This contribution focuses on haste can have violent and highly tiation and reconciliation). post-conflict situations and considers questionable consequences. Thus, time in the broadest sense of the the rush to achieve quick results with INSPIRING SIMILARITIES term. The main hypothesis of this respect to conflict resolution, and, paper is that time is one of the most even more so, reconciliation, may As in any negotiation, parties become decisive variables in determining to have no strong roots and may be un- involved in a reconciliation process what extent reconciliation can be sustainable. The failure of the Geneva when they have to do so. They only negotiated between former enemies. II talks on Syria demonstrates the join together in this way if each extreme difficulty of forward-looking party’s efforts to achieve a unilater- In the aftermath of international or outcomes processes (Zartman, 2005). ally satisfactory result are blocked civil wars, timing is pivotal, but in a Experience with other transitions - and if the parties feel trapped in a paradoxical way: urgency matters as such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Tunisia costly predicament. Similarly, the no- much as duration. On the one hand, and Bosnia-Herzegovina - reminds us tion of “mutually hurting stalemate” priorities such as rebuilding the po- that time is necessary in order to rec- is relevant in cases of a rapproche- litical machinery and the economy, ognize the scale of destruction of both ment between former enemies. or prosecuting human rights abus- the infrastructure and the social fabric When parties find themselves locked ers, are matters of great urgency. of the country, and to ensure a broad in a situation that is painful for both As is commonly admitted, “[t]he risk political will. If the initial process does of them (although not necessarily of relapse into violent conflict only not allow this indispensable time, the to the same extent or for the same increases with time” (UN Security rest is often built on sand (Sissons reasons), the way out they seek can Council S 2011/634, p. 4). This ur- and Al-Saiedi 2013). indeed become the starting point of a gency requires extremely quick reac- reconciliation process. tions on the ground and a great sense To address this tension between of adaptability. Accordingly, speedy short-term and long-term perspec- The Franco-German case is telling in decision-making is a necessary condi- tives, the present contribution is this regard. In a devastated Europe, tion for impacting post-conflict transi- divided into two parts. The first ques- the decision to work towards a rap- tions. The same comment could be tions the notion of ripeness (Zart- prochement was not a matter of al- made regarding conflict zones, where man, 2000) in a post-conflict context. truism, but was rather in both French the priority is to reach a cease-fire When are people ripe enough to and German national interests. as soon as possible, since each extra favour a rapprochement towards Among all the political, economic, day results in further casualties. In their former enemy? The second and security considerations that such contexts, the willingness to put examines the long-term character of promoted the transformation of rela- pressure on the parties to move on is any process of rapprochement. After tions between “hereditary enemies”, www.pin-negotiation.org 17

one was particularly significant: the When do the parties start thinking in immediate. As the former European existence of a common enemy in the terms of reconciliation: during or af- Commissioner Stefan Füle suggested, USSR – and therefore the external, ter the negotiation processes per se? “there is no alternative to reconcilia- mostly American, support for rap- At first glance, a variety of scenarios tion” (Batumi, 11 July 2012). Be they prochement. In such circumstances, can be observed, ranging from cases in the Balkans or in the Middle East, French and German leaders per- such as South Africa, where Nelson in Mali or Afghanistan, Ivory Coast ceived an undeniable “mutually hurt- Mandela started negotiating recon- or Somalia, the EU representatives ing stalemate” and considered the ciliation as soon as the secret talks appear as “reconciliation heroes”. To European Coal and Steel Community began in the 1980s, to those such as them, the notion of reconciliation is (ECSC) as their way out. Bosnia, where reconciliation was not directly associated with the notions at all on the agenda of the Dayton of peace, stability and reconstruction Unlike this example, there are many agreement. Besides looking at these – and therefore presented as neces- cases which show that in the absence varied cases, it is useful to take a sary. The argument is ambitious: it of a mutually hurting stalemate, the differentiated approach to the issue is because the EU itself is the result pain is not strong enough to drive of ripeness, according to the types of of a successful reconciliation that it is the parties towards reconciliation. protagonists calling for reconciliation. duty-bound to promote this process Situations which have remained In this respect, three main situations all over the world. This resolve has unchanged for years, such as that are conceivable. Rather than focus- been particularly tangible in former in Cyprus, are emblematic in this re- ing solely on the top-down versus Yugoslavia. Thus, the European gard. Other cases show that ripeness bottom-up debate, it is worth stress- Commission recommended starting is a necessary but insufficient condi- ing calls for reconciliation coming accession talks after the conclusion tion for launching a reconciliation from above, from below and from of an agreement between Serbia and process. Where spoilers considerably outside (Gluck, 2007). Each of these its province Kosovo. In this respect, benefit from intractable conflicts, levels suggests a specific response to reconciliation almost serves as an ac- ripeness in the eyes of the population the question of ripeness. cession condition for joining the EU. cannot lead to effective change on The changing attitude of the Serbian the ground. However, as in any other (1) If we first examine the attitude President, Tomislav Nikolic, towards negotiation, the absence of ripeness of outsiders, a standard pattern can Kosovo, as well as towards the crimes is not a valid reason for inaction. In be detected: they highlight the need committed in Srebrenica, shows that cases such as Israel/Palestine or the for reconciliation immediately after the EU’s persistent pressure in favour Congo, certain groups are able to the end of the hostilities or even of reconciliation is not completely fu- conceive of a rapprochement with before it. The reaction of the former tile. However, as many parties argue the other. Admittedly, without politi- French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, on the ground, it takes more than cal support “from above”, their efforts after the death of Colonel Gaddafi words – essentially words geared cannot be sufficient to influence the is telling in this regard. Just one day towards pleasing Brussels - to open whole population. Nevertheless, the after the death of the former Libyan up an effective path to reconciliation. existence of “pause conflict zones” President, Nicolas Sarkozy had a (in contexts that cannot yet be simple message: “What Libya needs (2) As this example suggests, the qualified as “post-conflict zones”) can now is reconciliation. Libyans need outsiders’ eagerness to call for rec- constitute decisive niches once there to forgive each other” (21 October onciliation rarely coincides with the is a real eagerness to move forward. 2011, AFP). Despite the fact that attitude of officials on each side. They create the social infrastructure the country was still devastated by Rather than referring immediately to which political leaders can count extreme violence, and despite the reconciliation, most leaders predicta- upon if they decide to take the risk – ambiguity of the notion of forgive- bly adopt a pragmatic attitude. Their or the chance - of a rapprochement. ness in the aftermath of a dictator- perceptions and their potential incli- ship, the reference to reconciliation nation towards reconciliation totally A DIFFERENTIATED RIPENESS was almost instantaneous. The depend on international and domes- same comment can be made more tic constraints. Thus, immediately Having looked at these similarities, broadly as regards the attitude of after an election, most Presidents the main question remains: when European Union (EU) representatives unsurprisingly start their mandate does a protagonist emerge ready to (Rosoux, 2014). Their insistence on by extensive calls for national rec- make efforts towards reconciliation? reconciliation is both systematic and onciliation. The attitude of President 18 PIN•Points 41/2015

ever, the impossibility of reaching an agreement as to the status of Kosovo showed that such a purpose cannot be imposed from above - it can only be an endogenous one. While many voices claim that a rapprochement between former enemies depends on tangible assistance from the interna- tional community in pursuing such a goal, it can hardly be denied that the forces for change are primarily internal and cannot be coerced.

In the aftermath of mass atroci- ties, victims simply resist when the Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire il- need for reconciliation in Rwanda. so-called “politics of reconciliation” lustrates this immediate response. In This was particularly true of Belgium. is perceived as an ideology or as a his first official statement, he made it rhetorical argument that seems to clear that reconciliation and national These examples show that, at the po- disregard their suffering. In Rwanda, unity were the main priorities of the litical level, ripeness directly depends for instance, voices coming from all country. Yet, in other cases, official on the perceived interests of each communities rapidly denounced what authorities put the emphasis on the protagonist. This predictable degree they called the “ideology of reconcilia- need to fight against impunity and of opportunism leaves one question tion”. From their perspective, the right therefore categorically reject any unanswered. As in the traditional question to address is probably not call for reconciliation. The Rwandan game of “chicken”, the question is: when but if reconciliation is possible. case is particularly interesting in this who will make the first move? As the All these elements show how delicate regard, since it indicates how quickly Russian-Polish and Israeli-Palestinian the issue of time management is in attitudes can change in this respect. cases reveal, most parties refuse bringing about reconciliation. While When the Rwandan Patriotic Front to take the initiative towards a rap- institutional and legal measures can came to power in 1994, the objective prochement. Few leaders are ready to be taken relatively quickly after the was not reconciliation but justice. expose a form of vulnerability - at least end of the conflict, so-called recon- The message repeated in the coun- in the eyes of their constituencies. ciliation policies must not come too try and abroad was that Rwanda had The choices made by Sadat in 1977 or soon. If so, they are ineffective and to erase the culture of impunity (that Begin in 2003 were genuinely auda- even sometimes counterproductive. lasted for too long and that was one cious - but also tragically dangerous. of the causes of the genocide). Eight 2. DURATION: NOT TOO QUICK years later, the Rwandan president (3) Besides calls for action coming Paul Kagame started focusing on from outside and above, we must According to Hayner, reconciliation reconciliation. Three main reasons consider initiatives coming from can be understood as a way to build justified this shift. Firstly, justice was, below. This perspective reveals the “relationships today that are not in fact, impossible. Since the judici- limits of any push towards recon- haunted by the conflicts and hatreds ary system was totally ruined after ciliation. The reconciliation process of yesterday” (2002: 161). From the genocide, the number of people can not, indeed, be started at any that perspective, the critical question who had to be tried and sentenced time. Immediately after the end of is not only “what happened?”, but was unmanageable. Secondly, jus- hostilities, the population affected also - and above all – “what shall we tice could result in the revealing of by the violence rarely calls for a rap- do with the past?” Similarly, one of embarrassing truths. Justice meant prochement with those who are still the most fundamental issues is not dealing with crimes committed on perceived as enemies. In Kosovo, to whether to remember or forget, but each side, including those which take only one example, reconciliation how to remember and forget in order were committed in the Congo after between Serbs and Albanians was to move forward. Events such as par- July 1994. Thirdly, most international the explicit aim of the United Nations ticularly traumatic violations of human donors strongly emphasized the peace-consolidation mission. How- rights can remain unexpressed for a www.pin-negotiation.org 19

period of time – a period that psy- that lead to this kind of impasse is Siberia by the NKVD (Soviet political choanalysts often call “latent”. Some to consider the extent to which the police) in 1949, he expressed regret specialists refer to a period of 25 process may be “haunted” by the that nobody had “ever apologized” years. However, there does not ap- past. for these crimes. This is not an pear to be any standard time-period isolated case - far from it. Thus the in this matter. In Greek tragedies, AN OPEN-ENDED PROCESS EU Parliament became a place of for instance, old debts were only contentious and highly distributive paid after three generations (Salles, Far beyond the scope of any “quick negotiations between Germany and 2012). This trans-generational impact projects” (UNHCR), “the Poland, and between Germany and transmission is absolutely critical in path towards reconciliation is a the Czech Republic, with respect to post-conflict situations. Case stud- marathon, not a sprint”, as the Pol- issues directly linked with the Sec- ies show that the second and third ish President Bronislaw Komorowzki ond World War. In another context, generations remain preoccupied said after talks with the former Rus- negotiations between China and with continuing feelings of guilt or sian President, Dimitri Medvedev Japan are constantly at risk from the victimisation, especially when past (quoted by Dempsey, 2010). The explosive weight of the past. To give injustices have not been adequately open-ended nature of the process a final example, the ongoing nego- addressed by their parents’ genera- is confirmed by all case studies. In tiations between Japan and North tion. The Armenian-Turkish case is 2012, by way of an illustration, the Korea have always failed to achieve emblematic in this regard. The Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik closure regarding the Japanese who persistence of intense emotions has Ilves, explained that, more than 60 were kidnapped in the 1970s and specific consequences on the nego- years later, Estonia was “still wait- 1980s, and who were used as spies tiation process. It limits the potential ing for apologies” from the Russian for Pyongyang (Le Monde, 31 May concessions made on each side and authorities (Le Monde, 12 April 2014). Each of these examples - and partly explains why certain issues 2012). Speaking about the “illegal there are tens of others - reminds remain non-negotiable for decades. annexation” of his country by the us that reconciliation remains unfin- Resistance can be so strong that it Soviet Union after WWII until 1991, ished business that requires long and is often qualified as “irrational”. One and more specifically about the arduous negotiations at all levels. way to understand the dynamics deportation of 20,000 Estonians to 20 PIN•Points 41/2015

AN INDIVIDUAL PROCESS are allowed can be summed up in time. Therefore it might be useful to two words: ‘Reconstruction, Rec- question our own assumptions. Is the The experience of a Rwandan onciliation’. These watchwords – as aim to distinguish between “good” survivor, actively involved in a local nice as they are per se – smother the (resilient) victims and “bad” (resent- reconciliation process, confirms both survivors’ distress cries” (131). ful) victims or to define a new social the dynamic character and the dura- contract? It is if – and only if – the tion of the process: “I took the time These accounts raise fundamental diversity of reactions and tempos is to hate everybody. It took me ten questions regarding timing in post- taken seriously that one can finally years. I needed this time for hatred. conflict situations. One of them was see an end and a beginning. Now I can think about reconciliation”. once summarised by a German stu- In listening to this sort of comment, dent of mine, who came to me after many observers emphasize the a seminar and asked, movingly: “How impact of a supposed “natural time long?”. Her two-word question meant References for healing”. Thus, in April 2014, the “how long do we Germans have to Canadian government considered apologize?”; “how long do we have Anstey, M. 2010. Managing change. Negotiat- that a period of two decades was to deal with a guilt that is not ours?”; ing Conflict, Cape Town, Juta & Cie. symbolically enough to “recover” and “how long will we have to justify our- Boles, T., Croson, R. and Murninghan, J. K. 2000. “Deception and Retribution in Repeated turn the page of the Rwandan geno- selves, compensate for and/or recall Ultimatum Bargaining”, in Organizational cide (Montgomery, 2014). However, the events of the past?”. The answer Behavior and Human Decision Processes, this emphasis on a quasi-magical given by the German Minister of For- Volume 83, Issue 2, 235-259. effect of time has to be questioned eign Affairs, Frank Walter Steinmeier, Dempsey, J. 2010, “Old foes see reasons to in at least two ways. First, who can confirms the open-ended character get along”, International New York Times, December 8. determine whether ten, twenty, fifty of the process. As he admitted: “It is Gluck, C. 2007. “Operations of Memory: or a hundred years is the right time- very dangerous for a politician to say ‘Comfort Women’ and the World” in Sheila period? How can we fix in advance a that we have succeeded. We have to Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (eds.)., standard pace of healing? Secondly, bring evidence of this reconciliation Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, Boston, Harvard how can one argue in favour of such [between Germany and its former University Press, 47-77. natural healing processes when in enemies] all the time” (La libre Bel- Hayner, P. 2000. Unspeakable Truths: most cases there is evidence that gique, 18 February 2014). Confronting State Terror and Atrocity, London, wounds remain? As numerous tes- Routledge. timonies tragically remind us, the * * * Lewicki, R. J., Barry, B. & Saunders, D. M. 2010, Negotiation, New York, Mc Graw Hill idea of a natural time for healing International Edition. does not systematically correspond As we look at the many examples, we Montgomery, S. 2014. “Rwanda: 20 years to reality – far from it (see Pinpoints realize that the way in which past ex- later. The burden of survival”, The Gazette, 1 34, 6-9). The experience of Révérien periences are re-lived ultimately de- April. Rirangwa, R. 2007. Génocidé, Paris, J’ai lu. Rirangwa is particularly emblematic pends on each individual’s attitudes, Rosoux, V. 2014, “Portée et limites du concept of this oversimplification of survivors’ emotions and energy. International de réconciliation. Une histoire à terminer”, experiences. After witnessing the and intercommunity conflicts pro- Revue d’études comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. massacre of forty-three relatives, this voke an infinite series of individual 45 (3-4), 21-47. Rwandan survivor was disfigured and fires that need to be extinguished Salles, A. 2012. “Ubris, catharsis et ‘troika’”, Le Monde, 11 May. left for dead. In describing himself one by one. The response to past Zartman, W. I. 2000.“Ripeness: The Hurting as a “prisoner of his ghosts and his atrocities is ultimately an individual Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul Stern & anxieties”, he explains: “my body, one. Far from being reduced to a Daniel Druckman (eds), International Conflict my face and the sharpest aspect of tension purely between anger and Resolution after the Cold War, Washington, National Academy Press. my memory bear the scars of the forgiveness, this individual response Zartman, W. I. & Kremenyuk, V. (Eds). Peace past – and will continue to do so until brings to the surface deep sadness, versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and the end of my life” (2007: 14). His fear, loss of trust and hope, and other Backward-Looking Outcomes, Oxford, words are hard-hitting: “Survivors emotions, which may result in sorrow, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. are troublemakers. We bother eve- or, rather, in calls for justice and ac- Sissons, M. and Al-Saiedi, A. 2013. “A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq”, rybody with our pain, our tragedies, countability. All these reactions dem- International Center for Transitional Justice, our dead ones and our rotten vivid onstrate that reconciliation cannot be http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report- memory. (…) The only narrative we negotiated at any price and/or at any Iraq-De-Baathification-2013-ENG.pdf. www.pin-negotiation.org 21

MARK ANSTEY NEGOTIATING CROWD BEHAVIOR

INTRODUCTION a strong probability of confrontation they resort to disruptive action or with police! there is an element of violence to Emerging from a station in central property or persons, their grievances Copenhagen recently I found myself A culture of protest action and the and substantive demands will not in the midst of a demonstration, form that it takes is shaped by many be attended to. It is a perception with protestors chanting and wav- factors including legal frameworks, founded in long experience. During ing placards. Suddenly the march social norms, group aspirations, a negotiation on an impending gen- stopped moving forward – had the emotional intensity of grievances, eral strike in South Africa in the late police arrived, was there a counter levels of frustration and patterns of 1980’s, employers sympathized with group blocking the way? No – in fact behavioral response in dealing with the workers’ cause but complained there was not a policeman in sight. A these (the history of relations). It about the disruptive effects of the street crossing had been reached – has been said that Lenin despaired strike on the regional economy. They the little red man was indicating stop. of German communists’ potentials for proposed that workers demonstrate The crowd moved through in batches revolt when he saw them buying sta- on a Sunday rather than a workday. in strict compliance with the traffic tion tickets to participate in a protest With a look of amazement the union lights! This was all in quite startling organized at the Berlin station. leader replied ‘Look we are not here contrast to the demonstrations that to organize a Sunday picnic – we are occupy media time in my home, Despite a democratic legal frame- in a political struggle to end the gov- South Africa. Here the traffic lights work that promotes freedoms of as- ernment of oppression – it’s meant would have been at risk of destruc- sociation, assembly, expression and to be disruptive!’ tion, burning tires might have been protest action (procedural rights), dragged onto the road, a few cars it seems that many communities While some individuals in crowds burned and there would have been in South Africa believe that unless may have no shared common pur- 22 PIN•Points 41/2015

pose (shoppers in a mall) or share Television screens carry daily im- employed by public order police the fairly benign purposes (support of ages of protestors in confrontational theory originally informed. The extent a sports team, or celebration of a exchanges with police. Across North of this shift is reflected in South Afri- national day), others represent col- Africa and the Middle East spontane- ca’s Goldstone Commission’s report of lectivities deliberately convened to ous protest action mutated into riots, 1992, the report of the Human Effects communicate a grievance, or create then revolutions and civil wars. In Advisory Panel of the Institute for a disturbance or disrupt the normal some there was a rapid collapse of Non-lethal Defense Technologies in flow of public activities, or provoke regimes (Tunisia, Egypt), in some January 2001, and in such documents authorities to action in front of regimes restored order through as the Commonwealth Human Rights cameras. brutal repression (Bahrain); others Initiative ‘standards and procedure for escalated into civil wars (Libya, Syria, Crowd control’ published in July 2005. Crowd control is a challenge for Yemen), or simply saw continuation public order police in both repressive of a long attritional exchange (Israel- Crowds mutate into riots when their and democratic societies. In the for- Palestine). In Kiev, Ukraine, protes- members commit violent or illegal mer they generally violate rules, and tors occupied the town square with actions that disturb the peace. Tradi- threaten regime control but police sufficient intensity to see collapse of tional understanding of this process are given wide latitude to deliver a the government but then (perhaps is one in which individuals lose their repressive response. In the latter an intended consequence) a collapse sense of individual accountability in a however peaceful demonstrations into civil war and wider tensions in ‘mob mentality’, and commit acts they are regarded as an important right, international relations between Rus- would not usually do because the embodying freedoms of association, sia and the European Union and USA. crowd makes them feel anonymous. assembly and expression. Authorities In Ferguson, USA, a police killing of a Referring to Momboise’s classic work are expected not only to tolerate pro- young black man gave rise to weeks (1967) Schweingruber posits that ‘all test actions but also to facilitate an of protest action and occasional riot- crowds can transform into lawbreak- enabling environment for them, and ing. In Brussels violent confrontations ing mobs’ (2000: 372). The process to ensure protections for the safety have taken place between police and is one that sees angry people gather, and security of both protestors and workers protesting changes to pen- fuelled by pent up grievances; milling the wider public. Within this balance sion arrangements. In Hong Kong around; being brought to a collective of democratic rights and responsibili- activists engage in street protests boil through collective grumbling and ties much can go wrong. Opportun- for an open democracy. In South rumoring; becoming increasingly less ists may use crowd situations to carry Africa social protest action has risen responsive to extra-group stimuli as out objectives unrelated to those of to a level described by one analyst individuals lose rationality and self- a demonstration. Attacks on property as a ‘rebellion of the poor’, spiking control as they are absorbed into a and people and looting may give way into terrible violence on the platinum ‘crowd mind’ and behave as parts of a to violent confrontations between mines and the Marikana killings. larger crowd organism in a context of police and citizens with casualties heightened emotionality and anonym- including bystanders. There may Thinking about crowds and crowd ity. Under the influence of agitating be some who have an interest in control has shifted. Understanding leaders, and following a trigger event provoking a violent response from of protests as ‘madding crowds’ has (a spark) or rumor, these individuals police as part of a media campaign given way to one of purposive collec- may then participate in destructive of their own. Police may enter crowd tivities. In more enlightened environ- and violent behaviour. It is a dynamic control situations with inadequate ments public order policing has moved that places authorities in a dilemma training or equipment, and have away from simply tactics of escalated with police accused of fueling violence ill-disciplined members within their force to negotiated management ap- whether they act brutally or too ranks who carry malevolent feelings proaches (Schweingruber 2000:371). weakly. towards protesting communities, or In his review of ‘mob sociology’ theory who respond poorly in high stress Schweingruber (2000) does not ques- Traditionally the thinking was that situations. Even in benign crowd tion its validity as much as its influ- there would be an incident which situations such as sports crowds, an ence over police crowd management would see people milling about – unexpected event such as a fire may tactics. Crowd management through police would be required to do a see panic and casualties. negotiation has been more effec- quick read of the situation and try tive than the escalated force tactics to resolve it as quickly as possible to www.pin-negotiation.org 23

prevent any escalation. If this was hindsight rather than being easily defeat demonstrations but to prevent not achieved however and the crowd foreseen and prevented. violent breakdown through more col- became more excited and subject to laborative means. Strategies should influence from emergent agitating Modern thinkers caution against in the first instance be aimed at leaders, these individuals should be simplistic understanding of crowd preventing breakdowns in demon- removed and police should call in behaviour in which analysts may strations, and then to contain and reinforcements to show a capacity simply find what they are looking for defuse and allow tensions to burn out for force if the crowd did not dis- in a self-reinforcing cycle of theory through non-confrontational means perse. But if this failed and the crowd and structured observation, and poor wherever possible. moved to a stage of ‘social contagion’ theory comes to inform action. and rioted, police should bring in fur- GOOD PRACTICE IN CROWD ther reinforcements, detain leaders, Police face dilemmas in managing MANAGEMENT cordon off and isolate the crowd and crowd behaviour. In democratic en- use necessary force to break up and vironments they must both protect Several elements facilitate good prac- disperse the crowd. In peak intensity rights of assembly and protest and tice in crowd management. Authori- situations police might use dogs and rights to safety and security of both ties should have a clear understand- then teargas and water-cannons protestors and the wider public. The ing of their purpose and role and they to disperse a crowd, and (though challenge is how to prevent a crowd should have an ability to assess the seldom admitted) lethal weapons to becoming a mob rather than trying purposes, nature, composition and ‘take out’ identified leaders. to deal with it when it has. And police mood of the crowds they are faced However this approach has been behaviour can be critical to this. Force with. They should wherever possible revised. In a review of studies of may simply provoke greater resist- be proactive in building relationships crowds and crowd control The Hu- ance and escalate into higher levels of trust with communities where man Effects Advisory Panel of the of violence. The problem has been they work for intelligence gathering Institute for Non-lethal Technologies that understanding of mob violence purposes, but also to facilitate nego- in 2001 made several important has not advanced in many places, tiations with credible leaders when observations of the nature of crowds and if police expect violence they act crowd management situations arise. informing modern thinking about is if it is going to occur (in terms of If authorities negotiate with organ- the management of demonstrations. mob theory), failing to recognize that izers of demonstrations over issues Crowds they concluded: their own behaviour may provoke vi- of timing, venues, routes, acceptable olence. ‘Thus the theory justified the behavior, marshaling, and the role • are not unified homogenous enti- practice, and the practice proved the and location of police, the door is ties but are usually heterogeneous theory’ (Schweingruber 2000:383). also opened to discuss measures to and multi-motive; limit the risk of breakdowns and re- • comprise ‘companion clusters’ SHIFTS IN THINKING ABOUT sponsibilities amongst organizers and rather than individuals; CROWDS AND CROWD various authorities. For example in • are not necessarily prone to MANAGEMENT one very big march organized by the ‘anonymity’ dynamics – they do ANC during South Africa’s transition, not necessarily disable individual However a change has occurred it was agreed that the police should cognition; where police have adopted a ne- post themselves a few blocks back • are a process – they have begin- gotiated management approach from the crowd. They would be close nings, middles and endings; to demonstrations. Policy shifts to enough to act quickly if things went • are not necessarily prone to permit rather than stop protests and wrong, but not so close as to provoke violence; to employ ‘minimum force necessary’ any angry responses from the crowd. • are not violent simply because of softened police actions and limited Marshaling responsibilities belonged social factors of deprivation, or police provocation as an element to the organizers of the march and frustration dynamics; in mob violence. ‘As police started they fulfilled these. The sheer pres- • seldom see entirely unified ac- trying to accommodate demonstra- sure of bodies saw a jeweller’s shop tion – and if there is such action, it tions, violence became less frequent’ window crack – the marshals called does not last long; (Schweingruber 2000:383). In short for a police presence to guard the • precipitating events / flashpoints when authorities achieved greater window and ensure that members are usually only identified in success when they sought not to of the crowd understood their pur- 24 PIN•Points 41/2015

pose, in effect protecting the police. between those of organizers and long-term relations with communi- The marshals discovered groups of others who might see opportunity in ties, establishing community-police youths interested in provoking a con- using the energy of a demonstration forums for trust building and infor- frontation taunting some police who for purposes of their own. Those mation gathering purposes. They were parked away from the agreed negotiating peaceful demonstrations should ‘make good things happen for march – they rather than the police need to surface such risks and where communities’, foster the building of brought them back into line. possible agree a modus operandi relations between specific police and for managing scenarios in which a specific communities; and develop a PURPOSE demonstration is hijacked by more deep knowledge of the communities aggressive elements. Crowds are no and its social patterns. Apart from the As with all strategies, purpose guides longer understood as homogenous value of such steps for normal crime action. The purpose of police re- entities and this offers opportuni- prevention and detection, it serves to sponding to demonstrations in demo- ties for peaceful management – but create an environment conducive to cratic dispensations is to protect the a heterogeneous composition has the second desirable process – the rights of all citizens involved – of problems of its own, demanding negotiated demonstration. protestors to assemble and to march differential responses to sections of If communities see value in demon- in expression of their grievance, crowds and if badly handled may strations and trust in police to protect and of the wider public to safety of provoke hostile responses from their rights to protest it facilitates person and property. The mission is elements that might otherwise have cooperation. With notice planners of not to defeat a crowd when there is been peaceful. protest action and police might nego- breakdown but to defuse tensions. It tiate a wide set of parameters for the is contain rather than to provoke. Of- In the case of spontaneous dem- activity: times, routes to be followed, ten easier said than done of course, onstrations police need to quickly marshaling, the form of police in- and especially if it is the intention of identify the purpose of the action: volvement, communication channels elements of a crowd to provoke the benign communication, expression of between protest leaders and police, use of force by police under the gaze anger, media attention, provocation the actions of other authorities such of television cameras. At all times of authorities, get someone to come as local government officials to whom though police should try to secure down and negotiate. And of course petitions may be delivered. the moral high ground – it is not a they need to determine whether in military victory that is needed. fact the action is spontaneous or CROWD MOOD & SPONTANEITY Police need to be clear about their simply the coming together of a well- own purpose and role but they also planned campaign by organizers who Purpose is often matched by mood. need to understand why a crowd have chosen not to communicate Those interested in managing dem- has come together. Early studies with authorities. onstrations require skills in identify- distinguished between collections ing shifts in crowd climate; whether of people gathered for no particular The higher the risk of violence reflected it is a celebratory, grieving, or angry common purpose, as in a shopping in the purpose of the crowd the greater assembly – and whether a change in mall (casual crowds); those gathered the need to negotiate the modus crowd mood is occurring and why. for a particular social purpose such operandi of a march with its organ- Celebratory or conventional crowds as a sports match (conventional izers. Even in apparently spontaneous don’t arrive with weapons; spontane- crowds); those in which people as- gatherings police should try to identify ous gatherings don’t wave printed semble for non-destructive celebra- leaders with whom they can talk. placards. So there may be signals of tory (singing and dancing) purposes the degree of spontaneity or organi- (expressive crowds); and those EFFECTIVE PREVENTION zation within a crowd that authorities assembled for more hostile purposes need to understand and work with. (aggressive crowds) where emotional Two major preventive processes can In the case of organized crowds there intensity makes for a higher risk of be identified for police: one long-term will be an organizing person or group breakdowns and violence. and in the form of context creation, with focus and purpose and organiz- the other more immediate and in ing systems in terms of networks and Of course there may be many the form of negotiations around the use of media. Spontaneous crowds gaps between the overt and covert conduct of marches. Police should emerge in response to particular purposes of demonstrations, and do lots of preventive work building incidents or triggers and dependent www.pin-negotiation.org 25

‘Pray for rain’ – it is a known cooler of hot crowds. Authorities should consider the impact of weather conditions on situations, as well as access to food and water and needs for sleep and warmth. Interventions may not be needed if crowds can be contained long enough. Of course activists have also considered this in recent times, bringing tents and sup- plies with them in their occupation of town squares. These tactics change the waiting game but the contain rather than contend rationale should be preserved for as long as possible. Police should proactively negotiate with those who will talk; validate on access to a gathering point, avail- and police and other authorities. leaders with credibility amongst ability of people and their priorities, Spontaneous demonstrations are activists partly because they have including work and family responsibili- more difficult to respond to – and influence but also because it concen- ties, daily routines and chores! especially ‘planned’ spontaneous trates accountability. People listen to action organized through social me- their own leaders first, and commit to Crowd composition & leadership dia which may see police knowing rules they’ve negotiated rather than As indicated crowds are seldom en- action is impending but not exactly ones imposed. tirely unified or homogenous entities sure where, or involving how many. – they are often heterogeneous and Planned ‘spontaneous’ demonstra- The message is ‘we want to help multi-motive in character reflecting tions of course reflect a deliberate you do this responsibly’ but police ‘companion clusters’ whose purposes effort to evade negotiations with sometimes neglect their key role of for participation differ. Within crowds authorities, to disrupt through sur- networking. Responsible protest it is helpful to identify ‘energy pock- prise. They present real difficulties of requires responsive government. ets’ shaping crowd behavior, and the management. Police should be active in networking nature of such energy: anger, cel- into the frame political and business ebration, fun, grief. Energy pockets SPATIAL AND OTHER leaders with whom activists want to of course relate to leadership – are DIMENSIONS talk, and locate credible mediators there leaders who might be engaged where they may lack such credentials for negotiation purposes, or to tar- Experts suggest that how groups within their own ranks. The search is get for arrest should resort to more assemble indicates how they will dis- for non-violent resolution and wider forceful tactics be obliged later in the perse. Police should avoid trapping or social responsibility is often required. process? cornering crowds, allowing exits and Those faced with managing demon- opportunities for dispersal and es- strations to peaceful conclusions also CROWD CONTROL cape. It seems people die in crowds need the media as an ally rather than less because of panic stampeding an enemy – and should have strate- Crowds can take many forms and than not being able to see what is go- gies to this effect. once formed may mutate. Police ing on – they are often not disorderly require skills in continuous crowd as much as uninformed about how THE USE OF FORCE assessment. The negotiated dem- to leave. Distancing affects crowd onstration offers greater but not behavior – if police are too close it A longstanding principle observed by absolute certainty regarding crowd can provoke; too far does not allow police in civilized jurisdictions is that behavior, enabling shared responsi- for a quick response – the message minimum necessary force be used to bility for the conduct of a march and carried through police positioning achieve a desired objective. Modern channels of communication to be set should be ‘containment’ rather than thinking is to contain and dissipate up between demonstration leaders confrontation. rather than disperse or defeat res- 26 PIN•Points 41/2015

tive crowds. The use of force should include pepper-spray, water or be they assume a much complex role require top-level authority from in the form of paint or dye balls – as frontline protectors of all citizens, within the police, and it should be a hit is painful but does not cause and mediators of social change. minimalist in character and progres- permanent harm. The discipline of sive in implementation with the use the police formation accompanied by of firearms as a last resort, after the stamping and banging of shields is use of teargas, batons and water intended to intimidate and encourage cannons. Baton charges should only dispersal. Arrests should be selective References take place after clear warnings and with leaders targeted. Defuse, deter, Anstey, M. 2006. Managing Change, Negotiat- following a signal (such as a whistle disperse are the range of objectives ing Conflict. Claremont, Jutas that can be clearly understood by a rather than defeat of a crowd. Anstey, M. 1993. Practical Peacemaking. Clare- crowd). Baton blows should be aimed mont, Jutas Goldstone, R. 1992. Commission of Enquiry at soft portions of the body, avoiding CONCLUSION Regarding the Prevention of Violence and contact with the head as far as pos- Intimidation – Second Interim Report. Cape sible. If baton charges are not suc- Anyone who has been involved in Town. cessful resort to firing (rubber bullets the management of large scale ag- Grabianowski, E. 2014. How Riot Control first) may occur after warning the gressive demonstrations will have a Works. Downloaded from http://people. howstuffworks.com/riot-control1.htm on 23 crowd and only on the authority of tangible sense of the tensions that May 2014. the most senior officer. Aim should be run through exchanges between ac- Human Effects Advisory Panel. 2001. Crowd low, directed at the part of the crowd tivists and authorities, and especially Behaviour, Crowd Control and the Use of that is most threatening and ceased the police who find themselves on Non-lethal Weapons. Institute for Non-lethal Defence Technologies. immediately when the crowd shows the frontline of such events. There Schweingruber, D. 2000. Mob Sociology and signs of dispersing. Help should be is no room for naivete or weakness, Escalated Force: Sociology’s Contribution to given any wounded. The proceedings but equally little for bullying or ex- Repressive Police Tactics. The Sociological should be accurately recorded – in cessive force. The shift in managerial Quarterly, 41,3:371-389. reports and in modern times through logic on the part of police in demo- Other readings video recordings. cratic societies has been away from tactics of defeating crowds, to ones William Aron. “Student activism of the 1960s Grabianowski (2014) outlines how directed at protecting the rights of revisited: a multivariate analysis.” Social police usually operate in riot sce- all parties, preventing breakdown, Forces. Vol. 52, 1974, pp. 406-414. 20 Leonard Berkowitz. 1969. Roots of Aggression: narios. They are usually well-armed shared responsibility for the control A Re-examination of the Frustration Aggres- but seek to prevent injuries. They of marches, foreseeing and agreeing sion Hypothesis.” New York: Atherton Press. operate in a squared formation with possible breakdown scenarios … and Brush, Stephen. 1996. “Dynamics of theory commanders and an arrest team at only as last resort the use of force change in the social sciences: relative depriva- the centre. This formation facilitates within a strict protocol of managed tion and collective violence.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 4-: 523—545. rapid response to changing situations escalation. The means through which Hanspeter Kreisi and Dieter Rucht (Eds) Social and a capacity to respond to attacks this shift is worked out is negotiation. Movements in a Globalizing World. London: from any quarter. Police try to allow MacMillan Press, Ltd. 27 escape routes rather than to entrap Not uncommonly it seems activists John McCarthy and Clark McPhail. 1998. “The rioters. Moving forward police allow use tactics that signal no desire to Institutionalization of Protest in the United States.” Pp. 83-110 in David Meyer and Sidney protestors into the centre of the negotiate – they want to ‘ambush’ Tarrow (Eds) The Social Movement Society: square where they can be arrested a system, disrupt rather than simply Contentious Politics for a New Century: New and then close ranks before moving communicate, provoke authorities York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield; forward again and repeating the into repressive responses – and John McCarthy, Clark McPhail and John Crist. 1999. “The diffusion and adoption of public process. The task is to prevent rather these present police and other au- order management systems.” Pp. 71-94 in than provoke violence. The use of thorities with very real dilemmas. If Donatella della Porta, Crowd Behavior, Crowd batons precedes the use of firearms police accept a role as protectors of Control and the Use of Non-Lethal Weapons which requires special training to illegitimate repressive regimes, the Clark McPhail, “Stereotypes of Crowds and reduce risks of serious injury or fa- dilemmas are reduced. But if they see Collective Behavior: Looking Backward, Look- ing Crowd Behavior, Crowd Control and the talities. Rounds used escalate from their primary role as being to protect Use of Non-Lethal Weapons Forward,” Studies wood and rubber to foam or sponge citizens and the rights of citizens to in Symbolic Interaction, Supplement 3, 1997, for close quarter work. Rounds may express resistance to oppression p. 37. 8 Ibid. 12 www.pin-negotiation.org 27

MIKHAIL TROITSKIY FOCAL POINTS IN ARMS CONTROL

In the contemporary world of grow- about falling victim to artful exploita- participants in a negotiation without ing complexity where major social, tion by the opponent. communication cannot resolve coor- political, and economic shifts are dination problems. Some observers determined by unexpected, cascade, Thomas Schelling and his followers have noted, however, that the ef- and even catastrophic developments, suggested two strategies of identify- fectiveness of “non-communicable” facilitation of coordination among ac- ing potential focal points during nego- focal points was debatable because it tors become vital. When decisions on tiations or other types of interactions was not guaranteed that the parties cooperation or conflict de-escalation among humans. First, a focal point “would attach the same salience to have to be taken under severe time may be found in a certain conspicuous the same point.”2 pressure, the importance of conspicu- material phenomenon.1 For example, ous solutions is difficult to overesti- the main clock at a city’s central rail- Second, a round number that does mate. Such solutions are often called way station is usually identified as the not correspond to any widely known “focal points” and include numbers, default meeting place. In arms con- phenomenon can serve as a focal objects, and phenomena the value trol, the range that separates strategic point in a negotiation where parties of which as bases for coordination is and other classes of missiles is agreed are able to communicate freely. Round expected be evident to all parties in- to be 5,500 km – roughly the distance numbers can be found in almost any volved. This essay looks at the role of a missile launched in Eurasia has to area under negotiation, including focal points in facilitating arms control travel to reach North America, and arms control. A round numerical solu- negotiations – a key activity shaping vice versa. The “focal allure” of these tion need not be so unique as to be contemporary international security. points, usually called “salient,” results identifiable without communication The intuitive point of departure for from the fact that they are expected the analysis presented in this essay is to be evident even to individuals who 1 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, (Cam- that symbolism plays a crucial role in seek coordination but are unable bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 57, enabling compromise in arms control to communicate. Absent a widely- 77; Schelling, Thomas, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 137. negotiation – an area prone to zero- recognized natural phenomenon or a 2 Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: A History, (New sum thinking and excessive concerns landmark underpinning a focal point, York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 167. 28 PIN•Points 41/2015

between the parties. Schelling, who tools of drawing the positions of the is premised on the belief that even was mostly looking at cases of rapid sides closer to one another; agree- a minimal risk of a major city being crisis escalation in which adversaries ment on these numbers was quite hit by a nuclear-tipped missile is did not have enough time to com- easy for the negotiating parties to sufficient to prevent one’s adversary municate, was not interested in this reach before they had to address from all-out aggression. In its turn, second source of focal points.3 more controversial issues. According counter-force targeting is based on to senior negotiators involved in the the assumption that a nuclear war can Both types of focal points have gained most recent round of strategic arms be fought and won by a sudden dis- traction in arms control. On one hand, control talks between the United arming strike that would eliminate all arms control is a less rapidly unfolding States and Russia, the ceilings for (or almost all) of adversary’s retalia- process than a real-time international deployed nuclear warheads to be tory capability. While it would be most crisis or war, so focal points in arms enshrined in the New START Treaty economically and politically sensible control are mostly numerical and situ- of 2010 were in fact not difficult to for a dyad of potential nuclear-armed ational, that is, they are picked in the agree upon. Neither side considered adversaries to converge around the vicinity of negotiators’ initial positions. it a major concession to commit to counter-value principle, certain trends On the other hand, conspicuous, or observing the maximum of 1,550 de- in the evolution of their mutual politi- salient solutions are also used – for ployed warheads and 800 of deployed cal attitudes and force structures can example, when negotiators need to and non-deployed carriers.4 result in a quantum shift to counter- delineate geographic boundaries of force targeting – a much more costly areas to fall under a negotiated arms In a similar vein, the Conventional and risky posture. In broad terms, control regime. Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed the choice of posture depends on the in 1990 and the preceding negotia- dominant worldviews among decision CLASSIFYING ARMS CONTROL tions on “mutual and balanced force makers, namely, whether they believe SOLUTIONS reductions” in Europe involved dozens in deterrence in general and whether of numbers most of which were, ac- they believe that the side which has a From the focal point perspective, one cording to the existing accounts of bigger arsenal stands real chances of can identify three types of solutions CFE negotiations, in no way focal. prevailing in a crisis. embodied in arms control agreements. Overall, in arms control negotiations, It can be argued that the two princi- 1) Non-focal point. Most of negotiated numbers often generate less conten- ples under discussion during the CFE arms control solutions come in such tion than, for example, the terms on talks also constituted non-equilibrium form. These solutions are reached which the sides would be monitoring focal points. The Soviet Union started without reliance on any symmetry or and verifying implementation of the off by demanding mutual force reduc- beauty of the number. In many cases, negotiated agreement. In these and tions in equal proportion to the initial numbers in arms control negotiations many other cases, the round num- numbers (in which Moscow had an are picked in a consensual manner bers’ “focal promise,” which can be advantage). In its turn, the United without the need to attract negotiat- defined as the power of attraction, States and its European allies insisted ing parties to a position that they was either unnecessary or weak. that the USSR should introduce greater would otherwise not consider optimal cuts that would eliminate the disparity based on their interests. In such 2) Non-equilibrium focal point. This is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. situations, the beauty of the number a focal point in the vicinity of which Eventually, the reform-minded Soviet may be present, but is not necessary there is another focal point, so that leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed in to override anyone’s initial negotiat- a shift from one to the other can oc- 1988 to the principle of parity be- ing position. Only a small share of cur relatively easily and oftentimes cause he considered the numbers numbers in arms control agreements unexpectedly. One example of non- of Soviet troops deployed in Eastern conform to the definition of a focal equilibrium focal points is provided Europe excessive and unaffordable. point. by counter-value and counter-force This change of preferred focal point targeting principles in nuclear strat-

For example, the round numbers used egy. Each principle is based on an 3 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict, pp. extensively in the New START (2010) underlying coherent logic that can 100-101. 4 See, for example: Lewis, Jeffrey, Bar Nunn, Foreign and Conventional Forces in Europe be adopted by the mutually deter- Policy Blog, October 17, 2012, http://www.foreign- (1990) treaties were not needed as ring sides. Counter-value targeting policy.com/articles/2012/10/17/bar_nunn www.pin-negotiation.org 29

allowed to promptly conclude the ena or objects, such as borders limiting the massive conventional negotiations and sign the CFE Treaty drawn along rivers or mountain weapons arsenals that the two blocs in November 1990. ridges or physical principles under- had accumulated in Europe. CFE talks lying weapon technologies. also had the potential to become rich A similar focal-point debate unfolded in focal point outcomes. during U.S.-Soviet negotiations on Several trends in the use of focal intermediate-range missiles. Under points in arms control deserve closer However, the power of focal points in the leadership of Gorbachev, the attention. arms control failed to fully material- Soviet Union eventually agreed to the ize. Numbers are usually dictated by complete elimination of this whole THE PROMISE OF NUMBERS the sides’ strategies and postures, class of missiles which implied bigger that is, by their determination of the reductions in absolute numbers for Round numbers began playing a vis- most likely adversaries and conflict the Soviet Union than for the United ible role in arms control negotiations scenarios. Arms control negotiations States. An alternative solution would with the emergence of mass-pro- usually focus on the possibility of have been to cut similar numbers of duced standardized weapons. As the an agreed change in postures that missiles or to compensate Moscow in number of weapons at the disposal of would, in turn, lead to a review of the a certain way for scrapping a greater each negotiating party was rising to optimal numbers of weapons neces- number of weapons. overkill levels, these numbers became sary to maintain the new posture. very large and abstract. A recent think Once postures are defined, agreeing The Global Zero principle – total tank report on the U.S. nuclear weap- on numbers becomes relatively easy. elimination of nuclear weapons – is ons capability suggested that “deep At the same time, round or otherwise another example of a non-equilibrium uncertainty [persists] in estimating “magic” numbers can serve as refer- focal point. As an end-state, the Global the adequacy of nuclear forces: how ence points that attract attention Zero is morally attractive; however, it will they work in the environment of negotiators and prompt them to does not represent a Nash equilibrium they might create? Lacking data, consider changes in posture that given the difficulties of compliance planners sought assurance in larger would correspond to those “magic” verification and everyone’s tempta- inventories, while analysts usually had numbers. tion to obtain a decisive edge by recourse to modeling gains and losses quickly (and covertly) deploying just under simplistic scenarios contrived For the United States and the Soviet a few nuclear weapons. to show the numerical consequences Union (Russia) rising numbers be- of various constraints—what Aron came both the cause and result of the 3) Equilibrium focal points. These derided as ‘strategic fiction.’”5 choice in favor of counter-force tar- are focal negotiation outcomes in the geting. Large nuclear stockpiles only vicinity of which there are no evident With abstract models and simplistic make sense if nuclear weapons are focal alternatives based on different scenarios ruling the day, solutions regarded as a war-fighting capability concepts of justice, such as “equal based on numerical focal points and as usable and allowing to prevail cuts” vs “total elimination.” Numerous became easier for negotiators. This in a conflict. Mutually deterring sides examples of equilibrium focal points concerned, first and foremost, nuclear stay at low numbers if they only see are provided below. explosive devices and the means of nuclear weapons as a guarantee their delivery. Over the 1960s, con- against ultimate defeat in a conven- Both equilibrium and non-equilibrium sensus emerged between the United tional conflict and do not consider focal points in arms control usually States and the Soviet Union, as well surprise disarming strike scenarios come in one of the following forms: as on a broader multilateral scale, as realistic. The decision by the two that the accelerating expansion of the nuclear superpowers to proceed with • numbers: round or otherwise deadly arsenals had to be contained. building massive overkill arsenals sig- “magical,” that is, sticking out First results were achieved by the nified a choice in favor of the counter- because of certain special early 1970s in the form of “ceilings” characteristics; imposed on further growth of Soviet 5 Butterworth, Robert, Slouching Toward Zero: • symmetries: points at the same and American nuclear stockpiles. At Considering U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs and distance from the preferred posi- approximately the same time, nego- Policy, George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook Brief, April 2013, p. 6, http://marshall.org/missile- tion of each negotiating side; tiations opened between NATO and defense/slouching-towards-zero-considering-u-s- • natural or other physical phenom- the Warsaw Treaty Organization on nuclear-weapons-programs-and-policy/ 30 PIN•Points 41/2015

speech in Berlin that the United States “can ensure the security of America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while reducing our deployed strategic nucle- ar weapons by up to one-third.”7 The number of deployed U.S. warheads at the time of this speech was capped by the New START Treaty at 1,550. The Russian side, subject to the same limit, did not explicitly endorse the 1,000 warheads goal citing concerns with U.S. plans to deploy potentially robust missile defenses. However, the number 1,000 previously featured in public statements by Russian officials who suggested that 1,000 would be the absolute minimum Moscow could possibly consider if “smaller” nuclear- armed states continue to refrain from multilateral limitations talks with the United States and Russia.

The “arbitrary focal numbers” phe- nomenon also transpired in the de- force targeting focal point. Once the Once the United States and the Soviet bates on “unacceptable damage” from U.S. and Soviet postures were ad- Union securely locked themselves in a nuclear attack. At the height of the justed and sides moved by the 1980s an overkill situation, win-sets in arms cold-war era arms race, policymakers towards discussing disarmament op- control negotiations between them in the U.S. and the USSR had to make tions (as opposed to just agreeing to or their blocs began to be based on bold assumptions about the scale of cap the arsenals’ growth), the exact raw estimates of “sufficient” numbers the destruction that the adversary number of retained warheads and/or rather than on exact calculations or would prefer not to risk. U.S. Defense missiles became – within certain limits plans of using the weapons, especially Secretary Robert McNamara defined determined by the postures – less a nuclear. For example, it became popu- the situation of mutually assured matter of principle than of a technical lar to claim, in Moscow or Washington, destruction (neither side is tempted decision. that a nuclear superpower “cannot to undertake a surprise disarming afford” to reduce its nuclear arsenal nuclear strike against the adversary) At the same time, the three other below the sum of warheads deployed as one in which the attacker would be NPT-compliant nuclear-armed states, by second-tier nuclear-weapon states. sure to lose at least 25 percent of its including China, have remained con- Alternatively, it was maintained, a the population and 50 percent of its tent with their limited arsenals, un- nuclear superpower needs to aim industrial capacity. willing or unable to plan for responses for an order-of-magnitude edge in to a potential first disarming strike by numbers of a nuclear superpower As the prominent military strategy an adversary. Their nuclear postures over any second-tier nuclear-weapon expert Lawrence Freedman noted, remain centered on the focal point of state. Both assumptions converged these numbers were not just beauti- counter-value targeting. In the recent on 1,000 as the minimum acceptable years, according to some analysts, number of deployed warheads to be 6 See, for example: Krepon, Michael, What Went Wrong India and Pakistan reached counter- retained by a nuclear superpower. with Arms Control, The Arms Control Wonk Blog, July 30, 2013, http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/ force numbers and are therefore likely archive/3853/what-went-wrong-with-arms-control to be planning for retaliation against Apparently leveraging 1,000 warheads 7 President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Branden- massive surprise nuclear attacks by as a focal point, U.S. President Barack burg Gate, Berlin, June 19, 2013, http://www.white- house.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/19/remarks- 6 the other side. Obama asserted in his June 19, 2013 president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany www.pin-negotiation.org 31

ful, but arbitrary: “These levels […] argues that “[b]ecause numbers of in the future. The treaty entered into reflected less a judgment about the chemical and biological weapons that force in 1970 for the term of 25 years tolerances of modern societies and are greater than zero can be hidden, thus making 1995 an important focal more the point at which extra explo- suspicions can only be conclusively point when the future of NPT had to sions would result in diminishing affirmed by use, if they cannot be be determined. marginal returns measured by new revealed by national technical means damage and casualties, the point at or intrusive treaty-monitoring re- Verification regimes in arms control which – to use Winston Churchill’s gimes.”10 Another critic points out provide some valuable examples of vivid phrase – ‘all you are going to do that Global Zero will be achieved by focal points. “Everything is accessible is make rubble bounce’.8” default as soon as nuclear arms be- to everyone” principle is enshrined in come redundant and/or outmoded. the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Twelve Despite the arbitrariness of large This may happen if a more powerful signatory states have the right to numbers, some focal points in arms weapon of deterrence is invented or send representatives to inspect any control crystallized as a result of diffi- if the risk of conflict involving major area in the Antarctic, including any cult negotiations and the focal points’ global or regional players is reduced signatory’s scientific bases, arriving significant power of attraction. to unimportant levels.11 sea vessels and their cargo.12 In a similar vein, the Seabed Treaty of SALIENT POINTS Focal point in arms control can also 1971 allows all parties to fully monitor take the form of a calendar date. one another’s seabed activity beyond “The number that matters most in January 1, 1967 was chosen by the the 12-mile territorial waters zone.13 norm-setting is zero,” noted one Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nego- prominent arms control analyst. tiators as the cutoff date pivotal for A competing focal point in the sphere He continued: “This number is the the treaty. By setting the criterion of of verification would imply a maximum clearest and most meaningful way to a nuclear test conducted before this number of permitted inspections. For set norms and customary practices date, this point helped to resolve the example, the US-Russian New START among responsible states. The num- non-trivial problem of who should treaty of 2010 envisages 18 annual ber zero is embedded in the CTBT, the be allowed to keep nuclear weapons short-notice on-site inspections (in Chemical Weapons Convention, and under NPT. addition to inspections carried out by the Biological Weapons Convention. national technical means) in order to States that do not honor the number Time focal points sometimes crystal- verify observance of the treaty limits zero become, ipso facto, outliers.”9 lize when negotiators face the need to and conversion or elimination of deliv- reach a new agreement not just be- ery systems. This includes 10 on-site Zero is indeed one of the most pow- fore the existing one has expired, but inspections of deployed warheads and erful focal points in arms control and to commemorate a certain anniver- deployed and non-deployed delivery far beyond this area. On the bilateral sary of another treaty. For example, systems at ICBM bases, submarine level, the US-Soviet Intermediate the United States and Russia sought bases, and air bases (Type One in- Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987 falls to sign a new START treaty before spections) and 8 on-site inspections under the same zero category. This the May 2010 date of opening of the at facilities that may hold only non- treaty completely eliminated two NPT Review Conference. In that way, deployed delivery systems (Type Two classes of ground-launched missiles Washington and Moscow wanted to inspections).14 The Open Skies Treaty covering the ranges between 500 present non-nuclear weapon states of 1992 provides for an equal number and 5,500 km. with a major accomplishment on the of “passive” and “active” inspections way towards nuclear disarmament – for groups of participating countries. Yet however attractive zero may be as an NPT commitment of nuclear-armed Each signatory – alone or together a beautiful number supposedly signi- nations. The treaty was indeed signed fying absolute security for everyone, in Prague on April 10, 2010 – three 8 Freedman, Lawrence, Strategy: A History, p. 170. in many contexts it has the clear trap- weeks before the NPT Review Confer- 9 Krepon, Michael, The Future of Arms Control, The pings of a non-equilibrium focal point. ence kicked off in New York. Arms Control Wonk Blog, August 6, 2013, http:// krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3858/ Many opponents of zero argue that the-future-of-arms-control it would be very hard to detect and NPT itself contained a provision man- 10 Ibid. 11 Tetrais, Bruno, The Four Strawmen of the Apoca- timely punish any breaches of a zero- dating discussion about the extension lypse, Survival, issue 55 no. 6, December 2013 based norm. Analyst Michael Krepon of the treaty at a certain focal date – January 2014. 32 PIN•Points 41/2015

with another participant – is assigned both sides and among U.S. allies and than numbers. Once principles are a number of overflight inspections by partners, and may not be conducive defined, agreement on exact numbers other signatory nations and is entitled to maintaining a stable, long-term of weapons can be reached relatively to the same annual number of flights strategic relationship.”17 easily. Principles usually imply alter- over other signatories’ territory.15 In native focal points with arms control its turn, the Comprehensive Test Ban Finally, a clash of non-equilibrium talks being essentially centered on Treaty requires a qualified majority focal principles has occurred in the making a choice among these points. of signatory nations (30 out of 51) to debate on the definition of outer Negotiating sides seek to substantiate launch an on-site inspection of a sus- space. Russia prefers the borderline the rightfulness of their respective ver- pected nuclear test. The exact figure to have an exact numerical value: sions of a focal point on the grounds of 30 votes in favor of an inspection outer space begins at the altitude of fairness or effectiveness. The was agreed upon as a result of a mid- of 100 km above the sea level. The competing focal points can be defined way compromise between the focal alternative approach championed as “non-equilibrium,” that is, allowing figure of 50 percent (25 votes) and by the United States is based on a shift from one to another without some nation’s insistence on the two- the distinction between two physical losing the basic characteristics of a thirds majority (34 votes). This very forces allowing an object to lift off focal point understood as a solution mode of reaching the consensus to be the ground: aerodynamic or gravi- grounded in a certain interpretation of enshrined in the treaty also exempli- tational. According to this principle, justice or the “beauty” of the number. fied a focal point solution. airplanes flying thanks to the lifting This does not mean, however, that, power of their wings in the air would once reached, a non-equilibrium focal In bilateral US-Soviet and Russian be considered travelling in the at- point is doomed to be dropped soon arms control negotiations, any nu- mosphere while a missile orbiting the in favor of a competing focal point. In merical solutions reached (concerning Earth thanks to gravitation would be fact, solutions such as the zero prin- permitted numbers of missiles or war- regarded as an outer space object. ciple applied to intermediate ballistic heads, details of inspections regimes missiles are resilient enough to remain etc.) reflected, apart from the sides’ These principles are mutually ex- in place for decades. However, the postures, compromises between their clusive, and each of them has clear probability of them being challenged espoused notions of justice. The practical implications desirable for at a later time through invocation of United States has regarded as fair the respective party. Deployment a competing focal point is higher than its preponderance over any potential of weapons of mass destruction in the same probability for equilibrium rival – possibly, out of belief that even outer space is prohibited by the Outer focal points. The lack of stability of in an overkill situation, advantage in Space Treaty of 1967. If the U.S. non-equilibrium focal outcomes in numbers still matters.16 Russia cen- interpretation of the atmosphere / arms control can be explained by the tered its negotiating position on parity outer space border is adopted, Russia equal standing enjoyed by alternative with United States for parity’s own will be faced with the possibility of a conceptions of justice. sake, refusing inter alia to consider high-flying WMD-equipped aircraft – the option of minimal counter-value a prospect Moscow considers a threat deterrence that could be based, for to its security. If the Russian definition example, on the submarine-launched is accepted, the United States will be 12 See: Antarctic Treaty (1959), http://www.atomi- component of the nuclear triad. deprived of the opportunity to deploy carchive.com/Treaties/Treaty1.shtml 13 See: Seabed Treaty (1971), http://www.atomi- high-altitude weapon systems that carchive.com/Treaties/Treaty7.shtml While questioning the need for parity, Washington believes it is capable of 14 See: New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New the U.S. side equally rejected minimal developing in the long run. START) (2010). http://www.atomicarchive.com/ Treaties/Treaty24.shtml deterrence. In the 2010 Nuclear Pos- 15 See: Open Skies Treaty at a Glance, Arms Con- ture Review (NPR) report, the Obama CONCLUSION trol Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/ factsheets/openskies administration argued that “the need 16 A scientific version of this argument was developed for strict numerical parity between Focal points have so far played a vis- most recently in: Kroenig, Matthew, Nuclear Superi- the two countries is no longer as ible yet limited role in arms control. ority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes, International Organization, vol. 67 compelling as it was during the Cold For the most part, arms control is iss. 1, January 2013, pp. 141-171. War.” However, it also warned against negotiation about principles – broad 17 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Re- view, Washington, DC, April 9, 2010, p. 30, http:// “large disparities in nuclear capa- concepts of threat, deterrence, force www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20 bilities” that “could raise concerns on structure and posture etc. – rather Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf 33 PIN•Points 41/2015 www.pin-negotiation.org 33

BANNING THE BANG CONTENT

OR THE BOMB? While talks continue on international regime building considering nuclear materials and terrorism, the MELAMUD, M.; MEERTS, P. Cingendaels Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) program launches a new book on the negotiations leading AND ZARTMAN, I. W. (2014). to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has CAMBRIDGE; NEW YORK: not entered into effect, almost 18 years after completing the negotiations. What lessons can be drawn from the CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. CTBT for future international cooperation for nuclear | NEW PIN BOOK PIN NEW | 373 PAGES. issues?

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated between 1994 and 1996, is the latest development in the nuclear arms control regime. It continues to serve a vital role in preserving the privileged status of the nuclear-weapon states and barring the way to proliferation. Banning the Bang or the Bomb? brings together a team of leading international experts who together analyze its negotiation as a model of regime

creation, examining collective dynamics, the behavior of ANNOUNCEMENT individual countries, and the nature of specific issues. The book offers practical guidance and training for future members of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization inspectorate to help them negotiate during an on-site inspection (OSI) in an inspected state. This is a valuable resource for researchers and professionals alike that turns an analysis of what has happened into a manual for what is about to happen.

AUTHOR

Mordechai Melamud is a retiree of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and is an associate member of the PIN group. He was formerly a research physicist with a Ph.D. in experimental physics from the Weizmann Institute of Science.

Paul Meerts is a Senior Research Associate at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

I. William Zartman is Emeritus Professor of International Organization and Conflict Resolution at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University.

ORDERING INFORMATION

Banning the ban or the bomb is the result of a research project of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program of the Clingendael Institute and is published by Cambridge University Press. It can be ordered here. 34 PIN•Points 41/2015

PAUL MEERTS DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION: ESSENCE AND EVOLUTION

a more stringent control through rules and regulations, networks and constructions.

The analysis of the Westphalia Conferences in the middle of the seventeenth century showed that rulers legitimized foreign interven- tion in order to keep the peace in the Holy Roman Empire of German nations. The treatise on the Utrecht Peace Negotiations at the start of the eighteenth century indicated the duty of the constituents to prevent future wars through unilateral or collective actions. The Congress of Vienna at This article summarizes some of the tion as a global system, as a pathway the beginning of the nineteenth cen- findings and recommendations of the to govern the world and its inhabit- tury created a more or less perma- doctoral dissertation of the author as ants, it seems sensible to strengthen nent alliance of the greater powers defended at Leiden University on 4 it without suffocation. Striving for collectively to hold the peace. The November 2014. balance between context and pro- Negotiations in Paris for the Versailles cess through further regime-building, Treaty, early twentieth century, tried The dissertation asked the question while keeping the arteries of the to solve the problem of future threats of how to further the use and use- process as open as possible, might of war by subduing the collective fulness of diplomatic negotiation in be of help in providing the world with enemy for as long a time as possible. order to limit destructive tendencies reasonably good state and inter-state Finally the Decision Making System in international politics. It presents governance. inside and outside Brussels, i.e. the insights that will hopefully help to The main proposition of the thesis, European Union, managed to do evaluate these processes as an that international/diplomatic negotia- away with internal wars by integrat- instrument in dealing with contra- tion can only be a viable alternative ing a growing number of countries in dictions among the parties that are for warfare if countries can exercise one balanced construction through shaping world affairs: parties with a certain amount of control over an international and supranational both individual and common interests their internal and external opponents approach, thereby establishing a sitting around tables that separate through regime-building, has been negotiation monopoly in the man- and connect them. discussed and analyzed throughout agement of internal and external the manuscript: first in Part I on cooperation and competition. Diplomatic negotiation is between Nature; and second in Part II on Outside and between these regimes, cooperation and competition. It is Conduct. The focal point in the first violence remains a problem. There vital for the future to enhance the part was the connection between is no negotiation monopoly because cooperative element in negotiation process and context, the balance be- of the relative weakness of global and to diminish the competitive side. tween war and words, and the quite institutions like the United Nations However, politics are characterized recent phenomenon of more violent Security Council, although negotia- by strife and competition is not only conflicts being decided through ne- tion has become a more important there to stay, it has the healthy func- gotiations than through victories. The tool in conflict management and tion of avoiding monopolization as second part focused on the question resolution over the centuries. On a well. Looking at diplomatic negotia- of to what extent the cases signalled regional scale, the progress of coop- www.pin-negotiation.org 35

eration – and thereby of negotiation post-negotiation processes. As dip- more effectively political negotiators – has been uneven. There has been lomatic negotiation is an instrument and their agents can conduct their a growing hope for regional institu- in managing international relations negotiation with external parties. tions to compensate for the lack of in such a way that problems can be This was dealt with in the chapter on decisiveness on a global scale. For solved in peaceful ways, it will have to negotiation and warfare. the moment, however, the European be effective as a tool in international Union seems to be an enigma – an governance and conflict resolution. One of the findings of the thesis is exception to the rule that regional or- By effectiveness, we mean managing that the creativity of the diplomatic ganizations are hardly more effective actors, factors and processes in such negotiator is in danger, and thereby than more encompassing regimes. a way that outcomes can be reached his effectiveness. Although the rulers at the lowest possible costs. Manag- were absolute in the seventeenth, States remain the domain of nego- ing sovereign countries is problem- eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, tiation, although they are enhanc- atic, unless – as has been stated and in some cases also in the twenti- ing their capacity for international above – there is a certain measure of eth and even now in the twenty-first negotiation as an alternative to war- control. This control can be exerted century, the space for their agents fare, because of growing economic through over-arching international – and thereby for their ability to interdependency, diplomatic insti- regimes. reach outcomes in a creative and tutionalization and the progress in human way – has been shrinking. international public law. The fabric of ACTORS The ambassadors of the seventeenth international cooperation, however, and eighteenth century were thus in remains vulnerable and dependent Since the seventeenth century, the a way ‘Brusselized’ already. Nobles on ripeness situations, as interna- state has developed into an ever- with common values using a lingua tional regimes are often still too stronger actor in diplomatic – that is, franca that they all understood, in an weak to create negotiated ripeness. inter-state – negotiation processes. age when nationalism was not yet a Negotiation has become a viable in- While in the seventeenth century serious issue, had more influence on strument of decision-making, but in the state was a tool in the hands of the outcomes than their rulers, who crisis situations it is still often more of dynasties, with the exception of Eng- mainly decided on the formulas, but an auxiliary instrument. The turning land and the republics, it progressed hardly on the details. point where diplomatic negotiation to become an instrument in the hands will be strong enough to make wars of the people, represented by their During the nineteenth century, rulers redundant is still to be reached and parliaments. However, in more than begin to intervene more and more in might never come, notwithstanding half of the world’s nations today, the the day-to-day negotiation process- the growing strength of diplomatic state is a de facto tool of oligarchic es, while in the twentieth century, negotiation over the centuries. or authoritarian elites, while some – politicians started to play a more presidential – dynasties still govern. and more dominant role in the actual Diplomatic negotiations start with the These internal differences have an negotiation process. This develop- actors who initiate the process. Ac- impact on the two-level games in the ment was facilitated by increasingly tors have three choices: to do noth- negotiation process. effective means of transportation ing; to pull back; or to push forward. Public opinion plays a major role in and communication. Political negotia- In other words, to freeze, to flee, democracies – and therefore parlia- tors can easily jump over the tables or to fight. These movements are ment, the media, and public and around which their agents try to fix mainly determined by the factors in- private sectors – in the conduct and the international problems of their side and outside the context in which decision-making of negotiators. To countries, and these diplomats and the actors operate. Inside or outside, sell negotiations to their own people civil servants can be scrutinized and three main factors play a role in the is often a major – and unsolvable – controlled in a much more effective decision of actors to act: interests; problem. Negotiators from semi- and way than in the past. Furthermore, values; and power. There are also non-democratic countries will have to secrecy is an important element in three main phases in the negotiation struggle less with their constituency, successful negotiation, either direct process itself, as a consequence of as they have more control over them. or back-channel. In foregone ages, these actions and factors: explora- Control is thus a major element in secrecy was much easier to uphold tion; selection; and decision. These dealing with internal pressure: the than either today or in the future. Bu- phases are embedded in pre- and more control over the home front, the reaucracies and intelligence agencies 36 PIN•Points 41/2015

can now penetrate the table. The between wars, although the peace overshadowed by the role of inter- media are much more effective than agreement did settle issues and does ests, but they can be as meaningful. in the past, as democracy demands have an effect that lingers on to the In Western negotiation research, the transparency, and transparency in present day, albeit in a negative way. emotional dimension has been under- turn is needed to establish and main- Issues remain painful for those that estimated for decades. Nevertheless, tain legitimacy, at least in democratic lost, such as Spain – Gibraltar remains values are present in both ‘Western’ countries. All this gives rise to a less a bone of contention. Meanwhile, and ‘Eastern’ negotiation arenas. effective diplomatic negotiation pro- Vienna showed common ground be- In the West, they take the form of, cess, thereby weakening negotiation cause of the existence of a common for example, the defence of human as a tool in the conduct of interna- enemy: Napoleon Bonaparte and the rights principles, the advocacy of tional relations. French Revolution. The main reason good governance, and the promo- why there was an agreement at all, tion of democracy. In the East, it is FACTORS and an agreement that more or less much more about reputation, pride stabilized Europe, was a new regime and honour: face-saving. Negotiat- Interests are the dominant driver in that came shortly after Vienna: the ing about interests is more open to international negotiation processes. Holy Alliance. Subsequently, Paris was trading than bargaining about values. Thus, situations of diverging and com- the consequence of a victory by the al- Values are non-negotiable (at least in mon interests are suitable for nego- lies, not of ripeness for all the parties. principle) and can thereby be a ma- tiation processes. The more diverging The victors were exhausted and this jor obstacle to effective negotiation, the interests, the more competitive the forged common ground among them, especially if they are connected to actors will be. Conversely, the more but Germany remained outside the ef- personal or group identity. common ground the actors share, the forts to create commonality between more cooperative behaviour we can the parties. As a consequence, the This was the topic of the chapter expect. Intra-institutional negotiation excluded party took revenge 20 years on reputation and ‘egotiation’. This will often provide a framework and later, something that had been fore- chapter illustrated the importance a level playing-field where the clash seen by negotiators already towards of ‘face’, even in Western culture of interests will be less harsh than the end of the Paris peace talks. and even with ‘rational, purposeful in extra-institutional environments. politicians’. The point was made that The chances for assured and mutu- Values and norms are embedded in issues of non-material interest could ally beneficial outcomes will therefore culture and culture’s impact on nego- have very negative consequences be enhanced. As well as interests tiation is very diverse, but in general for the negotiation processes, as as such, the question of stakes and one can distinguish between societies with the cases of Chamberlain–Hit- priorities will modify the weight of the in which negotiation is part of daily life ler and Krushchev–Kennedy. The interests. and those where people tend to pay a character and posture of the nego- fixed price. In the first type of society, tiators had a positive effect in the One example of this can be found in the exploration phase will take much Gorbachev–Reagan relationship. In a comparison of the negotiations in more time to conclude than in the the Stalin–Roosevelt–Churchill tri- Münster, Utrecht, Vienna and Paris. In second. However, in inter-state ne- angle, things were of a more mixed Münster the parties were so exhaust- gotiation, negotiators from the latter nature, as was also the case with ed that this ripeness facilitated much type of negotiation culture are often Nixon–Brezhnev–Mao. The role of common ground and thereby substan- much more willing to start a negotia- ‘egotiation’ was notable in the inter- tial outcomes, which not only closed tion process than those from the first nal negotiating situations: the rivalry the past wars in an effective way, but type. This is because of the enormous between Nixon and Kissinger; and also gave rise to new forward-looking importance of values and face-saving between Mao and Zhou Enlai. These regimes that are still relevant today. in the first type. The paradox is that competitive relationships in a way Utrecht, on the contrary, was a deal while members of those cultures are posed more problems for reaching made by the victors and left many more ready to bargain in the mar- viable negotiation outcomes than of the negotiating parties unsatis- ketplace, they are at the same time the interactions with the external fied: the common ground was quite much more hesitant to give in while partners. uncommon. As a consequence, new operating at the diplomatic level. wars broke out and the conference Values play a decisive role in inter- The thesis furthermore found that was not much more than a pause national negotiation. Values are often in diplomatic negotiation, the role www.pin-negotiation.org 37

and impact of power differences are remains the main problem. Context if an outcome will be reached, its probably the most important criteria change is often needed, but it might implementation is insecure. Incen- for distinguishing diplomatic negotia- only be the disaster that one wishes tives for using negotiation as a tool in tion from other kinds of negotiation to avoid which can force parties to conflict management will thereby be processes. It is, in other words, the start the process. Mediators can be weak. This enhances the chances for political aspect of inter-state nego- of great value, especially if they can warfare as an alternative to a peace- tiation, as politics is about the use be the source of a peaceful change of ful process of conflict resolution. and distribution of power resources. context through threats or diplomacy. The difficulty of reaching assured Extra-institutional negotiations are As a consequence of insecurity and outcomes and implementation was more influenced by power differences uncertainty, the exploration phase one of the reasons for strength- than intra-institutional processes, might become very time-consuming, ening inter-state regimes during and will therefore be much more while the selection and decision the last four centuries. Through risky than the latter. In other words, phases might be realized in a rela- these regimes, which culminated organizational structures around tively speedy way. in international organizations in the channels of negotiation will temper twentieth century and supranational the impact of power, although power CONTROL constructions today, sovereign states differences will not disappear com- are managing their relations in such pletely and will materialize in the An example of the role of control is a way that less costly (that is, negoti- inclusion or exclusion of actors in the the observations made in the chapter ated) solutions will become a viable negotiation process. on simulated negotiation processes instrument in international relations. under the heading ‘synergies’, which This opens opportunities for more PROCESS discussed the problems that the chair international governance through ne- will face in controlling negotiators in gotiation in the future, with a grow- The phases in the process are very the meeting. Too much control will ing importance for negotiation and much influenced by their institutional undermine the chair’s position, as how it will be conducted. Negotiation and cultural context. The institutional the participants might revolt. Not will therefore, in this vision, become environment has a huge impact on enough control will hinder the chair an increasingly essential part of the the way in which negotiations will de- in the task of coming to closure in a conduct of internal and external velop. Bilateral and multilateral nego- meaningful way. negotiations. tiations in international organizations provide for more security and thereby Control over diplomatic negotiations As a downside, there is the danger of stability than ad-hoc bargaining. with other parties is the nucleus of gridlock. While states are in need of Outcomes will be more assured than inter-state negotiations, as it deter- increasing control over internal and in negotiations outside institutions, mines their outcomes. No control external negotiation processes, they but the processes are normally quite means unassured outcomes. Even need more and more bureaucracy time-consuming. The exploration phase can be short, as partners often know each other quite well, but the decision-making can be very painful, as actors are aware of the binding and often legal character of their de- cision. The consequences are enor- mous. The post-negotiation phase, moreover, is hardly problematic.

The real problem of extra-institution- al negotiation often lies in the pre- and post-negotiation phases: how to get the actors around the table; and how to ensure compliance and enforcement. To pressure negotia- tors to come to the negotiation table 38 PIN•Points 41/2015

to exert control. Bureaucracy and governmental negotiators who are stand each other, which would allow control tend to enhance inflexibility, slowly but surely pushing aside the for a smoother negotiation process, which in turn hampers the negotiation diplomat as an agent in negotiation. but they will have to be hacked to- process and thereby its effectiveness This obstructs the process in two gether for a final and balanced overall as an instrument. Bureaucratic barri- ways: the sheer growth of actors outcome. With a weakened role for ers will slow down the process, as we creates more complexity; and al- the diplomatic services, whether EU already see in the European Union. though complexity might open new or national, such harmonization will As discussed in the conclusion to options, it also serves to suffocate become increasingly difficult. the chapter on the European Union, the processes. More complexity such gridlock can be tempered by means more formal rules to manage In sum, there are two trends for expanding the informal arena of EU it, and more time to come to closure. the future that will, depending on negotiation. It has been noted before Observations were made about the situation, work against each that progress in negotiations is often the future role of the diplomat as other or strengthen each other. On to be found ‘in the corridors’. In that a diplomatic negotiator in competi- the one hand, there is a growing sense, more informal talks will not tion with negotiators of other gov- institutionalization of the nego- only guarantee some freedom from ernmental and non-governmental tiation process, underpinned by a institutional obstacles, but will also agencies. It was observed that the multitude of negotiators facilitat- enhance the chances for successful distinction between diplomatic and ing these processes and thereby closure of the negotiation processes. non-diplomatic negotiators will prob- enhancing the chances for effective There is the importance of informality ably wither away, foremost in strong outcomes. This institutionaliza- in reaching deals: too much formal- regimes like the European Union. tion will result, on the other hand, ity leads to mechanical processes, This is an interesting paradox: while in growing complexity, formality while negotiation is not only about the regimes allow for successful and transparency, thereby creat- procedures, but very much about diplomatic negotiation processes, ing inflexibility in the negotiation creativity. Nevertheless, a strong link they will at the same time diminish process, which will obstruct it from with the formal side of the process the role and the importance of the reaching viable outcomes, as it is has to remain, as control will other- diplomatic negotiators. further complicated by complexities wise be lost and formalization of the stemming from the nationalization outcomes will not be realized, thus As a result, miscommunication will of international negotiations and making them redundant. also be on the rise because of the the internationalization of national erosion of diplomatic culture, as few- negotiations. The processes will be There are also other trends dimin- er and fewer diplomats are allowed more time-consuming, while in the ishing the impact of negotiation on to conduct international negotiation modern world, timely closure is of desired outcomes. As well as the processes. Professional cultures are the essence. growing role of the often ‘egotiat- bridges between societal cultures. It ing’ politicians, there are multitudes could thus indeed be helpful if nego- It is, of course, difficult to predict how of national and international civil tiators from specialized ministries sit much these two trends in diplomatic servants, lobbyists and other non- around the table, as they do under- negotiation will neutralize each other. www.pin-negotiation.org 39

However, as warfare is so damaging in cooperation has been made. The basis for negotiations at the higher in our globalizing world, there seems crux is the reform of the organization bureaucratic and political levels. to be no realistic alternative to nego- and the programme of these institu- Without this preparatory work, the tiation as a global tool in governance tions themselves, which can only be bureaucratic and political leaders and conflict resolution. Negotiation is done, of course, by their respective would not be able to conclude their an essential component of the fabric governments. Little investment is treaties. While it is difficult to reform of global governance. needed to make this materialize. the structures – and even more so the negotiation culture – at the high- RECOMMENDATIONS The organization of the forums est levels, it seems to be possible at facilitating negotiation processes the working levels. In order to strengthen diplomatic could be made more efficient. Again, negotiation as an instrument in this would not demand serious in- Finally, the issue of internal ne- international relations, a few rec- vestments in money and people, but gotiation processes should not be ommendations might be of value. there are serious constraints of a overlooked, as internal processes Diplomats and civil servants should political nature. As long as countries are often more important and more continue to play different roles, feel that it is in their interests to difficult to manage than external. whereby the diplomats’ role would cooperate, but that such coopera- Just as international politics is the have the helicopter’s view while tion diminishes their options to opt reflection of national politics, it specializing in certain niches such out, thereby reducing defence of might be said that international as conflict management. However, their vital national interests, such negotiation is the projection of the the formal difference between dip- reorganization and streamlining will national negotiation processes on lomats and other civil servants remain a Utopia, at least as far as regional and world politics. In order working internationally should be top-level negotiations like in the to enhance the effectiveness of diminished and – if possible – dis- United Nations Security Council are negotiation as an instrument in in- appear. It would be helpful to give concerned. It is questionable, how- ternational politics, internal reforms both roles the same status and – ever, as to what extent these top are needed. On the one hand, this is more importantly – to forge a com- institutions really count. easier than with external reforms, as mon culture. One of the tools to there is more control over internal create such a common international Perhaps the underlying negotiation processes; on the other hand, how- negotiation culture is to provide platforms are of much more im- ever, these reforms will immediately diplomats and other civil servants portance, as they prepare for the affect the positions and interests of with common education. With the highest level strata. International the bureaucracies and the political teaching of international relations negotiations will seldom start at systems of a country or an interna- studies – whether political, legal, the top. Day-to-day bargaining pro- tional organization. Enhancing the economical or otherwise – at uni- cesses by low-ranking and middle- efficiency of negotiation internally is versities all around the world, using ranking negotiators will prepare the therefore problematic. English as the lingua franca in both education and negotiation, there seems to be no serious obstacle to the rise of an overarching new diplomatic culture in negotiation.

This trend can be further stimulated through early and mid-career train- ing of international negotiators through diplomatic academies. Since the 1970s, and for Europe since the 1990s, diplomatic academies and schools of foreign service have met to discuss enhanced cooperation. However, notwithstanding several attempts to do better, little progress 40 PIN•Points 41/2015

As in the international arena, the bot- those of their government, their their outcomes. The more diplomatic tom–up approach might create more international organization, or them- negotiation processes abound, the chances for success than a top–down selves and their caucus or clique. more complexity arises, the more approximation. The problem re- regimes are needed to enhance their mains, however, that the decisions to Democratizing diplomatic negotiation effectiveness, and the more govern- reform the institutions that facilitate is therefore hardly possible. Diplo- ments will attempt to restrict the the negotiation processes will have to matic negotiation is ultimately about power of the regimes. be taken at the top, but they might an oligarchy deciding for those that be influenced in a positive way from it represents: about them, but only This is the Diplomatic Negotiation the bottom. As crises are often help- insufficiently on behalf of them. The Loop, which will restrain mankind’s ful in changing a context, the current negotiators are a ‘negoarchy’ of mu- efforts to solve its problems in a shortage of financial means might tual understanding, with a more or peaceful way at a time when conflicts invoke more streamlining of – and less common ‘negoculture’, as they are multiplying and the use of force is cooperation between – the institu- could not be effective otherwise. inadequate and harmful for interna- tions of the state or international By definition, their constituency will tional society. Construction and de- organization. This might in turn help be unhappy with the processes and struction go hand in hand. Diplomatic to simplify the negotiation process in outcomes of diplomatic negotiation, negotiation remains the most useful order to keep it manageable. while their governments might be tool for dealing with it. Increasing suspicious of them in cases where our understanding of diplomatic Diplomatic negotiation will remain a they represent international regimes. negotiation processes will only serve country’s main instrument, both in- to decrease misunderstandings and side and outside international organi- As a consequence, governments increase our effectiveness in settling zations, for representing its interests will keep the international regimes future disputes successfully. and dealing with the problems that as weak as possible, while these re- it encounters. Diplomatic negotiation gimes are needed to substitute trust This book can be freely will become more important as globali- for control in order to protect the downloaded from zation enhances interdependency and diplomatic negotiation processes and www.clingendael.nl/publications provokes regional and global conflicts. Interdependency is vital for negotia- tion. Without it, diplomatic negotiation processes could not function.

Government representatives navigate these processes in order to strength- en national interests and/or to man- age and solve conflictual situations. Whether chosen or self-appointed, the negotiators and their superiors manage the power that is mandated to them. In that sense they are elite, which automatically distances them from those they represent.

Diplomatic negotiation is therefore an elitist affair and it is not easy for those who have been represented to be heard. As negotiation is about compromise and compensation, the interests of the constituency cannot, by definition, be fully materialized. Moreover, the representatives will push for their own interests, being www.pin-negotiation.org 41

I WILLIAM ZARTMAN NEW PIN PROJECT 2015: CLOSURE: HOW NEGOTIATIONS END

“How do negotiations end?” is a depending on the terms of analysis, that an agreement, of any kind, is subject that had eluded any research although the search for a single con- better and more important than attention.1 Yet is, after all, the basic solidating answer that is meaningful waiting for an agreement on specific question in the analysis and practice is tempting. Until one is devised, an- desires, terms or issues? Conversely, of negotiation. The broader ques- swer to the question will have to be at what point do negotiators decide tion of how negotiated outcomes found in different analytical variables that, despite an agreement on major are determined is the underlying and approaches. issues, that agreement is outweighed concern of negotiation analysis, and by other considerations that make the question of negotiators’ behavior Two sister channels of inquiry may a successful outcome inappropri- in obtaining closure focuses on the provide at least inspiration if not ate? In the successful cases (Type last lap in the race. Closure is the models. There is growing attention to I), the parties agreed even though point where Ikle’s (1964) three-fold the When question at the other end they did not reach their stated goals option—Yes, No, Keep on Talking—is of the negotiation process. Ripeness or bottom lines; a partial agreement collapsed into the first two; talking theory, and the associated attention was deemed sufficient to provide a will continue till the end, but is imme- to readiness, address the conditions positive outcome. In the unsuc- diately focused—like Oscar Wilde’s necessary for negotiations to begin. cessful cases (Type II) the parties hanging—on the immediacy of yes or It does not, however, look into the settled important issues but even no. This inquiry focuses on that final appropriate and customary behaviors that amount of agreement was not phase of the negotiations. We posit associated with the situation. On the sufficient to warrant a final positive that the situation at this point is that other hand, there is a good deal of outcome. Under what conditions do the conflict/problem and relevant attention to explanation of how wars parties agree to agree on what they proposals have been thoroughly aired end. The subject is different enough have and under what conditions is in the negotiations: the preliminaries so that the terms of analysis do not the progress insufficient to constitute are out of the way, the negotiations seem to offer much insight into the the basis for an agreement? Above have been going on for a while, the question of how negotiations end. all, what kinds of behaviors are char- positions and interests have been A striking analysis (Faure 2013) of acteristic of each type? made clear, everything is on the ta- why negotiations fail is closer to the ble, and in principle there is a Zone of closure problem, both substantively Obviously the situations are on a Possible Agreement (ZOPA) although and in its organization: since failure spectrum, with extremes at either that may be up to interpretation; if is overdetermined, the study exam- end. There may be situations where there is an agreement it will be less ines a number of cases for specific both parties have gotten all they than the parties wanted but enough reasons of failure and then presents came for; it is assumed that such to justify a signature. At this point a dozen functional or disciplinary situations are rare and, for present in the negotiations, can the process answers, each using its own term purposes, uninteresting. There may be brought to conclusion, and how? of analysis. No common thread is also be situations where there is no What behavior is typical and required sought, perhaps wisely. agreement on anything, the parties to get the parties to Yes (to refer to are not ready to negotiate, and they the title of a book that does not focus Closure situations come in two may be acting for side effects (time, on this point in the process)? What types: negotiations that reach an publicity, reputation, etc). These variables are helpful in analyzing the agreement when Not Enough in too are outside this inquiry. But the situation? Like the broader question, comparison to original hopes and assumption is that in the big grey there are doubtless many answers, demand is still enough to make an area in the middle are most cases of agreement (Type I), and those that negotiation, where the parties do not 1 With the one exception of the penultimate chapter do not reach agreement because get everything they want or thought in Fred Charles Iklé’s How Nations Negotiate, which however concentrates mainly on behavior in the Enough was not enough (Type II). they deserved, where red lines are main part of the process.. At what point do negotiators decide breached in spots, and yet they 42 PIN•Points 41/2015

sense that the/an end is near and asking the prescriptive question, How attract other to own preferred point attainable, where the rising question, should they behave or where should of agreement; how are these used? as the end approaches, is whether the outcome lie, but rather, How do Are new compensations (trade-offs there is enough to constitute an parties act in such circumstances. or exchanges on different items) agreement and how do the parties being introduced? Is there a shift behave to attain it? Should one Behavior in such moments can be from concession to compensation? Is continue to negotiate to try to get identified in standard negotiations construction (reframing) introduced more, would pushing further push terms. One set comprises the three for the whole negotiation or for a seg- agreement out of reach, is there just agreement devices: concession, com- ment of it? Who adopts these behav- or not quite enough to make for a pensation, and construction (Zartman iors, one-sided or reciprocally? Other positive outcome? 2009). What type of concession terms for the analysis of negotiating behavior (moving toward each other’s behavior could be used. A complicating problem is that while position on the same item) is typical analysts know how far the parties are toward the end—large, small, split the Three analytical contexts bring these from a conclusion because it has hap- difference, unilateral? Does the previ- devices together. One setting is a pened, negotiators do not, because ous concession rate change (Cross game of security points (BATNAs). they are only trying to establish that 1969)? Negotiation has been likened Negotiators continually ask them- point. Nonetheless, closure behavior to two linked servomechanisms de- selves (or at least they should), What concerns how parties act when that signed to gradually move into focus in happens if there is no agreement? point comes into view, however their aims (Coddington 1970). How This is an intrapersonal question dimly, as they are trying to establish do they do this? Concessions have asked in the large and in the small. and reach it. How do they act in try- three functions—to alter own posi- The comparison point is one’s own ing to make it so? We are not (yet) tion, to signal willingness to other, to level of acceptability. In the large, www.pin-negotiation.org 43

it refers to the whole complex of can be used to frame the analysis of Negative instances or Type II nego- negotiations; if negotiations break behavior toward closure. tiations also abound. Closure is the down totally, does the situation go name of the history of Israeli-Arab back to war/conflict and how -bear CASES OF CLOSURE negotiations: once the inhibitions able or desirable is this outcome? against any talks at all (the 1968 Does a breakdown of negotiations These questions are real. This inquiry Three Nos) had been overcome, in means that they are irretrievable, is particularly relevant to the current 1973, negotiation proceeded on the are component elements all lost negotiations between the P5+1 return of Arab land to Egypt and (“Nothing is agreed until everything and Iran over nuclear disarmament Syria and peace treaties with Egypt is agreed”), can the parties pick up [Perkovich] ]. Since total and im- and Jordan. But the closer the with- where they left off? In the small, it mediate withdrawal of sanctions, and drawals came to the Palestine terri- does not seem likely that the same total elimination of enrichment ca- tory, the more difficult they became: question would apply to every issue pabilities are unlikely to be attained, when the ultimate goal of the Peace and negotiating point, concerning how much of each is necessary for Process came into sight, it moved whether the particular issue can be an agreement; what is the threshold further and further away. Over the decided bi/multilaterally. Thus, the of acceptability for each and how is it past half century, Greek-Turkish and security point question would seem decided? A similar question is bedev- Cypriot negotiations over the fate of to apply to the sum of the whole im- iling the peace process between Co- Cyprus seem to be marked by one pending agreement rather than to its lombia and the FARC, and also ELN, side—usually Greece—asking for a individual parts and would be of little particularly in regard to accountabil- little bit more and thereby collapsing help in the individual decision-shap- ity and transitional justice [Rettberg/ the agreement. Negotiations at Aru- ing process. While one is unlikely Nasi]. On the Israeli-Gazan cease- sha over the opening up of the regime to find a favorable BATNA to specific fire agreement of 2008, 2012 and in Rwanda in 1993 doggedly pursued questions, one can ask whether one’s 2014, the question arose each time the wrong problem, as the Tutsi ex- side is better off with no agreement, whether enough of an agreement iles and the genocidaires faced each all things considered, and use that as –an exchange of promises on what other. In negotiating a friendship a guideline for specific decisions. The not to do—was reached to constitute treaty, the French and Algerian were other context is a game of chicken, or the basis for a ceasefire [Gunning]. never able to come to satisfaction rather a game of a flock of chickens. On the domestic scene, the question on the deep scars that they had to This is an interpersonal question, on is characteristic of collective bargain- overcome (much like the Americans whether the other side is likely to ing, moving down to the very details and Iranians) where the French and blink first, first on the specific issue of the items discussed, where How Germans were able to come to clo- and then on the balance of the whole much is enough makes or breaks the sure on a similar history of wounds agreement as it is shaping up (Gold- agreement [Anstey]. The question [Rosoux]. Closure is a major issue in stein 2009). took a different form in a number of Chinese-Western business negotia- other cases, where a major item was tions, where the relation is the key The third setting is a game of ech- considered at some level and agreed and the agreement itself is incidental oes, sensing how particular moves to be left out for fear of derailing the and epiphenomenal [Faure]. Finally and then the whole outcome will other items on which agreement was in this list of examples are the ”Never ring back home in face of opposition in sight. The matter of Palestinian Ending Multilaterals” in the world con- and outright spoilers. The referent autonomy at Camp David in 1975, the gresses on major global issues where group may be internal, including the Kosovo question at Dayton in 1995, ambiguity, postponements, deadlines decision-makers who mandate the the subject of internal settlement in and lowest common denominator negotiators. Or it can be the larger Angola and Namibia in 1986, and the are keys to closure [Albin/Crump]. body politic, including the opposition issue of Jerusalem at Oslo in 1993 These well-known examples out of and voting public, as well as other were all major issues among these a potentially endless list are given bent on destroying the negotiating settled in these negotiation but were to illustrate the nature of the subject party and an agreement, believing left out in the settlement, as the straw and the different forms it can take. to be better off without than with that would have broken the agree- A study and comparison of cases can any agreement (comparative security ment’s back [Vukovic]. How was it be used to draw out inductive insights points). These elements of negoti- decided to drop these and move to for further distilling into more gener- ating behavior and its determinants agreement on the other issues? ally applicable propositions. 44 PIN•Points 41/2015

CAUSES OF CLOSURE Understanding and then to the final opens up many good questions. agreement on South Africa. What Does closure occur when unassigned In a search for an understanding of type of behavior is associated with gains are still on the table, avoiding closure behavior, at least three con- either reaction, and how do nego- contentious questions, or is it fa- cepts seem to be able to contribute tiation leap the avoidance barrier to cilitated by emptying the theoretical to analysis: approach-avoidance, move on to agreement? basket of gains and distributing them turning points, and unclaimed gains. [Thompson?]? Do parties close— The first says that as parties come Turning points are stocktaking mo- sign or break off—leaving potential close to the final issue (substance) ments when negotiators break off, gains on the table and why, missing or the final agreement (procedure), consider where they are and what potential gains from the agreement progress becomes more and more is ahead, and then decide either to either way, or do they clear the table difficult; the goal to which they return to complete the negotiation or and under what conditions? Again, had been working seems less and give it up (Druckman 1988)[Druck- a simple cost/benefit calculation is less acceptable as it is approached, man]. But this does not tell when, not sufficient: Are the decision made in what might be called asymptotic toward the expected end of the pro- out of ignorance (why?), out of bargaining [Pruitt]. But before the cess, the final turning point occurs some preconceived blockage against last hurdle which appears bigger and and what kind of calculations go into pursuing unclaimed gains (why and bigger as one approaches it, negotia- the decision to return and pursue within what limits?), or out of tors sometimes take stock of where the bargaining or call it off in the a calculation that claiming more they are and where they want to be, estimate that it can go no further. It benefits might upset the balance of weighing these values against the is clear that what is involved is more mutual cost/benefit calculations? fearful hurdle, and decide to go for it. than a cost/benefit tally sheet but As contrasted with the Israeli-Arab also an estimate of the chances of The latter set of questions enters into (Palestinian) negotiations, mentioned making progress if on returns. Simi- another area of conceptual inquiry, above, one might consider the 1992 larly, much has been made of the fact the matter of information. Analysts All-White referendum authorizing that parties tend to leave unrealized have claimed that much behavior can deKlerk to move ahead to Memo of gains on the table, and the concept be explained by the effects of infor- mation availability [Kydd]. In the case of closure, what is the effect of full or limited information, and can informa- tion be manipulated so as to provoke either break-off or completion? Can a party use its control over information to draw the other party to closure on its terms? Again the analysis needs to go beyond tally sheets, since the whole claim is that tally sheets are ignored, or are manipulated for ef- fect. We know that in the beginning, negotiators withhold information on their offers and demands, as is logi- cal for them to do ; are there similar guidelines for the use of information to produce closure, at a particular point, or avoid it?

A related area of inquiry goes back to timing, again referring to its use as in the matter of information [Svenson]. Information refers to material that a party controls and can manipulate; timing refers to external information www.pin-negotiation.org 45

that parties can seize on and take satisfy the source of the deadlines, threads, one or several leitmotifs? advantage of. More specifically, it often producing Lowest Common The one(s) currently available do concerns the way that procedural Denominator (LCD) or framework not lead very far beyond description, information can be used to produce agreements? In addition to usu- useful and necessary though that a procedural outcome, closure, and ally understanding of deadline as is. All approaches point to a cost/ with what substantive impact, on the an externally imposed cut-off date, benefit calculation, within different content of the agreement? Timing deadline can also be imposed by the contexts and dynamics. Beyond after all is the whole sense of closure evolution of the conflict: It’s now or such cold “realist” calculations lie question: why sign now? One such never. A specific form of closure in all sorts of psychological, historical, item is sequencing, in its sharpest such conditions could be to work strategic, processual calculation of form whether the Big Issue should for conflict management (truce, the value of agreement now com- be taken early or saved for last, both ceasefire) father than the more pared with BATNAs and opportunity choices about which logical argu- complicated conflict resolution, leav- costs. Even if this is the basic calcu- ments can be made. Or, stretching ing time under better conditions of lation, it does not tell how the par- the notion of “last,” under what con- suspended violence to work for a ties behave before that choice and ditions can closure be obtained only solution to the problem. what determines their behavior. At leaving the Big Issue or some other best these various contexts are only aspects of the conflict out entirely or The key to closure may also be contexts, that is, they can provide postponed until later, at what price? found in the parties themselves, a somewhat overarching analytical Another aspect of timing refers to the more relevantly the referent body framework for the other concep- components of ripeness: progress or bodies behind the actual negotia- tual lines of inquiry, such as turning is negotiation is made by a con- tors. The line-up of sides within the points, approach avoidance, timing, tinuation of the pressure of a mutual home group can change to produce etc., and even a propositional set- hurting stalemate (push factor) and an end—positive or negative—to the ting, but scarcely a guideline for the building attraction of a mutually negotiations. The focus here is on hypotheses (conditional proposi- enticing opportunity (pull factor). the array of parties one step back tions) on how negotiators behave as The two have at least side effects from the negotiations, ad it can they approach closure and why. For that can undermine each other: too cut across some of the other ap- the moment, such propositions and much push can distract the pull and proaches mentioned above. In the hypotheses will await the inspiration too much pull can find itself footless U-Vietnam negotiations, one of more and insight of inductive case studies. without a push to compare. How is members of the Vietcong Executive the balance maintained to produce Committee switched to approval of References closure? Translating these ele- an agreement with the US (Zartman ments into positions, closure is the 1978). Or the referent group may Coddington, Alan 1968. Theories of the point where hard positions and rigid be the domestic audience, as in the Bargaining Process. Aldine Cross, John 1969. The Economics of Bargain- redlines will have to be maintained discussions of two-level negotia- ing. Basic to produce movement but softened tions (Evans). In these views, the Druckman, Daniel 1986. “Stages, Turning to produce agreement, and flexible explanation of closure depends on Points and Crises,” Journal of Conflict positions will have to be solidified managing relations within the ref- Resolution on an agreeable position. These erent or domestic group behind or XXX 2:327-360 Evans, Peter, Jacobson, Harold, & Putnam criteria are contradictory enough to underneath the negotiations. From 1993. Double-Edged Diplomacy. California be of no insight, so how can they there, however, the matter goes Faure, G O, ed, 2013. Unfinished Business; be reconciled? A more mechanical back to some of the angles indicated Why International Negotiations Fail. Georgia aspect of timing concerns the use of above. Iklé, Fred Charles 1964. Ho Nations Negoti- ate. Harper & Row deadlines. Under certain conditions, Zartman, I William, ed., 1978. The 50% deadlines are known to facilitate ANALYSIS Solution. Doubleday. agreement, but they may facilitate a [email protected]; dandruckman@yah; meaningless agreement. How much A number of diverse paths of [email protected]; [email protected]; can they impose substantive agree- analysis have been indicated. They ‎[email protected]; nasi‎@uniandes. edu.co; [mrk.anstey@g]; sumosika@yah; ment and how much is it a matter of often cut across each other; others [email protected]; [email protected]. simply procedural agreement to sign run parallel as simply alternative au; go.faure@g; ‎jeroen.gunning@durham. anything in order to have signed and analytical tracks. Are there common ac.uk The Clingendael Institute sees the need for negotiation training NEGOTIATION support as part of the larger international conflict resolution toolkit and has therefore, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, taken the initiative to provide TRAINING negotiation training for:

1 Representatives of groups in conflict AS A CONFLICT 2 Mediators RESOLUTION The goal of the initiative is to strengthen the capabilities of participants in peace and mediation processes. To do so, INSTRUMENT Clingendael aims: • To enhance the quality and competences of mediators and representatives of groups in conflict taking part in During peace talks, success and failure negotiation processes; at the negotiation table are largely • To contribute to conflict resolution capacities locally and regionally; determined by the negotiation skills of • To support peace initiatives of international and regional the representatives of conflicting groups organisations. or the facilitation skills and expertise of The Clingendael Institute cooperates with international organisa- the mediator. Yet in conflict resolution tions and partner institutions to identify groups in conflict in need and the importance of the stakeholders’ demand of training, thereby increasing the chances for peace negotiation and mediation capacity in and complementing existing efforts. This means that the training achieving a successful outcome is often courses are: underestimated. Enhancing the Demand driven • In order to contribute to conflict resolution where it is most negotiation skills and knowledge of relevant and needed, the courses will be provided to represen- parties involved in peace processes can tatives and mediators in need of and willing to receive training as identified by international organisations; greatly increase the chances of success. Flexible • Clingendael has the capacity and flexibility to quickly respond to specific training requests from mediators, parties in a conflict and international and regional organisations involved in a peace process; Tailor-made • The training needs will determine the type and focus of each course, taking into account the different stakeholders, topics under discussion and regional context. The timing, length and location of the training will be determined depending on the needs. www.pin-negotiation.org 47

The PIN Program looks forward to a number of international Roadshows and Work Shops over the rest of the year.

A PIN Panel at the International Studies Association (ISA) organized by Mikhail Troitskiy on the theme of Overcoming Negotiation Blockages was held on Ash Wednesday, the morning after New Orleans’ famed Mardi Gras, where the ISA annual convention was held. The program comprised a paper by PIN members I. William Zartman (Johns Hopkins University), with Pamela Chasek (Manhattan College) and Lynn Wagner (Johns Hopkins University) on “Overcoming Blockage in Climate Change Negotiations,” and Mikhail Troitskiy (MGIMO) on “A Model of Negotiation in a Stealth Conflict: U.S.-Russia Dispute over Ukraine.” Sinisa Vukovic (Nijmegen University) also presented a paper on “Soft-power, Manipulation and Bias of Regional Organizations in International Mediation” and Shweta Singh (South Asian University) gave a presentation on “Negotiating the ‘Intractable Kashmir’.” Considering the hour and the day, there was a good audience and discussion.

The PIN Group will present a Roadshow on Mediation for the Toledo International Center for Peace (CITPAX) in Madrid on the subject of Mediation at the beginning of May. CITPAX and the Center for Economic and Social Science Research and Studies (CRESES) are designated as the academic bases of the Spanish-Moroccan Initiative for Mediation in the Mediterranean Region, and the PIN Roadshow will contribute to the effort. PIN members report on various aspects of their research contributing to the study and practice of mediation.

The annual PIN Workshop will take place in conjunction with a PIN Roadshow at the 8th annual Montenegro Summer School for Young Diplomats ‘Gavro Vukovic’, attended by diplomats from over 40 countries in early July in Cetinje, Montenegro. The Workshop will be devoted to launching the PIN 2015 Project on “How Negotiations End” (see accompanying PINPoints article), and the Roadshow will involve presentations on current advances in negotiation research and studies, with an accompanying simulation exercise. Cetinje was founded in 1482 as the royal capital of Montenegro, and long remained an independent diplomatic center in the Balkans.

A PIN Roadshow with special focus on the intercultural aspects of negotiation at the Peace Academy Rhineland Palatinate at the University of Landau, Germany, in early November. The Roadshow will be held before an audience drawn from the university partners of the Upper Rhine Valley. More details will be available as the program develops.