AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS :

INVASION OF NORTHERN FRANCE

COMINCH p-006

Title taken from preface .

UNI i ED STAi ES FLEET HKADOUARTa'.RS Of' THE COMMANDER IN CHllD' NAVY DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON 25, D . C .

21 October 1944

SECRET

Thie publication "Amphibious Operations" continues the series promulgating timely information drawn from action reports. It follows "Amphibious Operations, Exoludine Mar­ shall Islands Operations, Cominoh P-004", and covers the Invasion of Northern France.

Material contained herein has not been subjected to exhaustive study and analysis, but is ]seued in this form to make oommente, reoommendatione, and expressions of opinion concerning war experiences readily available to officers enfaged or interested in amphibious operations. It. should be widely oiroulated among commissioned oerscnnel.

This publication is classified as secret, non-re!,'.ist.ered. It shall be handled as prescribed by Article ?6, U, S. Navy Re;ulatione 19a'.:>. When no lon~er required it shall be des­ troyed by burnin(.. No report of destruction need be eub­ mi tted.

Thie publica~ion is under the oo~nizance of, and is distributed by the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Transmission by Re;,iatered Guard Mail or U. a re;iatered mail is authori~ed in a coordanoe with Artiole ?6 (15) (e) and (f), U.S. Navy Re!!ulations.

c.~.~~- c. M. OOOKE, Jr., Chi et' of Staff. SECRET

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR COMINCH P- 006 Standard Navy Distribution List No. 26 (15 Sept. 1944 ) List 1 a(l)less Cominch,b(l),c(l)less ComFairShipLant and ComFairShipPac,d(l),e(l),g(l) ComPhibPac(3) , Com­ ThirdPhib\3) , ComSeventhPhib(2) , ComTrComPhibPac(lO), ComTrComPhibLant(35); h(l)less ServLant,ServPnc; i(l)less ComNorWesSecWesSeaFron, ComNorCalifSec­ \VesSeaFron, ComSoCalifSecWesSeaFron, ComSec#ll5, Co.mSec#ll7,ComSurEsGroupESF;j(l),k only to COTCLant (l),COTCPac(3),CO Pre-ComTrCen,COTCPac(6) ; 1 only to Chief of Staff to Cine (1). List 2 a-3(1),a- 8 FairWings only(l),a-15 only to Fleet Aircraft Rec . Unit(l);a-16 only to ComUtWingServ(l); e(l),f(l),g(l)less DesCortShakedownGr;m(l)less LST Div,LCT Groups;n(l)Min..~ons only; w(l) . List 3 a(l),b-1(1) , d(l),f(l) , h(l),i(l),j{l) , k(l) , s(l) , u(l),v-1(1) , x(l) , aa(l),ii(l) , qq{l) , rr(l),uu(l) . List B-3 OinC Constr. Brigades only (1) . Standard Navy Distribution List No . 28 (1 October 1944) List 4 a(l),f(l),h(l),i(l) , j(l),k(l),u(l),v-1 (1),x(l), ii(l),qq(l),rr(l),uu(l) . List 6 a(l)less 17 NavDist Rep,SRNC,PRNC,SDG;b only to CNAOpTra Jacksonville,Fla(25),CNATra Pensa.Fla(l); c ( 1).

List 7 a(l)less Nyd Navy #128,Nav DD; d(l) only to Continental Air Centers; e(l) , f(5),g(30) USNA only; h(5),1(2) only to NavTraSta Newport, R. I . List 11 SecNav(3),UnderSecNav(l),ChrmGenBd(2) , InsGen(l), BuAero(5),BuPers(lO),BuOrd(5) , BuShips(5),BuY&D(5) , USMC(900),USCG(3) . Plus Special Distribution.

Numbers in parentheses indicate number of copies sent to each addressee.

11 S:SCRET COllTENTS

Pa&e

Ch.apter I llAP..RATIVE Report of Assault Force "0"...... 1-2 Chart Sho~·ing Location of Omaha and Ut-.h Beaches 1-3 Composition of Forces. . . . . 1-4 SUJ:1nary of Losses...... 1-6 11 11 Report of As e:a'tl t Force U • 1-8 Composition of Forces. 1-10 Summ~ry of Losses. . . 1-14 Plans and Plan~ing . . 1-15 Report of Weste rn Task Force 1-15 11 11 Report of Assault Force 0 • 1-16 Training ...... • . . 1-19 Report of We stern Task Force 1-19 11 11 Report of Assault Force 0 • 1-20 Weather. . . . . 1-21 Coverinf, Forces. . . . 1-22

Cb.apter 11 HAVAL GUllFlRE ?.eport of Western ~ask Force 2-1 11 11 Report of Assault Force 0 • 2-2 11 Report of Assault Force "0 • 2-8 Pointe Du Hoe Landing. 2-10 Battleships ...... 2-12 Destroyers ...... 2-13 Accuracy of Naval Gunfire. 2-19 Gunfire Support Craft ... 2-19 Problems of Close Support. 2-21 Preparation Fires, ?Tot Sufficient. 2-27 German Viewpoint on l~aval Gunfire. 2-28

Chapter III AIR SUPPORT Report of Western Task Force ...... 3-1 Air Support Organiz&.tion ...... 3-1 ~laval Doct::-ine on Air Support Organization 3-2 Anti-Aircraft Fire Discipline ... 3-3 Daily Summary D-1 Through D f 4. . 3-5 Control of Support Aircraft. . . . 3-7 1 11 Report of As 1Ho.ul t Force '0 • • 3-8 llaval :Joe trine for Deli very of Air Support 3-9 ::teport of Assault Force "U". . 3-10

Ch.apter IV SEIP TO S:iOffi': MOVEl-GllT Ociah.a Beo;ch. . . 4-1 Ticie of "H" hour 4-3 Underwater Demolition. 4-4 Utah Beach ...... 4-12 Control of Ship to Shore Movement. 4-15 Authority and Responsibility of Control Vessels. 4-1?

111 SZCRET CONTE!~T5 (Cont 1 d)

Page

Chapter IV SHIP TO s~o.RE MOVEMENT (Cont'd) Gunfire Support for UnderWater Demolition Teams. 4-18 HinPsweeping 4-18 LSTs . . . . 4-22 Small Craft. 4-23 DD Tanks 4-26 Order of Landing 4-2B

Chapter V LOGISTICS Report of Western Task Force •...... 5-1 Number of N•val Personnel in Western Task Force. 5-2 Report of Assault Force 11 U" .... . 5-2 Permanency of Organizations .... . 5-4 Summary of Personnel Vehicles Supplies - Utah. 5-7 Report of Assault Force "0"...... 5-8 Unloacing by Priorities .::h.irin~ A~sault Phase 5-11 Artificial HHbor Prcject ... 5-17 Effect of The Storm...... 5-17 Description of Artificial Harbor Equipment 5-21 Caisson Breakwat~r ~lements. 5-23 Floating ?ier Roadway .... 5-24 Floating Dre•kwater Elenents 5-25 Shore Party ...... 5-28 Lac~ of Coordination in Unloa~ing. 5-?.8 Small Landing Craft VS DUKWS in Unloadinr,. 5-29 Salvage...... 5-30 Summary of Dai:tar,e .. . 5-34 Medical ...... 5-35 Joint ~vacuation Plans 5-35 Evacuation Totals, Utah Beach. 5-37 Evacuation Totals, Omaha Beach 5-39

Chapter VI COMHUNICAT IONS Report of Assault Force 11 U 11 6-1 Publications ...... 5-2 Tr;offic ...... 6-3 11 11 Report of Assat:.l t Force 0 • 6-4 Frequency AssiGJ1ments .. 5-5 JaJ11~ing Eq~ipment ...... 6-7 CryptograPtic Channels ... . 6-9 Post Assault Co~munications. .6-12 RecomwPnd;otior.£ and Com~ents 6-18 Shore Fire Control Party Communic-.tions. 6-20 Count~r~easures. 6-21 Security ..... 6-22

Chapter VII LANDING CRAFT Report of Assault Force "0" ...... 7-1

iv SSCRET

CONTENTS (Cont 1d)

Page Chapter VII - LANDrnG C~AFT (Cont'd) Drying out of LSTs. . . 7-1 l'erformance of LCT( 6) ...... 7-1 !JUKWs • • • • • . • • • • • • · · 7-2 E:!.im!nating Manhandling of Supplies 7-2 Rhino Ferries 7-3 LCC( S). . 7-3 Lighters. 7-3 LCT(A) . . 7-4

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PA~ES Page

Promulgating Letter • ...... i Distribution List • ii Table of Contents • • .iii to v inclusive Chapter I . . .. . • 1-1 to 1-23 inclusive Chapter II ... . • •• 2-1 to 2-28 inclusive Chapter III • . . . . • J-1 to J-11 inclusive Chapter IV •• • 4-1 to 4-28 inclusive Chapter V •• • 5-1 to 5-40 inclusive Chapter VI •• • 6-1 to 6-22 inclusive Chapter VII • • 7-1 to 7-4 inclusive

v

:l

·

t

(/)

0 tx:l

:.a

t-3

A

.

unlo~d

s

'

LCl

background

;>nrl

lhe

in

li!nk~

in

firP

bring

LCT's

supporting

.

beacn

delivers

tne

.

c:rui~rr

behind

11

soldier

REACH

hill

·.;nile

lhe

woun~ed

OMAHA

ii

from

support

of

i!iel

rirE'

fire

the

lose

to

enemy

by

give aoes

to

bei!Ch

in

the

Corpsrrnn

on

moves

down

Hospit;il

nned

des•.royf'•

p

A

Naval

.

are

ion

l!k'n

Datta!

infantry

Infantry

oeacn

more

I

f-1

I-' SECRE.'T

Jromi Commander J.naul t J'orce now, (Commander lleTenth Amphibioua Force).

The assault on the VIERVILLE-COLLEVILE Sector o! the HOR!UND! Beaches was part of a joint British-American operation, the purpose of which was to secure a lodgement on the Continent !rom which to develop further offensive operations. Thie in turn, waa a part of a large strategic plan to bring about the total defeat o! Germany by means of aesaulta upon German-occupied Europe from the UNITED KINGDOM, the MEDITERRANEAN, and RUSSIA. The joint attack was launched in two adjacent areas in the BAY OF THE SEINE. Simultaneous assaults vere made by the Eastern Naval Task Force (British and Canadian), composed of Assault Forces "S", "J", and "G", and follow-up J'orce "L11 ; and by the Western Naval Task Force (U.S.), composed of Aasault Forcee 11 011 , and "U", and follow-up lorce "B". The boundary line between the Brit­ ish and U,S, Forces started at the root of PORT EN BESSIN Western Breakwater, thence 0250 true to Meridian oo 40' West, thence northward along this meridian to latitude 490 40 1 North, Aaeault .Force 11 01 at­ tacked enemy beaches in the VIERVILLE-COLLEVILLE Area while J.asault Force "U" attacked beaches in the MADELEINE Area, Force 11 B", landed over the same beaches as lorce "011 under the direction o! the Comman­ der, Force "O",

The entire operation was commanded by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, General D. D, EISENHOWER, U.S.A. Under him were three officers, each acting as the Commander-in-Chief of his respective arm, Their command was exercised jointly, The7 vere:-

Naval -- Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force - - Admiral Sir Bertram H, RAMSEY, RN,

Army ~ Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group -- General Sir Bernard L. MONTGOMERY, RA,

Air Collll:lander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force -­ Sir Trafford LEIGH-MALLORY, B.A.1',

Under the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief were the Commanders of the Eastern Naval Task Force, and the Western Naval Task Force, respectively, The Western Naval Task Force was commanded by Rear Admiral KIBX, USN, under whom were Assault Force "O" collllll8.llded by Rear Admiral HALL, USN; Assault Force 11 U11 by Rear Admiral MOON, USN; and follow-up Force "B" by Commodor e EDGAR, USN,

~ ~

~ ~

0 0

(/) (/)

l-j l-j

used used

Ce'lch Ce'lch

Reoch Reoch

FRANCE FRANCE

hes hes

Force Force

•e•c •e•c

Utah Utah

01Mha 01Mha

ng ng

TAsk TAsk

Miles Miles

NORTHERN NORTHERN

n

· ·

· ·

u

o

·

·

L., L.,

OF OF

N N

sterr sterr

o' o'

we

Nautical Nautical

SIO

'" '"

Force Force

Force Force

i i

by by

1 1

l l

INVA

ult ult

Locn Locn

ASS• ASS•

Ass.1ul Ass.1ul

-=-=-~ -=-=-~

_: _:

~: ~:

......

_=~ _=~

.,. .,.

.. ..

• •

i.~ i.~

-

......

' '

'-

::~ll\.... ::~ll\....

' '

......

......

......

-

L~ L~

.I. .I.

-

lt!rcour lt!rcour

..,."~-2--

'-..I '-..I

111...,.... 111...,....

_.

San San

. .

......

L

-­

Bare Bare

·~ ·~

:'

' '

I~ I~

, ,

......

.. ..

',., ',.,

r·\oe r·\oe

'\~ '\~

\ \

C:." C:."

''·· ''··

'I 'I

' '

.. ..

\~

......

......

~-

•,<. •,<.

~\ ~\

·, ·,

·. ·.

, ,

;!ft/ ;!ft/

,. ,.

' '

, ,

•••• ••••

\ \

\ \

; ;

' '

' '

.l. .l.

\, \,

, ,

}<._,\ }<._,\

\

) )

\ \

......

. .

I I

-

v v

l l

l l

r r

b b

L_ L_

I I

...... ~ ~ SECREI' NARRATIVE - .ASSAULT :roRCE "O"

The task of Assault Force "o• was to land assigned elements of the V Corpe, U. S. Army, in the VIERVILLE-COLLE>ILLE Sector of the coaet of NORMANDY, and to support the landing and subsequent Army opera­ tions by Naval gunfire, by establishing and operating a Ferry Service to unload ships and craft of follow-up convoys, by coordinating the siting and construction of port facilities off the beaches, and by exploiting the facilities of small ports in the CARENTAN Estuary.

To accomplish this task, the Commander Assault Force "011 had under his command the following ships and craft:-

Bombardment Transports Shipe Landing Craft

4 APA 2 BB 24 I.ST 3 XAP 3 CL 91 LCT(6) 2 I.SI( L) 40 LCT(5) 3 LSI(S) 2 LCT(4) 3 I.SI(H) 33 LCI( L) 4 LCH 5 LCC Gunfire Support Craft Escort Craft Minesweepers

5 LCG{ L) 9 DD 16 MS 7 LC? 3 Hunt DD 4 ML 9 LCT(R) l DE 6 Danlayers 34 LCP(L) 2 ODD 8 BYMS 8 LCT(A) 2 Frigates 8 MMS 6 LCT( HE) 6 SGB 9 PC 5 970-ML 7 ML 2 lmlL 6 SC 3 A/ S Trawlers

Far Shore Service Shipe

l Accommodation Ship l .ARL 12 LCM( CRU) Ferry Craft: •as LCT(5&6), 20 Rill', 119 LCM(3), 72 LBV(2). Service Craft: 9 Fueling Trawlers, 16 LBE, 20 LBJ, 5 LBW, 2 LBK, 1 Pontoon Drydock.

• After the LCT(5&6)s completed their mission, they became part of the Far Shore Ferry Service in both

1-4 SSCRET NARRATIVE - ASSAULT FORCE "O"

the U.S. and British sectors. These LCT(5&6)s were included in the Landing Craft listed above.

Miscellaneous Craft

1 AGC (Flagship) 1 DD (Relief Flagship) 1 LSD 15 USCG Rescue Craft 9 Dispatch Boats l PT (Dispatch Boat - Flag)

The ships and craft together with the Army forces assigned to A88ault Force 11 0 11 were organized into the following Task Groups:- (a) Landing Force . . ( 124.1) ( b) Shore Party (124.2) (c) Assault Group 0-l ( 124. 3) (d) Assault Group 0-2 (124.4) (e) Assault Group 0-3 ( 124.5) ( f) Assault Group 0-4 (124.6) (g) Escorts (124.?) (h) Gunfire Support Craft (124.8) ( i) Bombardment Group (124.9) ( j) Sweeper Group • (124.10) (k) Far Shore Service Group OMAHA (124.11) (1) Dispatch Boats. ( 124.12) (m) Rescue Vessels. . (124.13) The Landing Force was composed of elements of the V Corps, U.S. Army and included the First U.S. Infantry Division, Reinforced, less the 26th Regimental Combat Team, plus the 116th Regimental Com- bat Team, the 115th Regimental Combat Team, and the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions. This Force was supported by a Shore Party consisting of 2/3de of the 5th Engineer Special Brigade, l/3d of the 6th Engineer Special Brigade, and the Provisional Engineer Special Brigade Group Collllllander and Staff. Also included in the Shore Party were 2/3ds of the 6th Naval Beach Battalion and l/3d of the ?th Naval Beach Battalion. The remainder of the V Corpe, and the remainder of the Engineer Special Brigade Group, and of the 6th and ?th Naval Beach Battalions comprised the Landing Force and Shore Party of Force "B" which landed on the same 11 11 beach as Force 0 •

The Landing Attack Plan was as follows: The 16th RCT attacked on the left on Beaches FOX GREEN and EASY RED with two battalions in assault and one following. The 116th RCT attacked on the right with two battalions in assault and one following, on Beaches EASY GREEN, DOG RED, DOG WRITE, and DOG GREEN. One assault battalion of the 116th RCT landed three companies abreast on Beaches EASY GRJl:EN, DOG RED and DOG WHITE; the other landed three companies in column on :Beach DOG

1-5 SECREI' NARRATIVE - ASSAULT FORCE "O"

GREEN. Nine of the twelve companies of the 2d and 5th Ranger :Battalions landed on Beach DOG GREEN while the remaining three Ranger companies landed on the POINTI DU HOE in Sector CHARLIE to capture an enemy bat­ tery located there which threatened the Transport Area. The 18th RCT landed immediately after the 16th RCT on the same beaches. The Rifle Companies of the ll5th embarked in LCI(L)s were to land on call on the same beaches as the ll6th unless otherwise directed. The Landing was preceded by a forty minute naval bombardment at previously desig­ nated targets. A bombing attack was scheduled for delivery between H - 30 minutes and H hour. This, however, failed to materialize. In addition to the bombardment by naval gunfire from supporting ships and craft, tanks embarked in LCT(A)s fired on targets of opportunity during the last 3000 yards of their approach to the beach and 105 mm SP artil­ lery embarked in LCTs likewise fired during their passage thro~ the boat lanes. LCT(R)s and LCS(S)s were scheduled to deliver a full dis­ charge of rockets im r.i ediately prior to the "touchdown" of the infantry. The fire of the gunfire support craft and of the destroyers close inshore where they could observe the actual landing was to continue until such time as the advancing troops were actually endangered by it instead of being lifted at a pre-arranged clock time. In general, no equipment or troops were scheduled to land between the arrival of the demolition parties at H f 3 minutes and H f 30 minutes. The whole plan of assault, therefore, might be described as follows: To destroy enemy defenses and cover the shoreward progres s of the leading assault waves by naval and air bombardment; to land a wave of infantry preceded and supported by tanks to storm the enemy beach defenses, and cover the operations of the combat demolition parties while the latter were engaged in clearing lanes through the obstacles in the tidal area; and as soon as the lanes were open, to follow thro~ with successive waves of infantry, artillery, motorized equipment, and stores, in order to reduce the remaining enemy defenses and seize the beachhead.

In summary form, the material casualties were as :"ollows: Ships Lost 1 Damaged 1 LST's Lost 4 Damaged 3

~Cl( L) 's Lost 5 Damaged 17

LCT( 5&6) 1§ Lost 13 Damaged 78

1-6 I

, ' ' f~ J i -0 .,"' -> l 1• I

1-7 SECRET NARRATIVE - ASSAULT FORCE "011

S!llB.11 Craft l.()et LCM 1e 23 LCVP 1e 130

Miscellaneous Craft Damaged see 3 USCG Rescue Vessel 2 LC Fe 4

From: Commander Assault ForcE "U".

The primary mission of Force "U" was to successfully place a large volume of tank supported infantry on the ene!QY beach within a few hours. This required, (1) positive clearance of minee in the approaches to, and in, the assault area, (2) adequate and positive naval gunfire sup­ port, and (3) clearance of underwater obstacles near the beaches.

The coaposition and timing of the assault waves was determined by the army representatives in concurrence with Navy wishes. The mase of infantry required to be landed in the first few wavee necessitated ehort interval spacing between wavee with each wave containing many craft. Air cover, played a major role in affording complete protection trom air and submarine attack.

Ae the naval gunfire plan for covering the enemy known. dangerous targets w~e developed, the scheoe of mine sweeping became extremely complex because of limited sweeping facilities and the element of time. The transport area wae located 22,500 yarde to seaward to avoid fire from the extensive eyetem of hostile long range artillery. To insure positive timing of the waves, special control measures had to be pro­ vided. Early occupation of the Ilee de San Marcou! was considered necessary.

With few deviations the assault went according to plan. In spite of the complexities of the mine sweeping scheme, the channels were successfully opened on time. To maintain security from mines, constant sweeping was continued after the assault. Naval gunfire was so suc­ cessfully placed on targets threatening the landing only a few era.ft were lost from hostile shelling. Active enemy batteries were des­ troyed or neutralized by effective naval gunfire which was later controlled by observers who landed with the early assault waves. The drenching fire of the rockets of the LCT(R)s and the fire of LCGs and LCS effectively played their part in the initial landings. Thie force wae very fortunate in that no opposition was encountered on the Iles de San Harcouf which due to their position could have greatly handicapped the landing had they been hotly defended.

The task of the ArlQY and Naval demolition parties was euccesefully carried out. The landing was made at a time when the tide left all

1-8 SECRET ?Wi.RATIVJ: - ASSAULT FORCE 11 U11 obetaclee dry and they were cleared off before they interfered with the landings.

Due to the early loaa of the Red primary and secondary control vessels, the landing was made about 1000 yards to the southeast of the scheduled landing place. Thia proved to be fortuitous. The obsta­ cles found were leas formidable than those farther to the north.. Nor were the hostile shore defenses ae strong as those opposite the intended landing beaches. The waves had been trained to expect the possible lose of control veaeele. Consequently the landings on Red beach car­ ried on even though the control vessels were not functioning. The landings on Green beach were orderly and according to schedule. Re-con­ trol of despatching was reestablished on Red beach by the despatch of a new control vessel about the time of landing of the eighth wave. losses of men and material on UTAH beach were small during the initial landings primarily due to the overwhelming fire pover on the beach prior to landings.

Nearly all of the DD tanks were discharged and landed successfully. These supported the infantry with marked eucceee.

It 1e considered that the landing on UTAH beach wae extremely successful from every tactical aspect. Good fortune played a large part. But careful and thorough planning, meticulous briefing, and the sincere efforte of all concerned to make the operation the success that it was.

11 Force •0 1 part in Operation - - - - - involved the assembly and sortie of over 865 ships and craft from various ports in the Pl.ymouth.­ Torq~ Area. Thie Force was transported to the Far Shore in twelve separate convoys, the first to leave departing on D-2 day. Thie move­ ment va.s complicated by three factors.

(a) Force "U" waa the last Force to be formed. The craft assigned it were the last to arrive in England. Arrivals from the Medi­ terranean, United States, and other parts of the O.K. continued up to vi thin a d.e;r or two of l oading ~. In ma~ cases these craft bad practically no training.

(b) The lack of a large port necessitated the use of nine (9) different loading and sortie points. Most of the 12 Force •u11 convoys contained 3 or 4 sections which sortied from difft11ent ports and had to make precise sea rendezvous. Separating the craft into many small groups made loading more difficult, and required some craft to be moved after loading to different ports for sortie. It was necessary for moat escorts to sortie from ports different from that of the convoys. Since the final dis­ position of all convoys va.s by beaches in order of hitting the beach, satisfactory cruising dispositions were accomplished only b)' careful craft assignment and re-arrangement of craft at the

1-9 SECRET NARRATIVE - ASSAULT R>BCE 11 0 11

various rendezvous.

(c) Force "U" was required to steam considerably farther from eortie ports to the Assault Area. than other Assault Forces. Thie required early loading of troops with attend.ant fatigue factor.

The postponement of ~day found eeveral Force "U" conveys at eea because of the early sorties required. This necessitated back tracking for 12 hours for some convoys. and the seeking of shelter in Weymouth Bay for 247 gunfire support craft. LCTs and LCMs and other small craft. Both crews and embarked troops were thus exposed to the rough seas for an extended period. The sea conditions were so adverse that an LCT was s'WSIDped before taking shelter. The convoys which went into Weymouth Bay for shelter arrived there about 1700 to 2100 of the new ~2 day. It was not until about 2300 of new ~2 that definite word of new D-day was received. As a result. the re-sailing of these convoys of hundreds of craft from Weymouth Bay 4 hours later in the dark anchored over a ten mile area was a most difficult under­ taking. That they were properly re-grouped and arrived on lees than an hon.!' ~~hind schedule reflects great credit on the Commanding Officer1 and men of these craft and the Convoy Collll!landers. and was cloee to a miracle. It is worthy of note that fif1iJ' LCMs were involved. 42 eteam­ ing under their own power from Dartmouth. a distance of about 140 miles. Despite the turn back and re-etart, not one LCM failed to arrive on echedule • .Because of stress of weather however, seven(?) LCPL emokere swamped under tow. one LCT capsized, and some others had to return to Weymouth and missed the assault.

LSTs, LCie and virtually all escort craft had to be employed con­ tinually during the ten days prior to sortie and for the assault, in towing and escorting to assembly ports a great number of barges and other tows needed in the assault and in escorting craft to loading ports. Despite this additional burden and the late arrival of craft. only two Britieh LCTe of all the craft asaigned Force 11 U~ were unable to load and sail. Thie is a remarkable record of operation and main­ tenance for which Commander Service Force. Taek Force 127, deserves great credit. The assigned craft were in their proper ports correctly' loaded and re~ for sea.

CONVOY .ARRIVED OJ'J' mJv.BER COMPOSITION ASS1!MBLY POB:J: .§Q!ru! SPEED UTAH .BEA.CB

U-lA 1 .BB, 3CA .Belfast B -44 lZ k:ta 0229 2 CL, 4DD 1030 5 June 3 June 1 APA. 1 PT Ply'mouth B - 20 12 kta 1 DD 0930 5 June

1-10 SECRET lWlll.~.un - ASSAULT JORCI "tr'

OO'STOY ARRIVED on ~ QQMPOSITIO?l M§R:&BLY ~! SOliTll ~ UTAH BUCH U-U 2 LCH Dartmouth H - 17 12 kte (cont 1d) 2 PC 1230 5 June

2 APA, l LSI Tor 1!e.y H - 17 l2 kte 2 DD 1230 5 June

l DM Weymouth 1!e.y H - 13 12 kte l DD 1730 5 June

2 USCGC Poole H - 13 12 kte 1730 5 June

U-l.B 14 LCI(L) Plymouth 1500 11 kte 0730 2 DIS, lDD 5 June 6 June

17 LOI( L), Salcombe 1635 11 kts 0730 1 SC 5 June 6 June

5 LCI(L) Torquay 1815 11 kts 0730 5 June 6 June

4 USCGC Poole 2055 11 kte 0730 5 June 6 June

U-2A( 1) 1LCI(L),4LC7 Salcombe 1653 5 kts 0230 4LCT( R) I 4LCG 3 June 6 June 8LCT( A), 3ML 16 LCP( L)

l6LCT, 4 LCC Dartmouth 1743 5 kta 0230 50LCM,2 PC 3 June 6 June 1 SC

3 LCM (Sal- Portland 0430 5 kts 0230 vage) 4 June 6 June

1 DD Plymouth 1700 5 kts 0230 3 June 6 June

1-11_ SECRE"r NARRATIVE - ASSAULT :FORCE "U''

CONVOY ARRIVED OJ'J" NUMBER COMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT SORTIE SPllD UTAH BACH

U-2A(2) l LCI(L), l Dartmouth 2058 5 kta 0330 PC, 85 LOT, 3 June 6 June l SC

51 LOT, 2 PC Brixham 1833 5 kts. 0330 l SC 3 June 6 June l PG, 2 DD Plymouth 1515 5 kts 0330 5 YMS, l AT 3 June 6 June

U-2B 2 DD, l AT Plymouth 1430 0200 l ATR 3 June 6 June 5 LST, 5 RE.J' Dartsmouth 1543 5 kts 0200 3 June 6 June

U3 2 SC Salcom be 0605 5 kts 1430 5 June 6 June

5 LST, 5 RHF Dartmouth 0830 5 kts 1430 5 June 6 June

11 LST, l RHF Tor ~ At Pt.D 5 kts 1430 l DD, 4USCGC 1004 6 Juno 2 Corvettes 5 June 2 A/S Trawlers

4 USCGC Poole At Pt F 5 kta 1430 5 June 6 June

04 9 LST Salcombe 1930 5 kts 0900 5 June 7 June

8 Pontoon Salcombe 1930 5 kts 0900 Causeways 5 June 7 June 8 Blisters Salcombe 1930 5 kts 0900 5 June 7 June

l Repair Barge Salcombe 1930 5 .

1-12 SECRET NARRATIVE - ASSAULT FORCE "U"

CONVOY ARRIVED OFF HUMBER COMPOSITION ASS]l.!BLY PORT SORTIE SPEED UTAH BEACH

U4{ cont 1d) 3 A/S Traw- Plymouth 1630 5 kts 0900 lers 5 June 7 June us 18 LBV Yarmouth 1630 4 kts 1630 5 June 6 June

20 LID, 4LBE Poole 1630 4 kts 1630 5 June 6 June

3 LBW, 20LCM Poole 1630 4 kts 1630 5 June 6 June

5 Fuelin& Portland 1600 4 kts 1630 Trawlers 5 June 6 Jwie

2 M/ L 11 Poole 1430 4 kts 1630 5 June 6 June

U-6 18 LBV, ML 190 Yarmouth 0530 4 kts 1030 5 June 7 June

4 LBE, 2 LBK Poole 0500 4 kts 1030 Z ML 5 June 7 June

UM-1 11 ms, 8 MMS Plymouth 2400 8 kts 0330 4 June 6 June

11 AM Tor ::Bay 0632 8 kts 0040 5 June 6 June

6 PT Portland 1130 8 kte 0330 5 June 6 June

UM-2 4 ML, 8 .™ Plymouth 1715 8 kta 0015 4 June 6 June

4 Dan Layers Plymouth 1715 8 kta 0015 7 Jm.IL 4 June 6 June

3 PT 1s Portland 0400 8 kts 0015 5 June 6 June

1-13 SECRET NARRATIVE - ASSAULT FORCE 11 U11

CONVOY ARRIVED 017 ~ COMPOSITION ASSEMBLY PORT §2!!m SPEED UTAH BEACH

UM-3 4 ML, 8 JM Plymouth 2300 8 kte 2130 4 June 5 June

3 PT 1e Portland 1000 8 kte 21.30 6 June 5 June

KNOWN CASUALTIES AND I.OSS:iS

TYPE CASUALITY PliO.BA.BLE CAUSE

CO.BRY (DD) 6 June Sunk Enemy shellfire, or mined GLENNON( DD) 8 June Sunk Mined MEREDITH (DD) 8 June Sunk Mtned, or possible glider bomb JDFERS (DD) 7 June Slight Damage Enemy Shellfire

RICB (DE) 8 June Sunk Mined

LCT 967 13 June Sunk Mined < d) 1.CT 362 6 June Sunk Cause undetermined pr~Biit LCT 597 6 June Sunk N n M LCT 777 6 June Sunk N " LCT 486 7 June Sunk Mined LCT 458 7 June Sunk Mined (beached) LCT 447 l5 June Damaged Near mies shellfire while LCT(A) 2310 7 June Damaged Shellfire (Utah area) •AM 56 (OSPREY) 5 June Sunk Mine or torpedo enroute AM 125 (TIDE) 7 June Sunk Mined

PC 1261 6 June Sunk Enemy shellfire or mined. LST 496 ll June Sunk probably mined LST 499 8 June Sunk Mined LST 381 14 June Damaged Ran aground causeway LST 292 17 June Damaged Damaged hull while beaching

MMS 297 17 June Damaged Acoustic mine MMS 229 13 June Sunk Mined

YMS 377 17 June Damaged Near mine explosion SS GLENROY(LSI-L)l7 June Damaged Near mine explosion (mined) LCI 232 7 June Sunk Cause undetermined, probably •LCI(L) 219 ll June Sunk Bombed enroute Utah area LCF 31 6 June Sunk Cause undetennined, PfobablY mined/ 1-14 S:SCRET

KNOWIJ CASUALTIES AND :WSSES (Cont 1d) fln ~ CASUALI'l'Y PROBA.BLE CAUSE HMS MINSTllR 8 June Sunk Mined SUSAN B. ANTHONY 7 June Sunk Mined enroute Utah area SS CHARLES MORGAN 10 June Sunk Bombed • NOT IN .A.SSA.ULT .ARla

PLANS AND PLANNING

1rom: Naval Co1111Dander Western Task Force (Commander Task Jorce 122).

Taak Force ONE TWO TWO was established by directives from Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Commander TWELJ'l'H Fleet, All U.S. Naval Forces assigned to Operation - - - - - were placed in this force, and the Task Force Commander reported to the Supreme Commander, for duty under the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, For administration and logistical support the Task Force Commander opera­ ted under Colll!D8.nder U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, while on other mat­ ters he was authorized direct communication with Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

When the Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force, prepared the NaTal Outline Plan, representatives of Task Force ONE TWO TWO collaborated by attendance at numerous committee meetings and by direct consultation between opposite numbers of the American and British Naval Staffs,

With the increase from three to five assault forces, the Allied Naval Co111111&nder in Chief provided for both Eastern and Western Area Commands; and a British Naval Officer, as a counterpart of Co1D1Uander Task Jorce ONE TWO TWO, was appointed to the Eastern Task Force Com­ mand.

There exist tvo fUndamental differences between the U,S. and British methods of planning which had a considerable effect on the U.S. planning, These differences are:

(a) The British, in higher echelon prescribe detail• which in normal u.s. practices are left to responsible com­ manders 1n the lover echelons. (b) The British do not use a standard order form.

When details beyond thoae required for coordination, are prescribed by higher echelon•, the higher echelon is often then put in the posi­ tion of relying on the lower echelon for information and data, which only the lower echelon ee.n aupply. This results in delq and a lack of firmneaa in planning, which in turn greatly complicates the planning of lover echelons employing the u.s. ayatems. In addition the ~eedom

1-15 SECRET twmATIV'I - PI.llTS .AND PI.AlmllfG

of action of the reaponaible lover commander ie curtailed, as details of hia plan become directiTea from higher authority.

The u.s. naTal order form effectively fulfills its purpose. It ia especially effective in ebowing the relationship between tasks and the mean• for their accomplishment, in the form of definite task forcea. There is alao an advantage in having a specific place to look for cer­ tain types of instruction. When the plane and orders of a higher echelon contain the details of execution by a lower echelon, the lover collllll8llder ia forced to copy a great d&1.l into his own plans and orders if there ie doubt about the extent of distribution of the plane and orders of the higher commander; or it may force a wide distribution of higher echelon plane and orders, with unnecessary dissemination of eecret matters, not required by many or all of the lower echelons to wbom dietributed.

Planning relations vith the FIRST U.S. Army were smooth and effect­ ive, helped no doubt by previous close association of the same two etaffs in the Sicilian campaign. The fluctuation in. lift to be made available kept loading plans in a state of fluctuation until a late date.

The volume of plans and orders received by comr.ianders of small warships and landing. craft, must have appalled those Comnanding Officers wbo vere alloved to open them some seven days before the landing was to take place. At that late date there were numerous corrections to be entered by these small commands.

From: Collllll8nder Assault Force "O", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force),

The neceaeity for close liaison between the Staff of the Naval Task Force Collllll8llder and the Staff of the Landing Force Commander becomes more evident with each aJ:Jphibious assault. Close physical proximity between the two etaffe to facilitate mutual consultation is desirable during the planning, training, and rehearsal stages. Prior to Operation - - - - a planning group with representatives from all the Army Commands associated with Force 11 011 vas established in PLYJ.IOU'l'H vhere the Flagship of the Assault Force Commander wae based, thereby affording the opportunity for the close coordination mentioned above. A noteworthy fact, and one most pleasing to the Force Commander, was the early participation by the Air Force in this Joint planning. This close association and mutual understanding with its consequent apprecia­ tion. of the problems of the other services involved, endured thro'U&hout t.he whole period of preparation for the assault. The same close cooperation was present in the planning of all joint training exercises, and after each large scale exercise, critiques by each service were attended by representatives of the other. It is considered that the opportunity thus provided to exchange views, and discuss frankly all phases of the operation vae most valuable.

1-16 SSCRET NARRATIVE - PLANS AND PLANNING

Plana for the assault from higher echelons of coramand were received in ample time. However. voluminous changes were also soon received~ many of them after the operation order of this force had been completed and was in process of printing and assembling. This inevitably required chan,ges in the operation order which had to be published practically simultaneously with it. By the time the operation order was ready for distribution. the snips and craft of the assault force were being assem­ bled. and the difficulties of distribution were accentuated by their movements and by the fact that they were now arranged in task groups rather than in their normal ad.~inistrative units. It is appreciated that in so extensive an operation chan.-;ei: in plan are inevitable. But the very complexity of the oueration s~gests that every effort be made to reduce the number of changes to a minimUJ:I.

This coClllland considered that in some respects the orders from higher echelons were in such detail as to restrict the decision and freedom of action of the Assault Force Cornuander: by the same token, colll!llents from subordinates within this Force indicate a similar feeling on their part. not only in regard to the orders of echelons above the Assault Force Colll!llander, but also in regard to the Force Co1111Dander 1 e operation Oraer itself. It is impossible to state exactly what con­ stitutes too much or too little detail in an operation plan or operation order. The decision in each case must be baaed upon the necessity for enouring absolute coordination. Paradoxical as it may seem, the larger and more complex the operation. the more detail is necessary in the Supreme Oollll!lander 1 s plan in order to ensure that coordination. Thie ia especially true in an amphibious operation w~ich is restricted by its nature from the flexibility possible in an operation conducted entirely at sea or ent~rely ashore. It is believed, however, that the aim in the preparation of all operation plans or orders should be to reduce detailed directives to the minimum and to allow the subordinate the maxilll1l!D lati­ tude as to the way in which he may accomplish hie task.

In order to effect a proper and timely distribution of an opera­ tion order numerous factors must be weighed and balanced. Of para- mount importance in this assault was the need for security. The infor­ mation contained in Operation Order BB-44 vae such that no risk of compromise could be accepted; on the other hand, it vaa necessary to make an early distribution of the order to the task group comm.anders, especially the assault group commanders responsible for the preparation of detailed landing plans, in order that their own operation orders could be prepared. This was accomplished by bringing the Assault Group OoC1111andere and their Deputy Oom:na.nders aboard the Flagship while the Force Commander 1s order was still being written eo that they might assist by suggestion and criticism, and at the same time become thoroughly familiar with the Force Oommanier 1s intentiont. The order in finished form vaa distributed to them ten days before the assault. At the aame time distribution to the balance of the Force vaa col!Ull9nced. J'or reasons of security, holders of the order other than task group command.era

1-17 SECRET NABRATIVE - PLANS AND PLANNING

and flotilla commanders were directed to open the sealed envelope containing the order only on sign.al. This signal was sent when all ships of the Force were sealed on 31 May, six days before the assault.

The Assault Force Commander's order was distributed to all unit, ship, and craft co1111Uanders, down to and including LCTs. In the light of the experience gained, it is doubted whether such wide distribution was either necessary or advisable. In large part, the commanding officers of the smaller craft such as LCTs and the units such as LCM and LCP(L) Flotillas had neither the time nor the opportunity to digest the entire order. It is believed that it might have been better to limit the distribution and to leave to task group commanders the dis­ semination to the commanding officers of the small craft of informa­ tion necessary to enable them to perform tteir alloted tasks. This is, of course, closely related to the subject of how much detail to put into the operation order and how much to leave to subordinates. In the present instance, the Assault Force Comoander was on the third echelon from the top in the Naval chain of command, and by the tioe he had received the orders of higher authority and prepared his own, there was very little time left for his subordinates. Hence it was felt that the assault force order must be in such detail as to eliminate the necessity for all but the briefest orders on the pa.rt of the task group commanders. This was partially achieved but not to an entirely satisfactory degree.

Reco111Cendations .

That plans and orders of each echelon be stated in the most general terms possible consonant with clear understanding and adequate provision for coordination between subordinates, in order that the plans may be completed and promulgated at the earliest possible date and to allow maximum latitude to subordinates.

That once p l ans are comp leted and promulgat ed, changes be kept to a minimum and restricted to those which are basic and fundamental. Plane for an operation as complex as the invasion of the Continent can not be chr"lnged to meet a very minor change of circumstances. Whatever is gained in improvement in tte plan is frequently core than lost by the inability of lower echelons to provide t heir unite with complete orders governing the assault well in advance of the operation.

That the necessity for complete information as to the whole opera­ tion on the part of the officers to whom the order is di~t ribut ed be carefully weighed and the number of tr~ee who need to know restricted to the minimum .

From: CoJll!Janding Officer USS DOROTHEA DIX. (APA)

The planning for this operation was so t ho rough and r ealistic in all respects, insofar at least a s transport pA.I'ticipatlon was concerned,

1-18 SSCRET NARRATIVE - TRAINING that accomplishment of this ship's mission was well within its material and personnel capabilities. Arrangements for unloading provided a heavy margin for contingencies. The wisdom of this foresight was well demonstrated by the outcome - - even without scheduled LCI(L)'s, LCA 1s, and some LCVP 1 s which were delayed by weather and their own operations, sufficient boat and landing craft capacity became available to unload both troops and vehicles from this vessel, in sufficient time to meet the army's requirements.

HOWEVER, THERE WERE OTHER POHITS OF VIEW ON PLANNING

From: Commander Gunfire SUpport Craft Eleventh Amphibious Force.

Late delivery of Operation Plana and Orders. The complexities and difficulties in planning an operation of this magnitude and the importance of security are fully realized. There is no question but what the operation was brilliantly conceived and beautifully planned. ~t there was a very definite gap between the "planners" and the "doers". Practically everything was 11 socewhere11 in "some" plan. :But the r.iech­ anics of accomplishing ~any of the planned matters left r.iuch to be desired, especially when plans containing much to be done before sortie were received only a day or so prior to sortie. This was particularly true of certain logistic requirements. ------

From: Naval Commander Western Fask Force (Co:ur.iander Task Force 122).

On December 17, 1943, a directive for amphibious training was issued directing the ELEVEMTH Amphibious Force to arrange for the amphibious training of Naval Forces and such Army divisions as were to be assigned by the Commanding General of the FIRST U. S • .Army,

Amphibious training for the assigned divisions was carriPd out generally along the Southern Coast of England and particularly in the SLAPTON SANDS Area: Training exercises were first scheduled for battalions and Regimental Cor.ibat Teams: Finally full division and Corps rehearsals were held with all supporting elements, which included Engineer Special Brigades. Sea and air support units were ~xe rci sed in conjunction.

Every effort was made to simulate conditions that would obtain in the assault area, An important factor was the trainine of landing craft in beaching and retracting on flat beaches with large tidal ran~e. It is felt that this training paid big dividends. Another noteworthy feature was the training of landing craft in keeping the narrow swept channels with current running up to 3 knots,

Full scale r P.hearaals were held during periods 24 to 28 April for 11 11 Force "U" and 3 to 8 May for Force 0 • These rehearsals involYed a

1-19 S2CRET :JAR.RATIV.E - TRAINING

m~ve1~ent t~ sea of conbat loaded trans':'lo rts, LSTs, LCI( L)s, escorts and g-..uifi re support ships, aa well as build-up forces. Shuttle and ferry control were exercised also , Due to the proximity of ener:iy nircraft, sub~arines , and £-beats, these operations were undertaken nt c ri r.dder·,b!e risk. During EJ:ercise 11 Tiger 11 Ger:::an E-boats caused the loss of 2 L5Ts and badly danaged another.

It is consi dered that t hese o~erations were well-~lanned and e!ficientq executed, With the ex~ention of beach and. underwater obst~cl 0 G P. n ~ t ne absence of a nUlllber of t he gunfire su~po rt ships, the rehearsnls sioul~ted as nearly as possible the actual assault, It is extre~ely aifficult in this t TOe rehearsal to create the critical sit•..l.!ltion that occurs on every a ssault, i.e., of beaches heaped with supplies, bo~t~ disribled and the Army supply system in danger of a breakdown. A full-scale unloading was exercised in t hes e training ooerntions 'Uld served to acque.int t he beach organizations with the re~l proble~s involved anc permitted many corrective neasures to be taken.

Froc: Comoander Assault Force "O". (~ollllll8nder 3l evP~th A~~h1b1ous Force.) Recollll'lendations,

That whPnever practicable t he Javal Forces inclU.O.ing Transports, Landing Ships, Landing Craft, Con trol Vessels, and Beach Parties be well trained and proficient before joint training is undertaken. lt is a psychological fact that because the soldi er is definitely out of his natura l elecent in an a::rphibious operation and because the opera­ t ion has to do with water, ships and craft, he autooatically ass~es that the sailor knows all about it - at least, the Naval end of it, and he nat·J.rally looks to the sailor for i ns truction and guidance, If he finds th: t the sailor too is ignorant of what he is supposed to do and uncertain and confused , the soldier is diso~ed and often dis­ gusted, He £eels thnt the Navy is letting hio down, anJ his confidence is shaken, A Force wtich co!Dlll ences joint training with experienced and capable Naval elements can be develop·ed into an efficient effective amphibious force in a fraction of t he tiDe that it takes to develop a force where bo t h the Naval element and the Army elecent have to learn their jobs together,

That in training Army personnel for amphibious operations the initial phas e be undertaken with units not larger than a battalion, That as t hose units attain proficiency, the size and scope of the landing exercises be increased to Regimental, then to Division landings, with appropriate attached and supporting arms in each case, that every effort be made to see that t he Naval and Arey personnel teamed together in t hese exercises be the same ones wr.o vill work together in future operations against the eneciy, i-ro SECRET NARRATIVE - TRAINING

That every effort be lllB.de to simulate the conditions anticipated in the assault area including the character of the beach, beach obsta­ cles, simulated enemy defenses, terrain features, and where practicable, enemy opposition. Gunfire support and air support should be included in all exercises which include tactical training and are not limited to drill in the mechanics of loading and landing.

That the final exercise be insofar as possible a full scale rehear­ sal of the anticipated assault in which all forces to be included in the assault participate.

WEATHER

From: Maval Collllllander Western Task Force (Commander Task Force 122).

During the naval planni ng, the me teorological factors glven parti­ cular attention were:

(a) The expected conditions immediately following the assault, particularly witt respect to the likelihood of a quiet period.

(b) The expected conditions of wind and sea during the approach, particularly with respect to the effect upon smaller landing craft, heavy tows, etc.

(c) The expected wind and surf conditions on the assault beaches at H- hour.

(d) Conditions for l aying smoke.

(e) Visibility, especially in its rela tionship to directing and spo t t ing gunfire.

( f) Flying conditions, especially with respect to pr ecision air bombardment and air spot of gunfire.

( g) Likelihood of strong onsr.ore winds and dangerous surf.

D-dny was initiall y set for 5 June on considerations of light and tide conditions. It was apparent from the synoptic situation on 3 June, tr.at unfavor~ble weatter conditions wer ~ develoning, and, early oc ~ June, orders for a postpo~eoent of twenty- four hours were broadcast by the Allied Navnl Cor.11:ander. By tbe evening of 4 June, ~uch ic?roved conditions were forecast for the morning of 6 June, although only a low order of confidence could be ascribed to the likelihood of moderate or quiet conaitions for the follo.,,·inc several d.Ays . :Ale to the tid~ a:"?d ligi t con~itions as well a s ct~~r co~sideratior.s of i~portance, tte uncertaint~,. of t'.:::e wee.ti.er co:l:iitions i: ::1ediat ely following D-day ~ ··-.i: accei:;ted, and ~t 2 159 on 4 ..rune , t:·.e Alli,.C. \evnl Comr:ianC:er broa\i cast "\

J -21 SECRET NARRATIVE - WUTHER confirmation of 6 June aa D-day. These decisions were made by the Supreme J.llied Commander ------

J'rom1 ColllJlla.Qder AaaauJ.t Force •o",(Commander :11.eventh Amphibioua JorceJ. The ENGLISH CHANNEL is well knovn for the unpredictable nature of ita weather and, on at leaat tvo occasions during the period covered 1';r this report, it lived up to it• reputation. The first time waa when bad weather, accompanied by strong winds and roU&}l aeaa, made it necea- 11ary to postpone D day for twenty-four hours even tho~ many of the •lower co.aYoys had already started for the Assault Area and had to turn back. The second, was the three~ period commencing D f 13 dur­ ing which an unseasonable storm of near-gale force played havoc ~1th the artificial port and the ferry craft in the Jorce "o• Assault Area. In the initial planning one of the factors deemed neceaaa17 to the successful conduct of the assault was a minimum of four 4a.ys .good wea­ ther. This included light winds, calm or near calm aeas, and treedom from fog. It was understood that unfavorable weather would require a postponement of D day. Because of the aforementioned uncertainty of the weather in this area and the inablility of Aerologiet• to forecast it with any degree of accuracy from more than a day or two in advance, it waa alao realized that the decision to car17 out the operation or to poatpone it would have to bJ a last minute one. Unfortunately the apeed of the slow convoys waa such that they had to get underway about H-28 hours in order to arrive in the Assault Area on tillle. Recommendations.

That careful consideration be given to the weather forecast before actually colllJllencing the landing in an amphibio'JU operation leat bad weather maroon the Landin& Force ashore, and by depriving it of the support of the forces afloat, render it an easy prey to the defenders.

Jrom: Naval CoDllll&nder Western Task Force( Commander Task 7orce 122).

COVERING BORClilS

Cover for the operation vas provided, according to plan, by the British Home Commands of Plymouth, Portsmouth and Dover. These command.a had at their disposal DDs, MTBs, and other coastal craft and aircraft with which they provided cover against sorties of enemy DDs, E-boats, U-boats and W-boats in the channel outside the Assault Area.

Cover against sorties by major enemy unite was provided by the Home Fleet basing at Scapa and the Clyde, but it was not required.

1-22 SSCRET N.AlilU.TIVR - COVERING FORCIS

The .Ueaul t Area initially vas limited to the ~ o! the Seine eouth o! latitude 49-4-0. Outside this area the Home Commands main­ tained anti U-boat air patrol by day and destroyers and MTBs on patrol at night. In addition there were some coastal aircraft equipped with Leigh light• on patrol during darkness across lanes of probable enemy sortie•.

The disposition of the channel covering forces varied from night to night. Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, issued a daily despatch givin& the etations for these forces for the ensuing dark period, identifyin& the stations by sectors on special channel overprinted charts issued for the operation.

Generally the channel covering forces consisted of the following:

( 1) Plymouth Command - four to six DDs and six to eight MTBs. (2) Portsmouth Command - four DDs and four to six MTBs. (3) Dover Command - four DDs and eight to ten MTBe.

The Plymouth covering forces, a1sisted by radar stations in the United Xin&dom, repuleed an enemy destroyer sortie of three (3) Harviks and one (1) Elbing in the early morning of 9 June, destroying one (1) enemy DD and forcing another to beach. Except for that one sortie, their enemy contacts on the Western flank were all with li:-boats or 'ti'-boats.

The strength of the covering forces was not adequate to provide impenetrable cover for the cross channel routes, but it kept enemy activity to a minimum.

When forces of the Home Commands were stationed near the Assault J..rea boundary, the danger of conflict vi th unite of WlfTF Area Screen vas a difficult7 which va1 overcome by prohibiting either of these allied forces from crossing the Assault Area boundary. Direct commun­ ication between the screening and covering forces was impractical due to their limited equipment.

When the Assault Area was extended to include the entrances to Cherbourg, e measure of cooperation between screening and covering forces was provided by having DDs of each force guard the radio fre­ quency of the other force,

From the viewpoint of NCWTF the lack of direct communications with units of the covering force was a source of anxiety. There was consider­ able time lag between the origin of action reports of the covering forces and the time of their receipt in the flagship. There was also consider­ able time lag in the receipt of the channel disposition despatches. Thie made coordination of tactical effort between the Home Commands and the NC'iTF generally impracticable.

1-23

SECRET CHAP'fD II

NAV/il. CU!U'lHI

J'ro•I BaTaJ. Collll&nd9I' YHtern !'alllr: hro. (Commander Talllr: :rorce 122).

In :1e'br1:Msr7 194' requirements tor tire 911Pport onl.7 were eatillated b7 Allied :l&Tal Commander hpedi Uonary :Force a1 tollova: 3 liattle1hip1 2 He&T)' Oruiaer1 I Light Cruiser. 36 De1tro7era

'?hi• 11tiaate va1 b&1ed upon the atrencth ot coastal defenae1 and upon the 1cheme ot maneUYer ot the :rIBS!' U.S • .Artlq. lly ~ the known coast.al batteries bad increaud in n'Omber and in 1trength &1 11&1Q' batteries were pl.aced in concrete ca1ement1. Rovner, an in­ creased air boabing effort was aYailable to aa1iat in neutralising both the coastal batteries and the beach deten1ea.

Late in :rebruar:y the following l!ritish warships were de1ignated tor allocation ~ the Western Talllr: :Force: B.f.MILLllS llLIDli D:&BUS :&N!DPB.19 GLASGOW !liVXINS AJil 12 J'leet Destroyers DIDO 4 Hunt De1troyers llUCK PRllfCI

'!Jpon &11ignment ot u.s. warship• to the Western Task :Force cer­ tain l!ritiah warlhips vere detached and the final a1sigmnent of fire irapport ships to the .t..sault 1orces of the Western Task :rorce was as tollov11 .Aaaault :Force •o• illiNSJ.S GLASGOW TllAS MORTCADI ( :rr. ) ~Hl8 GEORGES Ln'GUXS ( Yr. ) (Total DD 11 9) 2 Hunt De1troyers.

J..asaul. t :Force •tJ11 BEVADA XNTIRPRl9 n:EBUS SODlBA (Dutch) Q.UIBCY D:SSDIV 34 TUSCA.I.OOSA DESDIV 20 HAWXlNS (Total DD 1 s 8) :BLACK PRINCE A re1erTe !ire support t;roup was constituted to relieve 1hip1 which bad severe battle damage or had depleted their ammunition. Th11 group conlisted of ADGUST.t. (WNTF ne.gahip), BELIDNA, DESDIV 33, plu1 PLUBKETT, D%SDIV 119 and DESDIV 18. (Total DD 1s 17.

2-1 SECRET ?U.VAL GUNJIRI - COMMANDIR TASI J'OR~ 122

Reco1111Dendation1.

1.onger period• of prearragned bombardment with deliberate fire at long and close range are required to effectively reduce strong enemy coastal and beach defense•.

Heavy air bombing of enemy etrong point• should be accompliahed prior to the aaeault.

Aircraft capable of remaining on station for at least 2 or 3 hours and capable of low altitude flying to search for targets of opportunity are required for efficient air spotting. Carrier based and land based groups should be especially trained in spotting naval gunfire for amphibious operations.

Photographic coverage and interpretation, which was excellent in this operation, le of paramount importance and should be continued.

From: Collllll8nder Assault Force "0 11 , (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force).

Background. Thie Operation involved the uee of several depart­ ures from previous practice in Naval Support Gunfire procedure, The most significant of these were the attachment to the divisions of Shore Fire Control Parties from the Joint Assault Signal Companies ae opposed to the use of specially trained organic division troops; the employment on a large scale of shallow draft converted landing craft to add to the fire support; and t he use of frequency modulated voice radio (SCR 609) sets for shore fire control communications. In addition, as originally planned, the operation contemplated con­ siderable inter-allied liaison, as the major gunfire support ships were to be largely .British,

Approximately January l an area about five miles deep and fronting some three miles on the sea was cleared of inhabitants and made available at SLAPTON SANDS, Although this area was in constant demand for battalion landing, shore party, and other amphibious exercises, it was possible to conduct there also training for various fire support units. Training for the operation included:

Training of three Joint Assault Signal Company Shore Fire Control Compon&nte plus parachute Naval gunfire spotter parties for one airborne division. Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers for these parties had received some training in the United States but were for the most part inexperienced. It was decided to augment the previous divisional gunfire liaison personnel by increasing the size of each party to twelve men and two officers, and more important, by assigning experienced liaison officers to each Regimental Co~bat Team (to be stationed at Artillery Battalion Headquarters). All the

2-Z S.SC~ET NAVAL GUNFIRE - ASSAULT FORCE "O•

above personnel plus the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers were given a compreheneive course of instruction which included the adjustment of destroyer and cruiser fire.

Training of British and American ships in U.S. Shore Fire Control procedure by firing exercises at SLAPTON SANDS and in the Clyde Area. In order to coordinate procedure, Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Forces issued an "AEF Assault Signal Book" which incorporated and expanded the then applicable CSP 2156(A). It vas decided that British ships operati11& with U.S. Shore Fire Control Parties would use the line-of-sight spotting procedure. One diffi­ culty in training lay in the fact that it was deemed most practicable to keep the U.S. heavy fire support ships in the CLYDE-BELFAST area. These ships were thus unable to participate in the Force 11 0 11 full scale rehearsal for the operation,

Participation of gunfire support ships and craft in various joint exercises in the SLAPTON Assault Area. In the case of the U.S. destroyers, this was definitely limited by the low ammunition allow­ ance possible.

Training of gunfire support craft under the direction of Commander Gunfire Support Craft,

As early as possible tentative allocations of fire support ships were made to the landi11& forces, and shore fire control parties held conferences, communication drills, and firing exercises with the ships with which they were later to be netted. As limited by the ships and forces participating, arrangements for the rehearsal were the same as for the operation. In the case of the heavy ships, th~ir shore fire control parties were put aboard for a period of about a week during which time the ships conducted several firings. It le felt that whenever possible these arrangements should be made.

In thie operation Naval and Army colllJllands duri11& the planni11& and training stages vere handicapped by what appeared to be a serious shortage of Naval gunfire support. All gunfire support, save that by shallow draft landing era.ft such a.s LCG{L)s, and LCPs manned by U.S. Naval Personnel, vas to be supplied by combatant vessels of the Royal Navy, It was not until detailed landing plans were well advanced that it was known that U.S. (Navy) battleships, cruisers, and de1troyers would take part in the operation. In the op inion of both U.S. Naval and U,S. Army Forces engaged in t he planni11& , the number and fire pover of British vessels tentatively allocated for gunfire support was inadequate. As a result of this, every possible means of supplementing the Naval gunfire support was explored a nd g;eat pressure vas broU&ht to bear by Ar1rry elements to include in the supporti11& fire mortar fire from LCVPs, artillery fire from tanks in LCT(~)s and LCT{HE)s in the leadi11& waves, and 105mm Howitzers firing from LCTs from 8000 - 3000 yards off the beach, SECRET ?UV.AL GUNFIRE - .ASSAULT JORCJ: "011

After thorough trials, which were marred by some un!ortllll&te acci­ dents, the latter two procedures were adopted. Another device tor augmenting artillery' fire power ashore in the initial wave in the assault was the DD tank.

The Force Commander acquiesced reluctantly both in the decision to employ tanks and artillery firing from landing craft, and to land tanks in the first wave. He ultimately agreed because he recognized the necessity for more fire power at this stage of the assault than could be supplied by the Naval craft then available. He was then, and still is, doubtful of the efficacy of DD tanks and tanks trom LCT(A)e landing in the first wave on strongly defended beach••. In unopposed landings ~ or landing on beaches against light opposition -­ where a strong counter-attack m.a;r be expected early in the assault, such tactics may be sound; against beaches obstructed by obstacles and strongly defended, however, it ie believed that Naval gunfire must supply close support to replace tanks ·and artillery until the beaches can be cleared su:fficiently to permit their landing. The assaults in the OM.A.HA and UTAH Areas illustrate the difference in the two situations, with the difference that the offshore winds ottered a good lee in the UTAH area, while seas in the OMARA Area proved too rough to permit tanks to swim. In the OMAHA Area the results of the concentration of tanks in the first waves were, to say the least, unhappy. Most of them were lost. In the UTAH Area, on the other hand, where less opposition and fewer obstacles were encoUAtered, the majcrity of the tanks were landed without ditticulty, and negotiated the beach successfully and were availabl& to spearh&ad the further assaults of the attacking infantry.

It is regrettable that in the preparation tor this operation as probably in most others, the gunfire support ships and cratt which ultimately participated could not be present in the early stages of training of the Landing Force. This would have helped to avoid the birth of what is believed to be unsound doctrine that sprang from a lack of assurance that Naval support in su:fficient strength would be furnished.

Naval Gunfire in the Operation. H-hour for the operation waa based on a variety of factors, and changed with the date of D day, In any case it allowed for at least fifty minutes of daylight prior to the landing, Airspot was furnished beginning fortT minutes before sunrise. Eased on these limiting factors, and on the amount of fire power available, it was planned to put down neutralizing fire on beach defenses from H minus 40 minutes to about H-hour and to lift fire to targets inland for twenty minutes thereafter. TEXAS was assigned the task of knocking out the strong (6 l55mm guns) battery believed to be on POINTE du HOE. ARKANSAS, GLASGOW, GEORGES LEYGUES and eleven destroyers were assigned targets on, behind and on the flanks of the beaches, MONTCJJ.M was given +.he task ot SSCRET NAVAL GUNFIRE - ASSAULT FORCE 11 0 11 neutralizing PORT en BESSIN initially. Fire wae to be continued on the flanks of the assault beaches for varying periods baaed on the time it wae expected that the troops would reach phase lines. Destroyers were ordered to close the beaches ae near as possible to deliver direct aim fire on pillboxes and beach defenses. All fire was delivered on shcedule. Immediately preceding the assault LCT(R)e were scheduled to fire full HE rocket salvos at strong points on the cliffs immediately behind the beaches . LCGs and LCS(S)s were assigned targets commensurate with their fire power.

From an examination of the beach defenses, and from the action of the defenders, it appears that the German defenses except obstructions were directed entirely against troops on or near the beaches and not against shipping or against boats until they were very close to the beaches. Casemated guns, pillboxes and machine guns were almost all sited to fire up and down the beach instead of out to sea. In many cases they were constructed so that they were invisible from seaward. All were difficult to detect. As a result, even though photographic reconnaissance was very thorough and usually correct, ships were unable to pick out all the positions in the areas assigned them. Further, the time available for pre­ landing bombardment was not sufficient for the des~ruction of beach --­ targets. Gen:ian technique permitted the attacking unite which got past the mines and underwater obstacles to get on the beach and then endeavored to wipe them out by the fire of automatic weapons and light artillery.

The assault sections of both the 116th and 16th regiments were held up on the beaches by enemy mortar, light artillery, automatic weapon and small arms fire. Thie fire was being delivered from strong points located at the top of the cliffs and bluffs overlooking the beaches and from mortars a little further inland. Although - Shore Fire Control Parties were landed at H f 30 minutes they were in many cases unable to set up their equipment because of casualties and enemy fire.

At this juncture the destroyers CARMICK, DOYLE, MCOOOK, THOMPSON, FRANKFORD, HARDING, EMMONS, and BALDWIN and the three British Hunts MELBREAX, TALYBO~T and TANATSIDE closed the beach and took under fire many of the enemy positions . Their fire wae directed in part from the ships and in part from Shore Fire Control Parties which managed to set up communications. Too much credit cannot be given the des­ troyers which participated in this bombardment. Lacking complete knowledge of their own troops positions, and hard pressed to pick out enemy positions, they closed in some cases to within 800 yards of the beach. Position after position was taken under direct fire. It is certain teat they destroyed many of the enemy positions and it is probable that without their assistance the casualties on the beach would h.•ve been considerably hieher. Heavier ships joined in the fire but for the ooet part fired with airspot at targets desig- SECRET NAVAL GUNFIRE - ASSAULT FORCE "O"

nated by SFCPe or planee. Spotting aircraft were kept busy searching for enemy guns inland from the beaches. Aided by the concentration of fire the 16th Infantry and somewhat later the 116th Infantry attacked and moved off the beaches.

~ The Germane had an elaborate system of tunnels which it was not practicable to clear out at this time even had its f'ull extent and nature been realized. Observers in these tunnels were able to spot for field artillery in the rear of the beaches with devastating accur­ acy. The Germane continued to hold their fire until LCTe and LCI(L)e hit the beach and then opened up. Evidently their guns were regis- ,,,... tered on the beaches: in any event their fire was very euccesef'ul. In addition to 88mm and 75mm fire the Germane used 200 lb. oil filled incendiary rockets. At least one LOT was hit by one of these rockets just as unloading was commenced. The craft was totally destroyed. 1'h1s artillery and mortar fire was very difficult to stop. and con­ tinued with decreasing intensity throughout the afternoon of D f 1 day. Fortunately in the later stages it was mostly directed against the block ships and against the beach area in general rather than against specific LCTs and vehicles on the beaches.

By 1300 on D day (B plus 6 hours 30 minutes) the situation had improved considerably a.nd the Shore Fire Control Parties began to function in their normal manner. From this time until D plus 4. when the forward line reached the JOREST OF CERISY and passed out of the range of all ships of Force "O" • effective call fire was delivered by all fire support ships as the need arose. On D f l, HAWKINS AND ENTERPRISE of Force "U" reported to the Bombardment Group Commander. These ships rendered valuable assistance. They were released to Force "U" that evening. On D f 2 BELI.ONA was requested and assigned from the Control Force. Ae their a~imunition allowance (?5%) was expended the origin.al fire support destroyers were replaced. b" destroyers from the screen. Replacement destroyers were BARTON, ELLYSON, 0 1 BRIEN, MURPHY and PLUNKETT.

Brief reference may be made to I.he operation against POi l~TE du HOE. Photographic reconnaissance indicated the presence of six case­ mated guns. On that premise, the position ....as subjected to severe air bombing both preceding and during the operation proper. Also --4'EXAS delivered some 250 rounds of 14 inch fire on it. When the Rangers succeeded in scaling the cliff; however. they found the casematee empty. It later developed that four of the guns had been moved and emplaced in a hedge lane about a mile south. This new position was bombarded and knocked out by TEXAS using airspot during the morning of D day. Meanwhile. the Rangers found t henselves in a precarious position and were maintained only by their own efforts and the untiring assistance of SATTERLEE, anc later THOMPSON, HARDING and BARTON.

2-6 SSCRET UAVAL GUNFIRE - ASSAULT FORCE 11 0"

In General, It is believed that the time available for pre­ landing bombardment was not sufficient, Genne.n defensive positions were well camouglaged and strong, It is considered that tr.ese positions should be destroyed by slow aimed fire from close ran&e, prior to the landing, Sometl:.ing more than temporary neutralization is required when troops face beach mines, wire, anti-tank ditches and similar obstacles after landing.

SEE COMMENT AT END OF THIS CHAPTER.

FTP 167 divides Naval t,llnfire support into three phases:

Counter-battery fire, prearranged and scheduled beach bombardment, and close supporting fires after the landing, Under the latter is included that critical period between H hour and the time Shore Fire Control Parties are set up. During this period Naval gunfire is restricted by the presence of troops ashore, Often troops apparently pinned down on the beach are waiting to attack in conjunction with other troops who have infiltrated the enemy lines, It is at thie time when close supportin& fire is moat necessary, Use of the SCR 609 has very appreciably reduced the length of this period, but additional measures are necessary, In this operation, one Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer with great intrepidity set up a radio in his LCV(P) and spotted from close offshore (this boat had been riddled by fire on two attempts to land), This act indicates the possible value of usin& spotters in LCSs or similar craft close inshore to control close supportin& and counter-battery fire.

THE USE OF SHORE FIRE CONTBOL PARTIES IN SMALL CRAFT CLOSE OFJ' $HORE W.Al!lWITS FURTHER DEVEI.OFMJ:NT AS A MEANS OF OBTAINING GREATER CONTINUITY OF SUPPORTING FIRES IN THE LANDING ASSAULT.

Durin& the period when the beach is still within ran&e of hostile gunfire but before SFCPs have attained observation on enemy artillery, it is very difficult to search out and eliminate trouble­ some enemy poei tions. German artillery has the habit of holding fire when Allied planes are in the vicinity. This accounts for the - fact that pilots tere sometime unable to locate positions reported by the ground forces. The Gennan 200 pound oil rocket is fired from a portable craft-packing box type case, and is difficult to detect. Airspot seems at present the beet means of locating both the gun and rocket positions.

Fighter aircraft flying in pairs :furnished effective airspot. U.S. ships experienced no difficulty with clock spotting as practiced by '8ritish pilots. With the extremely effective fighter cover and the lack of illftwaffe oppos ~ tion the use of VOS planes would have been practicable, !Ut the gain over P51 type airspot would not have jwitified the risk in the event of fighter opposition. SECRET RAVAL GUNFIRll - ASSAULT FORCE 11 0"

---.. Operating Shore Fire Control Parties through the Joint Assault Signal Companies was extremely difficult in the preparation stage, It was often necessary to go through as many as four command echelons to move a shore fire control party from SWANSEA to SLAPTON SANDS, Training and equipping the parties was handicapped in similar diffi­ culties which may not have I'esul ted had the parties been under tfaval control,

Fire Support by indiTidual unite was generally satisfactory, MONTCAIM, GEORGES LEYGUES and GIASGOW in particular rendered quick and accurate support, TEXAS contributed val~ble 14 inch fire, though in some instances cruiser fire might have been used instead, In one case an inexperienced spotter called for, but did not receive, battle­ ship main battery fire on a machine gun nest. It is possible that / the fire support ships in general delivered call fire in too great a volume and too quickly with regard to available amraunition, It is believed that equivalent results would usually have been attained by more deliberate fire, The problem is often a difficult one, as calls for fire are usually urgent and the natural procedure is to deliver the quickest support, The solution apnears to lie in the indoctrination of Shore Fire Control Parties in the proper use of the "deliberate fire" and 11 fire slower11 groups (AEF Assault Sigp.al Code), and, possibly, the introduction of code groups, similar to the "duration of fire" code groups, indicating the rate of fire, ~~~~~~------From: Collllllander Assault Force 11 U11 (UTA.Ii BEACH).

More training should be devoted to the coordination of Air­ spot with firing ships, large coastal batteries wl,ich cannot be reached for several days by advancing troops can only be destroyed by the use of Air spotting. Continuous daily improvement of air spotting during the assault phase emphasized the fact that maximU."!I results could have been attained on D-day if there had been previous training b0 tween the ships and the participating snotting planes prior to the Aseault,

It should be emphasized to Shore Fire Control Par~ies t:!lat the col!llllon voice channel shouln be used only when absolut~ly essential and when other channels of communications fail, The constant use of the co=on voice channel cluttered up that circuit continuously while the channels assigned to individWil SFCPs were co~paratively unused, This created co'lfusion nnd jacr.iin,· of the most important circuit at times when urgent delivery of fire was absolutely necessary,

All avail~ble inform~tion indicates that the Pre-H-Hour serial and nnva.l bombard.;:.ent of tl.e assault beaches, wLile causing no serious damage eith~r to the concrete structures or the guns in the strong­ points behind and <>ajace .• t to t!.ese beE-ches , effectively neutralized the positions by terrifyinr the ener.iy 9ersonnel in thera and b-J preventing then from manning their weapons find firin;; on the troops

2-8 SECRET BAUL GUD'Ill - ASliUL'l' J'OROI 1 ut'

du'l"in& the landings. Before the personnel in theae 1tronao1Dh could recover sufficiently, our troop1 vere able to uae tla~e throwers and machine gun !ire againat them and to ca,pture \he poe1- t1ons vith little opposition. It 11 belieYed that the reportedl.7 lov calibre and morale o! the enelllj' defenders also contributed to the quick capture of these etrongpoints.

Concl1.1.&1ons.

Enemy beach strongpoints like thoee found in the Utah Area are extremely difficult targets for aerial and naval bombardment, because o! their concrete construction, their buried poaition and theil' camouflaged appearance.

Every effort should be made to increaae the accurac7 o! the aerial and naval bombardment o! these strongpoint1.

While every attempt should be made to destroy such tar~et•. it must be assumed that no effective aerious damage will be done to the concrete structures or the installations within the strongpoint, b7' aerial and naval bombardment.

Intensive bombardment, hoveve~ should be continued to the last possible second before the landing of the troop•, so that the ene111.7 defenders will have no opportunity to recover from the effects of shock, concussion, and !ear.

It should be assumed that the etrongpoint can be completely silenced only by the infiltration of landin& troops and their capture of it with the aid of flame throwers, machine guns and light artille?'7 fire.

In connection with the foregoing tactical plan attention is invited to the fact that gunfire support ships were stationed as close inshore as navigation would permit. It is felt that this poliCT contributed materially to the effective reduction of the batteries vhich in many instances could be taken under direct short r~ fire with visual observation.

It was significant however that at least throughout the first week of the operation, no battery could properly be considered as being destroyed unlsss captured. There vere several instance• of positions which were believed on the basis of air and sea observation, to have been destroyed yet fP.UlS from these positions subsequen~ly opened fire. In some of these cases it is almost cert&in that g\UlS were moved and hidden during bombardment, and in others there is evidence that caeemates protected the guns against lethal damage although they were rendered in-operative during the bombardment and for many hours thereafter.

2-9 SECREI' BJ.VAL GUNJ'IBE - .ASSAULT FORCI M{J"

If one firiii conclusion can be drawn on this subject it is that assault forces must be prepared to deliver closely coordinated air and naval bombardment on coastal batteries until sucb time as the A:rrrq is itself able to protect its beachhead and access to it. POINTE DU ROE LANDING

J'rom1 Headquarters 2nd Ranger Infantry Battalion.

------Landed at Pointe du Hoe, J'rnace, ¢7¢5, 35 minutes late due to error of directions by guide craft. Naval fire ceased as planned at H-5. This delay allowed enemy time to recover from bombardment and man positions.

Ropes, being wet, many rockets failed to carry over cliff. Men went up cliff by those ropes which had anchored and by scrambling under heavy MG and sniper fire and a constant rain of grenades. Initial CP established in cave at foot of cliff.

Air and naTal bombardment had destroyed one AA and three 155mm gun emplacements plus one 155mm Gun, other guns having been withdrawn prior to D-Day. Well dug-in MG 1s and snipers opposed advance. More men up cliff forced enemy back. One pillbox w~s assaulted by Company F and Hq PersonnelLnine prisoners taken. Elements from all companies fought through to VlERVILLE-GRAlIDCAMP Road and established defense line. CP displaced to shellhole top of cliff at ¢83¢. Group notified not to land at Pointe du Boe.

J'rom: Commanding Officer USS T1liS. ( llll).

Spotting by the SFCP was satisfactory when used, and communica­ tion vas generally good. Unfortunately the lack of visual communica­ tion with the SFCP with the Rangers at Pointe du Boe, this vessel's primary target, proved costly to tbe Rangers in men and time. Tbe Bangers were 45 minutes late in landing at Pointe du Hoe, an apprecia­ ~le interval, wi.ich gave the enemy time to recover from the bombing and bombardment and put up a fierce resistance with mortars and machine guns brought from their underground network. As a result Pointe du Hoe was not ta.~en and cleared of the enemy until D f 2 instead of H f 30 minutes as planned. Had this vessel, or the inshore 1estroyers, known the plight of the Rangers at H-hour, fire could have been continued, keeping the enemy down until the Rangers could scale the cliff and over-run tr.e area.

From: Commanding Officer USS SATERLEE. (DD)

Col!llllenced maneuverine at ¢5¢¢ to approach fire support station. On station at ¢535 with POINTE DU HOE bearing 185° T., distant 3000 yards and opened fire on designated target at ¢548. Continued pre­ arranged fire until ¢645 except for period from ¢618 to ¢627 during SECRET

which time ve !ired eounter.~tt8l")' fire against small and medi11m­ caliber guns !irillg on us from the vicinit;y of POINTE DU ROJ:. We sustained. no hih fro11 this fire. During the period ¢535 to ¢645 ve maintained station 2600 - 3000 yarde from the beach. Br this time the Second Ranger ::Battalion landing craft were seen app~oaching from the eastward parallel to the beach. Aa these boats neared their landing point on POINTE DU ROJ: enem;y infantry were observed aBBembling on the clitfe overlooking the point, obviousl;y to repel the landing. Ve closed to within 1500 yarde of the beach and opened fire with main battery and heavy machine guns on enem;y infantry on the clif!­ tope. Results were good. During the period ve vere under ineffective tire from enem;y machine guns.

The Ranger• landed at ~7~8 and vere harrassed by hand-grenadee and pistol, rifle and machine-can fire from the cliff-tops above them. We maintained continuous direct fire vi th main battery and aachine guns at various tar«ete of opportunity on the cliff tops. Bm'in& this period in addition to continued ineffective machine g11.n fire, ve vere fired on and received near misses from a gun, believed to be about 88mm, in a pill-box on the cliff. Thie gun was silenced by seYeral 5R salvos.

Direct fire was maintained until communication was established with Shore Fire Control Part;y No. l, Second Ran&er Battalion. Thia communication was establiehed at ¢728, first target was designated. at ~729, and fire vaa opened at ¢731. Communication vas maintained and observed. fire was delivered as called for until l8s;-. ------. When range to targets permitted, 40mm machine guns were fired with 5M salvos, controled by main battery director. Throughout the day, the Shore Fire Control Party vas periodicall;y reminded that USS TJUAS was available for their fire support if desired, and target designations for the TEXAS vere requested. Onl;y on one occaeion was that fire requested. For that firing we rela\red all fire control information between the SFCP and the TEliS.

Our Shore J'ire Control Party came aboard before the exercise. Ve vorked vith them in a later shore bombardment exercise. We had several communiaation drills. They came aboard again in Portland just before D-d.ay. There was a complete and i ntimate understanding between the ship and the Ranger Shore Fire Control Party. As a result, during the close support firing, communications were uniformly excellent. It was as if the Shore Fire Control Party wa s in our C.I.C.

From daylight until the Rangers approached the beach there was no sign of life or activity around POIBTE DU HOE. It looked as if the bombardment had knocked them out completel;y. There were no visible targeta. Fire was reduced to conserve &111111unition because we did not know for how long the weather would delay the landing. This was a mistake, We should have continued neutralization fire at the scheduled

2-11 SECRET NAVAL GUNFIRE - DESTROYERS

rate against the face of the cliff and we should have called on the TEXAS, who was RVailable, to support us in this mission, As the Rangers hit the beach, the GeI'1!1ans came out of their holes and opened up with their machine guns, From then on we were firing on the Ger­ mans directly and on the points where r.iach1ne-gun fire could be detected, We should never lu.ve eased up enough to allow the enemy time enough to get out of their hiding places, This mistake can be attributed to two causes: lack of experience of the ColllJllB.nding Officer in actual shore bombardment anrl over-confidence in the effectiveness of the air bombardment.

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHOULD CONFORM TO THE MOV»IE1~T OF THE LAlJDI N'G roATS RATHER THAN ADHERE TO A PREDETERM UTED TIME SCHEDULE, IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS OPERATIONS THE AIR CO-OR­ DINATOR DROPPED PARACHUTE FLARES WHEN LA!IDING CRAFT HAD REAClV!D A PREDETERMINED DISTANCE FROM THE .BEACH AS A SIGNAL .FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE TO LIFT. SEE PAGE 3-5 OF "AMPHIBIOUS OPER­ ATIONS - COM INCH P-001 11 FOR ADDITIONAL COMMENT ON THE NECESS­ ITY FOR HAVING GUNFIRE SUPPORT CONFORM TO MOVEMENTS OF LANDING .BOATS,

From: USS NEVADA - ( .B.B UTAH BEACH).

It was astounding, and certainly more than could be hoped for, to have been able to make the approach and anchor all Fire Support Units and Transports in their respective areas within five miles of the enemy beaches completely unopposed, To find :Barfle\U' Light burning brightly with proper characteristics was remarkable, Al.though detail counter measures had been planned, it was anticipated that the approach might have to be made without the use of radar for navigational purposes, The full use of radar and the excellent ranges provided by Saint Marcouf Island was invaluable.

It will be noted that Auault Force "Un and Naval Escorts received no fire from enemy shore installations until after H-hour, Thie is probably due to excellent intelligence information, careful planning and execution of prearranged counter-battery fire from Fire Support Units, and pre-occupation caused by intensive air bombardment,

There was considerable difficulty experienced by Fire Support Ships in obtaining position of own front lines after the initial landing, It is considered that fUture operations should emphasize the necessity that specific plan• be laid to ins\U'e full liaison between Army and Navy in this matter, It is suggested that hourl,y reports of front line positions be required from forces ashore to a central command, and that compoeit situation reports be frequentl,y promulgated to all firing unite, SSCRET N~TAL GUNJ'l.RE - :BATTLESHIPS

From: USS ARKANSAS -(:BB) •

SFCPs were of little value to this ship. They were not suffi­ ciently familiar with the situation ashore to keep the ship informed of the position of own troope or to !ind suitable targeta. Had we waited on S~CPs to designate targets this ship would haTe done little or no firin&.

Because of the veakness of the SFCP organization, Naval Gunfire Support was not put to full use.

Air observers were excellent. Practically all targets fired upon were located by air observers, but they were handicapped by not knowing the location of our own troops, and not being able to identify troops sighted. It is iraperative that our troops have some means of identifying themselves to the plane.

Using fighter planes for air observers is an excellent practice, the only drawback being the short period they are able to remain over the target. In several instances the relief plane arrived in the middle of a shoot and was unable to locate the target.

After the initial firin& the 511 /51 caliber battery was of no further use because there is no means of controlling it for indirect fire. The 5"/51 caliber gun is too good a gun to be sitting idle.

It is recommended that some means of obtaining and reporting ,,.__. the position of our own troops would greatly increase the efficiency of Naval Support Fire. It was necessary time and again to reqiire the spotting plane to go low over concentrations of tanks, guns and personnel in an effort to distill&'lish between friend and foe. Such efforts took time and, in case of enemy troops, took the pilots into dangerous fire.

From: Deputy Collll:IB.nder Destroyer Fire Support Group. Force 11 0", ( Collllll8nder Destroyer Division 36).

At H minus 40 minutes (0550 B) or shortly thereafter all des­ troyers opened fire on their assigned targets. Coastal artillery 1.mmedintely answered the fire and from then on until late the next day all destroyers were under intermittent !ire by enemy coastal defenses, mortars and heavy machine guns, During the period of acheduled fire from H minus 40 minutes to H hour it was necessary for the destroyers to occasionally shift fire from their assigned target to some enemy gun that was shooting at them. In most of these instances a few salvos were sufficient to temporarily silence these enemy guns and fire W8.8 then immediately shifted be.ck to scheduled targets, The fire of all destroyers during thia period was fast and accurate. There were no material or personnel casualties during this

2-13 SECRE'T

phaae of the Support Fire although many enemy ahella !ell close aboard the destroyers. As the first wave closed the beach the Fire Support destroyers preceded them closing the beach to !rom one thousand ( 1000) to tvo thousand (2000) yarde. At ~617 (H minua 13 minutee) LCT(R)s commenc9d firing rocket• drenehin& the area juet inland from the beaches. Fire from thia beach was temporarily eilen.ced and the entire area covered with heavy emoke and duat. 'l'roopa landed and proceeded up the beach into the smoke.

J'rom the landing of the troops until the establishment of Shore Fire Control Parties the Fire Support Destroyers !ired on targets of opportunity. It is considered that the support of deetroyers during this phase was not utilized to over twenty (20) percent o! their possibilities. There was no co1D111unication with the beach ~ and on numer ous occasions destroyers could not fire on targets~ which should have been fired on because they did not knov the loca- ~ tion of our own troops. Thie is a most crucial period in the assault--­ and some method of co1D111unication between troops and fire Support Shipa must be devised. The Destroyers acquitted themselves vell indeed whenever a target presented itself. Numerous gwie firing on the beaches were detected by their flashes and were destroyed by the J'ire Support Shipe. The destroyers closed to lees than a thousand (1000) yards from the beach, the fire of each ship being directed by the Commanding Officer.

During the remainder of the day Fire Support Destroyers fired at targets as dir ected by Shore Fire Control Parties, Commander Destroyer Squadron EIGHTEEN, Commander Task Group 124.9, and by their own commandint; officers. (For individual ship targete and B.lll!lluni tion expenditure on each tar get see Reports of Action by Shipe). At 175¢ SATTERLEE had fired over seventy (70) percent o! her bombardment ammunition. Directed THOMPSON to relieve her in support of Rangers and shifted m;y pennant and eta!! to HARDING, SATTERLEE departed Fire Support Area to report to Area Screen Com­ mander, At 18¢¢ BARTON (Commander Destroyers Squadron SIXTY) and O' BRIEN reported to Fire Support Area and were assigned station& and Shore Fire Control Parties. At 2¢'/>¢ directed CARMICK to report to Area Screen Commander she having expended over seventy (70) per- cent of her bombardment ammunition. Omaha beaches were under •poradie but heavy shelling during moat of the afternoon and evening of D day. Thie fire came from sources Fire Support Shipe had great cli!fieulty in locating. However it was evidently controlled by observers watch- ing the beaches, There were numerous houses behind the beaehea and on adjacent hills and cliffs overlooking the beaches which had not been thoroughly shelled even at this late date. I believe that this vaa ~ a costly error on our part and for future landing operations I atrongly advocate the demoliehment of all structures, houses, churches, etc,, that could possibly house light artillery, machine.gune, mortars and/ or observation and communication posts prior to and i1111Dediately after

2-14 SSCRET NAVAL GONJ'lll - DESTROYERS the landing of troops, This could have readily been done by the destroyers but by the time we realized this our troops were advancing and we were unable to obtain permission to shell any but a few of the most obvious, It was tnost galling a.nd depressing to lie idly a few hundred yards off the beaches and watch our troops, tanks, landing boats, and motor vehicles being heavily shelled and not be able to fire a shot to help them just because we had no information as to__.­ what to shoot at and were unable to detect the source of the enemy fire, Advancing troops must have some visual means to call for immediate fire support from close Fire Support Ships, A mortar shell with a distinctively colored smoke would have been most effective and would have insured immediate destruction of a target""-' so designated,

Recommendations.

That pre-landine bombardment by Naval Forces be for a longer period than from H minus 40 minutes to H hour, In this connection it is most necessary that a ship continue its bombardment until a __ very short time before the troops actually touch down, i.e. (TEXAS bombardment of Pointe du Hoe ceased forty-five (45) minutes before-­ delayed Rangers landed).----

That there be established on the beach or on a control ship an agency which is kept constantly informed of vicinity of front lines and which can pass this information to Fire Support Shipe vho require it, Time after time in this operation destroyers were unable to shoot at excellent targets of opportunity because they could obtain no information as to the location of our own forces in the area in question, Thie, I believe, was the greatest difficulty with which the Fire Support destroyers had to contend,

That previous to the touchdown and before the troops have advanced too far inland every structure, Bouse and Church adjacent to the beaches or overlooking the beaches that could house any artillery, machine guns, mortars, and/or communication and observa­ tion posts be demolished. One destroyer in each Fire Support Area should be assigned this mission during the pre-landing Naval bomb­ ardment and all Fire Support Ships should assist while waiting for targets of opportunity.

Froil: Commander Task Group 125,7 (Gunfire Support Group Force "U",

On the Normandy beac!'l.es reports indicate that almost all structures regardless of the innocence of their appearance were actual or poten~ial stroneJ>oints containing light and heavy automatic veapone. Many of them were small and could only be obsdrved when shallow draft craft had closed the beach, On the Utah beach each of

2-15 SECRE'T HA.VAL GUNFIRE - DESTROYERS

these had been designated ------as a target of opportunity !or support craft. This tends to create the desired flexibility of gunfire aupport which insures against certain machine gun neats which are neutralized only upon capture. On this beach the army commander agreed to the continuation of such fire until a visual sign.al to desist. This ma;r have contributed to the rapid progress of the assault" troops.

From: USS OOYLE (DD).

The crowded conditions also prevented the ship from reaching the moat favorable position for firing at its assigned targets and exposed it to the fire of shore batteries which were not of immediate inter­ est. The expenditure of 350 rounds of ammunition in one hour is far below the capabilities of this type vessel, and it is felt that under aimilar circumstances, fewer ships firing the same total amount of 81111Dunition at the same total targets could do the job more effectively, The extra ships might well be briefed on the same targets and stand-by in close support, but clear of the bombarding area, to replace casual­ tiea and to engage batteries threatening the bombarding ships.

On receiving word of difficulties in landing at Easy Red beach, this vessel moved into the boat lanes to a position directly in front of the beach and less than a thousand yards offshore, The visible troops already on the beach were dug in behind a hummock of sand along the beach and the boats of the second wave were milling around off­ shore constantly threatening collision with the ship, Under these circumstances the enemy very naturally ceased firing and it was impossi­ ble to spot the guns that were causing the trouble. Neither could we be sure just how far the troops had advanced. We followed what seened to us the only reasonable course of action, in pick~ng out spots that seemed to be machine gun emplacement or likely positions, ascertaining as best we could that own troops were clear, and then firing at the spots selected. That this was effective, was demonstrated by the fact that after about an hour the troops advanced to the top of the ridge and the boats resumed landing, but it is felt that time and ammunition would have both been saved, had the ship had better information. Four methods of doing this are suggested. From the ship's point of view the last seems the most desirable but there is no reason why all should not be employed,

(a) Aasign to each ship an experienced infantry officer who by his knowledg~ of troop tactics, terrain, and appearances could advise the ship as to the best selection of targets,

(b) Provide some personnel in the first wave with a small port­ able signal lamp.

(c) Provide each ship with a small radio with a frequency for each beach to be covered. Send several of these sets into each

2-16 SSCRET NAVAL GUNFIRE - DESTROYERS

beacn with the first wave, to be operated from the beach itself. Several in order that at least one may be operable. Let the senior officer, or any officer on the beach, direct the ship to the targets that are giving him trouble.

Provide these same sets in the early waves of landine craft LCM and larger. Ma~· of these were hopelessly stranded but could have given us good information as to the needs of the beach for fire. An elaborate system of call siens is not needed, bow numerals are perfectly clear and sufficient for the purpose.

(d) Make greater use of colored smokes, especially those fired from rifle grenades. A smoke of a certain color fired at the mouth of a machine gun pit or into a clwnp of bushes might well mean to the Destroyer, 11 shoot this ~, he 1s bothering me". While another color behind a hedge or in a gully might nean, 11 Lay off, I em either here or intend to be soon."

Previous consultation and association with the Shore Fire Control Party, and battalion commander of the battalion to which this ship was assigned for fire support, was of inesti­ mable value. It was unfortunate that the forward observer should have been separated from the battalion for over twenty­ four hours after landing as this greatly affected our oppor- tunities for supporting fire. ------

The strong currents running in the assault area caused an unavoid­ able difficulty. However this was further complicated by having a large number of ships (5 destroyers) maneuvering in a very restricted area and at the same time trying to deliver effective neutralizing fire. Well over fift)" percent of the commanding officer's attention and effort was necessarily devoted to the triple problem of position, avoiding collision, and keeping the guns within their limits of train. All of these were difficult because of the crowded conditions, low speeds that had to be used, wind and current.

.From: USS D.fMONS. (DD) •

Shore Fire Control Party i/9 assigned to us was scheduled to land at H f 30 minutes but evidently did not make it, as no communications were established all day until 193¢. At that time a test transmission on C'fl auxiliary frequency was heard and acknowledged and JIMMONS was told to "Standby-wait". No further word was ever received either on CW or on the two :no! voice frequencies provided, although we made frequent calla !or two more days. It le not known what happened to this party, and their failure to make contact was most disappointing. Ae a result we had no knowledge of locations of our own forces, and SECRE'T NAVAL GUNFIRE - DESTROYERS

we fired on targets of opportunity only with reluctance and after considerable delay attempting to confirm their enemy character. Commander Task Group ONE TWENTY-J'OUR point NINE was of great aasis­ tance in designating targets over TBS.

A destroyer of this type could handle at least two SFCP's. It was the general experience that a large proportion of the time the SFCP could not observe or was moving up with the troops, and another party located elsewhere in the vicinity in position to observe could have used the ship's gunfire support. Targets of opportunity are unsatisfactory at best, particularly if the locations of friendly forces are unknown. A large proportion of the time the ships were idle and their services could have been used if 2 or more SFCPs per ship had been assigned. Spare parties could have been assigned to ships such as the !Ml-IONS whose regular party was either killed or captured.

From: USS HERNI>ON, (DD).

At approximately 131¢ the Shore Fire Control Party called for a large left spot. MPI was then adjusted 'y several small spots and rapid fire commenced at an initial rate of 12 round per minute. The Shore Fire Control Party kept requesting an increasing rate of fire until finally we were firing four gun salvos at five second intervals. Spots were applied as called for without checking fire. After the initial spot all deflection spots were to the right at the rate of a 100 yard right spot about every minute as the Army advanced normal to our line of fire. Five second salvos were maintained until 8.Dll!IUnition supply failed. Lower hoists will not supply ammunition at that rate, Fire was slowed to ten and fifteen second salvos, At this time it was explained to the Shore Fire Control Party that rate of fire was very high and alllJUunition was being used up. They replied that results were excellent, that the enemy was on the run, and requested that high rate of fire be continued.

Froc: USS FRANKFORD , (DD).

Conclusions and Recom!Dendations. In spite of the difficulty of the lack of a shore fire control it is felt that the fire delivered on targets of o?portWlity was effective and of material aid to the troops on the beach. Some of the targets selected may have been already immobilized but every effort vas made by this vessel to fire on targets that more definitely seem to hold up the advance of our troops from the beaches. Several attempts were mA.de to communicate visually with units on the beach to determine where we could fire to aid them but none of these visual messages furnished us with enough inforuation to open fire on dangerous nearby targets. It is recom­ mended that men in the first wave, particularly signal corps personnel, be advised of the capabilities of the destroyer fire control systems

2-18 SECRET

and be instructed how to designate close-up targets that are within range of the 5 inch guns. If th11 were accomplished destroyer1 could be of more aid to men on the beaches even though 1hore fire control parties were knocked out or pinned dovn.

From: Collllllander Task Group 126. 7 (Gunfire Support Group 11 Force •u .)

Intelligence was sustained over a long period and can be assumed to have reached as great a degree of aceurraoy as oan be expected. Yet in many instances it was not accurate as to the location of .,in• of small caliber and machine weapons. To meet this contingency flex­ ibility in the assignment of targets muat be exercised, and the use of sound discretion in picking and firing on targets of opportunity should be encouraged by the commanders of bombarding ui ti.

Reports indicate: that where assault troop commanders are willing to accept a risk of some danger to their personnel, in order to have sustained fire not only during the approach to the beach, but as the7 progress inland that, actually, casualties are substantially lover.

From: Naval Commander Western Task Force (Commander Task Foree 122).

In any case, it still seems that our forces are too cautious in the e~ployment of shell fire to support the infantry. There were cases where naval fire was withheld by Arm7 request and in retrospect it is felt trut the general attitude was over-cautious. No opportun­ ity should be lost of impressing upon responsible Army officers the dependability and accuracy of naval fire. There were in1tanoee in this particular of reports from the beach that our own ships were shelling our own troops on the beach. All of these reports were completely inaccurate, and they had the very unfortunate effect of limiting subaequent fire by captains who no longer trusted their own excellent judgment.

From: Commander Gunfire Support Craft, Eleventh .Amphibious Force, (Commanded Gunfire Support Craft of Western Naval Task Force).

At exactly H-40, the naval bombardment commenced as scheduled. Gun craft moved inshore to take up their positions for pre-arranged fire. Destroyers were moving in. At i-35 my operations officer remarked •1n five minutes, the beach drenching from the air le scheduled to start and continue until H-hour. Where are the airplane£l"

Several squadrons of fighters roared overhead but no bombers. We waited. That aerial beach drenching was to be sorely needed • .But it never came. Not one bomb was seen to drop on OMAHA beaches SECRE'T JU.V .AL aun'Ill - SUPPORT CR.U'T

by an:r obaerTer on the bridge of 'fIJ4i' headquarters ship. I have sub­ sequently learned that ve did not see the bombs because none were dropped on that beach.

At about H-25, one shore gun opened fire with one shot. The eplaeh landed about 300 yards off my starboard bow. It appeared to come from a point below and to the eastward of POINT D1 HOE: No other ahot vas fired, in11ofar as I could observe, from any shore battery until the conclusion of the bombardment.

The planned disposition of gunfire Support Craft was as follows:

(a) LOG(L) were to take up positions on the flanks of the LOT(A) wave and accompany the LOT(A) in as close to the beach as navi­ gational conditions would permit. NOS. 687 and 811 were on the left flank, NOS. 449, 426, and 424 were in their correct posi­ tion.

The Western Naval Task Force was divided into two assault forces. Allocation of Gun.fire Support Craft to each force was as follows:

roRCE 11 0 11 roROE "U11

9 LOT(R) 5 LOT(R) 7 LOF 4 LCF 5 LOG( L) 4 LOG{ L) 18 LOT(A)-LOT(HE) 8 LOT(A)-LCT(HE) 32 LCP(L) 16 LOP( L)

Gunfire Support Craft as used in this operation were an innova.­ tion in the United States Navy. Although various types of smaller craft had been used for close support of landings, t his operation was the first in which the U.S. Navy used the British type of shallow water major landing craft converted to gunfire support. ------NOS. 811 and 426 were a little late but arrived in time to open fire as scheduled. No. 449 went to UTAH by mistake and did not arrive off OMAHA in time to fire his pre-H hour schedule. These craft were scheduled to deliver neutralizing fire on specifically assigned targets from H-20 minutes to times vary­ ing from H hour to H-4 minutes. Targets were pill boxes and houses.

Rocket craft (LOT(R)) were to take po sition in close formation line abreast, about 2700 yards astern of the LOT(A) leading wave. They were to proceed in and deliver rocket fire when the leading wave was about 300 yards off shore. Rocket fire could not be simultaneously delivered by all craft as the MPI of the targets a ssigned t o each craft varied several hundred yards. It was necessary, therefore, for some craft to go in closer than others and to fire later.

2-20 SECRET

LC'l'(.A) were to co111J1ence !iring vi th embarked tank• at about B-16 or when the range o! their targeta waa approximately 3000 yard1. Tanka were to !ire as the era!t proceeded in. LCT(A) were to beach, retract, and return to the tranaport area after which they were to become a part o! the Ferry Service.

LC1 were initially dispo1ed about the transport area. At first light they were to come in on each !lank and ta.Ice up poli tione from close inshore to just iraide the line of departure !or AA protection to beache1 and boat lanes. If opportunity presented iteel!, they could ~e machine gun neats and pill boxes on the beach.

1rom1 B&val Commander Western Taek Force (Commande.r Taak J'orce 122).

There ia still however, a dead space between the pre-H-Hour bombardment and the time when liaiaon with the ground forces ashore it ~ficiently effective to permit observed fire upon enemy target• with due regard for Olll' ovn troops. Shore Fire Control Parties, when they are pinned to the beachline or have become casualties, can­ not aesist destroyers offshore in the first !ew hectic hours; and, when the enemy ia well concealed and the position of our troops is not clear to him, a naval officer offshore is in no position to order heavy fire. It has been suggested that Axm.y officers familiar with the tactical plan and qualified to observe and interpret troop movements on the beachline, should be attached to destroyers and other ships which are in immediate support. Subject to the viewe ot the Anq, thi1 Command concurs in that suggestion.

J'rom: Commander Gunfire Support Craft Eleventh Amphibious :roroe.

At about H plus 6 hours on D day, we proceeded close inshore all along the 01'..AHA beach. We were under fire the whole wey. Troops were unable to advance. I reported this to the Taak Force Commander and requested permission to lay down rocket barrage. The request vas refUsed becauae of the possibility of killing our own troops. I then proceeded to the force flagship to report in person to the Task Force Commander. Major-Generals HEUJ3NER and GEROW were aboard. After reviewing the conditions observed, it was again decided not to uae the rocke~a for fear of endangering ovn troops vho may have filtered through •

.AT OMAHA .BEACH, !BOUGH SHA.LI.OW DRAF!' LANDING CRAF1' WERE AVAIL­ ABLE TO RENDER CWSE SUPPORT DURING THE CRITICAL TIME BETWEEN '!'HI LIFTING OF liVAL GUNFIRE AND UNTIL THE TROOPS MOVED INLAND J'il ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE :EMPWYMENT OF ACCOMPANYING ARTILLERY 1 THEm FOLL :s:J'FECT COULD NOT BE OBTAINED BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY

2-21 SECRE'l. NAVAL GUNFIRE - SUPPORT CRAFT

OF THE LOCATION OF THE TROOPS AS HORE: IN OTHER WORDS DUE TO / LACK OF OBSERVATION AND COMMUNICATIOiIS. DURING THIS PHASE THE FIRE EFFECT OF DESTROYERS WAS AS REPORTED BY COMMANDER DESTROYER DIVISION 36 - "NOT UTILIZED TO OVER TWENTY (20) PERCENT OF THEIR -­ POSSIBILITIES • 11 AN OBSERVER IN THE AIR OVER THE ASSAULT AREA BY CLARIFYING THE MATTER OF LOCATION OF FRO'.iT LH:ES MIGHT HAVE ENAllLED MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF AVAILABLE CLOSE SUPPORT FIRE FROM SEAWARD, THERE HAS .BEE!\ A HEED IN ALL OPPOSED LANDINGS FOR A CONTINUATION OF SUPPORTING FIRES TO BRIDGE THE GAP .BETWEEN THE LIFTIUG OF NAVAL GUNFIRE AND THE TU!E THAT ARTILLERY CAN BE DF.­ PLOYED AND PLACED INTO ACTION ASHORE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBL»! IS UlffiER STUDY BY 'PRE WAR AND NAVY DEPAR™EIJTS. THE EXPERIEUCE AT OMARA BEACH D.E2·10NSTRATES THAT ITS SOLUTION EXTENDS FAR .BEYOND THE PROVISION OF ACCURATELY co::TROLLED FIRE FROM CRAFT STATIONED CLOSE INSHORE AND MUST INCLUDE POSITIVE MEANS FOR ESTABLISHING THE LOCATION AND COM­ MUNICATI!1G THE POSITION OF TROOPS THAT HAVE LANDED OR, AS IN THE SITUATION AT Ol.\AHA BEACH, THE FIRE SUPPORT AVAILABLE CANNOT .BE FULLY UTILIZED,

Upon return to the beach area, I observed LCH 86 and LCH 87, headquarters ships of Captains WRIGHT and IMLAY, close inshore, Both were being fired on by enemy batteries which could not be seen, We proceeded inshore to try to locate the batteries and were al.most immediately engaged,

Gun ships, except NO. 449 1 were generally in proper position and engaged pre-arranged targets on schedule, NO. 449 got lost and wound up on UTAH, He expended no main battery ammunition. NO. 424 vae assigned a target of opportunity over Dog Red by Commander Gun­ fire Support Craft at about H plus 5 hours, At about H plus 6 hours, Commander Gunfire Support Craft directed LCG( L) 687 to engage enemy machine gun emplacements holding the exit to Dog Green Beach, 687 fired 20 rounds of SAP and 20 rounds of HE, He appeared to have neutralized the area, On D plus l at about 1215, I received a mes­ sage from LCG(L) 687 requesting permission to fire on PORT EN BESSIN on advice of DD 472, Permission granted, LCG(L) 687 and 426 pro­ ceeded to PORT EN l!ZSSIN and, through a gap in the sea wall, observed a German vessel in the harbor, NO. 687 expended 30 rounds of SAP and 6 rounds of HE plus 20mm fire at a range of between 700 and 1000 yards, NO, 426 expended 48 rounds of SAP and 7 round of HE plus about 1100 rounds of 20mm. I was later infonned that two German vessels had been destroyed and about 125 Germane killed, Very few targets of opportunity could be located after D day. I attempted to contact shore fire control parties without success, I requested and received from the Taek Force Commander a gunfire liaison officer but he wae unable to establish communications ashore, At about 1130 on D day I contacted Admiral l!RYANT, commanding the combatant Fire Support Group and requested information ae to any targets he might HA.VAL GUNFIRE - SUl'PORT CR.A.FT

asaign me •. He suggested that I contact Captain Sanders in Command of DDa, Thie was done but Captain Sanders bad no targets to offer. Thereafter there was little !or the gun craft to do.

The en4!1111Y apparently did not want to giTe avay their gun posi­ tions during the pre-H-hour bombardment ae evidenced by our observa­ tion of only one splash from shore batteriew during this phase. It was peculiar because the fire seemed to be coming from behind the hill, Apparently, the enemy had observers either on the crest of the hill or along the slit trenches. They wasted little or no 8llllllunition on ships out of range. Whenever we were within 2000 yards of the beach we were fired on, But outside of two or three thouee.nd yards from the beach, we were rarely bothered.

Enemy fire slackened considerably about noon of D plus l and by the afternoon of D plus 1 vas only intermittent, Sniping con­ tinued until D plus 4.

Bocket craft took up their assigned positions, eome late. There fire, however, was generally accurate and, it is believed effective, They were ordered to return to the U,K, on D plus 1,

Flak craft had little or nothing to do. They engaged a few airplanes during night attacks and some pill boxes. LCF NO. 31 in Force UNCLE was mined with heavy lose of personnel. Several bodies were picked up off OMAHA beaches. LCF NO, 5 was mined during the 19-23 June storm. He was mined off OMAHA beach. There were no personnel losses.

LCP(L) attached to :B'orce OBOE were not used as smokers. They were finally used by the Ferry Control Officer as despatch boats. Most of them had, by D plus 3, been severely beaten by the weather and only a few were operational,

Gun ships have a definite value for close inshore work but ---­ their fire control system is too crude, It should be improved to permit indirect fire of reasonable accuracy, In this operation, it______, was decided not to link the gun ships with a shore observation party. This was a mistake as selecting targets of opportunity was difficult and even when found, could not be fired on in some cases because of ~ lack of information as to location of own troo~e. Under the existing orders, no target could be engaged if ovn troops were within 1000 yards of that target. Having no contact with the shore fire control party, it was impossible to get this information. The information was requested several times over the BJW (.Bombardment Calling Wave) but was not answered,

Rocket craft are the most useful and important of the close gunfire support craft, Properly trained and used, they can be of -

3-23 SECREI'

great aeaiatance. It is recommended that additional high speed, shallov draft, abort range rocket craft be dSYeloped.

One maber of the demo+ition unit informed me that th• vere Geraana caretul. to use no tracers in their machine gun bullet• b7 d.aT. As a rel'lll.t, it vaa difficult to locate their poaition•. The function of landin& craft converted to clo•e gunfire aup­ port era.ft vaa not, in m:y opinion, cryatallized by thia operation. I believe, and 8111 fairly vell convinced, that the flak craft vorth are bardl;r the time, trouble, and money to coxrrert them. It ia reco11111ended that none of this type be constructed and that none be uaed in areaa vhere our air superiority is aa dominant aa it vas off this In the beach. SICILY attack, flak ship• attached to ., command vere helptul.. :But in that action, ve vere su~jected to almost continU.-... enemy d.e,rlight air attacks for the first several day• and the J..l installations on large craft, such as LSTs, 11&s not nearly as extensive aa it i• nov. In this operation, daylight air attack vaa practically ent. non-exi•t•

From: Commander Asaault Force •o•. (Commander Eleventh -'mphibioua force).

Gunfire Support Craft actually uaed in this operation included LCT( R), LCF, LCG{ L), LCT(A), LCT( BE) and LCS( S). In general, because of late delivery, and distance from delivery point to training their state areas, of training vaa poor. In summary form the vievs of this co111D1and vith reference to the train1nt;, operations and effectiveness of the various types of gunfire support craft are aa follova:

LCT(R). Very effective against personnel in open or in trenchea. Requires high degree of training. Additional investigation made should be of the ability of a full salvo of barrage rockets to clear mines and vire. beach TBE SUGGESTED INVESTIGATION IS AT PRESENT BEING CONDUC'rn BY THE JOINT ARMY-NAVY EXPERIMENTAL AND TESTING !()ARD, J'ORT PIERC3, no~, AND IS FULLY DESCRIBED llJ THE I()ARD 1S MONTHLY REPORTS. PRO~S THE 7.2" ROCKET LAUNCHER MK 24 (llPERI!aNTAL), ..6.LSO KNOWN AS THE "WOOFUS", HAS BEEN DEVEU>PED TO CLEAR .BEACH AND MIDS WIRE. IT IS A UNIT CONSISTING OF ONE JIUNDllD .A.ND TWXN'l'T SINGLJ:-RAIL LAUNCHERS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN AN L<>I. DIGBS IT APPROXIMATELY 12,500 POUNDS I.ND CAN BE INSTALLID Ill OR llJMOV'ED J'BOM A SPECIALLY FITTED L<>I IN A SINGLE LIFT IN ..6.I()UT 30 MINUTES. THIS LAUNCHD IS AVAILABLE IN UT FOBM, THE IIT CONT.lINING THE MATERIALS NECJ:SS.ARY J'OR MINOR MODIJ'ICATIONS THE TO LCM, SUCH AS A JUNCTION BOX, STEEL PLATES TO INCREASE THE HEIGHT OF AN GIVE ADDITIONAL PROTECTION TO THI!: PILOT HOUSE, GUIDES .A.ND J'OR THE INSIDE OF THE BULWARKS OF THE L(J( TO HOLD 'l'HI

2-24 SECRE'T BJ.VAL GUNFIRE - SUPPORT CRil'T

LWNCRER. AJ'I'ER THE LAUNCHER HAS SERVED ITS PUHPOSE AND Bl!EN BD!OVED FROM THE LCJ.!, THE LATTER CAN l!E EMPLOYED IN THE NORMAL FASHION. TESTS AT FORT PIERCE INDICATE THAT THE "WOOFUS" IS VXRY EFFECTIVE AGAINST BEACH MINES AND WIRE AT .RANGES FROM .A.B'.>UT 220 TO 290 YARDS.

LCF. In this Operation of little use due to ineffective en~ air opposition. AA battery not particularly strong. Should be of value near beaches in early stages of an attack to repel fighter bomber and strafing attacks. With increased use of LSMs and LSTs on beach in early stages, need for LCFs decreases.

LCG( L). Partially effective. Fire control system should be improved. Beed exists for shallow draft gunboats for close support in early stages of landing. Communication facilities should be improved.

LCT(A) - LCT(HE). This is purely a makeshift arrangement, The use of LCT(5) or LCT(6) for this purpose is unsound for a number of reasons. Among them are slow speed, large and vulnerable target offered, poor sea keeping ability, etc. If attack landing plan commits Navy to their use, tanks should be placed on platforms and fire directed over r8l!lps.

LCS(S). Partially effective. At least half did not use rockets successfully firing them from too great a range.

Recol!IDendations.

That accuracy rather than speed in call fire should be stressed in the traini?l8 of ships and Shore Fire Control Parties.

That all fire support ships be included in rehearsals, Where possible, fire support ships should be staged in the same general area as the remainder of the Amphibious Force,

That designated forward observers patrol close to the beaches in LCSs or similar craft ae long as opposition on the beaches ie enco'1ntered in order to designate direct fire targets or spot where haze and smoke obscures the vision of the firing ships.

That the amount of airspot afforded be increased, particularly during the critical period while beaches remain under fire. Each cruiser and larger craft should have individual airspot in this phase. Destroyers should also be provided with colll!llunication with air spotting planes and should be utilized when the spotters locate targets within their capabilities.

2-25 SECRET Ji.A.VAL GUNFIRE - SUPPORT CRil'T

That Shore Fire Control code procedure be revieed eo that all deflection spot• of lees than one hundred yards vill be indicated by the vorda "right" or " left• ae applicable.

That the probable strength of the enemy defenee be carefully estimated in the formulation of the attack landing plan, and that where a etrong defense, including beach obstacles and observed mortar and artillery fire on the beaches ia expected, infantry eupported by the heavieet possible Naval gunfire and air bombardment be employed to seize the initial beachhead and armor including tanks, SP Artillery, etc., no t be landed until the beaches are cleared.

That no fU.rther consideration be given to the use of mortars firing from LCVPs or of l051111D Howitzers firing from LCTe to supple­ ment Naval gunfire support.

That before deciding whether to land tanks in the first vave, and to have them fire from LCT(A)e during the approach, the loas in carrying capacity of LCTs fitted aa LCT(A)s and the poasible loss of t he tank• themeelvea from ene11l7 !ire be carefully weighed against the slight gain to be derived from having the tanks fire only for the last fifteen minutes of the approach.

That use of LCT(R)s be continued. Detailed investigation should be made of the effect of a full salvo of 511 rockets on beach mine­ fields.

That shallow draft gunboats with quick firing guns and adequate fire control facilities be used. The LCI Gunboats in use in the Pacific appear to have served a very useful purpose. Possibly more useful would be a landing craft similar to the British LCG{L), but armed with tvo to four - four or five inch guns, a modern director, communications facilities including at least three AM and one :Bl~ receiver transmitters, anti-aircraft protection !or itself, the aea­ keeping qualities of at least an tCI, and ability to bead:! without damage.

Summary of Ammunition Expended by Caliber of Gun. The follow­ ing tables give the number of rounds and weight of projectiles expended during the aesault: (OMAHA BEACH).

Caliber ~ Will 14" 690 910,750 12" 819 889. 650 8" 15 3,900 6" 3,159 331,698 (includes esti­ mated figures for ENTERPRISE)

2-26 SSCRET NAVAL GWFIRE - SUPPORT CRAFT

Caliber ~ ~ 5",25 166 13,280 5" 10,576 613,408 11 4 • 7 524 25,676 4" 1,800 55,800-Estimated 3" 224 6,720 (This does not -----""nclude all PC fire)

~ 2,850,879 = 1,295,8 Tona LCT(R)s 173,336 = 79.0 Tona GRAND TOTAL 1,374,8 Tons

SINCE THE .BEGINNING OF THE WAR THERE HAS BEEN A RECURRING NE.ED J'OR A YARDS'FICK TO MEASURE THE .AMOUNT OF NAVAL GUNFIBE HEQ.UIRED TO NEUTRALIZE THE OPPOSING BEACH DEFENSES IN A LANDIUG ASSll'LT, AT TARAWA NOT ENOUGH NAVAL GUNFIRE WAS USED, XWAJALEIN ISLA.ND, WHlRE CASUALTIES AMONG TROOPS OF THE INITIAL ASSAULT WAVES WDE IJJW, WAS AN EXAMPLE OF AN EFFECTIVE Q.UANTITY OF NAVAL GUNFIBE AND ARTILLERY DELIVERED AGAINST DEFENSES ENCOUNTERED,

AT OMARA .BU.CH APPROXIMATELY 98,000 TROOPS LANDED AGAINST WELL PREP.AUD DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND MOVED IN DURING THE 1IBST FIVJ: DAYS WITH THE SUPPORT OF 1,375 TONS OF AMMUNITION FIR.ED BY NAVAL GUNS RANGING IN SIZE FROM 14" '1'0 3 11 ,

AT KWAJALEIN ISLAND, APPROXIMATELY 22,00v TROOPS LANDED AGAINST CONSIDERABLY WEAKER BEACH DEFENSES SUPPORTED BY 3,964 TONS OF .u!MUNITIOJ .JIJW> .BY NAVAL GUNS RANGING FROM 1611 TO 5" PLUS SOME 1,449 TONS 01 ARTILLERY FIRE,

THE RATIO BETWEEN OMAHA AND XWAJALEIH OF TEOOPS LA.NDED WAS APPROXIMATlDLY 4 TO l; OF DEFENSIVE STRENGTH OF POSITIONS ASSAULTED ROUGHLY 3 TO l; AND OF NAVAL GUNFIBE SUPPORT 1 TO 3,

USING KWAJALEIN AS A BASIS FOR A ROUGH COMPARISON, AND DIS­ REGARDING OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, THE LANDING OF FOUR TIMES THE NUMBXR O'I' TROOPS AGAINST APPROXIMATELY THREE TIMES THE DEFENSIVE STRENGTH WOULD CALL FOR AN .AMOUNT OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT AT OMAHA M.AJIY TIMES GllATER THAI THAT DIPIJJn.D AT XWAJALEIN. llT, THE WEIGHT OF METAL DELIVERED AT THE OMAHA DEFENSES WAS ONE THIRD THAT US.ED AT KW.AJA.LEIN.

THOUGH THE AMOUNT OF NAVAL GUNFlll TO m: DELIVERED IN A GIVEN SITUATION C.AHNOT BE ARRIVED AT MATHDtATICALLY, AND THOUGH NAVAL GUNJ'IRE Al.ONE WILL NOT NECESSARILY INSURE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING WITH MINIMUM CASUALTIES, THE FOREGOING BOUGH COMPARATIVE :rIGURES YILL SERVE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE CONCLUSION THAT AT OMAHA m:ACHE.S DURING THE PRE-LANDING PH.ASE, NOT DOUGH NAVAL GUNJ'Ill WAS PBO- _, vmn. - SECRET IU.V .AL CJUllJ' Ill - SUPPORT CRA1'f

J'ro111: Commander Battleehip Divieion ~ive. (CTG 124.9).

GEBMil MILIT.ARY JOURNJ.L 1S GI.OVIllG TRIBO'H TO MIGHT OF IU.VAL GUNS. GDM.UT T:&UGIW'H SIRVICi (HPD) 2004 16.6.44

1 Militaeri Sche Correepondenz Deutschla.nd" depicts the part played by the guna of the NaTy at the invaeion coaet; more decisive than bombint;.

The fire curtain provided by the guns of the Navy 10 far proved to be one of the beet trump card• of the Anglo-U.s. invasion Armies. It may be that the part played by the Fleet was more decisive than that of the air force• because its fire was better aimed and unlike the bomber formations it had not to confine it•elf to short "~eta of !'ire•.

1 1'ire power of warships must not be under-esticated - while the first trooplandi~ were in progres1 and no bridgehead existed the invasion force• had only little artillery at their disposal. It was, however, provided to very high degree by the combined Anglo-u.s. 1'leet. It would be utterly wrong to under-estimate the fire-power of warships even of smaller ve1sela. A Torpedo l!oat for instance baa the fire power of approximately a Howitzer .Battery, a destroyer that of a .Battery of .Artillery. Equivalent to an unusually heavy artillery barrage. With regard to its armament a cruiser may be compared with a Regiment of .Artillery. .Battleships carrying 38 CM or 40 CM Guns have a fire-power which to achieve in land warfare is difficult and only poseible by an unusual concentration of very heavy batteries. Great mobility of these "noating Batteries" - of particular advantage to the invasion troops which employed strong formations of warships ae floating batteries was the great mobility of the vessels by which--__ artillery concentrations could be achieved at any point of the coast and to change the place accordif16 to the exigencies of the fighting situation. The attackers have ma.de the best poaeible use of this opportunity."

"An umbrella of fire - repeatedly strong formation of warships and cruisers were used against single coastal batteries thus bringing a quite extraordinary 1uperior fire-power to bear on them. Moreover time and again he put an umbrella of fire (Feuerglocke) over the defenders at the focal points of the fightin& compared with which incessant heavy air attacks have only a modest effect."

2-28