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People's Liberation Army Encyclopedia of Modern China, Volume 3 – Finals/ 6/8/2009 19:56 Page 95 People’s Liberation Army: Overview KOREAN WAR When the Cultural Revolution started in 1966, Peng In 1950 Peng backed Mao’s decision to invade Korea, while was arrested and taken to Beijing. In one of numerous other military leaders urged the conquest of Taiwan. Con- struggle sessions, he was forced to kneel before forty thou- sequently, in September 1950 Peng arrived in Shenyang, sand people and was savagely kicked and beaten. Peng was tasked with the enormous problem of assembling an army kept in a prison cell, where he was not permitted to sit or of a quarter of a million with field officers who had no use the toilet. He was interrogated more than two hundred experience fighting a conventional war. By mid-October, times, and finally died in prison in 1974 after an eight-year the first troops crossed the Yalu River, and soon Peng was ordeal. He was cremated in secrecy. Peng was rehabilitated ’ commanding 380,000 troops. His forces eventually suffered in 1979, three years after Mao s death. a million casualties in a three-year war, which ended in SEE ALSO Communist Party; Cultural Revolution, 1966– stalemate and an armistice. Peng had difficulties dealing 1969; Korean War, 1950–1953; Mao Zedong; People’s not only with Mao but also with Joseph Stalin (1879– Liberation Army; Rural Development, 1949–1978: 1953) and Kim Il Sung (1912–1994), and on several occa- Great Leap Forward. sions Peng offered to resign. In 1954, in recognition of his success in fighting the BIBLIOGRAPHY United Nations forces to a standstill in Korea, Peng was Becker, Jasper. Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine. London: made minister of defense, a largely honorary position. The Murray, 1996. following year, he was declared a field marshal and joined Domes, Jürgen. Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985. the Politburo. The outspoken soldier continued to com- Hu Sheng. A Concise History of the Communist Party of China. plain about Mao’s personality cult and raised objections Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994. to his policies, especially after Nikita Khrushchev’s(1894– Li Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of 1971) denunciations of Stalin. Matters came to a head after Mao’s Personal Physician. London: Chatto Windus, 1994. the launch of the Great Leap Forward. In 1958 Peng toured Zhang Rong (Jung Chang) and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown parts of the country and discovered things were far different Story. London: Cape, 2005. from what was being reported. In Gansu, he found orchards cut down to fuel furnaces, while harvests were left to rot in Jasper Becker fields. After visiting Jiangxi and Anhui and his home village in Hunan, Peng sent telegrams to Beijing warning that the “masses are in danger of starving.” In early 1959 he visited Mao’s home village and found untilled fields, falsified pro- PEOPLE’S LIBERATION duction figures, and peasants dying of starvation. ARMY This entry contains the following: LUSHAN PLENUM OVERVIEW At the Lushan Plenum, which Mao called in 1959 and which Andrew S. Erickson lasted six weeks, Peng was encouraged by more sophisticated COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMED SERVICES leaderssuchasZhangWentian(1900–1976) to write Mao a Andrew S. Erickson petition, a handwritten letter that ran to ten thousand char- MILITARY DOCTRINE acters. The mildly worded petition did not even refer to a David Bachman famine and instead praised the accomplishments of the Great MILITARY ENTERPRISES AND INDUSTRY SINCE 1949 Leap Forward, observing there were more gains than losses. In Andrew S. Erickson a meeting with Mao at the plenum, however, Peng’stemper exploded, and he accused Mao of acting despotically, like Stalin in his later years, and of sacrificing human beings on the altar of unreachable production targets. Peng warned of a rebellion and said the Soviet army might be called in to restore OVERVIEW order. Mao interpreted this as a plot to overthrow him and The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is one element of the believed that Peng, during his recent trip to Eastern Europe, Chinese armed forces. The Chinese armed forces are com- had sought Soviet backing for a coup. At a showdown in posed of the active and reserve units of the PLA, the People’s Lushan, Mao summoned his military leaders to ask if they Armed Police (PAP), and the People’s Militia. The Central backed him or Peng. Afterward, Peng was dismissed as a Military Commission is the highest command and policy- rightist and put under house arrest in Sichuan. In the ensuing making authority for the Chinese armed forces (sharing com- purge of the “rightist opportunists,” large numbers of Peng’s mand of the PAP with the State Council through the Ministry real or suspected followers and sympathizers were arrested and of Public Security). In 2008, the PLA had about 2.3 million sent to labor camps. Many of them died of starvation. active-duty troops and an estimated 800,000 personnel in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN CHINA 95 Encyclopedia of Modern China, Volume 3 – Finals/ 6/8/2009 19:56 Page 96 People’s Liberation Army: Overview Joint Chinese and Russian military exercises, Shandong Peninsula, August 24, 2005. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), together with the people’s militia and the People’s Armed Police, form the basis of the armed forces in China. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the PLA has embarked on an aggressive modernization campaign, investing in new weapons systems and conducting military training exercises with neighboring countries. AFP/GETTY IMAGES reserve units. The 1997 National Defense Law states that the Following the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966– PLA has a “defensive fighting mission, [but] when necessary, 1976), the PLA has become increasingly professional. Train- may assist in maintaining public order in accordance with the ing has become increasingly sophisticated and realistic since law.” The PAP, which is primarily responsible for domestic the 1980s. Officers are being educated at a smaller number of security, officially numbers about 660,000 personnel, though more-advanced institutions, including civilian universities. another 230,000 PAP personnel may be under the daily Measures such as a National Defense Scholarship Program, command of the Ministry of Public Security. The primary initiated in 2000, have attempted to attract high school militia consists of about 10 million personnel and is tasked to graduates to study in civilian institutions with the obligation provide support to both the PLA and PAP. The PLA is to serve in the PLA upon graduation. This program, also divided into the ground forces, the People’s Liberation Army ’ known as the National Defense Student program, seeks to Navy (PLAN), the People s Liberation Army Air Force produce junior officers with the technical qualifications nec- (PLAAF), and the strategic-missile forces (Second Artillery). essary for PLA modernization. Some military academies have At least 200,000 PLA coastal and border-defense units been converted to training bases for the technical training of and roughly 100,000 PAP troops are responsible for border officers, noncommissioned officers, conscripts, and civilian defense. All elements of the Chinese armed forces engage in college graduates, as well as small units. societal activities (e.g., disaster relief and some infrastructure development). An unknown number of civilians (technical The 1999 Service Law reduced the conscript service specialists, administrative and custodial staff, administra- period to two years for all conscripts, but the overall quality tive contractors, and local government-paid staff) also sup- of recruits remains low and the system is subject to corrup- port PLA operations. tion. The PLA has gradually increased its military exchanges, 96 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN CHINA Encyclopedia of Modern China, Volume 3 – Finals/ 6/8/2009 19:56 Page 97 People’s Liberation Army: Overview attaché offices abroad (though few have PLAAF and PLAN PLANAVY(PLAN) attachés), and educational exchanges, and has conducted a In 1949 Mao Zedong declared, “to oppose imperialist aggres- variety of joint exercises with Russia and Western nations. A sion, we must build a powerful navy.” Founded on April 23, limited number of port calls and the PLAN’s first global 1949, the PLAN established its headquarters in Beijing in April circumnavigation in 2002 by the destroyer Qingdao and 1950 and its first base in Qingdao in September 1950. Assisted the support ship Taicang have furthered diplomacy. Since by 2,500 Soviet advisers, the PLAN was initially led by PLA 1990, when it first deployed military observers, the PLA ground-force commanders, whose forces were primarily former has greatly increased its role in United Nations peace- Nationalist sailors, many of whom had defected voluntarily, keeping. China has contributed roughly 6,800 personnel and their vessels. During the Cold War, the PLAN was repeat- to twenty-one United Nations peacekeeping missions edly reorganized, largely in attempt to improve equipment and since first sending military observers in 1990. In February maintenance. Until 1985, the PLAN was charged with coastal 2008, 1,962 Chinese personnel were deployed on peace- defense. As a subordinate organization, the PLAN would sup- keeping missions. These activities are supported by train- portthePLAinwhatMaoenvisionedtobeamajorgroundwar ing facilities at the PLA International Relations Academy against the superpowers. Following rapprochement with the in Nanjing and the China Peacekeeping Police Training United States in 1972, this concern was directed solely at the Center in Langfang, Hebei Province. Soviet Union. During the late 1970s, however, evidence emerged that China might be moving beyond a policy of coastal defense. PLA GROUND FORCE The PLAN sent submarines into the South China Sea and The approximately 1.6-million-person (and gradually decreas- beyond the first island chain into the Pacific Ocean for the first ing) ground force has historically dominated the PLA, both time.
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