Status-Seeking and Nation-Building

Journal of Interdisciplinary History, LI:I (Summer, 2020), 65–95.

Simone Paci, Nicholas Sambanis, and William C. Wohlforth Status-Seeking and Nation-Building: The “Piedmont Principle” Revisited The image of a core state serving as a nucleus drawing culturally similar, neighboring peoples into a larger nation powerfully influenced nationalism studies, but the role of interstate war and status-seeking in nation- building has been overlooked. By addressing this important gap, this Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 article sheds new light on Italy’s unification. It develops a “second- image reversed” theory connecting international and domestic politics and tests it in a paradigmatic example of nation-building, the Piedmont-led unification of Italy. Aspiring nation-builders looked to this case for inspiration: Prussia was “Germany’s Piedmont” and Serbia “Yugoslavia’sPiedmont.” Martin memorably coined the “Piedmont Principle” to describe the policy of awarding quasi-state institutions to nations within the Soviet Union in order to attract co-nationals outside Soviet jurisdiction, providing the foundation for both future national unification and Soviet expansionism. The borders of today’s Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and other states reflect the early attempts of Soviet officials to put that principle into practice. Yet a key feature of the Piedmont case generally evades studies of unification nationalism—the role of international status in inducing national identification.1

Simone Paci is a doctoral student, Dept. of Political Science, Columbia University. Nicholas Sambanis is Presidential Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. He is the author, with Michael Doyle, of Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, 2006); editor, with Paul Collier, of Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. I. Africa; II. Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (Washington, D.C., 2005). William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College. He is the author, with Carla Norrlöf, of “Raison de l’Hégémonie (The Hegemon’s Interest): Theory of the Costs and Beneﬁts of Hegemony,” Security Studies, 28, no. 3 (July–September 2019), 422–450, available at doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982; editor, with Anatoly V. Torkunov and Boris F. Martynov, of History of International Relations and Russian Foreign Policy in the 20th Century (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2020), 2 v.

1 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, XXXII (1978), 881–912. Second-image-reversed theories explore how the international system (“third image”) shapes domestic politics. Terry Dean Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 66 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Before unification, fewer than 5 percent of the people living on the Italian Peninsula spoke standard Italian. Foreign empires dominated most Italian states, and local identities exerted a powerful pull. How did this situation change, and why was Piedmont able to rise to the position of a core state representing the ideals of unification nationalism among a people who did not previously share a common national identity? Strong evidence suggests that ’ an important part of Piedmont s success at winning status relative Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 to other Italian sates was its ability to insert itself into international diplomacy and thereby gain the kind of international support that could facilitate a Piedmont-led Italian unification. Such a nation- building strategy was denied to many would-be Piedmonts. The role of status-seeking in nation-building projects is not only rarely studied and bereft of theory; it is also largely lost in the burgeoning literature about status in international politics. The contention that status affects state behavior dates back to Thu- cydides. It became a leitmotif in mid-twentieth century classical realism, as well as a subject in two waves of modern scholarship, the first in the 1970s and the second beginning in the new millen- nium. Cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neurosci- ence and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology demonstrates that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire to achieve social status. Status—a recognized position in a social hierarchy—thus figures crucially in social life. Scholars of international relations now increasingly agree that salient state behavior—an express dissatisfaction with the “rules-based liberal international order” and a favorable disposition toward “nation branding,” public diplomacy, troop contributions, aircraft carriers, humanitarian aid, “big science” projects, and much more—reflect the role that status plays in the international political arena.2 Status seeking is an increasingly invoked explanation for oth- erwise puzzling, costly state behavior, notably war. Yet, with rare exceptions, nation-building is not considered among the motiva- tions for status-seeking. In the case of Piedmont, a key mechanism

(Ithaca, 2001), 9, 274–276; David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Popu- lations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, 1998). 2 For a review of the status literature, see Alan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science, XVII (2014), 383–384. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 67 in the attainment of that status was participation in a major interstate war. Improbably, tiny Piedmont joined Britain, France, and Turkey against the Russian Empire, dispatching one-third of its army to Crimea. Viewed from the perspective of most models of war participation, this behavior is puzzling, but it follows seam- lessly from our theory, and, as we show, it worked.3 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 THEORY: STATUS, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND NATION-BUILDING What could possibly have been missing from the abundant literature that deals with the subjects of this article—war, nation-building, status, and social identity? Researchers largely ignored the connections between these phenomena. International relations (IR) theory asks why nation-states ﬁght wars or seek status, but because it takes the origins of nations and states as givens, it has little to say about how war or status-seeking helps to shape them. Classic theories of state- building in comparative politics consider interstate war as an external threat capable of consolidating the interests of domestic elites and unifying a population with a pre-existing common identity, but they tend to treat war as exogenous to the state-building process. This article bridges this divide by arguing that all of these pieces can be pulled together in speciﬁc settings.

NATION-BUILDING AND SOCIAL IDENTITY Nation-building is the process of creating—and identifying with—a common national identity to legitimize the authority of the state. Individuals have a repertoire of identities, not all of which are relevant all the time. Nation-building is the process that makes national identities salient by pushing individuals to re-imagine themselves as parts of a su- perordinate identity, a nation. The Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) in social psychology shows how intergroup cooperation can emerge from such re-categorization, weakening attachment to subordinate identities. The CIIM is applicable to the question of nationalism and nation-building because the ethnocentrism that

3 Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, 2017); Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputation and Status,” 371–393; Richard N. Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York, 2010); Thazha V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and Wohlforth (eds.), Status in World Politics (New York, 2014); Sambanis, Stergios Skaperdas, and Wohlforth, “Nation-Building through War,” American Political Science Review, CIX (2015), 279–296. 68 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH nationalism can encourage stands to diminish conflict within a nation as ties to subordinate groups, such as regions or ethnicities, dim under the umbrella of a new nation. Previous studies identify three key determinants of group identification—material benefits, in-group similarities, and group status. Material benefits include the payoff that individuals expect from joining or remaining in a group (a share of any material gains

that accrue to the group). In-group similarities refer to the cultural, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ethnic, or other perceived commonalities that individuals recog- nize between themselves and other group members. Group status depends on the place within an established hierarchy among competing groups. A key insight from social-identity theory is that individuals are more likely to identify with high-status groups (because they derive more self-esteem from group membership), with groups from which they feel less distant, and with groups that help them to derive greater material beneﬁts. This study brings the international system into focus as a key part of the social environment that contributes to the formation of individuals’ identities.4

NATION-BUILDING AND STATUS COMPETITION A crucial but unap- preciated component of social-identity theory for nation-building is how savvy elites, when using war with out-groups to mobilize support for their own political goals, also exploit the human desire for belonging to enlist people from other high-status groups to forge greater unity. The upshot is a complex framework of interdependencies between foreign policy and domestic nation- building. Consider a leader who wants to mobilize a coalition to support an agenda of uniﬁcation nationalism—for example, Otto von Bismarck in Prussia, Count Camillo di Cavour in Piedmont, or Nikola Pašić in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

4 For a game-theoretical model of social identification and ethnic conflict that highlights material benefits, in-group similarities, and group status, see Sambanis and Shayo, “Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict,” American Political Science Review, CVI (2013), 294–325. Sonia Roccas and Marilynn B. Brewer, “Social Identity Complexity,” Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, no. 2 (2002), 88–106; Sambanis, Schulhofer-Wohl, and Shayo, “Paro- chialism”; Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behav- ior,” in Stephen Worchel and William Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago, 1986), 7–24. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 69 Policy objectives could range from the unification of several regions into a larger country to the consolidation of a weak state threatened by internal conflict between different subnational groups or by centripetal forces. With such aims in mind, leaders will be sensitive to both material and nonmaterial payoffs for the (potentially) national group with which they want to create unity. The claim herein is that, under certain conditions, leaders can

achieve such unity by increasing national status as perceived by Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 the population.5 Status-Seeking and Inter-Group Conflict The basis of group identity is the perceived similarity of attributes, a finding that has been established in “minimum group paradigm” studies. Perceived distance between an individual and a group depends on the number of shared attributes, as well as on other factors like the social environment and politics. Inter-group conflict that makes some group-based attributes cognitively salient for individuals reduces the distance between individuals sharing those attributes and increases it relative to out-groups (that is, groups of individuals who do not share these attributes). Reducing distance makes identification with a group more likely.6 An important insight from social-psychology research is that group identification depends not just on shared attributes but also on relative status comparisons. According to a meta-analysis of experimental studies of status effects, individuals belonging to high- status groups are more likely to favor their in-group members than are individuals belonging to low-status groups. Status has both material and psychological components. Material benefits can include payoffs from inter-group contests. For example, a minority sepa- ratist group that achieves national independence will see its international status increase, thus leading its members to identify even more strongly with it. Intangible or psychological payoffs include

5 A scope condition for the theory is a sense of common nationhood, even if it is not a salient identity. The category nation should be available to individuals who might wish to identify with it. The ex ante distance felt between groups is a constraint on the effect of status on national identification. 6 In experiments, psychologists can construct artificial groups among individuals with no prior connection to each other to compete for dominance and status under certain conditions. Simple categorization as part of a group is sufficient to create a common in-group identity on the basis of shared attributes. See Tajfel, Michael G. Billig, Robert P. Bundy, and Claude Flament, “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior,” European Journal of Social Psychol- ogy, I (1971), 149–178. 70 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH the self-esteem that comes with knowing that one’s group is high on the social hierarchy.7 These insights, rooted in lab-based experimental studies and applied to the context of ethnic conflict by political scientists, set the foundation for an analysis of how inter-group comparisons of status based on outcomes of interstate war can lay the ground- work for national unification.

Integrating Status-Seeking in Theories of International Politics Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 The literature about status in international politics has converged on a number of core propositions highly relevant to this discussion. Most scholars now understand status as a function of “collective beliefs” concerning the ranking of a state within a certain group or association. Altering those collective beliefs to enhance actors’ standing can be expected to demand costly action. Social status is a positional good; its value depends on rank. High status is thus in- herently scarce, usually impossible to increase without the demo- tion of other actors prone to resist. Settled patterns of collective beliefs, moreover, tend to be “sticky” and resistant to change. Highly salient and costly actions are thus necessary to change status (a range of status-conferring behaviors meet these criteria, from conspicuous consumption in the form of big-science projects to the acquisition of colonies). For long spans of history, war was the standard means to inculcate status change.8 Although the connection between status and competitive interstate behavior is well understood, the mechanism proposed

7TajfelandTurner,“Intergroup Behavior,” 7–24; Ann Bettencourt, Kelly Charlton, Nancy Dorr, and Deborah Hume, “Status Differences and In-Group Bias: A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Effects of Status Stability, Status Legitimacy, and Group Permeability,” Psychological Bulletin, CXXVI (2001), 520–542. Comparisons of intangibles assume that a commonly known metric exists, that relative status assessments are not opaque, and that conﬂict outcomes affect inter-group status comparisons in a predictable way. In the analysis that follows, our premise is that participating in a great-power alliance and shaping diplomatic initiatives on the European scene would have raised Piedmont’s status vis-à-vis other Italian states in the eyes of most Italians. 8 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputation and Status,” 371–393; Andrew Q. Greve and Jack S. Levy, “Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,” Security Studies, XXVI (2018), 148–178; Liliach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations (Chicago, 2017); Wohlforth, Benjamin de Carvhalo, Iver B. Neumann, and Halvard Leir, “Moral Authority and Status in International Relations: Good States and the Social Dimension of Status-Seeking,” Review of International Studies, XLIV (2018), 526–546; Evan Luard, Types of International Society (New York, 1976); Lebow, Why Nations Fight; Tudor A. Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline: Status Anxiety and Great Power Rivalry,” Review of International Studies, XL (2014), 125–152. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 71 herein is not. Whether they model status as a means to some instrumental end, such as security and wealth (as in power-transition theory), as a solution to the commitment problem (as in the signaling framework), or as a noninstrumental end in itself, extant studies all operate at the individual level, through the lens of interstate competition. Our theory diverges from this trend by pos- iting status as valuable to leaders not only on the international stage

but also in domestic politics through nation-building and national Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 cohesion, which in turn can enhance a state’s capacity to act ex- ternally.9 The central proposition that emerges is that governments with nation-building objectives pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in search of enhanced status in a dynamic that can escalate to interstate war. Because playing the interstate status game pre- supposes mutual recognition of sovereignty among the states of a system, application of the theory requires a state recognized by others as sovereign in order for it to be allocated a more or less contested rank in the system. The theory presumes a shared understanding of relative status and that victory in war promises to increase it. At the domestic level, it implicates the existence of local, ethnic, or other parochial identities that compete with national identity for individuals’ loyalty, as well as the existence of a shared “nation” pertaining to all individuals living within a given territory. If individuals do not consider themselves as nominal parts of a nation, the trade-off between ethno-regional and national identities does not even arise. In other words, the theory applies to the phase of nation-building in which a prior awareness of nationhood or of commonalities among ethnicities sharing a broader territory already exists. We explore how policies of a central government build the capacity of a state to induce national identification. Theoretical Expectations for Unification Nationalism in the Italian Case The preceding discussion generates four conditions that we would expect to observe in the case of Italy’s unification: (1) nation-building as a part of leaders’ strategy for state survival in the anarchic great power system, under the assumption that national unification would increase state power; (2) the achievement of

9 Greve and Levy, “Power Transitions,” 148–178; Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputa- tion and Status”; Onea, “Between Dominance and Decline,” 125–152; Lebow, Why Nations Fight. 72 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH higher status internationally for Italy as a strategy for elites interested in strengthening Italian nationalism; (3) individuals’ support of a Piedmont-led Italian uniﬁcation increasing as Piedmont’s status (and Italy’s status) increased; and (4) individuals’ attachment to subordinate political units diminishing as their national attachment increased through the process of Italy’s uniﬁcation. All these ob- servable implications of the theory are capable of empirical support. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021

ITALIAN UNIFICATION: PUZZLES AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS As the canonical case of nineteenth-century nation-building, Italian unification has generated a copious literature. Nonetheless, our theory helps to account for three persistent questions. First, what explains the surge of nationalist sentiment at the expense of regional identification? Although the ideal of Italian unity had been building among elites for decades, the pre-existing reservoir of national allegiance in the population was low, and pockets of pro-unification sentiment confronted an embedded heterogeneity, especially between the North and the South. Since the Renaissance, the semi-autonomous states of the Apennine peninsula had been largely dominated by a shifting coterie of external powers, offering limited opportunity for any development of an Italian identity on a large scale. Yet, we observe a rapid turn-around in support of Italian unification. Second, unification under the auspices of Piedmontese Monarch Vittorio Emanuele II seemed unlikely. Earlier unification efforts led by Piedmont in 1848, spearheaded by liberal nationalists, had met with failure. What explains the political realignment that brought the Piedmontese monarchy to the helm of the unification movement? Third, in 1855, Piedmont joined the Crimean War alongside England and France as an ally of the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire. Although the northern Italian state had no direct interest in the conflict, it committed more than one-third of its army to the cause, adhering to an alliance that had come to include the Austrian Empire, which controlled large portions of the Italian North and was the foremost obstacle to unification. What explains these unlikely foreign-policy decisions?10

10 The North was divided into small, generally progressive, and technologically advanced states, whereas the South, which was mostly unified under the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 73 Our analysis shows that the sharp rise in Italy’s international status due to Piedmontese diplomacy and its participation in the Crimean War led to a political realignment in support of the monarchy’s role in the unification process and diminished regional attachments in favor of the unification project. The timing of these events cannot be explained outside the context of the war-induced increases in Piedmont’s status. Our central proposi- ’ tion is that a major objective of Cavour s foreign policy was to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 increase Piedmont’sstatussothatitwouldtakealeadershiprole in Italian unification. A related claim, connected to the domestic stage of our theory, is that Italian elites identified with the national group for nonmaterial reasons involving the enhanced status of a larger national group identity. They recognized that identification with the Italian nation under Piedmontese leadership would be appealing to individuals and weaken the salience of subordinate local-regional identities. Hence, our theory implies a feedback mechanism between the systemic and domestic institutional levels—foreign-policy goals (winning Piedmont a “seat at the European table” of shifting alliances) and domestic political goals (promoting Italian unification under Piedmont’s leadership). Indeed, the more positive the popular response to Piedmont’s foreign-policy successes, the better was the Piedmontese government’s ability to solidify new alliances and the stronger was the nationalist response to its status-seeking foreign policy. A key mechanism underlying this feedback loop is social identification. In selecting Piedmont as our paradigm, we opt for what Gerring and Seawright dub an “influential case” strategy. The point is to check the assumptions behind general models of nation-building with reference to a case that has exerted a strong influence on estimates of the overall power of those models. Scholars generally regard this canonical case, rich in primary evidence, as consistent with theories of nation-building that exclude the mechanism that we unveil. Although we clearly cannot provide a comprehensive was characterized by a more traditional, land-based elite. See Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 1994); Mario Isnaghi and Eva Cecchinato (eds.), Fare l’Italia: unità e disunità del risorgimento: In Gli italiani in guerra: conflitti, identita, memorie dal risorgimento ai nostri giorni, (Turin, 2008); Adriano Viarengo, Cavour (Salerno, 2010); Rosario Romeo, Cavour e il suo tempo 1854–1861 (Rome, 1984). 74 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH account of Italian unification, demonstrating that the novel mechanism operated in consequential ways in this case is probative for the theory’s importance.11 At each level—the bellicose, costly foreign-policy moves and the process of national identification—competing hypotheses are in play. The most closely related alternative hypothesis emerges from the extant scholarship about status. It holds that leaders seek

status not to further their domestic agenda but to improve their Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 international position, to bolster their self-esteem, or to increase their own wealth. These motives may complement the nation- building mechanism, but they imply different decision-making paths for leaders and distinct factors contributing to the likelihood of aggressive foreign policy and war. Diversionary war theory is the most directly competing explanation. It states that national leaders facing internal dissent seek to divert attention through international engagement. However, such diversion can work only if the nation already shares a common identity that can be mobilized. Our focus is on how international war helps to create the common national identity in the first place. Diversionary theory portrays leaders as chiefly preoccupied by domestic survival, whereas our theory predicts that leaders also anticipate potential longer-term gains from successful war participation, and that their pursuit of them shows a willingness to accept short-term domestic costs. The chief mechanisms in leaders’ diversionary accounts are “rally around the flag” (aggressive foreign policy to consolidate an internal group temporarily and divert dissent over domestic policy) and “gambling for resurrection” (international conflict to show strength to an internal audience); in both cases, the driving force is the leadership’s concerns with political survival rather than long-term concerns about state power, security, and nation-building.12

11 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly, LXI (2008), 294–308. 12 Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies (Boston, 1989), 258–288; Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict (New York, 2011); Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York, 1956); Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York, 1956); Diana Richards et al., “Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XXVII (1993), 504–535; Kyle Haynes, “Diversionary Conflict: Demonizing Enemies or THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 75 The third alternative explanation for Cavour’s foreign-policy decisions stems from the traditional reading of Italian historiography, which focuses on Piedmont’s diplomatic aims and largely ignores the interaction between international and domestic spheres in the context of the Italian nation-building process. Participation in the Crimean War was thus only a means to obtain a “seat at the European table.” As Royle maintains, “Cavour hoped that ’ Piedmont-Sardinia s growing strength would convince the Great Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Powers that supporters of Italian unity were not the dangerous revolutionaries of 1848 but reliable statesmen. Entering the Crimean War on the allies’ side was further proof that the Sardinians were mature and could be trusted.” Our review of the primary sources suggests that this explanation misses a critical part of the story—the positive spillovers of Piedmont’s diplomatic successes on national identification in Italian states.13 Concerning the domestic (or, more accurately, the “Italian”) level of analysis, our expectation is that Piedmont-sponsored Ital- ian national identity increased in salience because of Piedmont’s enhanced status after military victories. Thus, our explanation is consistent with the views of diplomatic historians who highlight the importance of the Crimean War for Piedmont’s foreign-policy successes. But we venture beyond those views by connecting the domestic and international spheres via the mechanism of social identification. Against this view, we must consider the main

Demonstrating Competence?” Conflict Management and Peace Science, XXXIV (2017), 337–358. 13 The historiography of the Italian Risorgimento is highly politicized, influenced by the larger intellectual struggles of twentieth-century Italy. For the early stages of the Risorgimen- to, scholars stressed the diplomatic dimension of the unification process. See William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and Times of Cavour (Boston, 1911). For the later decades, Marxist historiography highlighted the top-down dynamic of unification, whereas liberal and idealist authors emphasized the virtuous aspects of unification, associated with the moderate-reformist leadership of Cavour’s Piedmont. See Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (New York, 1994). As a result, through the 1970s and 1980s, scholars abandoned the topics of nation-building during the Risorgimento. Pre-unification nationalism has made a comeback in the recent literature, though predominantly under the lenses of constructivist studies of culture, language, and collective symbols. See Silvana Patriarca and Riall (eds.), The Risorgimento Revisited: Nationalism and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Italy (New York, 2011); Alberto Mario Banti and Roberto Bizzocchi (eds.), Immagini della nazione nell’Italia del Risorgimento (Carocci, 2002); Banti, Antonio Chiavistelli, Luca Mannori, and Marco Meriggi, Atlante culturale del Risorgimento: lessico e linguaggio politico dal Settecento all’Unità (Bari, 2011); Martin Clark, The Italian Risorgimento (New York, 2013). Trevor Royle, Crimea: The Great Crimean War, 1854–1856 (New York, 2004), 334. 76 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH competing hypothesis—that the chief driver of changing identification was not status but the anticipated material payoffs from Piedmontese rule. Process tracing is a recommended method for subjecting a novel theory to initial empirical account. The sections that follow presenttheresultsofasustainedefforttosiftevidence,withan emphasis on primary sources that report the perceptions of con-

temporary observers and participants. We scrutinize multiple deci- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 sions and trace the feedback between domestic effects and leaders’ subsequent actions, as well as the identification response of subnational groups. The study employs an alternative-hypotheses framework, allowing a more robust assessment of our claims. In the analysis to follow, we develop two sets of hypotheses along two distinct but interdependent levels—Cavour’sdecision-making process, and the evolution of nationalist sentiment throughout the peninsula culminating in unification.14 We address three questions: First, did decision makers perceive and act upon the link between status and identification in the drive to national unification? Second, how does evidence for this mechanism compare to support for the three main alternatives—the rallying around the flag, gambling for resurrection, and material incentives/instrumental attachment? Third, did enhanced status have the effect on national identification that our theory predicts?

STATUS AND WAR IN CAVOUR’S UNIFICATION STRATEGY Before Bismarck, Cavour had won the praises of theoreticians of realpolitik as a master strategist and nation-builder. After becoming prime minister in 1852, Cavour initiated all the major projects of the Italian uniﬁcation agenda. His strategic moves are widely seen as so consequential that he is considered the major architect of Italian uniﬁcation and the mastermind behind Piedmont’srole in conquering or annexing the rest of the Italian peninsula. An in-depth analysis of his strategic moves and assessments through his contemporary personal and diplomatic correspondence exposes

14 Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American Political Science Review, XCVIII (2004), 341–354; idem, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (New York, 2008), 645–684. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 77 the decision-making process of the Piedmontese government in the years before uniﬁcation.15 Cavour’s motives were obviously mixed and complex, but his realpolitik reputation owes much to his instrumental approach to the national project. He saw Italian uniﬁcation as inevitably intertwined with the socio-economic, military, and political destiny of the peninsula, long a preoccupation. “Without independence,

Italy cannot hope for any durable political improvement or be Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 confident of any real progress,” he wrote in 1846. His tactics were flexible, as was his vision of Italy’s ultimate contours, which he viewed as subject to political and strategic conditions rather than any geographical imperative.16 After the failed independence wars of 1848/9, Cavour real- ized that the Italian project required careful diplomatic framing and a top-down approach that prior popular insurrections had lacked. His strategy was twofold: (1) to enhance Piedmont’s status on the European stage, and (2) to place himself and King Victor Emmanuel II at the head of the Italian unification movement, coopting or sidelining competing social forces from the left and right. As he stated in 1855, the ultimate tool in pursuit of these intertwined objectives was military victory: “I believe that the key condition to improving Italy’s prospects, which precedes all others, is to enhance its reputation, to show all peoples around the world, dominant and dominated, our just qualities. And for this, two things are necessary [the demonstrated ability of liberal self-government] and a military valor to match our ancestors’.... It is up to our country to demonstrate how Italy’s sons can fight valorously on the fields of glory.”17 The decision to join the Anglo-French coalition in Crimea reflects these aims, which becomes clear when we consider alternative explanations for this seemingly puzzling endeavor.

15 Friedrich Meinecke (trans. Douglas Scott), Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’Etat and Its Place in Modern History (New York, 1957); Duncan Kelly, “August Ludwig von Rochau and Realpolitik as Historical Political Theory,” Global Intellectual History, III (2017), 301–330; Viarengo, Cavour; Romeo, Cavour. 16 Enrico Dal Lago, “Lincoln, Cavour, and National Uniﬁcation: American Republicanism and Italian Liberal Nationalism in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of the Civil War Era, III (2013), 99. 17 Roberto Balzani, “Cavour e le vie della Guerra,” in Isnaghi and Cecchinato (eds.), Fare l’Italia, 342–345; Viarengo (ed.), Camillo Benso Conte di Cavour: Autoritratto. Lettere, diari, scritti e discorsi (Milan, 2011), 656–657. 78 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Diversionary-war theorists might point to the fact that Cavour’s leadership was threatened by the king’s disagreement with his moderate, reformist platform. Moreover, in 1855, he had come under strong criticism for an anticlerical reform; the ensuing “Cambiana Crisis” almost brought down his government. Yet his willingness to risk his political reputation by entering the Crimean War is difﬁcult to see as the outgrowth of diversionary-war motives. It initially

lacked the support of political forces in Piedmont and Italy. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Right-wing conservatives opposed it; democrats and nationalists saw it as a betrayal of the Italian cause, given the adherence of Austria to the Anglo–French alliance. Cavour faced “levata di scudi” (concerted opposition) from most of the Piedmontese elites. Rather than the swift “rally round the flag” effectsthattypify diversionary war cases in the literature, Cavour had to withstand intense domestic counter-pressure for more than two months.18 The traditional historiography does not make the connection between victory-induced status gains and national unification at the design phase of Cavour’s foreign policy. Instead, it views the war effort as providing the leverage that Piedmont needed to raise the Italian question on the European stage. Yet, this interpretation is only plausible ex post. It misses the point that in the short term, entering the conflict brought little to no fruit for Cavour. As noted, it initially created opposition not least because the war ostensibly brought Piedmont into an alliance with Austria. Austria’s informal adherence to a non-aggression pact with France in 1854 brought serious geopolitical risk for Piedmont. According to Cavour in 1855, “As soon as [the two great powers that surround us] come to mutual agreement, Piedmont runs the risk of being suffocated, if it doesn’t try and act.” Traditional accounts also link Piedmontese participation in Crimea to the secret alliance with France in 1858, thus sustaining aspirations of a unified Italy under Piedmontese leadership. However, Cavour initially had no guarantees of future French help. Moreover, as we show later, French support alone would not have sufficed for the unification project. Indeed, Napoleon III’s aid derived from his ambition to replace Austria as the main foreign influence in Italy. When this vision was negated by the coalescence of Italians around

18 Cavicchioli, Sabina Cerato, and Silvano Montaldo, Fare l’Italia: i dieci anni che prepararono l’unificazione (Rome, 2002), 45–50; Romeo, Cavour, 93. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 79 Piedmont, he was quick to withdraw and reach an armistice with Austria. At this point, status-fueled identification played a crucial role to complete unification.19 Domestic gains and useful diplomatic relationships ultimately did accrue once Piedmont’s international status began to rise. But evidence suggests that what carried the day for Cavour’s willingness to take the gamble was the war’s potential effects on Piedmont’s fi status and ultimately on the appeal of uni cation among Italians. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 He worried that the reactionary parties would “try and persuade the public that the Great Powers treat us with no respect.” He continuously asked the Piedmontese General Alfonso Ferrero La Marmora for “fatti d’armi” (facts of arms) that would glorify the Piedmontese troops and enhance their international prestige. To a friend in the region of Genoa, he wrote, “You will certainly testify that not all Ligurs, not all Genoese parliamentarians oppose, if not for narrow-minded personal interests, a measure [the treaty] aimed at bringing our country glory and honor.” Only when the Piedmontese army finally clashed with Russian troops on the river Chernaya on August 16, 1855, did Italian public opinion react, as Cavour had hoped, with an unprecedented wave of support and public enthusiasm. Despite the modest significance of the battle and of the Piedmontese contribution in the scheme of things, that moment assumed symbolic importance for Piedmontese and Italian military history.20 Cavour was initially dismayed by the absence of immediate results from the war and the Peace Congress of Paris, but he quickly understood the reverberations that his international engagement had sent throughout Italy. Shortly after the Congress, he wrote to a friend, “I can assure you that [the treaty of peace at the Congress of Paris], even if does not include concrete measures for Piedmont, it has the virtue of displaying its name on the most important treaty signed in Europe after 1815, and on the same exact level of the Great Powers. Some may say that this is

19 Romeo, Cavour; Royle, Great Crimean War; Clark, Italian Risorgimento; Cavicchioli, Cerato, and Montaldo, Fare l’Italia; Carlo Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario di Camillo Cavour (Florence, 1990), XII, 39. 20 The Piedmontese lost 30 out of 18,000 soldiers to ﬁghting and around 2,000 to cholera in a war that claimed more than 500,000 Russian, Turkish, English, and French troops. None- theless, most large Italian cities to this day have a street named after the Chernaya. Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, XII, 42; Romeo, Cavour, 170. 80 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH all smoke and no meat [Italian saying]. To them, I will answer that public opinion is too a kind of smoke, but sooner or later it grows into a vapor that moves the greatest obstacles and overcomes the greatest difﬁculties.” He trumpeted the same claims in a speech to Parliament, stressing the “just fame that it won in Crimea, fame on the European stage, so great that we can now rightly call it national glory. . . . Certainly, [the war and the participation at the Con-

gress] has greatly enhanced the esteem for our country around Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Europe, and has given it a reputation that the guidance of our government, and the virtue of our people, will doubtlessly main- tain high.”21 Cavour’s letters reveal a conscious strategy of using the war to raise Piedmont’s international status in anticipation of the mobiliz- ing effect that it would have on the cause of Italian unification. The successful participation in the war marked a measurable turn- ing point in the nation-building process. Cavour began to exploit Piedmont’s newly won status increasingly to influence the Italian nationalist movement and to coopt competing approaches. In Paris, he met with Daniele Manin, the leader of the democrats; later the same year, he reached a “truce” with the revolutionaries led by Giuseppi Mazzini. Manin and Giorgio Pallavicino, another Italian patriot, returned from exile that year to found the Italian National Party. Since 1855, they had taken an instrumental position toward Piedmont. As Manin wrote in a public letter to Cavour, “We are with you, if you make Italy, if not, not.” Between 1856 and 1857, Cavour began a series of secret meetings with Sicilian Giuseppe La Farina, who eventually wrested leadership from Manin and Pallavicino and founded the National Society in 1857. The Society would become a key instrument for Cavour to influence public opinion throughout the peninsula, catalyze nationalist sentiments, and secure Piedmontese leadership.22 In this case, as in most others, measuring status is a core chal- lenge, but the evidence suggests that Piedmont’s international

21 Viarengo, Cavour; Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, XIII (1992), 344, 658–670. 22 Romeo, Cavour, 288; Emilia Morelli, 1849–1859: i dieci anni che fecero l’Italia (Florence, 1977), 55; Romano Ugolini, “La via democratico moderata all’unità: Dal ‘Partito Nazionale Italiano’ alla Società Nazionale Italiana,” in Leo Olschki (ed.), Correnti ideali e politiche della sinistra italiana dal 1849 al 1861 (Florence, 1978), 185–211; Anthony Cardoza, “Cavour and Piedmont,” in John A. Davis (ed.), Italy in the Nineteenth Century, 1796–1900 (New York, 2000), 124–125. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 81 status increased as a result of Cavour’s strategy. After the Congress of Paris, the British newspaper The Times published extensive re- ports about the Italian question, praising Cavour and Piedmont. The New York Daily Tribune published in September 1855 (and then republished in Germany soon thereafter) an article by Engels praising the Piedmontese military: “The Russians had to make all their charges under the most effective ﬁre of the allied artillery,

especially the Piedmontese, whose 16-pounders, though slow to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 move, are of the highest effect when once in position.” In confi- dential correspondence with Cavour, Napoleon III mentioned to Cavour that he would endorse Piedmont’s agenda for Italy. It is also generally noteworthy that during the war, the British and the French actively prevented Italians from engaging in real com- bat. If Piedmont contributed too much, Cavour would have gained too much leverage at the peace talks. Apparently, the British and the French were aware of Piedmont’s tactic of using the war to increase its diplomatic status.23 In 1858, Cavour moved on the diplomatic front. In a secret meeting, he and the French Emperor Napoleon III struck a secret defensive alliance against Austria—the Treaty of Plombières, which permitted Piedmont to expand in the North, a French ally to take the South, and the Pope to rule the center. The terms of the pact were a long way from unification, but Cavour sought to balance his ambitions with Napoleon’s diffidence. He understood that the diplomatic route alone could not secure a path to unification. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, Cavour started fomenting the nationalist movement. La Farina would soon show him a plan to coordinate the attack on Austria with uprisings in Central Italy. In 1859, he wrote to a Swiss supporter, “I believe we will now succeed. Italy is ripe. . . . Save a few insignificant exceptions, from the Alps to the Adriatic Sea, there’s now only one banner: that of

23 Cavicchioli, Cerato, and Montaldo, Fare,51;FriedrichEngels,“The Battle of the Chernaya,” New York Daily Tribune, 14 Sept. 1855, available at http://marxengels.public-archive.net/en/ ME0947en.html#Na. In his letter to Cavour, Napoleon III wrote, “Écrivez confidentiellement à Waleski ce que vous croyez que je puisse faire pour le Piémont et l’Italie” (Viarengo, Cavour, 250). This secret communication, in which Napoleon told Cavour that he was ready to hear Piedmont’s requests, thereby signaling his interest in the alliance that would materialize two years later, also suggests increased status for Piedmont. The French emperor now thought Piedmont strong enough to become a valuable ally for his plans in Italy. 82 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Vittorio Emanuele.” As the war drew closer, Cavour told his men in Central Italy that the time was right to unleash the nationalist sentiments that he had fueled. For instance, he wrote to Tuscany, “With the breakout of war, you shall without delay offer a defensive and offensive alliance treaty to Piedmont. . . . Once you have overthrown the Duke, a new temporary government should take control, managing Tuscany, declaring the dictatorship of Vittorio ” Emanuele, and dealing with the war efforts. In the same month, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Cavour ordered Piedmont to mobilize its army in an effort to in- stigate Austrian aggression.24 In April 1859, Austria refused a peaceful resolution and issued an ultimatum, an act of aggression that Piedmont was ready to exploit, thus triggering the defensive pact with France. France, Piedmont, and Austria clashed in the North; the populations of Central and Southern Italy rose against the restoration regimes. Throughout the war, Cavour had in mind what the war with Austria could mean for the unification of Italy. In June, he wrote to one of his men in Tuscany: “The saving of the national cause and the future of Italy depend upon our army’sdeedsinthiswar.Onedayof fighting . . . benefits the constitution of the Kingdom of Northern Italy more than ten speeches. If the Piedmontese keep behaving with such heroic alacrity on the battlefield, the masses . . . will force the independentists into sacrificing their individual interests in favorofItaly’s common good. The annexation of Tuscany to Northern Italy does not depend on what happens on the Arno river [in Florence] but on what happens in the Po’ valley [in Lombardy, where the fighting was taking place]. Two more victories for Vittorio Emanuele and unification is a done deal.”25 The escalation in Central Italy caught Napoleon III by surprise, however, prompting him to come to an early armistice with Austria at Villafranca in July 1859. The terms were that Piedmont would gain Lombardy alone; Veneto would remain under Austrian rule. Untouched by the treaty, Central Italy remained with its temporary government. Seeing his plan fail, despite the diplomatic and military accomplishments, Cavour decided to resign; he dis- appeared from public life until the winter. Cavour’s withdrawal is

24 Raymond Grew, A Sterner Plan for Italian Unity: The Italian National Society in the Risorgimento (Princeton, 1963); Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, XVI (1992), 244, 497. 25 Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, XVI, 906. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 83 further evidence that he was not a self-interested opportunist, motivated by political survival, but a true champion of uniﬁcation. These developments also show that European diplomacy, though helpful in the military struggle against Austria, could not have alone produced Italian uniﬁcation. The project now required the popular fervor felt throughout the peninsula.26 Without prompt action, the boost that Cavour’s policies had

brought to the cause would soon be wasted. Cavour decided to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 take back the helm of the government. After winning the elec- tions of early 1860, he struck a deal with France whereby in ex- change for the territories of Nice and Savoy, Napoleon III would support the annexation of Central Italy by plebiscite. As a result, in mid-1860, only the issue of Southern Italy remained to be settled. Cavour had changing views about whether uniﬁcation demanded the incorporation of the South. But at this point, the ﬁrst time in a decade, the initiative was out of Cavour’s hands. Seeing the Piedmontese government content with the expansion in the Center–North, General Giuseppe Garibaldi, a republican sworn to the king, decided to take independent action. With 1,000 men, he reached the shore of Sicily and instigated a revolt in the name of Vittorio Emanuele II. The speed of the uprising took everyone by surprise. In a matter of weeks, Garibaldi had taken the whole region.27 Cavour was quick to understand the situation: “If Garibaldi moves to the continent and takes the kingdom of Naples as he did with Sicily and Palermo, he becomes the absolute master of the situation. The King Vittorio Emanuele would lose pretty much all his prestige; to the eyes of the great majority of Italians, he would be no more than the friend of Garibaldi. . . . The King cannot accept the crown of Italy from Garibaldi’s hands: it would be unstable on his head. . . . To reinforce his throne, he shall mount the horse and look to overshadow the Sicilian expedition [in a war against Austria]. With the taking of Verona and Venezia, everyone will forget Palermo and Milazzo [Sicilian cities].”28

26 Romeo, Cavour, 633 27 See Viarengo, Cavour,257;Morelli,1849–1859, 135; Eugenio Di Rienzo, “Il Mezzogiorno nella diplomazia europea: 1848–1860,” in Giuseppe Galasso (ed.), Mezzogiorno, Risorgimento e Unità d’Italia: Atti del Convegno, 18–19–20 Maggio (Rome, 2011), 184; Viarengo, Cavour, 333; Morelli, 1849–1859,133;Grew,Sterner Plan. 28 Viarengo, Cavour, 371. 84 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Cavour’s thinking reﬂects the interplay between status, identi- ﬁcation, and nation-building, but it also highlights the importance of intra-elite political competition in determining foreign policy. The fact that Cavour was conscious of the risks that Garibaldi posed to the monarchy seems consistent with the “gambling for resurrection” hypothesis. But contrary to that hypothesis, Cavour was not concerned with advancing his self-interest, ensuring that

Garibaldi would not undermine the monarchy, which he saw as Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 vital to unification. Importantly, his idea of waging war against Austria to regain the status lost to Garibaldi was shaky. Ultimately, he did not have to take that gamble; Garibaldi eventually fell in line with the monarchy. Yet even in this instance, status came into play. Cavour expected to sideline Garibaldi with the increase in status that a potential war with Austria would carry. The status- seeking mechanism is therefore consistent with this reformulation of the “gambling for resurrection” hypothesis. Instead of risking everything to fight Austria, Cavour swiftly seized the initiative to frame the conquest of the South within the Piedmontese unification project. He sent military aid to Garibaldi, as the king marched southward with the Piedmontese army. In 1861, the two met in Teano, concluding the unification of the peninsula.29

STATUS AND IDENTIFICATION IN THE ITALIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT The second hypothesis stemming from our model suggests that the increasing national status of Piedmont, won in part through war, increased the salience of the national Italian identity sponsored by Piedmont among the relevant population. We explore two questions: Does the evidence indicate a shift of identity away from regional groups and toward the nation? Was the gradual coalescence of the Italian uniﬁcation movement around Cavour’s monarchical project evidence of the status-induced social identiﬁcation mechanism? Italy had been fragmented for centuries; each region had numerous claims to local self-determination. In the words of Massimo d’Azeglio, Cavour’s predecessor, “Having made Italy, we must still make the Italians.” The national Italian identity competed with

29 As we discuss in the conclusion, this dimension is missing from Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth, “Nation-Building through War.” Our analytical narrative of Italian uniﬁcation suggests one way to expand their model by integrating attention to intra-group political competition among elites. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 85 that of the smaller states that composed the peninsula—from the Granduchy of Tuscany to the small state of Parma—as well as with local city-based identities and wider regional afﬁliations. The political dimension is more problematical. Indeed, the Italian nationalist movement had existed long before Cavour, at least since the beginning of the century, but its factions fell along a spectrum from Mazzini’s radical revolutionaries at one end to Cavour’s moderate

monarchists on the other. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 Our narrative makes clear that as Cavour’s “decade of prep- aration” for Italian unification drew to its apex in 1859/60, wide- spread enthusiasm followed the growing national and international prestige acquired by the Piedmontese unification movement. Re- cent historiography about the Risorgimento is broadly consistent with this claim; the literature has moved away from the classic neo-Gramscian interpretation of a “passive revolution,” wholly dominated by the Piedmontese elites to highlight instead a bottom-up dynamics of increased national identification. Patriarca and Riall even characterize the Risorgimento as a “‘mass movement,’ whose popular basis becomes even more remarkable if the extremely low literacy levels, and the material difficulties imped- ing the circulation of persons and printed material, are taken into account.”30 Victory in war was a crucial element in generating grassroots support for unification. In the years following the Crimean War, restoration governments in Central and Northern Italy had to increase their policing efforts to suppress the growing pro- unification sentiments. As numerous episodes indicate, this shared enthusiasm characterized all strata of Italian society, though the middle and higher urban classes participated in the greatest num- bers. Importantly, the act of fighting, rather than the decision to join the war, was crucial in generating nationalist support for the movement. As noted earlier, Piedmontese participation in the Crimean War did not enjoy strong support initially, whereas news of the victory on the Chernaya River outside Sevastopol echoed triumphantly along the peninsula.31

30 Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell’Italia moderna (Milan, 1990); Maurizio Isabella, “Rethink- ing Italy’s Nation-Building 150 Years Afterwards: The New Risorgimento Historiography,” Past & Present, 217 (2012), 253; Patriarca and Riall (eds.), Risorgimento Revisited. 31 The Piedmontese casualty total of thirty was less than one-tenth of the French total, and far less than the Russians’. The battle constituted the only “act of arms” in the war. Luigi 86 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Public demonstrations in favor of Piedmont occurred throughout Italy. As Romeo points out, the enthusiastic (over)re- action can be partly explained by the parochialism of Italian society, which was not used to European involvements and thus had no basis for comparison. The Crimean War subsequently featured prominently in nationalist propaganda. For instance, Carlo Boggio wrote in an 1859 pamphlet, “We saw then an occurrence unique

in the whole world: we saw two of the most powerful and author- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 itative empires of Europe, France and England, requesting the alliance of a small state, only as large as a province or a colony of the two. . . . And while the rest of Europe praised the [Piedmontese] troops, the population of all Italy felt just pride in calling the soldiers sent by Piedmont in Crimea Italian soldiers.” This enthusi- asmgrewafterCavour’s participation at the Peace Congress of Paris, where he voiced the Italian question for the first time on the European stage. After Paris, the Mazzinian revolutionaries of Tuscany who sent Cavour a medal of honor, asked, “What should the many willing swords here do?”32 The following summer, Norberto Rosa published an open letter calling for a popular fund to contribute 100 cannons to the fortifications of Alessandria, a border city, in defiance of Austria. In a few days, the newspaper began officially gathering donations. In under two years, it gathered funds to pay for 127 cannons. Sizable donations arrived from all over Italy, especially Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and the rest of Central Italy, as well as from Italian communities all over the world, from Manila to Boston and many European countries. In 1857, under the leadership of Cavour’s man La Farina, the National Society started building on the press network inherited from Manin and Pallavicini, which influenced more than thirty newspapers in the entire Center–North. In 1858, a journalist in Romagna wrote, “Here there are no longer republicans and supporters of the constitution,

Lotti, Romagna e Toscana dall’unità ad oggi (Florence, 1969); Domenico Maria Bruni, Potere e circolazione delle idee: stampa, accademie e censura nel Risorgimento italiano: atti del convegno di studi nel bicentenario della nascita di Giuseppe Mazzini (Milan, 2007), 187–189; Isnaghi and Cecchinato (eds.), Fare l’Italia. 32 Romeo, Cavour, 174; Pier Carlo Boggio, Fra un Mese! (Turin, 1859); Lotti, Romagna e Toscana,5. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 87 moderates and enthusiasts, half-hearted liberals and extremists, as here there are either Italians who love Italy or its enemies.”33 Support for our argument about the grassroots nature of the movement is also evident. Key examples are the inﬂux of volunteers in the war against Austria, the insurrections against the restoration governments in Central Italy, and the results of the plebiscites, all of which signaled broader popular appeal for the na-

tional movement than at any previous time. By the end of the sec- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ond Italian War of Independence in 1859, Piedmont enjoyed the support of 50,000 men or so. This level of participation exceeded that of previous unification efforts, notably the 1948/9 First Italian War of Independence, by at least an order of magnitude. More- over, the biographical data available for these volunteers—chiefly representing the urban middle class but significant percentages of the upper and lower classes as well—indicate that they came dis- proportionately from the North and Center. Cavour himself could detect the upper classes among the mix of volunteers’ names: “We see the most famous names of Milan. . . . Yesterday, to our great surprise, we saw the very son of Milan’s intendent Segrebondi come as volunteer. If the movement is strong enough to unhinge the Austrian system, it means it has become irresistible.”34 Cavour and La Farina had orchestrated the uprising of Central Italy against the restoration governments through the action of the National Society. Before the war with Austria could even start, the Florentines revolted against the Lorenese government. Despite offering substantial constitutional concessions, the Duchy of Lorraine had to abandon Florence rapidly. As the war began, and Piedmont gained ground against Austria, insurrections followed in the rest of Central Italy. The enthusiasm surpassed Cavour’s wildest expectations (and plans). Revolts broke out south of Rome, in the papal territories of Umbria and Marche, which Cavour feared would be too much of a stretch. The populations chased the papal

33 Vincenzo Paciﬁci, “La sottoscrizione per i cento cannoni di Alessandria: motivazioni, polemiche e svolgimento,” Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, LXXI (1984), 170–196; Isabella Zanni Rosiello, “Note intorno al giornalismo politico bolognese degli anni,” in idem et al. (eds.), Convegno di studi sul Risorgimento a Bologna e nell’Emilia (Bologna, 1961), 1227. 34 Piero Del Negro, “I militari del risorgimento: regolari e irregolari,” in Beatrice Alfonzetti et al. (eds.), L’Italia verso l’unità: Letterati, eroi, patrioti (Milan, 2011); Anna Maria Isastia, Il volontariato militare nel Risorgimento: la partecipazione alla guerra del 1859 (Rome, 1990); Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, 269. 88 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH authorities from the cities and displayed the Piedmontese banner. Because the Piedmontese did not come to their aid, papal troops were able to suppress the uprising. These revolts are evidence of a genuine national identiﬁcation in Italy, which brought mass insurrection even without the direct diplomatic and organizational in- tervention of the Piedmontese elite.35 After news of the “secret” alliance between Piedmont and

France spread, support for the nationalist movement grew stron- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ger. Throughout the North, the acronym “Viva Verdi,” ﬁrst in- vented in the early 1850s, got unprecedented traction. The words ostensibly meant “hurrah for Verdi” (the famous composer with a political bent), but their ultimate referent was Vittorio Emanuele Re d’Italia (King Vittorio Emanuele of Italy). The writ- ing was “everywhere on the walls in Veneto.” A journalist from Modena wrote in 1859, “The walls of our houses have replaced the newspapers, and the names of Vittorio Emanuele, Cavour and La Marmora are written everywhere. The youth especially speaks continuously the name of Verdi, because this lucky name forms with its letters the ardent wish of all that want Vittorio Emanuele King of Italy.”36 When the war broke out, all the Central states experienced insurrections against the restoration governments, though with varying degrees of speed and resolve. Tuscany provides a paradigmatic example, since many smaller states followed its lead. Accord- ing to an article from Florence, “Yesterday morning, April 27th, the heads of the army . . . went to the Grand Duke . . . : they asked for the three-colored ﬂag and to join the Piedmontese army. . . . Meanwhile, 20 thousand people, both citizens and soldiers, gathered in front of the Palace, asking for the same thing, without any disorders or any seditious displays. . . . By nightfall, a new temporary government was installed in Palazzo Vecchio and calm, quiet

35 In contrast, further south, in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the situation remained “relatively quiet.” The lack of status-induced support for uniﬁcation in the South is explained by the larger ex ante psychological distance separating the South from the rest of Italy. Grew, Sterner Plan, 200–210; Marco Meriggi, “Dagli antichi stati all’italia unita,” available at http:// www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/dagli-antichi-stati-all-italia-unita_%28L%27Uniﬁcazione%29/. 36 Bruni, Potere e circolazione delle idee, 187–189; Michael Sawall, “‘Viva V.E.R.D.I.’: Origine e ricezione di un simbolo nazionale nell’anno 1859,” in Fabrizio Della Seta, Roberta Montemorra Marvin, and Marco Marica (eds.), Verdi 2001, Atti del Convegno internazionale (Parma, New York, New Haven, 24 gennaio–1° febbraio 2001) (Florence, 2003), 123–131. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 89 and order were restored in the city, as if nothing at all had happened during the day.”37 Whether or not the elite immediately reached universal agreement, the evidence is consistent with a status-induced shift in the salience of national identity. As one politician wrote at the time, “Tuscany does not intend to be swallowed or con- quered. Tuscany will join an Italian Kingdom (if this is possible):

it will not join Piedmont . . . the central mistake would be to con- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 fuse Tuscany with the National Society. . . . The great majority, that is four out of five, is of a different mind.” Yet, another replied, “The people keep demanding annexation to Piedmont, a desire that was instilled into them and now seems unstoppable; they keep organizing votes for it, regardless of their poor diplomatic timing.” As it turned out, annexation won in the temporary assembly, though nothing else happened until the next year, when Cavour found French support for the plebiscites.38 The historiography is divided about the legitimacy of the votes for annexation. Some authors portray the plebiscites as far- cical exercises orchestrated by Cavour. Others insist that they constituted a proper choice of the population between regional independence and national unity, especially in the case of Tuscany, which would likely have induced the other regions to follow suit. The vote was put to “universal suffrage”—the registered male population older than twenty-one. Official prognostications had shown great confidence that unification would win an over- whelming victory. Despite the opposition of the Church (given Cavour’s anticlerical liberal policies), many priests at the lower end of the hierarchy apparently preached in favor of unification, sometimes shepherding their villages to vote in direct violation of their superiors’ orders and at the cost of an official reprimand. As Isabella put it, the growing consensus is that the “plebiscites were a genuine experience of popular participation that sanctioned the existence of a nation and demonstrated popular adherence to it.”39

37 “Gazzetta Piemontese,” April 30, 1859, Archive of the Museo del Risorgimento, Milan (hereinafter AMR). 38 Raffaele Ciampini, I Toscani nel ’59 (Rome, 1959), 26–27. 39 Clark, Italian Risorgimento; Gian Luca Fruci, “Il sacramento dell’unitá nazionale: linguaggi, iconografía e pratiche dei plebisciti risorgimentali (1848–70),” in Banti and Paul Ginsborg (eds.), Storia d’Italia: Annali 22: II Risorgimento (Turin, 2007); Lotti, Romagna e Toscana; Andrea Aveto (ed.), Cronache dell’unità d’Italia: articoli e corrispondenze (1859–1861) (Milan, 2011), 106; Nidia 90 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH As our theory predicts, national sentiment grew at the expense of regional identities. As democratic leader Aurelio Saffi noted in his diary from 1860, “The cry ‘Italy and Vittorio Emanuele’ imposes to the monarchy the will of the Nation. The movement that wanted to limit the national uprising, and would have been content with a federation of constitutionally independent states, is now quickly fading away.” Indeed, the populations of the – Center North experienced the strongest pull toward national Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 identification, given the greater overlap between local and national identities. Conversely, lasting popular support for the unification tended to be most tentative in the South, especially in Naples.40 The initiative for identification derived largely from the North, drawing particularly from the young elites of the nationalist movement (less than one-tenth of Garibaldi’s men hailed from the South). The South presented a more complex situation. Garibaldi enjoyed strong support in the popular rebellions against the Bourbon Kingdom in Sicily and on the peninsula. However, these skir- mishes had more to do with regional cleavages and hopes for land redistribution than with national identification. Indeed, Garibaldi himself, when temporary dictator of Sicily, had to repress open rebellions. The lack of an effect of Piedmont’s victory-induced status in the South is evidence that status effects are mediated by the ex- ante psychological “distance” felt between groups. That distance was greater in the South, which did not share the commitment to national identity in Northern regions. Status alone cannot induce national identification in areas where social distance is too large for people to view themselves as part of the same nation.41 The remaining Papal States had already risen for Piedmont during the war with Austria. Cavour’s men could declare, “As for the populations, the spirits and the interests of the Marche push for annexation to Northern Italy. Same goes, with ardor,

Danelon Vasoli, Il plebiscito in Toscana nel 1860 (Florence, 1968), 38, 44; Isabella, “Rethinking Italy’s Nation-Building,” 254. 40 Angela De Benedictis, Irene Fosi, and Luca Mannori, Nazioni d’Italia: identità politiche e appartenenze regionali fra Settecento e Ottocento (Rome, 2012); Aurelio Saffi, Ricordi e scritti di Aurelio Saffi (1857–59) (Florence, 1900), V; Aurelio Musi, “La nazione napoletana prima della nazione italiana,” in De Benedictis, Fosi, and Mannori (eds.), Nazioni d’Italia,75–90. 41 Grew, Sterner Plan; Dal Lago, “Lincoln, Cavour, and National Unification”; Franco Valsecchi, “Le Classi Popolari e il Risorgimento,” Cultura e Scuola, IV (1965), 82–94. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 91 for Pesaro, Fano, Ancona, Iesi, and it will be difficult to prevent some kind of insurrection here. Macerata and its province, Osimo, Matelica and the others are more cautious, more tepid, but even the majority of conservatives are for unification. It is indeed for everyone an economic, political, national necessity. . . . Even more ardent is the Umbria, Perugia above all, together with Foligno and Terni.”42 Yet at least a part of the population in the South embraced

the nationalist project; circumstantial evidence suggests that the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 South had a role in the effort to achieve the enhanced status associated with the ascendant Italian national identity. The top-down approach to it seems to fit the South much better; scholars argue that the national movement was mostly the work of the “galantuomini” (the bourgeoisie), not the peasants. When the conquest of the South and the enthusiastic annexation of the Center–South was a fait accompli, however, the Piedmontese diplomats in Naples noticed definite signs of realignment: “It is undeniable that after the annexation of Central Italy to the King’s territories, the party that would like the same solution for Naples has rather grown.”43 This last point brings us to the question of what exactly the rea- son was for the apparent identity realignment. Was it due to a desire for the augmented status attached to the national group or to expectations of material payoffs from unification? The pro-unification propaganda made no such distinction, touting both consequences as advantages of annexation. According to a Tuscan newspaper, “A vote for unification means: Italy; Vittorio Emanuele; strength; independence; freedom; dignity; security; order. A vote for a separate kingdom means: Austria; weakness; servitude; dangers; revolution.”44 In contrast with Cavour’s Piedmont, all restoration governments had taken a turn toward autocracy. Hence, unification would mean modernization and a more liberal, market-oriented society, especially for the bourgeoisie. Yet, a rejection of restoration would have been possible under a new regime other than Piedmont, or even more likely with a loose federation, a solution that was on the table in 1860. A Piedmontese newspaper addressed this very point: “They offer us confederation, when we have already

42 Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, XVI, 266. 43 Valsecchi, “Le Classi”; Pischedda et al. (eds.), Epistolario, 639. 44 “La Nazione,” March 4, 1860, AMR. 92 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH put in place a customs union that encompasses half of Italy; we have already begun conforming our currencies, our measures and units, we have begun sharing our laws and abolishing our pass- ports! We have come just short of one step: political union. . . . Austria could only try and stop the union with force, but it cannot attack the provinces that have declared for it, nor Piedmont, which has accepted and defended it. . . . The national sentiment is so pro- ” foundly rooted that it cannot be eradicated. Moreover, the tim- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ing of the consolidation in nationalist sentiment shows a clear feedback mechanism between Piedmont’s military and diplomatic victories and surges of enthusiasm around Italy. The weight of the evidence is consistent with the view that this consolidation was a matter of status/psychic rewards, not material incentives or selec- tive rewards (the regions in question were already economically developed).45 Finally, we should examine the issue of political realignment. The primary evidence for this alignment provides signs of popular identification. As a leader of the Mazzinian revolutionary movement, Saffi explained, “When the public opinion of a country, of your country, is so universally unanimous and strong—even if totally wrong—it is impossible for a minority—or even worse for the few men we are—to change its course, to plot in secrecy, to organize the smallest protests and choose a banner that no one would follow, not even those that secretly share their ideals.” He also noted, “The cry ‘Italy and Vittorio Emanuele’ imposes to the monarchy the will of the Nation. The movement that wanted to limit the national uprising, and would have been content with a federation of constitutionally independent states, is now quickly fading away.” After the fall of Naples, he wrote, “The monarchy was imposed to the country as a necessity; the country acclaimed it; and we bowed obsequiously to the will of the majority.”46 The reasoning that emerges from Saffi’s writings, and from the letters of other non-monarchical nationalists, was that unification was the ultimate goal, regardless of its political color. As Manin wrote, their efforts engaged all “those republicans who love Italy

45 Galasso (ed.), Mezzogiorno, Risorgimento e Unità d’Italia; Riall, Italian Risorgimento; idem, Risorgimento: The History of Italy from Napoleon to Nation-State (New York, 2009); Aveto (ed.), Cronache dell’unità d’Italia, 107. 46 Saffi, Ricordi e scritti, V, 172, 157, 111. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 93 more than the Republic and those monarchists who love Italy more than any dynasty whatsoever.” As such, even if the political realignment of the nationalist movement is not sign of the non- monarchial nationalists’ identification, it surely provides additional evidence of the identification that most people embraced. Follow- ing Piedmont’s victories under Cavour’s leadership, no other unification project could possibly have won the hearts and minds of

the Italian population. The status of the Piedmont-sponsored Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 national group had grown too strong.47

Italy’s unification highlights the strategic role of elites, especially of Cavour, whose realpolitik strategy of Italian nation-building was driven by a commitment to enhancing Piedmont’s security and power on the world scene. War was key to Cavour’sstrategy. He expected that Piedmont’s military involvement in a war with the great powers of the time would reinforce the process of Italy’s unification under Piedmontese leadership. As different nationalist factions coalesced around Piedmont’s leadership, and the status of Piedmont and Italy rose, Cavour knew that the salience of regional attachments and identities would recede. These entwined processes help to explain Piedmont’s other- wise puzzling bellicosity, as well as the nature and success of national unification in a setting far less conducive to nation-building than is often assumed. Because the historiographical literature misses these effects, it cannot fully explain why the unification effort succeeded when it did. Partly as a result, the political-science literature about nation-building largely ignores the nexus connecting status-seeking at the systemic level and social identification at the domestic-institutional level. Research in IR about status also fails to consider its connection to nation-building. Archival evidence illuminates our theoretical mechanism and undercuts alternative interpretations of the war/status/nationalism nexus. We find no support for the diversionary-war hypothesis: Piedmont’s bellicosity was not a strategy designed to divert attention from domestic politics or to imbue local constituencies with a sense that Piedmontese elites were competent rulers. Cavour was not taking a foreign-policy gamble to advance his personal ambitions. Similarly, our work enriches the traditional account

47 Grew, Sterner Plan, 33. 94 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH from the historiography of the Risorgimento. Cavour’s strategy did not uniquely rely on winning a “seat at the European table” and seeking the alliance of the European powers. Rather, we have shown that by virtue of Piedmont’s successful participation in war and its subsequent elevation in European great-power politics, a wave of nationalist imagination pushed local elites to follow Cavour’s plan. That realignment at the elite level was re- — — inforced and partly motivated by a bottom-up surge of nation- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 alist sentiment in Northern and Central Italian states. Where opposition to unification was greatest, as in Italy’s Southern regions, the material rewards that could be anticipated as a consequence of unification helped to galvanize support for nation-building. The larger psychological distance felt toward the nation, however, diminished the effects of status-induced national identification in Southern Italy. Victory in international war is a crucial component of this narrative. Even when events suggest that Cavour’s actions were at least partly motivated by a desire to sideline political competition for the leadership of the unification project and to shore up support for the monarchy, status-seeking remained a key mechanism. This case echoes the lessons learned from other cases of unification nationalism, notably the Prussian-led unification of Germany. As in the German case, a key scope condition for our argument is the availability of the nation concept. Without a reservoir of common identity, status gains alone cannot motivate identity change, as was evident in the reluctance of Southerners to adopt the ideology of unification. Our case also suggests extensions for the theories of war and nation-building that motivate our analysis. Specifically, this article shows how elite competition complicates this dynamic and generates motives for belligerence on the international scene, though in ways that differ from expectations based on IR’s literature about “gambling for resurrection.” We highlight the historical contin- gency of nation-building outcomes; without French support, Cavour’sendeavorsmightwellhavefailed.Butwealsoexplain how the war/status/nation-building nexus made certain outcomes more likely. Our theory and evidence suggest that a core state that cannot enhance its status internationally may fail to unite potential co-nationals even when a shared identity exists among the elites THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 95 and the middle classes. Conversely, without such a shared identity, nation-building programs will be difficult to achieve without significant coercion, and regional or other parochial identities will remain stronger than the national identity. Countries like Afghanistan, with no nascent movement for national unification, should not expect economic development or foreign-policy achievements to induce a significant part of the population to identify nationally. fi ’ Had a process of uni cation not been underway in Italy, Piedmont s Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 war gamble probably would not have sparked a nationalist imagination that could have unified Italian states. But if status is important in explaining the building of some nations, it may also play a role in their destruction. As long as subnational allegiances appeal to prominent domestic groups, national leaders of multinational states or empires should be wary of any precipitous loss of status on the international scene, which could catalyze fissiparous ten- dencies domestically. War could result as a strategy to preserve status in such cases. In the case of Italy, war helped to make the nation, and the nation helped to fortify the state. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021