Status-Seeking and Nation-Building
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Journal of Interdisciplinary History, LI:I (Summer, 2020), 65–95. Simone Paci, Nicholas Sambanis, and William C. Wohlforth Status-Seeking and Nation-Building: The “Piedmont Principle” Revisited The image of a core state serving as a nucleus drawing culturally similar, neighboring peoples into a larger nation powerfully influenced nationalism studies, but the role of interstate war and status-seeking in nation- building has been overlooked. By addressing this important gap, this Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 article sheds new light on Italy’s unification. It develops a “second- image reversed” theory connecting international and domestic pol- itics and tests it in a paradigmatic example of nation-building, the Piedmont-led unification of Italy. Aspiring nation-builders looked to this case for inspiration: Prussia was “Germany’s Piedmont” and Serbia “Yugoslavia’sPiedmont.” Martin memorably coined the “Piedmont Principle” to describe the policy of awarding quasi-state institutions to nations within the Soviet Union in order to attract co-nationals outside Soviet jurisdiction, providing the foundation for both future national unification and Soviet expansionism. The borders of today’s Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and other states re- flect the early attempts of Soviet officials to put that principle into practice. Yet a key feature of the Piedmont case generally evades studies of unification nationalism—the role of international status in inducing national identification.1 Simone Paci is a doctoral student, Dept. of Political Science, Columbia University. Nicholas Sambanis is Presidential Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. He is the author, with Michael Doyle, of Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton, 2006); editor, with Paul Collier, of Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. I. Africa; II. Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (Washington, D.C., 2005). William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College. He is the author, with Carla Norrlöf, of “Raison de l’Hégémonie (The Hegemon’s Interest): Theory of the Costs and Benefits of Hegemony,” Security Studies, 28, no. 3 (July–September 2019), 422–450, available at doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604982; editor, with Anatoly V. Torkunov and Boris F. Martynov, of History of International Relations and Russian Foreign Policy in the 20th Century (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2020), 2 v. © 2020 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Inc., https://doi.org/10.1162/jinh_a_01520 1 Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization, XXXII (1978), 881–912. Second-image-reversed theories explore how the international system (“third image”) shapes domestic politics. Terry Dean Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 66 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH Before unification, fewer than 5 percent of the people living on the Italian Peninsula spoke standard Italian. Foreign empires dominated most Italian states, and local identities exerted a pow- erful pull. How did this situation change, and why was Piedmont able to rise to the position of a core state representing the ideals of unification nationalism among a people who did not previously share a common national identity? Strong evidence suggests that ’ an important part of Piedmont s success at winning status relative Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 to other Italian sates was its ability to insert itself into international diplomacy and thereby gain the kind of international support that could facilitate a Piedmont-led Italian unification. Such a nation- building strategy was denied to many would-be Piedmonts. The role of status-seeking in nation-building projects is not only rarely studied and bereft of theory; it is also largely lost in the burgeoning literature about status in international politics. The contention that status affects state behavior dates back to Thu- cydides. It became a leitmotif in mid-twentieth century classical realism, as well as a subject in two waves of modern scholarship, the first in the 1970s and the second beginning in the new millen- nium. Cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neurosci- ence and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology demonstrates that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire to achieve social status. Status—a recognized position in a social hierarchy—thus figures crucially in social life. Scholars of international relations now in- creasingly agree that salient state behavior—an express dissatisfac- tion with the “rules-based liberal international order” and a favorable disposition toward “nation branding,” public diplomacy, troop contributions, aircraft carriers, humanitarian aid, “big science” projects, and much more—reflect the role that status plays in the international political arena.2 Status seeking is an increasingly invoked explanation for oth- erwise puzzling, costly state behavior, notably war. Yet, with rare exceptions, nation-building is not considered among the motiva- tions for status-seeking. In the case of Piedmont, a key mechanism (Ithaca, 2001), 9, 274–276; David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Popu- lations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, 1998). 2 For a review of the status literature, see Alan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science, XVII (2014), 383–384. THE “PIEDMONT PRINCIPLE” | 67 in the attainment of that status was participation in a major inter- state war. Improbably, tiny Piedmont joined Britain, France, and Turkey against the Russian Empire, dispatching one-third of its army to Crimea. Viewed from the perspective of most models of war participation, this behavior is puzzling, but it follows seam- lessly from our theory, and, as we show, it worked.3 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 THEORY: STATUS, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND NATION-BUILDING What could possibly have been missing from the abundant literature that deals with the subjects of this article—war, nation-building, status, and social identity? Researchers largely ignored the connections between these phenomena. International relations (IR) theory asks why nation-states fight wars or seek status, but because it takes the origins of nations and states as givens, it has little to say about how war or status-seeking helps to shape them. Classic theories of state- building in comparative politics consider interstate war as an exter- nal threat capable of consolidating the interests of domestic elites and unifying a population with a pre-existing common identity, but they tend to treat war as exogenous to the state-building pro- cess. This article bridges this divide by arguing that all of these pieces can be pulled together in specific settings. NATION-BUILDING AND SOCIAL IDENTITY Nation-building is the process of creating—and identifying with—a common national identity to legitimize the authority of the state. Individuals have a repertoire of identities, not all of which are relevant all the time. Nation-building is the process that makes national identities salient by pushing individuals to re-imagine themselves as parts of a su- perordinate identity, a nation. The Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM) in social psychology shows how intergroup cooperation can emerge from such re-categorization, weakening attachment to subordinate identities. The CIIM is applicable to the question of nationalism and nation-building because the ethnocentrism that 3 Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, 2017); Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth, “Reputation and Status,” 371–393; Richard N. Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York, 2010); Thazha V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and Wohlforth (eds.), Status in World Politics (New York, 2014); Sambanis, Stergios Skaperdas, and Wohlforth, “Nation-Building through War,” American Political Science Review, CIX (2015), 279–296. 68 | PACI, SAMBANIS, AND WOHLFORTH nationalism can encourage stands to diminish conflict within a nation as ties to subordinate groups, such as regions or ethnicities, dim under the umbrella of a new nation. Previous studies identify three key determinants of group identification—material benefits, in-group similarities, and group status. Material benefits include the payoff that individuals expect from joining or remaining in a group (a share of any material gains that accrue to the group). In-group similarities refer to the cultural, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jinh/article-pdf/51/1/65/1873267/jinh_a_01520.pdf by guest on 02 October 2021 ethnic, or other perceived commonalities that individuals recog- nize between themselves and other group members. Group status depends on the place within an established hierarchy among com- peting groups. A key insight from social-identity theory is that in- dividuals are more likely to identify with high-status groups (because they derive more self-esteem from group membership), with groups from which they feel less distant, and with groups that help them to derive greater material benefits. This study brings the