International Human Rights Pressure, the Strategic use of Forced Disappearances: The Case of the Second Chechen War 1999-2009 M. Rodwan Abouharb Department of Political Science The Rubin Building, 29/30 Tavistock Square, University College London London, WC1H 9QU. Phone: +44 (0)20 7679 4922 Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 4969 Email:
[email protected] & Erick Duchesne Département de Science Politique And Institut Québécois des Hautes Études Internationales (HEI) Pavillon Charles-De Koninck 1030, av. des Sciences-Humaines Local 3453 Université Laval Québec (Québec) Canada G1V 0A6 Phone: 1-418-656-2131 Poste 2406 Fax: 1-418-656-7861
[email protected] & Caroline L. Payne Department of Political Science D-327 Academic Center Lycoming College Williamsport, PA 17701 Phone: (570) 321-4277 Fax: (570) 321-4371 Email:
[email protected] Prepared for the Human Rights in an Age of Ambiguity Conference, New York City, June 13-15, 2016. ABSTRACT We argue that repressive political leaders are rational utility maximizers acting strategically in their choice amongst types of repression. Choices amongst repression types depend partly upon leaders being held responsible for their particular actions. We argue that some decision-makers who wish to continue with repression will respond to increasing scrutiny of their state’s human rights record by firstly conceding that human rights violations may have taken place, but blame the opposition for these exactions. In contrast with the spiral and boomerang models, which posit that state behavior will improve, we argue that the second response of these repressive states will be to modify their repression strategies.