Thumping the Hive Russian Neocortical Warfare in Chechnya
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-03 Thumping the hive Russian neocortical warfare in Chechnya McIntosh, Scott E. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1379 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THUMPING THE HIVE: RUSSIAN NEOCORTICAL WARFARE IN CHECHNYA by Scott E. McIntosh September 2004 Thesis Advisor: M. Tsypkin Second Reader: T. Thomas Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED September 2004 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Thumping the Hive: Russian 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Neocortical Warfare in Chechnya 6. AUTHOR(S) Capt Scott E. McIntosh, USAF 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict. Why has success eluded this Cold War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic? Russia has since hiccupped back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided much speculation as to why. For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to support the Kremlin’s actions. These are significant independent variables that might explain Russian failure in 1994. However, another less tangible factor—Richard Szafranski’s paradigm of Neocortical Warfare—may explain Russia’s poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999. To evaluate this concept, the author examines the influences of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield communications—prime factors in influencing combatants’ perceptions—to gauge these factors’ effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions. He then holds the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Russian Information Warfare in Chechnya. Application of Neocortical 15. NUMBER OF paradigm. PAGES 108 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THUMPING THE HIVE: RUSSIAN NEOCORTICAL WARFARE IN CHECHNYA Scott E. McIntosh Captain, United States Air Force B.A., Russian and East European Studies, University of Kansas, 1993 B.A., Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Kansas, 1993 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL September 2004 Author: Scott E. McIntosh Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin Thesis Advisor Timothy Thomas Second Reader James J. Wirtz Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Since the 1994 Chechen war, analysts have written volumes about the evolution of—and lessons learned from—this ongoing conflict. Why has success eluded this Cold War superpower in subduing the small Caucasian republic? Russia has since hiccupped back and forth across the spectrum of conflict in the region and the years have provided much speculation as to why. For a decade, researchers have described Chechen terror, erosion of the Russian military, and the inconsistent resolve of the Russian population to support the Kremlin’s actions. These are significant independent variables that might explain Russian failure in 1994. However, another less tangible factor—Richard Szafranski’s paradigm of Neocortical Warfare—may explain Russia’s poor performance in the initial invasion and the improved performance in 1999. To evaluate this concept, the author examines the influences of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Public Affairs, Psychological Operations, and battlefield communications—prime factors in influencing combatants’ perceptions—to gauge these factors’ effects on the relative Russian performances in the separate invasions. He then holds the results up to the Neocortical lens to evaluate whether the concept is pertinent to the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. HISTORY .........................................................................................................1 B. EROSION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER..........................................5 C. CHECHEN USE OF TERROR......................................................................7 D. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE......................................................................10 II. 1994 INVASION.........................................................................................................15 A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (IPB)....17 B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) ...............................................................................22 C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ..........................................................25 D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS.....................................................30 III. 1999 INVASION.........................................................................................................35 A. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE..............39 B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ........................................................................................42 C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ..........................................................51 D. BATTLEFIELD COMMUNICATIONS.....................................................58 IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................65 A. GROWING ASYMMETRY AND URBANIZATION...............................74 B. NEOCORTICAL WARFARE......................................................................77 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................83 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................91 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Matrix...............................................................................................................13 Table 2. Matrix...............................................................................................................78 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS AAR—After-Action Report COTS—Commercial Off-The-Shelf Technology FAPSI—Russian Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information GRU—Russian military’s Main Intelligence Directorate HUMINT—Human Intelligence IPB—Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace MOUT—Military Operations on Urban Terrain MVD—Russian Interior Ministry OODA—Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act PA—Public Affairs PSYOP—Psychological Operations REB—Russian Radio Electronic Combat forces RIC—Russian Information Center RPG—Rocket Propelled Grenade SIGINT—Signals Intelligence xi THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank Dr. Jacob Kipp; LtCol Tim Thomas, U.S. Army (Ret.); and LtCol Les Grau, U.S. Army (Ret.) of the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Ft. Leavenworth, KS, for assistance and guidance in this endeavor. A hearty thanks also to Prof. Mikhail Tsypkin, who represents a cornucopia of former Soviet knowledge. The author would also like to thank Dr. James Smith and Mrs. Diana Heerdt, of the USAF Institute for National Security Studies, for their help in facilitating the focal research trip to FMSO. Mr. And Mrs. Andrew Brown of Baltimore,