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November 2009

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A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South

Robert Matthews

Summary South Waziristan, a remote mountainous region After a two-week spate of terrorism in late Sep- bordering , is the home base of the tember and October 2009, which killed at least 166 Tehrik-i- (TTP), and is people, the Pakistani army launched Operation Rah considered to be a global hub for Islamic e Nijat (Path to Salvation), a retaliatory ground of- militants. The Pakistani army’s historic coddling fensive in the Taliban-controlled area of South Wa- and cultivation of militants has ended by creating ziristan. The operation captured the global media’s a Frankenstein monster, which the military is now attention, as it exemplified the country’s deteriorating desperately attempting to control. The insurgents’ security and stability and highlighted the dramatic increasingly apparent goal is to destabilize and stakes involved. Over 28,000 Pakistani soldiers initi- ultimately overthrow the state, as evidenced by the ated combat executing a pincer movement to encircle spate of recent terrorist attacks. While the attack the homeland of the Mehsud tribe which lies inside a on the Mehsud Taliban and the TTP movement ring of government-held towns. The Mehsud are re- was welcomed by Nato members, the campaign’s puted to be among the fiercest fighters in Pakistan goals are still uncertain. The general view is that and the army faces 10,000 of them, plus an additional win, lose or draw, this battle will be tougher than 2,000 or so fighters from Uzbekistan, al-Qaeda and the operations in either Swat or Bajaur, and may the Punjab. be the army’s biggest challenge yet in their confrontation with home-grown jihadists.

Robert Matthews is a consultant on Afghanistan, Pakistan and US foreign policy with the Norwegian Peacebuild- ing Centre (Noref) in Oslo. He holds a PhD in Latin American history from New York University. A former professor of history and politics at New York University, Matthews has been a researcher on foreign policy with several foreign policy centres in Spain for the past twenty-five years. He has written about US relations with Latin America and with the developing world in general, as well as US involvement in low-intensity conflicts during the . In recent years his research has focussed on the US global war on terrorism, the wars in and Afghani- stan, US-Middle East policy, and US conflicts with Venezuela, Iran and North Korea.

November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are living a peril- the strength of Washington’s resolve, and fearful of ous moment. Afghanistan, besides its ongoing war India’s designs on its western border, can sustain the and violence, confronts a governance crisis and a will to win in this operation. More to the point, does president who stands accused of stealing the election. it see any advantage in destroying these erstwhile Pakistan has embarked on a high-risk military cam- geopolitical allies? paign to combat the escalating terrorism that is desta- bilizing the state. Both situations at this moment are If the army ends up being satisfied with merely de- cliff-hangers, but the Pakistanis may have been dealt grading the TTP as a terrorist threat, the latter will an even more difficult and complicated hand than the be left wounded but further radicalized, strength- government of Hamid Karzai. ened in the crucial struggle for the support of the people, and better positioned in the long run to ter- rorize and challenge the state. If the military wages Ambiguous objectives an all-out campaign but fails, the result will be even While the attack on the Mehsud Taliban and their more devastating. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) movement was wel- comed by Nato members, the campaign’s goals are still uncertain. In the first place, many of the mili- Background tants have ties to, or were trained by, the army and the The army’s historic coddling and cultivation of mili- Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The army also has tants has ended by creating a Frankenstein monster, widespread doubts that the resolve of US and Nato which the military is now desperately attempting to regional military commitments are firm. In addition, control. The insurgents’ increasingly apparent goal there is a general consensus that India is deepening is to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the state, its influence in both Afghanistan and the restive Pak- as evidenced by recent terrorist attacks. Yet the Paki- istani province of Baluchistan. stani army has only fitfully confronted the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Hence, the military’s aim may not be to eliminate the insurgency outright, but rather to disperse the The army launched brief offensives in South Wa- rebels and destroy the leadership. The goal would ziristan in recent years, but by the military’s own be to cripple its capacity to commit terrorism at will reckoning, the last two operations against the tribal throughout Pakistan, while keeping the insurgents militants in South Waziristan ended in failure. The alive as a geopolitical trump card. Nevertheless, de- January 2004 operation resulted in heavy casualties spite the elimination of its former leader, Baitullah and led to the infamous Shakai peace agreement in Mehsud, by a US drone in August, which resulted in April 2004, followed by an agreement with the late a brief succession struggle, the current TTP leader- Tehrik-i-Taliban chief at Sararogha ship seems intact and unified. on 5 February 2005. In late January 2008, the mili- tary launched to dislodge Mehsud The obstacles to achieving the objective of neutral- from his sanctuary. The operation did not faze the izing the Mehsud Taliban in South Waziristan are and within two weeks the mili- indeed formidable. In a real sense, the Pakistani tary conceded the necessity to revive the Sararogha army is challenging both history and geography in its peace deal. South Waziristan campaign. The Mehsud tribesmen possess a tradition of fierce resistance to those who The army was jolted into action last spring when would try to subdue them, a quality fully recognized militants advanced from the Swat valley in the by the British in the nineteenth century. North-West Frontier Province into the districts of Dir and Buner – within 100 kilometres of ; the A key question is whether Pakistan’s national securi- army was only able to wrest back the Swat valley ty establishment has genuinely reassessed its historic from the militants after a two-month campaign. Af- ties with Islamic militants and views them now as en- ter checking the militant advance in Swat last spring, emies, rather than defenders of the state and useful the military has had South Waziristan in its gun pawns to check India’s regional ambitions. Hovering sights, softening up entrenched rebel positions with over the operation in South Waziristan is the ques- sporadic air attacks during the summer. However, tion of whether the Pakistani military, sceptical of

November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan

Advantages enjoyed by the military this is the fifth army operation against the Pakistani 1. The most visible advantage the army has over the Taliban in the past five years and in each case the insurgency appears to be in its superior numbers and results were inconclusive. equipment. By deploying almost 30,000 troops it has committed roughly 10,000 more soldiers than the army deployed in Swat in the spring. Pakistani sol- Terrorist attacks diers also have better logistical support and supplies, The army knew in May that the real source of the including appropriate winter gear, than in previous mushrooming incidence of terrorist bombings in campaigns. Pakistan in the past three years was the southern- most tribal agency of South Waziristan. This re- 2. The military spent two months pounding enemy mote mountainous region bordering Afghanistan is positions with air strikes and has had time to prepare the home base of the TTP, and is considered to be a itself. The attacks do not represent a reactive coun- global hub for militants, responsible for 80% of Paki- terterrorist measure, except in the narrow sense that stan’s terrorist violence, including the assassination the spate of terrorist violence moved the timetable up of . slightly. In fact, the terrorist attacks were more likely a response to the army’s build-up and the indications The army has been planning an operation in South of pending military action in South Waziristan. The Waziristan since June, but then had its hand forced by army, sensing a threat to the Pakistani state for the the bloody spate of terrorism that engulfed Pakistan first time this year, and perhaps feeling that it has its in the three weeks prior to launching the campaign. back to the wall, now seems to possess the political The violence included a militant takeover of the mili- will necessary to beat back the insurgents. It initi- tary headquarters in Rawalpindi, and the killing of ated the attack aggressively by taking the battle to the some 180 people. In the absence of these attacks, the Mehsud Taliban with a ground offensive from three military would probably have opted to wait, continu- directions in order to surround the enemy. The army ing to soften up the area for a while longer. will continue to benefit from air support.

The Taliban militancy may weaken as the main Paki- 3. Washington, happy the army was finally taking stani Taliban faction is flushed from its stronghold. on this problem along the frontier with Afghanistan, The general view, however, is that win, lose or draw, promised to assist with stepped up unmanned flights this battle will be tougher than the operations in ei- over the battle area, for reconnaissance and identifi- ther Swat or Bajaur, and may be the army’s biggest cation of militant leaders in their mountain strong- challenge yet in their confrontation with home-grown holds. It is also rushing specialized equipment to the jihadists. military in the area.

As air force jets pounded the mountain strongholds of 4. The army contends that this time it will not repro- the militants, the army is moving more rapidly than in duce past unsuccessful efforts to subdue the Mehsud previous campaigns. It has retaken Koktai, the birth- and tribes. These failures reach as far back as place of , current leader of the the British experience in the nineteenth century and Taliban in South Waziristan, and the home town of have been mirrored by the army’s bungled attempts Mehsud, a senior Taliban commander in the past few years. Now the army declares that it known as “the mentor of suicide bombers”. will follow this invasion with a process of political and economic development, ultimately aiming to in- But soldiers will soon encounter a defensive perim- tegrate Waziristan into the rest of the country. eter around , the redoubt of tough and experienced Uzbek fighters 2500 metres up in the 5. Tribalism could work in the army’s favour. For ex- mountains and a gateway to the Taliban stronghold ample, the army was able to negotiate at least a tem- at Sararogha. As the army advances it risks getting porary deal with two rival militant leaders in North bogged down inside heavily fortified rebel sanctuar- Waziristan before the battle began. Two Wazir Tal- ies. Thus, the hope is to wrap up the campaign within iban groups led by and Hafiz Gul Ba- two months, before winter snows bog down the ef- hadar control territory which surrounds the Mehsud fort. stronghold that is the now the army’s battlefield. In

November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan

exchange for the army granting the insurgents safe 3. The army faces 10,000-12,000 hard-core Taliban, conduct for all their movements of men and supplies including as many as 1,500 tough Uzbek fighters, (and most likely also offering them sums of money), smaller numbers of Arab al-Qaeda members and el- the rivals of Hakimullah Mehsud pledged to remain ements of Punjabi militant groups. They are better neutral and refrain from attacking the army or its sup- armed and more fierce than the militants the army ply lines as it advanced through their territory. faced in Swat and very adept at hit-and-run tactics.

6. It appears that this time the political will to beat 4. For the time being, at least, the militants have re- back the terrorist threat in FATA is real. The army, tained the capacity to attack other areas of Pakistan. the government and the general population all agree Since the offensive began, suicide bombers, traced the time has come to deal with the Pakistani Taliban. to South Waziristan, have already killed over 100 Public sentiment, a significant percentage of which people, wounded at least 250, including two suicide had previously favoured the militants as defenders of bomb blasts at the Islamic University in Islamabad, Islam and Pakistani nationalism, has turned against and assassinated a brigadier general and his driver, them since the events last spring in Swat. After the also in the capital. The army hopes that this terror- first ten days of the present campaign, the military ist capacity will become diluted as the insurgents are claims that over two hundred jihadists have been gradually cleared from their strongholds. killed against a much smaller fraction of the army’s soldiers. However, the results so far appear inconclu- 5. Despite early hopes that the Afghan Taliban will sive and the reality is still open to speculation, as the stay out of the fight, there are already signs that Tal- army has virtually blocked access to the area by jour- iban fighters are crossing over the border from Af- nalists. ghanistan into Pakistan. Because fighting now is evolving from seasonal to year-round, these fighters At this juncture the difficulties and risks the opera- may ultimately augment the Mehsud forces well be- tion faces are not inconsiderable and would appear to yond the present numbers. counter the military’s optimism. 6. The terrain is arguably more difficult – rugged and semi-arid, with mountains and sparse forests cut Disadvantages confronting the military by creek beds and steep ravines – landscape favour- 1. If the army is better prepared now, the militants, ing the Mehsud tribesmen who have lived there for in fact, have had years to train fighters, prepare their centuries. The further the army penetrates into the bunkers, and stockpile weapons and ammunition. mountain strongholds dominated by the Mehsud, at This forces the army to deal with the insurgents, at heights of over 2000 meters, the more difficult and least for the short term, with a primarily military costly the fighting is likely to become. strategy — as opposed to a comprehensive counterin- surgency approach. There is little evidence so far of 7. Civilian casualties could undermine support. The the long-term counterinsurgency measures designed Pakistani army may opt to use heavy artillery and to protect and win the support of the population. longer-range weapons – which are less precise – in It remains to be seen whether the army can achieve order to soften up militant bastions, as well as to hold enough to allow for the development side of the op- down army casualties, resulting in more damage to eration to take hold. the local population.

2. The ratio of Pakistani soldiers to militants is low- Both South and North Waziristan have been the focus er than in Swat, where about 20,000 soldiers fought of more than 40 drone attacks this year, and Pakistan- 4,000 to 5,000 militants. In fact, it is estimated that of is calculate nearly 700 civilian deaths from drone at- the approximately 30,000 troops currently engaged tacks in Pakistan since 2006. Further missile strikes with some 11,000 Taliban in South Waziristan, there by US drones on militant leadership could produce are only about 11,000 infantrymen, a ratio of one to undesirable loss of civilian life. one and about a fifth of the soldiers needed to wage effective counterinsurgency in this case. Anti-Americanism is already rife among the Paki- stanis who blame the United States for the country’s current crisis. Civilian injuries and deaths would

November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan

aggravate the problem of a Pakistani population the United Mujahideen Council. Although the group openly critical of both the government and its alliance fragmented in a bitter leadership struggle after a US with the US. For now the US has pledged, at Paki- drone attack killed Baitullah Mehsud in August, pres- stan’s request, to refrain from using unmanned drone sures remain to recreate the front and to resist efforts aircraft to strike militants in the contested area. by the Pakistani army to divide them.

8. A potential problem looming on the horizon as the It is shaky deal in any case, resting on the shifting fighting drags on is the harm to civilians and dam- sands of FATA’s power politics and the mutual wari- age to their property and livelihood, resulting from ness and ambivalence of the army and two terrorist internal displacement. Reports indicate that upwards groups who have already engaged in bloody clashes. of 250,000 civilians have already fled the fighting in Precedents are not auspicious: recent army-Taliban South Waziristan. Initial predictions point to a smaller accords have generally broken down or ended up fa- civilian exodus which is not expected to produce a hu- vouring the Taliban, one way or another. Moreover, manitarian crisis on the scale of the approximately 2 Washington is undoubtedly looking askance at an ar- million people displaced (many still homeless) after rangement that fortifies a group with strong ties to al- fleeing the fighting in the Swat valley last spring. But Qaeda and the Haqqani Taliban faction, both of which it is too early to affirm that hope. Nato is fighting in Afghanistan. The agreement could well free these two Wazir groups to concentrate on The prospect of displacing half of South Waziristan’s Afghanistan. At this point, many observers predict population, and possibly mishandling assistance ef- this odd coupling of convenience between the army forts for the refugee population – as was the case in and their bloody-minded antagonists will be short- Swat – is potentially a serious problem for the gov- lived. ernment. First, in the tribal regions, long-term strate- gies aimed at gaining the population’s support for the government in Islamabad might suffer setbacks. This An uncertain future is critical in light of the historic mistreatment and ne- The failure of this operation would have serious, glect of the tribal regions by the central government. perhaps disastrous, consequences for Pakistan and well beyond. It will certainly complicate the already Second, among the general population, the perception strained alliance with the US. A battle lost in the heart of a reckless disregard for the safety and well-being of of Pashtun Pakistan cannot help but reinforce Nato’s Pakistani victims of this war could undermine pub- enemies in the Pashtun-dominated areas of south- lic support for the operation, the anti-militant cam- eastern Afghanistan. It will strengthen al-Qaeda and paign and the Pakistani military in general. This risk send a chill into the region — especially the Central is made more acute by the waning credibility of the Asian republics contending with their own versions of central government, already seen as corrupt and in- jihadism. The blow to the credibility of the Pakistani competent. To assuage the plight of the refugees and government, in tandem with the fragile political situa- reduce negative fallout for the government, Islamabad tion in Afghanistan, could produce a seismic wave of is now granting registered refugees (only 128,000 so instability for the near future. far) a month’s supply of food and a monthly stipend worth about $50. A crushing of the TTP on the other hand, would mark a significant victory and provide Pakistan with some 9. It is not clear that the agreement between the army breathing space to regain stability, but it will likely and the two Wazir Taliban groups will hold, or is a not have a major impact on the fighting in Afghani- model for future deals. In the first place, it was not stan. In fact, if the campaign drags on for any length an example of the army “flipping” these groups to of time, it could fuel the conflict across Pakistan’s bor- the government’s side; rather it was the army taking ders. Thus, at this point the operation undertaken by advantage of a current split among the Waziristan the Pakistani military in South Waziristan looks like Taliban. Nazir and Bahadar, encouraged by al-Qaeda a high-risk, modest-gain gamble whose outcome may and the Afghan Taliban leader , not be clear for some time. had allied with Baitullah Mehsud in February creat- ing a triple alliance which unified the North and South Waziristan Taliban into a single grouping they called

November 2009