November 2009 Noref Articles A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan Robert Matthews Summary South Waziristan, a remote mountainous region After a two-week spate of terrorism in late Sep- bordering Afghanistan, is the home base of the tember and October 2009, which killed at least 166 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and is people, the Pakistani army launched Operation Rah considered to be a global hub for Islamic e Nijat (Path to Salvation), a retaliatory ground of- militants. The Pakistani army’s historic coddling fensive in the Taliban-controlled area of South Wa- and cultivation of militants has ended by creating ziristan. The operation captured the global media’s a Frankenstein monster, which the military is now attention, as it exemplified the country’s deteriorating desperately attempting to control. The insurgents’ security and stability and highlighted the dramatic increasingly apparent goal is to destabilize and stakes involved. Over 28,000 Pakistani soldiers initi- ultimately overthrow the state, as evidenced by the ated combat executing a pincer movement to encircle spate of recent terrorist attacks. While the attack the homeland of the Mehsud tribe which lies inside a on the Mehsud Taliban and the TTP movement ring of government-held towns. The Mehsud are re- was welcomed by Nato members, the campaign’s puted to be among the fiercest fighters in Pakistan goals are still uncertain. The general view is that and the army faces 10,000 of them, plus an additional win, lose or draw, this battle will be tougher than 2,000 or so fighters from Uzbekistan, al-Qaeda and the operations in either Swat or Bajaur, and may the Punjab. be the army’s biggest challenge yet in their confrontation with home-grown jihadists. Robert Matthews is a consultant on Afghanistan, Pakistan and US foreign policy with the Norwegian Peacebuild- ing Centre (Noref) in Oslo. He holds a PhD in Latin American history from New York University. A former professor of history and politics at New York University, Matthews has been a researcher on United States foreign policy with several foreign policy centres in Spain for the past twenty-five years. He has written about US relations with Latin America and with the developing world in general, as well as US involvement in low-intensity conflicts during the cold war. In recent years his research has focussed on the US global war on terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghani- stan, US-Middle East policy, and US conflicts with Venezuela, Iran and North Korea. November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are living a peril- the strength of Washington’s resolve, and fearful of ous moment. Afghanistan, besides its ongoing war India’s designs on its western border, can sustain the and violence, confronts a governance crisis and a will to win in this operation. More to the point, does president who stands accused of stealing the election. it see any advantage in destroying these erstwhile Pakistan has embarked on a high-risk military cam- geopolitical allies? paign to combat the escalating terrorism that is desta- bilizing the state. Both situations at this moment are If the army ends up being satisfied with merely de- cliff-hangers, but the Pakistanis may have been dealt grading the TTP as a terrorist threat, the latter will an even more difficult and complicated hand than the be left wounded but further radicalized, strength- government of Hamid Karzai. ened in the crucial struggle for the support of the people, and better positioned in the long run to ter- rorize and challenge the state. If the military wages Ambiguous objectives an all-out campaign but fails, the result will be even While the attack on the Mehsud Taliban and their more devastating. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) movement was wel- comed by Nato members, the campaign’s goals are still uncertain. In the first place, many of the mili- Background tants have ties to, or were trained by, the army and the The army’s historic coddling and cultivation of mili- Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The army also has tants has ended by creating a Frankenstein monster, widespread doubts that the resolve of US and Nato which the military is now desperately attempting to regional military commitments are firm. In addition, control. The insurgents’ increasingly apparent goal there is a general consensus that India is deepening is to destabilize and ultimately overthrow the state, its influence in both Afghanistan and the restive Pak- as evidenced by recent terrorist attacks. Yet the Paki- istani province of Baluchistan. stani army has only fitfully confronted the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Hence, the military’s aim may not be to eliminate the insurgency outright, but rather to disperse the The army launched brief offensives in South Wa- rebels and destroy the leadership. The goal would ziristan in recent years, but by the military’s own be to cripple its capacity to commit terrorism at will reckoning, the last two operations against the tribal throughout Pakistan, while keeping the insurgents militants in South Waziristan ended in failure. The alive as a geopolitical trump card. Nevertheless, de- January 2004 operation resulted in heavy casualties spite the elimination of its former leader, Baitullah and led to the infamous Shakai peace agreement in Mehsud, by a US drone in August, which resulted in April 2004, followed by an agreement with the late a brief succession struggle, the current TTP leader- Tehrik-i-Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud at Sararogha ship seems intact and unified. on 5 February 2005. In late January 2008, the mili- tary launched Operation Zalzala to dislodge Mehsud The obstacles to achieving the objective of neutral- from his sanctuary. The operation did not faze the izing the Mehsud Taliban in South Waziristan are Taliban insurgency and within two weeks the mili- indeed formidable. In a real sense, the Pakistani tary conceded the necessity to revive the Sararogha army is challenging both history and geography in its peace deal. South Waziristan campaign. The Mehsud tribesmen possess a tradition of fierce resistance to those who The army was jolted into action last spring when would try to subdue them, a quality fully recognized militants advanced from the Swat valley in the by the British in the nineteenth century. North-West Frontier Province into the districts of Dir and Buner – within 100 kilometres of Islamabad; the A key question is whether Pakistan’s national securi- army was only able to wrest back the Swat valley ty establishment has genuinely reassessed its historic from the militants after a two-month campaign. Af- ties with Islamic militants and views them now as en- ter checking the militant advance in Swat last spring, emies, rather than defenders of the state and useful the military has had South Waziristan in its gun pawns to check India’s regional ambitions. Hovering sights, softening up entrenched rebel positions with over the operation in South Waziristan is the ques- sporadic air attacks during the summer. However, tion of whether the Pakistani military, sceptical of November 2009 Robert Matthews: A risky gambit: The Pakistani army campaign in South Waziristan Advantages enjoyed by the military this is the fifth army operation against the Pakistani 1. The most visible advantage the army has over the Taliban in the past five years and in each case the insurgency appears to be in its superior numbers and results were inconclusive. equipment. By deploying almost 30,000 troops it has committed roughly 10,000 more soldiers than the army deployed in Swat in the spring. Pakistani sol- Terrorist attacks diers also have better logistical support and supplies, The army knew in May that the real source of the including appropriate winter gear, than in previous mushrooming incidence of terrorist bombings in campaigns. Pakistan in the past three years was the southern- most tribal agency of South Waziristan. This re- 2. The military spent two months pounding enemy mote mountainous region bordering Afghanistan is positions with air strikes and has had time to prepare the home base of the TTP, and is considered to be a itself. The attacks do not represent a reactive coun- global hub for militants, responsible for 80% of Paki- terterrorist measure, except in the narrow sense that stan’s terrorist violence, including the assassination the spate of terrorist violence moved the timetable up of Benazir Bhutto. slightly. In fact, the terrorist attacks were more likely a response to the army’s build-up and the indications The army has been planning an operation in South of pending military action in South Waziristan. The Waziristan since June, but then had its hand forced by army, sensing a threat to the Pakistani state for the the bloody spate of terrorism that engulfed Pakistan first time this year, and perhaps feeling that it has its in the three weeks prior to launching the campaign. back to the wall, now seems to possess the political The violence included a militant takeover of the mili- will necessary to beat back the insurgents. It initi- tary headquarters in Rawalpindi, and the killing of ated the attack aggressively by taking the battle to the some 180 people. In the absence of these attacks, the Mehsud Taliban with a ground offensive from three military would probably have opted to wait, continu- directions in order to surround the enemy. The army ing to soften up the area for a while longer. will continue to benefit from air support. The Taliban militancy may weaken as the main Paki- 3. Washington, happy the army was finally taking stani Taliban faction is flushed from its stronghold.