MICT-15-96-PT 738 D738 - D711 11 July 2016 MB

UNITED NATIONS ______

Case No.: MICT-15-96-PT Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals Date: 11 July 2016 Original: English ______

IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER

Before: Judge Burton Hall, Presiding Judge Seon Ki Park Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

Date: 11 July 2016

PROSECUTOR

v.

JOVICA STANIŠIĆ FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ

PUBLIC ______

STANIŠIĆ DEFENCE MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATED FACTS ______

The Office of the Prosecutor Defence Counsel for Mr. Stanišić Mr. Douglas Stringer Mr. Wayne Jordash QC Mr. Scott Martin

Defence Counsel for Mr. Simatović Mr. Mihajlo Bakrač Mr. Vladimir Petrović

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I. Introduction 1. Pursuant to Rule 115(B) of the MICT Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules”),1 the Defence respectfully requests the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of certain facts which relate to the alleged crimes in the current proceedings and have been previously adjudicated by the ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers in the cases of Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al.,2 Prosecutor v. Krajišnik,3 Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić,4 Prosecutor v. Martić,5 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić,6 Prosecutor v. Simić et al.,7 and Prosecutor v. Tolimir.8

2. Annex A provides the 92 proposed adjudicated facts (“Proposed Facts”) that the Stanišić Defence requests the Trial Chamber to consider.

II. Applicable Law 3. Rule 115(B) of the Rules states:

At the request of a Party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber, after hearing the Parties, may decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts or of the authenticity of documentary evidence from other proceedings of the ICTY, the ICTR, or the Mechanism relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings. 4. In assessing whether to take judicial notice of a fact, the Trial Chamber follows a two-step process.9 Firstly, all Proposed Facts must satisfy the following factors:

i. The fact must have some relevance to an issue in the current proceedings;10

1 MICT/1/Rev.1, 18 April 2016. 2 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeal Judgement, 16 November 2012; Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-T, Trial Judgement, 15 April 2011. 3 Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeal Judgement, 17 March 2009; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgement, 27 September 2006. 4 Prosecutor v. Lukić and Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 4 December 2012; Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Judgement, 20 July 2009. 5 Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 October 2008; Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Judgement, 12 June 2007. 6 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 5 May 2009; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Trial Judgement, 27 September 2007. 7 Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 November 2006; Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgement, 17 October 2003. 8 Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Appeal Judgement, 8 April 2015; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Judgement, 12 December 2012. 9 Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts with Annex, 26 September 2006 (“Popović Trial Decision”), para. 4. 10 Prosecutor v. Hadžić, Case No. IT-04-75-T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts and Documents, 23 May 2013 (“Hadžić Decision”), para. 1; Prosecutor v. Karadžić, MICT-15-96-PT 1 11 July 2016 736

ii. The fact must be distinct, concrete and identifiable;11

iii. The fact, as formulated by the moving party, must not differ in any way from the formulation of the original judgement;12

iv. The fact must not be unclear or misleading in the context in which it is placed in the moving party’s motion;13

v. The fact must be identified with adequate precision by the moving party;14

vi. The fact must not contain characterisations or findings of an essentially legal nature;15

vii. The fact must not be based on an agreement between the parties to the original proceedings;16

viii. The fact must not relate to the acts, conduct, or mental state of the accused.17 However, the exclusion of Proposed Facts relating to the acts, conduct, or mental state of the accused does not apply to the conduct of other persons for whose criminal acts and omissions the accused is allegedly responsible

Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Fourth Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 14 June 2010 (“Karadžić Decision”), para. 16; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for Judicial Notice, 1 April 2005 (“Nikolić Appeal Decision”), paras 11, 48, 56. 11 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Concerning Sarajevo, 26 June 2008, para. 18; Prosecutor v. Mico Stanišić, Case No. IT-04-79-PT, Decision on Judicial Notice, 14 December 2007 (“Stanišić Trial Decision”), para. 37; Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Case No. IT-04-74-PT, Decision on Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 14 March 2006 (“Prlić Trial Decision”), para. 18. 12 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-PT, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 17 December 2009 (“Tolimir Trial Decision”), para. 8; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision on Third and Fourth Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 24 March 2005 (“Krajišnik Trial Decision”), para. 14. 13 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Karemera et al. v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ITCR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecution’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 16 June 2006 (“Karemera Appeal Decision”), para. 55; Popović Trial Decision, para. 8. 14 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Case No. IT-95-16-A, Decision on the Motions of Drago Josipović, Zoran Kurpreškić and Vlatko Kurpreškić to Admit Additional Evidence Pursuant to Rule 115 and for Judicial Notice to be Taken Pursuant to Rule 94(b), 8 May 2001 (“Kupreškić Appeal Decision”), para. 12; Prlić Trial Decision, para. 9. 15 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Popović Trial Decision, para. 10; Prlić Trial Decision, paras 12, 19; Krajišnik Trial Decision, para. 15. 16 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Popović Trial Decision, para. 11; Stanišić Trial Decision, para. 43; Krajišnik Trial Decision, para. 14. 17 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Karemera Appeal Decision, paras 49, 50-52. MICT-15-96-PT 2 11 July 2016 735

through one or more of the forms of responsibility enumerated in the Statute;18 and

ix. The fact must clearly not be subject to pending appeal or review.19

5. If these factors are satisfied in relation to a Proposed Fact, the Trial Chamber determines whether it should, in the exercise of its discretion, withhold judicial notice on the ground that taking judicial notice of the fact in question would not serve the interests of justice.20

6. In making the decision to withhold judicial notice, even when the proposed adjudicated fact fulfils the requirements laid out above, the Trial Chamber may take several factors into account.21 Facts that are ineligible for judicial notice include those that: (i) go to issues at the “core” of the Prosecution’s case; (ii) contain subjective inferences; (iii) are “unduly broad, vague, tendentious or conclusory”; or (iv) “due to lack of specificity in the original judgement, the Chamber has been unable to readily discern that the fact in question does not refer to the acts, conduct, or mental state of the accused”.22

7. By taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact pursuant to Rule 115(B) of the Rules, the Trial Chamber will achieve greater judicial economy by not revisiting adjudicated details contained in other final judgements at the Tribunal arising from the same or similar factual premises or scenarios. The Defence submits that by taking judicial notice of the Proposed Facts listed in Annex A, the Trial Chamber will be able to devote a greater proportion of trial time to the core issues in the case.

18 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Prosecutor v. Mladić, Case No. IT-09-92-PT, First Decision on Prosecution Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts, 28 February 2012, para. 8; Karemera Appeal Decision, para. 52. 19 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 11; Karadžić Trial Decision, para. 16; Krajišnik Trial Decision, para. 14; Kupreškić Appeal Decision, para. 12. 20 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 12; Popović Trial Decision, paras 15-19. 21 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 13. 22 Hadžić Trial Decision, para. 13; Popović Trial Decision, paras 15-19; Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T, Decision Granting in Part Prosecution’s Motions for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts Pursuant to Rule 94(B), 1 April 2010, paras 46-47. MICT-15-96-PT 3 11 July 2016 734

III. Submissions

A. The Motion is Filed without Prejudice 8. The Stanišić Defence files this Motion on the basis that the Prosecution case will remain identical to the case alleged in the first trial. As indicated by the Prosecution on the 23 May 2016, it may be that “the case is not so vastly different at all from the one that was tried the first time”.23 Without this reassurance, the Stanišić Defence submits that this motion is premature. Only through reliance on this commitment are the Defence able to assess the relevant Rule 115(B) admissibility criteria (including discerning that the fact in question does not refer to the acts, conduct, or mental state of the accused and the interests of justice more broadly) to be able to file this motion. However, in the event that the Prosecution case changes, the Defence reserves its right to revisit any of these issues and withdraw without prejudice to any submission herein.

B. The Proposed Facts have Relevance to the Current Proceedings 9. The Proposed Facts in Annex A are relevant to the current proceedings. The case against the Accused includes a large crime base over a wide geographic area, involving a significant number of alleged actors in these regions. Considering the ICTY judgements cited in the Annex adjudicated upon evidence relating to substantially similar crime bases, the factual findings in these cases are highly relevant to the current proceedings.

C. The Proposed Facts are Distinct, Concrete and Identifiable 10. When considering whether the facts in Annex A are distinct, concrete and identifiable, it is useful to think of the requirement in reverse: are the Proposed Facts under review “inextricably commingled” with other facts in the cited judgement?24 It is submitted that the Proposed Facts do not fall within this description. In light of this, the Defence submits that the Proposed Facts are distinct, concrete and identifiable. In the event that the Proposed Facts are commingled, they have been cumulatively cited in Annex A so as to provide the required context to produce distinct, concrete and identifiable facts.

23 T.43 (23 May 2005). 24 Popović Trial Decision, para. 6. MICT-15-96-PT 4 11 July 2016 733

D. The Facts as Proposed do not Change from the Formulation in the Original Judgement 11. Many of the Proposed Facts in Annex A are a precise replication of the facts contained in the aforementioned judgements. For the others, the facts are not verbatim but have been altered to allow the fact to be understood outside of the original judgement. The alterations have not produced any substantive change to the meaning of the original fact.

E. The Facts are not Unclear or Misleading in the Context in which they are Placed in the Motion 12. The selection of the facts from the original judgement or any stylistic or otherwise minor alterations has not rendered the facts unclear or misleading. Moreover, the Motion carefully places the Proposed Facts together in a manner that does not mislead or create any confusion or otherwise misrepresentation. Conversely, the Proposed Facts and their placement within the Motion ensures that the meaning of the individual facts and/or cumulative reading of the facts remains true to their intended meaning and will assist the Chamber in isolating and focusing on the core issues in the current case.

F. The Facts are Identified with Adequate Precision 13. As stated above, the Proposed Facts are, notwithstanding stylistic or minor changes, precise replications of the facts as contained in the judgements. They are accompanied with a paragraph reference to the paragraph in the relevant trial judgement.25

G. The Facts are not “Essentially Legal” in Nature 14. The Defence submits that the Proposed Facts are factual, not legal findings. While many factual findings are closely associated with accompanying legal findings or otherwise have a legal aspect to them, this does not change their essential character. Instead, the Proposed Facts endeavour to provide a factual background to the assessment of Stanišić’s alleged responsibility and will therefore assist the Trial Chamber.

25 See Kupreškić Trial Decision, para. 12, which held that a “request must specifically point out the paragraph(s) or parts of the judgement of which [the moving party] wishes judicial notice to be taken”. MICT-15-96-PT 5 11 July 2016 732

H. The Facts are not Based on an Agreement Between the Parties to the Original Proceedings 15. All Proposed Facts in Annex A meet this requirement.

I. The Facts do not Relate to the Acts, Conduct or Mental State of the Accused 16. The Proposed Facts do not relate to the acts and conduct of the Accused. The Accused is not mentioned in the Proposed Facts in the Annex.

J. The Facts are not Subject to Appeal or Review 17. Final appellate judgements were rendered in each of the proceedings. For the Proposed Facts from judgements where an Appeals Judgement has been rendered, the Proposed Facts in the Annex have either not been appealed or have been upheld on appeal.

IV. Relief Sought 18. For the reasons detailed above, the Defence has satisfied the requirements of Rule 115(B). Therefore, it respectfully requests the Trial Chamber to take judicial notice of the adjudicated facts set out in Annex A.

Respectfully submitted,

Wayne Jordash QC 11 July 2016 Word Count: 2171

MICT-15-96-PT 6 11 July 2016 731

THE MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS

Case No. MICT-15-96-PT

THE PROSECUTOR v. JOVICA STANIŠIĆ & FRANKO SIMATOVIĆ

______ANNEX A PROPOSED ADJUDICATED FACTS ______

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Proposed Adjudicated Facts

I. Bosnia Fact Proposed Fact Source Number 1. Witnesses for both the Prosecution and the Defence testified that a substantial number of residents of Simić Trial Bosanski Samac were evacuating themselves and their families in the period prior to the takeover. Judgement, para. 193 Although some claimed that it was mostly and Croats who did this, witnesses testified that Muslims were also leaving town where possible. Defence evidence tended to show that it was members of all ethnic groups who left Bosanski Samac in the year prior to the conflict. 2. Paramilitary units, commanded by “Crni” and “Lugar” were under the command structure of the 17th Simić Trial Tactical Group. Judgement, para. 396 3. The pursuit of regionalization, according to Krajišnik, was used by the SDS in response to the HDZ’s Krajišnik Trial and SDA’s attempts to discuss independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regionalization was a leverage, in Judgement, para. 59 his view, to suggest to the SDS’s coalition partners that the three parties should reach an overall agreement on the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina: its status within Yugoslavia as well as its internal organization. The Political Situation in Bosnia in 1991 4. By October 1991, the three-party coalition was crumbling. The SDA and HDZ pressed the Bosnia- Krajišnik Trial Herzegovina Assembly to discuss a declaration of sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would Judgement, para. 63 pave the way for the republic to assert its independence from Yugoslavia. The SDS protested that such a declaration would be unconstitutional as it would infringe on the rights of one nationality recognized by the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution, namely the Serbs, and it had not been vetted by the Council for Ethnic Equality. 5. In the course of the debate on whether to vote on such a declaration of sovereignty, during the night of 14 Krajišnik Trial and 15 October 1991, Radovan Karadžić expressed strong opposition and warned that the SDS would Judgement, para. 64 make use of constitutional mechanisms to prevent a vote. When the other parties decided to proceed with the vote, Krajišnik, as President of the Assembly, adjourned the session to the next morning. The SDS 729

deputies, as well as most Serb deputies not in the SDS, left the hall. However, the vice president of the Assembly then reconvened the session and the declaration was adopted. Without intervening, Krajišnik followed events on television from his office with some other deputies. 6. On 15 October 1991 the SDS Political Council met to assess the situation. Addressing the meeting, Krajišnik Trial Krajišnik suggested that, since the decision to adopt the declaration was illegal and unconstitutional, the Judgement, para. 65 SDS had to find a method of denouncing it. During this and other meetings, the idea emerged that the SDS should form its own institutions, which would function in parallel to those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 16 October the SDS’s “Announcement to the Serbian people” stated that the SDA and HDZ had breached the constitutional order. It reiterated the SDS’s support for federal institutions, including the JNA. At the SDS Deputies’ Club meeting of 18 October the SDS leadership decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of secession from Yugoslavia. 7. On 26 October 1991 all SDS presidents of the municipalities in the ARK as well as ARK government Krajišnik Trial met with Radovan Karadžić. During this meeting an order was presented and “fully accepted” by those Judgement, para. 70 present. […] The order consisted of fourteen points and called for, among other things, a “town command” amounting to a military administration; intensified mobilization of the TO; formation of military units; subordination of the TO to the JNA; disbanding of paramilitary units and their reassignment to the TO; take-over of public enterprises, the post office, banks, judiciary, media, and the SDK (Social Accounting Service); coordination with local directors and with the SDS in Sarajevo to ensure supplies for the population; and imposition of war taxes. The order was sent by telex on 29 October 1991 to presidents of all municipalities in the ARK by Radoslav Brđanin, in his capacity as “coordinator for implementing decisions”. 8. The Serb plebiscite was held on 9 and 10 November 1991. Although all ethnicities were allowed to vote Krajišnik Trial in the plebiscite, ballots were of different colours depending on the ethnicity of the voter. Few non-Serbs Judgement, para. 73 participated. The figures reported at the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 21 November were: 99.9 per cent of the 1,162,032 Serbs who voted and 99.1 per cent of the 49,342 non-Serbs who voted, voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia. 9. On 21 November 1991 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly proclaimed as part of the territory of federal Krajišnik Trial Yugoslavia all those municipalities, communes, and settlements where a majority of registered citizens Judgement, para. 74 of Serb nationality had voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia. If the majority in one municipality

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had voted to remain within Yugoslavia, the whole of that municipality would remain. In municipalities where the majority of people had not participated in the plebiscite […], the SDS proposed to look at single communes or settlements: if local communities had voted to remain, then only that community would be considered part of Yugoslavia, while the rest of the territory of the municipality would be allowed to join an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. 10. During the same session of 21 November 1991, Krajišnik declared that “these are crucial times for the Krajišnik Trial survival of the Serbian people in , and I would dare to say – even more broadly – Judgement, para. 80 when it comes to the Serbian people as such.” He cautioned that “All proposed solutions must be based on the Constitution and the laws, reflecting the interests of the Serbian people, but not at the expense of other peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. 11. The “first stage” of Variant A, applicable in municipalities with Serbs in the majority, includes the Krajišnik Trial following instructions: Judgement, para. 88 The SDS municipal board shall immediately form a crisis staff of the Serbian people in the municipality, to be composed of: - all members of the secretariat of the SDS municipal board; - municipal officials who are also SDS nominees in the following organs: president of the municipal assembly or president of the municipal executive committee; chief of the public security station or commander of the police; commander or chief of the municipal territorial defence staff; secretary of the municipal national defence secretariat or another SDS- nominated official from the secretariat; - assemblymen in the Assembly of the Serbian people of BH; - members of the Main Board of the SDS of BH from the municipality in question. 12. The Instructions set out a number of other actions to be taken at the municipal level: Krajišnik Trial Convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality ... Carry out Judgement, para. 89 preparations for the setting up of state organs in the municipality (executive committee, administrative organs, magistrates’ court, public security station, etc.) and propose individuals for posts and duties in these organs. Prepare the take-over of staff, facilities and equipment of security services centres and their incorporation into the newly established internal affairs organ ... Upgrade the protection and security of vital buildings and facilities in the

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municipality ... Make an estimate of the necessary size of active and reserve police forces, TO units, and Civil Defence units; on the basis of the estimate, these structures shall be reinforced and other necessary measures shall be taken for their activation, as may be required by further developments. The order to activate these units shall be issued by the crisis staff in each municipality ... Carry out preparations (create organisational means and other conditions) for: - ... reinforcing combat units as classified by the JNA with manpower as well as inventoried materiel and livestock, according to federal regulations, based on the Serbian principles of fairness and humanity, with SDS officials, other leaders and distinguished Serbs serving as personal examples; - the protection of material resources important for defence and resistance, as well as for the survival and activities of the population. 13. The main actions of the second stage include the establishment of state organs in the municipality; the Krajišnik Trial mobilization of all Serb members of the police forces in cooperation with “JNA commands and staffs”; Judgement, para. 90 the implementation of orders to mobilize reserve JNA forces and TO units; the assumption of control over public finances; and the take-over of the staff, premises, and equipment of the security services. 14. The second stage of Variant A also includes the following instruction: “In the implementation of all these Krajišnik Trial measures, ensure respect for the national and other rights of members of all peoples and, subsequently, Judgement, para. 91 ensure their involvement in the administrative authorities to be set up by the assembly of the Serbian people in the municipality.” 15. The instructions forming part of the first stage of Variant B, relating to municipalities where Serbs did Krajišnik Trial not constitute a majority, are substantially the same as those relating to Variant A, including the Judgement, para. 92 membership in the crisis staffs. The only significant difference in the first stage of Variant B is the instruction qualifying the actions for setting up state organs in the municipality, which states: “Ensure proportionate representation in government organs of members of other nations and nationalities who have expressed their loyalty to federal Yugoslavia.” 16. In some respects the instructions relating to the second stage of Variant B demand less forceful action. Krajišnik Trial They are focused primarily on municipal sub-regions in which Serbs were in the majority. Thus, for Judgement, para. 93 example, unlike in Variant A, there is no instruction to take over the staff, premises, and equipment of the security services in the municipality. Instead, at this point Variant B states: “At the approaches to

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places inhabited by Serbs, organize covert surveillance and set up a system for reporting all possible threats to the Serbian population.” 17. The Instructions have a general section on their mode of implementation. This requires the crisis staff to Krajišnik Trial “obtain and respect expressions of loyalty (in written form, if possible) to the constitutional order and Judgement, para. 94 judicial system of the federal state of Yugoslavia by citizens of other nationalities.” Implementation of the Instructions was to be “in accordance with the federal Constitution, federal laws and other federal regulations, as well as regulations issued by the Republic, when these do not conflict with federal regulations.” 18. The authorities of , in a letter to the Tribunal’s Office of the Prosecutor dated Krajišnik Trial November 2001, stated that the Instructions “were given by a certain number of retired officers of the Judgement, para. 96 former Yugoslav People’s Army”, and not by the SDS Main Board or another SDS body. 19. Around 20 December 1991, SDS members Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavšić voiced their opposition Krajišnik Trial to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency’s decision to apply to the Badinter Commission – established by Judgement, para.100 the European Community to issue advisory opinions on legal matters relating to the Yugoslav crisis – for recognition as an independent state. The Political/Military Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 20. A confidential document, contextually dated January or early February 1992, from the “organs of the Krajišnik Trial Republic of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina” to the JNA Chief of the Main Staff in and the Judgement, para. 109 commanders of the 2nd and 4th Military Districts (covering Bosnia-Herzegovina and small areas of ), noted that the Bosnian-Serb Assembly had decided to “institutionalize” a situation, in which the “Serbian territories” of Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain in federal Yugoslavia. The document stated that this was to be done through peaceful means, but went on to note that the organs of the Bosnian-Serb Republic were soon to establish full control over these Serb territories, and requested various forms of assistance from the JNA in this respect. First, the “organs” requested the JNA to assign officers to assist municipal TOs, SJBs, and CSBs, and to supply materiel, including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, helicopters, communications equipment, and uniforms, all of which was required by 20 February 1992 at the latest. Second, the “organs” asked the JNA to support them in taking over “Serbian territories in [Bosnia-Herzegovina] that remain part of Yugoslavia”. The requested support included deploying JNA units to positions, from which they could protect the borders of Serb territories and preparations for

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providing rapid assistance in establishing control of territory by securing important areas. The “deadline” for completion of tasks in relation to the second request was 25 February. In their turn, the “organs” undertook to enlist volunteers through municipal organs, and to designate persons (municipal presidents and TO commanders) to coordinate cooperation and joint operations with the JNA – a list with the phone numbers of these persons was to be provided to JNA Military District commands. 21. By 23 February 1992, representatives of the SDS (among them Karadžić and Krajišnik) and of the other Krajišnik Trial two national groups had agreed on a statement of principles for a new constitutional arrangement for Judgement, para. 114 Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to this statement, the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would keep its external borders. It would become an independent state made up of three constituent units which would group municipalities according to the nationality principle based on the last three censuses (1971, 1981, and 1991). Freedom of movement would be allowed only within each unit, while resettlement from one unit to another would be subject to a “special permit”. 22. After the republican referendum, and due to the fact that the Yugoslav leadership had by then clearly Krajišnik Trial expressed its position to SDS leaders that a Bosnian-Serb entity would not be allowed to be part of the Judgement, para. 123 new Yugoslavia in the near future, negotiations persisted, but mainly turned on the nature of what an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would be like (unitary or federal) and what the division of power among the entities would be. 23. For example, on 11 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly decided to continue international Krajišnik Trial negotiations on a confederative arrangement for the three national groups, albeit on its own terms. Judgement, para. 124 Krajišnik, Karadžić, Koljević, Plavšić, Buha, and Maksimović remained members of the negotiating delegation. In response to an invitation from José Cutileiro, international mediator, to continue the multi- party negotiations, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously rejected a draft of constitutional arrangements in Bosnia Herzegovina. During that session, Krajišnik tabled a proposal that the Bosnian- Serb delegates would continue the negotiations, subject to the restriction that the negotiators, at a minimum, seek to preserve Yugoslavia or pursue “three sovereign national states which may be linked up on the confederal principle.” Both the proposal and the restriction were adopted by the Assembly. 24. On 24 March 1992 the Bosnian-Serb Assembly elected Branko Đerić as Prime Minister, and he was Krajišnik Trial sworn in on the same day. The Bosnian-Serb Assembly proceeded to instruct the new Government to Judgement, para. 126 prepare, by 27 March, an operational plan for assuming power, that is, for establishing power in the

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Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular in the field of internal affairs, national defence and money transactions ... in all municipalities where Serbian authorities already existed, and in those municipalities where only recently established Serbian municipalities existed. 25. On 24 March 1992, the Bosnian-Serb Assembly also issued a decision verifying the proclamation of Krajišnik Trial various Serb municipalities. From April 1992, Bosnian Serbs implemented the take-over of Judgement, para. 127 municipalities. […] by this time, the Bosnian-Serb leadership was increasingly losing its confidence in diplomatic efforts, into which Krajišnik and the other negotiators had invested so much of their political capital. 26. The VRS had control over several weapons-production plants in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They Krajišnik Trial manufactured air-jet engines, radar and telecommunications systems, artillery and non-guided rocket Judgement, para. 199 munitions, armoured vehicles, optical electronics, and engines for military vehicles. The Pretis artillery and rocket-manufacturing plant in Vogošća municipality was the only plant to manufacture ammunition. 27. In Prnjavor, the “Wolves of Vučjak” were a paramilitary group, consisting of approximately 150 men. Krajišnik Trial They were headed by Veljko Milanković, a convicted criminal, trained in Knin (Croatia) in the summer Judgement, para. 214 of 1991. The Wolves were transferred from the Prnjavor TO to the command of the 327th Motorized Brigade on 5 June 1992, by General Talić, commander of the . General Talić commended the Wolves on several occasions. This despite the fact that they meddled in civilian affairs in Prnjavor town and committed crimes. The civilian police in Prnjavor, numbering at the time about 50 active members, was unable to stop this behaviour and requested the military police, the ARK crisis staff, and Radovan Karadžić to intervene. However, in September 1992, General Talić ordered that the military police would no longer operate in the town, but only at the front lines, and that police matters were to be taken care of by the civilian police only. 28. On 28 July 1992, and as a result of the VRS Main Staff Intelligence report mentioned earlier, Mladić Krajišnik Trial issued an order regarding the disarmament of paramilitary formations. The order noted that paramilitaries Judgement, para. 216 engaged in looting were operating in all territories under the VRS. It ordered all paramilitary formations with “honourable” intentions to place themselves under the command of the VRS. No individual or group responsible for crimes was to be incorporated into the army, and any member of a paramilitary unit who refused to submit to the unified command of the VRS was to be disarmed and arrested. 29. The report, while aimed at bringing law back to areas now under Bosnian-Serb control, also shows that Krajišnik Trial

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the VRS was more concerned with looting and the breakdown of order than with the widespread crimes Judgement, para. 217 committed by the paramilitaries. The report also does not account for the fact that incorporation of paramilitaries had already been the rule even before July 1992 and that crimes were committed, and were continuing to be committed, by the paramilitaries under the auspices of the Bosnian-Serb armed forces. 30. For example, the Prijedor paramilitary units named in the report took part in the attacks on Kozarac, Krajišnik Trial Hambarine, and other areas in Prijedor as part of the VRS in May 1992. The group led by Veljko Judgement, para. 218 Milanković, active in Prnjavor, was integrated into the 1st Krajina Corps in 1992 and was subsequently involved in military operations in June 1992. 31. The Bosnian-Serb Law on Internal Affairs was enacted by the Bosnian-Serb Assembly on 28 February Krajišnik Trial 1992, on the same day that the Assembly adopted the Constitution. The law was published in the Official Judgement, para. 225 Gazette on 23 March 1992. Article 81 of the Constitution provided for the police to be commanded by the Presidency where an imminent threat of war had been declared. 32. The Bosnian-Serb MUP was to handle security affairs on behalf of the Government. In accordance with Krajišnik Trial the law, two divisions within the MUP executed the Ministry’s security functions: the National Security Judgement, para. 227 Service and the Public Security Service. The function of the former was mainly to collect intelligence and make security assessments. Its performance was to be evaluated by the President of the Republic, who would report on the agency’s work to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly. The Public Security Service, on the other hand, was responsible for administrative and technical affairs related to protection from threats to state security, crime prevention, and detection and confiscation of illicit weapons; in other words, regular policing tasks. 33. The new law tasked all MUP personnel to “preserve the lives of people and human dignity” in the course Krajišnik Trial of carrying out their duties. Moreover, it provided that “Authorized officials shall execute orders issued Judgement, para. 233 by the Minister, or by their immediate supervisor, given in order to carry out matters and tasks of national and public security, except when such orders are contrary to the constitution of the law.” 34. A Bosnian-Serb MUP was established by the end of March 1992. Krajišnik Trial Judgement, para. 238 35. At the end of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs had, for the most part, achieved dominance over historical Serb Krajišnik Trial lands – in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Judgement, para. 899

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36. Calls to take over territories and create a Serb-dominated state in Bosnia Herzegovina became strong and Krajišnik Trial distinct in the Bosnian-Serb Assembly beginning in January 1992. At the Assembly session of 26 Judgement, para. 903 January 1992, a member of the Ministerial Council, Jovan Čizmović, addressed Krajišnik as Assembly President: “Taking the constitutional and legal status of the peoples as a starting point, it is both politically and legally correct to allow all peoples to create their own sovereign and independent states on the basis of the right of each people to self-determination and an absolute respect of the will of all other peoples, and not on the basis of a unilateral act and by the use of force. To solve this problem, I propose that we begin with an urgent operationalization and a declaration on the establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tasks set out in the instructions of 19 December 1991 should be carried out.” 37. At this stage in early 1992, respect for the interests of other peoples was still being expressed by Krajišnik Trial Karadžić, as separation and homogenization were not yet the declared aim of the nascent leadership. In a Judgement, para. 908 1994 speech to the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, Karadžić remarked upon the benefits that had accrued to the Bosnian Serbs from the early establishment of a de facto overall Bosnian-Serb authority: “we won the battle for our Republic on 18 March [1992] ... thanks to Mr. Krajišnik’s skills. We were talking all the time....The international community made a huge mistake by sending Cutileiro and Carrington to see us before the war and by accepting us as a party in the conflict. If they had ignored us, kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then said afterwards that some rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced difficult problems; nobody would have talked to us.” 38. As Karadžić recalled in his 1994 speech, the battle for the Republic began on 18 March 1992, the day on Krajišnik Trial which the Bosnian-Serb leadership, specifically Krajišnik, made known to the Assembly deputies its Judgement, para. 910 wish to pre-emptively take over territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while separating the Bosnian Serbs from the other two ethnic groups. 39. Miroslav Vještica summarized the situation as of that date [18 March 1992]: “we must urgently establish Krajišnik Trial a Serbian MUP in the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina, we must establish national defence, Judgement, para. 925 our Serbian army, which is already there on the ground, we just need to transform it into what we need to have.” The “Serbian army” already there on the ground was, at that point, the JNA and the non-enlisted Bosnian-Serb men of fighting age. 40. By the time General Mladić detailed his ideas about a new Bosnian-Serb army before the Assembly on Krajišnik Trial

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12 May 1992, the utility of an armed population had already been proven: “We are not starting from Judgement, para. 929 scratch. That is very important. Our starting point are the armed Serbian people in the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who have, in the course of the war so far, responded, insofar as they did, to the call to put a stop ... to the fascist and phantom Ustasha dragon. And so far, we have saved this people from being totally wiped out.” In 1995 Karadžić said: “Distribution of weapons was carried out thanks to the JNA. What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and distributed to the people in the Serbian areas, but it was the SDS which organised the people and created the army.” 41. Elements of a Bosnian-Serb police force were already in place by 18 March 1992. […] The Assembly Krajišnik Trial promptly set up the Bosnian-Serb MUP, passing a Law on Internal Affairs on 27 March 1992, and Judgement, para. 930 handing the ministerial post to Mićo Stanišić. He, on 31 March 1992, distributed a press release announcing the formation of five CSBs, one for each of the self-proclaimed and territorially vaguely defined Bosnian-Serb SAOs (Krajina, Herzegovina, Northern Bosnia, Romanija-Birač, and Semberija), and ordered the affected police officers to sever their ties with the old republic and swear an oath of allegiance to the new state. 42. Sead Omeragić, a Muslim journalist, had accompanied Biljana Plavšić and Fikret Abdić on this visit to Krajišnik Trial on 4 April 1992. In Bijeljina town the witness saw Serb flags on the mosques and broken glass Judgement, para. 937 and bullet holes on several buildings. He saw ’s men in uniforms bearing the insignia “Serbian Volunteer Guard”; members of the TO; and members of the White Eagles. Omeragić came upon a fellow reporter who informed him that the town had been cleaned in order to conceal atrocities that had been committed in the last few days. Plavšić’s first stop was at the Bijeljina crisis staff to take stock of the situation. Then Omeragić, along with Abdić and Plavšić, visited the barracks at which the large number of displaced persons referred to in General Janković’s report had sought refuge. Plavšić kept her distance from the displaced persons. The visiting delegation met with Arkan who, Omeragić observed, was in total control of the situation. When Plavšić saw Arkan, she kissed him (this image is captured on film). Plavšić said on several occasions that Arkan had done a good job in saving the Serb population from the Muslim threat. When Plavšić asked Arkan to hand over control to the JNA, he refused, saying that the “job” had not yet been finished, and that he would be going to Bosanski Brod next. According to Omeragić, at one point during their tour they came upon a journalist from the Oslobođenje newspaper, Vlado Mrkić. In a loud voice, he condemned the attack on Bijeljina, telling Arkan, as Omeragić recalled,

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“You will never be forgiven for what you have done to the Muslims in Bijeljina. History will judge you.” Arkan demanded Mrkić’s identification card, looked it over, and said “So you are a Croat.” At that point, according to the witness, Plavšić interjected: “No, he is a Serb, but what kind of Serb?” Arkan told Mrkić to get lost. 43. Around May 1992, Mico Stanišić told Milorad Davidović, a Serb from Bijeljina who worked for the Krajišnik Trial Federal SUP, that Arkan’s forces in Bijeljina and had his approval to be there and were helping Judgement, para. 939 to “liberate” territory that the Bosnian Serbs believed should be part of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. Stanišić also spoke of an agreement that Arkan’s forces could do as they wished with any property in the “liberated” territories. 44. In a letter dated 24 April 1992, General Kukanjac informed his superiors in Belgrade that the Bosnian- Krajišnik Trial Serb MUP had presented him with a long list of military equipment (including a request for six Judgement, para. 946 helicopters) needed by the special-purposes police detachment at the CSB. The requested equipment was issued. On 27 April the Bosnian-Serb Minister of Defence Bogdan Subotić wrote to the command of the JNA’s 2nd Military District requesting the assignment of active-duty military personnel to the ranks of the Bosnian-Serb TO. Already on 15 April 1992, a JNA colonel had been appointed commander of the Bosnian-Serb TO, to supervise and control local TOs. That such cooperation between the JNA and the Bosnian-Serb leadership was on-going was not a closely guarded secret. 45. Milorad Davidović was requested by MUP Minister Stanišić to go to Zvornik, where an out-of control Krajišnik Trial Serb gang was causing havoc, harassing Serbs as well as non-Serbs. Stanišić told Davidović that Judgement, para. 949 Radovan Karadžić and Krajišnik had had enough. The gang, which had taken control of the Zvornik SJB, was called the , a paramilitary unit of 100 to 300 men led by Vojin (Žućo) Vučković and his brother Dušan (Repić). Around 29 July 1992, Davidović and his men, together with military and special police units, arrested some 47 members of the Yellow Wasps, including Žućo and Repić. Davidović placed some of the men he arrested under the control of the VRS so that they might be incorporated into the armed forces. 46. The Bosnian-Serb leadership vacillated in its relationship with paramilitary groups, including Krajišnik Trial “volunteers” from , using them opportunistically to terrorize Muslims and Croats, or at other times Judgement, para. 979 complaining about them when their actions threatened the new order of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. From July 1992 onwards, when most of the territories had already been seized, the Bosnian-Serb leadership

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generally regarded paramilitaries as a nuisance. 47. In April 1992, Serbian volunteers, including Arkan’s men, helped seize Bijeljina and Bratunac. At this Krajišnik Trial time, their services were certainly appreciated by individuals such as Mladić; and the positive Judgement, para. 980 relationship continued into the next month, as the following telephone conversation from 13 May 1992 illustrates: Unković: “We have some Arkan’s men here.” Mladić: “Yes?” Unković: “Are they under our command?” Mladić: “All are. All under arms are under my command, if they want to stay alive.” Unković: “Excellent! Excellent!” Mladić: “So, all shall be under our command. No one shall do things on their own”. 48. Biljana Plavšić met with Arkan in Bijeljina on 4 April 1992. She met with him again on 20 April. (At this Krajišnik Trial meeting she referred to Bijeljina and Zvornik as “liberated” towns.) She also tried to contact Arkan by Judgement, para. 981 telephone on 23 April 1992. 49. The VRS had a plan of action broadly formulated by the political leadership. Neither Karadžić nor Krajišnik Trial Krajišnik found it necessary to become involved in the affairs of the VRS on a daily basis. This was done Judgement, para. 994 by their trusted commander Ratko Mladić, whom Karadžić and Krajišnik had selected for the job. General Mladić was guided by the strategic goals articulated by Karadžić and Krajišnik at the Bosnian- Serb Assembly session of 12 May 1992. […] 50. It would be incorrect to place the strategic goals for the Bosnian Serbs of Karadžić in 1992 on a pedestal Krajišnik Trial for in the final analysis they are anodyne statements, serving as official state policy and even qualifying Judgement, para. 995 for publication in the Bosnian-Serb Republic’s Official Gazette. If one is inclined to find in them insidious hidden meanings, it is because of the context and the events that followed. An anachronistic reading of the May goals is not only inadvisable, it misses the point, just as an anachronistic reading of the December Instructions misses the point. The instructions and the goals lacked substance and utility, but they did symbolize a new central authority at a time when the old order had disintegrated. The extent to which they found currency among Bosnian Serbs is an indication of the degree of acceptance of that new authority. 51. At a Vogošća municipal assembly meeting, on 14 November 1992, where Krajišnik was a guest of Krajišnik Trial

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honour, he joked: “There are no Muslims around so one should look for an Albanian in order to prevent Judgement, para. 1077 that Serbs quarrel with each other.” In an interview from late November 1992, he took credit for rescuing his people from slaughter and genocide. On another occasion around this time he sounded wistful about the Bosnian Serbs’ slow progress in achieving control over Sarajevo: “Sarajevo is a separate problem. At the moment ... the area of [the] city proper is marked as Muslim territory, but we shall plead for demilitarisation and division between the two national communities.” 52. No convincing evidence was presented as to Milan Lukić’s and Sredoje Lukić’s membership of the Lukić & Lukić Trial White Eagles or Avengers or any linkage between the White Eagles or Avengers and any of the crimes Judgement, para. 78 with which Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić are charged. No inference as to membership of the White Eagles can be drawn from the clothes, hats or insignia worn by Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić. 53. [On or about 14 April 1992, the Užice Corps of the JNA entered Višegrad.] Serbs, who had previously Lukić & Lukić Trial left Višegrad, returned when the Užice Corps arrived, and began to arm themselves with weapons that Judgement, para. 82 were brought in from Serbia. The Užice Corps also supplied local Serbs in Višegrad with weapons, and provided them with military training. 54. The Obrenovac Detachment was under the command of the Višegrad TO, and took orders from Vinko Lukić & Lukić Trial Pandurević. In a record of an interview, Milan Lukić lists a range of weapons that had been issued to him Judgement, para. 82 “as a member of a military unit of Republika Srpska, as a company commander”, specifically five hand grenades, a pistol, a rifle-launched grenade, a sub-machine gun, and an automatic rifle. 55. There is no evidence or legal basis which provides justification for a view that this SAO “government” Mrkšić Trial had legal authority, or that it had the legal or practical structures to investigate and conduct trials of war Judgement, para. 585 criminals or to keep in custody a large number (in the order of more than 200) prisoners of war. In particular, it is clear that it had no legal capacity to make decisions binding on the JNA or OG South, or to give binding orders to either of them, and most clearly, it had not the means to compel the JNA or OG South to comply with its wishes. 56. The VRS adopted and applied, with modification, the rules, regulations, and doctrines of the JNA, such Tolimir Trial as the criminal law code incorporating the laws of armed conflict set out in the Geneva Conventions, as Judgement, para. 80 well as the rules concerning service in the security and the intelligence organs, the Military Police (“MP”), and command and control. VRS members received training on the international laws of war and the Geneva Conventions.

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57. As the Chief of this Sector, [Tolimir] directed, coordinated, and supervised the work of the two Tolimir Trial Administrations, as well as subordinate security and intelligence organs, including the MP. The Judgement, para. 104 Administrations and the subordinate security and intelligence organs were duty-bound to exchange relevant information with each other. To avoid duplication and the crossing of competencies, [Tolimir] was the one to “decide who will get what information, what will be referred to whom”. Furthermore, the principle of command and control excluded the possibility of an officer (e.g., Milovanović) issuing direct orders to subordinates two levels down (Beara or Salapura); the officer would contact these subordinates' direct superior (the Accused). [Tolimir] would then decide whether he would assign a special task to the respective Heads of the Security or Intelligence Administration. If a subordinate officer received an order from a superior officer two or more levels above him, the subordinate was obligated to report that order to his direct supervisor. 58. In accordance with Article 13 of the “Law on Ministries during an Imminent Threat of War or a State of Tolimir Trial War" (“Law on Ministries”), police units were to participate in combat operations pursuant to orders Judgement, para. 150 issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Karadžić, and the Minister of the Interior, the latter of whom “shall give orders to police units through the Ministry Police Forces Command Staff”. Article 14 of the Law on Ministries further provided, inter alia, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces assigned police units to combat operations and that the units operated under the MUP commander in whose zone of responsibility they were performing their tasks while they were re- subordinated to the VRS. Consistent with that law the police could only be used for combat operations that were “established in advance by the commander-in-chief or the Minister of the Interior.” Upon an order by Karadžić on 22 April 1995 the VRS defined “more precisely and concretely” the engagement and employment of RS MUP units in combat activities as part of the VRS troops. 59. The Unit was based in Đeletovci in what was then called the Republic of Serb Krajina. During Tolimir Trial the summer of 1995 the Unit was deployed from Đeletovci to Trnovo, where it operated under the Judgement, para. 547 direction of Bosnian Serb Forces. At this time Slobodan Medić a.k.a. Boca was the Commander of the Unit. 60. After the fall of Srebrenica, while the Scorpions Unit was deployed in Trnovo, Medić received an order Tolimir Trial through his chain of command to provide vehicles to go to Srebrenica and, as a result, six Bosnian Judgement, para. 548 Muslims who were subsequently killed were collected by bus.

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61. The Chamber finds that following the fall of Srebrenica, the Scorpions Unit, which at the time was Tolimir Trial operating under the direction of Bosnian Serb Forces, summarily killed six Bosnian Muslim males from Judgement, para. 551 Srebrenica near the town of Trnovo. 62. As Chief of the Sector for Intelligence and Security Affairs, the [Tolimir] was responsible for control and Tolimir Trial management of the entire sector. Through his position, the [Tolimir} controlled the appointment of Judgement, para. 914 security and intelligence officers; as such, the appointment of Beara, Salapura, Radoslav Janković, Keserović, Popović, Momir Nikolić, Drago Nikolić, and Trbić, fell “directly and squarely” within his competence. The Accused was the immediate superior of the Chief of Security, Beara, and the Chief of Intelligence, Salapura. As an Assistant Commander, the Accused was directly subordinated to the Commander of the VRS Main Staff, Mladić. 63. Chief of Staff Milovanović described [Tolimir] as Mladić’s “eyes and ears”. [Tolimir]’s function was to Tolimir Trial prevent leaks of highly classified information from the enemy or “anyone else who wasn’t supposed to Judgement, para. 915 [k]now”, and to “cover up the intentions of the VRS”. To this end, [Tolimir] received daily written reports from each administration and detailed oral reports from his subordinates. Further, [Tolimir] was kept apprised of any assignments that went directly from Mladić to the [Tolimir]’s subordinate intelligence and security officers. Mihajlo Mitrović testified that available information was always presented to [Tolimir]; there were no secrets kept from him. According to Milovanović, Tolimir “always knew more” than his immediate subordinates, Salapura and Beara. 64. [Tolimir] was responsible for implementing and monitoring all security- and intelligence-related orders Tolimir Trial from Mladić and Milovanović. As put by Petar Škrbić, assistant commanders to Mladić were “experts for Judgement, para. 916 the implementation of the commander’s order[s] and decision[s] in the best possible way”. For example, [Tolimir] would receive assignments or tasks for the MP from Mladić and, as the MPs were professionally controlled by the security organs, the Accused would be duty-bound to see to it that they would be carried out. [Tolimir] could issue direct orders down the chain of command with regard to training and equipping units of the MP; in all other instances, the Accused could issue orders for the MP only with Mladić’s approval. In 1995, [Tolimir] was involved with the MPs in dealing with POWs, and was kept informed on the work and engagement of the MP units of the various Corps. 65. As an assistant commander in the VRS Main Staff, [Tolimir] took part in daily collegium meetings, gave Tolimir Trial briefings on the security situation in the RS, provided intelligence information, and made proposals for Judgement, para. 918

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counter-actions. Further, [Tolimir] would chair the meetings if neither Mladić nor Milovanović could be present and when the focus was primarily security-related. Additionally, [Tolimir] took part in the collegium’s decision-making process.

II. SAO Krajina Fact Fact Source Number 1. In early 1991, the SUP in Knin established a training camp in Golubić, a small village located Martić Trial approximately 9 kilometres north of Knin, because Milan Martić wanted properly trained police officers. Judgement, para. 144 2. On 19 December 1991, the RSK was proclaimed by the Assembly of the SAO Krajina with Milan Babić Martić Trial as its President, and the RSK Constitution was passed. The TO constituted the armed forces of the RSK. Judgement, para. 149 On 16 February 1992, the government fell as Milan Babić was removed from the office of President of the RSK by the RSK Assembly due to his opposition to Slobodan Milošević in respect of the . Milan Martić, who had previously opposed the Vance Plan, now publicly supported the adoption of the Vance Plan. After Milan Babić was removed from office, the Vance plan was adopted by the Assembly of the RSK. 3. The evidence shows that the RSK was not demilitarised in its entirety in accordance with the Vance Plan. Martić Trial On 28 April 1992, Special Police (“PJM”) Brigades and a PJM Administration were established within Judgement, para. 152 the RSK Ministry of Defence by the SSNO of Serbia. General Borislav Đukić, a JNA officer, was appointed Chief of the PJM Administration. The PJM Brigades were connected both to the Ministry of Defence and to the MUP of the RSK. The members of PJM units wore blue uniforms and used the side arms and the equipment of the TO. There is also evidence that TO vehicles were repainted in blue and used by the PJM. On 18 May 1992, the SVK was established. In peacetime, the SVK was to consist of TO units, however in the event of imminent threat of war and during wartime the PJM units would join the SVK. 4. The RSK leadership was against the demilitarisation of the RSK, asserting it would be unable to defend Martić Trial itself in the event of Croatian attacks. Thus, the Vance Plan was interpreted by the RSK authorities to Judgement, para. 153

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mean that UNPROFOR was to protect the population in the areas of deployment. In this context, Croatian forces carried out several armed incursions into the UNPAs between 1992 and 1995, including on the Miljevac plateau on 21 June 1992, Maslenica on 22 January 1993, Medak pocket on 9 and 12 September 1993, and from 1 May 1995. 5. On 20 April 1993, the RSK Supreme Defence Council was established, which was composed of the Martić Trial President of the RSK, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, and the Judgement, para. 155 Commander of the SVK. The President of the RSK “[led] the [SVK] in times of peace and war, in accordance with the [RSK] Constitution and decisions adopted by the Supreme Defence Council, and [presided] over the Supreme Defence Council”. The Supreme Defence Council was mandated to “adopt decisions on the readiness, mobilisation and deployment of the [SVK] and on other matters in accordance with the Constitution and the law.” 6. In August 1991, running water and electricity to Nadin had been switched off from Benkovac. Around Martić Trial September 1991, approximately 240 Croatian reserve police members and local volunteers were present Judgement, para. 236 in Škabrnja. In September 1991, Škabrnja and Nadin were shelled and subjected to aerial bombings, including by cluster bombs. On 2 October 1991, three villagers were killed, and it was decided to evacuate the civilian population, following which only members of the reserve police force and the volunteers remained in Škabrnja to guard the village. Around 2 October 1991, Nadin was attacked by the JNA, whereupon two men were killed. This attack was conducted in order to deblockade the road from Benkovac to the airport in Zemunik. On 9 October 1991, an agreement was concluded between, inter alia, the 9th Corps command located in Knin and representatives of the Zadar municipality on cessation of combat operations, raising of the blockade of Zadar, and a pullout of JNA from the Zadar garrison and the Zemunik airport to Benkovac. 7. On 19 February 1992, Milan Martić ordered the disbandment of an RSK MUP Special Purpose unit Martić Trial commanded by Predrag Baklajić due to information that this unit had been involved in criminal Judgement, para. 339 activities, including several murders, and incidents of robbery, theft and destruction. This disbandment was ultimately not carried through and the unit continued with criminal activities in 1992. On 1 April 1993, Milan Martić requested the MUP of Serbia to provide 20-30 inspectors to deal with homicides and property offences which were “rapidly increasing recently in the RSK”. On 7 September 1993, Milan Martić ordered the arrest of members of certain paramilitary groups, who were suspected of committing

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organised crimes. There is evidence that the unit Arkan’s Tigers, under the command of Željko “Arkan” Raznjatović, left the territory of the RSK in 1993 after an order had been issued by the SVK commander Mile Novaković and Milan Martić as Minister of the Interior. 8. […] After the attack on Struga, Captain Dragan Vasiljković arrested ten members of the TO in Dvor, Martić Trial who were allegedly responsible for killing several civilians. Subsequently, Milan Martić arrived in Dvor Judgement, para. 340 and ordered Captain Dragan Vasiljković to release the ten men, which he did. 9. Several armed clashes occurred during the spring and early summer of 1991 between SAO Krajina and Martić Trial Croatian armed forces and formations. Initially, these clashes were the result of tensions between the Judgement, para. 443 Croatian and SAO Krajina police and the climate of fear and mistrust between the Serb and Croat inhabitants. 10. There was a very limited SVK presence of approximately 50 to 150 SVK and police personnel within the Gotovina Trial town of Knin at the start of on 4 August 1995. The SVK also had transport vehicles and Judgement, para. 1225 mobile communication equipment in the town at this time. The SVK personnel at the SVK headquarters included 15 soldiers, as well as part of the Main Staff. A number of SVK officers were at the Pensioner’s Hall. Further, there were no more than 30 SVK members at the Northern barracks and that the RSK Special Police were located outside of Knin on the front lines. 11. A significant number of men from Knin had been mobilized and stationed at the front lines in Knin in Gotovina Trial early August 1995. Further, there were at least 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995. The vast Judgement, para. 1233 majority of these civilians were women, children, and elderly men. 12. Most of the villagers left Buković in Benkovac municipality on 4 August 1995 or in the night between 4 Gotovina Trial and 5 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Buković on this day, Judgement, para.1542 were Krajina Serbs. 13. Almost all of the villagers in Civljane left on 4 August 1995. A vast majority of those leaving were Gotovina Trial Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1546 14. Shells were fired at Gračac town from approximately 5 a.m. on 4 August 1995 and that there was a Gotovina Trial civilian population in Gračac when the shelling began on 4 August 1995, many of whom had left by 2 Judgement, para. 1550 p.m. on 5 August 1995. The overwhelming majority of people who left Gračac town between 4 and 5 August 1995 were Krajina Serbs. 15. Between 25 and 27 July 1995, some of the villagers, including Dušan Torbica’s children, left Torbica Gotovina Trial

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hamlet in Kistanje village. […] An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Torbica Judgement, para. 1553 hamlet in Kistanje village on these days were Krajina Serbs. 16. All but around ten of the villagers left Kakanj on 4 and 5 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not Gotovina Trial all of the persons who left Kakanj village on these days, were Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1555 17. The majority of the inhabitants of Kistanje had left the town by at least 13 August 1995. An Gotovina Trial overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Kistanje town were Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1556 18. Approximately 1,000-2,500 people left Knin in late July and early August 1995, a number of who left for Gotovina Trial Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia in the days prior to Operation Storm. Among the reasons they gave for Judgement, para. 1577 doing so was that they believed a Croatian military operation was imminent. There were at least 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995. The reasons given for leaving Knin before 4 August 1995 included rumours of the HV taking over Bosanko Grahovo, rumours of possible military activity in Knin, as well as food shortages, and a lack of electricity. 19. Approximately 14,000 civilians left Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995. A vast majority of the persons who Gotovina Trial left Knin on these days were Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1578 20. The columns of people leaving Knin on 4 and 5 August 1995 headed west towards Gračac municipality Gotovina Trial and north to Donji Srb, and on to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, while a relatively small minority of Judgement, para. 1579 people left Knin for the UN compound and surrounding villages near Knin. 21. On 4 August 1995, Polača in Knin municipality was shelled by Croatian forces. Most of the inhabitants Gotovina Trial of Polača left on 4 August 1995. An overwhelming majority, if not all, of the persons who left Polača on Judgement, para. 1581 this day were Krajina Serbs. 22. On 4 August 1995 a number of inhabitants of Žagrović in Knin municipality left the village. An Gotovina Trial overwhelming majority, if not all, of the persons who left Žagrović on 4 August 1995, were Krajina Judgement, para. 1585 Serbs. 23. On 4 and 5 August 1995 a large portion of the population left Plavno. The overwhelming majority, if not Gotovina Trial all, of the persons who left on these days were Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1586 24. On 4 August 1995, Promina Hill near Uzdolje was shelled by Croatian forces. On 4 or 5 August 1995, Gotovina Trial the majority of inhabitants left Uzdolje and who mostly Serbs. Judgement, para. 1596 25. An overwhelming majority, if not all of the persons who left Uzdolje on 4 and 5 August 1995 were Gotovina Trial Krajina Serbs. Judgement, para. 1597

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26. Between 4 and 7 August 1995 columns of people travelled through Donji Lapac municipality and Gotovina Trial crossed the border to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The columns consisted of at least 72,000 persons and in a 9 Judgement, para. 1606 August 1995 SVK 7th Corps report that 50,000-60,000 evacuated along the route Otrić-Srb-Donji Lapac, approximately 50,000-70,000 persons travelled in these columns through Donji Lapac municipality and to Bosnia-Herzegovina. These persons came from several municipalities in the Indictment area including Knin and Gračac, as well as from other municipalities, including Korenica. 27. The persons who left the aforementioned towns had been lawfully present there. There were at least Gotovina Trial 15,000 civilians in Knin on 4 August 1995, the vast majority of whom were women, children, and Judgement, para. 1747 elderly men, and approximately 14,000 of whom left on 4 and 5 August 1995. Similarly, there was a civilian presence and only a minimal SVK presence in the towns of Benkovac, Gračac, and Obrovac on 4 August 1995. Based on these conclusions, the vast majority, if not all, of the persons who left Benkovac, Gračac, Knin, and Obrovac on 4 and 5 August 1995 were civilians or at least persons placed hors de combat at the time.