(CUWS) Outreach Journal #1193

USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

CUWS Outreach Journal 1193 25 November 2015

Feature Item: “US Bomber Force: Sized to Sustain an Asymmetric Advantage for America”. Authored by Lt Gen Michael R. “Mike” Moeller, USAF (Ret.); published by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies; 18 November 2015; 26 pages. https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/AFA/def574d3-a429-454b-a3e8- e5073c93ca6b/UploadedImages/MI_Bomber_Force_Structure_Paper_Final.pdf?utm_source=hootsu ite As it has in the past, America’s bomber force provides far more than just long-range precision strike. Currently, geographic combatant commanders’ operational plans rely heavily on the bombers to perform a wide variety of missions in both permissive and heavily defended environments. The aircraft must be capable of providing precision attack, interdiction, close air support, armed overwatch, defense suppression, shows of force, anti-ship operations and minelaying, maritime surveillance, and, as always, nuclear deterrence, to name just some of their mission sets. Despite this importance, the number of bombers in the Air Force’s inventory has dwindled over time from thousands in the 1950s and 1960s to less than 100 combat-coded (i.e., available for operational missions) B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H aircraft in the current force. This decrease is due to a number of factors including changes in the strategic environment, shifts in operational approach, and resource constraints. Yet, analysis since the end of the Cold War has been remarkably consistent in establishing or validating the requirement for the Air Force to maintain 150 to 200 combat-ready bombers. This paper asserts that a modernized and capable Air Force bomber force of 150 to 200 aircraft is required to maintain America’s asymmetric advantage in long-range precision strike over any potential future adversary. The aging-out of the B-1 and B-52 fleets, combined with the increasingly sophisticated threat environment, drives the nation to make an immediate investment to procure a minimum of 100 new longrange strike bombers. In the long-term, to maintain the bomber force’s viability, the Defense Department should consider funding additional advanced bombers beyond those 100 aircraft before the last B-1s and B-52s retire by 2045.

U.S. Counter-WMD 1. Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) Begins to Take Shape 2. Nakatani: Japan Needs Better Missile Defense against North Korea

U.S. Arms Control 1. Russia’s Tu-95 Bomber Upgraded to Carry New Nuclear-Tipped Missiles 2. Russia Develops New Tactical Missiles for Iskander-M System 3. Deputy FM: Russia's INF Claims to US "Not an Excuse, it is a Real Concern"Russian, US 4. Diplomats Discuss Arms Control, Non-Proliferation of WMDs

Asia/Pacific 1. North Korean Leader's Top Aide Working on Farm as Punishment: State Spy Agency 2. Nuclear Envoys of S. Korea, China Hold Talks on N. Korea 3. N. Korean Leader Executes about 100 Officials: Think Tank

Europe/Russia 1. Putin’s Three-Tiered, Multi-Billion-Ruble 'War Room' Revealed 2. Chemical, Bacterial Attacks 'Among Risks to Consider' - French Defense Minister 3. Former Labour Defence Secretary Des Browne Questions Whether Trident Is an Effective Deterrent 4. Poll: Northern Ireland should Host Trident Nuclear Weapons, Says DUP MP - Do You Agree? 5. Putin: Russia Will Move S-300 Air Defense Systems to its Base in Syria

Middle East 1. Iranian Dy FM, IAEA Chief to Confer in Vienna 2. AEOI Publishes Document on Redesigning Arak Reactor (+Full Text) 3. Israel Has 115 Nuclear Weapons, Says US Think Tank 4. The Hunt for Red Mercury: Isis Tricked into Chasing after Mythical Nuclear Bomb Substance 5. World Powers to Help Iran Redesign Reactor as Part of Nuclear Deal 6. Russia Resumes Nuclear Trade with Iran as Sanctions Lifted 7. Global Watchdog Slams Ongoing Chemical Arms Use in Syria 8. AEOI Chief: Iran to Export 9 Tons of Enriched Uranium to Russia, Import 140 Tons of Ore 9. Ayat. Khamenei: Iran Supports Whoever Confronts Bullying Powers 10. Iran’s Air Defense Launches New Command Center

India/Pakistan 1. India Test-Fires Indigenously Developed Interceptor Missile 2. India Testfires Ballistic Missile, as Nuclear Club Eyes its ‘Inclusion’

Commentary 1. Get Ready, China: This Is Why Australia Needs Nuclear Weapons 2. The Pakistani Nuclear Deal that Wasn’t 3. (Ab)Normal Nuclear Pakistan 4. Time to Talk Straight 5. Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence 6. It’s Official: There Will Be No Iranian ICBM in 2015 Return to Top

Defense Update – Qadima, Israel Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) Begins to Take Shape November 22, 2015 The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and Raytheon have completed the first Program Planning Review on the future Multi-Object Kill Vehicle (MOKV) concept, a key step toward defining critical aspects of its design. This milestone ensures that the development plan is aligned with the MDA’s expectations, and on track for an upcoming Concept Review in December. Each MOKV will steer itself to a target and destroy it. Multiple MOKVs will be loaded on a launch missile such as the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). Each interceptor will be equipped with an advanced sensor, as well as divert, attitude-control and communications technologies, to enable each MOKV to home in on an individual target. Based on illustrations released by the company, each interceptor missile will carry a single bus mounting six MOKVs, each utilising its own sensor and diverting thrusters, thus enabling a single interceptor to engage multiple targets – whether real warheads or decoys – with a high probability of success. The design work on Raytheon’s MOKV concept is being conducted as part of Raytheon’s Advanced Missile Systems product line, which already has an impressive arsenal of missile-interception systems, some already operational and others, such as the MOKV, still in various stages of development. The Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missile, a three-stage GBI solid rocket booster, currently carries a single Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), capable of intercepting a single ballistic missile target. In case a threat missile is identified, the EKV can be launched into space. Once outside of the Earth’s atmosphere, operating at the edge of space at hypersonic speeds, the EKV’s job will begin. The EKV will seek out the target using multi-color sensors, a cutting-edge on-board computer, and a rocket motor used only for steering in space. It will hone in on its target with pinpoint precision and destroy it by the sheer kinetic forces resulting from the impact. This is the third generation of EKV that Raytheon is developing for the GBI. The first prototype was launched in 1998. The program evolved with several variants, undergoing 10 test flights that suffered quite a few failures until two successful flights, in 2013 and 2014, paved the way for further development and optimization. Currently being upgraded with the CE-II KEV variant, the fleet of GBIs is fully operational at Ft. Greely, Alaska. Since the original GBI and EKV vehicles suffered a large number of failures, the GBI/EKV system was considered unreliable. As a result, the Army has chosen to employ a ‘less-than-optimal shot doctrine,’ allocating more interceptors to each target missile, thus diminishing the number of attacking missiles it could intercept with the fleet of 44 GBIs planned to be on alert by 2017. The version currently under development is CE-II Block 1, designed to incorporate many improvements implementing lessons learned from past test failures. The first flight test of this missile is expected in 2016. If successful, it will be followed by operational deployment beginning the following year (installed on the next 10 GBI interceptors scheduled for delivery by the end of 2017). The reliability problems encountered with the EKV have lead the MDA to seek an alternative in the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV – sometime referred to as EKV CE-III), a modified design that leverages mature, proven components to simplify design and improve reliability. The RKV will

The Asahi Shimbun – Tokyo, Japan Nakatani: Japan Needs Better Missile Defense against North Korea The Asahi Shimbun November 25, 2015 HONOLULU--Japan is considering acquiring a more advanced missile defense system to counter "the evolving threat from North Korea," Defense Minister Gen Nakatani said here. "North Korea is improving its ballistic missiles," Nakatani said Nov. 23. "Acquiring a new asset would be one specific way to strengthen our capabilities." During his visit to Hawaii, Nakatani observed an Aegis destroyer responding to a ballistic missile in a mock exercise. He told reporters accompanying him of his hopes to purchase a newer missile defense setup, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system developed by the United States. The THAAD system is designed to destroy incoming ballistic missiles as they descend toward their targets. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201511250049 Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russia’s Tu-95 Bomber Upgraded to Carry New Nuclear-Tipped Missiles 21 November 2015 Russia’s Aviakor aviation factory has delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces the first modernized Tu-95MSM strategic bomber/missile carrier, the company’s press office reported. "The upgrade has significantly boosted the combat capabilities of the aircraft and the operating conditions for the crew," Alexei Gusev, CEO of Aviakor, said. The aircraft was named Dubna (after a town outside Moscow). The adjustment of the Tu-95 for the new armament and new military requirements took three months. The second aircraft is currently being upgraded by Aviakor and will be delivered to the Defense Ministry later in 2015. In December, the third bomber will be delivered to the factory for modernization. The modernized Tu-95 is equipped with advanced radio-radar equipment as well as a target- acquiring/navigation system based on GLONASS. The aircraft can carry up to eight Kh-101 strategic cruise missiles or Kh-102 nuclear-tipped missiles on the wing’s external mountings. The previous Tu-95 modification was armed with six Kh-55 cruise missiles on a rotary launching mechanism in the bay. The Kh-101 is bigger than the Kh-55, and cannot be carried in the bay of the aircraft. The Kh-101 has an operation range of up to 5,500 kilometers, with a complex trajectory. It can travel at an altitude of 30 meters above the ground. The Kh-101 is invisible to radar and has an accuracy of five meters. The missile is guided with a combined navigation system – inertial and GLONASS. It hits the target with a 400-kg warhead or 250-kiloton nuclear warhead. The Tupolev Tu-95 (Bear) long-range strategic bomber entered service with the Soviet Air Force in 1956. In 2010, a squadron of Tu-95’s traveled 30,000 km within 43 hours, having been refueled four times in the air. The Tu-95 is also the world’s fastest turboprop-powered aircraft. After the modernization, the Tu-95 is expected to stay in service with the Russian Air Force until 2025. http://sputniknews.com/military/20151121/1030508547/tu-95-bomber-upgrade.html Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russia Develops New Tactical Missiles for Iskander-M System 22 November 2015 Russia's defense industry is developing new missile types for the Iskander-M system, the Army's missile forces chief said on Sunday. Russia is developing new types of ballistic missiles for the Iskander-M tactical nuclear-capable missile system, the deputy head of Russia's missile forces Aleksandr Dragovalovsky told radio station Russian News Service. Dragovalovsky did not specify the exact types of missiles being developed for the system. Konstrukskoye Buro Mashinostroyeniya, the design bureau behind the Iskander, said in a press

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Deputy FM: Russia's INF Claims to US "Not an Excuse, it is a Real Concern" Russia's deputy foreign minister says there is no progress, and neither is there expected any November 23, 2015 MOSCOW, November 23. /TASS/. Russia so far sees no US side’s willingness to discuss claims of non-compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told TASS on Monday. "This issue is occasionally raised in our dialogue with the United States," Ryabkov said. "And it would be an exaggeration to say that some progress has been made." "We do not see the American colleagues’ readiness to seriously consider and discuss our claims regarding Washington’s non-compliance with the Treaty requirements," he said. "In essence, no answer has been given to our claims," the senior diplomat said. "They put forward such quasi-legal, untrue and unfounded arguments, saying that Russia is allegedly looking for a pretext to accuse the United States of violation of the INF Treaty." "It’s not an excuse, it is a real concern. But there is no dialogue, instead they claim that we allegedly violate the document," the official said. "There is no progress, so the situation is quite complicated in this sphere." "I do not think that in the coming months we will have some changes for the better, although we will continue to persistently raise these questions before the American colleagues," he said. "We are not evading the dialogue on the INF Treaty future." The INF Treaty was signed on December 8, 1987 in Washington. It came into force on 1 June 1988. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty, requires destruction of the Parties' ground- Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 km, their launchers and associated support structures and support equipment within three years after the Treaty enters into force. The intermediate-range missile is defined as ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM) or ground- launched cruise missiles (GLCM) having a range between 1,000 km to 5,500 km. The shorter-range missile is defined as GLBMs or GLCMs with a range between 500 km and 1,000 km (Article II). The Treaty covers the following intermediate-range missiles: for the United States, Pershing II and BGM-109G; for the Soviet Union, SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5. As for shorter-range missiles: for the United States, Pershing IA; for the USSR, SS-12 and SS-23 (Article III). The INF Treaty applied to all land-based missiles regardless of their equipment. A special clarification, adopted in the spring of 1988 during the ratification process, elaborated that it covered all missiles falling under the definition irrespective of whether they were equipped with nuclear, conventional, or "exotic" warheads. http://tass.ru/en/politics/838458 Return to Top

Sputnik International – Russian Information Agency Russian, US Diplomats Discuss Arms Control, Non-Proliferation of WMDs According to Russian Foreign Ministry, Deputy Foreign Minister and US Under Secretary of State discussed in New York City arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 25 November 2015 MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov and US Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller discussed in New York City arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Russian Foreign Ministry said Wednesday. "A number of pressing issues in the field of arms control and non-proliferation of WMD was discussed, as well as separate topics related to the interaction among five nuclear weapon states designated by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," the ministry said. Earlier in the day, Ryabkov told reporters that he had discussed with Gottemoeller, US State Department under secretary for arms control and international security, the downing of a Russian warplane over Syria by NATO member-state Turkey. On Tuesday, a Russian Su-24 jet crashed in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the plane was downed by an air-to-air missile launched by a Turkish F-16 jet over Syrian territory, and fell 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) from the Turkish border. One of the two Su-24 pilots was killed by fire from the ground after ejecting from the plane and a Russian naval infantry soldier was killed during the rescue operation. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that Turkey acted in line with its sovereign right to respond to threats, claiming that the Russian jet had violated Turkish airspace. Putin described the Turkish attack as a "stab in the back" carried out by "accomplices of terrorists." http://sputniknews.com/world/20151125/1030713414/russia-us-arms-control.html Return to Top Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Washington Free Beacon – Washington, D.C. China Again Tests Nuclear Hypersonic Missile Sixth flight of DF-ZF glide vehicle indicates weapon a high priority for Beijing By Bill Gertz November 25, 2015 China carried out a sixth flight test of its new high-speed nuclear attack vehicle on Monday designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses or carry out global strikes. The ultra-fast maneuvering strike weapon known as the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle was launched atop a ballistic missile fired from the Wuzhai missile test center in central China’s Shanxi Province, according defense officials. The vehicle separated from its launcher near the edge of the atmosphere and then glided to an impact range several thousand miles away in western China, said officials familiar with details of the test. The DF-ZF flight was tracked by U.S. intelligence agencies and flew at speeds beyond Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound. Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. Bill Urban declined to comment. “We do not comment on specific PRC weapons tests, but we do monitor Chinese military modernization carefully,” Urban told the Washington Free Beacon. It was the sixth time the hypersonic glider has been flight tested since last year. The website China Spaceflight reported Sunday that the test would take place, based on the Chinese government announcement of airspace closures along what would ultimately become the zone used by the glide vehicle during the flight test. The website reported that the airspace restrictions were similar to closures announced prior to an August DF-ZF flight test. The airspace was closed to commercial and military air traffic between 12:53 a.m. and 1:40 a.m. Beijing time on Nov. 23—the likely timeframe of the test. China’s most recent DF-ZF test took place Aug. 19, also from Wuzhai, and like Monday’s flight test was judged a success. U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed the DF-ZF to be a nuclear delivery vehicle for Chinese missiles, with maneuverability and high speeds that would allow it to defeat U.S. missile defenses, currently designed to counter non-maneuvering warheads with more easily-tracked ballistic trajectories. China also could use the DF-ZF for conventional-armed rapid global strike capability, according to military specialists. The vehicle is believed to reach speeds of between Mach 5 and Mach 10, or 3,836 miles per hour and 7,680 miles per hour. The high rate of testing for the glide vehicle is an indication China has placed a high priority on the weapon program and that it is making rapid progress. The Chinese conducted earlier flight tests on June 7, and on Jan. 9, 2014, Aug. 7, 2014, and Dec. 2, 2014. All the tests were first reported by the Free Beacon. The commander of the U.S. Strategic Command told reporters last summer that hypersonic glide vehicles are new strategic warfare technology and an emerging threat.

“As I look at that [hypersonic] threat, clearly the mobility, the flight profile, those kinds of things are things we have to keep in mind and be able to address across that full kill chain,” Cecil Haney said in an interview in July, using the military term for the process used to target and attack enemy missiles. Air Force Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, then-deputy commander of Strategic Command, said at the same time that hypersonic missiles offer a number of advantages as strategic weapons. “It offers a number of different ways to overcome defenses, whether those are conventional, or if someone would decide to use a nuclear warhead, I think gives it an even more complicated dimension,” Kowalski said. Currently, no nation has deployed hypersonic weapons but “it remains something that concerns us,” Kowalski added. The annual report of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, made public Nov. 18, stated that China’s hypersonic weapons are in the developmental stages and are “progressing rapidly.” The glide vehicle could be deployed by 2020, and a separate high- technology ramjet-propelled cruise missile could be deployed by 2025, the report said. The Mach 5 to Mach 10 speeds allow the arms to “strike any target on earth in under an hour,” it stated. “The very high speeds of these weapons, combined with their maneuverability and ability to travel at lower, radar-evading altitudes, would make them far less vulnerable than existing missiles to current missile defenses,” the report said. The report said China’s hypersonic weapons, as well as the use of multiple-warhead missiles, are part of China’s efforts to assure its missiles can penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Nuclear-armed hypersonic vehicles would be part of China’s retaliatory strike capabilities, while conventionally-tipped hypersonics could indicate long-range conventional strikes. “Alternatively, China may intend its hypersonic program for both nuclear and conventional purposes, or may simply be following the United States in pushing the technological frontier and is not yet certain which it will pursue,” the report said. China is among three nations that are developing hypersonic arms, along with Russia and the United States. Rick Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the sixth test indicates Beijing may be seeking a conventional rapid global attack capability similar to the developmental U.S. program called Prompt Global Strike. Fisher said analysis of Chinese solid fueled space launchers indicates the new Kuaizhou-2 launcher could be used with China’s anti-satellite missiles and also could boost the DF-ZF to intercontinental ranges. “It is possible that Kuaizhou-2 could become the basis for China’s first intercontinental non-nuclear armed Prompt Global Strike delivery vehicle,” he said, adding the booster “could likely carry multiple DF-ZF derived hypersonic maneuvering precision strike warheads.” China also is building and deploying sophisticated surveillance satellites that could be used for the precision global strike weapons.

The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea North Korean Leader's Top Aide Working on Farm as Punishment: State Spy Agency November 24, 2015 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent his key aide to a local farm in early November as punishment for the mishandling of a hydraulic power station construction project, South Korea's state spy agency said Tuesday. Choe Ryong-hae, the communist party's secretary, appears to have been receiving re-education at a farm in an unidentified province starting this month due to his responsibility for water leakage from the newly built hydraulic power station, according to the National Intelligence Service. The NIS told lawmakers that Choe, secretary of the Worker's Party of Korea, was punished for the problem at the power station near the North's border with China. It also added that there was a disagreement between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Choe. Despite the punishment, Choe seems to be able to be reinstated, given the nature of his crime is seen as relatively lighter than that of Jang Song-thaek, who was executed in early 2013. The agency's report was later released to the public by a lawmaker after it was reported to lawmakers in a closed session. Choe's whereabouts has been under intense media highlight since he was found to have been omitted from a list of a committee that prepared for a state funeral of a North Korean military marshal in early November. North Korea mobilized many young adults to complete the construction of the power station at the foot of Mount Baekdu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula. The project, launched in 2002, was completed in October to celebrate the North Korean ruling party's 70th founding anniversary. Meanwhile, the NIS claimed that 10 local citizens arrested earlier this month have close links to the Islamic State, which has claimed responsibility for the recent terrorist attacks in Paris. "They were not just praising IS but had close ties with IS," said Rep. Joo Ho-young of the ruling Saenuri Party, who participated the meeting. In mid-November, the NIS said in a parliamentary report that there are 10 people who have publicly expressed support for IS.

The suspects allegedly left questions on the Internet, such as how to cross the border into Syria and join the extremist militant group, according to the NIS. (Yonhap) http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20151124000883 Return to Top

Yonhap News Agency – Seoul, South Korea Nuclear Envoys of S. Korea, China Hold Talks on N. Korea November 24, 2015 BEIJING/SEOUL, Nov. 24 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's chief nuclear envoy held talks with his Chinese counterpart in Beijing Tuesday amid efforts to resume long-stalled multilateral nuclear talks with North Korea. Hwang Joon-kook, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei discussed the six-party talks and current events on the Korean Peninsula, said a South Korean diplomat who was involved in the meeting. Details of the Tuesday meeting were not immediately available. Before the talks began, a South Korean official in Seoul said, "The two sides will discuss the issue of restarting meaningful denuclearization talks and strengthening sanctions and pressure (on Pyongyang)." He stressed the importance of China's "constructive role" in dealing with North Korea which can carry out provocative acts anytime. The Foreign Ministry said Hwang's trip to Beijing this time is intended for "routine consultations" between the two countries, but it comes amid signs that Pyongyang-Beijing ties are improving. China sent Liu Yunshan, a high-level Chinese communist party official, to Pyongyang last month as a special delegate to a major anniversary event. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/11/24/0301000000AEN20151124007700315.ht ml Return to Top

The Korea Herald – Seoul, South Korea N. Korean Leader Executes about 100 Officials: Think Tank November 25, 2015 North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has executed around 100 party and military officials since he took office in late 2011 in a bid to tighten his grip on power, a Seoul think tank said Wednesday. But a number of North Korean power elites are disenchanted with the leader's so-called reign of terror, according to the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank under South Korea's spy agency.

Daily Sabah – Istanbul, Turkey Putin’s Three-Tiered, Multi-Billion-Ruble 'War Room' Revealed DAILY SABAH November 21, 2015 ISTANBUL --Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to the Russian defence ministry's new three- tiered, multi-billion-ruble national control defence centre on Nov 17 has dropped some jaws as the lay-out and capacity of the 'war room' is reminiscent of the Soviet Union during World War II. During his visit, Putin was showed live footage of long-range strategic bombers on way to Syria and was briefed on the latest Russian missions which come after a Russian passenger jet was downed by terrorists over Egypt last month. After the briefing, Putin ordered Russian commanders in Syria to make close cooperation with their newest ally France as part of Russia's efforts to gain a more prominent role in a proposed anti-terror coalition. However, it was not the Russian president's visit, nor his orders that caught the most attention. With its cinema-size screens, fortified walls and a 'said' maze of underground tunnels, the building could quite surely compete with those in the James Bond films, perfectly summing up Al Jazeera English's Russia correspondent Rory Challands' thoughts on the military complex. The new national defense center is to be in charge of launching ballistic missiles, deploying nuclear weapons as well as serving as a critical center of communication during a possible war. The roof top of the control center also has heli-pads to accommodate Russia's Mi-8 transport helicopter. The new Russian complex proves quite ostentatious as it claims that it is indeed bigger and better than its U.S. equivalent, the National Military Command Centre at the Pentagon as one Russian state news agency headlined with "Russian Defense Data Center Outperforms US Facility Threefold: Official" this week, reported the Washington Post on Nov 21. The center which was completed in 2014, comes as the newest addition of decade-long efforts to modernize the Russian army and has cost Russia billions of dollars. About two miles from the Red Square, the 'war room' is located on the Frunzenskaya embankment, on the left bank of the Moscow river.

An Airbus A-321 passenger jet of Russian airliner Kogalymavia carrying 224 passengers and crew had crashed in Egypt's Sinai peninsula on Oct 31, killing all on board. Daesh had released a photo of a bomb hidden in a soft drink can that it said had brought down a Russian passenger jet over Egypt last month, and had also announced on Nov 19 that it had killed hostages from Norway and China. http://www.dailysabah.com/asia/2015/11/21/putins-three-tiered-multi-billion-ruble-war-room- revealed Return to Top

RT (Russia Today) – Moscow, Russia Chemical, Bacterial Attacks 'Among Risks to Consider' - French Defense Minister 22 November 2015 Concerns have grown dramatically about the possibility of new lethal attacks by Islamic State against France. Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian has warned that his country is currently facing the risk of chemical and bacterial attacks. This kind of attack is “among the risks that we must consider,” he said on Sunday in an interview on Europe-1. But "it is very complicated to use chemical weapons from one territory to another," Jean-Yves Le Drian said. "Every precaution has been taken to prevent this kind of risk," the minister added. On Thursday, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls also highlighted the need for his country to be prepared for chemical and biological attacks, warning that the “macabre imagination” of Islamic State “is limitless.” US and European officials have repeatedly claimed that Islamic State is incapable of producing chemical weapons due to a lack of resources and technology, insisting that it has only managed to produce mustard gas so far, of low quality and in small quantities. "It's not enough to have mustard gas ... one has to be able to team that up with a system of dissemination and it is here that things and techniques start getting very complicated," Olivier Lepick, an expert on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, told AFP on Thursday.

He said that ISIS and similar groups had been interested in such weapons for quite a while, but "if it was so simple to stage an attack they would have done it a long time ago - and here we are speaking of a period of 20 years." "These arms are much more difficult to use than Kalashnikovs or explosives belts," Lepick said. Earlier this week, US security officials said that Islamic State has a group devoted to creating chemical weapons, AP reported, citing Iraqi and US intelligence sources. The group uses scientists from Iraq and Syria, as well as other countries in the region. Although ISIS has already used mustard gas on the battlefield, US intelligence agencies are skeptical about the terrorists’ capabilities to produce sophisticated chemical weapons suited for a potential terrorist attack. Iraqi officials warned, however, that control over vast territories in Iraq and Syria gives the

The Independent – London, U.K. Former Labour Defence Secretary Des Browne Questions Whether Trident Is an Effective Deterrent Lord Browne says the system needs to be secured against cyberattack By Jon Stone November 24, 2015 The Trident nuclear weapons system could be vulnerable to cyber attack, a former Labour defence secretary has warned. Lord (Des) Browne told the BBC there was currently “no guarantee” that the submarine-based nuclear missiles were actually an effective deterrent. He told the Guardian newspaper that the Government needed to ensure that potential “weak spots” in the system were protected against “a high-tier cyber threat”.

“If they are unable to [secure the weapons from cyber attack] then there is no guarantee that we will have a reliable deterrent or the Prime Minister will be able to use this system when he needs to reach for it, he added. Lord Browne was a Labour MP from 1997 until 2010. He served as Secretary of State for Defence between 2006 and 2008. The former minister’s comments come after a decision by Labour’s frontbench to abstain on a symbolic House of Commons motion by the SNP on scrapping Trident. The party’s leadership says the debate, called by the nationalists, is a political stunt. It is likely to highlight divisions within Labour on the issue, with MPs from the party’s right reportedly preparing to defy their leader and vote to keep the nuclear weapons. David Cameron has confirmed that Parliament will vote on renewal of the weapon. The Strategic Defence and Security Review revealed that the estimated official price tag of the weapon has risen from £25bn to £31bn – with a £10bn contingency fund available. Other estimates by the Reuters news agency based on official figures have been as high as £167bn taking into account the lifetime cost of the system. The system is opposed by Jeremy Corbyn, but it is still official Labour policy to renew it when its lifespan runs out. Scottish Labour has however voted to oppose the weapon's renewal. The Government says the weapon is an effective deterrent against attack. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/former-labour-defence-secretary-des-browne- questions-whether-trident-is-an-effective-deterrent-a6746566.html Return to Top

Belfast Telegraph – Belfast, Ireland, U.K. Poll: Northern Ireland should Host Trident Nuclear Weapons, Says DUP MP - Do You Agree? DUP MP Jeffrey Donaldson has told the Prime Minister that Northern Ireland is willing to play host to the controversial Trident nuclear weapons programme. By Lisa Smyth November 24, 2015 Mr Donaldson made the remark during a debate in the House of Commons yesterday, in which David Cameron outlined the government’s £178bn defence-spending plans for the next decade. The DUP MP’s offer followed comments by SNP Moray MP Angus Robertson, who said an overwhelming majority of MPs and civic organisations, including churches and the Scottish Trade Union Congress, are opposed to Trident. “What kind of family of nations with a respect agenda imposes something on one of its members against its will,” he asked. Taking to his feet, Mr Donaldson said: “With support for the Union in Northern Ireland growing ever stronger, may I help to assuage the concerns of the Right Honourable Member for Moray by

TASS Russian News Agency – Moscow, Russia Putin: Russia Will Move S-300 Air Defense Systems to its Base in Syria "We will take the most serious attitude to what has happened and all of our means will be employed for maintaining security," the Russian president states November 25, 2015 NIZHNI TAGIL, November 25. /TASS/. Russia will employ every single resource available, including the S-300 system, to ensure the safety of flights over Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin told the media. "The S-300 air defense complex will be moved to our air base in Syria. I do hope that this and other measures that we will take will be enough to make flights safe," he said. "I would like to say that we will take the most serious attitude to what has happened and all of our means will be employed for maintaining security," Putin stated. Earlier, the Russian defense minister noted that Russia's S-400 Triumf air defense systems will be moved to the Hmeimim air base in Syria. On Tuesday, a Russian Sukhoi-24M bomber was downed with an air-to-air missile launched from an F-16 fighter of the Turkish Air Force. One of the pilots died and the other was rescued and

brought to the Russian base. A Russian Mi-8 helicopter was destroyed during the search and evacuation operation. One Marine serving in the army on contract was killed. Turkey claims that the downed plane had violated its air space. The Russian Defense Ministry says the Sukhoi-24M stayed over Syria all the time and it was the Turkish fighter that violated the border during the attack. The Russian General Staff has warned that Russia will be destroying all potentially dangerous targets over Syria and moved towards the Syrian shores its guided missile cruiser The Moskva armed with the Fort system (the sea-launched equivalent of S-300). http://tass.ru/en/defense/839096 Return to Top

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) – Tehran, Iran 21 November 2015 Iranian Dy FM, IAEA Chief to Confer in Vienna Tehran, Nov 21, IRNA – Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Yukiya Amano will confer in Vienna, in upcoming days, to close the file of possible military dimension of Iranian nuclear program. Araqchi, who has undertaken leadership of JCPOA implementation follow up department will go to Vienna on Tuesday to confer with Yukiya Amano. Meanwhile, head of expert team of nuclear negotiator Hamid Baeedinejad has been involved in negotiations with representatives of the western governments to coordinate practical steps to implement the deal and the reciprocity to be made by the western governments. On the other hand, US Coordinator for implementing Iran's nuclear deal Stephen Mull is departing US for Vienna on Sunday to consider implementing process of JCPOA with other representatives from Group 5+1. Representatives of Group 5+1 will also make coordination with IAEA. One of obligations of G5+1 upon JCPOA is to compile and present a draft resolution to IAEA Board of Governors to close Iran's dossier forever. Simultaneously with Araqchi presence in Vienna, a team of Iranian experts will hold the last round of talks with IAEA on Tuesday November 24 to reach final conclusion on the past issues. Iran's permanent representative in the agency Reza Najafi will lead the team. Deputy Director General of IAEA and Head of Safeguards Department Varjoranta will lead the agency team for the negotiations. One week after the negotiations on December 1, the agency will present its report on resolving the outstanding issues to members of Board of Governors and then the board has 10 to 14 days to consider the report.

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran AEOI Publishes Document on Redesigning Arak Reactor (+Full Text) November, 21, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – The official document on the modernization and reconfiguration of Iran’s Arak heavy water nuclear reactor recently signed by the six world powers was published by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on Saturday. Tehran and the Group 5+1 (Russia, China, the US, Britain, France, and Germany) on July 14 reached a conclusion over the text of a comprehensive 159-page deal on Iran’s nuclear energy program. According to part of the deal, Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor is to be reconfigured. The document on redesigning the reactor has been signed by the foreign ministers of the sextet, the European Union representative as well as Iran’s foreign minister, and thus “is very rigid in legal terms”, AEOI Chief Ali Akbar Salehi noted on Thursday night. Here is the full text of the official document on modernization of Arak reactor. OFFICIAL DOCUMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TOGETHER WITH THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FOR COLLABORATION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PROJECT FOR MODERNIZATION OF THE REACTOR AT ARAK The People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, together with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, hereinafter 'the E3/EU+3', and the Islamic Republic of Iran, together, 'the Participants,' RECALLING the E3/EU+3's and Iran's strong commitment in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to the redesign and reconstruction of a modernized Arak heavy water research reactor (the Arak modernization project), FURTHER RECALLING Iran's commitment in the JCPOA to have responsibility for overall implementation of the Arak modernization project and the E3/EU+3's commitment in the JCPOA to assume responsibilities regarding the modernization project and to provide assistance needed by Iran for redesigning and rebuilding the reactor, WELCOMING the Joint Statement of Intent by China, Iran, and the United States of October 18, 2015, DESIRING to establish a framework that reflects their strong commitment to the modernization project,

REAFFIRMING their shared objective of providing an assured path forward for the modernization project, thereby instilling confidence that the modernization project should commence without delay, Confirm the following commitments: 1. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and have responsibility for development of a schedule and overall implementation of the Arak modernization project. The Arak modernization project will encompass a wide range of activities that include, but are not limited to, overall implementation efforts, design of the modernized reactor and subsidiary laboratories, fuel fabrication and qualification, application for and issuance of licenses, and construction and operation of the reactor and subsidiary laboratories. 2. The E3/EU+3 will engage in a range of collaborative activities in support of the Arak modernization project, in a Working Group to Support the Project for Modernization of the Reactor at Arak, which will be established in a Memorandum of Understanding among the E3/EU+3 (MoU), following consultations with Iran. Such collaborative activities will include, inter alia, reactor design, fuel development and fabrication, safety, reactor component procurement and fabrication, and spent fuel management, as specified in the MoU. 3. The Working Group participants commit to provide assistance, consistent with their respective national laws, for redesigning and rebuilding the Arak reactor and subsidiary laboratories as follows: a. China will participate in the design and construction of the modernized reactor, including in areas such as reactor design engineering, engineering technology services, supply of equipment, and fabrication of fuel for the initial core load, based on commercial arrangements. China is a co-Chair of the E3/EU+3 Working Group. b. The United States will provide technical support and review of the modernized reactor design, as well as analysis of fuel design and safety standards, to ensure it conforms with the key attributes and characteristics of the modernized reactor as set forth in the JCPOA. The United States is a co- Chair of the E3/EU+3 Working Group. c. France will participate in design review, supply of equipment based on commercial arrangements, and receipt and handling of spent fuel through commercial arrangements. d. The United Kingdom will participate in design review, training on safety and security, and supply of equipment based on commercial arrangements. e. Germany will participate in design review, the feasibility study, and supply of equipment based on commercial arrangements. f. Russia will provide consultative service, provided the availability of the necessary expertise and upon request of the co-Chairs of the E3/EU+3 Working Group. g. The High Representative of the European Union, as the coordinator of the Joint Commission, will facilitate the approval process of relevant designs and, if needed, of relevant equipment exports for the modernization project. 4. An international partnership composed of Iran and the Working Group will implement the Arak modernization project, China and the United States, as co-Chairs of the E3/EU+3 Working Group, are responsible for ensuring coordination of the Working Group, facilitating a prompt response by the Working Group to requests for assistance from Iran, including consolidated responses in the Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama area of design review, and serving as the primary interface on behalf of the Working Group with the Joint Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As the primary liaison between the E3/EU+3 Working Group and Iran, China will facilitate communication between Iran and the Working Group in the course of the implementation of the Arak modernization project. 5. Iran will develop and share as soon as possible with the E3/EU+3 Working Group its five-year schedule, including major milestones. The Working Group will promptly review Iran's schedule and share its view with Iran. 6. The E3/EU+3 and Iran express their firm commitment to cooperate to develop the final design of the modernized reactor and subsequently the final design of the subsidiary laboratories, in preparation for submitting the final design of the modernized reactor and the final design of the subsidiary laboratories to the Joint Commission for review and endorsement prior to construction. The Joint Commission will aim to complete its review and endorsement within three months after the submission of the final design. In this regard, the E3/EU+3 and Iran intend to make all reasonable efforts to ensure that the final design of the modernized reactor and the final design of the subsidiary laboratories as submitted to the Joint Commission clearly meet the criteria set forth in the JCPOA, with the aim of facilitating the Joint Commission's prompt review and endorsement as envisioned in the JCPOA. 7. Disputes or concerns regarding the implementation of this Official Document, including claims of non-performance or undue delays by any Participant with respect to its commitments, may be referred to the Joint Commission for discussion and resolution in accordance with the JCPOA. 8. Nothing in this Official Document modifies or alters the JCPOA in any way. In the event of a conflict between this Official Document and the JCPOA, the JCPOA prevails. 9. This Official Document becomes effective on the date the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has received from each Participant a copy of this Official Document with an original signature for that Participant. It is not necessary that the signatures for all Participants appear together on one original document. The High Representative intends to inform all Participants of the effective date of this Official Document and to provide each Participant a certified copy of this Official Document with the signature of each Participant. Signed in the English language. http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/11/21/922991/aeoi-publishes-document-on- redesigning-arak-reactor-full-text Return to Top

The Times of Israel – Jerusalem, Israel Israel Has 115 Nuclear Weapons, Says US Think Tank New report alleges Israel produced some 660 kg of plutonium at Dimona nuclear facility over past 50 years By Times of Israel staff November 21, 2015 Israel has amassed approximately 115 nuclear warheads since it developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the Six Day War in 1967, according to a report published this week by a US think tank.

The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a report on November 19 alleging that Israel possesses about 660 kilograms of plutonium, produced at the Dimona reactor since operations began in 1963, which would allow it to have an estimated 115 nuclear weapons today. The author does acknowledge that the actual number is a closely guarded secret. Other studies have put the number of Israel’s nuclear weapons at between 80 and 200. A single nuclear weapon has between three to five kilograms of plutonium, according to the ISIS study “Based on the total production of plutonium, the median for the number of nuclear weapons is about 165 with a standard deviation of 33 and a full range of about 90-290 weapons. Likely, Israel did not build this many nuclear weapons. A reasonable assumption is that the number of deployed weapons is 30 percent lower, or 115 nuclear weapons as of the end of 2014,” according to the report, written by former UN nuclear inspector David Albright. The study also alleges that “Israel has a wide range of delivery vehicles for its nuclear weapons.” Since the 1960s when Israel developed the nuclear-capable Jericho ballistic missile with France’s help, it has developed “several improved missiles since then on its own, as well as nuclear-capable cruise missiles,” according to Albright, who added that Israel “also has aircraft that can deliver nuclear weapons and may have the capability to launch nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from its submarines.” Israel maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither openly admitting nor denying that it possesses a nuclear program. It is also not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel’s nuclear activities came into sharp focus in 1986 when Mordechai Vanunu — a technician from 1976-1985 at Israel’s nuclear facility at Dimona — revealed overwhelming evidence of Israel’s nuclear program to Britain’s Sunday Times, including dozens of photographs, enabling nuclear experts to conclude that Israel had produced at least 100 nuclear warheads. Charged with treason, he spent 18 years in jail and was released under very strict conditions in 2004. http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-has-115-nuclear-weapons-says-us-think-tank/ Return to Top

International Business (IB) Times (London Edition) – London, U.K. The Hunt for Red Mercury: Isis Tricked into Chasing after Mythical Nuclear Bomb Substance By Mary-Ann Russon November 21, 2015 Islamic State (Isis) has set its sights on obtaining a rare and incredibly expensive lethal substance called Red Mercury that can make nuclear bombs as small as a sandwich bag, but there's only one problem – it doesn't exist. Although the terrorist group is apparently sophisticated enough to have its own 24/7 IT helpdesk and funds its activities by selling Iraqi and Syrian oil, as well as smuggling ancient relics out of the

Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama region to unscrupulous private collectors, it seems that IS is not beyond believing in an urban legend that has been floating around since the Cold War. What is Red Mercury? The legend revolves around the existence of a mythical compound known as Red Mercury, which is meant to be the main ingredient for a dirty bomb that would have devastating effects, causing radiation contamination and nuclear explosions of never-before-seen proportions. Red Mercury is allegedly made from mercury iodide – a scarlet-coloured powder that is odourless, tasteless, insoluble in water and poisonous, but it will turn yellow when heated above 126 degrees Celsius. It is an elaborate hoax that first appeared in major Soviet media in 1979 as a dream substance sold on the black market by arms dealers for hundreds of thousands of dollars per kilogram. Seemingly, Red Mercury could do whatever an army, dictator, Bond villain, rogue government, freedom fighter or terrorist wanted it to do, from making a super-powerful weapon to acting as an anti-radar paint or single-handedly guiding missiles. Although no one ever explained exactly how Red Mercury worked, an American physicist named Samuel T Cohen added his voice to the growing speculation about Red Mercury in the Western media in the early 1990s, claiming the substance would enable nuclear weapons to become much smaller than they are today, and he continued to talk about how unprepared the US was for such an attack until his death in 2010. His assertions were enough to spur ample articles in the Western media, and UK's Channel 4 made two TV documentaries on Red Mercury in 1993 and 1994 entitled Trail of Red Mercury and Pocket Neutron, which both claimed that there was "startling evidence that Russian scientists have designed a miniature neutron bomb using a mysterious compound called Red Mercury". Mythical bomb substance debunked Russian arms dealers and merchants on the black market had a field day, however, as they continued to sell packets of the red powder to clients in the Middle East and Europe who would do almost anything to get it throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even though they had absolutely no idea what it actually was. Eventually, in 1997, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists finally declared that Red Mercury was fake, stating: "The asking price for red mercury ranged from $100,000 to $300,000 per kilogram. Sometimes the material would be irradiated or shipped in containers with radioactive symbols, perhaps to convince potential buyers of its strategic value. But samples seized by police contained — interest to weapons-makers." only mercury(II) oxide, mercury(II) iodide, or mercury mixed with red dye hardly materials of A year later, 15 researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which helps to maintain US nuclear weapons, published an article in the Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, declaring that Red Mercury was undoubtedly "a relatively notorious nuclear hoax". However, no one wanted to listen, as purchases of Red Mercury continued on the black market, and a 1999 issue of IHS Jane's Intelligence Review reported that Western intelligence agencies were using Red Mercury to lure al-Qaida operatives into the open, persuading them to travel to the US, where special agents disguised as arms dealers were waiting to arrest them. Even funnier, in 2004 three men were tried for trying to obtain Red Mercury in the UK, and prosecutors told the jury that even though the substance didn't actually exist, this fact was

irrelevant as the men had clearly meant to do harm by building a dirty bomb with it. In the end, they were cleared. The urban legend lives on You would think, what with the advent of the internet and the plethora of information available, that any would-be terrorists would today know better, but no. An in-depth report by the New York Times says IS is still keen to purchase the mythical substance, and they reportedly were willing to pay up to $4m (£2.6m) for it, because they thought that other Jihadists had found it first. Apparently, IS told NYT source Abu Omar that they were willing to buy Red Mercury, as long as it matched specific photos they had obtained. In the Middle East, the urban legend has widened and people in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Syria all believe in the existence of both "hot" and "cold" Red Mercury. Smugglers on the black market claim that if Red Mercury is real, it will be attracted to gold but repelled by garlic, and that different colours of the same substance can even increase sexual potency. It is even claimed that old Soviet sewing machines contain tiny caches of the substance and you can harvest it from old workshops. So does the substance exist? Omar fervently claims it does, but that he was unable to give it to IS, and one of his associates obtained the substance but was caught by Turkish police. However, the NYT was unable to verify any of these claims, and the terrorists clearly haven't got it, or they would have used it by now. But it's still pretty funny to think that, somewhere, somehow, there are arms dealers peddling fake powders to terrorists for millions of dollars. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/hunt-red-mercury-isis-tricked-into-chasing-after-mythical-nuclear- bomb-substance-1529789 Return to Top

The Japan Times – Tokyo, Japan World Powers to Help Iran Redesign Reactor as Part of Nuclear Deal Reuters November 22, 2015 DUBAI – Six world powers will help Iran redesign its Arak heavy water reactor so that it cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium, according to a document released by the state news agency IRNA on Saturday. The document was signed separately on Nov. 13, 17 and 18 by the foreign ministers of Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany) as well as EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini. It became effective on the date it was signed by all states. The fate of the Arak reactor in central Iran was one of the toughest sticking points in the long nuclear negotiations that led to an agreement in July. Removing the core of the heavy water reactor to produce less plutonium is a crucial step before the relief from sanctions starts.

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) – Tehran, Iran 23 November 2015 Russia Resumes Nuclear Trade with Iran as Sanctions Lifted Tehran, Nov 23, IRNA – Russia will resume exporting nuclear technology to Iran, President Vladimir Putin has decreed on a visit to Tehran. The move follows Iran's agreement to international curbs on its nuclear program. UN sanctions against Iran are to be lifted in exchange for that agreement, under a deal signed in July. Russia says it will help Iran's export of enriched uranium and modification of nuclear facilities at Arak and Fordo. Iran says its nuclear program is only for civilian, not military, purposes. Mr Putin is in Tehran to attend a summit of gas exporting countries. His talks with Iranian leaders are likely to focus on the war in Syria, where Russia and Iran are the main military backers of President Bashar al-Assad. Russia has been conducting intense air and missile strikes against Syrian rebels including so-called Islamic State (IS), while Iran has been helping Mr Assad's forces on the ground. Under the July nuclear deal, six world powers secured a pledge by Iran to set long-term limits on its nuclear research. Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpile will be reduced by 98% to 300kg for 15 years.

In a decree published on Monday, President Putin said Russia would support Iranian efforts to export any surplus enriched uranium - that is, above the 300kg limit - by sending raw uranium to Iran in exchange. Russia will also help Iran to modernize the heavy water reactor at Arak and to modify two cascades at its Fordo uranium enrichment plant. Low-enriched uranium, which has a 3%-4% concentration of the isotope U-235, can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. But it can also be enriched more highly to the 90% needed to produce nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear program remains controversial and is under close international scrutiny. Israel and many US politicians are staunchly opposed to the deal on lifting sanctions. (Source: BBC) http://www.irna.ir/en/News/81850954/ Return to Top

Al Arabiya – Dubai, U.A.E. Global Watchdog Slams Ongoing Chemical Arms Use in Syria By Agence France-Presse (AFP) Monday, 23 November 2015 The Hague -- The Hague-based chemical weapons watchdog Monday voiced “grave concern” at the continued use of toxic arms in Syria, calling for those behind such attacks to be held accountable. A special meeting of the U.N.-backed Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) met to discuss the findings of three reports after investigations in Syria. The body expressed “grave concern regarding the findings... that chemical weapons have once again been used in the Syrian Arab Republic,” the OPCW said in a statement. The use of such weapons by anyone “is unacceptable and would violate international law.” “Those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable.” The OPCW investigations did not directly blame any of the parties in the four-year civil war, aimed at ousting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But earlier, a US representative to the OPCW, Rafael Foley, said: “The sad reality is that chemical weapons’ use is becoming routine in the Syrian civil war.” He charged there was only “one conclusion” from the expert reports that “the Syrian regime has continued to use chemical weapons on its own people.” But accusations have also mounted that extremists with the Islamic State group have resorted to such tactics. The OPCW confirmed earlier in November with “utmost confidence” that mustard gas was used in Syria in August during fighting between rebels and jihadists and “likely” killed a child. OPCW experts also concluded that chlorine gas was likely used in an attack in Idlib province in March.

FARS News Agency – Tehran, Iran Tuesday, November 24, 2015 AEOI Chief: Iran to Export 9 Tons of Enriched Uranium to Russia, Import 140 Tons of Ore TEHRAN (FNA) - Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi announced that Tehran has signed an agreement with Russia to export 9 tons of its enriched uranium and import 140 tons of uranium ore. "We will sell the Russians 9 tons of enriched uranium, and we will be paid for enrichment services through receiving raw material and import 140 tons of natural uranium which is a large amount," Salehi said in an interview with the state TV on Monday night. "The relevant agreement has been signed and we will adopt the needed action in this regard," he added. The Russian media have also reported that President Vladimir Putin has ordered adoption of the necessary measures and some good news will be announced about exchange of nuclear fuel in coming days, Salehi said. In relevant remarks in October, Salehi announced that Iran was conducting final negotiations with Russians in a bid to exchange its enriched uranium in return for natural uranium. The AEOI chief said that according to the provisions of the accorded nuclear agreement with the six world powers on July 14, an Iranian delegation is in Moscow to finalize nuclear fuel exchange with Russia. "We have about 9 metric tons of enriched uranium, and we opted to sell this amount in global markets in choosing from two options of deluding or selling; this is a strong advantage of JCPOA for Iran,” he added, estimating that the fuel exchange would be possible by next two months after necessary arrangements. “A second obligation of the nuclear agreement is drafting the official document of reconstructing Arak Heavy Water Complex which would be crystalized in three papers; the first of these three was

drafted few weeks ago in Vienna and Iran, the US, and China signed and the Group 5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Britain and France plus Germany) approved it. The first document identifies obligations of Iran and the Sextet and a general process of implementation,” Salehi added. "The second paper which is called ‘understanding document,’ has a work division mechanism among 5+1 in reconstruction of Arak Heavy Water Complex. A third and final paper was discussed in Vienna by Iran’s nuclear negotiators, and is a parent paper which should be signed; the bill approved by the Parliament as well addresses this issue, emphasizing that at least an official paper should be drafted on Arak Heavy Water Complex and be approved by authorities,” he told the program. About centrifuges, Salehi said that 5,000 centrifuges would produce about 100kg of uranium (5.3 per cent purity), which he provisioned to be used in other sectors or prepared for sale in global markets. The AEOI head asserted that the inspections of country’s nuclear facilities would be periodical; “Iran is fully prepared to implement the JCPOA after a presidential decree,” Salehi said. Iran and the six world powers held several rounds of talks in Geneva, Lausanne and Vienna before striking a final agreement in Vienna on July 14 to end a 13-year-old nuclear standoff. After the agreement, the UN Security Council unanimously endorsed a draft resolution turning into international law the JCPOA reached between Iran and the G5+1 over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13940903000391 Return to Top

Mehr News Agency – Tehran, Iran Ayat. Khamenei: Iran Supports Whoever Confronts Bullying Powers Tuesday, 24 November 2015 TEHRAN, Nov. 24 (MNA) – Leader of the Islamic Revolution has reiterated Iran’s policy of supporting groups and countries who confront the bullying powers of the globe . Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei received Bulivian President Evo Morales on Tuesday evening, who is in Tehran to participate in GECF. Leader of the Islamic Revolution praised ‘heroic resistance against the bullying of hegemonic imperialist powers’ by Bolivia and other Latin and South American countries, and believed that the US policies actively sought to create identity crises for the young generation of public in those countries; “these aggressive and domineering policies could only be resisted through strengthening of wills and improvement of regional alliances and cooperation; this resistance, I believe, has more weight and value than nationalization of oil industry in Bolivia during your incumbency,” he emphasized. “Iran was the first country to free itself from under the yoke of serfdom of the US by popular movement led by Imam Khomeini (RA), and uniquely and single-handedly resisted a host of pressures and restrictions imposed on us by the two superpowers of the time; based on this premise, the Islamic Republic of Iran supports groups or countries who heroically resist against bullying powers,” Ayatollah Khamenei told Morales.

Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama The Leader then turned to Bolivia’s ample natural resources and capacities, which would provide the rulers of the country as well as Iran the grounds for cooperation and which would provide necessary means for them to resist against the dominance of hegemonic powers; “economic development does carry value as long as it seeks to help political independence and flourishing of economic capacities; along with advances in hardware, growth in software is also worthy of serious attention by statesmen of country,” he added. “The US policies on South and Latin America could be labeled ‘dangerous,’ as it systematically followed a crisis of identity among the native young population through new means of communication; if it succeeds in inculcating an American mentality in your youth, then political changes would dispense without hard means such as coup d’état, and will bring about their domination to all aspects of life,” the Leader emphasized. Bolivian President Evo Morales, for his part, expressed euphoria for visiting the Leader and addressed him as a ‘spiritual father,’ and a sage leader whose inspiring and hope-bestowing remarks had taught many invaluable lessons about the revolutions especially in South America; on US interference in the internal affairs of countries in the region, Morales highlighted his responsibility vis-à-vis US officials’ discouraging warnings about his visit to Tehran; “I strongly emphasize that Bolivia is a sovereign country, and will not need the permission of others in its relations with any country especially Iran; we will not succumb to the pressures by the US officials,” Morales pointed out. “With nationalization of oil industry, we reinstate our independence and national sovereignty, effectively ending years of western denigration of and domination over our nation and values”. Morales highlighted the Bolivian development and government services to the public which have multiplied during the independence years compared to the dark era of being a vassal state of the west; “currently, Bolivian GNP (Gross National Product) has risen to $36bn, showing a 4-fold increase compared to the era when we had been dependent upon west,” he added. Bolivian president said that his country had always viewed Iran’s positions with a sense of praise and believed that Iran would continue its road to success; “we invest much hope in broadening of ties in all fields of interest; Bolivia will remain a sovereign nation and resistant as well with inspiration and support coming from revolutionary countries such as Iran,” he concluded. http://en.mehrnews.com/news/112273/Iran-supports-whoever-confronts-bullying-powers Return to Top

Tasnim News Agency – Tehran, Iran Iran’s Air Defense Launches New Command Center November, 25, 2015 TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran’s Air Defense on Wednesday inaugurated a command and control center in the country’s southwest. Addressing a ceremony to open the new center, Lieutenant Commander of Khatam al-Anbia Air Defense Base General Ali Reza Sabahi-Fard said it is part of the integrated air defense network that can closely monitor and defend the country’s air space. The southwestern command and control center employs a range of systems to collect data, detect aircraft, carry out active and passive defense operations and handle cyber missions and electronic warfare, he added.

Back in November, Air Defense Commander Brigadier General Farzad Esmaili had praised major strides taken by the Iranian experts toward self-sufficiency in the area of defense, saying the air defense base is “moving forward” in manufacturing weapons and military equipment. Iranian military experts and technicians have in recent years made great headways in manufacturing a broad range of indigenous equipment, making the armed forces self-sufficient in the arms sphere. Iran has already made it clear that its military might poses no threat to the regional countries, saying that the Islamic Republic’s defense doctrine is entirely based on deterrence. http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/11/25/926918/iran-s-air-defense-launches-new- command-center Return to Top

The Times of India – Mumbai, India India Test-Fires Indigenously Developed Interceptor Missile By Press Trust of India (PTI) November 22, 2015 BALASORE: As part of efforts to develop a full-fledged multi-layer Ballistic Missile Defence system, India on Sunday test-fired its indigenously developed supersonic interceptor missile, capable of destroying any incoming ballistic missile, from a test range off Odisha coast. "The test was conducted to validate various parameters of the interceptor in flight mode," said defence sources. The interceptor, known as Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile, was engaged against an electronically prepared target which simulated the trajectory of a hostile ballistic missile. After getting signals from tracking radars, the interceptor, positioned at Abdul Kalam Island (Wheeler Island), roared through its trajectory at around 0946 hrs to destroy the incoming missile mid-air, in an endo-atmospheric altitude, defence sources said. The 'kill' effect of the interceptor was being ascertained by analysing data from multiple tracking sources," a Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist said soon after the test was carried out. The interceptor is a 7.5-meter long single stage solid rocket propelled guided missile equipped with a navigation system, a hi-tech computer and an electro-mechanical activator, the sources said. The interceptor missile had its own mobile launcher, secure data link for interception, independent tracking and homing capabilities and sophisticated radars, the sources said. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-test-fires-indigenously-developed-interceptor- missile/articleshow/49879376.cms Return to Top

Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Daily Times – Lahore, Pakistan India Testfires Ballistic Missile, as Nuclear Club Eyes its ‘Inclusion’ Web Desk November 24, 2015 NEW DELHI – India on Tuesday testfired its ‘nuclear capable’ Dhanush ballistic missile with a strike range of 350 kilometres, the Zee News channel reported. The surface-to-surface missile was test fired from INS Subhadra in the Bay of Bengal. The channel reported that it was a naval variant of India's ‘indigenously developed’ Prithvi missile. Quoting unidentified officials at the India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation, the channel reported that the Dhanush missile was capable of carrying conventional as well as nuclear payload of 500kg and can hit both land and sea-based targets under 350km range. On the other hand, some Indian media reported that Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Chairman Rafael Grossi - who recently visited New Delhi to meet India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj - tried to build a ‘consensus’ to admit India at its annual meeting next June. “It's a very delicate process but I think there is less and less justification for the impasse,” said Grossi, who is also Argentinia’s ambassador to Vienna. There is a point that India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The nuclear group operates by consensus, admitting India alone would mean it could then bar its western neighbour from the club, potentially pushing Pakistan to the fringes.“India has a nuclear deal with the US, with France and it will soon have deals with Australia and Japan. So all this will of course complement its effort to get into NSG,” said a senior security official in Pakistan. “But people don't understand that India will use all this additional fuel (through civil nuclear deals) to make energy and have a lot more left over to use to make weapons. So at the end of it, the need for even more deterrence from our side will grow, not decrease,” the official said. Pakistan sees a nuclear lead as vital insurance against Indian aggression, and it appears to be gaining the upper hand over India in the nuclear contest. Analysts Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon estimate Pakistan is producing 20 nuclear warheads a year to India's five. The US State Department declined to comment on specific discussions over Pakistan, but an official said Washington had not entered into talks on a civil nuclear pact with it. Nor was it seeking a waiver for Pakistan to trade with the NSG. The US continues to integrate India into the global non- proliferation mainstream, this official also said. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/24-Nov-2015/india-testfires-ballistic-missile-as-nuclear- club-eyes-its-inclusion Return to Top

The National Interest – Washington, D.C. OPINION/The Buzz Get Ready, China: This Is Why Australia Needs Nuclear Weapons By Christine M. Leah and Crispin Rovere November 21, 2015 Over the past century, Australia has been America’s most dependable military ally. In every major U.S. conflict, including World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, Australians have fought alongside. Yet as competition between China and the United States heats up in the Western Pacific, Australia is cautious not to provoke its greatest trading partner. When it comes to a potential U.S.-China conflict, Australia is doing all it can to keep its options open – and with good reason. Australia is highly vulnerable to long-range missile attack, including those carrying nuclear payloads. Despite Australia being a continental power, almost all its population is concentrated in a half-dozen major cities — easy targets for small numbers of warheads. In a high-intensity conflict between the United States and China, it is conceivable that China may target Australia with long-range nuclear missiles as a step up the escalation ladder, demonstrating to the United States its capacity, and willingness, to conduct nuclear strikes over intercontinental ranges. In this eventuality, extended nuclear deterrence would hardly be credible. Retaliating on Australia’s behalf would demonstrably mean accepting large-scale nuclear attack by China on the continental United States. For this reason, many Australians believe entering into conflict with the world’s most populous nuclear power, for any reason and under any circumstance, is unthinkable – despite very strong support for the Australia-U.S. alliance overall. The most effective means for Australia to insulate itself from long-range nuclear attack is to develop or acquire its own reliable long-range nuclear deterrent. Many would consider this a bad idea. If Australia (a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT) went nuclear, conventional wisdom suggests it very difficult to dissuade Japan, South Korea and others from following suit, critically threatening the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. This view is fundamentally flawed. In actuality, Australia has a very unique legal status with regard to nuclear weapons. At present, there are five Nuclear-Weapon States under the NPT (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China). Under Article IX.3 of the NPT, a country may accede to the treaty as a Nuclear-Weapon State if that state “manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967”. Australia qualifies. In the 1950s and ’60s, Australia hosted a series of nuclear tests conducted by the United Kingdom. These nuclear explosions were conducted on Australian sovereign territory with the active participation of Australian scientists and military personnel.

Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama These tests received financial support direct from the Australian government, with at least some explosions likely to have used fissile material that had been sourced locally from within Australia. No other non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT is in this category. As Rod Lyon of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute sharply has observed from recently declassified documents, Australian negotiators were very much cognizant of this legal basis prior to Australia joining the treaty. In sum, if Australia determined it was a national security imperative to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, it would be legally entitled to do so. As this legal status does not apply to America’s other allies in the Asia-Pacific, a changed nuclear status by Australia under the NPT would not automatically undermine the treaty as a whole. A nuclear-armed Australia is likely to confer a number of strategic advantages upon the United States. It strengthens Australia’s resolve in supporting the United States in a potentially open-ended strategic contest in the Asia-Pacific. It supports extended nuclear deterrence by removing a potentially vulnerable element of the policy, and the nations in Southeast Asia will see Australia as a more capable strategic partner and deepen cooperation. There’s more. A nuclear-armed Australia makes drawing the country into a broader collective defense architecture much more feasible. Having a reliable U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific with an independent nuclear deterrent strengthens nuclear deterrence in the Asia-Pacific overall. And it achieves these objectives without fatally weakening nuclear non-proliferation efforts more broadly. The United States should publicly recognize Australia’s right to nuclear weapons under the NPT. This does not mean that Australia will immediately seek to acquire such weapons. Australia has a strong non-proliferation record and a long history of disarmament activism. In the short-term, Australia would use this recognition to leverage its position in present nuclear arms control negotiations, further persuading countries in the region to exercise nuclear restraint. Regardless of Australia’s future nuclear choices, just acknowledging the legal reality of Australia’s unique status under the NPT supports America’s long-term strategy in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. government should do so as a matter of priority. This piece first appeared in WarIsBoring. Christine Leah is a post-doctoral fellow in grand strategy at Yale University. Crispin Rovere is an independent analyst of defense and nuclear policy issues. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/get-ready-china-why-australia-needs-nuclear-weapons- 14416 Return to Top

New Europe - Brussels, Belgium OPINION/Op-Ed The Pakistani Nuclear Deal that Wasn’t By Shahid Javed Burki November 22, 2015 LAHORE – Recently, it came to light that the United States was attempting to negotiate with Pakistan a deal to constrain the Pakistanis’ fast-growing nuclear weapons program. That sounds

like good news: Any move toward non-proliferation seems like a positive step. Unfortunately, in this case the effort has had some dangerous unintended consequences. It all started last month, when US media reported that an agreement was already near completion. First, David Ignatius of The Washington Post reported, on the basis of conversations with senior US officials, that agreement had already been reached on a number of steps Pakistan would take to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence. A few days later, David Sanger of The New York Times confirmed. Both accounts suggested that the agreement would be announced in a joint statement following the October 23 meeting in Washington, DC, between US President Barack Obama and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. But the reality is that those media reports were the beginning, not the end, of the process. According to senior Pakistani officials – including Sartaj Aziz, a key adviser on foreign affairs and national security – there was no agreement in the works when the stories appeared. Rather, it seemed that the US was using the media to put pressure on Pakistan’s government to respond more readily to America’s pleas to cap production of tactical weapons and the short-range missiles that could deliver them.The reports put Pakistan’s political leaders in an awkward position. They could not possibly succeed in convincing the country’s powerful military establishment to place constraints on the development of the country’s nuclear arsenal. Indeed, the US effort merely widened the divide on security issues within Pakistani– a situation that serves no one’s interests. Pakistan’s leaders were determined to turn attention back toward their country’s rapidly deteriorating relations with India, a challenge with which the US could help. So when they received America’s draft of the statement to be issued after the Obama-Sharif meeting, and saw that it focused almost entirely on nuclear issues, it was decided that Aziz would head to Washington a day early to agree on revisions. From Pakistan’s perspective, the draft statement seemed to be driven by the White House. It seemed that “the office of the National Security Adviser wanted to add another ‘nuclear feather’ to Obama’s cap, following the successful negotiations with Iran,” Aziz speculated to me in a private conversation. Believing that the US State Department was not “kept in the loop,” Aziz requested that, if he could not agree on the statement’s wording with the designated official, he could meet with Secretary of State John Kerry. To be sure, the US government’s agenda would have some benefits for Pakistan. The US would press the Nuclear Supplier Group to issue a waiver to Pakistan, as it has already done for India, so that Pakistan could import the technology, parts, and components needed to build nuclear power plants. And, in fact, Pakistan needs to build about a half-dozen such plants – in addition to the two already being built by the Chinese near Karachi – to address its energy shortfall, which amounts to an estimated 5,000 megawatts annually. With voters heading to the polls in early 2018, genuine progress toward resolving the energy crisis would presumably be good for Pakistan’s political leaders. In exchange for this, however, Pakistan would have to limit the number of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal and cease development work on them. Moreover, Pakistan would have to mothball the short-range “Nasr” missile, which has already been shown to be capable of delivering small nuclear weapons over a distance of 50-75 kilometers. The US believed that shifting Pakistani leaders’ attention from nuclear-weapons development to power-plant construction would, in addition to bolstering efforts to close the energy gap, limit Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama Pakistan’s dependence on China for nuclear technology and reduce the risk of an immensely destructive war in South Asia. But these calculations failed to take into account Pakistani security considerations – in particular, the military’s renewed fears about India’s intentions. For some time, senior military officials have been concentrating on rooting out terrorism at home, and they have scored some impressive successes. But recent base-building activity by India near its border with Pakistan has been raising red flags in Islamabad. According to a senior Pakistani military official, India, in pursuit of its “Cold Start” military doctrine, is constructing eight bases at which heavy armor would be stationed. Developed after the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, the doctrine calls for Indian troops to move rapidly to occupy 300- 500 square kilometers of Pakistani territory in the event of another terrorist attack. The occupation would end only when Pakistan formally relinquished its claim to Kashmir and dismantled all terrorist training camps operating within its borders. “Tactical nuclear weapons,” the Pakistani military official explained, “will deter India from following through on this strategy.” Against this background, the US should have known that trying to compel Pakistan to limit its nuclear-weapons capability would fail. But it pushed anyway. As a result, Pakistan’s reliance on China has been strengthened, not weakened. And, instead of reducing the chances of a nuclear standoff in South Asia, the White House plan served only to distract attention from efforts to address tensions between India and Pakistan. Ultimately, the Obama-Sharif statement did emphasize India-Pakistan relations, and made no reference to the nuclear issue. Obama mentioned Kashmir as an unresolved issue, while pleading for stability in South Asian affairs. According to Aziz, Pakistan was satisfied with the final statement. The US, however, may not have felt the same. Shahid Javed Burki is Pakistan's former finance minister and vice president of the World Bank and is currently the chairman of the Institute of Public Policy, Lahore. http://neurope.eu/article/the-pakistani-nuclear-deal-that-wasnt/ Return to Top

The Nation – Lahore, Pakistan OPINION/Columns (Ab)Normal Nuclear Pakistan By Imran Malik November 23, 2015 Recently a lot of media hype was created on Pakistan’s nuclear program and its presumed relentless and reckless expansion. The Stimson and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace papers by Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, reporting by David Ignatius and the inevitable editorials of the New York Times were all aimed at creating alarmist concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Media leaks were also employed to test Pakistan’s resolve to safeguard and maintain the thrust and momentum of her nuclear program. The desired end state and common thread running through all of the above was ostensibly to ensure a “cap” on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile programs or at least seriously stunt its further growth and expansion. These institutions and individuals took it upon themselves to perceive and assess the threats to Pakistan and to lay down for it the perimeters within which its nuclear program ought to develop, function and flourish or otherwise. The Stimson Center’s paper Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

had the audacity to suggest five unilateral measures which could somehow convert a “rogue” Pakistan into a “Normal Nuclear Pakistan”. They averred that Pakistan ought to shift its declaratory nuclear policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic deterrence”, commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short range delivery vehicles and Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), lift Pakistan’s veto on FMCT negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production, separate civilian and military facilities and finally sign the CTBT without waiting for India. It appeared to be a rather presumptuous attempt to promote converging Indo-US interests in South Asia at the cost of Pakistan’s vital national interests. Furthermore, the US and India apparently intend to challenge China’s evolving ascendancy in this region. The US appears all geared up to help India emerge as the truly dominant and hegemonic power in the region, strong enough to counterbalance China. A major impediment to that end seems to be Pakistan, its Armed Forces and most importantly its nuclear and missile programs. They keep India distracted, pegged to and limited to the subcontinent only. India needs desperately to break free of Pakistan, elevate itself to the next level and then challenge China. US and Indian interests would thus be enormously served if Pakistan were to become subservient to India, caps, rolls back and eliminates its nuclear program and submits to total Indian supremacy in the region; the thrust and apparent raison d’etre of these rather meaningful studies. This is the point of departure where US and Pakistan’s national interests in the region diverge conclusively and decisively. These studies have misinterpreted the nuclear issue as a purely bilateral one between India and Pakistan. It is rather far more complicated with regional and extra regional dimensions and includes China. The US-led West’s build-up of India as a counterweight to China has enhanced its nuclear, missile and military prowess substantially. By default, India thus acquires corresponding and increasing numerical and technical superiority over Pakistan. This drastically increases the differential in force ratios between the two, creates a critical strategic imbalance and seriously aggravates Pakistan’s threat perceptions. It consequently sets in motion a perpetual, vicious and repetitive cycle of arms acquisitions and developments where India endeavors to match China and Pakistan moves to maintain strategic balance with India. Pakistan is faced with a “double jeopardy” too. Not only is the US-led West busy in enhancing India’s nuclear and military might but is also trying simultaneously to circumscribe Pakistan’s ability to defend itself. This is exemplified by the US-led West’s incomprehensible demand that Pakistan give up its defensive capabilities (TNWs, for example) without “helping to eliminate the very threats against which these defensive weapon systems were developed in the first place.” The conflict of interests of the major players in the region will force a persistence of the status quo. Pakistan will continuously feel compelled to “equalize the differential in conventional forces with India by relying increasingly on her nuclear assets to bridge the gap and maintain strategic balance”. This inevitable arms race is likely to continue perpetually with no logical end in sight unless all issues between India and Pakistan, especially Kashmir, are resolved amicably and justly. Unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, peace will continue to be assured through a veritable “balance of terror”. India is developing and expanding her own nuclear triad along with nuclear submarines thus effectively precluding any Pakistani move from “full spectrum deterrence” to “strategic deterrence”. Pakistan’s TNWs are there to counter India’s ambitious and fanciful Cold Start Doctrine. As long as the threat persists the counters will do so to, though Pakistan’s National Command Authority will exercise total control of all strategic assets in peace and war. Pakistan cannot lift its veto on the Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama FMCT as India’s existing stocks of fissile material would thus cement its superiority over Pakistan in perpetuity. Pakistan’s military and civilian nuclear programs are already separated with the latter placed under the supervision of the IAEA. Pakistan already has an undeclared moratorium on nuclear testing and by not signing the CTBT it will actually exercise an effective though indirect check on India’s future nuclear tests as well. Pakistan does not need to get into the Nuclear Supplier’s Group at any unacceptable cost. That can wait. In the meantime, Pakistan must concentrate on acquiring civil nuclear technologies for power generation from China and building large hydro power projects like the Bhasha, Dasu, Bunji and Kalabagh dams. The international community, meanwhile, needs to re-evaluate the prevailing international nuclear regimes and make them more judicious, just, equitable, fair and practical. These must be impervious to unilateral exploitations by any power, too. Unless these regimes dispense a fair and just international nuclear order they will continue to breed injustice, resentment, defiance, proliferation, conflicts and wars. There is a need to streamline and mainstream these international regimes first, before requiring or expecting states like Pakistan to submit meekly to their inequitable diktats! That might also make Pakistan’s strategic compulsions more acceptable and understandable for the international community and take the “abnormality” out of its nuclear program! The writer is a retired Brigadier, a former Defense Attache’ to Australia and New Zealand and is currently on the faculty of NUST (NIPCONS). http://nation.com.pk/columns/23-Nov-2015/ab-normal-nuclear-pakistan Return to Top

The News International – Karachi, Pakistan OPINION/Commentary Time to Talk Straight By Askari Raza Malik Monday, November 23, 2015 A nuclear Pakistan fits nowhere in the western geopolitical vision of South Asia, where India and China are the two main competing powers. Regardless of whether India can assume the envisioned mantle or not (which remains a highly improbable proposition), Pakistani woes continue with every stride made in the nuclear technology field. India and its powerful lobby in the west are at pains to emphasise that India is ready to assume that role if the only obstacle in its way – Pakistan – is effectively neutralised. In short, we must acquiesce to Indian hegemony and accept defeat on the Kashmir dispute. According to them, we should be persuaded to either dismantle our nuclear possessions, or cap our nuclear programme immediately. This is an open secret. The west has, at no time, tried to hide its intent with regard to Pakistan’s nuclear endeavours. At the same time it has unequivocally stuck by its policy objectives in South Asia with India occupying the centre stage. After India’s ‘Smiling Buddha’ nuclear explosion of 1974, a so-called surprise test, France and British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) cancelled their contract with the PAEC to build a nuclear reactor in Pakistan. At this point, Bhutto felt betrayed and decided to go at it alone. He gathered nuclear

scientists from the world, convincing them to give up their lucrative careers abroad for a sparse living here. Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan and his team’s untiring efforts gave Pakistan what no foreign nuclear help could have envisaged. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the revolution in Iran stole the focus of the world and Pakistan got enough time to establish the foundations for its nuclear programme. From then on the pressure was on the civilian leadership to halt the programme but the military was not prepared to part with the most potent deterrence the nation had striven to acquire. Today, Pakistan’s nukes evoke multi-dimensional fears, both imagined and real, and are shrouded by the mist of ambiguities and misinformation. At least two facets of the problem seem to be emerging slowly. One is the fear of our nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organisations, namely Al-Qaeda and Isis. This is the type of narrative the Indian media propagates constantly. The second fear is more genuine – that the spread of tactical nuclear weapons is combined with an ambitious missile programme of tactical and strategic dimensions. Al-Qaeda, Isis and similar organisations traditionally operate in a definite pattern, where they establish a firm base in a target country and then extend their operations outwards. It is impossible for them to acquire a similar foothold inside Pakistan unless the military is rendered completely impotent, isolated and shorn of peoples’ support. Though they have an ideological connect already available in Pakistan and their nuisance value cannot be ruled out, to credit them with the ability to defeat the Pakistani military is stretching one’s imagination. India is the biggest importer of arms in the world. The daunting advantage it has acquired over Pakistan in conventional war resources needs to be adequately counterbalanced. In modern-day warfare the simple equation of comparative strength ratio of men and equipment has become meaningless. The aggregate response matrix in the realm of the tangibles is now more complicated, basing its quantification on a host of factors including sophistication of weapons, ammunition and equipment, firepower and ranges, ability to operate at night, mechanisation, protection cum battlefield mobility, intelligence through satellites, automation of weapons and equipment, quality of radars and tracking devices with the latest software. Pakistan is seeking to offset the Indian advantage through tactical nuclear warheads and short- range missiles. The world’s concern is not entirely unfounded because this can lead to an unbridled proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. India’s latest experiment of Agni-IV (one ton nuclear warhead and 3500 kilometre range) and its future Agni-V with 10000 kilometre range giving it ‘a global nuclear strike capability’ do not seem to cause the faintest stir in our nuclear sensitive world which seems to be lost in its reverie of seeing India as a future world power. We cannot stop someone from entertaining unrealistic notions, but what we can do is to at least lay our cards on the table. If diplomacy means deceitfulness and duplicity we might as well shelve it for a while. We must candidly tell our friends that it is impossible to convince our people to accept Indian hegemony the status quo on Kashmir, despite India’s geographical size and its wonderful image around the world. We are no revisionists but Muslims have ruled India for a significant part of its recent history. It will be impossible to reverse peoples’ mindsets even if the leaders are willing to oblige. Moreover, we can never hope to match India in conventional war strength. We have to find an appropriate response to Indian intent as demonstrated by Modi.

Daily Times – Lahore, Pakistan OPINION/Commentary Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence Pakistani officials define our full spectrum minimum deterrence as India-specific. To put it simply, the strategic calculus is narrowed down to deterring a militarily and economically stronger India By Beenish Altaf November 24, 2015 Discussing Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) needs conceptual understanding. Conceptually, Pakistan’s treatment of FSD has been different from what others perceive. Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, the president/executive director of the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) maintains that Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA) is clear that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term, exists to plug the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Stimson Centre report, titled ‘A normal nuclear Pakistan’, authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, urged Pakistan to shift its declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence, commit to a recessed deterrence posture, limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons, lift Pakistan’s veto on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMNCT) and reduce or stop fissile material production, separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India. It is discriminatory in nature just to maximise India’s position vis-à-vis Pakistan. In an international conference, few confessions were made public by a prominent Pakistani figure in order to convey to the international community our ensured minimum deterrence capability. The Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 was held from March 23 to 24 in Washington DC, where Lieutenant General (retd) Khalid Kidwai, who is advisor to Pakistan’s NCA and was the pioneer Director General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which he headed Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) Outreach Journal

for an unprecedented 15 years till December 2013 (with an unheard of 12 extensions after his retirement from the army) was in attendance. As the head of SPD, Kidwai is credited with conceiving, articulating and executing Pakistan’s nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure. The development of Pakistan’s Shaheen-3 missile having a range of 2,750 km has the objective of preventing India from gaining second-strike nuclear capability from the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It is suspected that India was developing strategic bases on its Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan was also confronted with a credible threat from India, which was pursuing “dangerous, provocative and irresponsible doctrines like the Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive Strategy, and whose conventional military build-up was Pakistan specific”. It is absurd to ask Pakistan to revert from FSD to strategic deterrence when Pakistan aims only for ensuring equilibrium and not a quantitative balance to India. More specifically, Pakistani officials define our full spectrum minimum deterrence as India-specific. To put it simply, the strategic calculus is narrowed down to deterring a militarily and economically stronger India. But officials have articulated that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons’ programme is not open-ended. In the Washington conference Lieutenant General Kidwai explicated Pakistan’s quest for the Nasr shoot-and-scoot missile system, saying that it was in response to concerns that India’s larger military could still wage a conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear weapon. Since these tactical nuclear weapons are mounted on short distance missiles, their command and control is delegated to lower levels in the military. It is a well-known fact that these short-range, tactical nuclear weapons are a defensive response to India. More precisely, the development of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons is actually in response to India’s Cold Start Strategy. Rakesh Sood, the former Indian special envoy for disarmament and nonproliferation, views that it is extremely destabilising for any country to develop tactical nuclear weapons. He asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is “cloaked in ambiguity”, which undermines confidence between the two countries. Ironically enough, how will Prahaar be perceived here: as a stabilising or destabilising factor? Prahaar is a solid fuel rocket surface-to-surface guided short-range tactical ballistic missile by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India. It will be equipped with omni-directional warheads and can be used for striking both tactical and strategic targets. Besides, why is the Indian space programme with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) potential, India’s nukes or its missiles’ programme troublesome for anybody, particularly to the international community? Taking into account the fact that India is operating a nuclear submarine, the INS Chakra, and is currently testing another indigenously developed nuclear submarine, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that Pakistan’s sea-based second strike capability is a “work in progress” and will come into play in the next few years. Ruling out nuclear submarines for Pakistan, he said, “I will not say nuclear submarines but if broadly talking about a second-strike capability, for which submarines are a platform, then yes.” However, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that while Pakistan had already moved from minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence, the current arsenal size would be sufficient for the next 10 to 15 years. As per the estimates of the arms Control Association, Pakistan currently has between 100 to 120 nuclear warheads as compared to India’s 90 to 110 warheads. Nevertheless, Pakistan believes that the rising conventional disparity with India fetched its inherited security dilemma from the eastern borders, lowering its nuclear thresholds and forcing it Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama to bolster efforts to play the much0anticipated numbers game. It also gauged the efficiency of Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrence, termed as FSD. The full spectrum deterrence, as being implemented by Pakistan, is a little different than that perceived by others, specifically the west. For that matter, it needs coherent literature and elucidation on the subject. It would be helpful in neutralising the international community’s concerns regarding the concept that Pakistan aims for nuclear parity with India. Factually, Pakistan does not seek parity; it only aims for balance. The opposite could be true for India because its programme is neither for balance nor parity but rather for prestige and supremacy. The writer is associated with the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/24-Nov-2015/pakistan-s-full-spectrum-deterrence Return to Top

The National Interest – Washington, D.C. OPINION/Feature It’s Official: There Will Be No Iranian ICBM in 2015 Take note, naysayers of 2010. By Greg Thielmann November 24, 2015 For many years, U.S. intelligence officials have publicly assessed that Iran could possibly flight-test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015. Among other consequences, this now outdated projection, and misinterpretations of it, prompted policymakers to schedule the deployment of ever more advanced missile defense systems into Europe, and led Congress to propose building a major strategic interceptor base on the Eastern Seaboard of the United States. GOP presidential candidates have also made hyperbolic claims based on the 2015 date. For example, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) warned in January that Iran would soon be able to launch nuclear strikes against “New York or Los Angeles.” But sometime during the past few months, the long-standing official estimate of Iran’s potential intercontinental missile capability was significantly revised. Adm. William Gortney, chief of Northern Command, answered for the record a question on the issue from a March 19 congressional hearing with this new conclusion: “Iran will not be able to deploy an operational ICBM until later this decade at the earliest.” The official abandonment of 2015 as the year of an Iranian ICBM should lead U.S. policymakers to reshape certain U.S. missile defense programs and security policies. The now-outdated 2015 projection emerged publicly for the first time with the release of an unclassified version of a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on foreign missile threats. The estimate concluded that, after North Korea, Iran was the hostile country most capable of testing an ICBM by 2015. The 1999 NIE described analysts as being divided on the likely timing of Iran’s first test flight of an ICBM that could threaten the United States—from likely before 2010 to less than an even chance by 2015—but implied that most believed it would happen within the estimate’s fifteen-year timeframe.

This projection has been exploited by many members of Congress to try to accelerate costly projects to defend against long-range missiles. Although the 1999 NIE focused on the “first flight- test” development milestone rather than the traditional criterion of “operational capability,” this distinction was often ignored, heightening the apparent imminence of the threat. In a letter last year to President Obama, 28 Republican senators protested the lack of specific limits on ballistic missiles in the Iran nuclear deal, citing the U.S. intelligence community's belief that “Iran could have intercontinental capability as early as” 2015. Such statements were already misleading at the time. Independent experts, like Michael Elleman of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, had been arguing for some time that Iran would not be likely to field an ICBM before 2020. But the intelligence community appeared reluctant to rule out an Iranian ICBM flight test before year’s end. On July 29 of this year, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter provided evidence in congressional testimony that the government’s Iranian ICBM estimate had been revised. But it was little noticed— perhaps because it came in the form of a warning about the Iranian threat: “I wouldn’t rule out that in 10 years, Iran could progress to an ICBM.” Adm. Gortney’s written response to the House Armed Services Committee is more precise. It is also more striking, given the four-star flag officer’s prudent, worst-case threat perspective as the military commander charged with aerospace defense of the U.S. homeland. That he is more likely to err on the side of caution was evident when he characterized North Korean KN-08 ICBMs as already “operational,” even though these systems have never been flight-tested. Gortney’s implicit acknowledgement that an Iranian ICBM is years rather than months away is, therefore, especially significant. In combination with adoption of the Iran nuclear deal’s constraints on Iranian warhead development, this update in threat projections concerning a potential Iranian ICBM should lead to changes in U.S. policy: The third phase of missile defense deployments to Europe should be suspended. The first two phases involve ship-based and Romania-based systems, designed to counter the short- and medium-range missiles in Iran’s arsenal. The third phase, deploying higher velocity interceptors into Poland, is intended to counter a longer-range ballistic missile threat from Iran. Deploying these systems now would only feed Moscow’s suspicion that the European Phased Adaptive Approach was always intended to counter Russian missiles and has nothing to do with the actual threat from Iran. The Defense Department should continue to resist congressional efforts to build East Coast facilities for strategic ground-based missile defense interceptors. With no Iranian ICBMs on the horizon, there is even less justification for diverting missile defense resources needed for improving the strategic ground-based interceptors currently deployed on the West Coast. Adm. Gortney says explicitly in his response to Congress that the current threat does not merit East Coast deployments. Washington should press for negotiations on an intermediate- and long-range flight test ban throughout the Middle East. Following adoption of the Iran nuclear deal, which will block Tehran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon for at least a decade and probably much longer, Iran’s senior military leader stated on November 3 that Iran will observe a self-imposed limit on developing ballistic missiles with ranges over 2,000 kilometers. This alignment of Iran’s declared intent with the U.S. Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538 USAF Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies CUWS Outreach Journal Maxwell AFB, Alabama assessment of the technical status of Iran’s missile programs opens up an opportunity to achieve similar commitments on long-range missile testing from other states in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. The intelligence community deserves credit for finally updating its estimates of Iran’s ICBM potential, even if the public had to wait too long. It is now up to the policy community to adjust U.S. missile defense plans and work harder with our international partners to exploit the opportunity to pursue a regional diplomatic approach, which limits missile threats from the Middle East while there is a chance to do so. Greg Thielmann, a former Foreign Service officer and Senate Intelligence Committee staffer, is now Senior Fellow of the Arms Control Association. http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/its-official-there-will-be-no-iranian-icbm-2015- 14424?page=show Return to Top

ABOUT THE USAF CUWS The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University, while extending its reach far beyond - and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON), now AF/A5XP) and Air War College Commandant established the initial manpower and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation . The Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management released a report in 2008 that recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." As a result, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide continuing education through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the Counterproliferation Center in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research to not just countering WMD but also nuclear deterrence. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. The CUWS's military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation - counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

Issue No.1193, 25 November 2015 United States Air Force Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies| Maxwell AFB, Alabama https://cuws.au.af.mil \ https://twitter.com/USAF_CUWS Phone: 334.953.7538