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42 Spring 2004.Indd Michael McManus examines the Liberal role in the Suez crisis of 1956, and the long-term consequences for the Liberal Party. LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS vents’ was Harold The Liberals’ general election. Leader Clem What is not always recog- Macmillan’s famous new leader, Jo Davies was enduring one of his nised nowadays is the fact that answer when asked Grimond, on the increasingly common bouts of the position of the Liberal Party campaign trail. what he feared most ill health and the party’s Chief had already begun to recover in politics. Yet it was Whip, Jo Grimond, had largely even before the Suez Crisis. Local Eevents – or rather one event in led the line in his stead. Although elections in 1954 and 1955 had ‘particular – that propelled him the party’s manifesto was criti- shown only the tiniest flickers of into the job that, in his decep- cised both for lack of invention improvement, but parliamentary tively laid-back way, he had long and for its leaden tone, in its way by-elections began to bring some coveted, that of Prime Minister. it was arguably both radical and seriously good news. At Torquay The Conservatives under Win- far-sighted, advocating closer in December 1955, Peter Bes- ston Churchill had received fewer British involvement in Western sell increased the Liberal vote votes than Labour at the general European integration, parliamen- by almost 10 per cent. Only two election of 1951, but won more tary assemblies for Scotland and months later, at Gainsborough seats. In 1955, under Anthony Wales, measures against monop- and at Hereford, Liberal candi- Eden, the party had gained both olistic practices in industry, and dates enjoyed significant swings votes and seats and began to protection for individual citizens in their favour. The foundations reclaim the mantle of the ‘natural against racial prejudice, union were fragile, to be sure, but the party of government’. Although harassment and even against arbi- first shoots of recovery were it was already clear that Eden was trary actions by the state itself. apparent and, when the party no longer the man he had been The number of candidates – 110 enjoyed a number of unexpected – the principled and courageous – was one higher than in 1951 gains in the local elections of matinée idol who resigned from and the Liberals neither lost nor May 1956, some of the younger the Chamberlain Government gained any seat. In only a tiny generation of Liberals apparently as a protest against appeasement handful of constituencies did the began to feel that a renewed lead- – the economic situation was party’s support rise significantly, ership might be able to take bet- beginning to improve and both notably in North Cornwall and ter advantage of the shift in public Prime Minister and party looked North Devon, where Jeremy opinion. settled for a decent tenure. Thorpe’s newly minted brand of Then came the ‘event’ to The Liberal Party was effec- highly personalised campaigning end all events for a country still tively becalmed in the 1955 was setting the pace. grappling with its decline from 38 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS imperial power to the interna- was seriously divided on the mat- Crisis. Clem Davies stepped down tional second division. Follow- ter. In many ways the Liberals from the leadership at the party’s ing the refusal of the Americans were still close to the Conserva- autumn conference in Folkestone and British to finance the Aswan tives in a way that seems quite in late September, when the open- Dam in southern Egypt, on 26 alien today. Two of the party’s MPs ing act of the Crisis was being July 1956 the Egyptian President – Donald Wade in Huddersfield played at full intensity, and Gri- Gamal Abd al-Nasser summar- and Arthur Holt in Bolton – held mond emerged effortlessly from a ily nationalised the Suez Canal. their seats only because they were field of one as the obvious succes- The governments of Britain and involved in de facto pacts with local sor. By a peculiar twist of fate, Gri- France, the two countries where Tories, and three others – Clem- mond had to travel to the USA for most of the shares in the Canal ent Davies, Rhys Hopkin Morris a six-week tour and was not even were held, immediately con- and Roderic Bowen – had been in the hall when Davies made cluded that they should settle for greatly helped by the absence of his emotional speech of resigna- nothing less than ‘regime change’ Conservative candidates in their tion, the tears streaming down his and, in due course, entered into a constituencies at the 1955 gen- cheeks. By the time he returned to secret and opportunistic arrange- eral election. Decisive leadership the UK, it was all too clear that the ment with the Israeli government was now required; the party des- situation at Suez was about to turn – the notorious Sèvres Protocol perately needed someone to forge ugly. He had learned at first hand – to bring that about, by military a distinctively Liberal position that, even though it was arguably means if necessary. There followed around which everyone could the Americans who had precipi- a domestic political crisis that unite. Importantly, Jo Grimond tated the seizure of the Canal by would bring the British political himself was soon engaged in a abruptly refusing to finance the establishment to breaking point, profound ‘learning process’, which Aswan Dam, in an election year also fundamentally and perma- no doubt involved some interest- neither the Democrats nor the nently changing many people’s ing exchanges with Lady Violet. Republicans had any intention of perceptions of the Conservative Grimond moved rapidly away supporting a military intervention. Party. A huge opportunity was from his Blimpish initial reaction Nonetheless, at the end of Octo- about to be created for a re-ener- towards Nasser’s occupation of ber the Israeli army deliberately gised Liberal Party. the Canal Zone. In a statement provoked hostilities by invading An entry in Violet Bon- on 18 August 1956, for instance, the Sinai peninsula and, given that ham Carter’s diaries, describing he denounced the Government’s pre-arranged and agreed pretext, a meeting of the Liberal Party pompous behaviour at the dis- Confront- British and French forces began Committee on 31 July 1956, both astrous Suez conference. He was to land at Port Said and occupy records the (possibly surprising) certain that, as soon as Nasser had ing the the canal on 5 November – the initial reaction of one leading nationalised the Canal, ‘the best Suez Crisis very day on which Jo Grimond Liberal of the time – the then that could be hoped for from the was confirmed as leader of the Chief Whip Jo Grimond – to the conference was a compromise was not at parliamentary Liberal party at an Suez situation and neatly embod- by which the Egyptian act of eve-of-session dinner with his five ies the Liberal dilemma in the nationalisation would be virtually all straight- colleagues at the House of Com- face of such unilateral aggression: accepted, while the canal admin- mons. istration was placed under some forward for Grimond had still been in the Jo – describing himself as the sort of international control’.1 He the Liberal USA when the most recent cru- Capt. Waterhouse of the Lib. also foresaw longer-term problems cial votes on Suez had taken place, Party – is in favour of ‘going it arising from oil and the Middle Party of on Thursday 1 November 1956. alone’ & landing troops in the East. On Thursday 13 September Holt had abstained but Davies, Canal Zone. He says Nasser’s 1956, however, along with Arthur 1956. Even Wade and Bowen had supported action is the parallel of Hitler’s Holt and Donald Wade, he did the Labour opposition. By the when he invaded the Rhineland give the Eden Government the a parlia- time Grimond returned to take & that unless we bring about his benefit of the doubt by supporting mentary up the reins as the party’s parlia- fall the whole Middle East will it in two critical divisions on Suez. mentary leader, the British and go his way – nationalise their Rhys Hopkin Morris too had pri- party of French governments had issued oil, threaten to cut us off, etc. I vately evinced robust support for an ultimatum to the Egyptians think this is true. Yet I hardly feel Anthony Eden’s stance at Suez, only six and, once Nasser had summar- that we can ‘go it alone’ & align but as a Deputy Speaker he kept ily rejected it, the threat of inva- world opinion against us … his views off the public record and MPs was sion was both real and immediate. did not take part in these contro- seriously Grimond knew that the Liber- Confronting the Suez Crisis was versial divisions. als must come completely off not at all straightforward for the It is impossible to separate Jo divided on the fence. He was supported in Liberal Party of 1956. Even a par- Grimond’s assumption of the this by the officers of the Liberal liamentary party of only six MPs Liberal leadership from the Suez the matter. Party Organisation, who agreed Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 39 LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS on 2 November that, ‘the policy mess at Suez. This, he said, ‘was into a corner … Then, gracefully of the Government, because it has like the burglar claiming that that but mockingly, Grimond rose to dealt a serious blow at the estab- by his skill and violence he had deliver the knock-out.’3 lishment of the rule of law, would compelled the police to improve Although the Suez Cri- stand condemned even if it were their methods greatly’.
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