Michael McManus examines the Liberal role in the Suez crisis of 1956, and the long-term consequences for the Liberal Party.

LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS

vents’ was Harold The Liberals’ general election. Leader Clem What is not always recog- Macmillan’s famous new leader, Jo Davies was enduring one of his nised nowadays is the fact that answer when asked Grimond, on the increasingly common bouts of the position of the Liberal Party campaign trail. what he feared most ill health and the party’s Chief had already begun to recover in politics. Yet it was Whip, Jo Grimond, had largely even before the Suez Crisis. Local Eevents – or rather one event in led the line in his stead. Although elections in 1954 and 1955 had ‘particular – that propelled him the party’s manifesto was criti- shown only the tiniest flickers of into the job that, in his decep- cised both for lack of invention improvement, but parliamentary tively laid-back way, he had long and for its leaden tone, in its way by-elections began to bring some coveted, that of Prime Minister. it was arguably both radical and seriously good news. At Torquay The Conservatives under Win- far-sighted, advocating closer in December 1955, Peter Bes- ston Churchill had received fewer British involvement in Western sell increased the Liberal vote votes than Labour at the general European integration, parliamen- by almost 10 per cent. Only two election of 1951, but won more tary assemblies for Scotland and months later, at Gainsborough seats. In 1955, under Anthony Wales, measures against monop- and at Hereford, Liberal candi- Eden, the party had gained both olistic practices in industry, and dates enjoyed significant swings votes and seats and began to protection for individual citizens in their favour. The foundations reclaim the mantle of the ‘natural against racial prejudice, union were fragile, to be sure, but the party of government’. Although harassment and even against arbi- first shoots of recovery were it was already clear that Eden was trary actions by the state itself. apparent and, when the party no longer the man he had been The number of candidates – 110 enjoyed a number of unexpected – the principled and courageous – was one higher than in 1951 gains in the local elections of matinée idol who resigned from and the Liberals neither lost nor May 1956, some of the younger the Chamberlain Government gained any seat. In only a tiny generation of Liberals apparently as a protest against appeasement handful of constituencies did the began to feel that a renewed lead- – the economic situation was party’s support rise significantly, ership might be able to take bet- beginning to improve and both notably in North Cornwall and ter advantage of the shift in public Prime Minister and party looked North Devon, where Jeremy opinion. settled for a decent tenure. Thorpe’s newly minted brand of Then came the ‘event’ to The Liberal Party was effec- highly personalised campaigning end all events for a country still tively becalmed in the 1955 was setting the pace. grappling with its decline from

38 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS imperial power to the interna- was seriously divided on the mat- Crisis. Clem Davies stepped down tional second division. Follow- ter. In many ways the Liberals from the leadership at the party’s ing the refusal of the Americans were still close to the Conserva- autumn conference in Folkestone and British to finance the Aswan tives in a way that seems quite in late September, when the open- Dam in southern Egypt, on 26 alien today. Two of the party’s MPs ing act of the Crisis was being July 1956 the Egyptian President – Donald Wade in Huddersfield played at full intensity, and Gri- Gamal Abd al-Nasser summar- and Arthur Holt in Bolton – held mond emerged effortlessly from a ily nationalised the Suez Canal. their seats only because they were field of one as the obvious succes- The governments of Britain and involved in de facto pacts with local sor. By a peculiar twist of fate, Gri- France, the two countries where Tories, and three others – Clem- mond had to travel to the USA for most of the shares in the Canal ent Davies, Rhys Hopkin Morris a six-week tour and was not even were held, immediately con- and Roderic Bowen – had been in the hall when Davies made cluded that they should settle for greatly helped by the absence of his emotional speech of resigna- nothing less than ‘regime change’ Conservative candidates in their tion, the tears streaming down his and, in due course, entered into a constituencies at the 1955 gen- cheeks. By the time he returned to secret and opportunistic arrange- eral election. Decisive leadership the UK, it was all too clear that the ment with the Israeli government was now required; the party des- situation at Suez was about to turn – the notorious Sèvres Protocol perately needed someone to forge ugly. He had learned at first hand – to bring that about, by military a distinctively Liberal position that, even though it was arguably means if necessary. There followed around which everyone could the Americans who had precipi- a domestic political crisis that unite. Importantly, Jo Grimond tated the seizure of the Canal by would bring the British political himself was soon engaged in a abruptly refusing to finance the establishment to breaking point, profound ‘learning process’, which Aswan Dam, in an election year also fundamentally and perma- no doubt involved some interest- neither the Democrats nor the nently changing many people’s ing exchanges with Lady Violet. Republicans had any intention of perceptions of the Conservative Grimond moved rapidly away supporting a military intervention. Party. A huge opportunity was from his Blimpish initial reaction Nonetheless, at the end of Octo- about to be created for a re-ener- towards Nasser’s occupation of ber the Israeli army deliberately gised Liberal Party. the Canal Zone. In a statement provoked hostilities by invading An entry in Violet Bon- on 18 August 1956, for instance, the Sinai peninsula and, given that ham Carter’s diaries, describing he denounced the Government’s pre-arranged and agreed pretext, a meeting of the Liberal Party pompous behaviour at the dis- Confront- British and French forces began Committee on 31 July 1956, both astrous Suez conference. He was to land at Port Said and occupy records the (possibly surprising) certain that, as soon as Nasser had ing the the canal on 5 November – the initial reaction of one leading nationalised the Canal, ‘the best Suez Crisis very day on which Jo Grimond Liberal of the time – the then that could be hoped for from the was confirmed as leader of the Chief Whip Jo Grimond – to the conference was a compromise was not at parliamentary Liberal party at an Suez situation and neatly embod- by which the Egyptian act of eve-of-session dinner with his five ies the Liberal dilemma in the nationalisation would be virtually all straight- colleagues at the House of Com- face of such unilateral aggression: accepted, while the canal admin- mons. istration was placed under some forward for Grimond had still been in the Jo – describing himself as the sort of international control’.1 He the Liberal USA when the most recent cru- Capt. Waterhouse of the Lib. also foresaw longer-term problems cial votes on Suez had taken place, Party – is in favour of ‘going it arising from oil and the Middle Party of on Thursday 1 November 1956. alone’ & landing troops in the East. On Thursday 13 September Holt had abstained but Davies, Canal Zone. He says Nasser’s 1956, however, along with Arthur 1956. Even Wade and Bowen had supported action is the parallel of Hitler’s Holt and Donald Wade, he did the Labour opposition. By the when he invaded the Rhineland give the Eden Government the a parlia- time Grimond returned to take & that unless we bring about his benefit of the doubt by supporting mentary up the reins as the party’s parlia- fall the whole Middle East will it in two critical divisions on Suez. mentary leader, the British and go his way – nationalise their Rhys Hopkin Morris too had pri- party of French governments had issued oil, threaten to cut us off, etc. I vately evinced robust support for an ultimatum to the Egyptians think this is true. Yet I hardly feel Anthony Eden’s stance at Suez, only six and, once Nasser had summar- that we can ‘go it alone’ & align but as a Deputy Speaker he kept ily rejected it, the threat of inva- world opinion against us … his views off the public record and MPs was sion was both real and immediate. did not take part in these contro- seriously Grimond knew that the Liber- Confronting the Suez Crisis was versial divisions. als must come completely off not at all straightforward for the It is impossible to separate Jo divided on the fence. He was supported in Liberal Party of 1956. Even a par- Grimond’s assumption of the this by the officers of the Liberal liamentary party of only six MPs Liberal leadership from the Suez the matter. Party Organisation, who agreed

Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 39 LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS on 2 November that, ‘the policy mess at Suez. This, he said, ‘was into a corner … Then, gracefully of the Government, because it has like the burglar claiming that that but mockingly, Grimond rose to dealt a serious blow at the estab- by his skill and violence he had deliver the knock-out.’3 lishment of the rule of law, would compelled the police to improve Although the Suez Cri- stand condemned even if it were their methods greatly’. Grimond sis clearly buoyed Jo Grimond successful’.2 Yet both Hopkin felt that the Suez crisis had been through his early months as Lib- Morris and Holt still sympathised the inevitable consequence of eral leader, the likely long-term with Eden’s actions, and Wade years of weak policy towards the political consequences must too had to be mindful of his vul- region, and pressed the Govern- have been less easy to discern at nerable situation in Huddersfield ment to adopt a sustainable and the time. It was unfortunate for should he become too outspoken coherent attitude towards the Grimond that his assumption of in his criticisms. Middle East. He now proposed the leadership was followed by Although his public stance what he described as a policy of a series of political misfortunes was slightly equivocal in the In his first the ‘extreme centre’, under which for the party. The first by-elec- early days, Grimond’s old friend clear guidelines would be drawn tion, for instance, took place at David Astor told me that he was speech in up for the final stages of decolo- Chester, where the Liberals never privately at one with the sceptics nisation. Britain would also have had a chance. Then Rhys Hopkin from the start, regularly attending the House to play a leading role, working Morris died suddenly and unex- meetings of a group that Astor set through the Commonwealth and pectedly on the night of 21–22 up to organise anti-Eden forces. of Com- Europe, in setting up really effec- November 1956. Hopkin Mor- He arrived at this position by an mons as tive international mechanisms for ris had won his seat by fewer than impeccably rational process. The dealing with future flare-ups in 500 votes in both 1950 and 1951 Liberals had always been in favour Liberal the Middle East and elsewhere. In and, although his majority had of a stronger United Nations, and his New Year message for 1957, risen to over 3,000 in 1955, he had long argued that it should leader, Gri- Grimond warned against Britain had a sizeable personal vote and ideally have set up some kind of becoming a new Middle West Carmarthen was by any token a international ‘police force’ to deal mond was – ‘midway between Europe and highly marginal seat. Labour’s by- with just this type of situation. As cheered America, understanding neither, election candidate was Megan it was, the British and the Israelis vaguely resentful of both, trying Lloyd George, formerly deputy were dealing with the problem from the to wrap jingoism around us and leader of the Liberals, and the in their own way, which could vent our troubles on foreigners; local Liberals selected John Mor- not be tolerated. As the Korean Labour yet expecting the same foreign- gan Davies, who shared Hopkin War so nearly did, it could have ers, particularly the Americans, to Morris’s pro-government views dragged the superpowers into a benches lend us money and give us oil’. on Suez. To his great regret, Gri- conflict that was being waged by when he Suez provided Grimond with mond felt obliged to support the their allies and de facto surrogates. a wonderful political opportu- candidature of a man with whom Even the UN as it was, short on mocked nity. By the time of the last criti- he disagreed profoundly on the respect, might and firepower, cal vote on the crisis, on Thursday most important issue facing the would be a better arbiter at Suez the Gov- 6 December, he was able to lead nation. In February 1957, Megan than Eden and his post-imperial all of his colleagues into the Lloyd George was returned to the ‘might is right’ coalition. Up in ernment’s opposition lobby. Furthermore, House of Commons as Labour Bolton, Arthur Holt continued claim along with the question of colo- MP for Carmarthen and the to argue that, although it would nial policy, Suez had the effect of Liberal parliamentary party was have been greatly preferable for to have dramatically radicalising a sec- reduced to only five MPs. the UN to be up to the job, until tion of public opinion. By play- In this instance the night most and unless it was suitably ‘beefed inspired ing up the Liberals’ opposition to certainly was darkest before the up’, the British and their allies Eden’s policy, Grimond greatly dawn. As Grimond and his cir- were perfectly entitled to get on the crea- enhanced their image as an ‘anti- cle had hoped, the Carmarthen with sorting out the Suez situa- tion of system’ party. For the thousands result was not indicative of some tion by themselves. On that basis, of people who were stimulated deep malaise for the Liberals. It Grimond could argue, the disa- a United into political activity by their was almost entirely attributable greement was about tactics rather opposition to Suez, the Liber- to local factors, not least the deep than principles. Nations als now looked like a serious and local affection that there had been In his first speech in the House attractive proposition. The crisis for Hopkin Morris and the sheer of Commons as Liberal leader, force to also gave Grimond the opportu- force of personality of Megan Grimond was cheered from the sort out nity of making a mark in Parlia- Lloyd George. Suez had not only Labour benches when he mocked ment. As Ian Trethowan wrote in changed the way in which Brit- the Government’s claim to have the mess the News Chronicle, ‘day by day, he ain thought about itself: it had inspired the creation of a United was able to wait until some luck- permanently moved the politi- Nations force to sort out the at Suez. less Minister had backed himself cal goalposts. There had been a

40 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 LIBERALS AND THE SUEZ CRISIS subtle shift in public opinion, What What he always knew, how- Michael McManus is a former SDP particularly with regard to the ever, was that Suez had given the member and was the Conservative Conservative Party, and a small Grimond Liberals – and him personally – a Parliamentary candidate for Wat- but significant group of voters and crucial lifeline when they were at ford in 2001. He is the author of (perhaps more importantly) polit- always their weakest. At by-elections in Jo Grimond: Towards the Sound ical activists had detached them- Gloucester, Rochdale and Tor- of Gunfire (Birlinn, 2001) and is selves from the Tories. They were knew, how- rington, the Liberals soon dem- Political Director of Vote 2004. now in search of a new home, ever, was onstrated that they knew how to and the Liberals’ charismatic new campaign – and how to hurt the 1 Guardian, 20 August 1956. leader was just the man to build two big parties. In the wake of 2 The Times, 3 November 1956. that Suez 3 News Chronicle, 18 December 1956. one for them. One obvious gain Suez, the Liberal Party was back had given 4 The Times, 1 April 1957. close to home was the decision of in business. 5 Jo Grimond, Memoirs, p. 192. Laura Grimond’s brother Mark to turn down overtures from the the Liber- Conservative Party, and stick with als – and the Liberals instead. His narrow victory at the Torrington by- him per- election in 1958 would be come to be seen as a watershed, the first sonally – a Liberal gain at a by-election for three decades. crucial life- With Suez and Carmarthen line when REVIEWS out of the way, Grimond began in earnest to lead his party on its they were long march and 1957 became the year in which he made his per- at their Reformism and the Risorgimento sonal imprint on the Liberal Party, setting out a distinctive political weakest. Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini: The Risorgimento platform on nuclear defence, the and the Unification of Italy (Longman, 2nd edition, 2002) economy and Europe. Suez reared its head again at Reviewed by Piers Hugill the end of March 1957, when the French press first leaked word of the Sèvres Protocol, the secret erek Beales (with, in this trace his chosen narrative from document in which collusion new edition, additional the end of the Austrian War of between Britain, France and Israel Dinput from Eugenio Succession in 1748. The signing had been formalised. The Gov- Biagini) has set out a knowingly of the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle, ernment had explicitly denied revisionist history of the Ital- which ‘inaugurated nearly fifty in the House of Commons that ian Risorgimento, at least from years of peace in Italy’, was first Britain had any foreknowledge the point of view of traditional considered the starting point of of the Israeli attack on Egypt; so, Italian historiography. In fact, as the Risorgimento by the poet said Grimond, if these French Beales himself recognises, there Giosué Carducci (1835–1907). disclosures were true, they would have been a number of reassess- However, it is only comparatively demonstrate that the Eden Gov- ments of the Risorgimento since recently that it has been sug- ernment was ‘made up of rogues the fall of fascism and the conse- gested again (the first edition of and their dupes – not to men- quent historical anti-fascist con- this book was published in 1971). tion incompetents’.4 Outside the sensus of the Italian Republic.1 Previous reckoning began with furnace of Westminster twenty Indeed, this post-fascist revision- the Napoleonic invasion of Italy years later, Grimond was able to ist trend, by consciously histori- in 1796 (for the left and liberals) take a more relaxed view – ‘while cising the process of unification or with the Congress of Vienna I personally rather welcome the in Italy, has entailed reviewing in 1815 (for conservatives). veil which has been drawn over the concept of ‘nation’ itself and Since this book was originally this incident – there may well be the very idea of a national unity intended to form part of a series occasions when ministers must lie project ever having existed in of works reassessing historical in the national interest – yet the Italy in the accepted form of topics from a contemporary lib- contrast between the treatment of Risorgimento. eral political perspective, it is no the dissemblers on this occasion Part of this reassessment of the surprise perhaps that the origins and the way that others have been processes that defined and facili- of the Risorgimento should be expelled from public life for lesser tated Italian unification is evident sought in the Enlightenment offences, is strange to say the least in Beales’ decision to go further (or the indigenous Italian form of it’.5 back in time than is usual and to of Iluminismo) and in the slow

Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 41