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Three Corners' Bluff: Pre-War Europe's Most Dangerous Game

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Three Corners' Bluff: Pre-War Europe's Most Dangerous Game Pre-war Europe’s Most Dangerous Game Emily Falconer Major: History The U.K. Advisor: Professor William Fowler Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain The year 1938 was a turning point for international relations in pre-war Europe. While the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were previously able to keep their aggressive German enemy Sir Neville Henderson at bay, 1938 marked a dramatic shift in foreign policy for all three nations. For Germany, under the command of Adolf Hitler, it marked the start of his hostile expansion into British or Soviet territory. For British Ambassador to Germany “allies” the UK and the USSR, respectively led by Sir Neville Chamberlain and Josef Stalin, it forced each of them to make cut-throat decisions in regards to their long-time alliance, and to come to agreeable terms with their common enemy, Adolf Hitler. In 1938, the world was unclear; anything could happen, and “[Henderson] Had almost become Hitler’s all was fair game. Only one outcome was imminent: Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich were ready for war. The only question was: Who would he fight first? ambassador to us, rather than our ambassador to Hitler.” On one hand, the UK and the USSR were steadfast allies, committed to defeating fascism in Europe at all costs, and in thorough agreement to defend one another should one find themselves attacked by Germany. On the other hand, both the UK and the USSR feared each other just as much, if not more, “The personal representative of the prime than they feared Hitler’s Germany. The three nations sat on a three-cornered scale with Germany as the tipping point. From Chamberlain’s perspective, Hitler’s eastward expansion could result in one of two minister’s policy in Berlin, rather than that of things for the UK: the entire Foreign Office.” 1. Hitler could defeat the Soviet Union, but be too weakened by war to aptly defeat the British, essentially assuring British victory. As early as November 5th, 1937, Hitler had planned out his two eventualities for war. Both were 2. Stalin could defeat Hitler, taking Germany off the map, and leaving behind a weak and less- two front wars against the UK, France, and the USSR threatening Soviet Union. Case Red: Main theater in the west Case Green: Main theater in the east For Stalin, the same was true in regards to the possibility of Hitler expanding westward first. It is thereby very unsurprising that both nations went to extreme measures to ensure that Germany provoke the Anthony Eden opposite end of the continent first. From 1938 until the outbreak of World War Two, both the UK and the USSR used a combination of policy, military, and intelligence to ensure that they could avoid British Foreign Secretary the impending war for as long as possible. Anthony Eden was Chamberlain’s main source of The U.S.S.R opposition within the Foreign Office. He served as Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain Foreign Secretary of the U.K. under Neville Chamberlain from 1935 until February 1938, when he ultimately resigned due to his conflicting views about the Prime Minister’s policy towards Germany. “Our Secret Service doesn’t spend all of its time looking out the window.” “England? England will not lift one finger for Austria. No, you can’t expect any help from The Cambridge Five England.” Stalin’s Chief Spy Ring in Britain Peace in Our Time? “I have come away with the conviction that Britain shall never conclude a serious military pact with the Russians. The Prime Minister’s “The stupidest thing that has ever The Munich Pact was signed by Chamberlain and Chancellery openly admits that they had been done.” – Sir Winston Churchill Hitler on 29 September 1938. always reckoned that we could just break any pact. These were actual words spoken To Chamberlain, the Munich Pact marked an end to the threat of another world war. To Hitler, on the other by Secretary Horace Wilson.” hand, the Munich Pact was a mere piece of paper. While he did indeed claim the Sudetenland two days later, he most certainly did not stop there. On 3 October 1938, just two days after he ceded the Stalin created an intricate network of espionage that was Sudetenland, Hitler conquered Prague and unparalleled in any other country. For over two decades, incorporated all of Czechoslovakia into the Reich. Stalin’s chief spy ring known as the Cambridge Five had Roughly a year later, he did the same in Poland. The infiltrated the British government at multiple levels and in Munich Pact went from a significant triumph to a many different departments. Because of this, Stalin had complete failure in a matter of days. Both Chamberlain and Stalin were absolutely determined to avoid war at all costs. Because of this, each of them access to top secret information that was often kept secret tried desperately to push their “ally” into war with Hitler, who had openly admitted several times that he was ready from even some of the most senior members of British for battle. However, it was a victory which only one man was able to enjoy, and the prize went to Josef Stalin. Faber, government. Throughout the whole pre-war period, 12. “ Chamberlain repeatedly assured Stalin that a three-power Extra! Extra! Read all about how the The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed on 23 August 1939, the very day which was set for the settlement of Anglo- alliance between Great Britain, France, and the Soviet mighty head of the British Empire goes German spheres of influence. While Hitler would eventually break this pact just as he had broken the Munich Pact, Union would be the probably course of action in the event the signing of Molotov-Ribbentrop represented the complete failure of the policy of appeasement and of begging to Hitler!” of a world war. Chamberlain’s secret goals for the Munich Conference. .
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