The Case of the Belgian Fortification System 1926–1940

CHAPTER TEN

BETWEEN PASSÉISME AND MODERNISATION? THE CASE OF THE BELGIAN FORTIFICATION SYSTEM 1926–1940

J. Vaesen

Introduction

“An old knight mounted on a vast and ponderous war horse, encased in the thickest of armour against a young upstart, less heavily armoured, mounted on a lighter, more manoeuvrable charger, and relying for vic- tory upon a lance sharpened and hardened by a new process.”1 Th is was the widespread post war image of the situation of the Allied and German armed forces at the beginning of the Second World War and it is still very much alive in Belgium today. Th e issue of the preparation of the Belgian army was already subject to debate in the inter war period itself, certainly when international tensions rose again in the 1930s. Some authors used the French word passéisme in order to describe the situation of the Belgian armed forces. Th e term refers to the supposed past-oriented thinking of (political and military) policy makers, who (allegedly) took only their experience during the First World War into account. Th ough more recently scholars have nuanced both the excessive emphasis on the new processes on German side2 and the supposed lack of innovation and/or preparation on Allied side,3 Belgian military historians have only to a limited extent picked up the innovations in military historiography abroad.4

1 R. H. Barry, “Military Balance. Western Europe, May 1940,” in History of the Second World War, vol. 1, no. 7, 3–6 (1966), p. 171. 2 Cf. J. P. Harris, “Debate. Th e Myth of Blitzkrieg,” War in History 2, no. 3 (1995); R. L. Dinardo, “German Armour Doctrine: Correcting the Myths,” War in History 3, no. 4 (1996): pp. 384–397; and K. H. Frieser, Le mythe de la guerre éclair (Paris: Belin 2003). 3 Cf. B. Bond and M. Alexander, “Liddell Hart and De Gaulle: the Doctrines of Limited Liability and Mobile Defense,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. P. Paret (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), pp. 598–623; E. Kiesling, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fi x it: French Military Doctrine between the World Wars,” War in History 3, no. 2 (1996): pp. 208–223. 4 J. Vaesen, “ ‘De sa tour d’ivoire vers la cité?’: De Belgische hedendaagse militaire historiografi e sinds 1970,” in De tuin van heden: Dertig jaar geschiedschrijving over 222 j. vaesen

How can we assess the issue of (lack of) modernisation of the Belgian army in the inter-war period? Th e vast and ponderous war horse with its thick armour in the quotation above refers to the fortifi cation system. Just as France with its Maginot line, Belgium had established an impressive shield in order to protect the nation from a (German) assault in the inter-war period. It was even the fi rst “weapon” within the Belgian army to receive the fi rst wave of modernisation invest- ments aft er the establishment of a study committee in 1926.5 Moreover, this issue was a crucial aspect of the Belgian political debate, leading to fi erce disputes and confl icts and even to the fall of the Government Jaspar II in 1931. Th erefore, the fortifi cation system provides a fine example of the preparation of the Belgian armed forces in the inter-war period on the one hand, and of the relationship with the broader political debates, on the other. I will analyse the modernisation of the defen- sive system not by describing the forts and bunkers as such. Central to this study, rather are the actors and their opinions, the goals, the means and the limitations regarding the establishment of the system. Daniel Marc Segesser concluded correctly that the continuing disputes over specifi c issues prevented a coherent Belgian military discourse.6 Using the case of the fortifi cation system I will analyse the impact of the many foci of power, the areas of tension within the Belgian society and their relevance for the decision-making process as well as the military options taken.7 In short, the exogenous and endogenous actors and factors that infl uenced the establishment of the so-called ‘permanent het hedendaagse België, ed. G. Vanthemsche et al. (Brussels: VUBPress, 2007), pp. 457–497. 5 G. Provoost, Vlaanderen en het militair-politiek beleid in België tussen de twee wereldoorlogen (Louvain: Davidsfonds, 1977), pp. 384–399. 6 D. M. Segesser, “Landesverteidigung im Schatten des totalen Krieges: Das belgische Offi zierskorps und die Sicherung der territorialen Integrität des Landes,” in An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft , 1919–1939, ed. S. Förster (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2002), p. 279. 7 I drew partly upon the research I performed for my MA thesis, which was pub- lished by the Royal Army Museum (Brussels). See J. Vaesen, Tussen Scylla en Charbydis: De Belgische militaire politiek en de economische crisis, 1930–1936 (Brussels: Royal Army Museum, 2004). I used documents from the following archives: State Archives Belgium – Brussels (Proceedings of the meetings of the national Government; Personal Papers of Charles de Broqueville); Archives of the Royal Palace – Brussels (archives of the secretary of the King); Royal Army Museum – Brussels (Papers of the Defence department, papers of the British military attaché in Brussels; Russian archives); Centre for historical documentation on the armed forces – Brussels (personal papers Brabant and de Lannoy); Archives of the Department of Foreign Aff airs – Brussels; Centre for historical research and documentation on war and contemporary society SOMA- CEGES – Brussels.