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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75-28,938 RANGEL, Rudolph Stone. 1924- HENRY LANE WILSON AND THE FALL OF FRANCISCO I. MABERO.

The American University, Hi.D., 1975 History, modern

Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor. Michigan 48106

© COPYRIGHT

by

RUDOLPH STONE RANGEL

1975

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. HENRY LANE WILSON

AND THE FALL OF FRANCISCO I. MADERO

by

Rudolph Stone Rangel

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

History

Signatures of Committee:

Chairman

Dean ox tne ooxxege

Dat^

1975

The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

TEE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

tro 7?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS

Chapter I. HENRY LANE WILSON

Family background, education, early career; involvement in politics; appointment to the diplomatic service. Changes in American foreign policy. Wilson’s views. Problems of the Chilean post. Wilson’s successes in Chile. Interlude in Belgium.

II. WILSON IN POKFIRIAN MEXICO.

Wilson's appointment to Mexico: importance of the post; his assessment of the Mexican problem. Revolutionary ferment. The election of 1910. Wilson in the twilight of the Diaz regime: daily tasks, anti-American demonstrations, neutrality violations. Gathering strength of the Revolution. The resignation of Diaz.

III. WILSON AND MADERO

Wilson's sorrow for Diaz. The interim government of De la Barra. Wilson's favorable attitude toward Madero; the Plan de San Luis Potosi; Madero's pecularities. Wilson's gradual disenchantment with Madero: massacres and disorders, offenses against American life and property, Maderista corruption, incompetence of Madero, the spread of anarchy.

IV. LA DECENA TRAGICA - CUARTELAZO: 9-12 FEBRUARY 1913 ,

The plots; outbreak of revolt; the first four days; Wilson's activities.

V. LA DECENA TRAGICA - STALEMATE: 12-17 FEBRUARY 1913

Wilson's increasing concern and efforts to stop the fighting; conviction of a coming rebel victory; first contacts with General Huerta; fears of U.S. intervention; diplomats' suggestion that Madero resign.

VI. LA DECENA TRAGICA - GOLPE DE ESTADO: 17-18 FEBRUARY 1913 . . 116

General Huerta; Huerta's contacts with rebel leaders; increasing demands for Madero's resignation; Madero's intransigence; Huerta's decision and action. The Pact of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Embassy; Wilson's efforts on behalf of Madero; the assassination; reactions to the assassination.

VII. DAYS OF TRANSITION: 19 FEBRUARY - 12 MARCH 1 9 1 3...... 147

Taft's acceptance of Wilson's suggestions on recognition of Huerta; Wilson's aid to Huerta; Taft's delay in extending recognition; the Huerta regime not reactionary; rise of Carranza. The Woodrow Wilson administration; President Wilson's views; Bryan and the Department of State; the new administration's disinterest in foreign affairs.

VIII. IN SEARCH OF A POLICY - 4 MARCH - 27 AUGUST 1913...... 167

President Wilson's tacit recognition of the Huerta regime; statement of 12 March 1913; the administration's paralysis; press attacks on Ambassador Wilson; the State Department's concurrence with the ambassador; the president's increasing doubts; controversy over the ambassador and recognition; the first emissaries to Mexico; Hale's report; the president's decision; the ambassador's recall.

AN ESSAY ON SOURCES AND CONCLUSIONS...... 201

SELECTED 3IBLI0GSAPHY ...... 219

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

The major problem of research of this study has been to

analyze and appraise Che role of Henry Lane Wilson during the adminis­

tration of Mexican President Francisco I. Madero, with special

reference to Wilson’s actions during the barracks revolt of February

1913 and the subsequent overthrow and assassination of Madero and Vice-

President Pino Suarez. In order to evaluate the ambassador’s role

properly, we must describe and evaluate his view of his role and duties

in light of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America • not only during

the Taft administration but also in light of Wilson’s successful career

as a diplomat prior to the Mexican appointment.

There are supporting problems to be solved. What evidence is

there that the ambassador was an accomplice— and perhaps even master­

minded the plot to overthrow President Madero and, later, to have him

murdered? Why were the accusations made and widely disseminated and

believed? Why was there a conflict between the Woodrow Wilson

administration and the ambassador over the Mexican policy of the

United States? Finally, what did partisan political reasons of a

purely domestic nature have to do with the recall and discrediting of

Henry Lane Wilson?

The "rehabilitation" of Henry Lane Wilson is important for a

number of reasons. In sixty years, four generations of Mexicans

(while maintaining deep personal friendships with individual citizens

of the United States) have grown up with ill-concealed resentment of

v

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the U.S. government— partly because of the picture of the ambassador

commonly presented. His alleged actions intensified the resentments

caused by repeated interventions in Mexican internal affairs.^" As

Howard F. Cline states, "In the rise and fall of Madero from 1910 to

1913, Henry Lane Wilson spoke for the whole United States in Mexico. . . .

Every United States ambassador since his day has lived under the ..2 shadow of Wilson . s actions during the first stages of the Revolution.

U.S. friends of Mexico (especially those who have sympathized with the

legitimate goals of the Revolution) have in turn been forced to exist

under the cloud of Wilson1s alleged misbehavior. It is not easy to

live with the knowledge that a U.S. citizen was instrumental in (and

was perhaps the instigator of) the death of the "Christlike" Madero.

A redefinition of Henry Lane Wilson's role is important for

another reason. Until recently, most historians have accepted the view

that President Wilson's refusal to extend recognition to the provisional

government of Gen. Victoriano Huerta was based primarily on idealistic,

moral grounds. While recent scholarship has largely discarded this

view, an examination of a number of recently published U.S.^history

textbooks for undergraduates reveals that most of them still hold to 3 the older view. Indeed, specialized monographs are still being

published which insist that Woodrow Wilson's actions in the field of

1No U.S. official in Mexico had before been accused of helping to overthrow a Mexican government. 2 The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 130, 133.

^See, for example— among others— Allen Weinstein and R. Jackson Wilson, Freedom and Crisis: An American History (New York: Random House, 1974); and David Burner, Robert D. Marcus, and Emily S. Rosenberg, America: A Portrait in History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974).

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foreign affairs were "determined by moral purposes and guided by 4 idealism. By taking the president s public statements and speeches

in isolation and at face value, much is still made of "missionary

diplomacy." A problem presents'itself at once: if President Wilson

would not recognize "a government of butchers" in the case of Mexico,

why did he do so in the case of Peru (in 1914)? Why did he recognize

a new Chinese leader who came into power through murder, as (allegedly)

was done by Huerta? Most historians still leave the question hanging,

while others simply credit the double standard to Woodrow Wilson's

"hypocrisy."

The ambassador's role is, then, essential to an understanding

of how political partisanship, a sensationalist press, and misinforma­

tion on the part of subordinates affected President Wilson's policy­

making on this occasion.

It is hoped that this study will show further that, instead

of making a thorough and impartial investigation of the ambassador's

true role in the events of February 1913, the president for purely

partisan reasons chose to allow Henry Lane Wilson to be discredited.

Loudly dissociating himself from the "dollar diplomacy" of the previous

administration, Woodrow Wilson could not accept in Mexico a government

supposedly created through the connivance of the representative of that

administration.

This study would not have been possible without the unstinting

sacrifice of time and effort on the part of my wife, Sandra Turner

^Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Executive Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1974); Walter T. K. Nugent, Modern America (Boston: Houghton^ 1973).

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Rangel, archivist and reference consultant in the Diplomatic Branch

of the National Archives, nor without her constant encouragement.

A wife who is also a colleague is a blessing beyond measure.

Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. CHAPTER I

HENRY LANE WILSON

With deep roots in the heartland of the United States, Henry

Lane Wilson was the proud heir of a tradition of public service. He

descended from a family of Scotch-Irish frontiersmen that had come from

Ulster in the 1730s. Like most of the peoples of the United States

then and since, the Wilsons were a mobile people. They settled in

Lancaster, Pennsylvania, before they moved down to the vicinity of

Lexington, Virginia. A century later found than striking out for

Kentucky, and by the 1850s they were in southern Indiana.

Henry's father was James Wilson, whose public service began as

a soldier in the Mexican War under Gen. Winfield T. Scott. When Henry

was born at Crawfordsville, Indiana, on 3 November 1856,^ the elder

Wilson was making his first successful bid for Congress, where he

served for two terms (1857—61). When the boy was only five years old,

James resigned his congressional seat to serve as a major in a regiment

of Indiana volunteers. Two of his brothers died at Gettysburg, where

James himself was seriously wounded. Following the war James Wilson,

though in delicate health, accepted an appointment as U.S. minister to

Caracas. He died at this post in 1867.

Eugene Frank Masingill, "The Diplomatic Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Univ., 1957), pp. 5, 6. The year given by Masingill is 1857, but official and family records show 1856 to be correct.

1

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James' young widow, Emma Ingersoll Wilson, was born of old

Puritan stock in Connecticut. With her Yankee ancestors she shared a

deep piety coupled with a practical turn of mind. James had left her

no fortune, but he had provided the means for his family to live in 2 frugal comfort. Emma raised two sons, John Lockwood and Henry Lane,

in the stern bosom of the Presbyterian Church and managed their

education through college.

The Wilson brothers attended the public schools of Crawfords-

ville and went on to Wabash College, where John graduated in 1874 and

Henry graduated in 1879. Deciding to become a lawyer, Henry read law

first in the offices of McDonald and Butler, in Indianapolis, and then

under Benjamin Harrison.^ Meanwhile, John entered politics and was

elected representative to the Indiana legislature in 1880. In 1882 an

opportunity presented itself, and Henry was employed by the Lafayette

Journal. Two years later he was owner and publisher of the paper.

That same year, 1884, he married Alice Vajan and prepared to join the

massive migration to the West, where opportunities seemed to be even

better.

The territory of Washington had been created out of the Oregon

Territory in 1853; statehood had been slow in coming, yet it seemed

inevitable in the very near future. The population was increasing at a

phenomenal rate (375 percent between 1880 and 1890). and economic

expansion went apace. Henry's older brother had already moved to the

territory and was doing well. In 1885 Henry followed. He arrived at

Spokane, entered into the practice of law, and soon found himself in

^There had been three, but one son died in infancy.

^Indianapolis Star, 23 Dec. 1932.

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banking. He expanded into real estate, where he was so successful

that he gave up his law practice.

Washington was granted statehood in 1889, and John Lockwood

Wilson became its first congressman. Inevitably, Henry was active in

his brother's campaign. Henry achieved a reputation as a staunch and

active Republican. As a personal friend of President Benjamin

Harrison in an age of political spoils, Henry Lane Wilson was offered

his first diplomatic post— Caracas, where his father had died twenty-

two years before. Wilson declined. Perhaps the memory of his father

influenced his decision.

Henry's career in real estate and investments continued to 4 enjoy uninterrupted success, and he built up a considerable fortune.

But when disaster struck in the Panic of 1893, he joined the large army

of the bankrupt.

After this misfortune he became even more deeply involved in

politics. In 1895 he managed John's senatorial campaign and had the

satisfaction of seeing his brother emerge from the battle not only a

senator but also the undisputed leader of the Republican Party in the

State of Washington. The following year Henry actively campaigned for

William McKinley. Wilson had known McKinley since the two men had

campaigned together for James G. Blaine throughout Indiana in 1884. By

the end of the 1896 campaign Henry Lane Wilson was known by such

Republican leaders as Mark Hanna and Sen. Cushman K. Davis (of

Minnesota)^ as a man to be taken into account. The fact that his

4Ibid.

^Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1927), pp. 1-3.

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brother was a senator, the Republican leader of a Republican state,

and publisher of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer also counted. It is

not unlikely that the badly defeated Democratic candidate, William

Jennings Bryan, also knew of Henry Lane Wilson. If so, this knowledge

would be useful to Bryan eight years later.

McKinley was grateful to Wilson for his hard work during the

campaign. After the victory celebrations, the new president offered

his friend a place in the administration. Wilson expressed a prefer­

ence for the diplomatic service, and the president offered him the

post of minister to Japan. A few days later Mark Hanna also expressed

the hope that Wilson would accept some office in the administration.

When Wilson replied that he had agreed to take the Japanese post, Hanna

expressed surprise, since that post had already been offered to someone

else. In order to save the president embarrassment, Wilson agreed to

serve as minister to Chile.^ Thus began a seventeen-year career in the

diplomatic service, one of the longest as chief of mission in the

history of the Department of State until that time.7

Wilson began this career at a time of great change in D.S.

foreign policy. During the McKinley years the United States began to

act like the great power that it was becoming. These years were full

of significant events. By 1901 the United States had won a war against

6Ibid, p. 2.

7Unaware that George P. Marsh had served in Italy continuously from 1861 through 1882, Wilson was convinced that his was the longest consecutive service as chief of mission in the history of the depart­ ment. Compare Wilson’s testimony in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, S. Doc. 285, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1920, p. 2249 (hereinafter referred to as S. Doc. 285); and Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman, United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), pp. 82, 84.

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Spain and now ruled colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Within

only four years a new colossus had appeared on the world stage and

added an entirely new dimension to world power politics.

Many reasons have been proposed for this drastic change in the

foreign policies and world position of the United States. The economy

of the United States had reached maturity and needed raw materials and

foreign markets. Most businessmen preferred peaceful expansion of IJ.S.

trade, but after 1898 the need to invest abroad led them to demand

political stability and security in the places of investment. Also,

many were listening to Alfred T. Mahan, "the Apostle of Sea Power," who

convincingly argued that national greatness had always depended on

overseas commerce but that the latter was possible only when it was

backed by naval might. This argument, of course, required the acqui­

sition of overseas harbors and coaling stations.

Nor must the needs of national security be ignored. These were

times of rapidly changing power relationships among the industrialized

nations. The European powers, having already divided up Africa, were

now looking to the Near and Par East. The Europeans watched each

other as they staked out their spheres of economic and political

influence. Since 1871, Germany had dominated continental Europe while

Britain ruled the seas. Now the latter power's situation was changing;

Germany was challenging Britain by a program of naval expansion. And

in the Far East a new great power, Japan, was challenging traditional

Russian interests in Korea and Manchuria.

One common factor in U.S. expansionism was the idea of Anglo-

Saxon superiority, which the people of the United States seemed to

share with the Englishmen. This feeling was made the more credible

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by the widespread acceptance of Social Darwinism, which applied

evolutionary theories to society. Perhaps no clearer expression of

this sentiment of Anglo-Saxonism can be cited than that of Josiah

Strong’s Our Country (1886), which urged expansion as a religious

duty. The world would inevitably benefit from the spread of the purest

(evangelical) Christianity and the moral, democratic society that was

its wordly expression. The entire history of the world, Strong . ,

affirmed, had been but a preparation for the coming of the Anglo- g Saxon.

Temperamentally and ideologically, Henry Lane Wilson was well

suited to represent the United States during those expansionist years.

While he did not share the myth of Anglo-Saxon superiority, he did

believe that some races were by nature more progressive than others.

He expressed his beliefs, in reference to Latin America, in a manner

that contrasted sharply with Josiah Strong’s:

The attitude of superiority and super-wisdom sometimes affected by crude diplomacy, but oftener by commercial agents, should have no place in our relations with Latin America. . . . It was an error to measure the Chilean or the Argentine, with traditions inherited from the Guadalquivir or the slopes of the Pyrenees, by the austere standards of Puritan morals, or a Mexican or a Brazilian by the inelastic codes of a twentieth century philosophy. . . . Inventive genius and the tremendous strides of the Anglo-Saxon energy have created changing modes of life and thought which the Latin stubbornly resists. . . . We may not hope, we should not wish, to take from him the world in which he and his forefathers have lived.

Yet he expressed the national expansionist sentiment when he acknowledged

^Josiah Strong, Our Country, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, ed., Great Issues in American History: A Documentary Record (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 183-87.

^Wilson, pp. 11-12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the existence of "that immutable law which compels all vigorous

nations to grow without pause.

The changes in U.S. foreign policy during the years from

McKinley to Taft signaled changes also in the administration of foreign

affairs. The Department of State went a long way toward being separated

from domestic politics. During those sixteen years, civil-service

protection and the use of competitive examinations for appointments to

the Consular Service became accepted and standardized procedures. Even

the Diplomatic Service was (largely) taken out of the hands of the

spoilsmen.*"’

Henry Lane Wilson soon discovered that the Chilean post was

to demand the best he could offer. There had been sour feelings in

that country against the United States for many years, dating all the

way back to the 1850s, when Chilean miners were lynched or chased from

California s gold diggings. 12 More recently, salt had been rubbed on

■^Ibid., p. 107 In this case, Wilson was referring to Chile's destiny.

■^For reforms and reorganizations of the Department of State, see Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 205-21; Natalia Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 1789-1943 (Washington: National Archives, Division of State Department Archives, 1943); James L. McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs (New York: Knopf, 1950); Bertram D. Hulen, Inside the Department of State (New York and London: Whittlesey House, Division of the Macmillan Company, 1939); Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779- 1939: A Study in Administrative History (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 119-26; and Waldo H. Heinricks, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," in John Braeman et al., Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1971).

^^William Robert Kenny, "Mexican-American Conflict on the Mining Frontier, 1848-1852." Journal of the West, 6 (6 Oct. 1967), 183-87.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. old wounds by the well-meaning James G. Blaine, who (as secretary of

state) seemed determined to rob Chile of her gains in the War of the

$ Pacific. Muddling on, Blaine unwisely appointed Patrick Egan, an

Irish immigrant, minister to Santiago. Egan made himself thoroughly

unpopular with the Chileans and was resented by the popular and

influential British colony. In 1891, civil war broke out between the

Chilean congress and president, and the U.S. Navy captured and detained

the congressional steamer Itata, which was gun-running out of San Diego,

California. The Chilean congress, victorious in the war, did not

forget the affront, even though U.S. courts later held the capture

illegal.13

The situation degenerated to the point of war fever when, later

in 1891, the captain of the USS Baltimore imprudently granted shore

leave to some 120 men at Valparaiso. A brawl erupted in a barroom

between drunken sailors and angry citizens; the sailors were mobbed and

mauled— resulting in many wounded and the deaths of two U.S. citizens.

The United States demanded apologies and compensation and, when these

were not forthcoming, sent an ultimatum. . President Harrison was so

furious over the incident that the normally hawkish Blaine had to

restrain him. Chile was forced to grovel and to pay. Scarcely six . 14 years later Wilson, Harrison s old friend, arrived at Valparaiso.

Fortunately, Wilson had been preceded by Edward H. Strobel,

who (unlike Egan) knew how to make friends— if not for the United

States, at least for himself. Strobel had managed to tone down the ..

13 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton, 1964), pp. 425-28.

14Ibid.

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antagonism somewhat; he had gone to Chile hoping that, as the U.S.

representative, he could "recoup the great expense" of running a

suitable establishment there. In two and a half years he had not been

able to do so. He was convinced, however, that his style of living had

impressed the Chileans and that he had gained more respect for the

United States.1"5

Chileans who got to know Strobel liked him personally, though

they continued to bear their grudge against the country he represented.

At first, Henry Lane Wilson still encountered considerable delays in

transacting diplomatic business, as well as a hostile press.1(5 Wilson

did not display the "style of living" that impressed, but he did have

qualities that would prove more effective in a rapprochement between

the two countries: a blunt honesty that Chileans admired, a deep and

genuine admiration for the Chilean people, an appreciation of their

history and culture, and above all an almost Latin sense of humor. ^

He had, in short, that quality so admired by Latin Americans: he was

simpatico.

"^Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, vol. 45, National Archives (hereinafter cited as NA), Record Group (hereinafter cited as RG) 59.

^Wilson to John Hay, 19 March 1900, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59.

^This quality is illustrated best in Wilson's own memoirs, where he was free from the stilted language of official correspondence. On one occasion, when Wilson was not yet as fluent in Spanish as he would become, the Chilean prime minister, Antonio Valdes Cuevas, complimented Mrs. Wilson on her use of Spanish. Mr. Wilson, trying to show how well he spoke the language, told Valdes, "Si, la senora habla bastante bien, pero ella podria hablar mucho mejor si no tenia medias" (p. 47). But what he had intended to say was that Mrs. Wilson would speak better if she lost her fear of doing so. What he actually said was that she would do better without stockings (medias).

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These qualities of Wilson’s were soon to be put to severe

tests. It became his first serious duty to insure Chile's neutrality

in the Spanish-American War. In view of the previous problems

between Chile and the United States, it was not an easy task. The

explosion of the Maine brought only stiffly correct words from the

Chilean foreign office. There was a noticeable coolness, followed

by bitter denunciations of the United States by the press and public.

Wilson reported to John Sherman, secretary of state, that "the

sentiment of the people of Chile is strongly and overwhelmingly in

sympathy with Spain.Indeed, U.S. citizens in Chile were exposed

to popular street demonstrations, as well as to other risks of personal

harm. Wilson himself was warned by the legation servants to forgo

during the demonstrations his customary evening stroll, but he 19 persisted in going openly to the plaza.

Wilson demonstrated his ability to rely on his own resources

during emergency situations. On one occasion the U.S. consul at

Valparaiso, John F. Caples, reported intense feelings over the forth­

coming arrival of an American warship, the USS Oregon. The consul had

been informed of a secret plot to destroy the ship. Since it was a

holiday and no one at the foreign office was available, Wilson entrained

for Valparaiso, where he went directly to the intendant, Don Jose Maria

Cabezon Jordan, investigated this official, and confirmed the existence

^Wilson to Sherman, 20 May 1898, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59. 19 Wilson, pp. 48-49. Beaten up several times by some pro- Spanish neighborhood boys, Wilson’s ten-year-old son, John, endured it because he had been made to promise not to fight back. After one particularly nasty thrashing, his father released John from the promise; and John so became the terror of the neighborhood that the other boys' parents called on the police for protection!

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of the plot— whereupon he ordered precautions to be taken. The

following day Cabezon Jordan informed the president, who took further

precautions. As it turned out, the Oregon had been warned; and she

continued on to Punta Arenas for coaling. Only the gunboat USS

Marietta arrived at Valparaiso. Upon returning to the capital, Wilson

apologized to the foreign minister for his "irregular actions," but

the latter wholeheartedly approved of Wilson's precautionary measures.

The Department of State also expressed approval.^

Thanks in large measure to Wilson's diplomacy (which more than

once considerably softened rather blunt notes from the U.S. government),

the anti-Yankee attitude in Chile gradually began to dissipate. A

small band of Chilean liberals— some of them personal friends of the

U.S. minister's— openly approved of his country’s policy, and a number

of intellectuals turned against Spain. Pamphlets and newspaper

articles appeared— denouncing Spanish barbarism in Cuba and presenting 21 the U.S. side in a more favorable light. The end of the war saw

Chileans friendlier than ever toward the United States. Minister

Wilson basked in his wide popularity.

New challenges to his patience and goodwill soon appeared,

however, though they did not directly involve U.S. interests. Rather,

20 Wilson to Sherman, 11 April 1898, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59; William R. Day to Wilson, 17 May 1898, Records of the U.S. Legation in Chile, Instructions from the Department of State, Diplomatic Post Records, NA, RG 84 (hereinafter cited as NA, RG 84, with appropriate information). "It was this ability to act as vigorously and according to good judgement that distinguished him [Wilson] in Theodore Roosevelt's mind from the 'pink-tea variety of diplomats,'" says Masingill, p. 24, citing Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951-54), IV, 1089-90. 21 See enclosures-in Wilson to Day, 11 June 1899, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59; Wilson, p. 51.

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they concerned the long-festering controversy over the Argentine-

Chilean border, which came close to leading to open war between the

two countries. Argentina and Chile had been engaged in negotiations

on and off for the past half-century, and each time the talks had

broken off with increasingly bitter recriminations. One particularly

thorny problem was that an 1881 treaty had defined the border as the

highest peaks that divide the waters along the Andean range. But it

was later found that the highest peaks and the watershed did not

always coincide. British arbitration had been accepted in 1895, but

each country accused the other of improperly trying to influence the

decision.

About the time that Wilson arrived at Santiago, the dispute 22 had reached an alarming stage. The Chilean armed forces had been 23 placed on alert and kept in top shape for an expected Argentine move.

The national guard was increased to a wartime footing, and a full

military-training program was started. The congress (which had sat

in extraordinary session since November 1897) was dissolved, to give

the president a freer hand. Mass meetings were held, and extremely

jingoistic speeches were heard everywhere. Wilson felt that the 24 government might not be able to control the citizenry, and he

warned the Secretary of State:

The failure of diplomacy to find a remedy for the situation within the next two months will, in my judgement, bring the

22Wilson to Sherman, 25 Jan. 1898, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59; Luis Galdgmez, History of Chile, trans. Isaac J. Cox (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. 405.

23Wilson to Sherman, 6 Oct. 1897, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59.

24Ibid., 25 Jan. 1898.

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government to the point of believing that which perhaps the majority of the people here believe, i.e., that the question between the two countries can only be settled by an appeal to arms.

Henry Lane Wilson strongly felt that he could not stand aside

and permit the situation to deteriorate further. Taking the initiative,

he obtained permission from the Department of State to communicate

directly with William I. Buchanan, head of the U.S. legation at Buenos

Aires, in order to try to find a way to work out a settlement. Then

he took other steps:

Intervening quietly in the delicate situation, I suggested . . . that the differences in the event of the failure of the two governments to come to an agreement, should be submitted to the arbitration of a commission headed by Buchanan. . . . After numerous diplomatic exchanges and consultations, the Chilean government, with some misgivings, I think, accepted this plan of settlement and Mr. Buchanan . . . immediately entered upon his duties.-®

Buchanan succeeded in fixing the boundary onee and for all. Soon

thereafter the presidents of both countries met in the Straits of

Magellan and promised more cordial relations for the future.22

Wilson took a leave of absence in early 1901— perhaps hoping

for a promotion and transfer to another post. This desire was not based

on any dislike of Chile; he had made many friends in that country and

had developed great admiration for it. His desire was based on personal 28 reasons. Looking forward to visits with relatives and a well-earned

rest, he arrived in the United States with his family. He was not to

25Ibid., 17 May 1898.

26Wilson, p. 59; William R. Day to Wilson, 28 July 1898, NA, RG 84; Wilson to John Hay, 9 August 1898, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59.

22Gald5mez, p. 406. 2^Masingill, pp. 37-38.

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enjoy it. President McKinley informed him that another border dispute

had flared and that the U.S. minister’s presence was urgently needed

in Santiago. Wilson cut his leave of absence short and returned to

Chile at once. This was the last time that Wilson was to see his

friend. The president was to fall by an assassin's bullet shortly

thereafter. Henry Lane Wilson was always to grieve for him. Wilson

expected his diplomatic career to end shortly, since he did not know

Theodore Roosevelt's attitude toward the reforms being carried out in

the Department of State. But wholly in favor of the professional­

ization of the Diplomatic and Consular Services, President Roosevelt

carefully went over the records of his chiefs of mission. Wilson's

businesslike procedures and devotion to duty impressed the new

president, and the diplomat s usefulness in Chile was undisputed. 2°

When Wilson returned to Santiago, he found the country in a

high state of excitement. War fever was at a high pitch again over

minor details of the border settlement. Wilson felt that the most

practical service to be rendered by bystanders was gently to edge the

two nations toward peaceful settlement. He had himself set the

precedent.

Minister Wilson found himself more popular (and thus more

effective) than ever in Chile. He was everywhere praised for his

presentation of the Chilean cause (in Washington), which had been

given wide publicity. Wilson believed that Chile was in the right;

he even suspected Argentine designs. But he was always careful in

his public statements not to take sides. In his confidential

correspondence with the Department of State, however, he explained the

29Wilson, pp. 59-60; Masingill, p. 37.

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situation as he saw it. The press in Washington had somehow ascer­

tained the minister's personal views, and these were made known to the

Chileans. Upon his return to Chile, then, the government arranged an

extravagant banquet in his honor. Shortly thereafter, he was approached

on the possibility of Chile’s buying two warships from the United

States, and the minister strongly urged the Chilean government to

adopt instead a more peaceful attitude.^

Since his views on the controversy were too well known, Wilson

could not present himself as an arbitrator. But he did engage in

active efforts with the British minister, Gerald Lowther, who was

instrumental in bringing about a modus vivendi. By May 1902, peace was

established, and a permanent agreement reached.^

Wilson had desired peace between the two South American

countries. But his frequent despatches on the negotiations displayed

a running note of pessimism, and this note was to become one of

Wilson’s characteristics.

He was later to be accused of undue pessimism in his reports

from Mexico. Wilson, however, tried as conscientiously as possible to

predict accurately any problems that might appear. It became his

habit to want his government to be prepared for any eventuality that 32 might leave him open to criticism.

^For most of Wilson's second stay in Chile, I am indebted to the information provided in Masingill, pp. 38-61.

^Wilson to John Hay, 29 Sept. 1902, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA. RG 59- Masingill says that one of Wilson's sons claimed that the "Christ of the Andes" was Wilson's idea (p. 58). 32 , Those who were to condemn Wilson s pessimistic reports and predictions from Mexico either disregarded the uncanny accuracy of these predictions or went so far as to attribute their accuracy to Wilson's helping to bring about the events. See P. Edward Haley, Revolution and

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Henry Lane Wilson felt that the usefulness of a diplomat should

be measured by his effectiveness in harmonizing relations between his

country and that to which he was accredited. In turn, harmony should

lead to increasing trade and commerce. But Chile had long been

oriented to Europe, both culturally and commercially, and hard-headed

Chilean businessmen bought where they could obtain long-term credit

and popular and familiar products. The Chilean public must now first

be convinced of the superiority of goods made in the United States.

Furthermore, Chilean buying power must now be increased by the

creation of a greater demand in the United States for Chilean products.

Chile's European economic orientation was evidenced by the fact

that British sovereigns were much more in demand than U.S. gold coins.

The U.S. vice-consul at Antofagasta reported:

Americans and travelers generally would serve their commercial interests in bringing British soverigns to the coast rather than American gold. For the former there is always a fair rate of exchange, while American gold is little known except in larger commercial centers like Valparaiso, and in interior towns its sale is exceedingly slow.33

In many cases, U.S. consulates were in a shameful condition of 34 physical deterioration and disrepair. In view of this, the

legation found itself dealing more and more with consular matters.

Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 34-35, citing Wilson to Knox, 22 September 1911, decimal file number 812.00/355, General Records of the Department of State, NA, RG 59— this decimal file number hereinafter indicated by a virgule (/), preceded by pertinent information and followed by numerals and the symbols NA, RG 59 (a record group comprised exclusively of General Records of the Department of State). 33 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Monthly Bulletins, Bureau of American Republics, 1897, S. Doc. 178, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1899, p. 771.

^Wilson to Hay, 2 April 1900, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59, enclosures.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Wilson received many requests for help in establishing commercial

contacts.^ The legation rendered all the help it could, but Wilson

was careful to caution against investments in enterprises that were

certain not to produce returns. The minister was the object of

many complimentary letters for his efforts.

A great deal was accomplished by Henry Lane Wilson in promoting

the value of closer trade relations. He worked with the Bureau of

American Republics and, in 1899, helped convince Chile to join the

organization in that year.^ When Buchanan, the former minister to

Argentina, became manager of the Pan-American Exhibition (of 1900),

Wilson worked with him; and they were instrumental in getting Chile’s 37 enthusiastic participation in the exhibition. So pleased were the

Chileans with the results of the exhibition that they took Wilson on

a tour in a special train throughout the central and southern regions

of the country. The following Fourth of July the U.S. minister was

lavishly feted, and the newspapers reported:

. . . there does not exist between the two countries at the moment any question to be settled, there can be no quarrels about the demarcation of frontiers, commercial competition is out of the question, and there is no divergence of opinion with regard to international doctrine.^

Another editor was even willing to have his own country accept the

blame for the Baltimore affair (above, p. 8): "The moment has arrived

^Masingill, p. 48.

^Wilson to Hay, 6 March 1899, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59. 37 Wilson to Hay, 3 Oct. 1900, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile; Buchanan to Hay, 3 Jan. 1900, enclosure in Hill to Wilson, . 11 January 1901, Instructions from the Department of State, NA, RG 84.

~^E1 Porvenir (Santiago, Chile), 20 July 1901, cited by Masingill, p. 51.

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to admit that a great part of the responsibility for these events ..39 was ours.

Chile and the United States were on a veritable honeymoon,

and much of this mood was due to Wilson’s efforts. When President

McKinley was assassinated, the Chileans showed genuine sympathy.*0

When U.S. troops landed in Panama in 1903, only a few newspapers

raised the cry of "imperialism”; and though there was sympathy for

Germany in the Venezuelan crisis of 1902-03, the bombardment of Puerto

Cabello by 3ritish and German forces in 1902 shocked Chileans into

thinking in terms of the Monroe Doctrine.*1 Indeed, the Chilean

government even embarrassed the United States by refusing to charge

for rendering port services to the U.S. Navy. Of course, the Navy 42 gracefully declined. Wilson’s role in improving C'hilean-U.S.

relations was best described by Norman Hutchinson, the secretary

of the legation:

The position that the members of a Legation have in a social sphere not infrequently stands as the criterion of the political position a Legation may enjoy in relation to the cordiality of restraint existing between two independent states. In this respect, the United States Legation at Santiago is an example of a Legation standing high socially and politically. From every source, and even in Lima, and on the steamer coming down the west coast, I have heard nothing but praise for the Minister, and for the manner in which he has, by his cordial and sympathetic personal intercourse with Chilean people, and by his attention to, and appreciation of, their institutions, brought this Legation into

39 La Tarde (Santiago, Chile), 4 July 1901, cited by Masingill, p. 51. 40 Wilson to Hay, 5 Oct. 1901, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59. 41 Hutchinson to Hay, 29 Sept. 1902, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59. 42 Hay to Wilson, 10 Jan. 1903, Instructions from the Department of State, NA, RG 59.

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a social and political position which it has not hitherto enjoyed since the unfortunate affair of 1891. From being the most disliked of foreigners, we have come to be the most liked and admired, and our Minister is undoubtedly the most popular foreign representative in Chile, or that has been in Chile within the ordinary memory of man. This change of sentiment, brought about mainly by the personal character of our representative has, I understand, done something for our country commercially, as we have risen, in this respect, from the seventh to the third place during Mr. Wilson's tenure of office here. I am not unmindful of the fact also that this good feeling for our country has deepened since the recent Pan-Amercian Congress for the Chileans believe that the United States and their republic drew somewhat closer together as regards certain questions. . . . The social and political position needs to be maintained by a Minister who will treat them as Mr. Wilson has done. . .

Wilson's final transfer from the Chilean post in 1905 did not

terminate the good feelings of the Chilean government and people for

him. After he had become ambassador to Mexico, the Faculty of

Philosophy, Humanities, and Fine Arts of the National University of

Chile bestowed upon him the tile of honorary member. His diploma,

sent to him through the Chilean Legation at Mexico City on 12 July

1911, was accompanied by a message, which read as follows:

In transmitting the resolution adopted by the said institution to his Excellency, Mr. Wilson, you will have the goodness to make known to the distinguished American diplomat, the great satisfaction with which the Government of Chile approves of this designation which it considers not only a just recognition of his intellectual gifts but a cordial testimonial of appreciation of the constant proofs of affection with which his Excellency Mr. Wilson has earned the gratitude of our country.^4

Wilson took a much-needed leave of absence in 1902, during

which he visited Europe and returned to Washington before he went back

to Chile. Then, in 1904, President Roosevelt asked him to help out

43 Hutchinson to Hay, 8 March 1902, Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, NA, RG 59. 44 Wilson, pp. 105-06; Eduardo Suarez Mujica, Chilean minister to Mexico, to Henry Lane Wilson, 14 April 1911, 123.W691/57, NA, RG 59.

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in the presidential campaign. While Wilson was busy on this assignment,

he decided to help, "in a quiet way," his own brother’s senatorial

campaign in the State of Washington. John Lockwood Wilson was

defeated that year, and the Democratic senators from Washington

demanded that Henry Lane Wilson not be reappointed to a diplomatic

post. President P.oosevelt, however, overrode the rules of senatorial

courtesy by informing the Washington delegation that he was not 45 appointing Wilson— merely transferring him to a new post.

The new appointment was to the legation at Brussels, where he

would have increased responsibilities. But Belgium was not as taxing

a post as Chile had been, and it proved to be merely an interlude of

four years in an otherwise exciting and useful diplomatic career.

There were a few problems of a diplomatic nature to be encountered

in Belgium, and Wilson took the opportunity to travel— spending most

of his summer vacations in England. While in Brussels, he ran into

an old friend, the Mexican minister to Belgium, Francisco de la Barra.

The two diplomats had been officially presented to the king on the 46 same day. The friendship with De la Barra was to be of much value

to Henry Lane Wilson in the years ahead.

The U.S. minister remained in Belgium long enough to represent

the president at the funeral of old King Leopold and at the coronation

of King Albert, both of whom he greatly admired. In the meantime he

had visited home in order to take part in the Republican National

Convention that nominated William Howard Taft as its candidate for the

election of 1908. Henry Lane Wilson was a happy, successful man by

45 Morison, Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, IV, 1089.

^Wilson, p. 131.

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this time. But he was also a restless man, one who enjoyed the

challenge of difficult assignments. He was offered several posts

(including that of Ambassador to Russia); but, pleading a limited

fortune, he declined them all. He wanted to go to Mexico. He could

speak the language; the country was closer to home— which meant that

his children could attend U.S. schools and he could visit his ailing

mother and brother- But perhaps more important, as he later stated,

he was informed that a crisis was looming in Mexico, and he felt that

he could be of better use to his country at that post. There were

those in Washington who strongly agreed.

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WILSON IN PORFIRIAN MEXICO

Some U.S. leaders (among them Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge and Sen.

Elihu Root) were aware of Henry Lane Wilson’s extraordinary successes

in Chile, and they urged his appointment to the post of ambassador to

Mexico City.^ Porfirio Diaz, president of Mexico for thirty-four

years, had brought order, political stability, and economic progress;

but much remained to be done. As the centennial of the Hidalgo revolt

approached, Wilson related, these senators and others interested in

Mexico began to anticipate serious trouble. They wanted in Mexico a

man that understood the Latin-American psychology and that spoke the

language. In a clear about-face, the entire Congressional delegation

of the State of Washington petitioned President Taft to send Wilson 2 there.

Before these recommendations were received, Henry W. Scott had

been nominated to Mexico; and Wilson was instead offered the post at

Constantinople. Wilson preferred to wait and, late in 1908 (almost a

year after Taft took office), Wilson was informed that Scott had 3 declined the post and that Wilson was appointed Ambassador to Mexico.

Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 159.

^Washington State Congressional Delegation to Taft, 22 April 1909, 5841/17-18, NA, RG 59. Their petition did not mention the possibility of a crisis in Mexico.

^Henry Lane Wilson testimony, S. Doc. 285, p. 2249.

22

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The President and, indeed, the Department of State expected

the Diaz regime to continue indefinitely. Wilson did not share this

confidence, since he said that he had information "through other

channels" (not identified) that convinced him that there was the

possibility, if not the danger, of disturbed conditions.4

The importance of the Mexican post in U.S. diplomacy is

indicated by the fact that 33 percent of all correspondence of the

Department of State in the year 1910 was with Mexico.^ There was good

reason for this. Mexican foreign trade for that year totaled $227.5

million, and exports amounted to $130 million. The United States

took 75 percent of the exports and furnished 58 percent of the imports.^

U.S. investment in that country is estimated at $1.057-$1.5 billion.7

Furthermore, there were some 16,000 U.S. citizens living in Mexico

then. Some 15,000 were engaged in agriculture in various colonies,**

4Wilson, p. 167.

5S. Doc. 285, p. 2251.

^Mexican Year Book: A Financial and Commercial Handbook, Compiled from Official and Other Returns, 1911 (London: Mexican Year Book Publishing Company, 1912), passim (hereinafter cited as Mexican Year Book, 1911).

7S. Doc. 285, p. 3322. 8 There were seven Mormon agricultural colonies in the State of Chihuahua and three in Sonora. These statistics are necessary because they show the Woodrow Wilson administration's ignorance of the U.S. presence in Mexico. Wilson and his secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, were to be under the impression that most Americans in Mexico were representatives of Big Business. "I have to remind myself," he said, "that I am President of the United States and not of a small group of Americans with vested interests in Mexico (Joseph P. Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as I Knew Him [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1922], p. 146). Bryan shared the view that U.S. citizens abroad had left home only in search of excessive profits and, hence, did not deserve protection (Bryan to Wilson, 20 July 1913, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Library of Congress, File II— hereinafter cited as Wilson Papers).

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while an equal number were cultivating small holdings (as distinguished 9 from plantations and stock-grazing ranches). Some 2,000 U.S. citizens

worked on the railways, 5,000 in mining, and possibly 8,000 were

engaged in educational work or living in that country for other

reasons.1^ Nearly 1.8 million Mexican nationals were employed by

U.S. corporations or individual U.S. citizens.11

From the standpoint of material wealth and international

repute, Mexico had reached by 1910 the highest point since her

independence. Her banks of issue had assets of $368 million, with

capital of $59.4 million and deposits of $36 million. Auxiliary

banks had capital of $24.9 million and assets of $64 million.12

Mortgage banks had capital of $5 million, with resources of $26

million. There were in circulation $56 million in banknotes and

metallic reserves of $46.5 million.12

Federal receipts for 1903-10 totaled $53 million, while

expenditures were $47.5 million. Beginning in 1895, there had been

a surplus of cash revenues over cash disbursements every year— the

aggregate for the fifteen years being $73.5 million, of which $37

million had been spent on public works and improvements, while the 14 balance constituted the treasury fund.

9S. Doc. 285, p. 3312.

10Ibid., p. 3311.

1;lEdward I. Bell, The Political Shame of Mexico (New York: McBride, Nast and Co., 1914), p. 341.

12S. Doc. 285, p. 3337.

12Mexican Year Book, 1911, passim.

14Ibid.

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Public works representing the expenditure of nearly $210

million were in evidence.15 Railroad mileage totaled 16,000 miles.15

The seven chief lines during 1910 carried 10.8 million passengers

(with gross earnings of $8.5 million) and nearly 12 million tons of

freight (with gross earnings of $32.5 million).^

When Porfirio Diaz took office, an indifferent system of

public education accommodated some 163,000 pupils. This system was

improved and enlarged, so that in 1908 there were 12,000 schools 18 with an estimated attendance of one million students, Diaz boasted.

The development of telegraphic communications under Diaz

throws an interesting sidelight on the rigorous methods of the old

dictator, as reported by Creelman in his 1908 article in Pearson's

Magazine. Creelman quoted Diaz:

Telegraphing was a difficult thing in those times. Today we have more than 45,000 miles of telegraph wire in operation. We began by making robbery punishable by death and compelling the execution of offenders within a few hours after they were caught and condemned. We ordered that whenever telegraph wires were cut and the chief officer of the district did not catch the criminal, he should himself suffer; and in case the cutting occurred in a plantation the proprietor who failed to prevent

15J. Creelman, "President Diaz the Hero and Creator of Modern Mexico," Pearson's Magazine, 19 (March 1908), pp. 231-77.

15Francisco Bulnes, Toda la verdad acerca de la revolucion Mexicana: La responsabilidad criminal del Presidente Wilson en el desastre mexicano (M&cico: Editorial Los Insurgentes, S.A., 1916; rpt. Editorial Libros de Mdxico, S.A., 1960), p. 111. (Creelman, however, says 19,000 miles.)

1^Mexican Year Book, 1911, passim.

15Creelman, p. 248. However, on the national average, only one-third of the children between the ages of six and twelve were enrolled— the majority in the major population centers. Of these, only one of three attended regularly, and few finished the primary curriculum. About 80 percent of the population over ten years of age were illiterate. See Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), p. 234.

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it should be hanged to the nearest telegraph pole. These were military orders, remember.^

Mexico's agricultural production in 1910 totaled $87.5 million;

industrial production, $113.5 million.^ The total amount of foreign

capital invested in Mexico prior to the outbreak of the Madero

Revolution has been estimated variously at $2.4-$3.4 billion. 21

The national debt stood at about $220 million in 1910. Because

of the apparent stability of the government at that time, Finance

Minister Jose Limantour had just been successful in negotiating at

Paris a new foreign loan of some $100 million or more for the conversion 22 of a five-percent loan of 1889 into a four-percent obligation!

This low interest rate alone would show the confidence of the world

financial community in the strength and character of Mexican institu­

tions under Diaz.

Henry Lane Wilson was aware of the progress revealed by these

statistics. But he was not deceived. He and those U.S. citizens that

feared for Mexico's future were aware not only that much was wrong

but also that a serious crisis might be approaching— perhaps much

sooner than they themselves anticipated. When the new Ambassador to

Mexico arrived at the capital of the republic, he carefully wrote

down his observations. In a lengthy despatch to Secretary of State

Knox, he accurately described the other face of the Diaz regime. No

one has ever accused the ambassador of being, in this, overly

19Mexican Year Book, 1911, passim.

20Bulnes, Toda la verdad, p. 10.

21S. Doc. 285, p. 3322.

22Mexican Year Book, 1911, passim.

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pessimistic. "Theoretically," Ambassador Wilson began, "Mexico is

a federal republic similar in form to ours, certain specified rights

being reserved to the States and certain others exercised by the 23 Central Government." But there the similarity ended, he added.

Through his control of the electoral process, the President of

Mexico controlled the congress and the state governments. His

control over the judiciary was even more absolute. "It is not

difficult to see," noted Wilson, "that the President of the Republic

is really an autocrat ruling and governing through republican forms,

and maintaining his rule by the use of those instrumentalities which

inherently belong to the Executive, namely: the army and the police."

This being the case, the maintenance of peace and order, the security

of invested capital, and the existence of cordial relations with

neighboring nations depended almost entirely upon the character of

"the Executive."

For this reason, Wilson observed, "we are rapidly approaching

a crisis in the affairs of this nation, the result of which must be

of vital importance to the American Government, to American Commerce,

and to American capital invested here." This crisis, he said, was

approaching rapidly because the president was eighty-three years old

and, because of his age, infirm. This infirmity was obvious in

various ways: Diaz could not hear too well and had a failing memory,

a tendency to become maudlinly sentimental, and a senile vanity about

his place in history.

Speaking of the influence surrounding Diaz (i.e., the

Cientifico group in whose hands "rests the fate of the Republic"),

23Wilson to Knox, 31 Oct- 1910, /355, NA, RG 59 (the source of all direct quotations until the next footnote)..

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the ambassador, under appropriate subheadings, continued:

Concentration of wealth and lands. It is probably capable of demonstration that the great mass of the wealth of the country is in the hands of 10% of its popula­ tion. This is certainly true of the land, 90% of which is in the hands of probably 10% of the population. It is not at all an uncommon thing to find millions of acres in a single holding and some large land holders, like Molina and Terrazas, have passed the 10,000,000 mark. Probably ten millions of the population of Mexico do not own a foot of land nor have other means than that derived from daily toil.

Taxation. This evil is especially objectionable not only on account of its measure but also because of its various offensive forms. Practically everything in the way of a legal instrument is taxed— checks, bills, deeds, certificates, and licenses. This taxation is framed so as to fall as an especial burden upon the middle, commercial, and poorer classes.

Debasement of the masses. The spread of intemperance and consequent debasement of the masses is breeding and nursing poverty, ignorance and superstition with alarming rapidity. As this element constitutes two-thirds of the population it may readily be understood what a menace their existence is to a continuance of peaceful conditions.

The growing middle class. This class, while not an evil, is a danger. Its existence springs from the better things which the Government has done and from the example and influence of the so-called American invasion. All over the Republic a class of sturdy tradesmen, usually of Indian blood, has developed. This class is industrious, intelligent, takes an acute interest in public affairs, is impatient of existing conditions, and is constantly exerting a stronger and wider influence. Usually this class is opposed to the present Government and bitterly hostile to the group of men supposed to be its moving force. It may easily be supposed that in the event of a crisis the vast majority will rise to the support of ambitious men offering remedies for present evils. . . .

The Judiciary. By far the greatest evil and the greatest cause of complaint in the Republic is the lame, incompetent and corrupt judiciary. . . .

Not only does the judiciary perpetrate injustice upon the Mexicans,

but "the grossest injustice and the rankest outrages to persons and

property of American citizens," complained the ambassador.

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Another serious and dangerous phase of the situation in

Mexico gave Wilson concern: the pronounced anti-American feeling

that existed throughout the country. This feeling was not confined

to any one class, though it naturally found its most violent expression

among the lower classes, "where the restraints of custom, courtesy

and education are weakest." This hostility the ambassador blames

on the war of 1846, on racial antipathy, and (above all) on "resentment

of American commercial aggression and envy of American property and

thrift." This anti-Americanism expressed itself in two ways: in

attacks on American property interests (either by "fictitious" legal

proceedings or direct confiscation through the collusion of corrupt

officials, at times not even cloaked under the forms of law) and in

attacks on personal rights (frequently without process of law). Cases

of the latter kind were so frequent as to be of almost daily occurrence,

wrote Wilson, and sometimes the embassy was called upon to interfere

in the prevention of abuses and violations of personal rights of a

kind "which one is accustomed to associate more with Asiatic countries

than with a free Republic in this Western Hemisphere." Some of these

offenses were righted by appeals to the Foreign Office, some by

unofficial letters to the governors of the states, and some "by the

discreet exercise of the Embassy's good offices with the officers of

the law."

Wilson finished his analysis of the Mexican situation in 1910

by insisting that Diaz had done much good for the country in a

material way and that, if the poor had not been well housed and the

artisan class was not protected by just laws, the failure was due to

the swift period of transition through which Mexico was passing, the

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difficulty of dealing with materials at hand, the obstacles arising

from a scattered and sparse population, and the apparent impossibility

of securing loyal subordinates to carry out the policies of the

administration. But "the evils and dangers which surround the

administration of President Diaz are real, in spite of the vast amount 24 of good which it has conferred upon the country."

The opposition to Diaz’ rule, which had been increasing with

each return to power of the dictator, received an added stimulus two

years before Henry Lane Wilson was appointed to Mexico, as a result

of the publication of the so-called Creelman interview, in which Diaz

was quoted as having declared:

No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my present term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. I snail be eighty years old then. . . . I welcome an opposition party in the Mexican Republic. . . . If it can develop power, not to exploit but to govern, I will stand by it.25

Scarcely a month elapsed after this famous interview was

published before the old general called together the Cientificos.

Minister of Finance Jose Limantour, Vice-President Ramdn Corral,

and Minister of Development (Fomento') Oligario Molina, to inform

them that he daily received letters urging him to accept reelection.

Before deciding anything, he said, he wished to consult with his

friends and advisers. He added that, though he considered himself

too old to begin another presidential term, he was willing to sacrifice

himself for his country. Limantour approved of another term for Diaz,

provided he make a number of radical changes in his platform. Above

all, declared Limantour, in order to preserve peace, the makeup of the

Cabinet must be completely changed. Diaz agreed, providing Corral

24Ibid. 25Creelman, p. 270.

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remained as vice-president.^ Diaz' predilection for Corral is hard

to understand. As the leader of the Cientificos, the man was roundly

hated throughout the republic. As an "Americanized Mexican," he was

repugnant to the patriotic sentiment of northern Mexico; and, having 27 trafficked in Yaqui peonage, he was persona non grata in the south.

Yet Molina suggested that the vice-president must take a more active

role in governing and that he should become known especially by the

military, who should accustom themselves to taking orders from him.

To this Diaz agreed.^ Diaz' candidacy was not made public, however,

until April 1909.

Apparently, information concerning this conference, so at

variance with the explicit promise contained in the Creelman interview,

reached the ears of Francisco Indalecio Madero, Jr., a wealthy landowner

from Parras, Coahuila, and a member of one of the most powerful and

richest families in northern Mexico. Madero had studied in the United

States and France, was an admirer of American democracy, and had

disappointed his family by becoming more interested in politics than 29 in finance. The man from Parras took advantage of the widespread

discontent to try to force Dxaz to keep his promise. He founded the

Anti-Reelection Party, and he hastened the publication (in October

^Ramon Prida, iDe la dictadura a la anarqula! (El Paso: Imprenta El Paso del Norte, 1914), p. 16. 27 Bell, p. 59; Consul Marion Letcher (Chihuahua City) to Bryan, 17 Oct. 1913, /9484, NA, RG 59,

^Prida, pp. 16-17. 29 Details on Madero are from Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955) , passim; and Charles C. Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1952), passim.

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1908) of his book, La sucesion presencial en 1910, which voiced

that party's sentiments and which had for its object the formation

of a public opinion against the reelection of Diaz.

While such peaceful propaganda was going on, many Mexicans,

not content to await the results of the 1910 elections, gathered

on the border with the United States, where armed conflicts occasionally

arose. On 26 June 1908, when some forty men armed themselves on the

U.S. side of the border and attacked the federal garrison at Las

Vacas, Coahuila (opposite Del Rio, Texas), they withdrew after having

lost several men and exhausting their ammunition.^ Such attacks by men

of considerable education and ardent political views greatly added to

the problems of U.S. federal officials, who were accustomed to dealing

with cattle thieves and smugglers, as well as to the U.S. embassy in

Mexico City, which was forced to press claims for damages to the lives

and property of U.S. citizens."^

In the national election of 26 June 1910, reelection was the

outstanding issue. Many people were willing to allow the reelection

of Diaz, but demanded freedom to vote for or against the vice-president.

Indeed, among the supporters of Diaz, even the opponents of Corral

decided to fight his reelection, choosing as their candidate Gen.

Bernardo Reyes, former governor of Nuevo Leon. At one time Reyes had

stood so high in Diaz' estimation that it was popularly believed that

he would eventually succeed the dictator. Diaz' selection of Corral

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 (Washington: GPO, 1919), p. 349 (hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations, with appropriate information).

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led to the formation of opponents around Reyes. The Diaz government

eliminated Reyes from the race, however, by sending him on a military

"mission" to Europe. This left the field of opposition to Madero.

In the campaign that ensued, Madero was active in urging

the people to "rise against the existing tyranny and fight with what

weapons they could find for the reestablishment of constitutional 32 government. That Madero made considerable headway is evidenced

by the fact that Diaz took advantage of Madero's personal attacks to

order his arrest on 5 June 1910. Madero's arrest came as a result

of a speech he made at the railroad station in San Luis Potosi. The

original charge (concealing a fugitive from justice) was later changed

to sedition. Madero fled to Monterrey, where he was captured and

returned to San Luis Potosi and confined to the penitentiary. There

his correspondence was opened and examined by the government, which

claimed to find proof that he was planning an armed revolution. 33

Diaz had previously hesitated to arrest Madero. As he informed

Ambassador Wilson, several months prior to the election a requisition

for the arrest of Madero was received by the Mexico City chief of

police— in pursuance of an indictment filed against Madero in a court

of the State of Coahuila. The indictment was based upon allegations

that he had forcibly entered the lands of a U.S. company whose property

joined one of his haciendas and that, aided by a number of his peons,

32 Records of the Research and Information Section, Agency of the United States, Special Claims Commission, United States and Mexico, NA, RG 76 (hereinafter cited as NA, RG 76, with appropriate information), "File on the History of the Mexican Revolution: The Mexican Revolution From the Plan of San Luis Potosi, Monograph Number 4," p. 7.

33Prida, p. 19.

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had stolen something like $75,000 worth of guayule. Diaz intervened to

prevent the arrest, because people might consider it a case of political

animosity; and the plaintiffs were urged to withhold the case until 34 after the election.

It does not appear that Diaz was overly concerned about

these incipient revolutionary activities by Madero. In any case,

following the elections Madero was released on bail, but confined to

San Luis Potosi. On 5 October, Madero escaped to San Antonio, Texas.

There he joined a revolutionary junta that had established headquarters

there; he was immediately chosen as its president. This group

composed the Plan de San Luis Potosi, which was to become the program

and rallying cry of the Revolution. Although the plan was drafted

on 25 October, it was backdated to 5 October, to make it appear that

the Plan was drawn up in Mexico.

In retrospect, Madero's arrest and flight and the publication of

the Plan appear as momentous events in Mexican history. But their

importance was not apparent at the time. The presidential election

of 1910 had taken place in accordance with schedule and program, and

Diaz had won overwhelmingly. Madero believed, however, that had the

election been fairly held, he might have been elected. In the Plan,

Madero declared the elections null and void, assumed the provisional

presidency, and called upon Mexicans to join him in a general uprising

on 20 November against the senile dictator. Thus far, there was

nothing anomalous about the process. It had all happended before.

But this time Mexico was much more prepared to answer the call than

Madero dreamed. He was the last to realize that all the elements of

34 NA, RG 76, The Mexican Revolution, p. 7.

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a total social revolution were present and that he was the "man of the

hour," who was expected to give it form and substance. Merely seeking

modest political reforms, the man from Parral unleashed a storm that

was to carry Mexico into twenty years of civil war, anarchy, untold

misery, foreign intervention, and (after the tempest was finally calmed

by methods like those of Porfirio Diaz) order and progress under new

elites.

The U.S. ambassador knew that the Diaz regime was in trouble,

but he did not associate this trouble with Madero. Indeed, he was

not at all impressed by the man. "When Madero first attracted my

attention," he declared years later, "he was engaged in the business of

making incendiary speeches, usually of very little intellectual merit,

before audiences in remote parts of Mexico."35 Wilson was much too

busy protecting U.S. citizens and trying to smooth out problems between

the U.S. government and the tottering regime to consider Madero much of

a threat to the established order. As he had done in Chile, the

ambassador cultivated the personal friendship of those men that could

be useful to the interests of his country and for whom he generally

had a sincere respect, if not affection. Enrique Creel, minister of

foreign affairs, was one of the wealthiest landowners in Chihuahua—

and a friend. Wilson also got along well with Francisco Leon de la

Barra, Manuel Calero, and Pedro Lascurain— all likewise destined to

be foreign ministers. All these men, said Wilson, "possessed in common

a lively appreciation of international obligations and a profound 36 respect for the traditions of the Mexican Foreign Office."

35S. Doc. 285, p. 2256. 36Wilson, pp. 178-79.

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The ambassador's friendly contacts served him well in dealing

with the numerous daily problems he had to face. The embassy was

really a workshop. Unlike the leisurely pace in Brussels, Wilson's

workday began at nine o'clock in the morning and very frequently

extended until one or two o'clock the following morning. There were

always from half a dozen to fifty people asking for interviews. Nor

were these only businessmen. There were doctors, lawyers, teachers,

clergymen, engineers, and visitors that were there for their health,

recreation, or research. Wilson declared that while he was in charge

of the embassy, "no American representing vested interests in Mexico

ever asked any aid from the embassy except in the matter of physical 37 protection. There were instances, of course, when the ambassador

was called upon to represent some important interests before the

Mexican government, but these instances were (almost without exception) 38 under instructions from the Department of State.

One of the most serious problems that Wilson had to face during

the last days of the Diaz regime was the widespread anti-American

rioting that occurred in the early days of October 1910. These riots

were ostensibly provoked by the burning of Antonio Rodriguez, a Mexican

national, at Rock Springs, Texas, for the alleged rape of an American 39 woman. For three days Mexico City was in the hands of mobs that

destroyed considerable property, tore down and burned the U.S. flag,

and insulted and abused U.S. citizens whenever they were found on

07 OQ S. Doc. 285, p. 2251. Ibid., p. 2252. 39 This incident followed the publication of John Kenneth Turner's Barbarous Mexico: An Indictment of a Cruel and Corrupt System (London and New York: Cassel and Co., 1911), a severe and somewhat overdrawn indictment of the Mexicans under Diaz. Turner afterwards became associated with a communist movement in Lower California.

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the streets. U.S.-owned clubs, hotels, and known business<*houses

were attacked, and in some instances children of the U.S. schools

were assaulted.

It is not clear what political forces were responsible for

inciting the agitation that led to these outrages. The ambassador

agreed with the Department of State that enemies of Diaz "inspired

the malevolent demonstrations hoping to embarrass him with us. "43

The ambassador reported that

. . . thorough investigation convinces me that recent anti- American demonstrations are simply a convenient cloak for attacks on the Diaz Government. . . . Nearly all the rioters in this city are opponents of the Government, and their utilization of the Rodriguez incident makes it difficult for the Government to proceed with that vigor which it otherwise could. 42

Following an interview with President Diaz, the ambassador reported

that Diaz ''considers the anti-American disturbances a convenient 43 cloak for the revolutionists." But there were those who had the

opinion that the Diaz government itself had incited the attacks in

order to justify the threat of U.S. intervention and thereby put 44 down the approaching revolution. To support his opinion, he

cited the fact that El Debate, a paper controlled by persons closely

associated with the government, was the first and most ferocious in

40 Wilson to Knox, 9 Nov. 1910, /357, NA, RG 59; Wilson, p. 191.

41Taft to Wilson, 10 Nov. 1910, /358, NA, RG 59.

42Wilson to Knox, 11 Nov. 1910, /365, NA, RG 59.

43Ibid., 12 Nov. 1910, /366, NA, RG 59. 44 Consul A. A. Graham (Mexico City) to Knox, 21 Nov. 1910, /395, NA, RG 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38 45 attacking the people of the United States for the lynching. It

was notable, he wrote, that there was no attempt on the part of the 46 police to protect U.S. citizens. This lack of police protection

brought a heated protest from the ambassador in a note to the Mexican

foreign minister. On the other hand, El Diario del Hogar, a socialist

paper and a confirmed enemy of the dictator, was no less bitter in 47 its denunciation of U.S. citizens. Before the demonstrations and

riots were finally quelled on 14 November, they had spread to Ciudad

Porfirio Diaz (Piedras Negras), Guadalajara, Chihuahua, Veracruz, and

Puebla.^

Whether the riots registered an attempt on the part of Diaz 49 to materialize El Fantasma of U.S. intervention or cf his political

enemies to discredit the regime, the vigorous repression of this

anti-U.S. uprising, after a long delay, left the atmosphere charged

and ready to explode at the first spark.

A constant source of embarrassment and chagrin to the U.S.

ambassador was the constant flow of arms and prospective rebels across

the border from the United States. Pascual Orozco, Jr., was becoming

a serious threat in the mountains of Chihuahua, and there were

scattered bands of rebels elsewhere. Consul Luther Ellsworth (at

45Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 354. 46Ibid., p. 355. 47 Wilson later became convinced that the rioting was the work of the Diaz government (p. 191).

4^In San Luis Potosi, a boycott of U.S. goods was initiated (Consul George A. Bucklin, Jr., to Knox, 14 Nov. 1910, /396, NA, RG 59. 49 The Phantom of U.S. intervention in case of a rebellion against Diaz was held up as an argument by the government any time there was trouble (Frederick B. Kellogg to Taft, 10 June 1911, /2109, NA, RG 59).

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Cuidad Porfirio Dfaz, now Piedras Negras) sent numerous despatches

reporting wholesale smuggling across the border, with little attempt

on the part of U.S. authorities to stop it.^° He finally complained

to Ambassador Wilson that "Knox makes it almost impossible to enforce

neutrality laws.The ambassador reported the complaint and added

his own, whereupon Knox informed them that

. . . it is not illegal . . . to trade in arms and ammunition during a war or during a revolution. . . . If the Mexican Government desires to exclude such materials from her territories, it is clearly her duty and not ov rs to accomplish such exclusion. . . . This Government cannot be charged with responsibility of preventing the legal importation of arms and ammunition into Mexico nor the exclusion from Mexico bands of unorganized Mexican citizens who are returning to their native land. 52

Regardless of the merits of this argument, President Taft took a

different view from his secretary of state; efforts were increased

to stop (or at least slow down) the flow of rebels and ammunition.^

It was not an easy task. Local authorities refused, according to Gen.

Anson Mills, "for incompetence or faithlessness" to arrest violators 54 of the neutrality laws. Enforcement was left in the hands of

federal officials; and, while they showed some diligence, it was

reported that "there has been equally extraordinary diligence on the

^Luther Ellsworth to Knox, nineteen despatches from 25 Aug. through 9 Nov. 1910, /398-419, NA, RG 59.

51Wilson to Knox, 16 Nov. 1919, /447, NA, RG 59. 52 Knox to Ellsworth, 25 Jan. 1911, Central Records of the Department of Justice, 90755/516, NA, RG 60 (hereinafter cited as NA, RG 60, with appropriate information). 53 Attorney Gen. Geo. W. Wickersham to U.S. Attorney L. W. McDaniel (Waco, Texas), 7 Feb. 1911, 90755/510, NA, RG 60. 54 Brig. Gen. Anson Mills to W. W. Keblinger, Secretary of the Interior Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico, 6 Feb. 1911, 90755/486, NA, RG 60.

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part of the insurrectors that violate such neutrality laws-""^ As

a final resort, the president ordered, on 11 February 1911, that U.S.

troops be disposed along the border to enforce the neutrality laws."^

This move backfired. The United States was suspected in Mexico of

"ulterior motives" in mobilizing along the frontier.

Madero had set 20 November 1910 as the target date for a

general uprising against the dictatorship. On 19" November, accompanied

by some friends, he headed for the border; but he lost his way and

wandered around all night, until he finally located and waded across

the Rio Grande. He expected to meet his uncle, Catarino Benavides,

with some 500 men. But Benavides did not appear until the following

day— and then with only four willing comrades, instead of the 500.

Disgusted, Madero recrossed the border and returned to San Antonio.

While Madero was gone, his father (the elder Francisco I. Madero)

gave a premature press conference announcing the start of the Revolution:

There are 26 Senators in Mexico who are waiting for my son to cross the border. He is in earnest. This is no small revolt, but a revolution in which the monied interests of Mexico are taking an active part. . . . If he crosses the border he will be met by some of the most influential men in the republic. . . . You do not realize the strength of the revolutionary movement in Mexico. Men who are millionaires are supporting it. . . .

What Don Francisco was publicly admitting, though he did not say so

was that his son had decided to violate the neutrality laws of the

55S. Engelking (Asst. U.S. Attorney at El Paso) to Charles A. Boyngton (U.S. Attorney, Waco), 20 Feb. 1911, 90755/603, NA, RG 60.

56L. W. McDaniel (U.S. Attorney, South District of Texas) to Attorney Gen. George W. Wickersham, 13 Feb. 1911, 90755/531, NA, RG 60.

57Wilson to Knox, 9 March 1911, /969, NA, RG 59.

58Prida, p. 22. 59 San Antonio Light and Gazette, 20 Nov. 1910.

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United States. The Mexican Embassy in Washington forwarded a clipping

of the interview, together with a note, to Secretary Knox, who

informed the Attorney General.^ The latter issued general instructions

for the arrest of Francisco I. Madero, Jr.^ By then Madero had

finally made it back to Mexico.

Madero, of course, did not start the acts of rebellion that

initiated the Revolution. Gradually picking up steam, it had been

going on since at least 1906.^ More recently, there had been outbreaks

in Cananea, Hermosillo, Guaymas, Zacatecas, Puebla, and several places

in Coahuila. Fascual Orozco was daily becoming more formidable in

Chihuahua. Doroteo Arango, otherwise known as Francisco Villa, had

risen at San Andres, Jose de la Luz Blanco in Santo Tomas, Guillermo

Baca in Parral; and there were others. While Madero was hiding from

the U.S. federal authorities in New Orleans, San Antonio, Dallas,

and El Paso, the fighting was spreading. By early December, Orozco

had captured Ciudad Guerrero, an important railroad juction in

Chuihuahua. In Lower California, Ricardo Flores Magon's Liberal Party

was engaged in its own rebellion, and Emiliano Zapata had risen in

60Knox to Wickersham, 19 Dec. 1910, 211.12 M 26, NA, RG 59.

61Wickersham to Knox, 30 Nov. 1910, 90755/342, NA, RG 60; /515, /520, NA, RG 59.

^Adolph Krakauer, a prominent El Paso merchant, stated: "I suppose you know that this revolution was started by Orozco and a few of his men in the mountains of Chihuahua. That was a local grievance against the Chihuahua state government conducted by Creel. . . . It was a grievance against the Terrazas family, of which Creel was a member. These mountain people undoubtedly had grievances against the government. They were oppressed and their crops failed. They did not want to pay the taxes. They wanted to get time and it was granted. . . . The revolution was started against the Creel and Terrazas regime. When that revolution assumed large proportions, then Madero thought, 'Here is my chance to get in,' and he did" (S. Doc. 285, p. 128).

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Morelos. It appeared that Madero had been left out of the Revolution.

On 13 February 1911, he finally crossed the border, sought out

Orozco, and found him some thirty miles from the city of Chihuahua.

Soon he was joined there by Villa and dozens of other guerrillero

leaders. All agreed to recognize Madero as provisional president of

Mexico.

Except for Orozco’s victory at Ciudad Guerrero, however, the

federal troops appeared to be efficiently stamping out the rebellion.

On 16 November, Ambassador Wilson reported accumulating evidences of

revolutionary outbreaks, but he added his belief that "the

conspiracy . . . will be easily suppressed by the Government, which

is vigilant and well informed."^3 That same day, federal authorities

attacked the house of Maderista Aquiles Serdan in Puebla, where

weapons and ammunition were stored. Serdan and thirty-nine others

were killed, including Puebla’s chief of police.^ Rebels were driven

back from Ciudad Juarez, Gomez Palacio, Durango, Ciudad Guerrero,

Chihuahua (which they retook shortly), and a number of other places.

Wilson reported that his advices indicated that the movement was

being rapidly suppressed throughout the republic. "Only Ciudad

Guerrero remains in the hands of the rebels," he declared. "The

Revolutionary movement had degenerated into bandit warfare but the

Government now seems to be in control of all centers.Indeed,

the situation looked so promising for the Diaz government that

63Wilson to Knox, 16 Nov. 1910, /388, NA, RG 59. 64 Report of Capt. Girard Sturtevant, U.S. military attache, 20 Feb. 1911, OF 48, NA, RG 76. Local as well as federal authorities were involved in the raid on Serdan's house.

65Wilson to Knox, 25 Nov. 1910, /474, NA, RG 59.

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General Hoyt, commanding general of the Department of Texas, began

planning a troop concentration at Fort Clark with a view to an early

return to Fort Sam Houston.88

Gradually, however, the tide began to turn in favor of

the rebels. On 24 December, Consul Ellsworth at Ciudad Porfirio

Diaz (Piedras Negras) reported a clear-cut victory for the rebels

at Ojinaga.87 This was only the start. By 8 February, Ambassador

Wilson had become aware of the ineffectiveness of the federal army.

He stated that the lack of organization of the rebels

. . . is compensated for by the ineffectiveness of the Federal Army which seems to be badly officered and lacking in spirit, courage and discipline. The army, too, seems to be greatly less in effectiveness than the published enrollments indicated, this being due in some cases to the existence of actual skeleton regiments, and others, according to current rumor, to padded rolls."®

A week later the ambassador summarized the situation as worsening:

Revolutionary situation in a general way is becoming worse. In fully one half of the Mexican States there is a greater or less Revolutionary activity. I am very apprehensive about the situation in Guadalajara where Revolutionists have already captured some suburbs, where sympathies of inhabitants are almost wholly with the revolt and where there is also an unusually strong anti- American sentiment recently reinflamed by the Governor*s speech. Situation at Durango is also bad, railway communications being interrupted between there and Torreon. In Guanjuato there is also apprehension on account of large American interests and Mexican employers. In other states similar conditions exist, but only meager details reach here on account of censorship. There are many indications of uneasiness in this city.

The rebels continued to advance steadily until they laid siege to

88Copy of letter, General Hoyt to War Department, 17 Dec. 1910, /570, NA, RG 59.

67Ellsworth to Knox, 24 Dec. 1919, /594, NA, RG 59.

68Wilson to Knox, 8 Feb. 1911, /796, NA, RG 59.

69Ibid., 16 Feb. 1911, /798, NA, RG 59.

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Ciudad JuarezJuiirez on 19 April. By 10 May,!-l"..ay. JuarezJt!2rez fellf::ll to Orozco anda~d

Villa; twol:W'O weeks later President DiazD:l.a.z resigned. Madero's unlikely

Revolution hadbad triumphed.

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WILSON AND MADERO

It was Henry Lane Wilson's misfortune to arrive in Mexico at

the beginning of that country's "Time of Troubles." He was able to

witness at first hand the death agony of the old regime. The ambassador,

harshly critical as he was of that regime, was nonetheless a personal

admirer of Porfirio Diaz— not for what he had become, but for what he

had once been and for what he had accomplished. Wilson went to pay

his respects to Diaz on the day the latter resigned, but the old

general was too ill to see him. He chatted for a few moments with

Senora Diaz instead— and then left, he said, "with the feeling that

I had been the unhappy witness of the humiliation of a great and

distinguished man and of a good and gracious gentlewoman."^ Of Diaz,

he was later to write,

. . . the great structure which had been built by the wisdom, sobriety, and patriotism of one man had not been built strong enough to withstand the storms which presently broke forth; from the pinnacle which he had reached, Diaz fell to an abyss, and with him fell his country.2

Nevertheless, Wilson was in Mexico not to mourn the fall of people he

admired, but to maintain, as well as he could, good relations with

whatever government was in power and to protect, to the best of his

ability, the interests of the United States and its citizens.

^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 215. 2Ibid.:

45

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According to the truce signed between the Maderistas and the

government on 21 May 1911, President Diaz was to resign and Francisco

Leon de la Barra was to serve as interim president. But from 7 June

1911, when Madero entered Mexico City, "De la Barra was President in .. 3 name only, stated Edward I. Bell, a long-time resident of Mexico

and publisher of the Mexican Herald. This statement was corroborated

by Braulio Hernandez, who had been an active Maderista agent during

the Revolution but who soon turned against Madero after the downfall

of the Diaz government. "Although Francisco de la Barra was 4 Provisional President, Mr. Madero was President in fact, he declared.

On his arrival in Mexico City, Madero opened offices in the Paseo de"

la Reforma and, utterly ignoring De la Barra, began to handle the

more important matters. His brother, Gustavo, who had offices in the

Avenida Juarez, began to arrange for the elections that would give

legal sanction to the power already possessed by the Maderistas.^

On 23 June 1911, Ambassador Wilson made a survey of the

situation and concluded that the revolutionists were in control of

two-thirds of the republic— the remainder tending in the same direction.

The revolutionary movement, he reported, had been accompanied by

rapine, violence, looting, the collapse or organized government, the

robbery of banks and business houses, and "the most repellent and

savage barbarism." The economic situation was growing steadily

worse: trade had suffered severely; almost every important

^Wilson to Knox, 17 May 1911, /1830, NA, RG 59; The Political Shame of Mexico, p. 109. 4 Hernandez' pamphlet entitled "An Appeal to Justice," /3724, NA, RG 59.

^Prida, JDe la dictadura a la anarquia! . p. 45.

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establishment had cut salaries and the number of its employees,

while the cost of living had greatly increased. In the country

districts no crops had been planted, so that there were fears of

possible famine. In view of the banishment from public office of

practically all trained officials, the ambassador doubted that the

government could address itself to remedy these conditions.

Nor was he optimistic over the reforms proposed by the

revolutionists. An abundance of new laws (on the subjects of suffrage,

finance, the judiciary, war, and the division of great estates)— "some

of them of a radical and some of an utterly impracticable character"—

were already under consideration by the Congress. He doubted they

would pass. On the suffrage reforms, Wilson was quite skeptical,

with over two-thirds of the population illiterate and totally untrained

for the responsibilities of intelligence citizenship, he felt, the

result would not be orderly, peaceful, and progressive government,

but rather a long period of corrupt practices in elections, of

violence at the polls, and of armed settlements— which would end in

the supremacy of the most forceful leader. Wilson ended his analysis

by predicting a long period of turbulence and political unrest.*’

According to Prida, Madero was generally accepted upon his

appearance in Mexico City as the real head of the nation, while De la

Barra was generally ignored.^ Within a few weeks, however, it was clear

that Francisco Madero himself was in control neither of the rowdy elements

•that had flocked to his banner nor of the responsible leaders who

were anxious for reform. De la Barra was forced to confront Madero

and point out to him that the latter's influence appeared to be

^Wilson to Knox, 23 June 1911, /2181, NA, RG 59. ^Prida, p. 46.

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waning and that Madero did not seem able to provide guarantees for

order. Threatening to resign, the interim president cast the full

responsibility upon the revolutionary leader, unless the latter should

stop interfering and allow the legal head of government to act.

Madero quickly agreed "unreservedly" to submit to De la Barra's demands.**

De la Barra's policy was to pacify the country in preparation

for the coming elections. But Secretary of Gobernacion Emilio Vazquez

Gomez— as well as the secretary of war, the Mexico City chief of

police, and the chief of the rurales— were all Maderistas, according to

the Treaty of Juarez; and these four men were the biggest obstacles.

Madero was forced to cooperate with De la Barra, and these four were 9 removed. But this removal did not end the interim president's problems.

When Emiliano Zapata refused to lay down his arms in Morelos, the new

Secretary of gobernacion, Alberto Garcia Granados, sent three columns

of troops to force him to disband. One of the columns was led by

Gen. Victoriano Herta, a widely respected professional soldier. Without

consulting with the president, Madero interfered, conferred with Zapata,

and then wired De la Barra that a settlement whereby Zapata would

remain armed and in control of the area had been reached. Madero's

purpose was to mollify Zapata, who did not trust De la Barra. Unaware

that General Huerta was strictly following De la Barra's orders,

Madero charged that Huerta and Gen. Bernardo Reyes were plotting to

"set up a tyranny" and that Zapata, "that most valiant and most

**This encounter is best detailed by Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968), p. 90. 9 Charge d Affaires Fred Dearing to Knox, 4 Sept. 1911, /2345, NA, RG 59. Ambassador Wilson was on leave at the time.

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upright soldier of the revolution," was trying to save the country.

Even the Maderista newspapers "found it difficult to give their

entire approval" to this ridiculous charge.^ The army, though of

course greatly offended, held its peace.

During the first few months in Mexico City, Madero was

almost universally acclaimed as the savior of Mexico. Howard F.

Cline declares that "Madero evoked enthusiasm from all but coffee­

house politicians, disappointed fanatics, and the United States

Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson.The last phrase of the statement

is not accurate. True, the ambassador had predicted a period of

turbulence, but this prediction was before Madero had entered Mexico

City. After meeting the revolutionary chief, the ambassador modified

his views. Indeed, he wired Knox that "with the arrival of Madero,

dangers from the revolution are to be considered at an end," though

he cautioned that "there may be new revolutionary movements and the 12 rise of formidable opposition" to Madero. Wilson did not choose

to prejudge Madero:

Of the character of Mr. Madero very little can be said at this time. By the country at large and by a portion of his own family he is regarded as a dreamer of uncertain tendencies and a vendor of political nostrums unsuited to these people and these times. Yet I am reminded that Joseph was called a dreamer but became the practical ruler of a great kingdom and made his brethern princes. ^

A few weeks later Wilson informed Knox that Madero

10Dearing to Knox, 23 Aug. 1911, /2304, NA, RG 59. See also Michael C. Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 25-26.

33The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 130.

12Wilson to Knox, 22 June 1911, /2181, NA, RG 59. 13Ibid.

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earnestness, truthfulness, and loyalty, and, it may be, reserves of strength and force of character which time may more fully reveal .14

During the presidential election campaign, the U.S. Ambassador

remained strictly neutral, though he did indicate to the Department of

State his preference for Madero. Of the chief contender, General

Reyes, Wilson said,

His campaign has revealed this flamboyant person in his true character of an opera—bouffe soldier and patriot and his candidacy seems to have lost the support . . . of the Army and to have become a byword and a jest in the arena of politics.15

Madero was elected president on 1 October in what the British

charge d’affaires described as a "free and impartial" election.1"

Wilson was not fooled. Although there was no doubt in his mind about

Madero's popularity, the election of Vice-President Pino Suarez was

secured "by the exercise of methods closely resembling those of General

Diaz during his regime."1^ Had the elections been truly free, Francisco

14 Wilson to Knox, 11 July 1911, /2219, NA, RG 59. In contrast, the British charge d’affaires, Sir Thomas Beaumont Hohler, said: "He [Madero] is a wretched insignificant little figure of a man of very mean appearance— a big head with bulging upper part while his mean little features occupy only the lower quarter of it. He is a spiritualist, a teetotaller, a vegetarian, a homeopath, and to judge from the few minutes talk I had with him, windbag. . . . I have great difficulty in believing that he will last” (Hohler to Bryce, 16 June 1911, quoted in Calvert, p. 93). Bell says that there was "little fire" in his eyes and that he was at a loss to account for this magnetism (p. 112). Many years later Wilson was still to recall that "the President, Francisco Madero, was in no sense of the word corrupt, and his private life was a model of virtue" (p. 242n).

15Wilson to Knox, 22 Sept. 1911, /2384, NA, RG 59.

^"^Hohler to Grey, 4 Oct. 1911, quoted in Calvert, p. 94.

^The manner in which Pino Suarez was forced on the party led to the defection of many of Madero's followers— notably the VAzquez Gdmez brothers, Francisco and Emilio. Emilio was already angry at having been dismissed as Secretary of Gobemaci6n (Dearing to Knox, 4

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Vazquez Gamez would probably have been chosen for the second-highest

office.Nevertheless, the ambassador looked forward to the 19 acceptance and general recognition of the Madero government.

During the victory celebrations following the elections, and

even before, Madero and Wilson "lavished praise" on each other.

Indicating the need for closer and friendly relations between the two

countries, Wilson at one such banquet made a speech to which Madero

replied that it "would be the basis of his program.At one dinner

at which Jos£ Vasconcelos was present, he heard Ambassador Wilson's

praise of Madero. Vasconcelos later wrote about the experience:

Most of us were close followers of Madero and felt that we were enjoying a sort of political honeymoon which would never end. One must remember that we were very young men.^

The "honeymoon" was not to last for long. At Madero's

accession on 6 November 1911, the country was actually torn apart by

factional strife. It was not a simple matter of Maderistas against

the old regime, as those who love clear-cut situations would have us

believe. In the first place, it was difficult to define just who the

"Maderistas" were, except for the members of the Madero clan itself.

Madero's revolutionaries had included such disparate elements as

Zapata, the Vazquez Gomez brothers, Pascual Orozco, Jr., Francisco

Villa, Jose Vasconcelos, and many others. All of them had come under

Sept. 1911, /2345, NA, RG 59; Wilson to Knox, 2 and 27 Oct. 1911, /2453, NA, RG 59).

■^Consul Clarence A. Miller (Tampico) to Knox, 6 Oct. 1911, /2418, NA, RG 59.

19Wilson to Knox, 26 Dec. 1911, /2656, NA, RG 59. 20 L. R. Wilfley to Taft, 11 July 1911, /2224, NA, RG 59.

^Jose Vasconcelos, Ulises Criollo (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1958), p. 89.

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the umbrella of the Plan de San Luis Potosf, but each with his own

reservations. Many were, simply, opportunists (such as Villa).

Members of the old regime who were adamantly opposed to Madero

included the Cientificos in Europe (e.g., Corral, Limantour, Roberto

Nunez, Pablo Macedo, and others— including several ex-governors of

states). These men supported General Reyes. In the United States,

there were some reactionary emigres also supporting Reyes. Emilio

Vdzquez Gdmez denounced Madero when his brother was denied the

vice-presidential candidacy in. 1911, and there was a separate group

backing his brother, Francisco Vazquez Gdmez, who was allied to the

Partido Popular Evolucionista headed by Vera Estanol. Fernando

Iglesias Calderon, the son of Dr. Jose Marfa Iglesias, former president

of the supreme court, headed the Partido Liberal, to which were

attached some followers of Ricardo Flores Magon. The Magonistas

proper were anarchists. Finally, there was the Catholic Party, rich

and prestigious, but largely unorganized.

At the start of his administration, Madero tried to form a

coalition government— and succeeded partially. The supreme court was

composed of men appointed during the Diaz regime. The congress was

made up of men elected before the revolution. Without the cooperation

of these elements, the new president would find it impossible to

introduce any reform laws successfully. But the holdovers from the

Diaz days also saw the need for compromise. The leading members

of the Catholic Party, the representatives of the old wealthy families,

and the commercial and financial interests realized that Madero had

been honestly elected and, thus, gave him their formal though

reluctant support. Without such support, they felt, Madero might not

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be able to maintain himself— resulting in anarchy and the always- 22 present fear of U.S. intervention. Isidro Fabela complains that

Madero's cabinet was composed largely of men who, though esteemed

for their probity and some for their renowned talent and culture,

were strangers to the revolution. The only revolutionaries were

three: Vice-President Jose Maria Pino Suarez, Minister of Gobernacion

Abraham Gonzalez, and Minister of Communications Manuel Bonilla.2^

The old regime, adds Fabela, was left practically intact. The

bureaucracy and the police remained; the legislature and judiciary 24 suffered no modification. It could not be otherwise. Although

there was much talk of "the revolution," what Francisco Madero wanted

were "democratic" reforms and, perhaps, even moderate economic and

social reforms. It nowhere appears that he wanted a complete

transformation of Mexican society. In this sense, not even the new „ „ 25 president himself was a revolutionary !

Madero was aware of the dangers involved in the wholesale

uprooting of the old regime and its immediate replacement with untried

men. Indeed, before Madero’s election, the old revolutionaries had

been overwhelmed by a veritable flood of job-seekers and opportunists.

Even old General Reyes, who threatened from Paris that he was coming

home to put Madero down, offered his services to Madero upon arrival in

22Wilson to Knox, 20 Feb. 1912, /2889, NA, RG 59. 23 Historia diplomatica de la Revolucidn Mexicana, 2 vols. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1958), I, 24.

24Ibid., pp. 23, 25. 25 Madero had supported Ricardo Flores Magon and his newspaper, Regeneracion, until 1905, when the platform of the Liberal Party was published. This platform was truly revolutionary, and Madero defected.

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Mexico. Reyes realized where his chances lay. Against Madero he

did not revolt until he had failed to received the vice-presidential

candidacy in 1911.28 Emilio Vazquez Gomez had been made secretary

of gobernacion by the Treaty of Juarez, and he began at once to use

the power of the government to interfere in state and local elections

and to replace old government employees with his hangers-on. The

result of his actions was that state- and local-government machinery

began to crumble,2^ conditions became unsettled and demoralized,28

and the "revolution" gained hundreds of new enemies among the dismissed

employees.

Ambassador Wilson clearly defined Madero's dilemma in a

despatch of 20 February 1912:

After taking office, however, Madero soon discovered the impossibi­ lity of making a Government which would be acceptable to the world drawn exclusively from the elements which had placed him in power and he accordingly constructed a Cabinet entirely satisfactory in character to the better class of public opinion but whose names and antecedents have aroused the suspicions and disappointed the ambitions of the great mass of his active supporters.29

Of course, Madero was unable to keep his promises, even those

that concerned only moderate political reforms, much less those

calculated to ameliorate the lot of the poor and the workers. Wilson

continued:

With this cabinet and with a vast number of officials drawn from the same class he endeavored to carry out a program distinctly

^Ernest Gruening, Mexico and Its Heritage (New York and London: The Century Company, 1928), p. 302; Bell, p. 113; Calvert, p. 87. 27 Hohler to Grey, 4 July 1911, cited by Calvert, p. 88.

28Consul Miller (Tampico) to Knox, 20 July 1911, /2238, NA, RG 59. 29 Wilson to Knox, 20 Feb. 1912, /2889, NA, RG 59.

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favorable to the lower classes. With this administration and and with a congress elected under the regime of General Diaz, it was natural that the initiation and consideration of laws of a drastic and radical character would proceed slowly and that to the vast number of disappointed office holders would be added thousands throughout the Republic who have indulged in hopes in some cases of just remedial legislation and in other cases of wild dreams of confiscation and appropriation.30

Consequently, Madero was soon practically deserted by those

who had placed him in power; and his most dangerous opponents became,

not the mebers of the old regime (to whom he posed no real threat) but

those who had composed the so-called Maderista ranks. Scarcely a

month after his inauguration, the hostility toward Madero began to

increase."*1 From throughout the country, according to the U.S.

consuls, reports began to filter in of anti-Madero sentiments— reaching

the point of open demonstrations, as in Guadalajara on 14 September 1912.

Madero's increasing unpopularity was due not only to his

inability to bring reforms, but also to allegations of growing nepotism,

graft, and corruption. There was much criticism because Gustavo

Madero received $320,000 in gold from the national treasury to reimburse 32 himself for expenses of the Revolution" and, according to a recent 33 author, barely escaped almost certain prosecution for embezzlement."

Gustavo was charged with organizing Zapatista raids in the state of

30Wilson to Knox, 6 Dec. 1911, /2599, NA, RG 59.

31Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Knox, 4 Feb. 1912, /2809; Consul Philip E. Holland (Saltillo) to Knox, 10 Feb. 1912, /2810 and 8 Oct; 1912, /5323; Consul Samuel E. Magill (Guadalajara) to Knox, 14 Sept. 1912, /5038; Consul Clement Edwards (Acapulco) to Knox, 26 Sept. 1912, /5213, NA, RG 59. 32 Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Knox, 4 July 1911, /2217, NA, RG 59. 33 Willxam Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), p. 72. Johnson does no: document his charge.

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Morelos in order to get control of properties dedicated to sugar 34 production. Of the approximately 173 male members of the Madero

clan (including uncles, cousins, brothers, and sons), ten held high

key titles, which included Secretary of War (Madero's brother-in-law),

Secretary of the Treasury (Madero's uncle), and perhaps dozens of 35 others scattered throughout the government bureaucracy. Emilio

Vazquez Gomez disliked and distrusted the Maderos, because he felt

that they were fighting for themselves and their business interests,

instead of for the Revolution. ^ Ambassador Wilson suspected that

"irresponsible elements dominated the councils of Madero; elements..

which were not seeking the overthrow of the old regime for the good 37 of Mexico, but for their own profit and advancement."

As the country became progressively disillusioned with

Francisco Madero, so did the U.S. aabassador. He had been friendly

to Madero and had wished him well. Wilson was only too well aware of

the fact that the man had tried to control his followers. It soon

became obvious, however, that he was unable to do so. The depradations

and atrocities that had shocked the world at the beginning of the

Revolution seemed to continue unabated.33 The irregular Maderista

forces simply would not lay down their arms. Emilio Vazquez Gomez,

34 Testimony of Sloan W. Emery, sugar planter, in S. Doc. 285, p. 2209.

33Madero has been excused on the basis that "nepotism has always been common in Mexican politics" (Johnson, p. 91).

36Ibid., p. 77. 37Wilson, p. 213.

33Qnilio Madero's troops had massacred over 300 Chinese nationals at Torreon on 24 May 1911 (Consul Philip C. Hanna [Monterrey] to Knox, 25 May 1911, /2016, NA, RG 59; Consul Ellsworth [Ciudad Porfirio Diaz] to Knox, 24 May 1911, /1974, NA, RG 59.

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in charge of disbanding these forces, had chosen to do so by paying them

off generously. But since the men continually took up arms again, they

had to be paid off repeatedly— at tremendous cost to the treasury. 39

Zapata himself had demanded the post of revolutionary commander in

Morelos, and it was alleged that he had only agreed to forgo his 40 appointment for a bribe of §100,000.

At least five well-defined uprisings took place during the Madero

administration. About the middle of November 1911, Gen. Bernardo

Reyes issued a pronouncement, which quickly came to a mute, inglorious

end on Christmas. A second effort was that of erstwhile Secretary

of Gobernacion Emilio Vazquez Gomez, which got off to a poor start

on 1 February 1912 and disintegrated three months later. Noisier, but

equally unsuccessful, was the movement launched by the nephew of Don

Porfirio, F£lix Diaz, in October 1912. It, too, lasted a few days; and

Diaz, in the dungeon of San Juan de Ulua at Veracruz, found himself

under the sentence of death. The most significant revolts against

Madero were those of Emiliano Zapata in the south and Pascual Orozco, 41 Jr., in Chihuahua. Zapata was to continue his struggle until 1919,

when he was assassinated. Orozco was to be defeated by Victoriano

Huerta at the Battle of Bachimba on 4 July 1912. Aside from these,

there were literally hundreds of "revolutionary" bands roaming and

39 Hohler to Bryce, 16 June 1911, cited by Calvert, p. 88. 40 Hohler to Grey, 14 July 1911, cited by Calvert, p. 90. John Womack, Jr., does not mention the incident in Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969)^ 41 See Womack; see also Michael C. Meyer, Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1967).

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ravaging the countryside— and sometimes attacking and taking towns. 42 which they regularly sacked and put to the torch.

In the midst of this turmoil, foreigners— and particularly

the thousands of U.S. citizens scattered throughout the republic—

were bound to suffer. Consular reports (too numerous to cite here in 43 detail) were full of complaints of U.S. citizens robbed, kidnapped,

executed, and threatened by bandits posing as revolutionists, by

members of recognized rebel bands, and by those claiming to represent

Madero's cause. Even U.S. consuls were not exempt.44 The Madero

government appeared incapable of providing any sort of protection,4^

and U.S. citizens by the thousands began to flee.4° Three months after

Madero took over the presidency, the ambassador reported that the

government was powerless to hold more than the urban centers and that

federal troops had mutinied in several places.47 In Washington, Fred

42 A fairly complete list of the many bands and their leaders is the "Confidential List of Revolutionary Leaders and their Agents" in the Miscellaneous File on Mexican History, Research and Information Section (entry 148), NA, RG 76. 43 See the Records of U.S. Foreign Service Posts (NA, RG 84) from the several consulates during this period; and (in NA, RG 59) the 312.11 files, on "Protection of Americans in Mexico" for the same period, as well as the 812.00 files. 44 Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) was robbed by a Maderista officer (Ellsworth to Knox, 1 June 1911, /2010, NA, RG 59). 45 Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Knox, 15 Feb. 1912, /2799, NA, RG 59.

4^A trainload of refugee American women and children was held up -and robbed near Torreon (Consul Alonzo B. Garrett [Nuevo Laredo] to Knox, 16 Feb.1912, /2812; Consul Alex V. Dye [Nogales], 19 Feb. 1912, /2829, NA, RG 86). Congress authorized the Secretary of Her to supply tents and rations to refugees in El Paso; President to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 2 Aug. 1912, 27075, Correspondence File, Secretary of War, NA, RG 107.

47Wilson to Knox, 2 Feb. 1912, /2727, NA, RG 59.

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Dearing thought that Wilson "has rather overstated conditions"48 in

respect to the dangers in which some U.S. citizens found themselves. 49 But the reports from most of the consuls bore out the ambassador.

Fabela has written that President Madero had no serious

international problems until toward the end of his administration and

that these were provoked primarily by Henry Lane Wilson.^ On the

contrary, strained relations between the Madero and Taft administrations

were provoked by the disturbances that preceded the Orozco revolt. In

1912, an election year, President Taft was coming under increasing

pressure to do something about the situation of the harassed U.S.

citizens in Mexico. On 6 February, President Taft mobilized troops along

the Mexican border. This action had been taken once before, during

the Madero revolution against Diaz when it had been heralded as simple

military exercises. The president now acted without making any

announcement at all."*^ By 24 February the Orozquistas were approaching

Juarez, and there was danger of firing into El Paso. Taft was inclined

to send U.S. troops into Mexican territory to help the Madero troops

keep the rebels away, but Huntington Wilson advised against it—

suggesting instead that residents of El Paso remove themselves from

48Dearing to Taft, 17 Feb. 1912, /2881b, NA, RG 59. 49 See, for example, Consul Theodore C. Hamm (Durango) to Knox, 10 Feb. 1912, /2767; Consul Leo J. Keena (Chihuahua) to Knox, 13 Feb. 1912, /2844; Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Knox, 12 Feb. 1912, /2821; Consul Philip C. Hanna (Monterrey) to Knox, 13 Feb. 1912, /2782; Consul Philip E. Holland (Saltillo) to Knox, 3 Feb. 19^2, /6051; and many others— all in NA, RG 59.

~^Historia Diplomatica, I, 10.

51Bell, pp. 153 ff; New York World, 4 April 1912.

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the Mexican government to withdraw and to take a defensive position

elsewhere. This order meant, of course, the federal evacuation of 53 JuArez. President Taft felt that, to get Madero to comply with the

U.S. request, a veiled threat to him might not be completely out of

order. "You know I’m not going to cross the line," Taft told Huntington

Wilson, "but I suppose it will do no harm to threaten them a little.

The federals abandoned Juarez to the Orozquistas. By this withdrawal

of federal forces at the request of the United States, the United

States had assumed a moral oblidation to the Mexican government.

This arrangement was satisfactory to Ambassador Wilson. But,

though greatly disappointed with the performance of the Madero regime,

he was not ready to give up hope. He still strongly supported the

government against Orozco.^ Those who have characterized the ambassador

as a hopeless reactionay find it difficult to explain why he would be

against Orozco, who was supported by the ultraconservative Chihuahua

landowners, particularly the Terrazas and Creel families.^ The fact

is that Wilson was still confident of the success of the government

to put down the rebellion. ^ Not all agreed. The recently arrived

British minister, Francis W. Stronge, informed his Foreign Office:

52Huntington Wilson to Taft, 24 Feb. 1912, /2884a, NA, RG 59.

5"^Huntington Wilson to H. L. Wilson, 26 Feb 1912, /2912, NA, RG 59.

"^Memorandum by Fred Dearing, 26 Feb. 1912, /2912, NA, RG 59.

55Wilson to Knox, 4 March 1912, /3048; Huntington Wilson to H. L. Wilson, 3 March 1912, /3005i, NA, RG 59.

^Meyer, Mexican Rebel, pp. 53-66; Johnson, p. 88.

57Wilson to Knox, 10 March 1912, /3365, NA, RG 59.

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the American Ambassador assures me that he is doing his best to support the Madero Government, and he has given me some proof that this is so. His views are, however, so pessimistic that I think his Government might easily conclude that it was useless to compromise the future by supporting a lost cause.

Before Huerta's successes against Orozco had changed the situation

for the better, Stronge himself became quite pessimistic— even coming

to feel that some means must be found to bring about the suppression 59 or retirement of Madero. As late as December 1912, President Taft

was becoming increasingly exasperated with Maderofs performance. "I

am getting to the point," he wrote, "where I think we ought to put a

little dynamite in for the purpose of stirring up that dreamer who

seems unfitted to meet the crisis in the country of which he is

President."^®

Although Ambassador Wilson wholeheartedly supported Madero

during the Orozco rebellion, it was at this time that the first serious

disagreements appeared between the two men. Perhaps Wilson could

understand that Madero could not control the actions of rebels and

brigands. But he felt that Madero should have been able to discipline

his own men. When General Huerta was placed in command of the Division

of the North, which was engaged against Orozco, Francisco Villa and

his irregulars were sent along. But almost immediately, Villa

separated himself from Huerta’s command and began plundering estates

and mines in the region— most of the victims being U.S. citizens.

Wilson complained to Madero, who told the ambassador that he doubted

the reliability of this information. After a second investigation,

^Stronge to Grey, 23 March 1912, quoted in Calvert, p. 125.

^Ibid., 3 May 1912, cited by Calvert, p. 126

60Taft to Knox, 14 Dec. 1912, /5697, NA, RG 59.

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Wilson presented the evidence (that he had gathered) of the

depradations. When Madero hedged, Wilson threatened to call upon his

own government to send troops across the border to protect U.S.

lives and property. Madero angrily replied that this call would

constitute an act of war, whereupon Wilson retorted that "... when

soldiers in the uniform of a government attacked the persons and

property of citizens of a friendly government and reparation was

denied by the offending government, an act of war had been

committed. Truckling under, Madero sent the order to Huerta for

Villa's apprehension. Huerta, who hated Villa and his marauding

horde, happily complied and had Villa sentenced to death by a hastily

convened court-martial. But Emilio and Raul Madero, who were along

on the campaign, intervened; and Villa was sent to Mexico City,

where he was imprisoned in the district penitentiary.^

Although the ambassador continued to support Madero for some

time to come, this incident cooled their relations considerably.

Madero began studiedly to ignore the ambassador's petitions for the

protection of U.S. citizens. But even more galling to Wilson was

the refusal of the Mexican president even to investigate the many

cases of U.S. citizens that had been thrown into prison. Wilson

investigated 175 separate cases for which there appeared to be no

justification and demanded that the prisoners be placed under bond

^Hjilson, pp. 293-94; Wilson testimony in S. Doc. 285, p. 2275.

^The actual charges against Villa were insubordination and horse theft. See Clasence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 135; Martin Luis Guzman, Memorias de Pancho Villa (Mexico: Compania Editorial de Ediciones, 1960), pp. 142-50. Villa escaped from the penitentiary just prior to the Decena Tragica, and he was in rebellion against Madero at the time of the latter’s downfall.

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and released. When these demands failed, Wilson's notes to the

Mexican foreign office became increasingly "sharp." Some of these

notes were addressed under direct instructions from Washington;

others, on the ambassador's own responsibility.^

Another source of irritation between the ambassador and the

president was, under the circumstances, inevitable. That there had

discrimination against the Mexican employees of U.S.

enterprises, there could be no denial. The best-paying and most

responsible jobs (including those with the railroads) were held by

U.S. employees. The Revolution intended to remedy this situation.

As early as June 1911, Mexicans began replacing U.S. citizens in many 64 responsible positions in Mexico. There is no record that Ambassador

Wilson entered any complaint on this score. But when Madero authorized

a decree requiring that all railroad employees must know Spanish or

face dismissal, Wilson issued a strong protest, since this requirement

meant the wholesale firing of hundreds of U.S. employees, including

engineers and conductors. After a confrontation with Wilson, Madero

promised to rescind the order— not, however, until he realized that

there were not enough Mexicans qualified for the jobs. This incident

increased bitterness, as Wilson was to admit.^

A definite break in the relations between Wilson and Madero

took place sometime in September or October 1912. By then the

ambassador had become convinced that his optimism about Madero's

^^Wilson testimony in S. Doc. 285, pp. 2277-78.

^Consul Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) to Knox, 6 June 1911, /2196, NA, RG 59.

65Wilson testimony in S. Doc. 285, pp. 2254, 2276.

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chances of success had been misplaced, as the latter's course (in

the ambassador's judgment) became more erratic and indicated that he

was no longer in control of his own administration, much less the

country. Wilson's belief that only a stronger man could govern Mexico

was growing daily. This was not only Wilson's conviction; many

Mexicans felt the same way, as did members of the foreign colonies

in the republic.

A would-be strong man suddenly burst upon the scene in October

1912, while Wilson was on leave in the United States. Felix Diaz,

nephew of Don Porfirio and a brigadier general in the Mexican army,

resigned his commission and pronounced against the government. Within

a short time, the city of Veracruz fell to his troops. Information

began to arrive from many parts of the country that pro-Diaz sentiment

was widespread.^ In view of their experiences during Madero's eleven

months in office, most U.S. citizens in Mexico also were, understandably,

in favor of Diaz. Montgomery Schuyler, U.S. charge d'affaires, made

his pro-Diaz sentiments clearly known to the Department of State— for

which he was reprimanded.^7

Ambassador Wilson, visiting his seriously ill brother in the

United States, was immediately summoned to Washington for a conference.

On his way he unwisely granted newspaper interviews in which he

expressed the opinion that Felix Diaz— in view of his widespread

^Schuyler to Knox, 1 and 16 Oct.. 1912, /5135 and /5253, resp.; Consul Clarence A. Miller (Tampico) to Knox, 17 Oct. 1912, /5262 and 22 Oct. 1912, /5365; Consul Claude A. Guynat (Salina Cruz) to Knox, 17 Oct. 1912, /5368; Consul Alex V. Dye (Nogales) to Knox, 18 Oct. 1912, /5279; Consul Theodore C. Hamm (Durango) to Knox, 19 Oct. 1912, /5290a; Knox to Taft, 19 Oct. 1912, /5290a; Consul Philip E. Holland (Saltillo) to Knox, 22 Oct. 1912, /5320 and /5364, NA, RG 59.

67Schuyler to Knox, 17 Oct. 1912, /5720, NA, RG 59.

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popularity— might be successful. Wilson even said a few complimentary

things about Don Porfirio's nephew.88 Unfortunately for Wilson, three

days later, Diaz was defeated and captured. Schuyler wired the

Secretary of State that these developments were bad for Mexico and that

the United States should send warships to every Mexican port, since

he anticipated even greater disturbances.89

Madero, of course, became aware of the ambassador's sympathy

for Diaz and decided that the ambassador was persona non grata. Pleased

with the election of Woodrow Wilson, the Mexican president sent his

Minister of Foreign Relations, Pedro Lascurain, to the United States to

seek an interview with Woodrow Wilson. He was to ask the President-elect

to remove Ambassador Wilson when the former came to the White House, ...... 70 _ witnout rendering necessary representatives Dy tnis Government." mere

is no record that Lascurain saw Woodrow Wilson, and Henry Lane Wilson did

not become aware of this maneuver until after the fall of Madero.^

The Diaz uprising was the occasion of the further alienation of

not only Madero and Wilson but also Madero and the federal army.

A Mexican officer considered that his first loyalty was to the national

army— which he thought of as the essence of patriotism— and not to a 72 political administration. The Mexican generals were not exactly

68New York Times, 19 Oct. 1912; Washington Post. 20 Oct. 1912; Fabela, Historica Diplomitica, I, 35.

69Schuyler to Knox, 23 Oct. 1912, /5333, NA, RG 59.

^Madero to Lascurain, 23-Dec.1912, quoted in Wilson, pp. 234-35.

7LWilson, p. 234n. 72 Calvert says the same was true of the European contemporaries of the Mexican generals (pp • 105-06).

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excited about a civilian president, but they were willing to give

Madero an opportunity to prove himself. The army had made no move

to aid General Reyes. When Diaz prononounced and took Veracruz, it

was commonly held that the army would defect to him. But, instead,

General Beltran announced that he would take the city; and he did so,73

in spite of the fact that the army had a long list of grievances

against Madero. The U.S. military attach^, Capt. W. W. Burnside, who

was in close and friendly relations with many military men, reported

to the ambassador:

Some months previous to the outbreak of the revolutionary troubles in Mexico City, I had formed the opinion, and so reported it in official despatches, that it was only a question of time as to how the Federal Army would as a whole remain loyal to the administra­ tion of President Madero. Through the promotion of revolutionary leaders of the Madero revolution over the officers of the regular army, a resentful feeling had been created in the minds of many officers of the regular forces through the belief that the army was being needlessly sacrificed for the support of visionary and impracticable ideas, and that there was little chance for appreciation or reward of faithful service under the existing administration. However, signs of the discipline that had been developed in the regular army during the administration of President Porfirio Diaz continued to prevail, but in view of the repeated circumstances which tended to discredit the regular army, it was my belief that it was only a question of time when patience would be exhausted and the regular force would give its support to a change of administra­ tion, believing, outside of possible personal advantage, this to be the only means of avoiding the complete demoralization of Mexico.74

Felix Diaz was tried by court-martial and sentenced to death,

and Madero refused to commute the sentence to exile. This refusal

was a violation of the unwritten rule that rebellious generals be

sent into exile, a rule that had been scrupulously observed even

under Porfirio Diaz. Felix Diaz was saved from death, however, by a

73Consul Canada (Veracruz) to Knox, 23 Oct. 1912, /5424, NA, RG 59.

74Burnside to Wilson, 5 June 1913, in S. Doc. 285, p. 2262.

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decree of amparo granted by the supreme court.75 "Only from this time."

says Calvert, "did the other generals join hands against the govern­

ment."7^ In refusing to pardon Diaz, Madero had sealed his doom.

75Schuyler to Knox, 27 Oct. 1912, /5358, NA, RG 59.

75Mexican Revolution, p. 106.

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LA DECENA TRAGICA - CUARIELAZO: 9-12 FEBRUARY 1913

By the beginning of 1913 there were ominous signs that the

Madero administration was in deeper trouble than its apologists

cared to admit publicly. In spite of the barrage of optimistic

propaganda, many observers of the Mexican scene1 were becoming

increasingly concerned at the deterioration of order, not only in the 2 provinces, but in the City of Mexico itself. Rumors of plots and

These observers included U.S. consuls and Mexican newspapers. See, among others, Consul Philip Holland (Saltillo) to Knox, 3 Jan. 1913, /5825; Consul William Alger (Mazatlan) to Knox, 25 Jan. 1913, /6031; Consul William Canada (Veracruz) to Knox, 29 Dec. 1912, /6025; and Consul Thomas Bowman (Nogales) to Knox, 20 Dec. 1912, /5770, NA, RG 59. Enclosed in a number of the despatches were clippings from newspapers constantly reporting rebellions, raids, and battles— indicating, thus, widespread disorder and discontent. 2 Howard F. Cline repeats the old revolutionary propaganda when he says that "at the opening of 1913 . . . nine-tenths of the republic was peaceful and already settling down to routine existence" (The United States and Mexico, p. 30). This propaganda is repeated by Peter Calvert: "The last reports before the Decena Tragica show almost complete calm throughout the country" (Mexican Revolution, p. 118). These statements are simply not borne out by the evidence. See State Department Decimal Files 812.00 (from at least mid-December 1912 through January 1913) for despatches (too numerous to cite here in full) reporting the general deterioration of conditions throughout Mexico. Recent studies agree that conditions were desparate. Kenneth J. Grieb presents a well-documented summary in The United States and Huerta (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 4-6. Michael C. Meyer says, "The temper quickened in January, 1913 as all semblance of law and order broke down in the republic" (Huerta, p. 47). Even Frank Brandenberg, a friend of the Revolution, admits that "by February, 1913, the prestige of Madero had fallen to low depths. . . . He could not re-establish order. . . . Every day Mexicans were abandoning homes and jobs to follow leaders opposed to Madero" (The Making of Modern Mexico [Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964], p. 50).

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countexplots had proliferated since the capture of Gen. Felix Diaz in

October.

At Veracruz, Consul William W. Canada became so alarmed at reports

of an uprising expected on 20 January that he requested the presence of U.S.

armed vessels for reassurance. 5 He was taken seriously enough that >vig

request was forwarded to the Navy, and on 22 January the USS Wheeling sailed

for Veracruz. Two days later the consul informed the State Department of

a rumor that President Madero was planning a sham uprising in order to

murder General Diaz. Canada suggested that the U.S. Government intimate to

the Mexican government that the plan was known in the United States.5

There were those in Washington who refused to acknowledge the

seriousness of the situation. Secretary Knox, for example, characterized

the "increasing pessimism" in the reports of Ambassador Wilson as

"unjustified, if not, indeed, misleading"^ and disregarded them, in spite

of numerous consular reports substantiating those of the ambassador. Fred

Hearing, the assistant chief of the Latin-American Division at the

Department, said in an office memorandum that he suspected that Wilson was

obtaining his information from the newspapers arriving at the embassy.^

3 Consul Canada (Veracruz) to State Department, 19 Jan. 1912, /5898, NA, RG 59. 4 Correspondence between State and Navy Departments, 21 and 22 Jan. 1913, /5907 and /5922, NA, RG 55. The previous week the USS Denver had been sent to Acapulco, then endangered by Salgadistas (see correspondence between the embassy in Mexico and the State and Navy Departments, 14 Jan. 1913, /5867, NA, RG 59).

524 Jan. 1913, /5865, NA, RG 59.

6Knox to Taft, 27 Jan. 1913, /7229a, NA, RG 59.

^Memorandum, 21 Jan. 1913, /5913a, NA, RG 59. Cline says that the ambassador's reports were based "on Mexican rumors, on Wilson's own dislike and contempt for Madero, plus a correct estimate of the military forces that would be arrayed against him" (p. 130).

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The fears of impending revolt being reported by Ambassador

Wilson and Consul Canada turned out to be justified. Apparently, the

plots for the overthrow of Francisco I. Madero were conceived (as early

as October 1912) by Gen. Manuel Mondragon, Gen. Gregorio Ruiz, and a

civilian named Cecilio Ocon.® Contact was soon made with prominent

Felicistas and Reyistas, including Luis Liceaga, Miguel Othon de

Mendizdbal, Rafael de Zayas Enriquez, Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros,

and Rodolfo Reyes, son of the imprisoned Gen. Bernardo Reyes. Gen.

Victoriano Huerta, then convalescing from an eye operation in the

sanatorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, was contacted; but the general 9 refused to become involved in the plot.

The proposed cuartelazo was well financed. According to Ramon

Proda, Inigo Moriega (a Spanish subject) contributed generously, as

did (among many others) Tomas Braniff, the militant Catholics Eduardo

Tamariz and Gabriel Fernandez Somellera, and such people as Fernando

de Teresa and Manuel Leon. Money was also obtained from the Spanish

and European colonies— and even from the wife of Don Porfirio Diaz,

who was said to have contributed 50,000 pesos.^

At first, since the general was immensely popular in Veracruz,

the somewhat sketchy plans appeared to center about the liberation of

General Diaz from San Juan de Ulua. The plotters soon became convinced

^De como vino Huerta y como se fue: Apuntes para la historia de un regimen militar, vol. 1: Del cuartelazas a las disolucidn. de las cameras (Mexico: Liberia General, 1914), p. 18; Meyer, Huerta, p. 45. General Mondragon was Mexico's leading artillery officer during the Dxaz regime. 9 From the memoirs and letters of participants in the plot, Meyer thoroughly documents Huerta's refusal (Huerta, pp. 46-47, n. 1).

"^Ramon Proda, La culpa de Lane Wilson, embajador de los E. U. A., en la tragedia mexicana de 1913 (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1962), p. 505.

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that a barracks revolt in the capital itself would be the most

effective way of seising the government.^ They then proceeded to

trick the government into transferring Diaz to Mexico City. Rumors

of an impending uprising in Veracruz were spread, and the Madero 12 government fell into the trap. Consul Canada heard the rumor and

then reported it in a lengthy despatch (of 1 February):

The rebel forces operating in this district had formed a plan to attack Veracruz for the purpose of liberating ex-General Felix Diaz from the Fortress of San Juan de Ulua where he had been confined since his unsuccessful uprising in October. . . . About eight days previous to the time for the coup to take place it appears that the Federal Government discovered the plot and prepared to use the uprising to its own advantage.^

The consul followed this report with an account of a conspiracy

(allegedly hatched by the Madero government) that included in its

program the fomenting of an uprising (among the "ignorant classes")>

during which it was hoped that an opportunity would present itself

either to assassinate Diaz or to give the conspirators an excuse to

execute him afterward. According to the rumor, the government was

in a mood to do things thoroughly, since other men prominent in the

Porfirio DiTaz regime were also included among those to be murdered.

Indeed, several of those threatened begged the U.S. consul to

grant them asylum in order to prevent what he considered to be a

barbarous act by a desperate government. In accordance with U.S.

policy not to grant diplomatic asylum except under the most

extraordinary circumstances, the request was refused.

^^Meyer, Huerta, p. 46.

^^Rodolfo Reyes, De mi vida: Memorias politicas, 2 vols. (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929-30), I, 197, n. 1; Alfonso Taracena, Mi Vida en vertigo de la revolucion mexicana (Mexico: n.p., 1930), p. 89. 13 Canada to State Department, 1 Feb. 1913, /6072, NA, RG 59.

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If the government formulated a counterplot, it backfired.

Mexico City newspapers published the plans of the supposed uprising,

and the government was forced to change tactics. On 23 January, Diaz

was spirited away from San Juan de Ulua in the middle of the night and

taken by rail to Mexico City, where he was lodged in the district 14 penitentiary.

The date for the real uprising and the liberation of Generals

Diaz and Reyes was then set for 18 February; but the conspirators,

fearing that the Madero government had heard of their plans, advanced

the timetable to 9 February.

The plan itself was quite simple. It consisted, first of all,

in the much-talked-of delivery of General Diaz from the district

penitentiary— and of General Reyes from the military prison in

Santiago Tlaltelolco— by a simultaneous movement of forces against the

two places. The combined forces were thereupon to take by assault

such essential points as the National Palace, the Ciudadela (the

arsenal), and certain sections of the war department. Cadets of the

military college at Tlalpam were to have the honor of placing Madero

under arrest. Afterward, some sort of military government would be

established until the country could be pacified.^

No further report of the conspirators was sent to the Department

of State until 9 February. A telegram from the U.S. consul at Nuevo

Laredo that evening informed the State Department:

14Taracena says: January 24. The defenders of Felix Diaz maliciously bring to the attention of the Government the danger of having that military officer remain in Veracruz, where he may escape, and today he arrives in Mexico City, and is confined in the Penitentiary" (p. 89).

^ D e como vino Huerta, p. 18.

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It is reported that a mob in Mexico City liberated Generals Reyes and Felix Diaz last night, and in the fighting which followed, the former was killed and the latter escaped. It is rumored that there is serious trouble in the city of Mexico.

The rumor was borne out by another telegram the consul sent several

hours later :

Rebels said to be in possession of the Palace and public buildings in Mexico City. General Villar, commarider-in-chief of federals ^- reported killed. General Huerta takes command of federal troops.

The consul’s reports proved to be only too true. At three

o ’clock on the morning of Sunday, 9 February, General Mondragon called

at the Escuela Militar de Aspirantes (at Tlelpan), where 300 cadets

joined him. He then proceeded to the artillery barracks at Tacubaya,

where he collected 300 dragoons from the First Regiment, 400 men from

the Second and Fifth Artillery Regiments, and 100 from the Liberated

Barracks.^ Mondragon personally led part of his forces to the

Prision Militar de Santiago Tlaltelolco to free General Reyes, while some

of the cadets and a few others were sent to secure the National Palace.

Reyes received his liberators in full-dress uniform and took command

of the forces. It was now five o'clock in the morning.

Within an hour, Mondragon had planted artillery in front of „ 19 the Penitentiary; and Diaz was freed without a struggle.

Leading his troops and expecting no resistance, Reyes headed

for the National Palace on horseback. He assumed that the palace

^Alonzo B. Garrett to State Department, 9 Feb. 1913, /6053, NA, RG 59.

17Ibid., /6054, NA, RG 59.

^Prida, tlDe la dictadura a la anarquia! , p. 475; Armando Maria y Campos, Episodios de la Revolucion Mexicana: De la Caida de Porfirio Diaz a la Decena Tragica (Mexico: Libro Mexicano, 1957), p. 193.

19Wilson to Knox, 10 Feb. 1913, /6077, NA, RG 59.

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had been^secured by the cadets and that Gen. Lauro Villar, the

commandant of the plaza, and Gregorio Ruiz, commandant at the palace,

were fellow conspirators. The situation had drastically changed,

however. Gustavo Madero was alerted to the rebellion and then

awakened Villar to tell him that the palace had fallen. Villar,

deciding to remain loyal to Madero, at once collected some 60

troops from the 24th Battalion and headed for the palace. Meanwhile,

Gustavo was joined by Gen. Angel Garcia Pena, minister of war, at

the palace, where both men were captured by the cadets and the palace 20 guard under General Ruiz. Almost Immediately afterward, General

Villar and his men entered the palace through a side door, won over

the palace guards, arrested Ruiz, easily disarmed the cadets, and

released their prisoners (including Gustavo Madero and General Garcia

Pena). General Ruiz was then summarily handed over to a firing squad.

Some of the cadets who had laid down their arms at General Villar's

orders were also shot. 21

Scoffing at a warning that loyal forces had recaptured the

palace, General Reyes arrived before it with his forces. Immediately,

Adolfo Basso, the building superintendent, shot and killed Reyes; 22 the so-called Battle of el Zdcalo (the Cathedral square) commenced.

^Manuel Bonilla, Jr., El regimen maderista (Mexico: Talleres Linotipograficos de El Universal, 1922), pp. 128-35.

21Pe como vino Huerta, p. 20. The evidence is inconclusive as to who ordered the executions: Madero, Huerta, or the cabinet. See Meyer, Huerta, p. 49. 22 Basso was later captured by the rebels and executed on the same spot as Gustavo Madero, in the courtyard of the Ciudadela. Prida, pp. 499-500. For a full account of the military engagements during the Decena, see Francisco Vela Gonzalez, "La quincena trAgica de 1913" (Historia Mexicana, 12 [enero-marzo 1963], 440-53). Confusing and contradictory reports are cleared up by Ross, Madero, pp. 275-355.

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There is some dispute as to the number of people killed and

wounded in the Battle of el Zocalo; but, including scores leaving 23 early mass at the Cathedral, the number was considerable. Within

the hour, however, the rebels fled in disorder and wandered about until

Generals Mondragon and Diaz reorganized them and led them to the 24 Ciudadela.

Upon receiving news of the uprising from Minister of War Angel

Garcia Pena, President Madero left Chapultepec castle and, accompanied

by a guard of loyal cadets from the Colegio Militar and a mob of

friends and officials, set out for the National Palace on horseback.

He proceeded down the Paseo de la Reforma, arriving at the Zocalo by 25 way of the Avenida Cinco de Mayo. By now the shooting had stopped, 26 but the Zocalo was littered with corpses. On the way, General 27 Huerta approached the president and offered his services. Because

General Villar had been seriously wounded in the attack on the

National Palace, the post of Military Commandant of the Plaza was

vacant. Madero may have distrusted Huerta, but the general had

saved the government once before. Besides, General Garcia Pena

suggested that Huerta assume command; General Villar agreed with the

suggestion. Madero approved the order placing Huerta in command of

the federal forces in the city. Villar asked Huerta to pledge to

23 Maria y Campos places the figures at 500 persons of all ages, sexes, and conditions killed and about 2,000 persons wounded" (p. 193). Ambassador Wilson more conservatively set the figures at 350 dead and 500 wounded (Wilson to Knox, 10 Feb. 1913, /6C77, NA, RG, 59.

24Prida, p. 475. 25Grieb, p. 13.

26Wilson to Knox, 9 Feb. 1913, /6056, NA, RG 59.

27 Fabela, Historia diplomatica, I, 28.

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defend the administration to the end and advised him: "Be very

careful, Victoriano."^

At one o'clock in the afternoon, Generals Diaz and Mondragdn

led a successful attack on the federal arsenal, the Ciudadela.

During the assault, a junior officer in the Ciudadela assassinated

General Villarreal, the commandant. The arsenal fell to the rebels

within half-an-hour, whereupon General Mondragdn immediately emplaced

cannon and machine guns to cover many of the important points of the 29 city. During the attack on the Ciudadela, the military prisoners

at Santiago Tlaltelolco began a riot, in which 200 mutineers were

killed and the rest, despairing of the possibility of escape, set

fire to the building.^®

with the capture of the Ciudadela, the situation had reached

a point where neither side could dislodge the other. The rebels

controlled the government arms and ammunitions. The Ciudadela was

impregnable, since the rebels could sweep the streets leading to it

with their machine-gun fire and their artillery could inflict heavy

damage on the federal forces, as well as on practically all of the

^Bonilla, pp. 146-56; Prida, p. 497. Manuel Marquez Sterling, newly arrived Cuban minister, says that Huerta's appointment displeased Madero's family and friends and that it was made without consulting the president! (Los ultimos dias del Presidente Madero: mi gestion diplomatic a en Mexico [Habana: Imprenta Siglo XX, 1917; rpt. Mexico: Editorial PorrCia, 1958], p. 359). Marquez Sterling repeats many unfounded rumors and gossip of the day— reporting them all uncritically as facts. Meyer points out that one reason Madero may have accepted Huerta's offer was that the latter "was the most prestigious officer with combat experience in Mexico City who had not already defected to the rebel side" (Huerta, p. 50). 29 "Veinte meses de anarqufa," p. 236, enclosure in OF 908, Documents on Mexican History, NA, RG 76.

^ D e como vino Huerta, p . 19.

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center of the city. As Kenneth J. Grieb has pointed out, the government

was compelled to attack, since its prestige suffered as long as the 31 rebels retained control of any portion of the capital. The rebels

were clearly in the ascendancy.

On Saturday, 8 February 1913, Ambassador Wilson had made

arrangements with some friends to spend the following day in the 32 country. His plans were shattered when (at seven o’clock Sunday

morning) his servant, Clement, awakened him with news of the rebellion.

The battle at the Zocalo was still in progress. Dressing quickly and

hurrying down to the main floor of the embassy, Wilson there found 33 none of the staff but— badly frightened and "badly informed" — a few

U.S. citizens. After calming them, the ambassador made a hasty survey

of the nearby streets, which he found completely empty. It was

evident that, aware of the situation, everyone else was staying

indoors. As soon as he returned to the embassy, Wilson made some

hurried telephone calls to the staff; and by ten o'clock most of them

were on duty.

Ambassador Wilson could obtain no reliable data as to what

was actually taking place until one o'clock that afternoon, though

rumors were being brought in by the throngs of anxious U.S. citizens

(and other foreigners) seeking refuge in the embassy. Wilson wired

Secretary Knox at two o'clock with the few details he had been able 34 to muster.

"^Grieb, p. 13. ^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, pp. 252-53. 33 This narrative of Wilson s activities during the rebellion is based primarily on his lengthy report to W. J. Bryan, 12 March 19 1 3 /6480, NA, RG 59— except where otherwise indicated.

^ 9 Feb. 1913, 2 P.M., /6056, NA, RG 59. This wire was not

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At the time Wilson telegraphed Washington, Montgomery Schuyler,

Jr., secretary of the embassy, had just returned and made his report

of an automobile trip through the city. Bodies still lay where they

had fallen in the Zdcalo. In the main streets were large but orderly

crowds and heavy patrols of mounted police. The people were shouting

"Viva Diaz" and "Muera Madero."33

During the attack on the Ciudadela, which was less than a

mile from the embassy, most of the diplomatic establishments were in the

line of fire. The U.S. embassy was just on the edge of the firing

line. The situation of the foreign nationals and the location of the

embassy made the latter the center of the noncombatant activities during

the Decena Tragica. ^ During the attack, Cuban Minister Manuel Marquez

Stirling was driven out of his legation. U.S. embassy automobiles

rescued the Portugese minister from his legation, while about a mile from

the embassy the U.S. consulate was many times invaded by shots. The

French charge d'affaires and the British minister were so surrounded

that they could escape from their homes only at intervals. 7

While the storming of the Ciudadela was in progress, members of

the diplomatic corps requested that Ambassador Wilson ask the Madero

government for protection. Wilson telephoned Pedro Lascurain,

secretary of foreign affairs, who was with President Madero in the

received in Washington until 11:53 P.M., one hour'after Consul Garrett's second telegram (see above, p. 73, n. 16).

35Wilson to Knox, 9 Feb. 1913, /6056, NA, RG 59.

3^See Grieb, map facing p. 14.

37S. Doc. 285, p. 2260. The French, German, and Austrian legations were directly in the line of fire, while the Cuban legation was behind the rebel lines.

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National Palace. The ambassador asked for an adequate guard for all

diplomatic agents, since they had been entirely without protection.

He also suggested that saloons and pulque shops be closed. On all

these requests, Lascurdin promised immediate action.38 The guards,

however, failed to materialize, partly because the mounted police

and many rurales had declared for D£az. Only the National Palace

remained loyal to Madero. 39

During the afternoon an emissary from General Diaz called on

the ambassador with this message: "Urge Madero to resign in order

to avoid unnecessary bloodshed." Wilson may have agreed with the

possible solution, but he informed the messenger that he was unable

to take any action, since the emissary had presented no credentials to

substantiate the authenticity of his mission. The ambassador stated

further that he could assume no responsibility without the approval 40 of the entire diplomatic corps. The messenger left to secure

credentials from Diaz, which were soon forthcoming.

As soon as Diaz' emissary had left, Ambassador Wilson assembled

all the chiefs of mission to discuss the dangers facing the foreign

colonies and the diplomats themselves. It was decided that Wilson

should ask the secretary of foreign affairs categorically whether

the government could or could not afford adequate protection to the

foreign colonies. On this point Lascurain was found to be exceedingly

noncommital— confining himself to the statement that he would do all

he could. The secretary's words failed to reassure the diplomats.

38Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

39Wilson to Knox, 9 Feb. 1913, /6057, NA, RG 59. An Ibid., /6058, NA, RG 59.

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They at once authorized Wilson, in the name of the diplomatic corps,

to demand protection from General Dfaz (in control of the areas where

the foreigners lived) and to inform the general that he would be held

responsible for the maintenance of order and the proper protection

of foreigners. Wilson justified this measure by an explanation to

Washington:

The crisis made some action necessary, but nothing has been done which would involve any recognition of Diaz nor embarass our Government, which, however, should take prompt and affective action to meet the obligations which rest upon it.^~

When Diaz’ emissary returned, the ambassador sent Third

Secretary Henry F. Tennant with the emissary to present to General

Diaz the communication of the diplomatic corps. Diaz' answer was no

more reassuring that Lascurain's had been. Concerned about the danger

to the foreign residents, Diaz said he had endeavored to have a

conference with the Inspector General of Police, who had informed him

that the mounted police had been transferred to the service of the

military commandery and that the foot police were too limited in 42 numbers to be of use. Furthermore, Diaz asserted that he thought it

was the duty of the government— not himself— to furnish such protection, 43 inasmuch as he was the attacker and not the constituted government.

The remainder of the day passed rather quietly. Toward three

o'clock President Madero collected a small force of rurales and left

with his cabinet for Cuernavaca to confer with Gen. Felipe Angeles.

41 Ibid. Secretary Knox subsequently approved of Wilson s actions (Knox to Wilson, 10 Feb. 1913, /6095a, NA, RG 59).

^^Memorandum from Tennant, dictated by Gen. Fdlix Diaz, 9 Feb. 1913, copy in "The Ten Tragic Days (Review of [H. L.] Wilson's Correspondence), Law Memorandum no. 82," NA, RG 76 (hereinafter cited as Law M

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Few knew of Madero's whereabouts, and his absence caused great 45 consternation. The only subsequent excitement occurred about 5:30

P.M., when heavy rifle fire and several discharges of artillery were

heard in the direction of the Ciudadela. This exchange of fire was of 46 short duration.

Wilson wired his message of the day to the State Department at 47 7 o'clock, with the latest information he had. He stayed up until

1 A.M. But though there was much evidence of military activity, he

could get no accurate details. Before retiring, he dictated and

dispatched to Lascur&in a note conveying the resolutions adopted

earlier by the diplomatic corps. The note forwarded in writing the

same requests that Wilson had previously delivered by telephone.4**

The ambassador arose early Monday morning and set about

forming organizations for the rescue and aid of U.S. citizens and other

foreign residents. Forming an emergency rescue service, he managed

to bring from the area under fire some 2,600 of his countrymen, who

were housed and fed in the vicinity of the embassy for the next nine 49 days. As the embassy became increasingly involved in this humanitarian

work, the scope of its other activities also increased. Ambassador

45Wilson to Knox, 10 Feb. 1913, /6075, NA, RG 59. De la Barra informed Wilson that a commission of senators was about to confer with him, but that he could conceive of no results, "as there appears to be no representative of the Government visible" (Wilson to State, 9 Feb. 1913, /6078, NA, RG 59).

4**Pe como vino Huerta, p. 20.

47Wilson to Knox, 9 Feb. 1913, /6058, NA, RG 59.

4**See above, pp. 78-79; cf. Wilson to Lascurain, 9 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76.

49S. Doc. 285, p. 2260.

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Wilson and his staff soon found themselves maintaining telegraph

communications, a banking service, post-office facilities, and even

a newspaper— at a time when these services were nonexistent in the

rest of Mexico City. Inevitably, the U.S. embassy became the

center of all the activities of the entire diplomatic corps, who

made it their central headquarters. Wilson was soon to procure from

the belligerents an agreement to allow his staff and volunteers to

distribute bread and milk to the poorest classes, many of whom after

the first few days were starving because the food supplies had been

cut off by the fighting.^

By mid afternoon of 10 February, Wilson had his organizations

(together with a medical-aid corps) in fairly good working order, He

spent the afternoon forming an active U.S. "military" guard to patrol

the residential district, since there was neither police nor military

protection. Other foreigners were later added to the guard, and they

managed to render valuable service.^ Wilson was careful to notify

the Foreign Secretary of this step:

At a meeting of the diplomatic corps held at this embassy this morning it was decided, in view of the circumstances that there exists no effective police protection for the residential district in which the diplomatic establishments are situated and where most of the foreigners reside, to form for the preservation of law and order and the protection of life and property a foreign guard, the duty of which shall be to protect in a greater or less degree the districts referred to. I shall avail myself of the first opportunity to advise your excellency of the steps which have been taken, trusting that they will meet with the approval and cooperation of your excellency's government.^2

50Ibid., p. 2261.

51Wilson to Knox, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

^^ilson to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. At noon, the ambassador wired his first communication of the day 53 to the State Department. The military situation at that time had not

materially changed: he still did not know the whereabouts of Madero;

and Huerta, "whose loyalty is questioned," was in charge of the palace.

Practically all of the police and rurales, as well as the local

authorities, had revolted to Diaz, who was entrenched strongly at the

arsenal with 2,500-3,000 men. Gen. Aureliano Blanquet was apparently

cut off at Toluca with his troops, "or else he was disloyal."5^ Wilson

believed that Gen. Felipe Angeles, in command of the federal troops in

Morelos, was also cut off. He had no way of knowing that President

Madero was at that time conferring with General Angeles. Two trains with

loyal troops were said to be arriving. It turned out to be two regiments

of rurales.55 Wilson also informed the Department that De la Barra and

Huerta were said to be in consultation for the purpose of bringing about

some arrangement that would save further bloodshed.

Wilson did not know that Huerta and Diaz, through the efforts of

De la Barra, had agreed to meet for the purpose of arranging a compromise.

They were to meet between the lines in the "El Globo" candy shop. There

is some dispute as to whether this meeting actually took place.^ In any

5310 Feb. 1913, /6075 NA, RG 59. 54 Blanquet denied rumors of disloyalty in a wire to Madero (De como vino Huerta, p. 22).

53Maria y Campos, p. 199; OF 908, NA, RG 76.

^Marquez Sterling says that Huerta did not appear for the meeting, but sent his emissary, Enrique Cepeda, who met with General Diaz (pp. 425-27). Prida, p. 505; Joaquin Pina, Memorias de Victoriano Huerta (Mexico: Ediciones Vertice, 1957), pp. 22-24; Manuel Gonzales Rami res, La revolucion social de Mexico, vol. 1: Las ideas— la violencia (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960), p. 342— all say that Huerta was there.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. case, Diaz sent to Wilson later in the day a message saying that he

preferred to prevent bloodshed and that he was hopeful of good issue

from "negotiations now being carried on with General Huerta.

Apparently no agreement was reached^8— since that afternoon Huerta,

in an apparent show of strength, ordered a body of rurales to attack

the YMCA, which was under Diaz’ control. They were mowed down by 59 Diaz machine-gun fire. After the repulse of the attack on the YMCA,

Diaz was as strongly entrenched as ever. Soon thereafter, President

Madero finally made his appearance at the capital with a force of

2.000 troops under the command of General Angeles. Madero at once

appointed Huerta commander of all the federal troops, approximately

4.000 strong. Within hours, twenty-five carloads of rurales were to

arrive from San Juan del Rio.^ Madero was now in a much stronger

position. Rumors of an impending pitched battle began to circulate.

Adding to the consternation was the information that the dreaded

Zapatista chieftain, Genovevo de la 0, was on his way to the city by

way of San Angel.82

Ambassador Wilson was justified in becoming alarmed. There

were some 5,000 U.S. citizens (and perhaps 25,000 other foreigners of

all kinds) in the city without any protection whatsoever— living in

constant fear of both the Zapatista bogey and the violence of the mob,

which was expected to precipitate trouble at any time. By then the

5710 Feb. 1913, /6077, NA, RG 59. 58Ibid., /6078, NA, RG 59. 59 Gonzales Ramirez, pp. 342-43.

8<^NA, RG 76, "Viente meses de anarquia," p. 238; Maria y Campos, p. 199.

61Wilson to Knox, 10 Feb. 1913, /6077, NA, RG 59.

62Ibid., /6078, NA, RG 59.

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foreign colony, remembering the havoc created by the riots of 1910,

were well aware of the fury of Mexican riots. Against this contingency

neither the federal government nor Dfaz took the slightest precaution.

This failure left the "foreign guard" in the position of sole protector

of foreign life and property.

Wilson felt not only that the situation was becoming more

serious in the "pit.?.!, but also that it would probably have echoes

in the provinces, expecially if the rebellion of Diaz were victorious.^

Wilson suggested to the Secretary of State that warships with marines

should be sent to points on the Atlantic and Pacific and that visible

activity and vigilance should be displayed on the border, in anticipa­

tion of sympathetic outbreaks in Mexican ports.^ Though these actions

on the part of the U.S. government would afford a measure of security

to foreigners living in the ports, they did not solve the problem in the

capital. Wilson admitted to the Department that he was at a loss as to

how to "solve the problem."^ To make the situation even more ominous,

the French charge d'affaires informed Wilson that he was in possession

of "accurate information" that as soon as the loyal troops arrived in

the city from San Juan del Rio "a bombardment" involving the whole

foreign colony would begin. ^ Wilson asked for protection against the

"threatened outrage," but "the most diligent efforts failed to reveal

the whereabouts of any member of 'de jure' government.The bombard­

ment began at 10:15 A.M. on 10 February with the federals firing first.

^3Ibid., /6076, NA, RG 59. 64Ibid., /6075, NA, RG 59.

65Ibid., /6076. 66Ibid. 67Ibid., /6077. 6SIbid.

^9Diaz to Wilson, 13 Feb. 1918, enclosure to Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

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Unable to locate the president or his cabinet, the ambassador

undertook to put into effect directly the measures he had unsuccessfully

requested. He dictated and dispatched to the Inspector General of

Police and to all the precinct captains in the city a letter that

requested the closing of all drinking places.70 He also dispatched

to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (at home) and to General Diaz

unofficial notes suggesting ("with authority of the diplomatic corps")

that the bombardment of the city be conducted in such a way as to

inflict as small an amount of damage as possible on the residential

district.73 Much to his surprise, the note got to Las curd in, who

answered Wilson that the military commander of the plaza (Huerta) had

sent forces to guard the Juarez and Roma colonies, where many foreigners 72 lived. The forces sent by Huerta were a number of nonuniformed 73 police, who did not remain for very long, Wilson reported.

Despairing of any real help from either of the contending

forces, Wilson took other precautionary steps. He wired the Department:

I have taken every possible measure for the safety of the American colony and its members are active and vigilant. Most of the Embassy’s staff are in the Embassy, which, though it will possibly be in the line of fire, is safer than their present residences.7^

Wilson also appealed directly to the Zapatista forces on their way to

the city. Shortly after Genoveno de la 0 attacked the federal forces

70Wilson to Chief of Police, 10 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76.

73Wilson to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 10 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76. 72 Lascurdin to Wilson, 10 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76.

73Wilson to Knox, 10 Feb. 1913, /6087, NA, RG 59.

74Ibid., 11 Feb. 1913, /6086, NA, RG 59.

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at the Dolores Cemetery outside the city, Wilson demanded reassurances

from him. Wilson was assured that the Zapatistas would "protect all

diplomatic establishments and the property of foreigners."7^

Early Tuesday morning, Huerta and Diaz met at the home of

Enrique Cepeda;7^ but the negotiations.fell through. At 10:10 A.M.,

the opposing forces again clashed. The rebel forces then consisted

of some 4,000 men, about the same number as the federals; but the

latter were handicapped by the very questionable loyalty of some of

the troops.77 The federals held the National Palace and the Rinconada

de San Diego, the National Railway station, the Hotel Imperial near the

Cafe Colon in the primera Calle de los Artes, calle de Lucerna, calle

de Prim, the Teatro Nacional, and the comer of the Arcos de Bel A and

El Nino Perdido. From these points, various attacks were launched

against the Ciudadela— all of them unsuccessful. A battery planted

in the Teatro Nacional was quickly silenced by a few shots from the

rebels.V 78

At the beginning of the action on 11 February, the rebels were

in possession of all the buildings surrounding la Ciudadela, including

the YMCA building, from which their machine-gun fire inflicted heavy

losses on the federals lying in the southern part of the city. This

section again suffered a heavy bombardment through a rebel attempt to 79 silence the guns of the federals that held the Rinconada de San Diego.

75Ibid., /6086 and /6091, NA, RG 59.

7^Prida, p. 505; Pina, pp. 22-24.

77Wilson to Knox, 11 Feb. 1913, /6078, NA, RG 59. General Blanquet's troops refused to march from Toluca against Diaz (ibid., / 6086). 78 79 De como vino Huerta, p. 24. Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Neither side was sparing of powder. The ambassador reported

at the end of the day that the day's exceedingly heavy and indiscriminate

fire had dc-ne an enormous amount of damage in the business portions

of the city and had damaged certain parts of the residential sections.

Hardly a house (including the embassy) escaped being hit by bullets.

The ferocity of the battle angered Wilson, who complained that the

fighting was

conducted in violation of the rules of civilized warfare, as no notice has been given to the noncombatants in the fighting zone. . . The estimate of surgeons is that the fire of the Diaz forces inflicted the loss of 1,000 dead and wounded on the Federal forces. The streets are filled with these unfortunates. What the loss of the revolutionary forces may be, it is impossible to ascertain, though it is assumed to be heavy.88

The U.S. consulate general was destroyed. The Deputy Consul General

personally watched as federal troops deliberately fired into its

windows.• A 82

As the day progressed the "loss of life and destruction of

noncombatant property" increased momentarily. Wilson became convinced

that the Government of the United States, in the interest of humanity and in the discharge of its political obligations, should send hither instructions of a firm, drastic, and perhaps menacing character to be transmitted personally to the Government of President Madero, and to the leaders of the revolutionary movement.88

Wilson belived that were he "in possession of instructions of this

character, or clothed with general powers in the name of the President,"

he might "possibly be able to induce a cessation of hostilities, and

83Ibid. De como vino Huerta gives 200 killed and 800 wounded (p. 24).

82Wilson to Knox, 11 Feb. 1913, /6091 and /6111, NA, RG 59.

83Ibid., /6092, NA, RG 59.

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the initiation of negotiations" for definite peace arrangements.

This idea was rejected by the State Department.®"*

The results of the day's fighting were favorable to Diaz, but

the government continued to bring in reinforcements all during the day—

indicating that the fighting might resume in the morning. Reinforcements

were also arriving for Diaz. Three thousand were supposedly on the way

from Cuautla and Jojutla.®®

At daybreak on 12 February, the bombardment of the Ciudadela

resumed. During the night some 1,500 federal reinforcements had

arrived from Cuernavaca to strenghten the federals, and a total of 6,500

men attacked the arsenal.88 A change in the position of the contending

forces placed the foreign residential district between the belligerents, 87 in the direct line of fire.”' Among U.S. citizens, two women (a Mrs.

Holmes and a Mrs. Griffith) were killed, some men were wounded, and

500-600 additional U.S. citizens were driven from home, to take

refuge in the embassy. As vast crowds of refugees filled the streets

in front of the embassy, the panic was enormous.®® In the intermittent

but fierce fighting, neither the Red Cross nor the White Cross were

respected by the federals, who commandeered Red Cross vehicles for their

own use; and the president of the Red Cross was killed. Nor were the

rebels innocent in this respect. When some White Cross personnel were

detected by Dxaz to be carrying ammunition, they were summarily

executed.89

®4Ibid., /6087, NA, RG 59. ®5Ibid. 86Marxa y Campos, p. 202.

®7Wilson to Knox, 12 Feb. 1913, /6102; see Grieb, map facing p. 14.

®®Wilson to Knox, 12 Feb. 1913, /6103, NA, RG 59.

89Ibid., /6105, NA, RG 59.

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LA DECENA TRAGICA - STALEMATE: 12-17 FEBRUARY 1913

Ambassador Wilson had been denied the powers he had sought

from the State Department,^ but he still felt that the time for sore

effective action had arrived. He communicated with the chiefs of

mission that were not in the vicinity of the eabassy

their advice on how best to confront the contending leaders in person,

to seek an end to the mounting atrocities. Lest he be unable to

return home, Francis W. Stronge, the British minister, could not attend

the meeting, but he addressed to Wilson a note in which he associated

himself "with you and with my colleagues in any measure you may take 2 to put an end to the present state of things."

Authorized thus to represent the British minister and accompanied

by the Austrian and Spanish ministers, Wilson went that morning to the

National Palace and, after some difficulty, had an interview with

President Madero. He protested the continuance of hostilities in the

city, the loss of U.S. life and property, and particularly the

destruction of the U.S. consulate general. He added that the President

of the United States was greatly concerned about the situation.3

1Knox to Wilson, 12 Feb. 1913, /6092, NA, RG 59. 2 Stronge to Wilson, 12 Feb. 1913, quoted in Fabela, Historia diplomatica, I, 87.

3Wilson to Knox, 12 Feb. 1913, /6112, NA, RG, 59; Fabela, I, 39-40.

90

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Madero, visibly embarrassed (so Wilson wrote in his Diplomatic

Episodes), gave assurances that measures that would end the rebellion

by the following night were being taken by the government. The

ambassador writes that he was not to be deceived, however: "These

statements," he said, "made no impression on me or my colleagues."4

That afternoon Wilson— joined by Paul von Hintze (the German

minister), by Bernardo Cologan y Cdlogan (the Spanish minister), and by

Stronge— went to see Diaz in the Ciudadela. After being received by

the rebel general "with all the honors of war," the diplomats made

the same representations. Realizing the impossibility that hostilities

could cease entirely, they urged at least that "fighting be confined

to a particular zone." Diaz expressed his regrets that he could not

comply, but he insisted that his attitude from the beginning had been

defensive.

In a state of perfectly understandable exasperation, Wilson

sought to strengthen his demands by a thinly veiled threat that,

in extreme circumstances, intervention might not be out of the question.

General Diaz’ answer is not recorded; but he did let it be known that,

were it not for his forbearance, not one stone would stand upon another

in the City of Mexico and— what is more to the point— that he would

shortly be reinforced by 2,000 fresh troops then in the San Lazaro

station.^

The result of the day's fighting was another victory for the

rebels. The attacking government forces were "twice repulsed with

heavy but unknown loss," and some refugee federal soldiers coming

4Wilson, p. 257.

5Ibid., pp. 257-58; Fabela, I, 40-42.

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to the embassy reported that their volunteer regiment and the Twentieth

Battalion had been annihilated.**

On the morning of 13 February, firing again commenced. It

was feared that the fighting would be heavier than ever, since the

federals let it be known that they would be prepared to make some

aggressive forward movement.7

In the middle of the afternoon, the fighting still continued

to be favorable to Diaz. Rebel General Mondragdn at the time was

shelling the National Palace with heavy guns from the Ciudadela and

maintaining a heavy fire upon it from the captured government

Musketry Academy and the San Ldzaro station.** Viewed from the roof of

the embassy, the National Palace and the whole city appeared enveloped

in smoke and dust, indicating that the damage to the palace was great.

During the bombardment, four hundred rurales arrived and took positions

in front of the German legation on the Calzada de los Insurgentes,

three blocks from the U.S. embassy. Their officers informed Von Hintze

that they did not know for which side they had come but that their 9 colonel was having an interview with Diaz.

Wilson became convinced that conditions were ripe for a

rebel landslide:

Unofficial reports are coming in that Oaxaca, Manzanillo, Guadalajara, Veracruz, Puebla, and various other cities have declared for Diaz; I have no confirmation of this. . . . Reports have just come to the Embassy that a train has been ordered in readiness for the President; the report comes from the train dispatcher. *-0

**Marxa y Campos, Episodios, p. 202; Wilson to Knox, 13 Feb. 1913, /6128, NA, RG 59.

7Ibid. 8Ibid. 9Ibid.

10Wilson to Knox, 13 Feb. 1913, /6128, NA, RG 59. The

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In the late afternoon, the Diaz forces made a sortie. The

fighting was long and fierce, and the number of dead and wounded

was enormous.

During the fighting, the position of the foreign residents

became even more critical. The previous day (12 February) several

large U.S. apartment houses had been destroyed; their residents,

rescued only with the greatest difficulties. Vigorous efforts were

made to remove foreigners from the line of fire, but these efforts

had little success. The reasons, as the ambassador explained to

the State Department, were these:

The range is so wide, and the localities of refuge so limited [that] many Americans are at present closed up in houses within the firing line and cannot be reached in the interval of firing when I invariably send automobiles to render the best possible assistance.^

Bullets continued to hit the embassy; and one U.S. citizen

(identified only as Brandenburg) was wounded on the crowded embassy

grounds. The Belgian and Cuban ministers were driven from their

homes; the French and German legations also reported being frequently

struck by bullets. The American Club was completely demolished, and

four U.S. citizens (whose names were then unknown) were killed in a

Protestant missionary church.^

The problem of maintaining any kind of communication with

Washington further complicated the ambassador's efforts. No mail

had reached him since the first day of the fighting; even the post

office was closed. Although the wires seem to have remained intact,

"unofficial reports" were greatly exaggerated. The cities mentioned had not declared for Diaz. Most seemed to be waiting for the matter to be decided in Mexico City.

1X13 Feb. 1913, /6128, NA, RG 59. 12Ibid,

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Wilson complained that the difficulty of transmitting telegrams to

the Department was increasing; the embassy’s messengers were almost 13 invariably fired on or threatened. He reported that on the morning

of 13 February he dispatched the usual two volunteer messengers

(U.S. citizens) with official and other cablegrams. They carried a

pass from the ambassador indicating their mission and displayed U.S.

and white flags on their automobile. Nevertheless, they were stopped,

threatened, insulted, and taken to the federal General Navarrete, who

took both flags off the automobile and took the men under guard to

General Huerta. Huerta issued them a pass to carry them to and from 14 their destination.

The ever-increasing throng that filled the embassy also began

tc cause trouble, in spite of the various relief committees formed by

the ambassador. Indeed, all the legations were now crowded to

overflowing by refugees; yet even in the legations they were still in

the danger zone. The U.S. embassy found it extremely difficult to

provide bed and board for all the refugees, as most of the markets

were closed. The ambassador was forced to send outside the city for

necessities. Prices were enormously high, but the refugees were

willing to pay.^

The only serious effort by Mexican officials to spare the

foreign colonies was made on Thursday, 13 February, when the

Secretary of War, Gen. Garcia Pena, in a communication with Diaz, drew

his attention to the fact that the continuous bombardment was playing

havoc with foreign lives and property- The secretary declared such

action to be in "flagrant violation of the laws of war as observed by

^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^ De como vino Huerta, p. 26.

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civilized nations" and threatened that the defenders of the citadel

would be held "beyond the law" if all future firing were not confined

within the hostile zone. General Diaz made some recommendations for

the saving of life and property. The reply to these was an order to

surrender with permission to retire from the city. Angered, Diaz

retorted that "he and his men preferred to die at their posts, without

asking for, nor desiring clemency.

The fighting on Thursday had been the worst since Sunday,

and Ambassador Wilson was not certain in whose favor it was resulting.

But about this time, Capt. W. W. Burnside, the U.S. military attache,

informed the ambassador that he was convinced that the Maderista

situation was now hopeless. As he later wrote,

I was absent from the City of Mexico when the outbreak of Feb­ ruary 9 occurred, but upon returning at 10 A.M. on the morning of the 11th it was learned that previous opinions as to the doubtful loyalty of the regular army had been confirmed. . . . All of the attempts to advance on the Ciudadela from February 11 to February 16 resulted unfavorably for the Federals, and generally resulted in their falling back to positions more distant than [sic] the Ciudadela. . . . On February 16 I visited the Ciudadela and found the revolutionists well supplied with food, arms, and ammunition, and feeling confident of success. On the same day General Huerta personally stated to me that in case the Ciudadela was ever captured, the fighting which had previously taken place would be as nothing compared to that which would accompany the fall of the Ciudadela. I do not recall now the exact date on which I stated to you that the Government would be unable to take the Ciudadela, but such was my opinion at all times after the evening of February 13. Subsequent events only strengthened this opinion and made me feel more certain that it was correct.-*®

16Ibid., p. 26; Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6154, NA, RG 59.

17Wilson to Knox, 13 Feb. 1913, /6138, NA, RG 59.

"^Burnside to H. L. Wilson, 5 June 1913, reproduced in S. Doc. 285, p. 2262; also Burnside to War Department, 25 Feb. 1913, 5761-69, NA, RG 165.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Pessimism over the ability of Madero to maintain himself

much longer was nearly universal. Even Manuel Marquez Sterling, the

Cuban minister and an avowed Madero partisan, felt that the government

was not able to protect the foreign colonies. Although the number of

Cubans in Mexico City was relatively small, he called upon his own

government for help; and on 12 February the Cuban cruiser Cuba, with

a company of infantry, set sail for Veracruz. Marquez Sterling

informed Foreign Secretary Lascurain that the Cuban soldiers were

coming to protect the Cuban legation and, "subject to my orders," to

protect Cuban life and interests. Marquez Sterling then notified Wilson

on the same matter. 19

The Cuba had set sail for Veracruz on the same day that the

USS Virginia had been ordered to Tampico and the USS Vermont, the

USS Nebraska, the USS Georgia had been sent to join the USS Wheeling at 20 Veracruz. The USS Denver was on her way to join the USS South Dakota 21 at Acapulco, and the USS Colorado was nearing Mazatlan. The USS

Georgia was diverted from Veracruz and ordered instead to Tampico. 22

Meanwhile, there were rumors in Washington that a British vessel and

a German vessel were to be dispatched, should the respective diplomatic

missions need them; and in official circles in Europe were reported

19 MArquez Stirling to LascurAin, 13 Feb. 1913; MArquez Stirling to Wilson, 14 Feb. 1913, Law Memorandum no. 82, NA, RG 76. 20 State Department to Consul W. W. Canada, 11 Feb. 1913, /6095g, NA, RG 59. 21 State Department to Consul Clement Edwards (Acapulco), 11 Feb. 1913, /6085b; State Department to Consul William E. Alger (Mazatlan), 11 Feb. 1913, 6085c, NA, RG 59. 22 State Department to Consul Clarence A. Miller (Tampico), 11 Feb. 1913, /6085a, NA, RG 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97

discussions of U.S. responsibility in connection with the chaos in

Mexico.™ - 23

Ambassador Wilson wired the Department on the morning of

14 February:

Will the Department please instruct me immediately as to the measure of control I will be permitted to exercise over the American ships and marines which should arrive tomorrow at various Mexican ports? So far as the situation in Mexico City and Veracruz is concerned, I recommend that I be clothed, under such restrictions as may be lawful and as the Department may think proper, with power to act immediately in crises without further instructions. The situation is becoming hourly more acute and dangerous, and conditions here are almost chaotic. The scarcity of food and impending hunger are now becoming a fait accompli and the Department should consider, in making its reply to this telegram, all possible contingencies which may arise. 2^

The Department refused to grant Wilson any such sweeping

powers. Rather, he was informed that the purpose of the naval

dispositions in Mexican waters was to observe and report on the

situation, with particular reference to the protection being afforded

foreigners. It was pointed out that the sending of U.S. vessels

represented no change whatever in the policy of the president and,

that, under the present distressing circumstances, the requirements

of the general situation were such that it would be inadvisable to

instruct the ambassador in the way that he had suggested. The

Department felt that the latest reports from Mexico City seemed to 25 indicate a turn for the better. Wilson, taking exception to the

23 State Department Memorandum by Fred Dearing, 11 Feb. 1913, /6125, NA, RG 59.

24Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6149, NA, RG 59. Stronge was informed by the Foreign Office that "Ships are being sent to Veracruz" (Grey to Mr.. Woodcock, 12 Feb. 1913, cited by Calvert, Mpyican Revolution, p. 142).

25Knox to Wilson, 15 Feb. 1913, /6149, NA, RG 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. last statement, informed the Department that, on the contrary,

conditions were growing steadily worse. The Department justified

its attitude in a telegram:

The Department’s statement that the latest reports from Mexico City seemed to indicate a tarn for the better was based upon what was at the time an apparently correct report that Madero had indicated his willingness to resign, and upon nothing e l s e26 .

A possible solution to the ambassador's difficulties soon

presented itself. At noon, Foreign Secretary Lascurain called to

invite Wilson "in the name of the President" to take a residence in

Tacubaya, out of the line of fire. The ambassador offered his thanks

to the president, but did not hesitate to decline the offer.27 Before

Wilson could transmit this information to the Department, the

Associated Press reported the matter— adding that the Foreign Secretary

had warned the ambassador that "the firing must proceed."2**

In view of Wilson's constant complaints about the endangered

foreign residents, the Department was at a loss as to the reasons

for Wilson's refusal to move out of the embassy. Wilson was instructed,

however, to lodge a formal protect; but, if this should prove to be

ineffective and the position of the embassy were to become more

dangerous, he was instructed to evacuate the premises rather than

risk casualties. The secretary then added a few words of caution 29 against unnecessary ambassadorial heroism.

Ambassador Wilson answered this message the following day—

explaining at great length why his removal to Tacubaya would be a

calamity to the entire U.S. colony:

26Ibid. 27Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6147, NA, RG 59.

28Knox to Wilson, 14 Feb. 1913, /6170a, NA, RG 59. 29Ibid.

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The Associated Press, though usually accurate, has erred in this instance. Mr. Lascurdin called at the Embassy on the part of the President, to tender me the use of a house in Tacubaya for the Embassy, offering at the same time to see that it was manned by servants and provisions. I expressed my appreciation of the President's courteous attention, but declined the offer as I shall decline all others. The Government has placed me here in charge of its records, archives and property, and here all of the system of aids for the American colony has been centered. If the firing becomes intolerable, I will remove all women and men who so desire from the Embassy. The removal of the Embassy would be a calamity to the entire American colony. Americans cannot be advised to go to a safer place because there is none. Outside the firing range there are bandits, and inside there are bullets. The rules of international precedents are of little value in a case of fighting where shrapnel is used on both sides, and where the locations of batteries and bombardment are made without notice.

In a telegram later that evening, Wilson replied emphatically

to the suggestion of removal to a safer area: "There is no question

of removing Americans to a safer place. There is no safe place, and

many of those in the worst districts refuse to leave their homes."31

On the afternoon of 14 February, Wilson reported that the

fighting of the previous day had not resulted in any change in the

positions of the combatants but that many federals were killed, while

Diaz had lost very few men. Five hundred federals had gone over to

the rebels during the night, and the intervals between firing from the

federal side seemed to indicate either that the federals were seeking

new positions or that their ammunition was running low. Both the Red

Cross and the White Cross— though accustomed to the sufferance of every

outrage, he reported— had at last been interfered with to such an

extent that the latter organization ("by far the larger of the two")

was disbanded because of the siezure of their vehicles by the government

30 Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6174, NA, RG 59; S. Doc. 285, p. 2261.

31Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59.

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and the government's refusal to respect their flag. It seems, Wilson

reported, that the government had become hostile toward both

organizations for their refusal to "permit federal officers to bear

their emblems and occupy their automobiles." Wilson added that steps

were being taken to get the Congress to declare an armistice.32

In a separate telegram received at the Department at the same

time, Ambassador Wilson gives some additional information about his

noon interview with Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lascurain:

Mr. LascurAin came here this morning and expressed a desire to talk with me in an unofficial way. He seemed profoundly moved, and said that something must be done to terminate a dreadful situation. I endeavored to impress upon him the fact that public opinion, both Mexican and foreign, was holding the Federal Government responsible for these conditions, and urged him to take some immediate action that would have the effect of leading to a discussion between the two contending elements. I suggested to him the advisability of calling together the Senate and of arranging for an armistice during its deliberations. He is profoundly impressed with what he believes to be the threatening attitude of our Government, and intimated to me in confidence that the President ought to resign.

It should be noted that in this interview the idea of President

Madero*s resignation came from Lascurain, not Wilson. In a note

later that day, Stronge (the British minister) expressed his approval

of what he thought had been Wilson's actions. According to Kenneth

Grieb, Stronge believed that Wilson had suggested the resignation, 34 whereas Wilson merely urged an armistice.

32Ibid., 14 Feb. 1913, /6152, NA, RG 59.

33Ibid., /6153, NA, RG 59 (emphasis mine). 34 The Pnited States and Huerta, p. 17, citing Foreign Office correspondence between Stronge and Foreign Minister Grey. From Stronge's note to Wilson, Grieb is led to believe that the latter had, indeed, suggested Madero's resignation; and Grieb bases almost the entire chapter on that mistaken assumption. Stronge's note to Wilson appears in Spanish in Fabela, Historia Diplomatics, I, 87.

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Later in the day, Von Hintze (the German minister) reported to

Wilson that Francisco de la Barra, who had previously offered to serve

as an intermediary between the federals and the rebels, had gone to 35 the palace and had a conference with Madero and Huerta. Madero

authorized the former interim president to see Diaz and Mondragon

about an armistice to find a solution to the conflict.3^ When De la

Barra came out, he was applauded by the people, to whom he made a

speech.37 De la Barra went to the Ciudadela and had a conference with

the rebel leaders. Their terms included the resignation of Madero,

vice-president Pino Suarez, and the cabinet. 33 Diaz pressed the point

that, for all practical purposes, he controlled the city and that 39 until the present he had curbed his fire. The latter statement,

often repeated, might or might not have been true; but it seems to

have impressed everyone concerned— including the entire diplomatic

corps. It was also pointed out that federal forces at Ozumba,

Miraflores, La Compania, Chaleo, Tlahuan, and San Rafael had declared

for Diaz; and in some cases their pro-Federal officers had been 40 killed. The end result of De la Barra s mission was that Madero s

own cabinet asked the president to resign; he vehemently refused to

35Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6173, NA, RG 59. 36 -r Marxa y Campos, p. 204.

37Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6173, NA, RG 59.

33Maria y Campos, p. 205.

39Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6154, NA, RG 59. £0 Ibid., /6155, NA, RG 59.

^Tbid., /6173, NA, RG 59; Bonilla, El regimen Maderista, p. 72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 42 Gonzalez Ramirez stresses the fact that Lascurain was a

militant Catholic who wanted Madero to resign. Whether or not this

imputation is true, it is clear that Lascurain— in view of the

expected arrival of the U.S. vessels— was "profoundly impressed with

what he believes to be the threatening attitude" of the U.S. 43 government. The Foreign Secretary expressed his fears to Madero,

who ordered him not only to approach President Taft directly but also

to let the Senate know of the danger. Madero thus hoped to find in 44 that body moral backing for himself from the fear of intervention.

This attempt to influence the Mexican senate backfired.

Lascurain addressed the Senate, who thereupon debated at length—

finally agreeing on 15 February that Madero should, indeed, resign.4^

Gonzalez Ramirez excoriates the Senate for this action, though he

concedes that "among the senators . . . could be found jurists of

reputation, and even an illustrious constitutionalist, who in that 46 moment lost their sense of proportion. Lascurain then suggested

to the senators that they should send a ce ^ittee to the palace to . 47 ask for the president s resignation.

Sometime during the evening of 14 February, Gen. Aureliano

Blanquet arr'cad at the outskirts of the city with 700 soldiers;

La_ revolucion social de Mexico, p. 345.

43Wilson to Knox, 14 Feb. 1913, /6153, NA, RG 59.

44Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 344. 4^Ibid., p. 345. 46 Ibid., p. 347 (translation mine). It was Sen. Jose Diego Fernandez who proposed that Madero be asked to resign (see also Maria y Campos, pp. 208-09). Meyer says that most of these senators were Felicistas (Huerta, p. 54).

4^Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 345, n. 149.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 48 Gen. Enrique Rivera came from Oxaca with 900- Both these men mere

officers of the professional army (not Maderistas); and it was

generally assumed, Ambassador Wilson later testified, that they

had come to the aid of Diaz, not Madero. It was widely known, said

Wilson, that the chiefs of the Mexican army were deserting Madero. By

now most observers— foreigners as well as Mexicans— agreed with

Captain Burnside's estimate that the revolution could not be put 49 down. At any rate, Blanquet remained on the outskirts and did not

enter the battle on either side.

Ambassador Wilson consulted the opinion of the diplomatic

corps by telephone on 14 February and found almost unanimous belief

that Madero could not survive. Only the Chilean and Cuban ministers

dissented.

In view of these developments, the same day Ambassador Wilson

asked the representatives of the largest colonies of foreigners

in Mexico to come to the embassy for consultations on the following

day, 15 February. The British, Spanish, and German ministers and

the French charge d'affaires agreed to come. There was considerable

difficulty in getting them through the lines, however. One embassy

automobile, en route to bring them, was held up by federals and

robbed. The automobile that went for Minister Stronge was fired upon

by the federals and riddled with bullets, even though it carred a

federal colonel and six soldiers.

^®0F 908, NA, RG 76, "Veinte meses de anarquxa," pp. 247-48. 49 With Wilson s testimony, S. Doc. 285, p. 2263.

"^Marquez Sterling, Los ultimos dias, p. 405; Fabela, Historia diplomatica, I, 43.

51Wilson to Knox, 14 and 15 Feb. 1913, /6173 and /6174 (resp.), NA, RG 59.

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The conference lasted from one o’clock in the doming of

15 February until almost three. The Spanish minister recited the

efforts with De la Barra and Lascurain— all to no avail. From

information furnished by the diplomats themselves and from "other

sources," according to Wilson, they became convinced that only by 52 prompt action could a violent coup d'etat be averted. The meeting

became quite emotional, with Wilson reportedly exclaiming,

"Madero is a madman, a fool and a lunatic, and must be legally declared without mental capacity to exercise his charge. . . . This situation is intolerable. . . . I will put order," the latter banging his fist on a table.53

The ministers agreed that, unless Madero made "amicable and peaceful

arrangements for his retirement," he would probably be overthrown

violently— jeopardizing the lives of both his family and many of his

personal followers, who were at the time objects of personal 54 antipathy. So then they decided to advise Madero, "not officially,

but unofficially," that the wise course for him was to resign and

turn his powers over to the Congress.55 The opinion was unanimous

that they should act at once, without waiting for instructions. The

Spanish minister, Don Bernardo de Cologan y Cologan, was designated

to bear to Madero the joint views of the diplomats.5**

The Spanish and German ministers then returned to their homes,

in spite of the firing still in progress at that haur. Stronge found

it too dangerous to cross the line of fire and spent the night at the

embassy.v 57

5^Wilson, p. 262. 55Marquez Sterling, p. 416. 54 55 Wilson, p . 263. H. L. l{ilson testimony, S. Doc. 285, p. 2263.

56Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59. 5?Ibid.

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On the morning of 15 February the Spanish minister went to the

palace, entering slightly in advance of thirty senators, headed by

Senators Gumercindo Enrxrquez and Guillermo Obregdn, who had been 58 commissioned to deliver the Senate's message to Madero. Upon being

received by the president, Cdlogan went over the points that had been

discussed by the diplomats and indicated that it was the unanimous

advice of the conference that the wisest thing would be for Madero to

tender his resignation, putting his powers in the hands of the Congress.

Choosing to ignore the important consideration that the

diplomats were rendering their advice in a purely unofficial and

friendly manner as observers, Madero became quite upset and began to

scold the minister. Madero told Cologan that he did not recognize the

right of diplomats to interfere in a domestic question and that he was,

furthermore, the constitutional President of Mexico. He expressed

his fear that, were he to resign, the country would be plunged into

chaos. No, he stated, he would never resign; but, if necessary, he

would die in defense of his rights as the legally elected president 59 of the republic.

At this moment the arrival of the senatorial delegation was

announced, with the statement that they were coming to ask for his

resignation. Madero replied, "iTonterias!" And, after a hurried

conversation, he vanished through one of the doors— refusing to see

the senators. When they were ushered into the room, they were told

that the president had gone with General Huerta to examine firing

Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 346. Meyer says the commission was led by Enriquez and Joaquin Pimentel (Huerta, p. 55).

59Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59.

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points and that he would be unable to see them. The senators then had

a brief conference with Ernesto Macero and Don Manuel Bonilla.60 After

leaving the palace, some of the senators harangued the populace— asking

them to support the legislative power and to prevent impending U.S.

intervention, which, they declared, was being demanded by the European 61 powers.

Lascurain had apparently tried to intimidate Madero (probably

by exaggerating Wilson's supposed threats of intervention); the

president had, in turn, attempted with the same threat to trick the

Senate into backing him. Madero had ordered Lascurain to approach

President Taft through the Mexican embassy in Washington; now, in

a second message, Madero addressed himself directly to the U.S.

president. Perhaps this approach was intended to clear the air of

the rumors of intervention; perhaps he hoped to free himself of

some part of the foreign population that so limited his field of

action. At any rate, Madero's message was received in Washington

on 15 February at 9 P.M.:

I have heard that the [U.S.] Government . . .has ordered that warships shall set out for Mexican coasts with troops to come to this capital to give protection to Americans. Undoubtedly the information which you have, and which caused you to determine, is erroneous or exaggerated, since the lives of Americans in this capital will be in no danger if they quit the firing zone and concentrate themselves at certain places in the city and in the suburban towns in which there is absolute tranquility, and in which the Government can give them every measure of protection. If you instruct Americans resident in the capital to do this . . . all danger to the lives of American and foreign residents will be avoided. . . . I

60Ibid.; and Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 346.

61Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59.

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request, then, that your Excellency order your ships not to disembark troops. . . . 62

The note from the Mexican ambassador in Washington to President

Taft read:

At the instigation of Ambassador Wilson with a part of the Diplomatic Corps, one of its members was commissioned to notify President Madero that he should resign his position in order to solve the present conflict in the city. . . . The President . . . informed them that he was resolved to die at his post before permitting foreign interference. The Ambassador, in view of local circumstances, will try, perhaps, to disembark marines, and this will produce an unnecessary international conflict of terrible consequences. It is urgent, therefore, to avoid disembarkation.

Events were moving faster than messages. Before Ambassador

Wilson received copies of the messages from the Mexican president and

his ambassador to President Taft, the German minister, Von Hintze,

came to tell Wilson that the federals were now being maneuvered in

such a manner as to fire over the foreign residential district against

the Ciudadela— and also that the French school (which Wilson had

filled with women and children), having been taken over by federals,

now had a battery stationed there. The German asked Wilson to join

him in a visit to General Huerta to ask for a cease-fire at 3:30 P.M.,

when they hoped to take up the questions of possibly a daily armistice 64 and of a definite limit to the firing zone. The reason Von Hintze

Quoted in Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59.

^Ibid. At 9:00 P.M. the same day, Wilson wired Knox: "I have just received a letter from the British Minister reading as follows: 'Mr. de la Barra is here. From what he tells me, Madero's final answer as regards resignation will largely depend on the reply received from President Taft. I gather that he would, or at least might resign, on the face of a threat of immediate intervention'" (Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6176, NA, RG 59). Stronge was much more emphatic than Wilson that Madero should resign (see Calvert, pp. 137-39). 64 Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6175, NA, RG 59.

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wanted an interview with Huerta was that the latter had given some

evidence of concern for the safety of foreign nationals.

Indeed, that same morning a battery had been sent to the block

on which the U.S. embassy was located. The whole U.S. colony, who

depended on the embassy for almost everything at the moment, became

panic-stricken. At that point Enrique Zepeda, an engineer, said that

he knew General Huerta personally and offered to carry a message to

him.^ Wilson wrote Huerta a courteous note, asking him to remove

the battery to some other place. Huerta sent an equally courteous

reply informing the ambassador that orders in compliance with his

request had been issued. By the time Zepeda had returned with

Huerta's note, the battery had already been removed.^ Zepeda also

told Wilson that Huerta wanted to meet with him and others of the

diplomatic corps. ^

Wilson and Von Hintze went to the palace to see Huerta; but,

much to their regret, they were ushered in to see Madero, "whom we

had not asked to see." It was only after repeated requests that they

were allowed to have an interview with Huerta— and then only in the

presence of Lascurain.^ Wilson asked, first, that the military

^Zepeda had been introduced to Wilson by Consul Gen. Arnold Shanklin. The engineer was Huerta's nephew, but rumor had it that he was Huerta's illegitimate son. Zepeda was later described by Wilson as his "confidential messenger" with Huerta (see Calvert, p. 146; Wilson, p. 273).

^Wilson to Huerta and Huerta to Wilson, 15 Feb. 1913; Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913,/6840, enclosure, HA, RG 59.

^Wilson adds that twice more Zepeda brought the same message> saying that Huerta "contemplated of a course of action which would bring about a cessation of the intolerable situation that existed." Wilson did not seem clearly to understand these messages (p. 274; see also Wilson's testimony in S. Doc. 285, p. 2280).

^Wilson had never been acquainted personally with Huerta— had

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dispositions of the government forces should be made so as not to

render firing on the citadel over the residential quarter necessary;

second, that a fire zone should be established around the U.S.

embassy, which should be treated not only as an embassy, but also as

a humanitarian establishment; third, that the government should unite

with a committee of U.S. citizens for the purpose of establishing

centers for the distribution of bread for the poor; fourth, that

soldiers on certain U.S. buildings and public buildings (and especially

on one that Wilson had designated as a general refuge) should be

removed; fifth, that an armistice of three hours should be given to

enable the embassy's recue committee to take starving U.S. citizens

in dangerous localities to safer zones; and sixth, that an armistice

of twelve hours should be reached to enable foreigners to leave Mexico

by train. All these demands were finally agreed to by General Huerta

and President Madero.

Wilson wrote that President Madero then

submitted to me a telegram he had sent to President Taft; a considerable part of it was misleading and inexact, and I so informed him. The President also attempted to convince me that the situation in the country at large was at variance with the information that I have received.

After his interview with Huerta and Madero, Wilson received

the messages relaying the notes from Madero and the Mexican Ambassador

to Washington. The Department (as noted above) wanted to know exactly

never even seen him until this morning. Nor had Wilson ever sent messages to Huerta, except the one relating to the removal of the battery. All the messages that Zepeda brought were received in the presence of U.S. witnesses "whose affidavits," Wilson later wrote, "are on file in the Department of State" (p. 275; affidavits are reproduced in S. Doc. 285, p. 2280).

69Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6178, NA, RG 59. 7°Ibid.

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what Wilson had told Lascurain that made the latter believe in the

possibility of intervention. 7^ Wilson replied that in his Friday

interview with the Mexican Foreign Secretary the latter had asked in

a purely unofficial and friendly way whether the U.S. government

intended to land troops in Mexico. Wilson said that he replied

that he had no authority in the matter and that he had received no

instructions to that effect. He told Lascurain, however, that it was

possible that the European powers were bringing pressure to bear on the

U.S. government and that, if the situation grew to be intolerable and

involved great danger to the foreign residents, Washington would

necessarily have to consider the question of obtaining the protection

that the Mexican government seemed unable to give. Wilson added: "On

no other occasion have I mentioned intentions of our Government."

During the interview with Madero, the latter also had expressed the

hope that the United States would not land marines; and the ambassador

said he had replied simply that he had no instructions and no authority 72 in the matter.

On the afternoon of 17 February, during a visit to Lascurain,

Wilson reviewed the interview they had had three days earlier.

Lascurain agreed with Wilson in every particular; and, in a personal

note he sent Wilson on that day, he expressed his great regret that

the incident of the messages to President Taft had occurred. He said

that Wilson had stated to him on 14 February that Wilson had no control

over the marines and had not asked for their landing. In other words,

President Madero knew that his message to President Taft.was based on

71Kncx to Wilson, 15 Feb. 1913, /6172c, NA, RG 59.

72Wilson to Knox, 17 Feb. 1913, /6208, NA, RG 59.

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73 falsehood. Relative to the Mexican embassy's note to the State

Department, Wilson reported:

I have today exchanged very forcible notes with the President which terminated in a statement from him that he has instructed the Embassy in Washington to advise the Department that in view of the satisfactory explanation made by me, the incident might be considered closed. I have to say to the Department that I have made no explanations to President Madero, but have called his attention to the palpable misrepresentations contained in the Mexican Embassy's note, and have said to him that I expect him to recall it.^

A copy of President Taft's reply to Madero was sent to

Ambassador Wilson. President Taft informed the Mexican president both

that the policy of the United States had not changed and that no orders

had been given for troops to land.73

Though reassured on the question of intervention, Madero

still continued to use the supposed threat to try to rally support. On

15 February he had circulated Associated Press statements to the effect

that there would be no intervention "unless Americans were wantonly

slaughtered."7** On 16 February he telegraphed all the governors of

the states that U.S. intervention was an accomplished fact.77 President

Taft worried that these false reports being circulated by the Maderistas

could lead to outrages against U.S. citizens in Mexico. On the other

hand, Secretary Knox wired Wilson that "their too emphatic denial might

73Ibid., /6224, NA, RG 59.

7^Ibid., /6236, NA, RG 59. Wilson informed Stronge on 17 February about the Mexican Embassy's note (Wilson to W. J. Bryan, 12 March, 1913, /6849, enclosure, NA, RG 59).

75Knox to Wilson, 17 Feb. 1913, /6223a, NA, RG 59.

76Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6177, NA, RG 59.

77Ibid., 16 Feb. 1913, /6181 and /6183, NA, RG 59.

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possibly destroy the sobering effect of the idea that intervention,

in certain contingencies, could not be avoided."

The secretary left the matter in Wilson's hands:

With your, full knowledge of the President's policy and your intimate knowledge of the local situation, it is left to you to deal with this whole matter of keeping Mexican opinion, both official and unofficial, in a salutary equilibrium, between a proper degree of wholesome fear and a dangerous and exaggerated apprehension.78

The imposition of this delicate task did not alarm the ambassador.

"The policy indicated," he wired back, "was adopted some days ago,

and is, and will be pursued."79

Ambassador Wilson's success in obtaining an armistice from

General Huerta was received with relief and rejoicing by the U.S.

colony. While the armistice was in force on Sunday, 16 February,

there was great activity in taking foreigners out of the danger zone

and transporting many women and children to the United States. Wilson

was quite pleased— even optimistic— about having the armistice extended

for another day, as General Diaz had agreed. Captain Burnside, the

military attache, was sent to the palace to induce the government to 80 agree also.

Conditions in Mexico City and throughout the republic, however,

were far from improving on 16 February, the eighth day of the rebellion.

Captain Burnside visited inside the Ciudadela and reported that the

federals had inflicted no loss or damage on Diaz, who, on the

contrary, had now extended his lines in one direction far beyond the

78Knox to Wilson, 17 Feb. 1913, /6223a, NA, RG 59.

79Wilson to Knox, 17 Feb. 1913, /6237, NA, RG 59.

80Ibid., 16 Feb. 1913, /6180, NA, RG 59.

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Gobernaci6n Palace (which he had taken) and in the other direction

to the German School. The government was employing an excess of

censorship: It suppressed the Mexican Herald (thus depriving the

English-speaking community of its only remaining newspaper); the

Associated Press despatches were censored to the point that they lost

all value; and the government was censoring private telegrams sent

through the embassy's post and telegraph office.^ Since there were

no trains arriving in the city from north or south, freight traffic was

absolutely stopped.8^

From outside Mexico City the reports were no more optimistic.

The federals in the State of Chihuahua had gone over to Diaz, as had

the border city of Nuevo Laredo; and there was a report of a "dangerous

movement in Monterrey."88 The Laredo railroad line north of Monterrey

was in the hands of the rebels, and no tickets south were being sold.8^

Wilson's hope for an extension of the armistice was buttressed

by a message from Huerta on the morning of 16 February:

General Huerta has indicated a desire to talk with me, and I shall see him sometime during the day, and shall perhaps ask the German and Spanish Ministers to accompany me. I hope for good results of this.85

Before Wilson could gather his colleagues for the conference

with Huerta, the armistice he had worked so hard to bring about broke

down. At noon on Sunday, 16 February, Diaz informed the ambassador

that the federals were violating the armistice by taking new positions,

establishing cannon in certain buildings, and placing 700 pounds of

81 82 q-a Ibid. Ibid., /6182, NA, RG 59. Ibid., /6180, NA, RG 59.

^Consul Alonzo B. Garret (Nuevo Laredo) to Department, 16 Feb. 1913, /6198, NA, RG 59.

85Wilson to Knox, 16 Feb. 1913, /6180, NA, RG 59.

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dynamite in the sewers approaching the Ciudadela. Wilson sent U.S.

"scouts" to investigate, and they found the statements to be true.

Undaunted, Wilson requested some federal representatives, who were in

the embassy, to arrange for the extension of the truce the following

day. They agreed to return at 7 P.M. to meet with representatives of

Diaz. No sooner had the federal emissaries left, however, than a note

arrived from Huerta. The general stated that, on account of the

violation of the truce by the revolutionists, the cease-fire must be 86 terminated. Firing commenced again at 2 P.M. Nevertheless, Wilson

was unwilling to accept this as Huerta's final word. He sent Captain

Burnside to the Ciudadela to fetch the rebel delegates "by agreement with

the Government." Burnside informed Wilson both that the morale of the

troops at the Ciudadela was excellent and that no damage had been

effected by the federal firing. Only eighteen rebels had been killed.^

At midnight the ambassador had reported:

Huerta has just sent me a special messenger saying that it was impossible to keep the appointment he made with me today, but that he expected to take steps tonight toward terminating the situation.88

Wilson may have believed that Huerta was ready to talk about the

extension of the armistice. Many others, however, felt that the time

was ripe for the expected coup d’etat. Mexicans, some of them

deputies in Congress, began seeking protection from the embassy. Since

the embassy was already uncomfortably crowded, the ambassador, advising

them to come to the embassy in cases of acute danger, farmed them out

to the houses under the control of his committees. Wilson asked for

instructions on this point, and the Department advised him that only

86 87 88 Ibid., /6207, NA, RG 59. Ibid. Ibid., /6186, NA, RG 59.

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such temporary refuge should be accorded Mexicans as in the ambassador'sa.!!!bass.ador' s 89 judgment was absolutely necessary to preserve human life. 89

89Ibid. (and reply)reply), • /6184,/6184. NA,NA. RG 59.

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LA DECENA TRAGICA - GOLPE DE ESTADO: 17-18 FEBRUARY 1913

Proud of his humble beginnings and Indian background, Gen.

Victoriano Huerta was a professional soldier who had served his country

well and honorably during both the Diaz and the Madero administrations.^

The Maderistas, of course, suspected the general of disloyalty— simply

because he was a professional military man— and the military were

known to be, as a whole, unhappy with the treatment they had received

from Madero. The Maderistas also knew that there had been trouble

between Madero and Huerta. Michael C. Meyer has carefully studied the

relationship between the two men, from the fall of the Diaz regime to the 2 Decena Tragica. In spite of their differences, Meyer finds no evidence 3 that the general had ever been involved in any anti-Madero plotting.

When Madero left for Cuernavaca on the first afternoon of the

rebellion, Huerta was left in complete control of the federal forces

in the city. The federals were outnumbered by the rebels, and Huerta

was unable to take the offensive. Federal artillery could not damage

the thick walls of the Ciudadela. Furthermore, Huerta was unable to

attack the arsenal from the rear without seriously endangering the

U.S. embassy and the various legations nearby. This jeopardy, it

was believed, could lead to foreign intervention. Furthermore, the

^Grieb, The United States and Huerta, p. 12.

^Meyer, Huerta, passim. ^Ibid., pp. 46-47.

116

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federal troops lacked all types of ammunition. The ammunition had 4 been stored in the Ciudadela and was now in the hands of the rebels.

In view of this impossible situation, Huerta had tried to

arrive at some agreement with the Felicistas, in hopes of stopping

the carnage. After all, though Huerta could not dislodge Diaz, neither

could Diaz escape from the arsenal. Huerta had actually met with Diaz

at the house of Enrique Zepeda on 10 February, but no agreement was

reached. Diaz would settle for apparently nothing less than the

resignation of Madero; Huerta merely offered Diaz clemency and

permission to retire from the city."5 Despite the claim of all

pro-Revolutionary historians, there is no evidence either that Diaz

and Huerta arrived at an agreement to depose Madero at this time or

that the remainder of the ten-daysT battle was a macabre fiction.^

Madero had returned on the following day (11 February) with

some reinforcements; and, though Huerta was a prestigious general

with ample combat experience, the president apparently intervened to

direct the military operations in person.^ This was nothing new.

4Grieb, p. 14.

^Huerta to Diaz, 13 Feb. 1913, in Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, enclosure, NA, RG 59.

^Gonzalez Ramirez, La revolucion social, p. 342; Calvert, Mexican Revolution, p. 132; Ross, Francisco I. Madero. p. 291; Grieb, p. 14. Meyer disagrees with the view that the Decena Tragica was the result of an agreement between Diaz and Huerta (Huerta, p. 55). All pro-Revolutionary historians cite either Vera Estanol, La Revolucidn Mexicana: orlgenes y resultados (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1957), p. 272, n. 3, or Prida, iDe la dictadura a la anarquia!, pp. 472, 505.

^The U.S. military attache noted that the manner of attack was not characteristic of Huerta, and he concluded that President Madero interfered with the general's operations and ordered daily advances (Captain Burnside to War Department, 25 Feb. 1913, 5761-69, NA, RG 165).

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The president had similarly interfered with Huerta's conduct of the

campaigns against Zapata and Orozco.** Madero now impatiently insisted

on the use of greater force. Huerta retorted that, while it might be

possible to take the Ciudadela, a large section of the city would be 9 devastated.

One can only conjecture as to just when Huerta reached the

decision that the only possible solution to the stalemate was Madero's

resignation. Madero's own cabinet had already asked for his resignation

on 14 February, and the committee of senators had been trying to see

the president since 15 February to demand his resignation. Huerta had

failed to dislodge the rebels from the Ciudadela, while the rebels

continued to expand their lines.^ The only alternatives appeared to

be either a battle of attrition (in which noncombatants— and particularly

foreign nationals— were bound to suffer even more) or the resignation

of the president. U.S. intervention was not out of the question. Madero

himself had announced that the United States would intervene in cases of

the "wanton slaughter" of U.S. citizens.^ President Taft had not

ruled out military intervention under any circumstances. As the carnage

continued, it became increasingly possible that the United States might

intervene. Indeed, not only were there U.S. warships at Mexican ports, 12 but U.S. troops were known to be moving toward the Mexican border.

**See Meyer, Huerta, pp. 21-26, 38-41. ^Ibid., p. 51

^Gen. Julio Navarrete to Huerta, cited by Juan Gualberto Amaya, Madero y los autenticos revolucionarios de 1910 (Mexico: Por el autor, 1946), pp. 429-30.

X1Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6177, NA, RG 59.

^Knox to Wilson, 13 Feb. 1913, Post Records, Mexico City, 1913, NA, RG 84; Admiral George Dewey to Secretary of War, 13 Feb. 1913, AGO 2011734, NA, RG 94.

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On 16 February, the U.S. government began assembling a force of 2,000

marines on transports at Guantanamo. 11 Ambassador Wilson was following

his instructions to the letter. He was not threatening to land marines.

But he was not ruling out the possibility.1^

The possibility of intervention aside, Huerta may have also

realized that he was in a position of strength to force the president's

resignation. Meyer notes that "by the 15th Huerta enjoyed considerable

personal support not only from the federal army and many of the rebel

rank and file, but from a majority of the Senate and from the most

influential members of the diplomatic corps as well."1'*

Huerta had asked to see Ambassador Wilson on 16 February,

while the armistice was still in effect. However, after the armistice

broke down at 2 P.M. that day, Wilson received from the general a message

regretting that he could not keep the appointment and adding (as

previously noted) that "he expected to take steps tonight toward

terminating the situation."1^ This note was described years later by

Wilson as "mysterious and epigrammatic":

I assumed that an arrangement might be under contemplation which would lead to the peaceful retirement of Madero, followed by the surrender of his powers to Congress and an agreement for a new

13 Knox to Wilson, 18 Feb. 1913, /6254c, NA, RG 59. 14 Knox wrote to the Secretary of the Navy: In the opinion of this Department, few things will work so successfully towards the reestablishment of peace and order in Mexico as an effective but unoffensive display of the great naval power of this nation. . . . The central government at Mexico City will be kept in a state of careful regard . . . by pointing out the likehood that it will be used in certain contingencies ..." (Knox to Secretary of the Navy, 25 Feb. 1913, /6274, NA, RG 59).

1^Meyer, Huerta, p. 58.

^Wilson to Knox, 15 Feb. 1913, /6177, NA, RG 59.

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election. . . . I did not for a moment suppose that a violent coup d’etat would occur. . . .17

It is not certain that Huerta himself had in mind a "violent

coup d'etat" at that time. That same day (16 February) the committee

of senators had again attempted (unsuccessfully) to see Madero. The

senate wanted Madero to resign the presidency and Diaz to step down

as leader of the rebels, after which both Madero and Diaz would agree

on an interim president and early elections.1^ Huerta was no fool.

So long as there was the slightest chance that Madero would step down

voluntarily, there was no need to risk the complications— domestic and

political— inherent in the overthrow of the government by force. When

Madero again refused to see the senate committee, Huerta decided to

act. He ordered General Blanquet to enter the city and sent a

detachment to the palace to replace the Maderista guards from Coahuila.^

This was the morning of 17 February. Huerta then notified the senate

leaders that, in reply to a request from them, he would agree to a

conference at the Commandancia Militar the following day.20 Things

appeared to be falling into place. That afternoon Huerta sent another

message to Henry Lane Wilson, who reported to Secretary Knox at 4 P.M.:

General Huerta has just sent his messenger to me again to say that I may anticipate some action which will remove Madero from power at any moment, and that plans were fully matured, the purpose of the delay being to avoid any violence or bloodshed. I asked no questions and made not suggestions beyond requesting that no lives be taken except by due process of law. I am unable to say whether these plans will come to anything or not. I simply repeat to the Government the word sent to me, which I feel bound to listen to as it so immediately concerns the situation of our nationals in this city.21

^2Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 275.

Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 346. "^Ibid., p. 348. 2°Ibid., p. 346.

21Wilson to Knox, 17 Feb. 1913, /6225, NA, RG 59; Post Records, Mexico City 1913, NA, RG 84.

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Gustavo Madero had been instrumental in foiling the Reyes

takeover on 9 February, and he again intervened at this point (on 17

February). Gustavo had never trusted Huerta and had been urging the

president to remove him, but Madero had turned a deaf ear to his

brother's advice. Nor did Gustavo trust General Blanquet, who was

also a regular army officer: Gustavo felt trapped when the Maderista

guard was removed from the palace and elements of the 29th Battalion

took over their posts. Sen. Jesds Ureta had informed Gustavo Madero of the

Diaz-Huerta meeting at Zepeda's house on 10 February, and he used this

meeting as an excuse to take matters into his own hands. He arrested 22 and disarmed Huerta.

Ambassador Wilson received a distorted version of the incident.

In a note to the British minister later that day, Wilson wrote:

Reports have just come to the Embassy that Huerta is the virtual prisoner of his officers at the Palace. This story, while not confirmed, may possibly account for his failure to keep the appointment which he himself made with me for yesterday. The story is that these officers are in direct communication with Diaz and are advising him how to direct the destructive fire which he is making.23

President Madero, informed of Huerta's arrest early on the

morning of 18 February, at once ordered Huerta brought to him. After

a lengthy conversation, he was convinced of Huerta's innocence and

personally returned the general’s pistol. According to Manuel Bonilla, 24 he then gave Gustavo a tongue-lashing.

A few minutes after this incident at the National Palace, the

members of the Mexican supreme court were ushered in to see the

22Ross, pp. 304-05; Meyer, Huerta, p. 56.

^Wilson to Strongs, 17 Feb. 1913, enclosure to Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

^ E 1 regimen Maderista, pp. 204-11.

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president. Madero must have known that they, too, came to ask for his 25 resignation, for he received them rather coldly.

To Wilson the Maderista cause appeared to be hopeless. At

10 P.M., he sent to the Secretary of State a despatch describing the

situation as he was it. The firing had been particularly prolonged

and heavy, but no damage had been inflicted on the Ciudadela.

Considerable damage, however, was inflicted on surrounding buildings;

and there was heavy loss of life. Wilson also reported that many

federals were killed in the immediate vicinity of the embassy, and

many bullets entered the embassy itself— but with little damage. Diaz

was continuing to extend his lines. Apparently trying to attack a

battery in front of the British legation, he was now at the corner of

Niza and Insurgentes, while in another direction he was at Orizaba

Street— which meant that he would soon be in control of the foreign

residential district. Meanwhile, federal troops were being withdrawn

from all exposed points and retired toward the palace. General Blanquet

had turned his guns toward Chapultepec Castle— which seemed to indicate

that he had reached an understanding with Diaz. Also, reported the

ambassador, Blanquet's troops had been placed in charge of the National

Palace, "which is in accordance with the message sent by General Huerta

that all purely Maderista soldiers were to be put outside, and soldiers

upon whom he could depend would replace them." The ambassador ended

his report with the significant words, "I expect important developments

tomorrow."2** Meanwhile, the senators that had appealed to Madero to

resign had formed a committee to approach Huerta, Diaz, and the other

25S. Doc. 285, p. 2263.

26Wilson to Knox, 17 Feb. 1913, /6235, NA, RG 59.

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men that held in their hands the military power. As agreed upon the

previous day, the senators went to see Huerta, who had just returned

(to the Commandancia Militar) from leading his troops in review before

President Madero. The president had reviewed the troops from the

balcony of the palace.

Upon entering his office, Huerta told the senators that he

was at their orders and that he would obey those the senate might

decide to give him, whatever they might be. Fearing foreign intervention,

the senators replied that they wanted the government to come to some

agreement with the rebels.^ Sen. Jose Diego Fernandez later said

that the senators requested Huerta to depose Madero in order to 28 forestall U.S. intervention. Huerta then called into the office Gen.

Garcia Pena (secretary of war) and General Blanquet and had the senators 29 repeat their resolution. According to Zayas Enrique, Huerta then

offered to install in the presidency Francisco Carbajal y Rojas

(president of the supreme court), but the senators urged him to act

for himself. The general then asked for the support of the majority 30 of the supreme court. It was forthcoming.

Gen. Garcia Petia opposed the proposal for the resignation of

President Madero and bitterly reprimanded the senators. But he

apparently felt that the president had not only done nothing to

conciliate the senate but seemed determined, moreover, to antagonize

them by refusing to receive them. At the insistence of Gen. Garcia

27 Gonzalez Ramirez, pp. 346-47. 28 „ 29 De como vino Huerta, pp. 122-25. Meyer, Huerta, p. 56. 30 Rafael Zayas Enrique, The Case of Mexico and the Policy of President Wilson (New York: A. & C. Boni, 1914), pp. 67-79; Ross, pp. 305-06.

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Pena, however, the president finally agreed to receive the senators.

This proved to be his last chance, for Huerta may have decided to

await the results of this conference.

Though Senator Enrique was supposed to be the spokesman, it

was Senator Obregon who began the conference— with a rather long--winded

speech, until President Madero asked him to speak clearly and

frankly. Obregdn then stated that the senate felt it necessary to ask

for Madero's resignation. The president replied that he would never

resign and that they would have to remove him from the palace dead.^

It was now close to 10 A.M.

After Madero's encounter with the senators, Huerta ordered

General Blanquet to place Madero under arrest. But first, they must

remove Gustavo Madero and Gen. Felipe Angeles. The latter was ordered

to go to the Commandancia Militar, where he was disarmed and arrested.

Huerta drew Gustavo from the palace by arranging to lunch with him at

the Gambrinus Restaurant. When these two men were out of the way,

Blanquet ordered Col. Teodero Jimenez Riverol and Maj. Rafael

Izquierdo, with a detachment of four privates, to apprehend Madero.

With them went Enrique Zepeda. The president was meeting in a

conference room with some of his cabinet. Col. Jimenez Riverol

addressed the president with statements that the revolution had now

gone on for ten days, that thousands of their brethren had been slain

without accomplishing any good, and that he beseeched the president

to turn his powers over to the congress. Otherwise, Jimenez stated,

Gonzalez Ramirez, pp. 347-48.

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the president was under arrest on orders of Generals Huerta and 32 Blanquet.

At precisely noon on the last day of the Decena Tragica (18

February), Ambassador Wilson sent his first despatch to Washington:

This morning there is a complete calm, except that at certain intervals Diaz fires his heavy guns to prove that he has abundant ammunition. Blanquet's forces refuse to fight Diaz, and 700 Federal soldiers returned today to Cuernavaca. The supposition now is that the Federal generals are in control of the situation and the President.^3

Little did Henry Lane Wilson imagine that this message was to

be taken out of context and used with damaging effect to "prove" that

Wilson was a conspirator in the overthrow of Madero. Robert H. Murray,

in his sensational articles several years later, was to say that "he

[Wilson] announced to the State Department hours in advance of the

fact, that what was yet to be accomplished was already done."3^

Wilson's was, in fact, an astute observation, based not only on Huerta's

messages but on information that was available to any observing person.33

Wilson did what he was being paid to do: keep the Department of State

informed to the best of his ability. The fact that he was an acute and

unusually accurate observer should be to his credit. The fact was that

the "Federal generals" had, indeed, been in "control of the situation

and the President" since the arrival of Blanquet. Everyone in Mexico City

but Madero knew it.

32 Ibid., pp. 348-49; Prida, p. 526; Henry Lane Wilson, in S. Doc. 285, p. 2263.

33Wilson to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6249, NA, RG 59. 34 "Huerta and the Two Wilsons," Harper's, Weekly, 25 March 1916.

33See Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," pp. 172-74.

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When Colonel JimSnez laid hands on President Madero, the

latter took a pistol from his pocket and killed him.^ Major Izquierdo

ordered the soldires to fire on Madero, but Marcos Hernandez, Madero's

cousin, was killed instead. Madero then shot Izquierdo and fled

through a door into the arms of Blanquet, who told the president, "You

are my prisoner! ..37 He then arrested the cabinet and other officials.

At the Gambrinus Restaurant, Huerta excused himself from the

table to answer a telephone call. Assured that the arrest of Madero

was accomplished, Huerta returned to the table, mentioned something

about an emergency, and borrowed Gustavo Madero's pistol. Then he

placed Gustavo under arrest.^® Huerta then sped to the San Lazaro

station, where Gen. Manuel Rivera, chief of the Eighth Military Zone,

had just arrived from Oaxaca with reinforcements and was now awaiting 39 permission to enter the plaza. Huerta convinced Rivera to join the 40 coup. It was now two o clock in the afternoon.

Zepeda had been shot in the hand during the arrest of Madero.

Without stopping to treat his hand, he hurried the two and a half

miles to the embassy to inform the ambassador that Madero had just

been made prisoner by Blanquet ("apparently with the approval of

Huerta"), that the president had resisted and a number of officers

Henry Lane Wilson in S. Doc. 285, p. 2263; Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 349; Federico Gonzalez Garza, La revolucion mexicana (Mexico: A. del Bosque, Impresor, 1936), p. 406. Gonzalez-Garza, an eyewitness, says it was Capt. Gustavo Garmendia, Madero's aide, who killed Jimenez and Izquierdo. Zepeda, who was also an eyewitness, claimed that Madero himself shot them, as well as two soldiers. The question remains unanswered (Wilson, p. 275).

^Ross, pp. 308-09. ^Marquez Sterling, Los ultimos dlas, pp. 464-65. 39 40 Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 348. Prida, p. 526.

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in the room had been killed, and that he (Zepeda himself) afterwards

had taken a squad of men and captured Gustavo Madero in the Gambrinus 41 Restaurant.

A short time later Harry Berliner, an embassy messenger,

arrived with a verbal message from Huerta ("who was evidently acting

in conjunction with Blanquet," according to Wilson) announcing the

overthrow of the government. Wilson at once dictated a note to Huerta

and sent it by Berliner: "On no account permit any violence against ,,42 the persons of the President and Vice-President.

Later in the afternoon, as the diplomatic corps was assembled

with Ambassador Wilson, the latter received the first official

communication from Huerta:

His Excellency, the American Ambassador: The President of the republic and his ministers are now in my power at the National Palace as prisoners. I trust that Your Excellency will interpret this act of mine as the most patriotic manifestation of a man who had no other ambition then to serve his country. I beg Your Excellency to accept this act as one which has no further object than to restore peace in the republic and to insure the interests of its children and those of foreigners who have brought us so many benefits. I offer Your Excellency my greetings and with the greatest respect I beg you to bring the contents of this note to the attention of His Excellency President Taft. I also beg of you to convey this information to the various diplomatic missions in this city. If Your Excellency would honor me by sending this information to the rebels at Ciudadela, I would see in this action a further motive of gratitude from the people of this Republic and myself towards you and the always glorious people of the United States. V. Huerta43

41Wilson to Knox, 18 Feb. 1913, /6245, NA, RG 59.

43"Berliner subsequently made an affidavit confirming the incident, but mistakenly attributing the note to Mrs. Wilson, who took my dictation on her personal card" (Wilson, p. 276n). 43 Huerta to Wilson, 18 Feb. 1913, enclosure to Wilson to Knox, 18 Feb. 1913, /6244, NA, RG 59; and Post Records, Mexico City, 1913, XXI Cl 800, NA, RG 84.

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The last paragraph casts serious doubt on the theory that Huerta’s

actions were a result of agreement reached by Huerta and Diaz. But

even if there had been such a secret agreement, the note indicates

that the ambassador knew nothing about it— and was being used.

Having listened to Huerta's note with obvious relief, the

assembled diplomats at once authorized Wilson to draft an answer

in the name of the corps:

American Embassy Mexico, February 18, 1913 General: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of this date announcing that you have made prisoner the President of the Republic and also that his ministers are in your power. The resident diplomatic corps is at this moment assembled in the embassy and the information contained in Your Excellency’s note has been brought to their knowledge. My colleagues instruct me to say that they rely upon you and the Mexican Army to preserve order in the City of Mexico and trust that you will use your best efforts to induce Mexicans of all elements to cooperate to the same end. I have, etc. Henry Lane Wilson

In his own name, Wilson sent an additional note to Huerta:

Without desiring in the least to intrude into Mexican domestic affairs, I beg to suggest the desirability, in view of the chaotic conditions which now exist, that you place yourself and the army under your command at the disposition of the Mexican Congress.44

He also requested Huerta, through Henry G. Tannant (second secretary of

the embassy), to release Lascurain (secretary of foreign affairs),

Ernesto Madero (secretary of finance), and Hernandez (secretary of

gobernacion). They were all at once freed, and they took asylum in the

U.S. embassy. Wilson later wrote: ". . .at that time I am sure it 45 was Huerta s intention to free Madero also. Unofficially, Wilson

sent a messenger to advise General Diaz of what had transpired.

44 Both notes are enclosures to Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

45Wilson, p. 278.

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While Wilson was in the process of writing the notes to Huerta,

the latter had some fliers prepared; these were distributed in the

streets at four o'clock, at the same time that the cathedral bells

announced the news to the city:^

In view of the very difficult circumstances through which the nation, and in the last days, the capital of the republic have labored, and in view of what may be considered a state of anarchy resulting from the incapable government of Mr. Madero, I hereby assume executive powers. Until the Congress of the union meets and makes determinations on the present situation, I shall hold Francisco I. Madero and the members of his cabinet, prisoners in the National Palace. Once the matter is resolved every effort will be made to unite all minds in this historic moment. We must all work together to reestablish the peace which for the entire nation is a matter of life or death. Issued in the Executive Palace, February 18, 1913. The General Military Commander in Charge of the Executive Power. 47 V. Huerta

Madero had been deposed, but peace had still not been made. It

was unlikely that Diaz would be pleased with Huerta's unilateral

assumption of "the executive power." The Felicistas were still in

rebellion against the federal government; Huerta was now, for all

practical purposes, that government. There were still two hostile armies

in possession of the capital, and all civil government had disappeared.

Bands of looters and robbers were beginning to appear in many of the

streets; and starving men, women, and children were parading in many

of the great thoroughfares. A new danger for the foreign nationals 48 appeared to be in the process of emerging: the danger of mob action.

Under these circumstances, and without consulting anyone, Ambassador

Wilson decided to ask the two antagonists, Diaz and Huerta, to come

48Grieb, The United States and Huerta, p. 20.

4 7E1 Pais, 19 Feb. 1913, cited by Meyer, Huerta, p. 59; Maria y Campos, Episodios, pp. 216-19; De como vino Huerta, pp. 32, 140.

48Wilson, p. 279; S. Doc. 285, p. 2263.

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together for a conference in the embassy. This was a logical place:

it was neutral ground— actually U.S. territory— and the full

scrutiny of the diplomatic corps would lessen the danger of mutual

treason. Neither Huerta nor Diaz wanted to walk into a trap. "My

object," says Wilson, "was to have them enter into an agreement for

the suspension of hostilities and for joint submission to the federal

congress.„49

Much to Wilson's relief, both generals agreed to meet. Near the

hour fixed (9:30 P.M., some six hours after Madero's arrest),

General Diaz arrived— accompanied by embassy officials and a number of

followers, possibly because he feared a trap. Shortly thereafter,

Huerta arrived— similarly escorted. The meeting was not secret. The

embassy was "packed to overflowing" with U.S. citizens, the diplomatic

corps, and the officers of Diaz and Huerta.^® After a few amenities,

the generals were escorted into the embassy library, where a

conference table was available. Wilson was dismayed when the generals

brought their small army of retainers and advisers into the library

with them, and the opponents at once began to engage in "wordy conflicts

betokening unknown duration and infinite possibilities."^ At Wilson's

earnest request, the generals agreed to meet alone, with only the

embassy clerk (D'Antin) present. Wilson then entreated the two leaders

to arrange their differences and submit to Congress, the only existing 52 representative of the people.

The conference did not go smoothly. Three times the discussion

was broken off, and each time Wilson entered the library and appealed

49Wilson to Knox, 18 Feb. 1913, /6246, NA, RG 59.

50S. Doc. 285, p. 2264; Wilson, p. 280. 51Ibid. 52Ibid.

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to their reason and patriotism to continue.^ Finally, to force a

decision, the ambassador admonished the generals that, unless they

brought about peace, the demand of the European powers for intervention 34 might become too strong for Washington to resist. Shortly before

1 A.M. on 19 February, the generals reached an agreement, which they

signed and deposited in the embassy safe. This was known as the Pact

of the Embassy. ^

In essence, the Pact provided for Huerta to assume the

provisional presidency by the authority of the Congress, while Diaz

was to name the cabinet and receive Huerta's support of his candidacy

at the next presidential elections.

The pact having been concluded, the generals left the embassy.

Henry Lane Wilson must have believed that his ordeal was over. At

midnight, he had sent a despatch detailing all that had taken place,

concluding with these optimistic words:

I expect no further trouble in the city, and I congratulate the Department upon the happy outcome of events which have been directly or indirectly the result of its instruction.^

The mass of people in the city appears to have been well

pleased at the end of the fighting. At 5 P.M., when the bells in the

53 Cline makes the amazing statement that "Generals Huerta and Diaz met in the American Embassy at 8 P.M. on February 18, where openly and formally they concluded the secret pact already agreed upon during the previous day" (The Dnited States and Mexico, p. 132). The book is full of such examples of gross inaccuracies.

54Wilson to Knox, 18 Feb. 1913, /6246, NA, RG 59. Wilson was still following Knox's advice.

"^Grieb calls it also the "Pact of the Ciudadela" (p. 21). There is no documentary evidence that a "Pact of the Ciudadela" ever existed. The name is based on the unfounded assumption expressed by Cline (see n. 53, just above). The text of the Pact of the Embassy can be found in many printed sources. Meyer reproduces it (Huerta, pp. 235-36).

56Wilson to Knox, 18 Feb. 1913, /6246, NA, RG 59.

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cathedral tower were announcing the change of government, the streets

were thronged with a noisy mob of people who gave vent to their

enthusiasm by indiscriminate abrazos and mutual congratulations. But

there were some in a much less happy mood. Sullenly refusing to be

joyful, these people (many of them victims of Gustavo's gang gunmen, the

porra) congregated in front of the Gambrinus Restauraunt and howled for

the blood of Gustavo Madero. It was destined to flow soon enough. ^

For the rest of the evening, Wilson reported, looting went unchecked;

but by morning the city was perfectly quiet.

The generals may have agreed that Huerta was to have the

provisional presidency; but, in order for such an agreement to be legal,

the legitimate president (Madero) and vice-president (Pino Suarez) had

to resign. The first order of business, then, was to procure the resignations

of these two men. Foreign Secretary Pedro Lascuriin, taken prisoner 59 with Madero, was released early on the morning of 22 February.

Lascurain was in line for the presidency after the vice-president,

according to the Constitution. A group of congressmen then visited the

president and vice-president, prisoners at the National Palace, urging

them to resign. The congressmen were followed by Gen. Juvencio Robles,

who pointed out to Madero and Pino Suarez that it was useless for them

to refuse, since the entire federal army was now their enemy. Finally,

relatives of the president and vice-president added their pleas, until

the men succumbed to the pressure and the pleas.^ But they presented

three conditions: Maderista governors in all the states must continue

~*^De como vino Huerta, p. 34.

58Wilson to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6246, NA, RG 59.

^G onzalez Ramirez, p. 351. 8^Ibid., p. 352.

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in office: Madero supporters must not be molested in any way; and

Madero, Pino Suarez, and General Angeles and their families must be

accompanied to Veracruz, on the way to their exile, by the Japanese

and Chilean ministers.^ It was also agreed that Lascurain should

present the resignations to the Congress only after the departure of

Madero and his friends from Veracruz.^

The secretary of foreign affairs did not keep his promise.

At 8:45 P.M., Lascurain, accompanied by the committee of congressmen

appointed earlier in the day to interview Madero and Pino Suarez,

submitted the letters of resignation, without the conditions agreed to,

to the Chamber of Deputies.^ The Chamber voted to accept the

resignations, and they designated Pedro Lascurain president ad interim. 64 Lascurain was then sworn in before the two houses of the Congress.

After appointing Huerta secretary of gobernacion, Lascurain submitted

his own resignation as president ad interim. The Chamber of Deputies

then declared Huerta president ad interim. At 11:20 P.M., Huerta was

then sworn in before the two houses. Though all these acts were

strictly according to the letter of the Constitution, they were not

in accordance with the agreement with Madero and Pino Suarez.^

^Fabela, Historia diplomatics, I, 127. 62 Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 352.

*^D e como vino Huerta, pp. 35, 158.

^ I b id., pp. 161-63; Maria y Campos, pp. 225-27.

^Felipe Tena Ramirez, dean of the Mexican constitutional lawyers "and by no means an adherent of Victoriano Huerta," concludes that "the constitutional formalities were impeccably observed . . . therefore the government of Huerta was not born of usurpation ..." (Derecho Constitucional de Mexico [Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1955], p. 73, quoted in Meyer [Huerta, p. 683). As if to confirm the legality of Huerta's interim presidency, Huerta received a congratulatory

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Early in the morning of 19 February, before Madero and Pino

Suirez had resigned, Wilson heard that Gustavo Madero had been killed

by the process of the ley fuga. ^ Gustavo had, in fact, been turned

over to a mob of drunken soldiers at the Ciudadela, where he had been

brutally tortured and then mercifully shot.^ Shortly thereafter,

Von Hintze (the German minister) arrived at the embassy and found the

ambassador and Mrs. Wilson "enthusiastic" over the necessity of saving

Madero*s life. The Wilsons evidently feared that the ley fuga might

be applied to Madero and Pino SuArez as well. The two diplomats

went together to Huerta at the palace, where they expressed their

fears for the life of the ex-president. Von Hintze later wrote to

Wilson:

. . . we got from him his word of honor as a caballero and a soldier to protect the life of his abated opponent. We got some more promises. Do you remember that I told you when we reached your embassy: "In future days you will realize that by today* s action you have added a laurel wreath to the crown of the United States"? You have, and I am sure you and every American is proud of it. . . .88

When Wilson and Von Hintze returned to the embassy, Dona

Sara Madero, the ex-president’s wife, was there with her brother;

they bore a petition from the Madero family for the diplomatic corps

to intercede on behalf of the ex-president. Since the ambassador had

just been to see Huerta, he delegated the Spanish and Cuban ministers

to convey the request. The two men proceeded to the National Palace,

letter from the members of the Supreme Court two days after the inauguration (De como vino Huerta, p. 170).

66Wilson to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6264, NA, RG 59.

^^Ross dramatically details Gustavo's death (pp. 307-13). 68 Adm. Paul von Hintze to Wilson, 8 Jan. 1913, S. Doc. 285, p. 2274; Wilson, pp. 344-45.

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where they found the Chilean minister. The three of them then had an

interview with General Blanquet. It was pointed out that, as one of

the conditions of his resignation, Madero had asked to be permitted

to go into exile. This request had been agreed to. General Blanquet

assured the ministers that Madero, Pino Suarez, their families, and

othar high officials of the Madero government would be permitted to

leave for Veracruz. The Chilean and Cuban ministers, who were close

personal friends of the Madero family, asked to accompany him; and

General Blanquet agreed.^9 The train to bear Madero and his retinue

to Veracruz was ordered, and there is no reason to believe that it was

not intended at this time that the ex-president would not be permitted

to leave.

But early in the afternoon, a message was received from Gen.

Jose Refugio Velasco, the military commander at Veracruz, who demanded

clarifications on the change of government and strongly implied that he

would not support the provisional government unless he received additional

information.7^ This was ominous news, since Veracruz was the only

practical route for the ex-president's train. The new government was

not yet in complete control of the situation, and fears of a pro-Madero

counterrevolution were rife. Then, too, ex-president Madero did

nothing to allay those fears. When asked, as a matter of courtesy, to

select an officer to command his guard, Madero chose General Angeles,

a staunch Maderista who was a fellow prisoner; and Madero adamantly

refused to select anyone else.7^

^9Marquez Sterling, pp. 487-93.

7^Ibid., pp. 549-50; De como vino Huerta, pp. 172-73.

71Grieb, p. 25.

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Sometime after the receipt of General Velasco's message.

Ambassador Wilson went to Huerta to learn the exact situation and to get

guarantees for public order. Huerta reassured the ambassador and went

on to explain about Gustavo's death: Gustavo Madero had been killed

by soldiers without orders; Gustavo and the ex-president had twice

tried to assassinate him and held him prisoner for one day. Then

Huerta asked Wilson whether it was best to send the ex-president out

of the country or to place him in a lunatic asylum. "What can I do

with him? He is loco [crazy] and he is under the control of other

dangerous persons," Huerta was later quoted by Wilson as having said 72 at this interview. Huerta may have mentioned to Wilson that General

Velasco might attempt to free Madero, for the ambassador replied that 73 Huerta ought to do what was best for the peace of the country.

Wilson was later warned by Secretary Knox that "General Huerta's

consulting you as to the treatment of Madero tends to give you a 74 certain responsibility in the matter."

It seems that Huerta, in spite of Madero's truculence and

Velasco's threat, at first decided to carry out his promise to send

Madero to Veracruz. The train that had been ordered arrived at the

railroad station, and at ten o'clock that night the families of

Madero and Pino Suarez, former officials, and a strong guard boarded

the train and proceeded to await the prisoners. They were to wait for

four hours.

72S. Doc. 285, p. 2273.

73Wilson to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6271, NA, RG 59.

74Knox to Wilson, 20 Feb. 1913, /6271, NA, RG 59.

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The delay was caused by the conniving of the Madero family

themselves. Sometime after 10 o'clock, while the Madero family and

friends were already in the train, the government intercepted telegrams

that had been exchanged between them and General Velasco, in which

the Maderos urged the General to rise when the train reached Orizaba.7^

Huerta at once countermanded the order fcr Madero's departure. At

one o'clock in the morning, U.S. Consul William Canada (Veracruz)

telegraphed Ambassador Wilson that the military commander, the

governor, and other state officials declared that they had not

recognized Huerta and had ignored the order to release Felicista

prisoners. General Velasco was recruiting Maderista volunteers for a

rebellion upon Madero's arrival. Canada ended the message: "Do not

allow ex-President Madero to come here nov."7“ There is no record to

indicate that Wilson showed this telegram to Huerta. He did not have

to, since Huerta had all the evidence he needed. At two o'clock in

the morning, Pedro Lascurain arrived at the railroad station and

informed the Madero group that the prisoner's departure had been

temporarily suspended.77

Unaware of the intercepted telegram in Huerta's possession,

Wilson (again accompanied by Von Hintze) went to see the president

on the forenoon of 20 February. The diplomats remonstrated -• r

against the treatment accorded to Madero by keeping him imprisoned

75S. Doc. 285, p. 2273.

76Canada to Wilson, 20 Feb. 1913, 1 A.M., PR Mexico City 1913, NA, RG 84; Canada to State Department, 20 Feb. 1913, 3 P.M., /6279, NA, RG 59.

77Mexican Herald, 21 Feb. 1913, cited by Grieb, p. 26.

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in a small cell, and they urged Huerta "with insistence" for a

guarantee of Madero's life. Huerta gave them a positive guarantee

that the life of Madero would be protected, "at the same time saying

to us that there were men about him who wanted the life of Madero from

motives of revenge, these men and their families having suffered at

the hands of the Madero family during Madero's presidency." He added

that his greatest problem was to get Madero out of the country— and

out of the situation entirely.78 Huerta then informed them that his

original plan of sending Madero out of the country had been frustrated

by the activities of the Madero family, whose telegrams had been 79 intercepted and were of record. Huerta then showed the diplomats

the intercepted telegrams.8*^ He added that, since he was now

provisional president, he was responsible to the Mexican nation for

whatever might occur and that they could accept his assurances that

no violence was under contemplation. Wilson then requested Huerta to

transfer the ex-president to "more commodious quarters, and to provide

him with his customary food and other things essential to his always

delicate state of health."8^

Wilson understood that ex-President Madero, being a prisoner,

was in no condition to be plotting escape, much less a counterrevolution.

The dangerous situation he now found himself in was the making of

well-meaning but bumbling relatives and "friends." There was now

little that Wilson could do. As Grieb has tersely stated,

78Wilson to Knox, 20 Feb. 1913, /6277, NA, RG 59; S. Doc. 285, p. 2273.

79Wilson, p. 284. 8°S. Doc. 285, p. 2273.

81Wilson, p. 285.

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It is unlikely that Huerta would have heeded any counsel in a matter that involved the survival of the government, and it cannot be denied that Madero was a menace to the Huerta regime. . . . It is unlikely that vigorous efforts would have altered the course of events.82

Wilson and Von Hintze were still at the palace when Mrs. Wilson

telephoned from the embassy that Mrs. Madero was there, accompanied

this time by the ex-president's sister, Mercedes. Wilson hurried

home. The interview he had with these women was distorted three years

later by Robert Hammond Murray, a muckracking reporter for the New York

World, and his distortions were later used to vilify Henry Lane Wilson.**3

Mrs. Madero is reported to have stated that his behavior and appearance

were "brusque" and that at times Mrs. Wilson tugged at his coat,

apparently to try to induce him to speak differently. When Mrs. Madero

asked him to use his influence to protect the lives of her husband

and the other prisoners, Wilson purportedly replied, "That is a

responsibility that I do not care to undertake, either for myself, or

for my government."**^ Mrs. Madero then produced a note from Madero's

**^The United States and Huerta, pp. 25, 28.

33See, for example, Henry Bamford Parkes, A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton, 1950), p. 334; Fabelaj Historia Diplomatica, I, 154-58. Cline says: "Mrs. Madero asked Ambassador Wilson to use his influence with the new government to safeguard their existence. The Ambassador replied that he could not meddle with the internal affairs of the Huerta regime. . . . Ambassador Wilson's insensibility to humanitarian appeals dogged him forever" (p. 133). These writers do not quote Murray directly, but the accusations they present were first expressed by him (see chapter VIII, below). 84 Ernest Gruening (Mexico and Its Heritage, pp. 569-73), quoting an interview (purportedly taking place on 15 Aug. 1916) between Mrs. Madero and Robert Hammond Murray. It should be noted that the interview supposedly took place after the publication of Murray's libelous articles, "Huerta and the Two Wilsons," in Harper's Weekly (March-April 1916).

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mother to President Taft, which the ambassador "reluctantly" promised

to send.8"*

Annoyed as he may have been with the Maderos because of their

plots to recue the ex-president, Wilson was not insensitive to

Madero's situation. He had no love for Madero. Indeed, he wired

Knox: "A wicked despotism has fallen." Yet, in the same telegram,

he complained:

I understand that severe treatment is being received by Madero and the Vice President, and some generals who are still incarcerated in the National Palace. In my opinion this feature of the situation should be brought to the attention of the President, and I would suggest that the Department send the Embassy instructions to officially deal with the matter of reprisals with General Diaz as an intermediary with General Huerta.80

This was a very busy day for General Huerta, yet Wilson visited

him once more that afternoon. As he reported to Knox, he "unofficially

requested" that, in order that the life of the ex-president and ex-vice­

president be not taken "except by due process of law," the utmost

precautions be taken by the general. Huerta informed Wilson that "these

two persons" would probably be tried, "but did not state upon what

charges," and that every precaution was being taken to guard their

lives. 87 Reassured, Wilson went home. This was the fifth time Wilson

had interceded for Madero in three days.

The only remaining center of potential violence in the

rebellion was eliminated on the afternoon of 20 February by the

withdrawal of the erstwhile rebels from the Ciudadela. At 5 o'clock,

^ Later, Madero's mother was to accuse Wilson of refusing to send the telegram to Taft (Mercedes Gonzalez de Madero to Taft, 2 March 1913, PR Mexico City 1913, NA, RG 84). Wilson did send the telegram (Wilson to Knox, 21 Feb. 1913, /6320, NA, RG 59).

86Wilson to Knox, 20 Feb. 1913, /6277, NA, RG 59. 87Ibid.

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Generals Diaz and Mondragon quitted their stronghold and, marching

their men through a rain of flowers and confetti, presented themselves

before President Huerta and turned over their forces to the new govern­

ment.^^ A parade of units from both sides formed, after which Diaz

and Mondragtfn were received by Huerta and the cabinet.89 Wilson

reported that the work of cleaning up the city and restoring order in 90 all departments was being vigorously prosecuted. It was a monumental

job:

With guns hushed, the work of cleaning up and rebuilding could begin. Red Cross units and teams of volunteers gathered up the bloated and decaying corpses and tried their best to make identifications from what remained. Those who could not be identified were loaded on carts and transported to vacant fields for mass burials. Sanitation workers scoured the streets and attacked a ten-day backload of garbarge, while electricians began to repair broken wires dangling dangerously from their poles. Children cooped up during the fighting sallied forth from front doors and shopkeepers posted signs announcing that they were again open for business as usual. The huge public square in front of the National Palace was cleared of debris and a shiny military parade, replete with drum and bugle corps, intimated the return of happier days.91

Huerta held his first cabinet meeting on the night of 21

February. The problem of what to do about Madero was becoming

increasingly thorny. Because of the plots to rescue the ex-president,

sending him to Veracruz was absolutely out of the question. To

attempt to ship him out by some other port involved long, circuitous

routes, across open country, where the possibility of an attack was

ever present. There was also a message from President Taft, relayed

through the ambassador that afternoon, to the effect that the

88Ibid., /6271, NA, RG 59. 89Maria y Campos, p. 233.

9°Wilson to Knox, 20 Feb. 1913, /6277, NA, RG 59.

91Meyer, Huerta, pp. 65-66.

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shooting of Gustavo Madero had caused an unfavorable impression in

Washington; but the D.S. president was gratified to believe that the 92 deposed president and vice-president would not meet the same fate.

The cabinet debated and concluded that neither exile nor the committal

of Madero to an insane asylum was the answer. Rather, it was decided

that the man should be tried for political crimes. Until the preparation

of formal charges, to be handled "with the greatest respect for legal

technicalities," the prisoners should be remanded to the Penitentiary 93 of the District, where they would be more secure.

An extensive literature has grown up around the responsibility

for the assassinations of Madero and Pino Suarez; it has been found

impossible to place the ultimate responsibility for the crime definitely

on any one person. Most of the accounts are full of unsubstantiated

accusations against favorite enemies. Huerta, of course, is the

prime suspect in such writers as Fabela and Gonzalez Ramirez, but their 94 charges rest mostly on a presumed motive. Others have accused Henry

Lane Wilson of the ultimate responsibility— largely from circumstantial 95 evidence. Still others accuse Felix Dxaz or Cecilio Ocon or Manuel

92Knox to Wilson, 21 Feb. 1913, /6294a, HA, RG 59. 93 Legends circulated in Mexico to the effect that the cabinet agreed to have Madero murdered have been thoroughly discredited (see Ross, p. 326; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, p. 241, n. 50; Meyer, Huerta, pp. 80-81). 94 Meyer, Huerta, pp. 77-80. 95 Louis Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1916 (New York: Exposition Press, 1967), pp. 19-20, 41; Daniel A. Morenc, Los hombres de la Revolucion: 40 estudios biograficos (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1960), p. 104; and Gonzalez Ramirez, p. 363— all charge Wilson*s complicity in the murders. Gruening says that Wilson by refusing to intercede for Madero was an accomplice (pp. 569-73)— as does Fabela (Historia Diplomatics, I, 154-58), who cites MArquez Sterling, passim.

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Mondragdn or some combination of any of these men. And so it

goes.

Accounts of the assassinations are themselves full of

contradictions and myths. Numerous versions appeared almost before

the bodies of Madero and Pino Suarez were cold; and the accounts

continued to proliferate. Even the admitted pistolero that shot

Madero, Maj.. Francisco Cardenas, gave three separate versions of

the killings.^0 Meyer has it that, shortly after 10 P.M., Madero and

Pino Suarez were placed in separate cars, each of which contained three

rurales under the command of Major Cardenas and Cpl. Rafael Pimienta.

They sped away from the palace toward the penitentiary. Upon their

arrival there, they circled out toward the rear of the building,

where Cardenas shot Madero in the back of the neck, while Pimienta

killed Pino Suarez. Then both bodies were riddled with bullets— as

were the automobiles— in an attempt to simulate an attack on the

convoy. The bodies were then taken to the front entrance to the 97 penitentiary, wrapped in grey serapes, and dragged inside.

Francisco Ledn de la Barra, formerly interim president and

now secretary of foreign relations, later that night informed

Ambassador Wilson of the deaths of Madero and Pino Suarez. De la

Barra explained that the government had intended to transfer the

ex-president and vice-president to the penitentiary, where it would

possible to make them more comfortable and where they would be in

^Meyer is the first to describe these three versions in English (Huerta, p. 78). 97 Ibid., pp. 71-74. This account of the assassinations is as accurate a reconstruction as is possible from the available evidence, according to the author.

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security until the public passions had subsided. They were accordingly

transferred at about 11:30 P.M. En route to the penitentiary the party

was attacked; and, in the struggle that followed, both the ex-president

and vice-president were killed.98 President Huerta, in a published

letter the following morning, made the same explanation— adding that

all the circumstances would be made the subject of a rigid judicial

investigation.

During the remainder of that day and the following, Wilson

tried to find out more about what had happened. He later wrote that he

was finally satisfied and remained convinced that

the death of Madero was not, in my judgement, brought about by Huerta, but by two, and perhaps three, individuals closely connected with his official family. . . . To my distinct knowledge, Huerta did not desire the death of Madero. I am further cognizant of the circumstance that he was deeply shocked and surprised by his death. The inside facts with regard to the death of Madero were put in my possession by Francisco de la Barra, former provisional President of Mexico and minister of foreign affairs under Diaz and Huerta . . . and Ambassador to Washington, a very highly cultivated and very humane man, whose opinion I would accept upon almost any matter of fact.99

The ambassador urged the Department of State to accept the

government version of the assassination, "for the present."100 After

all, Wilson felt, the assassinations (while unfortuante) were no

business of the U.S. government since, at the time Madero was murdered

or killed, he was no longer president of Mexico, but simply a Mexican

citizen. Wilson believed that his death, however repugnant to all

codes of civilization, should have concerned the rest of the world from

a political standpoint no more than the death of any other Mexican

98Wilson to Knox, 23 Feb. 1913, /6321, NA, RG 59. 99 Wilson, pp. 285-86; S. Doc. 285, p. 2287.

100Wilson to Knox, 23 Feb. 1913, /6323, NA, RG 59.

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citizen, "especially at a time when we were overlooking the death by

murder of hundreds of American citizens in Mexico." Besides, claimed

the ambassador, the death of Madero made no impression whatsoever in

Mexico. It was taken by Mexican public opinion as a necessary and

usual consequence of an overthrow. Contrary to what some pro-Madero

reporters were writing, there seems to have been no general sense of 102 outrage in Mexico.

The assassinations of Madero and Pino Suarez caused widespread

revulsion in the United States. The antiadministratior. New York

World, in particular, published somewhat hysterical editorials.

Previously, the paper had consistenly backed Madero's efforts to

bring "democracy" to Mexico— implying that the country was prepared

to put U.S.-style government into practice. It now contradicted

itself, saying in an editorial (of 25 February) that recent events had

demonstrated that Mexico was incapable of ruling itself. The writer

of the editorial believed that the murders were "the logical consequence

of normal political conditions in Mexico.Somewhat more cautiously,

the Washington Post merely wondered editorially about all the expressions

of horror in the press— when the murderous Cipriano Castro (of Venezuela)

101S. Doc. 285, pp. 2278-79. 102 Luis Lara Pardo, Matchs de Dictadores: Wilson contra Huerta; Carranz~ contra Wilson (n.p., 1914; rpt. Mexico: A. P. MArquez, 1942), p. 148; M e yer(Huerta, p. 65) contra Gruening (p. 753). Newspaper clippings from the provincial press sent by the U.S. consulates throughout Mexico seem to back up the ambassador's statement to a certain extent. The assassinations became a call to arms after Carranza's Plan de Guadalupe of 26 March. (See Post Records for various consulates, Feb. and March 1913, NA, RG 84).

'^N e w York World, 25 Feb. 1913 (see editorials and articles in this newspaper, especially during November 1910 and June 1911 and 11-25 February 1913).

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had just been Invited to visit the United States and no one seemed 104 perturbed.

None of the newspapers went so far as to advocate nonrecognition

of the new Mexican provisional government. The World stated editorially

that Huerta should be promptly recognized, as Ambassador Wilson had

suggested. True, Huerta came to power "through treachery and

assassination," but "in the society of nations one thing alone is

taken note of: whether a government is a fact and there is good reason

to believe it will maintain itself.

The Taft administration's reaction to the assassinations

was predictable. It was the expression of "regret," but without

inuendos or raising of official eyebrows. Secretary Knox had long

expressed the view that Mexican internal matters and disputes were

no business of the United States, so long as U.S. citizens and interests

received adequate protection.

'''^Washington Post, 26 Feb. 1913.

105New York Herald, 27 Feb. 1913.

106Knox to John D. Archibald, 10 May 1911, 90755-863, NA, RG 60.

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THE DAYS OF TRANSITION: 19 FEBRUARY - 12 MARCH 1913

Ambassador Wilson's insistence that the United States accept

the Huerta government's version of the Madero and Pino Suirez

assassinations was based on the concern that official expressions of

disbelief might jeopardize the delicate negotiations that had to ba

entered into with the new government. To Henry Lane Wilson, career

diplomat of the "old school," nothing was more important than the

protection of U.S. lives and interests.^- He felt that the early

recognition of the Huerta government was essential for this protection.

Recognition, however, could be used by the ambassador as a lever to

help bring about the settlement of the outstanding disputes between the

two countries. There would be no harm in delaying formal recognition

for a few days, until at least tentative agreement could be reached.

As early as the afternoon of 19 February, therefore, even before the

Huerta government had been legally established, Wilson wired Knox:

In many important matters, I have been assuming considerable responsibility in proceeding without instructions, but no harm has been done, and in my opinion great benefits have been won for our country, and especially for Americans in Mexico. . . . At any rate I would suggest that the Department give me general instructions immediately that the complaints set forth in our note of September 15th be brought to the attention of whatever

Grieb, The United States and Huerta, p. 17; Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, 1969), p. 547; Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 254.

147

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government may be created here, and that at least an arrangement to settle them all be urged.2

Basically, there were five questions to be settled: the

long-festering Chamizal controversy, the problem of the distribution

of the Colorado River waters, border claims for damages to U.S.

citizens from the Battles of Agua Prieta and JuArez in 1911, the

thorny question of justice for foreigners before Mexican courts, and

claims for loss of life and property during the Revolution (including

the Tlahualiio claims, to be settled by an international commission).

As soon as Huerta was installed as provisional president, Wilson

felt he could proceed to do business, since the general had taken

office "in accordance with the Constitution and precedents."3

Wilson did not wait for his instructions to arrive before he

proceeded to make his move. He testified later that "the disposition

of the administration under President Taft and Secretary Knox was to

accept my recommendations upon all questions. In other words, they 4 followed the embassy. This statement was generally true. On the

night of 20 February, then, he called together the diplomatic corps

for the purpose of ascertaining their collective opinion on the matter

of recognition. This move was necessitated by the fact that they were

all invited to meet the new provisional president the following noon.

None of the diplomats had yet received any instructions. Still, they

all agreed that the recognition of the new government was imperative

if it were to be able to impose its authority and reestablish order

in the country.3 To help the new government achieve these

W i l s o n to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6264, NA, RG 59.

3Ibid., 20 Feb. 1913, /6287, NA, RG 59. 4S. Doc. 285, p. 2280.

5Wilson to Knox, 21 Feb. 1913, /6319, NA, RG 59.

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desiderata— and believing that he was "interpreting the desires of

the Department and assisting in the tranquilization"8— Wilson sent a

circular telegram to all the U.S. consuls and consular agents in the

republic. The message breathed optimism:

Provisional Government installed yesterday with General Huerta as President. General public approval of Congress in this city, which is perfectly quiet: reassuring reports from other places. President Madero is a prisoner, awaiting the decision of Congress in his case. The Senate and Chamber of Deputies are in full accord with the new administration. You should make this intelligence public, and in the interests of Mexico, urge general submission and adhesion to the new Government, which will be recognized by all foreign Governments today.7

The Taft administration accepted Wilson’s recommendations

without exception.** There was never any question that Huerta would 9 be recognized at the earliest possible time. Indeed, Secretary Knox

wired the ambassador thus: "The Department is disposed, from the

statements and tenor of your recent telegrams, to consider the new

Provisional Government as being legally established." Knox added:

You are instructed to say to those seeking recognition as the new Provisional Government, that the United States will be glad to receive assurances that the outstanding questions between this country and Mexico . . . will be dealt with in a satisfactory

6Ibid.

^Wilson to all consuls and consular agents, 21 Feb. 1913, /6325, NA, RG 59. This action and others on the part of Wilson to help the Huerta Government establish its authority were fully endorsed by Taft and Knox (Knox to Wilson, 28 Feb. 1913, /6394, NA, RG 59).

8Knox to Wilson, 21 Feb. 1913, /6325a, NA, RG 59. 9 Meyer says that when Madero and Pino Suarez were assassinated, President Taft had less than two weeks left in his presidential term, and he decided to leave "the delicate question of recognition" to Woodrow Wilson (Huerta, p. 110). Taft and Knox afterward declared that they would have given formal recognition— even as late as 4 March— if they had known that President Wilson would not recognize the Huerta government (New York Times, 23 April 1915; Taft to W. V. Bachus, 10 July 1916, Taft Papers; Diary of Chandler P. Anderson, 15 March 1915).

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manner. These questions and the grievances of this Government are set forth in general terms in the Department's note of September 15th, to which the attention of the new Provisional Government should be invited. . . .

Wilson was further instructed to deal directly with General Huerta,

"in order to avoid the stereotyped and slow treatment of these

matters to be expected from De La Barra," the new secretary of

foreign affairs.^

Knox may have been under the impression that Wilson was on

rather close terms with Huerta, but such was not the case. As the

ambassador pointed out in reply, his relations with De la Barra were

extremely intimate, since they had known each other for more than

twelve years. There was no need, Wilson felt, to deal directly with 12 Huerta. On the morning of 22 February, Wilson had with De la

Barra an informal conversation, during which he conveyed to the Foreign

Secretary the instructions received from Knox. They arranged to

meet formally two days later; but, on the basis of the first conversation,

Wilson became convinced that he could secure the results aimed at

by his government "without resorting to the refusal of full ..13 recognition. Wilson pointed out that the Huerta government

understood that the ambassador expected something to be done

immediately; and, since there seemed to be every disposition to be

grateful to the embassy for its good offices in helping to bring about

a termination of the conflict and since the atmosphere was now entirely

friendly, he requested further instructions. He preferred not to

10Knox to Wilson, 21 Feb. 1913, /6325a, NA, RG 59.

n ibid., 23 Feb. 1913, /6326a, NA, RG 59.

12Wilson to Knox, 23 Feb. 1913, /6326, NA, RG 59. 13Ibid.

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impose final settlement of the differences between the two governments

as a condition of full recognition of Huerta's government. Of course,

he would follow whatever instructions he received, but he advised 14 against using recognition as a weapon.

Secretary Rnox was not so sure. After all, as he had indicated

in his instructions of 21 February, "in view of the situation which

has prevailed for the past two years or more, this Government must

very carefully consider the question of their ability and earnest

disposition to comply. . . ."15 Nevertheless, Knox agreed to be

guided to a degree by the results of Wilson's coming interview with

De la Barra on 24 February— providing the ambassador should be careful

not to accord anything like formal recognition until instructed but

to make the forms of conducting business conform to this.^ When

Wilson asked for clarification as to the "forms" of conducting business,

it was explained to him that, since the press reaction to Madero's

overthrow was quite adverse, the embassy should be careful to reflect

the president’s reserve relative to the recognition of Huerta. "The

attitude should be one of de facto recognition of a de facto government,"

Wilson was told.^7 In spite of the ambassador's optimism, the

conference with De la Barra appears to have borne little fruit. Indeed,

it was not until 13 March that Huerta accepted all the D.S. claims "in

principle.By then, of course, the Taft administration had ended its

tenure.

14Ibid. ^Knox to Wilson, 21 Feb. 1913, /6325a, NA, RG 59.

16Ibid., 23 Feb. 1913, /6326, NA, RG 59.

17Ibid., 25 Feb. 1913, /6379a, NA, RG 59.

x8Wilson to W. J. Bryan, 13 March 1913, /6681, NA, RG 59.

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Wilson now began to urge that recognition be extended,

regardless of an immediate agreement on the points at issue. The

urgency stemmed from practical considerations. Huerta's provisional

government was the only government recognized as such by most of the 19 republic. To Wilson and, indeed, to the State Department, as well

as to the Mexican congress and supreme court, there was no doubt as

to the new government's legality (as we have seen, above). But of

more concern to Wilson than the niceties of legal procedures was the

possibility that without Huerta there would be no government at all.

"I support the Provisional Government of General Huerta," Wilson

declared, "because it is the legally constituted Government and if

it did not exist there would be no government, but chaotic conditions

of the worst character. The entire diplomatic corps is in accord." 20

That this was an accurate estimate of the situation was later borne

out by President Wilson's "emissary," William Bayard Hale— no friend

of Huerta's or the ambassador's— who reported as late as July:

Huerta supporters continue to use every means to impress argument that the United States Government, by refusing recognition, is giving Mexico over to anarchy. .. . It is true that Huerta's end cannot be far off and that to follow there is nothing in sight but anarchy.

Prompt diplomatic recognition by the United States was

essential for the pacification of the country, because delay would

be costly: as long as Huerta was denied recognition, Mexican money

19 Twenty-five of the twenty-seven states recognized Huerta. The governors of Sonora and Coahuila, significantly, refused immediate recognition (Manuel Calero, The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson As It Appears to a Mexican [New York: Press of Smith and Thompson, 1916], p. 8).

20New York World, 8 March 1913. 21 Hale to Ben G. Davis, telegram, 17 July 1913, /23629, NA, RG 59.

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in the United States was frozen and thus unavailable to the Mexican

government. Furthermore, since Huerta had inherited a depleted 22 treasury, he desperately needed foreign loans. European and U.S.

bankers were anxious to make loans available— but only after . . 23 recognition.

Wilson had, of course, a certain amount of personal

admiration for Huerta. Not only was the general a friend of the

United States and an enemy of lawlessness, but he was

a man of iron mold and courage. . . . He possessed abundant vices but was not without great qualities of mind and heart. He had an unusual gift of eloquence and sufficient natural diplomacy and statesmanship to put into confusion and ridicule "the Puritan of the north," as he called President Wilson. He was a devout Roman Catholic, a believer in the Diaz regime and policies, and with all his faults I am convinced that he was a sincere patriot and in happier times might have had a career honorable to himself and useful to his country.2*

Wilson's admiration and confidence extended to Huerta's initial

cabinet:

Perhaps no other Mexican cabinet has contained men of such exceptional ability and high character as did the cabinet of_ General Huerta in the initial months of his administration.^

This was an accurate observation. Michael C. Meyer agrees

that "the original cabinet designated by the Pact of the Embassy

provided Huerta with some of the most talented and experienced men

in Mexico . . . all men of integrity and experience. . . . These

included such luminaries as Francisco Leon de la Barra (secretary of

22Walter Flavius McCaleb, Present and Past Banking in Mexico (New York: Harper, 1920), p. 207; Meyer finds no proof of allegations that the Maderos looted the treasury (Huerta, p. 179). 23 Haley, Revolution and Intervention, p. 88.

Huerta, pp. 140-41.

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foreign relations, a former ambassador to the United States, and former

interim president of the republic), Alberto Garcia Granados (secretary

of Gobernacion under De La Barra), Jorge Vera Estanol (secretary of

education), TorihLo Esquivel Obregon (one of Mexico's most distinguished 27 scholars), and several others (equally distinguished).

These men were no mere puppets to be manipulated by an

all-powerful dictator. Indeed, during the first few months of his

administration Huerta was anything but a dictator, though he became

increasingly authoritarian as the months passed and the rebellion

against his government spread. ^ Nor was the Congress of the Union

a mere rubber stamp. The Congress frequently rejected Huerta's

recommendations and policies— and quite successfully. For example,

in accordance with the provisions of the Pact of the Embassy, Huerta

proposed for the permanent presidency early elections, which he asked

the Congress to schedule for July 1913; but a Chamber committee 29 recommended that elections be postponed until the country was pacified.

This was a ploy by the Maderista deputies, who would rather have

Huerta remain in power than face Fglix Diaz as president. Huerta, they

believed, had no intention of restoring the porfiriato-— as Diaz did.

The Catholic Party also wanted to postpone the elections, in order

to have time to organize their campaign and (perhaps) to let Diaz'

popularity die down a bit. Realizing the impossibility of getting

27 Ibid. Yet John Lind said of these men, "a worse pack of wolves never infested any community" (Lind to Bryan, 13 Nov. 1913, /9704, NA, RG 59).

2^For Huerta's relations with his cabinet, see Meyer, Huerta, pp. 127-55. 29 Nemecio Garcia Naranjo, Memorias de Nemecio Garcia Naranjo, 8 vols. (Monterrey: Ediciones de El Porvenir, 1956-62), VII, 125.

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the Congress to agree to early elections, Huerta settled for 26

October.^

Nor was the Huerta regime reactionary, as it transpired. It

has been pointed out by Meyer that Huerta and his advisers "realized

that the days of Dfaz were gone forever and . . . recognized the need

for reform." Indeed, in the matter of attempting social and economic

reforms, Huerta's regime, Meyer argues, was much more progressive

than Madero's.^

All these matters impressed the ambassador. Wilson certainly

did not want Mexico to slide back into a reactionary porfirianism, 32 which he had criticized so bitterly. Neither (as we have seen,

above) did he feel that the republic was ready for a U.S.-style

democracy- The ambassador felt that, under the leadership of a strong

government (one that would avoid the excesses of both porfirismo and

maderismo), Mexico could, in time, achieve her own equilibrium— a sort

of guided progress toward her own brand of democracy:

Perhaps 80 per cent of the population of Mexico were without an abiding place except by sufferance and took no more than a nominal part in the affairs of the country, were unable to read or write and, while preserving the traditions and vices of their ancestors, were made infinitely worse by the engrafting of the vices of the white man. This element of the population can never be brought to the practice of democratic self-government by revolution. Their elevation to the level of self-government can be accomplished only be evolution, and the slow processes of evolution can only be worked out through control by a strong

30 Diario Oficial de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 76 (31 May 1913), cited by Grieb, p. 56; Wilson to Bryan, 1 May 1913, /7355, NA, RG 59.

3~*~Huerta, p. 177. Meyer presents a good argument that Huerta's government was not counterrevolutionary, but progressive (pp. 156-77). 32 Wilson to Knox, 31 Oct. 1910, /355, NA, RG 59.

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central government working to definite ends through the medium of universal education, the establishment of order and justice, and the development of the material resources of the country. . . . Existing evil conditions . . . will be an ever-present menace unless righted by a strong and vigorous government moving on definite lines of policy and which, instead of attempting to set up an altruistic republic among people unfitted by education and tradition, shall adopt a practical policy leading to a system of universal education, the implanting of sound political ideas, and a patriotism which shall be something higher and nobler than hatred of the thrifty foreigners.

By 23 February, all but four of the states had acknowledged

Huerta's government. But these four— the northern states of Sonora,

Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Durango— could spell trouble. Within a few

days, Durango was to extend acceptance, while Coahuila and Sonora were 34 to be in the midst of negotiations. Governor Venustiano Carranza

(Coahuila) was to be the leader of those that refused to accept Huerta.

Carranza had been a Diaz senator, who had changed sides to support

Madero at the right time and had been elected Maderista governor of

his state. Over the issue of federal payments to the state troops and

their control, he had been on the point of declaring against Madero

at the time of his overthrow; but Carranza did not act at once.33

When Huerta had informed the state governors of his assumption of power

on 18 February, he had, unfortunately, been careless with his words:

"Authorized by the Senate, I have assumed the executive power, the

President and his Cabinet being prisoners."3** Carranza had convened

33Wilson, pp. 199-200, 204. 34 Alfredo Braceda, Mexico revolucionario, 1913-1917, 2 vols. (Madrid: Tipografia Artistica, 1920-41), pp. 93-95; Ross, Madero, p. 278; Grieb, p. 31. 35 Braceda, loc cit.; Alfonso Junco, Carranza y los orfgenes de su rebelion (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1935), pp. 102-04. 36 Huerta to State Governors, 18 Feb. 1913, cited by Braceda, p. 142.

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his state legislature, which had passed a resolution to the effect

that the Constitution did not authorize the senate to appoint a new 37 president. This reading was true, but the senate had done no such

thing. Acting in conjunction with the Chamber of Deputies, they had

merely acknowledged the legality of the succession. After being

informed of the procedures followed in Mexico City, Carranza (according

to Consul Philip E. Holland) admitted that the transmittal of power

was legal;38 and, deciding to "conform," he still continued to

negotiate on the issue of federal-state relations. On 22 February he

sent a delegation with credentials addressed to Huerta. This delegation

was ignored, whereupon Carranza declared against Huerta. However, on

25 February he telegraphed Huerta's secretary of gobernacion, Alberto

Garcia Granados, proposing telegraphic conference to regularize

relations between the state and federal governments. Again Carranza 39 was ignored.

The following day Carranza's brother, Jesds, informed U.S.

Consul Luther Ellsworth (Ciudad Porfirio Diaz) that the governor was

definitely in rebellion. The governor had already informed President 41 Taft to that effect. It is interesting to note that during all the

negotiations between Carranza and Huerta, no mention was made of

3^Fabela, Documentos Historicos, I, 5.

38Consul Philip E. Holland (Saltillo) to Knox, 19 Feb. 1913, /6272, NA, RG 59.

39Holland to Knox, 23 Feb. 1913, PR Mexico City 1913, NA, RG 84; Holland to Bryan, 11 March 1913, /6968, NA, RG 59; Carranza to Alberto Garcia Granados, 23 Feb. 1913, /21088, enclosure, NA, RG 59. 40 Ellsworth to Knox, 26 Feb. 1913, /6385, NA, RG 59.

41Carranza to Taft, 25 Feb. 1913, /6425, NA, RG 59.

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Madero. But, in his wire to Taft, Carranza gave the assassination

of Madero as the reason for his rebellion. What he did not inform

Taft was that his delegation was still in Mexico City trying to see

Huerta (as they would continue to try to do until March).42 The

governor of Sonora, Jose Maytorena, following Carranza's lead, was also 43 engaged in the attempt to negotiate with Huerta.

Wilson had urged Consuls Ellsworth, Hostetter, Holland, and

Bowman to do all they could to mollify Carranza; but they had failed.

Instead, the old governor became angry at what he considered interference.

The fighting actually began on 1 March. Even thereafter, Wilson

made one final attempt at bringing about a reconciliation between

Carranza and Huerta. He instructed Consul Holland to

. . . assure the governor that he is rebelling against a legally constituted provisional government. . . . Urge upon him that his overthrow and defeat appear to the embassy to be inevitable. Urge upon him the necessity of immediately making terms with the provisional government.44

Carranza angrily rejected this plea and charged Wilson with being largely 45 responsible for the situation. He did not explain how. On 4 March

the federal forces chased Carranza out of Saltillo; and on 26 March,

Carranza published his Plan de Guadalupe, in which he named himself

First Chief of the Constitutionalist Forces. If anyone had doubts about

42 Junco, pp. 102-04. 43 Consul Louis Hostetter (Hermosillo) to Knox, 26 Feb. 1913, /6498, NA, RG 59; Consul Thomas 3owman (Nogales) to Bryan, 5 March 1913, PR Mexico City 1913, XXV, Cl.800, NA, RG 84.

44Wilson to Holland, 4 March 1913, PR Mexico City 1913, XXII, Cl.800; and PR Saltillo, 1913, Pt. 2, Cl.8 — both in NA, RG 84. Wilson was acting without specific instructions in this matter. 45 Holland to Consul General Philip C. Hanna (Monterrey), 5 March 1913, PR Monterrey, Cl.8, NA, RG 84.

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the legality of Huerta’s accession to the provisional presidency,

there could surely be no doubts as the the illegality of Carranza's

proclamation of himself as Madero's successor; Carranza had no legal

right to do so. His announced intention to "avenge" Madero and the

adoption of the "Constitutionalist" title were effective propaganda

devices. They served the governor well in the months and years to

come.

The problems Huerta faced in northern Mexico appeared to the

ambassador to be minor. He was convinced that Huerta, if he could

obtain the necessary funding, could pacify the area quickly enough.

Huerta was not in the habit of losing battles. The provisional

president, certainly, seemed to be succeeding in the establishment of

his authority elsewhere. Numerous rebel leaders (including Pascual

Orozco, Jr., and some of the Zapatista leaders) accepted Huerta's

authority,^ though Zapata— suspicious— proclaimed his opposition.

Wilson continued to urge recognition until the last hours of

the Taft administration. But Taft continued to insist on the settlement

of the outstanding questions. The Taft administration ended on this

note.

Woodrow Wilson was sworn in as president of the United States

on 4 March 1913, the day Carranza was driven out of Saltillo by

Huerta's troops. The following day, "in accordance with established

precedent," Henry Lane Wilson transmitted his resignation to the

president through the new secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan,

the man he had done so much to help defeat in the campaign of 1896.

46 Consul Wilson to Knox, 27 Feb. 1913, /6412, NA, RG 59; Consul Theodore C. Hamm (Durango) to Knox, 27 Feb. 1913, /6413, NA, RG 59. See also Meyer, Huerta, p. 87.

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"I feel," he wrote, "that my resignation should be immediately

available in order that the President may be saved any embarrassment

in connection with the policy of this administration towards Mexican

affairs.- ..47

The new administration seems to have formulated no policy

"towards Mexican affairs." Indeed, neither Woodrow Wilson nor Bryan

had announced any foreign policy at all. Woodrow Wilson's attention

was riveted to domestic matters, and it would so continued for many

months yet to come.4** It was only external circumstances that finally

forced the president to acknowledge grudgingly that he lived in a

world of nations. "It would be the irony of fate"— he is quoted— "if 49 my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs."

As it developed, Woodrow Wilson's Latin-American policy

seemed at first to be merely an extension of his domestic concerns.

His attitude was summarized in his "Mobile Address" (of October 1913):

We have seen material interests threaten constitutional freedom in the United States. Therefore we will know how to sympathize with those in the rest of America who have to contend with such powers, not only within their borders, but from outside their borders also.^®

47Wilson to Bryan, 5 March 1913, 123 W 691/106, NA, RG 59. 48 From March through June 1913, the president was too preoccupied with pushing his domestic program through Congress to bother with foreign affairs. He wanted no issues to distract the Congress from tariff revision and banking and currency reform. He let all questions of foreign policy lay in abeyance until he was sure his bills would pass. See Walter Hines Page to Colonel House (23 Nov-. 1913), in Benton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page, 3 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1922-23), I, 212. 49 Charles W. Thompason, Presidents I've Known and Two Near Presidents (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1924), p .'265.

^Bemis, p. 547.

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"Material interests," of course, were evil: for Woodrow Wilson

saw economic and political decisions as essentially moral choices.

The new U.S. president possessed the mentality retained by fundamentalist

Protestants (even of a latter day), to whom every choice and every

action is possessed of moral implications and guided by moral

imperatives. "When the Wilson administration came in," Henry Lane

Wilson later recalled, "it immediately assumed the position that

everything that had been done by the prior administration was wicked."^1

Woodrow Wilson's entire political life was a crusade to remake the world

along lines set down by a sort of Covenant theology of his own brand

of Calvinism. The key concept of Wilson's secularized Calvinism was

"democracy," narrowly defined as the Anglo-Saxon political and economic

democracy of his New Freedom.

When the New York World gloated that "the Democrats will 52 change the foreign policy of the United States," neither the paper

nor the administration knew what form that change would take. The

president was relatively ignorant of foreign affairs,^ and his own 54 ignorance was compounded by that of his secretary of state. Henry

Lane Wilson declared that "Mr. Bryan ran the State Department like

the back kitchen of a restaurant." Within weeks of Bryan's arrival,

incompetence and inattention to business had become the order of the

51S. Doc. 285, p. 2281. 52New York World, 5 March 1913.

^Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956), p. 279. 54 A typical Bryan anecdote: Bryan wrote to the president from Lincoln, Nebraska, that he had just "secured authentic information" that Madero had resigned before his assassination. This was one month after the State Department had been so informed by the ambassador, and nine days after the ambassador's comprehensive report of 12 March (Bryan to President Wilson, 21 March 1913, Wilson Papers, File II).

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day. Ambassador Wilson, a stickler for proper form, complained

bitterly that he received telegrams uncoded, undated, and even

improperly addressed! The situation deteriorated to such an extent

that he finally refused to accept such telegrams as official— chiding

the secretary of state that the messages must be coded, properly addressed,

and sent from the State Department before he could accept them as

official.^ The British ambassador to Washington amazed his Foreign

Office with his observation that "owing to [the] change of administration

and [the] frequent absence of [the] Secretary of State, the State

Department is in a chaotic condition and seems to have no settled

policy."^

The reasons for this sad condition of the State Department

are not hard to find. Graham H. Stuart has stated that "perhaps no

President has ever appointed his Secretary of State with greater

hesitation, nay, even trepidation, than did Woodrow Wilson in appointing

William Jennings Bryan.The president may have been a man of

unbending integrity, but he also knew the meaning of party obligations.

It is true that Bryan had declared:

Cabinet positions ought not be regarded as currency with which to pay debts. . . . We venture to hope that Governor Wilson will be governed by higher motives than gratitude in the selection of his official household. He need not consider any service that Mr. Bryan has rendered him.58

55S. Doc. 285, p. 2289.

"^Ambassador Spring-Rice to Foreign Minister, 14 July 1913, F.O. 371/1674, file 6269/32635, quoted in Calvert, Mexican Revolution, p. 197.

^Department of State, p. 224.

~^The Commoner, 10 Jan. 1913, quoted in Stuart, p. 224.

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It is true that there was violent opposition within the party to 59 . Bryan's appointment. But Bryan had been the Democratic party s

standard-bearer for sixteen years— its presidential candidate three

times. It was he that had turned the tide in Wilson's favor at the

convention, and it was he whose support Wilson now needed to get his

legislative program through Congress.^ Besides, the president needed

a loyal man that saw things his way. William Jennings Bryan shared

the Wilsonian ideology as few others did. The Wilsonian press

certainly agreed that the cabinet should reflect the president's

This indispensable requirement for loyalty fitted in perfectly

with what Ilcfaman calls "the Democratic party's traditional belief

in the 'spoils system'"— adding that the system "found no more

passionate advocate in the administration than the new Secretary of

State."^2 Bryan proceeded to "reorganize" the Department on the

basis of party loyalty and party service. Assistant Secretary Francis

Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him, p. 118. The president's own campaign manager, William F. McCombs, urged Wilson to state, during the convention, that he would not appoint Bryan. Wilson told him to "go to hell" (William J. Bryan and Mary B. Bryan, The Memoirs of William Jennings Bryan [Philadelphia and Chicago: John C. Winston and Company, 1925], p. 350).

^Arthur S. Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 25, 113; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 8 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1927-37; rpt. New York: Scribner's, 1946), III (1931), 440.

^"It ought not to be a task of overwhelming difficulty to find nine fully qualified Democrats who are in complete sympathy with the aims and purposes of Woodrow Wilson ..." (editorial, "A Cabinet of Wilson Democrats," New York World, 26 Feb. 1913).

62 Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, pp. 119-26; Calvert, p. 168.

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M. Huntington Wilson described the scene of Bryan's first day in

office:

From the first moment his waiting room was overflowing with political friends from all over the country seeking favors for themselves or their constituents. He was left hardly a moment for Department business, and I even had to sign most of the mail for him. . . . He had never been interested in diplomacy; and this made it not only difficult but actually impossible, quickly to impart to him a conception of foreign relations.

Within a few months of Woodrow Wilson's inauguration, the

disinterest in foreign affairs by the president and the secretary of

state were made doubly disastrous by the absence of a strong body

of experienced civil servants capable of formulating and guiding

foreign policy in an orderly manner. There were wholesale firings,

hirings, transfers, and demotions— a not unusual procedure during a

change of administrations. The professionals left in the Department

were suspected, abused, understaffed, and overworked. Huntington

Wilson had been asked to remain as assistant secretary until the

Department had been reorganized, but he resigned in disgust just two

weeks later.^ Having accepted the post of counselor, John Bassett Moore,

a distinguished international lawyer, managed to put up with these

conditions until March 1914.^5 Fred Dearing, assistant chief of

the Latin-American Division, was soon demoted to Brussels, while

^ M e m o i r s of an Ex-Diplomat (Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), pp. 246-47. 64 Link, Woodrow Wilson: The New Freedom, p. 279; Secretary Wilson was replaced by John E. Osborne, a prominent Democratic politician and at that time a member of the Democratic National Committee (Stuart, p. 226).

^"The whole service, from its uncertain chief pottering platitudes and codding cheap politicians to his incompetent horde of retainers now infesting foreign capitals, is the despair of men trained in diplomacy like John Bassett Moore," editorialied the New York Tribune on 14 March 1914.

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W. T. S. Doyle, chief of that division, was replaced by Boaz W.

Long, a man with scant knowledge of Latin America and no diplomatic

experience— but a loyal Democrat.

The Consular and Diplomatic Services fared no better than the

Washington headquarters. Diplomatic appointments were made on the

basis of "taking care of" the several states. "I am trying to

distribute these appointments in such a way as to make all the states

feel that they have been recognized," explained Bryan to the president.88

Indeed he was.8^

The president had distrusted the professionals in the Department

because some of them were wealthy Republicans performing their duties 68 while undeterred by low salaries. The dismembering of the Department

was not calculated to encourage President Wilson to make use of what

was left, even if he had been so inclined. He was never known to pay

attention to expert advice when it differed from his own intuitive

Bryan to Woodrow Wilson, 24 May 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA, RG 59. Out of some forty-odd diplomatic chiefs of mission, twenty- nine were changed within the first six months (Stuart, p. 228).

^Dr. William H. Leavell, a retired Presbyterian minister of Carollton, Mississippi, was recommended as ambassador to Belgium or Greece because "both of the Senators from Mississippi are supporters of the Administration, and if you think it was wise to honor that state with a diplomatic appointment, this may be the man for the place" (Bryan to Wilson, 24 May 1913, Correspondence, NA, RG 59). William W. Russell, minister to Santo Domingo (who had previously served as minister to Bogota and Caracas), a graduate of the Naval Academy and clean of political partisanship, was replaced by a New York "police court lawyer" of unsavory reputation, one James M. Sullivan, who was later shown to have been an intimate of New York gambling interests and to have been recommended to Santo Domingo by people having large financial interests there (Report on the Foreign Service [New York: National Civil Service Reform League, 1919], pp. 119-27). On the other hand, a "thoroughly competent" man under consideration for chief of mission to Buenos Aires was not appointed because, Bryan reasoned, "I do not know of any political advantage that the party would receive from his appointment" (Bryan to Wilson, 1 Sept. 1914, Correspondence, NA, RG 59). And so it went.

68Grieb, p. 45.

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conclusions, and now he showed his contempt for the spoilsmen either

by conducting negotiations in the foreign field through special

envoys whom he could trust^ or by tpying out communications to foreign

governments himself.

When Henry Lane Wilson sent a full 213-page report on the

Mexican situation to Secretary Bryan, recommended the early recognition

of President Huerta, and asked for instructions, he might as well have

been talking to himself. There were to be no instructions, because

there was to be no announced policy. Philander Chase Knox had been

totally dedicated to his job and recognized as a principal policy-maker

of the Taft administration. A man of his caliber might have been able

to take the responsibility from President Wilson's shoulders, had the

latter been willing to share that responsibility; but had he been so

willing, he did not have a secretary of state to share it with. Bryan

was interested in the Department and the Consular Service chiefly as

sources of jobs for "deserving Democrats." He took no serious

responsibility at this time for the formulation of policy or even for

running the Department. Much of the time he was not even in Washington.^

Henry Lane Wilson was dealing with unconcerned men.

^ L i n k , Woodrow Wilson; The New Freedom, p. 279.

70He spent 37 of his first 134 days in office away from Washington (New York Times, 17 July 1913). He also refused to give up lecturing on the Chautauqua circuit (Grieb, pp. 46-47).

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IN SEARCH OF A MEXICAN POLICY: 4 MARCH - 27 AUGUST 1913

President Wilson probably had never heard of Victoriano

Huerta before the latter toppled Madero. According to Colonel House,

Wilson did know of Madero, whom he regarded as "an idealist" trying

hard to uplift the Mexican people and deserving of sympathy and

support.1 Like most interested persons in the United States, he

must have been disappointed at Madero's overthrow and shocked by

his assassination. It is reasonable to believe that he accepted the

common suspicion that Huerta was responsible for the murders, even

before hearing the evidence. Press reports seemed to indicate that

there was widespread discontent in Mexico over the Huerta coup and

that the U.S. ambassador could not be trusted to give an accurate 2 account of the situation. Indeed, three days after the new

president entered the White House, a campaign to blame the ambassador

for Madero's fall was launched by the New York World.^

Yet no evidence has been found to support the assertion

that Woodrow Wilson had decided from the beginning to refuse recognition

of the Huerta government. Even those that attacked the ambassador and

showed their distaste for Huerta had been insisting that the latter

^House, Diary, 18 Jan. 1913; Bemis, Diplomatic History, p. 546.

2New York World, 1 March 1913.

^"Madero's Overthrow Due to Diplomatic Meddling," headlined the New York World on 7 March 1913.

167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168 4 should be recognized. The two questions (the one of Huerta's

recognition and the other of the trustworthiness of the ambassador),

though separate, became inextricably entwined; and the president

vacillated on both. He declined to accept the ambassador's pro forma

resignation of 4 March, but refused to send him any instructions as to

his intentions. At the same time, Bryan’s first communication to

Ambassador Wilson indicated that the administration did not completely

accept his estimate of the situation in northern Mexico. The

secretary gave no reasons for this skepticism.

Rather than the clear-cut policy statement that Ambassador

Wilson expected, Bryan merely advised him to urge on Huerta the use

of "mediation and just concessions" to secure the support of the people

and achieve peace.When Ambassador Wilson informed the secretary

that he had been sharing consular despatches with the Huerta government

in order to help it restore order, Bryan gave tentative approval of this

procedure.^ But perhaps the most telling evidence that the new

administration had not yet decided against Huerta was Bryan's suggestion

to the attorney general that anti-Huerta rebels who strayed into the

hands of U.S. authorities on the U.S. side of the border should be

prosecuted under the neutrality laws of the United States. At the same

4New York World, 27 Feb. 1913.

5Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 6 March 1913, 123 W 691/107, NA, RG 59. Indeed, the secretary showed his dislike of Republican Wilson at once. He unwittingly signed on 6 March a standard commendation for Henry Lane Wilson's actions during the Decena Tragica. Realizing what he had done, he wired the embassy cancelling the commendation (Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 7 March 1913, 124.126/28a, NA, RG 59).

63ryan to H. L. Wilson, 8 March 1913, /6522, NA, RG 59.

^H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 9 March 1913, and Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 11 March 1913, /6574, NA, RG 59.

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time, there was no effort to stop the flow of arms and ammunition

that the Huerta government was purchasing from U.S. manufacturers.

The supply of arms was not to be cut off until August, when Sen.

Augustus C. Bacon, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

complained.®

Much has been made of President Wilson's statement and Bryan's

circular (of 12 March) denouncing revolutions and dictatorships:

We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just governments rest always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and in practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigue and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs tainted and discredited. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests of ambition. We are the friends of peace, but we know there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interests of peace and honor, who protect private rights and respect the restraints of constitutional provision.9

Some have seen in this statement either the implication that the

president would not recognize Huerta^ or that it was, in fact, the

formal announcement of a new recognition policy. ^ If it was a new

^Bryan to Attorney General, 11 and 14 March 1S13, /6684 and /6704a (resp.), NA, RG 59; Calvert, Mexican Revolution, pp. 177-78. 9 Bryan to all U.S. Legations and Embassies in Latin America, 12 March 1913, /710.11/102a, NA, RG 59; New'York Times, 12 March 1913.

^For example, David F. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1926), p p . 43-44.

^Samuel Flagg Bemis, Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation (New York: Karcourt, 1943), p. 175; Meyer calls the statement "a drastic change in United States recognition policy" (Huerta, p. Ill), while Haley says it "committed the United States to a far-reaching, activist, and specifically political role

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policy, it included no provision for implementation; and, indeed, it was

not implemented— in the case of neither Mexico nor any other nation.

The statement may be read as an effort by President Wilson to buy

time to formulate some policy. Even the pro-Administration press

noted that the "new" policy was similar to that announced at the

beginning of President Taft's administration and that it was upon

such a declaration that Secretary Knox and Huntington Wilson had i.l2 inaugurated their "Dollar Diplomacy, the substitution of friendly

dollars for unfriendly bullets. In his Diary, Josephus Daniels

wondered how the president's statement was to be applied specifically

to Mexico.„ . 13

The New York World seems to have been the first to ask

editorially whether the statement meant that Huerta would not be 14 recognized. That nonrecognition was not what the Wilson statement

meant can be seen from the subsequent conduct of the administration.

When Ambassador Wilson was informed in advance that Great Britain

had definitely decided to recognize Huerta (he was the only U.S.

official to be so informed), he advised that the United States should

"restrain England" from doing so— if the U.S. government had not

yet decided to extend recognition. The administration ignored

his advice, continued to transact business with Huerta in a normal

in Latin America," and that it "supplies most of the motives for the frequent Caribbean interventions undertaken during his administration" (Revolution and Intervention, pp. 84-85).

12New York World, 12 March 1913.

"^Daniels Papers: Diary, Tuesday, 11 March 1913; [W. ] Wilson Papers, File VII.

14New York World, 12 March 1913.

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manner, and merely stated to inquirers that no formal recognition had

been given "as yet-"^ So far was the administration from implementing

a nonrecognition policy at this time that the Mexican provisional

government was invited to join the United States in common efforts

in the international field. Said Ambassador Wilson:

Mr. Bryan instructed me to ask the Government of Mexico, which he had not recognized, to join with the United States in the recognition of the new Republic of China, and he also instructed me to extend an invitation upon several occasions to the Government of Mexico to associate itself with the United States in conferences (i.e., in a universal peace movement).^

The administration gave to foreign governments during these early

weeks no hint of a new nonrecognition policy. When the British

inquired about U.S. intentions, the British ambassador was told that

"we would wait a while" before recognizing Mexico.'*'^ Likewise, when

the ABC Powers demanded to know what the U.S. government intended to

do (since they had agreed to follow the U.S. lead), the U.S. ambassador

at Rio de Janeiro was told to inform them that the United States, "not

ready to consider recognizing Mexico," hoped they would refrain from 18 doing so "until it was," Official statements given to the press

up to this time all gave the impression that the United States did 19 intend to recognize Huerta, but not just yet.

^Memorandum by Alvey A. Aldee, 29 March 1913, /6992, NA, RG 59.

16S. Doc. 285, p. 2289; Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 9 April 1913, /7064, NA, RG 59.

^ B r y c e to Grey, 1 April 1913, no. 87, F.O. 371/1672, file 6269/16743, cited by Calvert, p. 166.

^Bryan to U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 31 May 1913, /7653, NA, RG 59.

19N ew York World, 6 April 1913.

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The first public statement by the president specifically

on the question of recognition was not made until 12 April. He

declared that the recognition of the Mexican provisional government

was "some way off"— might, in fact, never happen— but that

the de facto Government of Mexico might be recognized as the Provisional Government when it had worked out the problems now before it— the establishment of peace— and had demonstrated to the world that it was capable of running the republic.

There was no hint of moral disapprobation in the statement— merely

the generally accepted requirement that a de facto government must

be in control.^®

The statements in the press corresponded with the attitude

within the government. The State Department still considered the

Huerta government the "obviously responsible authority of the country" 21 and continued to act on that premise. Huerta was being handled with

some care. One potential source of embarrassment to the provisional

government was the presence of U.S. warships in Mexican waters, where

they had been stationed just before and during the Decena Tragica. A

discreet hint from the Mexican government was all it took for the

ships to be rotated, rather than remain constantly in each port, in 22 order to save the Mexicans any embarrassment.

The Wilson administration's procrastination, in respect to

recognition, exasperated those that demanded decisive action. Foreign

governments, in particular, could not understand it— in spite of

20 Ibid., 12 April 1913. The following day it was reported that a new requirement had been added: that a constitutional election be held after the fighting had ceased.

M e m o r a n d u m by Alvey A. Aldee, 22 April 1913, /7206, NA, RG 59.

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explanations. On 23 May the government of Norway, deciding to wait 23 no longer, extended recognition to Huerta. Great Britain had 24 recognized the provisional government as early as late March.

By the end of summer the same action had been taken by France, China,

Spain, Austria-Hungary, Colombia, Montenegro, Germany, Honduras, Italy,

Ecuador, Japan, Holland, Uruguay, Monaco, Bulgaria, Turkey, Costa

Rica, Denmark, Haiti, Portugal, Bolivia, Switzerland, Belgium, and

Serbia— in that order. Still awaiting the U.S. lead were

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Panama, Venezuela, 25 Persia, and Greece.

Recognition had become a controversial issue largely because

of the argument over the ambassador's role in the February coup in

Mexico. Since the ambassador was a staunch Republican and a supporter

of the Taft policies, the liberal press in the United States saw in

him the personification of the "Dollar Diplomacy" of the Taft

administration that the Wilson administration had publicly rejected.

The ambassador's efforts on behalf of Huerta's recognition may have

given the president second thoughts. Aside from this, Woodrow

Wilson (a stubborn man) did not like to be pushed into a decision

before he had fully made up his mind. And the Huerta cause was being

pushed not only by the ambassador sitting in Mexico City without

instructions but also by many other U.S. citizens with interests in

Mexico. During the spring months, President Wilson received a

veritable deluge of letters, telegrams, telephone calls, and visits

23 Ambassador, Christiana [Oslo], to Bryan, 23 May 1913, /7715, NA, RG 59. 24 25 Details in Calvert, pp. 131-66. Meyer, Huerta, p. 112.

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from prominent people— many of them backers of his administration.2**

Ambassador Wilson's report (of 12 March) in which he continued

to urge early recognition, did not reach Washington until 21 March;27

it probably was never read by either the president or Bryan. Since

the administration had given no other indication of its intentions,

the ambassador assumed that the only thing holding up the favorable

action was the matter of the 15 September claims. When, therefore,

he informed the secretary on 13 March that the Huerta government had

accepted all the U.S. demands "in principle,"2^ he must have believed

that the last obstacles had been removed. But he received no reply.

March dragged by--then April— with no answer from the administration.

"Washington is a deep hole of silence toward Ambassadors," complained 29 Waiter nines Page in London. Henry Lane Wilson would have agreed.

The veterans in the State Department backed Ambassador

Wilson's recommendations. The assistant chief of the Latin-American

Division, Fred Morris Dearing, before his purge a month later, wondered

whether Huerta's alleged complicity in Madero's death (which he

doubted) was holding up recognition. He seconded the ambassador's

recommendation and absolved Huerta of Madero's assassination:

Huerta and his advisers are not so stupid they could not have foreseen the effect of permitting this to occur. . . . [Madero's

2**See, for example, William Haven (American Bible Society) to Bryan, 17 March 1913, /6779; Oscar J. Braniff to Joseph Tumulty, 22 April 1913, /7258; James Speyer to William McAdoo, 7 May 1913, /7473— all in NA, RG 59.

27H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, /6840, NA, RG 59.

2Y L. Wilson to Bryan, 13 March 1913, /6681, NA, RG 59. 29 Page to Colonel House, 23 Nov. 1913, in Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page, I, 212.

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death] has nothing whatever to do with the expediency [of recognition]•

State Department counselor John Basset Moore agreed with Dearing:

Government of the United States, having originally set itself up by revolution, has always acted upon the de facto principle. We regard governments as existing or not existing. . . . Our depreciation of the political methods which may prevail in certain countries cannot relieve us of the necessity of dealing with the governments of those countries. . . . We cannot become censors of the morals or conduct of other nations and make our approval or disapproval of their methods the test of our recognition of their governments without intervening in their affairs.-^1

As much in the dark as anyone else in the State Department, Counselor

Moore may have accepted the spreading rumor that the delay in

recognition was due to the president’s moral disapproval of Huerta.

The only dissenting voice in the State Department was that of the newly

appointed chief of the Latin-American Division, Boaz W. Long, who

offered the suggestion that, since American public opinion was hostile 32 to Huerta, recognition would bring only temporary advantages." But

Colonel House, the president's confidant, supported the recommendation

of E. N. Brown, of the National Railways of Mexico, and recommended 33 to President Wilson that the administration make contacts with Huerta.

All this advice seemed to be falling on deaf ears, as far

as the president was concerned. At the same time that he was being

urged to normalize relations with the Mexican government, President

Wilson was seized with misgivings about Huerta’s actual control of

the Mexican republic and about the ambassador's veracity. H. L. Wilson's

^Memorandum by Fred Morris Dearing, 16 April 1913, /8070, NA, RG 59.

3 ^"Memorandum by John Basset Moore, 14 May 1913, /8378, NA, RG 59.

32Boaz Long to Bryan, 25 May 1913, /17177, NA, RG 59.

33House Diary, 27 March and 1 April 1913.

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despatches seemed to contradict those of some of the consuls. It

was inevitable, of course, that, conditions being different in

different parts of the country, these differences would be reflected

in the despatches of the consuls. But Ambassador Wilson, as well

as the Latin-American desk at the Department, could be expected to

have a broader and more accurate view of the situation than the

personnel at Saltillo, the center of Carranza activities, since the

former had broader sources of information. Consul Philip Holland

(Saltillo) would see the matter as more menacing than, say, Consul 34 Theodore Hamm at Durango.

The president chose to believe the reports in the liberal

press rather than to believe the State Department. The reason is not

hard to find. The press reports agreed substantially with the despatches

coming from Saltillo. The vice-consul there, John Stilliman, was a

Princeton classmate of Woodrow Wilson's and a personal friend. It is

reasonable to believe that the president read Stilliman's messages

with particular care. It is unlikely that he read the voluminous

State Department correspondence. When Stilliman's somewhat exaggerated

reports of chaotic conditions in Sonora "due to failure of the Provisional

Government to send adequate troops or to treat with state officials"33

were transmitted to the ambassador, the latter informed Bryan that he

"placed no evidence in the reports of the Consul at Saltillo, since

34Ho'lland (Saltillo) to Bryan, 14 March 1913, /6719; Hamm (Durango) to Bryan, 5 April 1913, /7358— both in NA, RG 59.-

35Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 17 March 1913, /6695, NA, RG 59. It should be noted that Stilliman’s reports of Carranza's strength were sent while the latter was still on the run from Huerta’s troops.

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they reflect the influence of the Sonora State officials."38 One

suspects that the president would rather believe his friend.

President Wilson's doubts about the ambassador increased,

not only because the latter contradicted Stilliman but also because

of the increasing ferocity of the crusade by the New York World

against Henry Lane Wilson. The World had not opposed Huerta's

recognition, but it was violently opposed to the ambassador's remaining

in Mexico. The World's attack took on the aspect of a personal

vendetta.

The first indication of the newspaper's coming attack on

Henry Lane Wilson appeared on 1 March when the World headlined

"CONSULS CONTRADICT WILSON. Rosy reports of Huerta Ascendancy Not

Borne Out by Lesser Officials” and then went on to say that the reports

from northern Mexico showed that Huerta did not control the region."*

This was only the beginning. The campaign seriously got under way

on 7 March: "MADERO'S OVERTHROW DUE TO DIPLOMATIC MEDDLING OF

AMBASSADOR WILSON," the World headlined before it continued:

Charge is Freely Made in Mexico that Representative of the U.S. Gave Encouragement and Direct Aid to Traitorous Generals. . . . Revolution could not have succeeded except for this aid and encouragement. His plan to recognize Huerta is a matter of record.38

The headlined attacks grew increasingly more strident for

the next three days. But though the paper centered on Ambassador

Wilson, it made certain that the entire Taft administration became

stained with the accusations. Thus, the World said:

36H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 17 March 1913, /6744, NA, RG 59.

37New York World, 1 March 1913. 38Ibid., 7 March 1913.

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Information which has filtered into Washington from numerous sources in Mexico lays on the State Department and Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson responsibility for the overthrow of the Mexican Government. . . . Ambassador Wilson completely backed by former Secretary Knox and Assistant Secretary Huntington Wilson.39

Other liberal papers quickly took up the hue and cry. The

Boston Globe, for example, announced in a headline that observers

"Believe Wilson’s Hostility to Madero Reflected Taft Attitude."40

The World tried to make it appear that accusations against

H. L. Wilson and the Taft administration were not just its own but

that belief in Henry Lane Wilson’s complicity in the overthrow of

Madero was widely shared. Thus, it referred to a "Letter to Foreign

Diplomat Asking . . . Meaning of Activity of Our Country's Representative

to Madero" and cited an unnamed "American Financier [who] says 'Wilson

Not to be Trusted.” 1 It even brought in the military ("Army Officers

Know the Facts"):

For a fortnight officers of the Army stationed here [Washington] have held the opinion that Ambassador Wilson did much to bring about the downfall of Madero in Mexico. Some of them openly charge him with being responsible for the assassination of Madero. . . . High War Department Official said Ambassador Wilson, the American in Mexico City, and the State Department wanted peace at any cost and were going to get it at any cost.^l

The World demanded action. In an editorial headed "Put Him

Out," it declared that Wilson "ought to be put out to show Huerta we

don't approve of murder" and that "President Wilson and Secretary Bryan

must see that it is not only American lives and estates that are 43 involved in this situation. . . . There is also American honor.

Ibid., 8 March 1913. u 7 March 1913.

H ew York World, 8 March 1913. 42Ibid., 7 March 1913.

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The attacks intimated something more than a mere political

"hatchet job." With all the characteristics of a personal revanche,

they seemed to be a vindictive effort to destroy Henry Lane Wilson's

career. Wilson was convinced of the identity of his chief tormentor:

Throughout the difficult days in Mexico I had the cordial cooperation of all American news distributing agencies and of the American correspondents with one exception; this exception caused me some personal discomfort by his incomprehensible malice and mendacity and by his inventions and perversions of truth cast suspicion upon the character of our diplomacy in Mexico.^4

This man was Robert Hammond Murray, Mexico City correspondent for

Joseph Pulitzer's rabidly anti-Taft New York. World. The man had not

always been an enemy of Henry Lane Wilson's. Indeed, when the

ambassador first arrived in Mexico, Murray had written President Taft

a letter in which he spoke of the ambassador in high terms. 4^ But

the subsequent actions of both men showed that they were on opposite

sides of the political fence. Murray's writing was so pro-Revolutionary

that it was widely believed that the Madero family subsidized his

writings.4^ What embittered Murray more than anything else, however,

was his humiliation by the ambassador during a time of danger. "In a

dangerous crisis," said Wilson, "I expelled this correspondent from

the embassy for conduct unbecoming an American and a gentleman."47

It seems that he was put out for frightening the ladies by spreading

the false rumor that the embassy was being attacked. When he was

44 H. L. Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, p. 185.

45Murray to Taft, 27 June 1910, /22380/85, NA, RG 59. 46 Memorandum by Boaz Long, 22 Aug. 1913, /17669, NA, RG 59.

47H. L. Wilson, p. 186.

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required to leave, Murray ("a man of enormous vanity”) said he would 48 get even, according to Henry Lane Wilson.

Murray set to work on the ambassador at once. "On three

different occasions," said Wilson, "he fabricated stories to which . . . 49 I was obliged to enter official and substantial denials." Murray

accompanied Ernesto Madero on his flight into exile,50 managed to

secure information from the confidential files of the State Department,51

and proceeded to the task of attacking Wilson. William F. Buckley,

a U.S. businessman residing in Mexico, was to call Murray "an

unscrupulous American."5^ Murray was to persecute Wilson for years.

In 1916, an election year in which the Republicans launched an attack

on Woodrow Wilson’s Mexican policy, Murray wrote a series of articles

on "Huerta and the Two Wilsons,"55 in which he repeated and embellished

the old canards in an effort to make the Republicans look bad. For

this purpose, he was given access to the confidential files of the

State Department. H. L. Wilson suspected that the despatches, clearly

marked "confidential," were made available to Murray on orders of the 54 president himself. Murray proceeded to mutilate some of the despatches,

4®S. Doc. 285, p. 2288. Murray later became an official propagandist for the Carranza government (ibid., testimony of William F. Buckley, pp. 773-74); New York Times, 8 March 1913. 49 H. L. Wilson, p. 186.

50Memorandum by Boaz Long, 22 Aug. 1913, /17599, NA, RG 59.

51S. Doc. 285, Wilson testimony, pp. 2888-89; Buckley testimony, p. 774. 52 Ibid., Buckley testimony, p. 774.

53Harper’s Weekly, 62 (25 March - 29 April 1916), 301-03, 341-42, 364-65, 402-04, 434-36, 466-69.

54 S. Doc. 285, p. 2289.

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interpolate and omit passages, and claim that his writing was "based

on the records." That same year he published an interview with the

widow of Francisco Madero, in which Dona Sara accused the ambassador

of being responsible for her husband’s death.^ Although Murray was

finally and effectively silenced in 1917 by a libel suit filed by

Wilson, he continued to bedevil the ambassador until at least 1923.

When the World boasted that its "exposure of Ambassador

Wilson" was a bombshell that created consternation in Washington,

the paper was not exaggerating. Murray's articles, published all

over the country by the Pulitzer papers, were widely accepted as

true. Hundreds of letters (practically all expressing indignation and

anger at the ambassador) were received in Washington from throughout

the United States. Typical of this correspondence was a letter from

Chicago:

The Chicago Tribune of March 7th publishes [sic] an article stating that overthrow of the Madero Government and the resulting murder of the president and his brother was the result of the plotting of Ambassador Wilson. The public has suspected as much all along. Will you use your honorable offices to has thes [sic] terrible charges sifted to the bottom and the facts given to the public.^

But Ambassador Wilson had his defense also. In an interview

in New York, Ernesto Madero (who had been given refuge in the U.S.

embassy immediately after the fall of his nephew, Francisco) denied

that the ambassador had been working to undermine the Madero government

55New York World, 15 Aug. 1916.

-^Murray to Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes, 22 June 1923, 123 W 691/293, NA, RG 59'.

57Hew York World, 8 March 1913.

"^George S. Forbes to Bryan, 8 March 1913, 123 W 691/109, NA, RG RG 59.

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59 and absolved him of any responsibility. Two weeks later Ernesto

Madero wrote Henry Lane Wilson a letter confirming his press statement:

My first duty on my arrival in this city and in placing myself at your orders is to address you this letter which will convey to you my sincere appreciation for all the marked proofs of friendship you have shown us and which we shall never forget.

The New York Times immediately mounted a counterattack against

the World:

The New York World's Article Against Ambassador Wilson Arousing Great Indignation Among Foreigners and Natives. It is known here that the author of the articles has been for many years a personal enemy of Wilson and a publicity for the Maderos. It is known that Ambassador Wilson did all in his power to save the life of Madero. He and Mrs. Wilson both paid all kinds of attention to Mrs. Madero and assisted her to leave after her husband's death.

Concentrating its fire on Murray and his connections with

the Maderos, the Times for several days continued its barrage, which

branded the World's articles "wild and hardly intelligible charges.

A flood of correspondence defending Ambassador Wilson began

to arrive at the Department. Most of the messages from U.S. citizens

in Mexico urged his retention at the Mexican post as being in the best

interests of the United States.^ Nor were all the letters in favor

of the ambassador sent by U.S. business interests. A large number

of them came from ordinary citizens, some insisting that it was 64 not true that the ambassador paid attention only to the rich.

59New York Times, 9 March 1913.

^H. L. Wilson to-Bryan, 23 March 1913, 123 W 691/136, enclosure, NA, RG 59.

^ New York Times, 8 March 1913. ^Ibid., 9 March 1913.

^Most of this correspondence is-in the "Henry Lane Wilson" File, 123 W 691, NA, RG 59.

^Examples from NA, RG 59: Frank W. Saxon to Bryan, 16 March 1913, 123 W 691/441; J. H. Collard to Bryan, 18 March 1913, 123 W 691/137.

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Even Democratic politicians asked that Wilson be retained:

Of course it is a bad time to ask a delay in the appointment of a good Democrat to a job held by a Republican, but . . . we feel justified in asking him to give us any assistance.

There were messages commending Ambassador Wilson and urging

his retention from numerous U.S. organizations, including a "Committee

Representing the American Colony of the City of M e x ico,a

committee of "The American Clergy in Mexico,the Board of Directors

of the YMCA in Mexico City,^ and many others.

As Murray’s devastating attacks continued unabated, Wilson

was forced to defend himself. On 13 March he transmitted copies of

several letters commending his actions during the bombardment. These

letters included messages of congratulations and expressions of

gratitude from, among others, Stronge (the British minister), Von

Hintze (the German minister), Aygues Parsu (the French charge d'affaires),

Cdlogan (the Spanish minister), D'Arenas de Lima (the Portugese minister),

and a committee of the British colony.^ One month later he forwarded

a statement sworn to before Nelson O'Shaughessy, secretary of the

embassy, by Henry F. Tennant (second secretary), Louis D'Antin (first

clerk), and Charles B. Parker (second secretary). The statement

declared:

^5Sen. Morris Sheppard to Bryan, 17 March 1913, enclosure letter from Turney and Burgess, attorneys in El Paso, 123 W 691/142, NA, RG 59.

^Committee to President Wilson, 4 March 1913, 123 W 691/11, NA, RG 59.

^ A m e rican Clergymen in Mexico to H. L. Wilson, enclosure in Wolson to Bryan, 12 March 1913, 123 W 691/139, NA, RG 59. 68 Manton M. Myvell to G. J. Babcock, General Secretary, YMCA, Mexico City, to Bryan, 14 May 1913, 123 W 691/unnumbered, NA, RG 59.

69H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 13 March 1913, 123 W 691/140, enclosure, NA, RG 59.

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We, the undersigned members of the staff of the embassy of the United States at Mexico City, do hereby certify that one of our member was constantly on duty, both night and day, at the embassy during the bombardment within the city, which lasted from February 9 to February 18, 1913, and also thereafter until the fall of President Madero’s administration and the establishment of the present provisional government; that one of our number was present at all interviews between the Ambassador and messages from President Madero and later, at interviews between him and Gen. Huerta and Felix Diaz; that all correspondence and notes of every kind were either dictated directly to one of us, or when dictated to volunteer clerks, passed under our observation; that there was never the slightest indication of any understanding between Ambassador Wilson and Gen. Huerta and Felix Diaz, except in regard to matters pertinent to the safety of the Americans and other foreign colonies within the city of Mexico; and that Ambassador Wilson's energies were directed throughout the bombardment to the saving of human life, to the bringing about of a cessation of hostilities, and after the fall of President Madero, to the restoration of order and peace within the City of Mexico and throughout the Republic.

We would also add that we have knowledge of the active efforts of the ambassador to render aid to various members of the Madero family, and especially to the deceased ex-President.

We voluntarily make this statement in view of the unjust attacks upon Ambassador Wilson by certain American newspapers and by some Mexicans of the late administration, whose characters in this Republic are not above reproach.70

In the midst of the raging controversy, Ambassador Wilson, in

trying to elicit even a hint of what the Wilson administration intended

to do, encountered nothing but silence. It became common knowledge

that the ambassador— indeed, the entire Department of State— were being

left entirely in the dark. The Washington Post reported "Wilson in

the Dark. Ambassador to Mexico Has Not Heard from Washington in Two

Weeks. Even His Urgent Cables Being Unanswered."71

The Mexican provisional president was known as a fearless

man, but a patient one. President Wilson's inaction and puzzling

?0H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 13 April 1913, 123 W 691/189, NA, RG 59.

7Washington Post, 16 May 1913.

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silence, however, finally taxed even Huerta's patience beyond endurance.

On 7 May he called Ambassador Wilson before him and informed him that

the attitude of the U.S. government was "unwise and susceptible of an

unfriendly interpretation." Under the circumstances, the government

of Mexico was not ready to settle the claims presented by the note of

15 September. Three days later Huerta and his secretary of foreign

relations issued a statement to the effect that only routine matters 72 would be discussed with the U.S. embassy. This left Ambassador

Wilson with no more authority than that of a charge d'affaires— he 73 complained. Feeling that his efforts had come to naught, the 74 ambassador for the second time tendered his resignation. For the

second time, President Wilson refused to accept it.7'* These actions

created a very confusing state of affairs. Counselor John Basset

Moore made the observation:

There would appear to be incongruity in keeping as ambassador at a post, not for the purpose of transacting business, but merely for the purpose of receiving and transmitting complaints against the attitude of his own government, with which attitude he does not himself agree.

The sense of urgency of those concerned with Mexican affairs—

whether they were businessmen, U.S. citizens resident in Mexico, officials

of the Department of State, or the ambassador— was not shared by

the president. His chief preoccupation was his domestic reform

legislation. But he had not totally ignored the Mexican problem.

72H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 8 May 1913, /7431, NA, RG 59.

73Ibid., 19 May 1913, /7454, NA, RG 59.

74Ibid., 16 May 1913, 123 W 691/201, NA, RG 59.

75Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 17 May 1913, 123 W 691/201, NA, RG 59.

^Memorandum to John Basset Moore, 14 May 1913, /8378, NA, R G 59-

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Aware of the widespread outrage against Ambassador Wilson fomented by

the Democratic press, President Wilson wondered whether the ambassador

had, indeed, been guilty of improper conduct. If so, it would mean

that recognition of the Huerta regime would give the impression that

the new provisional government of Mexico was a creature of the United

States. How would this differ from the policies of the Republican

administration, whi h he had condemned?

The president could neither trust his ambassador in Mexico

nor ignore the please of those friendly to his administration that

wanted Huerta recognized. The president needed all the friends he

could hold. This was no time to alienate political allies. He had

too many enemies in Congress.

President Wilson decided to take a step that he would take

many times in dealing with foreign problems: He would send someone

he could trust to investigate matters personally and report back to

him. There were a number of questions for which he needed answers

before he could make up his mind on what to do about Huerta’s recognition.

A definite line of policy would depend on the answers to important

questions: Just how well did Huerta control the country? What was

the strength and character of the opposition to the general? And,

perhaps most important of all, how deeply involved in the overthrow

of Madero had the U.S. ambassador been— if he had been involved at

all?

In early March the president decided to send a personal

investigator to look into the situation. He already had in mind a

personal frienu and devoted follower, William Bayard Hale.^ It

^George Foster Peabody to Bryan, 10 March 1913, /6596, NA, RG 59.

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was not until April, however, that Hale was asked to go down to

"Central and South America" and find out what was "going on."^

A former Episcopalian clergyman, Hale had become a journalist and

worked for the Hearst chain of newspapers. He had edited the president’s 79 campaign biography, a collection of speeches entitled The New Freedom;

otherwise, he was unqualified for the job. Ray Stannard Baker said

that he was "temperamentally unfitted for such a task."^ He knew

virtually no Spanish or anything about Mexico— even less about foreign

affairs.

While Hale was making his preparations to leave for Mexico,

Secretary Bryan sent his own investigator, Reginald del Valle (of

California), a personal friend. Del Valle went to northern Mexico to

seek out the rebel leaders and discover the source of discontent

with Huerta’s government, the causes of the Madero revolution, and

the system of land tenure.

Del Valle was a good choice. He was of Mexican ancestry,

spoke Spanish fluently, was acquainted with Mexican politics, and

knew the country well.8^ Ambassador Wilson later testified that Bryan

sent Del Valle because he did not trust Hale, whom President Wilson 82 was sending and who did not get along with the secretary.

78W. Wilson to Hale, 19 April 1913, Wilson Papers, File VII.

79Haley, p. 90.

8^IV, 243; Hale subsequently became a paid propagandist for the German embassy in Washington and publicly broke with the president (Calvert, p. 136).

^ B r y a n to Del Valle, 31 May 1913, /20446, NA, RG 59.

82S. Doc. 285, p. 2290.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Both men began sending their reports by the beginning of

June. Del Valle’s reports were sent to Ben G. Davis, chief clerk

of the Department of State, at his home in Takoma Park, Maryland,

while Hale’s went to the same man, but at his office in the Department.83

Del Valle had interviews with Maytorena (governor of Sonora),

Felipe Riveros (governor of Sinaloa), and Carranza (governor of

Coahuila and "First Chief" of the Constitutionalists), as well

as with prominent businessmen, bankers, and ordinary citizens. He

reported that the Constitutionalists were destroying property and

outraging citizens, that they were composed of "the worst elements

in their respective states," that they made forced loans and confiscated

private property, that the economies of the states were at a standstill,

and that thousands of people were refugees. He concluded that the

Carranzistas were simply after personal power and gain, while Carranza

himself was a man of "little ability, a narrow, inordinate stubbornness

[and] not liked."84 In his final report, after having visited Mexico

City, Del Valle described the Madero administration in a very bad

light but reported on the conduct of the U.S. embassy favorably.83

When the last report was received, he was immediately recalled.

Secretary Bryan disregarded his own emissary’s reports (especially

the unfavorable impression of Carranza) and even tried to find

83Hale to Davis, 3 June 1913, /23616; Del Valle to Davis, 8 June 1913, /13641, NA, RG 59. All these reports were kept out of the State Department's Purport Books until March 1920, when the new Republican -administration came in (see- 812.— /23616 - /23653, NA, RG 59).

84Del Valle to Davis, 8 June 1913, /23641; 9 June 1913, /23642; 17 June 1913, /23644; 23 June 1913, /23646; and 27 June 1913, /23648- all in NA, RG 59.

85Ibid., 16 July 1913, /23656, NA, RG 59.

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excuses for the First Chief's "irritation.Del Valle's reports

completely contradicted the impressions that President Wilson was

getting from Carranza's own emissary to Washington, Francisco Escudero,

later to be Carranza's Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Escudero

identified the Constitutionalist cause with that of the Madero

revolution and talked vaguely of "democracy," agrarian reform, relief

for the poor and the workers, the expansion of education, and other

things that Wilson liked to hear^ but that the Carranzistas were

never even to attempt to implement.

It has often been said that Hale was sent to Mexico by President

Wilson only for the latter to have his own preconceptions confirmed.

Hale's negative report on Ambassador Wilson was to be sent on 18 June,

and one historian states:

The President himself would not have written the report any differently had he gone to Mexico City. It confirmed everything that he suspected and appealed to everything he believed. . • - The policy that Woodrow Wilson had initiated therefore was sound.

The facts appear to be otherwise. President Wilson had

initiated no policy. If anything, it seems that he was inclined to

recognize Huerta up until the time he received Hale's first report.

On 12 May, before either Del Valle or Hale had left for Mexico, Julius

Kruttschnitt, chairman of the board of the Southern Pacific Railroad,

sent the president through Col. E. M. House a memorandum written by

an old personal friend of the president's, Judge Delbar J. Haff, of

Kansas City.

^Bryan to Wilson, 25 June 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA, RG 59.

^Memorandum by Escudero, 24 July 1913, [W.] Wilson Papers, File II.

^Meyer, Huerta, p. 115.

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The judge informed the president:

Foreign nations are becoming restive and are seeking to undermine the influence of the United States in Mexico. The British Government has already recognized Huerta in a most marked manner by autograph letter from the King, due to the efforts of Lord Cowdray (Sir Weetman Pearson) who has the largest interests outside of American interests in the Mexican Republic. He is using his efforts to obtain a large loan in England, and I am informed that he has succeeded on condition that the English Government would recognize Huerta, which has been done. If Mexico is helped out of her trouble by British and German influence, American prestige in that country and the commerce of the Untied States will suffer great damage.89

Judge Eaff then suggested that President Wilson offer to recognize

Huerta on condition that the fighting stop, an election be held,

and Huerta pledge that the election would be free and fair.

According to Ray Stannard Baker, the president was greatly

Impressed by the memorandum. This impression was strengthened seme

days later by a personal visit from Judge Haff, accompanied by another

old friend, Cleveland H. Dodge. Baker states that Dodge's approval 90 carried much weight with the president. Nevertheless, Wilson

(possibly waiting for the reports from Hale) took no immediate

action. Kruttscbnitt and those associated with him continued to press

the president to accept Haff's plan. On 26 May, Edward Bush and

S. W. Eccles conferred with the president and Bryan in the office of

the president's personal secretary, Joseph Tumulty, and offered their

services in convincing Huerta to agree to move the elections to an

earlier date. They did not realize, of course, that the Mexican

president had had a difficult time convincing the Congress to hold

elections at all. The following day Bryan wrote the president that

89Delbar J. Haff to W. Wilson, 12 May 1913, /7576, NA, RG 59. 90 ™IV, 246-47.

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the proposal these men had made seemed to offer I:a way out," and the

president replied that he found the proposal "interesting" and

important and that he would like to discuss it "at an early date."91

Judge Haff also wrote the president to the effect that Huerta's

government seemed much more strongly based than he had previously

believed, while liberty of speech and press still continued in

MMexico. 92

Sometime during the negotiations the president prepared

instructions for Henry Lane Wilson:

We are ready to recognize him [Huerta] now on condition that all hostilities cease, that he call an election at an early date, the twenty-sixth of October now mentioned being, in our judgement, too remote, and that he absolutely pledge himself . . . [to] a free and fair election. . . .

President Wilson's "Confidential Instructions to H.L. Wilson"

were never to be sent. William Bayard Hale arrived in Mexico at the

beginning of June with the announcement that he was preparing to write

an article for a magazine. He at once surrounded himself with

individuals that could be of use to him in his mission, which he

conceived of as that of prosecutor of Henry Lane Wilson. Hale was

convinced that the ambassador was unsatisfactory as the U.S.

representative, and he did not believe that Huerta should be 94 recognized. During his stay in Mexico, Robert Hammond Murray was

^Julius Kruttschnitt to Bryan, 26 May 1913, [W.] Wilson Papers, File II; Bryan to Wilson, 27 May 1913, and Wilson to Bryan, 28 May 1913, Wilson-Bryan Correspondence, NA, RG 59.

92Haff to Wilson, 28 May 1913, /7746, NA, RG 59.

9^Confidential Instructions to H. L. Wilson (undated), [W.] Wilson Papers, File II. 94 Grieb, The United States and Huerta, p. 80; Meyer, Huerta, p. 114.

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his constant companion and confidant. In Washington, even Boaz W. Long

complained:

It seems to me almost incredible that Mr. Hale could go in search of information and immediately ally himself with any given man or set of men, expecting thereby to receive an absolutely impartial view.95

While Hale was "investigating" (so he said) Ambassador

Wilson's conduct, the ambassador continued to perform his duties as

best he could under the circumstances. He had not yet received any

instructions. In a despatch in which he indicated to the president

the great disadvantages of delay (almost identical to those enumerated

by Judge Haff), the ambassador wrote that

. . . the great and permanent advantages which European nations are securing as a result of our forced inactivity, are making such a disheartening impression on me that, at the risk of being considered intrusive and insistent, I must again urge upon the President that on the highest grounds of policy, which in this case I understand to be the conserving and the extension of our material interests in Mexico, the restoration of peace and the cultivation of sentiments of friendship and respect with a neighboring and friendly nation, that we should without further delay, following the example of all governments accredited here but two, accord official recognition to the present provisional government.96

The ambassador added that, though he had been the president's

personal representative at his post for three months, he still did

not know the attitude of the administration. As late as 10 July

he still had not been informed. That day he challenged the administration:

recognize Huerta or close the embassy and recall the U.S. representatives

to* «Mexico. - 97

Memorandum by Boaz W. Long, 22 Aug. 1913, /17669, NA, RG 59. Hale continued to receive information from Murray after he returned to the United States. He shewed Bryan one such message, saying, "This is from a man in whose judgement I have confidence" (R. H. Murray to Hale, 27 Sept. 1912, [W.] Wilson Papers, File II).

96H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 9 June 1913, /7743, NA, RG 59.

97Ibid., 10 July 1913, /8027, NA, RG 59.

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In answer to this, Wilson finally received word from Bryan on

"the President's personal statement of his position." The ambassador

was told that this word was confidential (for his personal information,

and not to be passed on to the Mexican government):

This government does not feel that the provisional government of Mexico is moving towards conditions of settled peace, authority and justice, because it is convinced that within Mexico itself there is a fundamental lack of confidence in the good faith of those in control at Mexico City, and in their intention to safeguard constitutional rights and methods of action. This government awaits satisfactory proof of their plans and purposes. If the,present provisional government of Mexico will give the Government of the United States satisfactory assurances that an early election will be held, free from coercion or restraint, that Huerta will observe his original promise not to be a candidate at that election, and that an absolute amnesty will follow, the Government of the United States will be glad to exercise its good offices to secure a genuine armistice and an acquiescence of all parties in the program.

Though this was not an official statement of policy (rather, the

"President's personal statement"), it contained a new note: for the

first time, there was an indication of Woodrow Wilson's desire that

Huerta himself not be a candidate for the presidency. The Mexican

people were not to be free to choose Huerta, even if they so desired.

It was a flagrant case of intervention, and it indicated which way

the U.S. president's policy, once clearly formulated, would go.

Furthermore, it still did not tell the ambassador just what he was

supposed to do.

Henry Lane Wilson had not been officially informed of the Del

Valle and Hale missions, though they were the talk of Mexico. Wilson

complained to the Secretary of State that these missions were putting 99 the embassy in a very bad light, but his complaint was ignored.

98Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 15 June 1913, /7743, NA, RG 59.

99H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 10 July 1913, /7999, NA, RG 59.

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Hale’s first telegrams to the Department were not ignored, however. On

12 June there arrived in Washington a brief telegram in which Hale

indicated the ambassador's responsibility for Madero’s downfall and

suggested that the ambassador's behavior would cause the government

that retained him as its envoy to share his responsibility.

On 1 July the president received Hale’s long-awaited complete

report. Typed by Hale himself on 18 June, it turned out to be an

almost verbatim copy of Robert Hammond Murray's articles of 6, 7, and

8 March in the New York World— as comparison will show.

The report is a marvel of misinformation and ignorance, if

not downright malice. In its thirty-three pages it manages to cram

all the accumulated bilge of Robert Hammond Murray's personal hatred

and Hale’s political and social ignorance, as well as unsubstantiated

rumors and gossip. Hale admits at the beginning that the inept and

unpopular Madero administration had adopted methods of repression

and that the treasury was depleted by the horde of grafters surrounding

the president. But then, as he goes on to discuss the Decena Tragica,

his misinformation breaks through. After misspelling the names of

most of the participants and getting his dates and actions thoroughly

confused, he sets out to place the blame.

Hale directly charges Ambassador Wilson with full responsibility

for the fall of the Madero regime and the death of the ex-president.

He states that Henry Lane Wilson could have ended the bombardment at

any time by simply issuing a stern warning that the United States

would not recognize a government set up by force (i.e., the ambassador

should have anticipated Woodrow Wilson's unorthodox recognition

100Hale to Davis, 12 June 1913, [W.] Wilson Papers, File II.

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policy, which even the U.S. president-elect had not yet formulated!),

that Madero had not been betrayed and arrested until the rebels had

ascertained that the ambassador had no objection, and that the plan

to set up a "military dictatorship" would never have been formed except

in the embassy, under the ambassador's patronage, and with the

ambassador's promise of recognition. Finally, he says that Madero

would not have been killed had Wilson made it clear that the plot

must stop short of murder.

The report is so full of internal contradictions that it is

difficult to know just where to begin critiquing them. For one

example, Hale takes several pages to attribute the coup to the

ambassador before he says that Huerta and Diaz had reached an agreement

before they met with him. He repeats the lie that the ambassador

refused to intercede for Madero's life. After accusing the ambassador

of having "delivered the men to death," he concludes that "it is in

my judgement absurd to picture Mr. Wilson as a malicious plotter."

But despite the contradictions, obvious at first reading to

those who understood the Mexican situation, the report shocked Woodrow

Wilson. He wrote Bryan:

The document from Hale is indeed extraordinary. I should like, upon my return from a little outing, to discuss with you very seriously the necessity of recalling Henry Lane Wilson in one way or another, perhaps merely 'for consultation' until we have had a talk with the man himself.1®2

After his return from his "outing," the president again wrote Bryan:

After reading Hale's report and the latest telegrams from Henry Lane Wilson, I hope more than ever you will seriously consider

101Ibid., 18 June 1913, /7798 1/2, NA, RG 59.

^^W. Wilson to Bryan, 1 July 1913, /7864 1/2; Bryan to W. Wilson, 3 July 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA, RG 59.

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the possibility of recalling Wilson, as I suggested in a recent note, and leaving matters in the hands of O'Shaughnessy, who you will notice is commended as a perfectly honest man by Hale.1®^

There can be little doubt that the president's final decision

on the matter of recognition was closely tied to his acceptance of

Hale's report as proof of the ambassador's complicity with Huerta.

Up to the time of Hale’s messages, the administration had rather carefully

refused to tip its hand— even under great pressure. But on 22 June,

the Mexican-American Arbitration Treaty was allowed to expire. "This ,,104 . . .. . wss 2n crsincus sxgxii On j_ 7 ouj_y, it wss snriouiicGG tnst condicions

that had been set for the recognition of Huerta— that a constitutional

election be held after the fighting had ceased— had been refused by

the general. This announcement, of course, was not true.On 20

June the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after

closeting himself with President Wilson, announced the administration's

course: the U.S. would definitely not recognize Huerta.Within

less than two weeks, arms were flowing to the Carranzistas, while the

administration carefully began to investigate the sources of arms to

Huerta and both the president and Secretary Bryan began to delay export

permits for arms previously purchased by the Mexican provisional 107 government.

On 15 July, Bryan wired H. L. Wilson: "The President

desires that you come to Washington immediately to report personally on

"^W. Wilson to Bryan, 3 July 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA, RG 59.

10

1Q5New York World, 17 July 1913; Calvert, p. 173n.

^ ^ New York World, 20 June 1913; Calvert, p. 177.

Calvert, p. 178.

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the situation. Leave first secretary in charge of tha Embassy.

There was no hint to the ambassador that he was being permanently

recalled. Indeed, he was to have a most difficult time later bringing

home his personal belongings, since he was not even permitted to 109 return to Mexico for that purpose.

News of the ambassador's departure for Washington signaled

another flurry of articles in newspapers attacking and defending him.

Alfonso Madero publicly contradicted his uncle Ernesto Madero—

declaring that the ambassador was morally responsible for the overthrow

and assassination of his brother, Francisco, and that the Maderos

were firmly supporting Carranza.Other newspapers quoted the

ambassador as stating, "My motive in aiding the federal government

of Mexico has been to protect the lives of Americans, "XJ"L while both

the Washington Post and the New York Times justified his actions and 112 condemned the administration's inaction.

108 Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 2 Aug. 1913; H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 4 Aug. 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, NA, RG 59.

109Bryan to H. L. Wilson, 15 July 1913, 123 W 691/282a. The day after receiving the telegram, Ambassador Wilson left on the Ward Line steamer Mexico (Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," p. 232). Yet John P. Harrison ("Henry Lane Wilson, el tragico de la Decena," Historia Mexicana, 6 [julio 1956 - junio 1957], 374-405) in a puzzling statement says that the ambassador moved exceedingly slowly in returning to Washington: "Si hubiera sido posible, lo habria hecho a lomo de mula" (p. 405). Harrison seems to be pandering to his audience's prejudices.

110New York World, 20 July 1913.

*^ Boston Herald and New York Tribune, 26 July 1913.

^^Washington Post and New York Times, 26 July 1913; New York Times, 28 July 1913; Washington Post, 31 July 1913.

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On the day the ambassador arrived in Washington, 26 July

1913, he conferred with Bryan and then dictated a lengthy report,

in which he stated that Madero had violated all his promises and

had been anti-American, that he (Wilson) had taken part in the Pact

of the Embassy merely as a referee and solely on humanitarian grounds,

and that Huerta should be recognized— but only under certain conditions

(e.g., the settlement of outstanding claims). The only alternative,

he concluded, was direct military intervention.

After having been kept waiting for a while after he arrived

for his appointment, Henry Lane Wilson on 28 July confronted the

president. Woodrow Wilson did most of the talking— not even bothering 114 to ask the ambassdor questions, in spite of the fact that a Senate

committee was astounded at the ambassador's knowledge of Mexico.'Lx^

Henry Lane Wilson later calmly recalled that President Wilson "impressed

me as being under the influence of opinions other than those I had

been reporting to the Department and as having perhaps a different

version of the events that had occured in Mexico.

At Bryan’s request, Henry Lane Wilson submitted his

resignation on 5 August to become effective on 14 October.This

was the third time the ambassador had tendered his resignation.

The Wilson administration had now cleared the way for action. The

113 H. L. Wilson, memorandum, 26 July 1913, [W.] Wilson Papers, File II. 114 H. L. Wilson to Bryan, 28 Aug. 1913, 123 W 691/277.

115New York Times, 2 Aug. 1913; Washington Post, 1 Aug. 1913. (The president may not have known this.)

116Bryan to O'Shaughnessy, 14 Aug. 1913, /8379a, NA, RG 59.

117H. L. Wilson, p. 313.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Informed by the White House that Gov. John Lind had been charged with a

new mission to Mexico: to get Huerta to resign.The Mexicans were

not to be permitted to vote for him, regardless of their wishes.

Woodrow Wilson's policy of bare-faced interventionism in Mexico— and

Latin America, for that matter— was now the long-awaited new policy of

the United States.

On 27 August 1913, Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of

the Congress of the United States, in which speech he spelled out his

new-found Mexican policy. "I deem it my duty to speak very frankly of

what this Government has done and should seek to do in fulfillment of

its obligation to Mexico," he declared. The reasons that the United

States "does not feel at liberty any longer to stand idly by," he said,

was because that country "lies at last where all the world looks on.

Central America is about to be touched by the great routes of the

world's trade and intercourse running free from ocean to ocean at the

Isthmus." Then he stated his demands:

A satisfactory settlement seems to us to be conditioned on— (a) An Immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico and a definitive armistice entered into and scrupulously observed; (be) Security given for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part; (c) The consent of Gen. Huerta to bind himself not to be a candidate for election as President of the Republic at this election; (d) The agreement of all parties to abide by the results of the election and cooperate in the most loyal way in organizing and supporting the new administration. The Government of the United States will be glad to play any part in this settlement or in its carrying out which it can play honorably and consistently with international right. It pledges itself to recognize and in every way possible and proper to assist the administration chosen and set up in Mexico in the way and on the conditions suggested.

118«ew York Times, 5 Aug. 1913.

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Taking all the existing conditions into consideration, the Government of the United States can conceive of no reasons sufficient to justify those who are not attempting to shape the policy or exercise the authority of Mexico in declining the offices of friendship now offered.*19

It is difficult to believe that Woodrow Wilson did not know

(or at least suspect) that he was condemning Mexico to the horrors of

an intensified civil war. He stated: "It is now our duty to show what

true neutrality will do to the people of Mexico to set their affairs in

order and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly

counsels." He added, significantly:

While we wait, the contest of the rival forces will undoubtedly, for a little while, be sharper than ever . . . and with the increased activity of the contending factions will come, it is to be feared, increased danger to the noncombatants in Mexico as well as to those actually in the field of battle. . . . We should earnestly urge all Americans to leave Mexico at once and should assist them to get away in every way possible. . . .

Subsequent events, of course, were to give the lie to President

Wilson's vaunted "neutrality." The incident at Tampico and the attack

on Veracruz were to be examples of this "neutrality." The mischief

done to Mexico by the U.S. president was to bedevil him and his

successors for many years to come. Yet nowhere can be found the

slightest indication that President Wilson ever doubted the righteous­

ness of his course of action.

119 U.S. Congress, House, Mexican Affairs: Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, August 27, 1913, H. Doc. 205, 63d Cong., 1st sess., 1913, passim.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. AN ESSAY ON SOURCES AND CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this study has, to a large extent, been determined

by the nature of the charges leveled against Henry Lane Wilson, as well

as by the nature and availability of the source materials. There are

problems in dealing with both the charges and the evidence.

Official government records are, of course, voluminous; but

the paucity of Wilson's personal (as opposed to official) correspondence

has created difficulties. In 1960 the Indiana State Historical Society

stated that, so far as is known, "there is no collection anywhere of

the papers of Henry Lane Wilson." Only six letters and one telegram

from Wilson to Charles Warren Fairbanks (in the Fairbanks manuscripts

at the Lilly Library, University of Indiana) and two letters from

Wilson to Samuel Moffett Ralston (in the Ralston Papers at the same

library) were available. Subsequently, John V. Wilson, the ambassador's

son, bequeathed his father's "papers" to Prof. Donald Rowland, of the

Department of History, University of Southern California, where they

are now available. Few letters of a personal nature are included in

this small collection, which consists chiefly of newspaper clippings

and manuscripts relating to the Revolution; none are significant for

this study.

By far the largest amount of material dealing with the public

career of Henry Lane Wilson is in the National Archives (at Washington).

Much of this material has been inspected by researchers whose focus

201

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was on other topics; thus, materials detailing the actions of the

ambassador have been largely overlooked. Now available on microfilm

is the correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson,

bj’ and large not duplicated at the Library of Congress in either the

Woodrow Wilson Papers or the William Jennings Bryan Papers. The

"Henry Lane Wilson File" (123.W691) in the General Records of the

Department of State proved quite useful, though there is an unexplained

gap for the crucial period of January-February 1913. This file,

apparently not available to Masingill, has not been used to advantage

by more recent writers. Additional important materials located in

the General Records of the Department of State can be found in both the

numerical and decimal files. Other essential materials are in the

Records of the Diplomatic and Consular Posts; the Central Files of the

Department of Justice (which contains a special file— 90755— on "The

Mexican Revolution," used only by Kenneth Grieb [The United States and

Huerta]); and the Main Series of Letters Received, Office of the

Adjutant General, War Department (which includes several boxes on "The

Mexican Revolution," with much useful material— especially on northern

Mexico and the border regions).

Besides the General Records of the Department of State, the

National Archives contains no greater source of information on the

early states of the Revolution and on the career of Henry Lane Wilson

than that available in the Records of the Research and Information

Section, Agency of the United States, Special Claims Commission, the

United States and Mexico. These records are located at the Federal

Records Center (Suitland, Maryland). Though available for many years,

they have been unused since they were compiled in the mid-1920s.

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They include ten boxes of "Historical Materials on the Mexican

Revolution," one box on "Conditions Along the Mexican Border, 1911-

1919," three boxes of "Confidential Publications of the Department of

State Regarding Mexico, 1910-1915" (not otherwise available), twenty-one

boxes of "Reference Materials" regarding Revolutionary Mexico, several

boxes of "State Department Records Describing Conditions in Mexico,

1919-1920" (again, not otherwise available except in the General Records

of the Department of State, where they are not always duplicated), and

many more— including several unpublished monographs, translations and

clippings from Mexican newspapers, and worksheets referring to the

identity of Mexican revolutionary forces (eight boxes). This study is

based primarily on research into all these records.

The papers of government officials that had a part in

influencing U.S. foreign policy on Mexico during this period have been

consulted, especially those of the presidents themselves and their

closest advisors. At the Library of Congress, Woodrow Wilson's papers

have been studied, as have the papers of William Howard Taft (containing

interesting correspondence with Henry Lane Wilson) and Charles Evans

Hughes (containing some correspondence with Henry Lane Wilson during the

1916 presidential race).

U.S. newspapers (especially the New York World, the New York

Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Daily Tribune, the San

Francisco Examiner, the New York Herald, the Los Angeles Times, and the

Indianapolis Star) have been consulted for contemporary editorial and

news materials. The most important were the New York World, which

set out to "get" Henry Lane Wilson, and the New York Times and the

Washington Post, both of which came to his defense.

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I acknowledge and regret the lack of materials from the

Mexican archives and Mexican newspapers. Since I am dealing with the

U.S. ambassador, I would expect to find the materials most useful to

my purpose in the Archivo General de la Secretarxa de Relaciones

Exteriores. But since part of this study also involves conditions

throughout Mexico during the Madero administration, I expect that the

Archivo Eistorico de la Defensa Nacional (not open to foreign scholars)

and the files of the Secretarxa de Gobernacion in the Archivo General

de la Nacion would be of additional value. Though in a later revision

of this study I hope to remedy this defect, there are good reasons

for presenting the study now. Dra. Eugenia Meyer, of the Instituto

Nacional de Antropologxa e Historia, one of Mexico's younger

professional historians'1’ and a specialist on the Huerta era, has

advised me that Wilson's role could best be studied in the records

of the Department of State, since the only materials available in

Mexico are Wilson's correspondence with the Mexican foreign office.

Again, Peter Calvert (The Mexican Revolution 1910-1914: The Diplomacy

of Anglo-American Conflict) spent two years in Mexico and used none of

the material from those archives. Calvert is not a sloppy researcher.

His materials on Wilson came from the National Archives and the British

Foreign Office. Meyer (Huerta: A Political Portrait) and Grieb (The

United States and Huerta) used Mexican records in only five percent

of their references— and no Mexican records in their references to

Wilson. These facts lead me to suspect that there may not be sufficient

^"Author of Conciencia historica norteamericana sobre la Revolucion de 1910 (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropologxa e Historia, 1970) and translator of Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (trans. as Huerta y la Revolucidh; Mexico: Ediciones Diogenes, 1971).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205

material in Mexico to influence the basic thesis of this study. Thera

was, to be sure, a very practical reason for not researching in the

Mexican repositories: I am a teacher in a state community college

that, not encouraging research and publication, makes no provision

for research grants or sabbaticals. Indeed, one is penalized for

traveling for research, since one must take leave without pay. I

spent one summer off within the past six years for researching at

the National Archives and the Library of Congress.

This study also lacks the use of Mexican newspapers. I would

like to visit the Hemeroteca Nacional and study its collections of

provincial newspapers. Though many Mexican newspaper files are

available at the Library of Congress, most of the newspapers are from

the capital. During the period here covered, they were generally

subject to pressure (if not outright censorship) from the government;

thus their value is rather limited. There is a large number of

clippings and copies of newspapers, especially from the provinces, in

the Records of the Diplomatic and Consular Posts; and these have been

used.

Considering all these factors, I am convinced that the range

of primary materials I have covered— and the depth to which I have

plumbed them— is such that a fairly accurate picture can be presented.

No secondary work on Henry Lane Wilson had appeared in

English prior to Masingill's dissertation and, aside from two minor

articles, none has appeared since. Frank A. Jerome, of Madison

College, Harrisonburg, Virginia, has been working on a book (tentatively

titled Henry Lane Wilson and the Mexican Revolution) for some five

years, but the work is not expected to be finished for some time. The

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interested student, then, nest glean ehat he can from scattered

references in books dealing with related topics, in which the

ambassador's role is decidedly that of a supporting actor. In all

these works, he is generally characterized as either a knave or (more

recently) a meddling fool.

In search of a villain, U.S. "pro-Revolutionary" historians

choose the knave; "anti-Revolutionary" writers (a rarity) completely

ignore him; moderates simply dismiss him as a pompous anachronism.

Mexican historians must have their demonio yanqui. It would never do

to blame Mexican disasters on Mexicans alone. Wilson has always been

the ideal choice. Again, as with American historians, the reactionaries

have chosen to ignore him. Wilson is interesting only as an evil man.

Besides, conservatives tend to be ultranationalistic, as if to prove

that one is not necessarily un-Mexican by being merely anti-Revolutionary.

A gringo in one's corner would embarrass the cause.

The result has been that Henry Lane Wilson has generally

remained what Robert Hammond Murray made him in 1913 and 1916. Murray,

a personal enemy of the ambassador's, opened fire on Wilson with a

series of articles in the New York World beginning on 6 March 1913,

in which he first intimated, then strongly implied, that the American

diplomat was involved in a Diaz-Huerta conspiracy. (Of course, he

also implied a Diaz-Huerta conspiracy, but that is another matter.)

Licenciado Luis Manuel Rojas immediately took up the cause. Rojas

was a Maderista deputy in the Mexican congress, and he was the first

Mexican publicly to charge Wilson's complicity. He later expanded

his charges in a book entitled La culpa de Henry Lane Wilson en el

gran desastre de Mexico (Mexico: La Verdad, 1918).

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Most of the book does not deal with Henry Lane Wilson or Mexico’s

disaster; rather, it tries to prove that Mexicans are ready for

democracy. However, the material on the ambassador appears to have

been taken from a series of scurrilous articles, "Huerta and the Two

Wilsons," also written by Murray and published in Harper’s Magazine

(62 [25 March - 29 April 1916], 301-03, 341-42, 364-65, 402-04,

434-36, 466-69). The articles were based on confidential records

of the Department of State, made available to Murray by unknown

officials (suspicion points to either William Jennings Bryan or

President Wilson himself), in time for the election campaign of

1916, when Ambassador Wilson was serving as adviser to Charles Evans

Hughes. Murray took Wilson's despatches out of context, interpolated

them, and distorted them to his heart’s content. A few years before,

Wilson had had Murray thrown out of the embassy in Mexico City for

improper conduct, and the latter had sworn to get even. He did.

La culpa de Henry Lane Wilson was not, however, the first

bastard child of Murray’s articles. In 1917 Manuel Marquez Sterling,

Cuban minister to Mexico during the Decena Tragica and an intimate

friend of the Madero family, published Los ultimos dxas del President

Madero: Mi gestion diplomatica en Mexico (Habana: Imprenta Siglo XX,

1917). Because of its wide influence on later writers, this book

needs to be mentioned. In this tract, Marquez Sterling took Murray's

articles from Harper’s Magazine, translated them into Spanish, and

sandwiched in his personal recollections of events, as well as gossip,

hearsay, rumors, and (it appears) a certain amount of sheer fiction—

most of it in rather poor taste. Marquez Sterling places the full

responsibility for the downfall and assassination of President Madero

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squarely on the shoulders of Henry lane Wilson. The almost psychotic

Yankeephobia of the writer oozes from each bitter sentence. Yet it

set the pattern (that has not yet been fully overcome) for the

interpretation of this tragic period.

From the time of Murray and his intellectual offspring,

practically all writing relating to Henry Lane Wilson and his conduct

in Mexico can be traced back to these "sources." This is true of

some "memorias," whose authors appear to have refreshed their dimming

recollections of long-past events by dipping into Marquez Sterling or

Rojas (or each other). These sources were used to "prove" that the

American ambassador (an Old Guard Republican Dollar-Diplomacy

reactionary) hated, vituperated, lied about, and persecuted Madero

because the latter would not pay him money; that he grossly exaggerated

conditions in Mexico under Madero in order to make the Mexican president

look bad; that he decided to remove Madero and, thus, set in motion

the whole chain of intrigues that led ultimately to the Decena Tragica;

that he was the mentor, if not the director, of the conspiracy that

involved Diaz, Mondragon, Reyes, the Mexican senate, the Madero cabinet,

including the foreign minister, and finally Huerta; and that, to crown

his infamy, he either ordered, encouraged, or countenanced Madero’s

murder. Wilson became a malevolent being of heroic proportions— the

perfect example of Yankee perfidy.

The mythology of the Revolution began to be created during a

period of anarchy and near-anarchy (from about 1910 to 1920), and this

mythology required demons as well as angels and heroes. As Madero

became ever more apotheosized, Huerta, Diaz, Reyes, and (above all)

Henry Lane Wilson became the great villains of the Revolution. What

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historical writing was done in Mexico (and, to a large extent, in the

United States) was of a violently partisan and bitterly polemical nature.

It is understandable: objectivity in scholarly pursuits could not be

expected in a maelstrom that swept away one-tenth (some say one-fifth)

of the Mexican people. The writing was not done by professional

historians. By far the bulk of it was done by participants, and it

was in the form of pamphlets assailing someone or defending someone

else. Much of it was, of course, done in exile after the writers'

side lost.

The sheer bulk of this material makes it impractical to

discuss even a small portion of it in so limited an essay as this

is. One fine example, however, is Francisco Bulnes* Toda la verdad

acerca de la Revolucion Mexicana: La responsabilidad criminal del

Presidente Wilson en el desastre mexicano (Mdxico: Editorial Los

Insurgentes, S.A., 1916; rpt. Editorial Libros de Mexico,

1960), which is self-explanatory.

Limiting ourselves to major works that have proved to be

significant for this study, we see that the process of mythologizing

has gone unabated until quite recently, when Isidro Fabela published

his Historia diplomatics de la Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico: Fondo de

Cultura Econdmica, 1958-59) in two volumes, which contain a substantial

amount of archival material not accessible elsewhere. Fabela, however,

boasts of his service under Venustiano Carranza and sentimentally

admits that his works fulfill a promise to the first chief. The

documentation, therefore, and the commentary are all carefully

selected and written to enhance the memory of the Constitutionalist

cause. Henry Lane Wilson is naturally cast (with the anti-Maderistas)

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as an unconscionable villain. Likewise* Manuel Gonzalez Ramirez' La

revolucion social de Mexico: Las ideas — la violencia (Mexico: Fondo

de Cultura Econdmica, 1960) is an extremely partisan work. Citing

Marquez Sterling at every turn, Gonzalez Ramirez dips heavily into

the memoirs of the participants. His use of archival material is

practically limited to the published Papers Relating to the Foreign

Relations of the United States— and that quite selectively.

The greatest impetus toward the professionalization of

history in Mexico came in 1940 with the founding of El Colegio de

Mexico, dedicated to the training of professional historians. This

training has led to greater objectivity and to the publication of great

masses of documents and truly scholarly works. Little has been done,

however, to shed light on Henry Lane Wilson. Perhaps as Huerta becomes

"rehabilitated," so will the ambassador; but we have still to wait.

Daniel Cosio Villegas' article, "Sobre Henry Lane Wilson," in Memoria

del Colegio Nacional (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1961), though

quite moderate, still takes the traditional view of the ambassador's

role. So does Jesus Silva Herzog, Breve Historia de la Revolucion

Mexicana (2 vols.; Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1966). Both

men exonorate Wilson from plotting the coup and masterminding the

assassination, but they maintain that he could have stopped both.

Moderation is still the exception, however. More in the mainstream

are such works as Daniel A. Moreno, Francisco I. Madero, Jose M.

Pino Suarez, el crimen de la embajada (Mexico: Libros Mexicanos,

1960); Ramon Proda, La culpa de Lane Wilson, embajador de los E. U. A.,

en la tragedia mexicana de 1913 (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1962); and

Martin Luis Guzman, "Henry Lane Wilson: Dn Embajador Malvado,"

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Cuadernos Mexicanos (129 [julio-agosto 1963], 203-08), whose title

tells all. Without exception, these writers still paraphrase Murray

{generally without giving M m credit) and cite Manuel Marquez Stirling!

In discussing U.S. historians of the Revolution, I

shall again limit myself to works that have proved significant to my

study. Here, again, the prospects of carefully reevaluating the

evidence on Henry Lane Wilson are discouraging. (One researcher

at the National Archives in Washington shook his head and said, with

a sad smile, "You can’t rehabilitate Henry Lane Wilson!").

As in Mexico, the earlier works on the Mexican Revolution

in this country were those of nonhistorians (e.g., Anita Brenner

and Ernest Gruening), and some of them are still at it. William Weber

Johnson's Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation

(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968) is a journalistic exercise by

a professor of journalism. Unlike in Mexico, however, the profession­

alism of history in the United States has gone apace since the last

quarter of the nineteenth century, and professionals fairly well

dominate the field. The trend has been, however, for U.S.

historians to take their cue from the Mexicans in dealing with the

Revolution. That old standby, Henry Bamford Parkes' History of

Mexico (Boston: Houghton, 1938 and later editions), is a good example.

Two generations of students of Mexican history have been served,

without caveats, the Revolutionary mythology, including demon Wilson.

Textbooks for surveys of Latin-American history (too many to list here)

have done the same. Until quite recently, monographs have fared but

little better. Charles C. Cumberland's The Mexican Revolution: Genesis

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Under Madero (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1952) has now become a

"classic" study of the early period of the Revolution, and as such

it is still quite useful. But in trying to bolster Madero*s eroding

reputation as a genuine revolutionary, Cumberland had to punish old

whipping-boys Huerta and Wilson— which he did. Concentrating on his

hero, the writer could not have been expected to take the time to

reexamine evidence that might cast doubt on the guilt of his villains.

So the demons stayed damned. In Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of

Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955), Stanley Ross

presents the best narrative of the Decena Tragica ever written; with

genuine skill and craftmanship, he weaves the various strands of

military actions, political events, diplomatic maneuverings, and

crisis situations into a sharply delineated tapestry. But like

Cumberland, he came to praise Caesar, not to bury him; and Ross, too,

needed his Brutus. In the magnificent architecture of this book,

Wilson remained in his gargoyle's niche.

Masingill states in his dissertation that Howard F. Cline's

The United States and Mexico (originally published in 1953) was "the

first work in which an attempt is made to present the role of the

ambassador in a fair and impartial light" and adds that Cline read

more of Wilson's despatches than did other writers. This claim may be

true; but, again, the vast field that Cline chose for himself

inevitably forced him to lean heavily on the work of others. No man

covering the whole field of Mexican-U.S. relations could possibly

cover everything. Cline did not. Though he does reject the extreme

perfidy that Revolutionary mythology attributed to Wilson, Cline

repeats many of the canards. He evidently did read more despatches

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than: say. Cumberland or Ross, because Cline focused on international

relations; but he read much into Wilson’s despatches that simply is

not there. A clear pattern emerges in reading his narrative carefully:

the words are Cline's, but the structure is Murray's. Without

documentation (the closest he comes is when he says, "as the documents

reveal") he leaves the reader wondering where he got his information.

John P. Harrison, "Henry Lane Wilson, el tragico de la Decena"

(H.storia Mexicana, 6 [enero-marzo 1957], 374-405), studies William

Bayard Hale's report to Woodrow Wilson (and realizes the crucial

Importance of it) but says little about the subject of the report—

the ambassador and his actions. Lowell L. Blaisdell's "Henry Lane

Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero" (Southwestern Social Science

Quarterly, 43 [Sept. 1962], 126-35) simply rehashes old canards for

the benefit of his predominantly liber1-left audience. Daniel James's

Mexico and the Americans (New York: Praeger, 1963) includes

a chapter (7) on "Ambassador Wilson's Conspiracy." Documentation?

None. And so it goes.

Peter Calvert, an Englishman, in The Mexican Revolution, 1910-

1914 was the first writer to picture Wilson as something other than

an ogre. He does not believe that the ambassador was involved in

any plot to overthrow Madero— not at first at least. He also admits

that Wilson was not always anti-Madero, but gradually became so as

Madero proved his incompetence to govern unruly Mexico. Wilson

became involved in efforts to unseat the Mexican president, Calvert

says, toward the end of the Decena Tragica. He credits Wilson with

initiating efforts to get Madero to resign. Calvert does not exonerate

Wilson from the charge that he was at least partially responsible for

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Madero*s fall. Rather, he assumes that the ambassador was instrumental

and attempts to justify his alleged actions! Calvert feels that Wilson

was simply looking out for U.S. interests— which is what a diplomat

is all about. The book is well-researched, though some of the

omissions are interesting. Over fifty percent of Calvert's citations

are to archival material (forty percent American, ten percent British);

and though he was in Mexico for two years, he has no references to

Mexican archives of any kind! Not that he does not cite Mexican

sources; ten percent of his references are to Frida, Rojas, Marquez

Sterling (hermano latino), and Fabela. One suspects that this is

where Calvert gets his outline on Wilson— filling it in later with

Wilson's despatches.

Kenneth Grieb, The United States and Huertaa could be considered

a revisionist in dealing with President Huerta. Of the more recent

works, Grieb's is by far the most painstakingly researched. A small

book (214 pages,including the bibliography), it is a seminal work.

Researchers are already working on some of the questions it raises.

Grieb's study is based largely on archival and manuscript material

(75 percent): American (69 percent), British (4 percent), and

Mexican (1.5 percent). Where most researchers in the National

Archives have limited themselves to the decimal files of the Department

of State, which are all on microfilm, Grieb ranged widely into the

Department's personnel records, the Records of the Diplomatic and

Consular Posts, the Bryan-Wilson correspondence, Justice and War

Department records, as well as the Woodrow Wilson papers in the

Library of Congress. His Mexican sources are from the Archivo General

de la Secretarla de Relaciones Exteriores, though he made little use

of them.

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Grieb*s focus is on the efforts of Huerta to obtain recognition

from Woodrow Wilson, as well as on the latter*s efforts to unseat

Huerta. Henry Lane Wilson is, as usual, on the periphery; and Grieb,

preoccupied with his essential theme, did not pay too much attention to

the ambassador. He stops short of implicating Wilson in any actual

plot, though he does otherwise accept the traditional views. Wilson,

he feels, was a fool and a meddler in internal Mexican affairs. Without

citing sources (or else citing the traditional defamers), he assumes

Wilson's worst intentions. For instance, the ambassador is accused of

urging the Mexican foreign secretary, Pedro Lascurain, to impose

resignation on Madero; and Grieb then cites British Minister Sir Francis

Stronge's letter to the ambassador in which the former assumes

(mistakenly) that that is what Wilson did. He also assumes the

traditional view, strongly disputed by Calvert, that the ambassador

controlled and used the resident diplomatic corps. Grieb repeats

the story that Wilson, had he tried, could have saved Madero*s life.

Even in describing the personal characteristics of Wilson, Grieb

uses (but does not cite) Murray's "Huerta and the Two Wilsons"

practically word for word. On the whole, Huerta comes out looking

better than Wilson.

A more recent revisionist work is Michael C. Meyer's Huerta:

A Political Portrait. Meyer uses Mexican archives more extensively

that did Grieb, but this material still amounts to only about five

percent (with ninety percent from the U.S. National Archives and

five percent form British Foreign Office documents). All the National

Archives records are from the General Records of the Department of

State, except for a very few citations from the Bryan-Wilson

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correspondence. Where Grieb obtained a copy of Huerta's military

record from the War Department files (though they are still classified),

Meyer got the same record from the Archivo Historico de la Defensa

Nacional, through the intercession of Dra. Eugenia Meyer (no kin).

Meyer is by far the kindest to Henry Lane Wilson, though

(again) his focus is elsewhere. He states that there is no proof

that the ambassador planned and directed the murders of Madero and

Pino Suarez. However, he adds, it is clear that Wilson "meddled

shamelessly in Mexico's internal affairs and that his opposition to

the Madero government was responsible, at least in part, for the

collapse of the regime" (p. 76). Since Meyer is too busy clearing

Huerta to waste time on Wilson, the latter is largely ignored.

None of these writers is interested in Henry Lane Wilson's

activities except as they affected Anglo-American relations— or the

relations between Huerta and the United States. None tries to explain

the amount of abuse and accusation heaped upon the ambassador. There

is no mention of Wilson's efforts on behalf of refugees, the services

provided by the embassy during the calamity, the dangers to the

foreign colonies, the damages to foreign property, or Wilson's

desperate efforts to obtain relief for the starving poor of Mexico

City. None mention his success in obtaining a cease-fire in order to

bury the bloating dead and to care for the wounded and the hungry.

This whole aspect of Wilson’s activities is passed over in silence.

Perhaps it just does not fit in with the image of the necessary "ugly

American."

It has not been my task to defend Henry Lane Wilson against

all the charges leveled against him. Such a self-imposed task

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would have been an impossible burden, since the accusers range from

those who, like Gonzalez Ramirez, assert that Wilson was the mastermind

behind the Decena Tragica and the assassinations of Madero and Pino

Suarez, to the many writers who simply claim that Wilson overstepped

his authority and was guilty of nothing more than poor judgment. I

have merely narrated the events and actions of the participants as

the documents reveal them to me and have left it to the reader to

determine whether the available evidence indicates wrong-doing on the

part of the ambassador.

Considering the enormity of the crimes alleged by some, there

is amazingly little evidence. As indicated earlier in this essay, the

first charges were aired by a personal enemy of Wilson's, Robert

Hammond Hurray; and these charges were simply manufactured out of the

whole cloth. Murray imputed motives, assumed attitudes, and cast

suspicions— but proved nothing.

Having carefully sifted through the available evidence,

I have reached certain conclusions. I find that Henry Lane Wilson

saw himself as what he was supposed to be: the official representative

of the United States to a foreign country. He saw his task as that of

promoting and protecting the interests of his country and its citizens

abroad and of doing all that he could to maintain friendly relations

with the government of any country to which he was sent. He was

eminently successul in Chile. He acquitted himself with credit in

Belgium. In Mexico he shrewdly analyzed the situation during both

the Diaz and Madero administrations, and he accurately reported to

his government how events in that country could or would affect U.S.

interests. He knew, long before many others, that Madero was in

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trouble, not only from his enemies, but from those who had been his

erstwhile followers; and he predicted the probable course of events.

When time proved him right, he was accused of having engineered those

events. He foresaw the disastrous course of Woodrow Wilson's policies

toward Mexico, and he warned the president. For this he was disgraced.

Henry Lane Wilson was in the clutches of his personal and

political enemies the minute Woodrow Wilson moved into the White

House. It was to the advantage of the new Democratic administration to

make the ambassador— and, through him, the previous Republican

administrations— the whipping boy for whatever mistakes were made in

Mexico.

Wilson's entire career in the diplomatic service shows that

he was a faithful public servant. But he was in the wrong political

party.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Official Government Records

1. National Archives and Records Service

Record Group (RG) 21, Records of the District Courts of the United States. Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Law Docket 59138, H. L. Wilson v. Norman Hapgood. Vol. 63 and Law Case Files, 1863-1934. Complete records of the suit for libel filed by Henry Lane Wilson against Norman Hapgood, publisher of HarperTs Weekly, over the publication (in 1916) of Robert Hammond Murray's articles, "Huerta and the Two Wilsons."

RG 59, General Records of the Department of State. Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, 1913-15. Letters received from the president and copies of letters sent to him by Bryan (many of Bryan's letters refer to diplomatic despatches and notes to the president for his information, comment, or approval; letters received from the president contain his comments on the matters thus referred); by and large not duplicated in any other records or manuscript collections.

------. Numerical File 5841, vol. 476; and Decimal File 123.W691, Henry Lane Wilson File. Correspondence and memorandums relating to the ambassador, with a strange gap for the (crucial) period of January- February 1913.

------. Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of State, 24 January 1911 - 23 April 1918. 10 vols. Press copies of letters sent by Secretaries Knox, Bryan, and Lansing to the president, members of Congress, Cabinet members, ministers and ambassadors of foreign nations, et al. (arranged chronologically, each volume contains an index of names of the addressees).

------. Decimal File 812.00-812.927, Records of the Department of State Referring to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-29. The best-known and most comprehensive file on Mexico for the period covered; includes diplomatic and consular despatches, correspondence to and from individuals and foreign governments, and communications between agencies of the U.S. government.

219

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------. Diplomatic Despatches from Chile, 1837-1303. Vols. 43-50. Volumes covering the period of Henry Lane Wilson's service in Chile.

------. Disorders in Mexico. Confidential publications of selected documents of the Department of State for the information of U.S. diplomatic and consular personnel.

RG 60, Central Files of the Department of Justice. Numerical File 43718 (folded), "On the Mexican Revolution." Records of individuals and movements in the United States engaged in activities against the Mexican government after 1310 (includes two boxes of separately filed "Enclosures").

RG 76, Records of the Research and Information Section, Agency of the United States, Special Claims Commission, United States and Mexico. Second only to the 812.00 File (of RG 59, above) in importance for this study, includes files on "Conditions along the Mexican border, 1911-1919"; "Confidential Publications of the Department of State Regarding Mexico, 1910-1915"; "Consular Reports and Other State Department Papers, 1913-1920"; "Inventories of United States Property in Mexico, 1912-1913"; "File on the History of the Mexican Revolution: The Mexican Revolution from the Plan of San Luis Potosi, Monograph Number 4"; "File on the History of the Mexican Revolution: The Tragic Ten Days, Monograph Number 12"; "File on the History of the Mexican Revolution: The Madero Administration, Monograph Number 9"; "The Tragic Ten Days (Review of [H. L.] Wilson's Corre­ spondence), Law Memorandum Number 82"; "Reference Files"; "Records of the Department of State Describing Conditions in Mexico, 1910-1912"; "Translations of Articles from Mexican Newspapers, 1914-1930"; "Veinte meses de anarquia," anonymous MS in Office File (OF) 908, "Documents on Mexican History"; and "Worksheets Referring to the Identity of Mexican Revolutionary Forces."

RG 84, Records of U.S. Foreign Service Posts. Records of the U.S. Legation in Chile, Consular and Miscellaneous Communications Received; Consular and Miscellaneous Communications Sent; and Instructions from the Department of State.

------. Records of the U.S. Legation in Mexico, Decimal Files 1912- 13.

RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Letters Received (Main Series), R and P Files (184934 K2 Number 2; 2320670; and 1716354), Sections 1-15, Files on the Mexican Revolution.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221

Useful chiefly for ascertaining conditions along the Mexican border during the Revolution. (Much of the information is duplicated in RG 76, which, however, is not as easily available, since it is stored at the F deral Records Center, Suitland, Maryland).

RG 107, Records of the Secretary of War. Correspondence Fil3, 1890- 1913. Of limited use for this study, but still valuable for students of the military aspects of the Revolution.

RG 165, Records of the War Department, General and Special Staff.

2. Other U.S. Documents

Congress, House. Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries During the Year 1902. H. Doc. 305, 57th Cong., 2d sess., 1903.

. Mexican Affairs: Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, August 27, 1913. H. Doc. 205, 63d Cong., 1st sess., 1913.

------, Senate. Claims Against Mexico for the Destruction of Life and Property of American Citizens in That Country. S. Doc. 67, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919.

------. Daily Consula Trade Reports. S. Rept. 645, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1920.

------, Committee on Foreign Relations. Brief in Support of Senate Resolution of April 20, 1911, Relative to Intervention in the Affairs of Mexico. S. Doc. 25, 62d Cong., 1st sess., 1911.

------. Investigation of Mexican Affairs. S. Doc. 285, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1920. "Fall Committee" report containsing 3,381 pages of testi­ mony and documents of all kinds on U.S. relations with Mexico during the Porfirio Diaz and Revolutionary eras to 1920; though indispensable for the study of U.S.-Mexican affairs, must be used with extreme caution, since much of the testimony of witnesses— and the lines of questioning posed by investi­ gators and the senators themselves— is highly biased against policies of the Woodrow Wilson administration toward Mexico; value of the report rests on the general accuracy of statistical information and in that it reveals the attitudes and views of U.S. citizens in Mexico during the period covered.

------. Monthly Bulletins, Bureau of American Republics, 1897. S. Doc. 178, 55th Cong., 2d sess., 1899.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 Department of State. Proceedings of the United States-Mexican Commission Convened in Mexico City, May 14, 1923. Washington: GPO, 1925.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1912. Washington: GPO, 1919.

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913. Washington: GPO, 1920.

Wilson, Woodrow. The Mexican Question. Washington: GPO, 1916; rpt. from Ladies' Home Journal (Oct. 1916).

3. Mexican Documents

Archivo historico diplomatico mexicano. 48 vols. Mexico: Secretarla da Selacicnas Exteriores, 1923-36 and 1943-50.

Diario Official de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 84 (16 mayo 1906), 212-22.

Dxaz, Lombardo. "Las victimas de la 'decena tragica.' Cadaveres y heridos, etc. Estadxstica por el jefe de la Seccion de Estadistica." Mexico: n.p., 1913.

Documentos historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana. Vol. 1: Revolucion y regimen constitucionalista. Ed. Isidro Fabela. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960.

------. Vol. 9: Revolucion y regimen Maderista. Ed. Isidro y Josefina E. de Fabela. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1965.

Mexican Foreign Office. Diplomatic Dealings of the Constitutionalist Revolution in Mexico. Mexico: Imprenta Nacional, S.A., [1918]. All notes between the United States and Mexico up to 1918.

B. Manuscript Collections (by location)

Indiana Univ. (Lilly Library), Bloomington. Fairbanks, Charles Warren, Papers. Six letters and one telegram from Henry Lane Wilson to Charles Warren Fairbanks (none of consequence for this study, but useful for the study of the ambassador's later political activities).

------. Ralston, Samuel Moffett, Papers. Two letters from Ambassador Wilson to Ralston (dealing with political affairs not of consequence to this study).

Library of Congress, Washington. Anderson, Chandler P., Diary of.

------. Bryan, William Jennings, Papers.

------. Daniels, Josephus, Papers: Diary

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ------. Knox, Philander C., Correspondence of.

------. Taft, William Howard, Papers.

------. Wilson, Woodrow, Papers.

. wilsoniana, Ray Stannard Baker Collection of.

Univ. of Southern California (Department of History), Los Angeles. Henry Lane Wilson Papers. Papers bequeathed to Prof. Donald Rowland by Henry Lane Wilson's son, John V. Wilson, consisting chiefly of newspaper clippings and MSS ' elating to the Mexican Revolution (none of importance to this study).

Univ. of Texas, Austin. The Garcia Collection, "Papeles varios sobre la revolucidn, 1910-1915." Manuscript documents relating to U.S. activities in Mexico.

C. Published Letters

Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters. 8 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1927-37; rpt. New York: Scribner's, 1946.

Baker, Ray Stannard, and William E. Dodd, eds. The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 6 vols. New York: Harper, 1925-27.

Butt, Archie. Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aide. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1930.

Hendrick, Burton J. The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page. 3 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1922-23.

Morison, Elting E., ed. The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt. 8 vols. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1951-54.

Seymour, Charles, ed. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House Arranged as a Narrative. 4 vols. Boston and New York: Houghton, 1926-28.

D. Memoirs

Barron, Clarence W. They Told Barron: Conversations and Revelations of An American Pepys in Wall Street. Ed. Arthur Pound and Samuel Taylor Moore. New York and London: Harper, 1930.

------. More They Told Barron: Conversations and Revelations of An American Pepys in Wall Street. Ed. Arthur Pound and Samuel Taylor Moore. New York and London: Harper, 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224 With previous entry (above), a large collection of notes taken during conversations with U.S. financial and industrial leaders by the publisher of the Wall Street Journal.

Bryan, William J. and Mary B. The Memoirs of Willi am Jennings Bryan. Philadelphia and Chicago: John C. Winston and Company, 1925.

Cabrera, Luis [pseud. Bias Urrea]. Obras politicas del Lie. Bias Urrea, 1909-1912. Mexico: Imprenta Nacional, 1921.

------. Veinte anos despues. Mexico: Editorial Botas, 1938.

Calero, Manuel. Un decenio de politica mexicana. New York: n.p., 1920.

De la Huerta, Adolfo. "Memorias politicas." Excelsior. 22 junio - 24 agosto 1920.

Esquivel Obregon, T. Mi labor en servicio de Mexico. Mexico: Ediclones Botas, 1934. Written by an official of the Huerta government on the Decena Tragica and the Huerta administration.

Estrada, Roque. La revolucion y Francisco Madero. Guadalajara: [Imprenta Americana], 1912.

Flores Magon, Ricardo. Epistolario revolucionario intimo. 3 vols. Mexico: n.p., 1924-25.

Fosdick, Raymond. "Personal Recollections of Woodrow Wilson." Centennial Woodrow Wilson. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958.

Garcia Naranjo, Nemecio. Memorias de Nemecio Garcia Naranjo. 8 vols. Monterrey, N.L.: Ediciones de El Porvenir, 1956-62.

Gimeno, Conrado. La canalla roja: Notas acerca del movimiento sedicioso. El Paso: n.p., 1912. Pamphlet by "an ex-rebel," exposing the "sordid ambitions" of the revolutionary leaders.

Guzman, Martin Luis. Memorias de Pancho Villa. Mexico: Compania editorial de Ediciones, 1960.

Houston, David F. Eight Years With Wilson's Cabinet, 1913 to 1920. 2 vols. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1926.

Marquez Sterling, Manuel. Los ultimos dias del Presidente Madero: Mi gestidn diplomatics en MAxico. Habana: Imprenta El Siglo XX, 1917; rpt. Mexico: Editorial Porrda, 1958. Bitterly anti-Yankee tract by the Cuban minister in Mexico at the time of Madero*s fall; highly-colored account of events.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225

0'Shaughnessy, Edith. A DiplomatTs Wife in Mexico. New York and London: Harper, 1916. Intimate and sympathetic portrait of Huerta by the wife of the U.S. chargd d'affaires during the general’s regime.

Pina, Joaquin. Memorias de Victoriano Huerta. El Paso, 1915; rpt. M&cico: Ediciones Vdrtice, 1957.

Reyes, Rodolfo. De mi vida: Memorias politicas. 2 vols. Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1929-30.

Taracena, Alfonso. Mi vida en el vdrtigo de la revolucidn mexic^na. Mexico: n.p., 1930.

Thompason, Charles W. Presidents I've Known and Two Near Presidents. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1929.

Tumulty, Joseph. Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1922.

Vasconcelos, Jos£. Pllses Criollo. Mexico: n.p., 1935.

Wilson, Francis M. Huntington. Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945.

Wilson, Henry Lane. Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile. Ambassador's apologia, to be read with caution: he congratulates himself at every turn and admits no mistakes.

E. Newspapers

Boston Globe, 1913.

Boston H erald, 1913.

El Diario (Mexico), 1913; El Imparcial (Mexico), 1914.

Indianapolis Star, 1911-14.

Mexican Herald (Mexico City), 1908-14.

New York Herald. 1913.

New York Times, 1911-15.

New York Tribune, 1913.

New York World. 1913.

El Pais (M&cico), 1914.

San Antonio Light and Gazette, 1910.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226

Sprxngfxald (111.} Republican, 1914.

Washington Post, 1913.

F. Contemporary Works (1907-36)

Aguilar, Rafael. Madero sin mAscara. Mexico: n.p., 1911. Rabid anti-Madero tract: "Madero es falso y ambicioso y debil de caracter. Su gobierno despotico terminara en la anarqula."

Album. "La decena tragica. The days of tragic events in Mexico City, 9-1S febrero 1913." Mexico: n.p., 1913.

Alcerresa, Felix M. "Cronica historica de los acontecimientos tragicos." Mexico: Imprenta Mixta, 1913.

"Algtmas observaciones diplomaticas." Mexico: Imprenta de Carranza e Hijos, 1917.

American Academy of Political and Social Science. "The Purposes and Ideals of the Mexican Revolution." The Annals, 69 (Jan. 1917), Supplement.

American Club [Mexico]. "Souvenier of the banquet tendered to the American Ambassador, Hon. Henry Lane Wilson, September 12, 1911." N.p., n.d.

An American Diplomat. "The Diplomatic Service— Its Organization and Demoralization." New York Outlook, 106 (7 March 1914), 533-38.

"American Exodus From Mexico." Literary Digest, 47 (13 Sept. 1913), 405-06.

"American Interests in Mexico." Moody's Magazine, 11 (April 1911), 233-37.

Barron, Clarence W. The Mexican Problem. Boston and New York: Houghton, 1917.

"Battle of Mexico City." Current Opinion, 54 (March 1913), 180-82.

Bell, Edward I. The Political Shame of Mexico. New York: McBride, Nast and Company, 1914. Used with caution, can be a source of much useful information (author, who was editor and publisher of La Prensa and The Daily Mexican of Mexico City, was heavily biased in favor of Madero).

Bulnes, Francisco. Los grandes problemas de Mexico. Mexico: n.p., 1927. Essays on personages and problems by a conservative.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227

------. Toda la verdad acerca de la Revolucion Mexicans; La responsabilidad criminal del Presidente Wilson en el desastre mexicano. Mexico: Editorial Los Insurgentes, S.A., 1916; rpt. Editorial Libros de Mdxico, 1960. President Wilson blamed for fanning the flames of civil war by encouraging rebellion and obstructing the Mexican govern­ ment's efforts to pacify the country.

Butterfield, B. F. "Evils Abolished by the Mexican Revolution." The Public, 17 (28 Aug. 1914), 823-24. A U.S. apologist for Madero and the Constitutionalists presents rosy pictures of Revolutionary achievements, in a magazine advocating the "Single Tax" theories.

------. "The Evils of Mexico’s Old Regime." The Public, 17 (4 Sept. 1914), 849-51.

Butterfield, Delores. "Conspiracy Against Madero." F o r m , 50 (Oct. 1913), 464-82. Anti-Huerta, anti-Henry Lane Wilson propaganda of a sensationalist nature.

------. "Mexican Insurrection Reactionary." The Public, 15 (12 April 1912), 343-44. Vitriolic attack on Pascual Orozco, Jr.

------. "What Mexico Has Lost." The Public, 16 (28 Feb. 1913), 198. Lament for Madero.

Calero, Manuel. The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson As It Appears to a Mexican. New York: Press of Smith and Thompson, 1916. Follows the conservative line of Francisco Bulnes.

"Chaos in Mexico." The Public, 18 (26 March 1915), 303-05.

Colley, S. "Americans and Mexican Concessions." The Public, 19 (4 Aug. 1916), 725-26. Extremely pro-Revolutionary editorial.

Coolidge, Archibald, G. The United States As a World Power. New York: Macmillan, 1912.

Creelman, Joseph. "President Diaz the Hero and Creator of Modern Mexico." Pearson's Magazine, 19 (March 1908), 231-77. Famous Creelman interview with Diaz that encouraged opposition candidates for the 1910 presidential election.

De como vino Huerta y como se fue: Apuntes para la historia de un regimen militar. Vol. I: Del cuartelazo a las disolucion de las camaras. Mexico: Librerxa General, 1914. The only volume ever published of a proposed multivolume work on the Huerta regime, includes a pro-Huerta account of the Ten Tragic Days, but critical of Huerta regime. (Some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 8 authors, including Kennth J- Grieb, The United States and Huerta, attribute the book to Jan Leander De Bekker; but Isidro Fabela, Historia diplomatics de la Revolucion Mexicana, says that it is "obra del diputado renovador, poeta y revolucionario Jose Ines Novelo."

de la Barra, Francisco L. "Commercial Progress of Mexico." Bulletin of the American Republics, 30 (April 1910), 569-76.

Didapp, J. B. Los Estados Unidos y nuestros conflictos internos. Mexico: Tipografia de El Republicana, 1913. By an agent (in the United States) of radical anti-Madero factions.

Doblado, Manuel. Mexico para los mexicanos: el presidente Huerta y su gobierno. Documentos para la historia de la tercera independencia mexicana, reunidos y publicados. Mexico: Imprenta de Antonio Enriquez, 1913.

Dobson, Miles. At the Edge of the Pit. Pasadena, Calif.: n.p., 1914. Atrocities and outrages against U.S. citizens and Europeans listed after the fall of Diaz.

Dodd, W. E. "Should We Commit More Criminal Aggression?" The Public, 17 (27 March 1914), 291.

Enrique, Rafael Zayas. The Case of Mexico and the Policy of President Wilson. New York: A. and C. Boni, 1914.

Espinoza, Gonzalo N., Joaquin Pina, y Carlos B. Ortiz. La Decena Ro.ja: la revolucion felicista; caida del gobierno maderista; elevacion al poder del general Victoriano Huerta. Mexico: Imprenta Enriquez, 1913. A strongly anti-Madero account by personal witnesses.

Fernandez Guell, Rogelio. Episodios de la revolucion mexicana. San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta Trejos Hermanos, 1915.

Fernandez Rojas, Jose. La revolucion mexicana de Porfirio Diaz a Victoriano Huerta. Guadalajara: Tipograffa de la Escuela de Artes y Oficios del Estado de Jalisco, 1913.

Figueroa, Domenech, Jr., y Antonio P. Gonzalez [Kanta Klaro]. La revolucion y sus heroes. Mexico: Herrero Hermanos, Sues., 1912. Covers the period October 1910 to May 1911; favorable to Leon de la Barra.

Figueroa, Domench, Jr. Viente meses de anarquxa. Mexico: por el autor, 1913.

Fyfe, Hamilton H. The Real Mexico: A Study on the Spot. New York: McBride, Nast, and Company, 1914.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22 9

Gonzalez Garza, Federico. La revolucion mexicana. Mexico: A. del Bosque, Impresor, 1936. Another eyewitness account.

Gregory, Thomas B. Our Mexican Conflicts, Including a Brief History of Mexico From the Sixth Century to the Present Time. New York: Hearst's International Library Company, 1914.

Guzman, Dr. Ramon. El intervencionism de Mr. Wilson en Mexico. New Orleans: por el autor; Washington: Library of Congress, 1915. By the Director of the Pan American Review, who sees a great contrast between Woodrow Wilson's words and actions.

Harvey, George. "The President and Mexico." North American Review, 197 (Dec. 1913), 737-44.

------. "Six Months of Wilson." North American Review, 197 (Nov. 1913), 577-608.

Hernandez, Braulio. "An Appeal to Justice." N.p., n. d. Anti-Madero pamphlet enclosed in 812.00/3724, NA, RG 59.

La decena tragica en Mexico (datos veridicos tornados en el mismo teatro de los sucesos). Leon, Gto.: Imprenta de El Obrero, 1913.

Lane, Franklin K. "The President's Mexican Policy." New York World, 16 July 1916. Defense of Wilson's policy by his Secretary of the Interior.

Lara Pardo, Luis. De Porfirio Diaz a Francisco Madero: La sucesion dictatorial de 1911. New York: Polyglot Publishing and Commercial Company, 1912. An anti-Madero tract.

------. Matchs de dictadores: Wilson contra Huerta; Carranza contra Wilson. N.p., 1914; rpt- Mexico: A. P. Marquez, 1942.

Lemke, William. Crimes Against Mexico. Minneapolis: Great Lakes Printing Co., 1915. An attack on the "dishonorable and cowardly policy of Woodrow Wilson following the collapse of the builder of Mexico, Porfirio Diaz."

Leon Ossorio, Adolfo. "Rastros de sangre. Sucesos sangrientos de Mexico." Habana: Imprenta y Papelerxa El Iris de Gumercindo Martinez, 1913.

Lowry, Edward G. "The Application of the Wilson Doctrine to Mexico and Latin America." World's Work (London), 23 (April 1914), 483-89.

Lyle, E. P., Jr. "The Development of Mexico by American Capital." World's Work (London), 11 (Dec. 1907), 14-32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230

MeGalah, Walter Flavius. Present and Past Banking in Mexico. New York: Harper, 1920.

Madero, Francisco I. La sucesion presidencial en 1910. Tercera ed. Mdxico: n.p., I9IT The work that aroused the middle classes to. action against Porfirio Diaz.

Mexican Year Book: A Financial and Commercial Handbook, Compiled from Official and Other Returns, 1912. London: Mexican Year Book Publishing Company, 1912.

Mexico [City] Committee of the American Colony. "Facts Submitted to President Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan Relative to the Mexican Situation and the Record of the Hon. Henry Lane Wilson Therewith." Mexico: Committee of the American Colony [1913J. A day-by-day account of the Decena Tragica and of H. L. Wilson’s activities on behalf of U.S. citizens, other foreigners, and Mexican victims of the battle.

Murray, Robert Hammond. "Huerta and the Two Wilsons." Harper's Weekly, 62 (25 March - 29 April 1916), 301-03, 341-42, 364-65, 432-04, 434-36, 466-69. The work in which Murray casts entire blame on Henry Lane Wilson for the fall and murder of Madero; based on "confidential records" of the Department of State, mysteriously made available to Murray. (A comparison of the original records with the articles shows that the records were mutilated, interpolated, and distorted; H. L. Wilson won a libel suit in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against Norman Hapgood, publisher of Harper’s Weekly, as a result of the publication of these articles.)

Prida, Ram6n. ?De la dictadura a la anarqufat El Paso: Imprenta El Paso del Norte, 1914.

Report on Foreign Service. New York: National Civil Service Reform League, 1919.

Republican Party National Committee. "Wilson’s Fatal Policy in Mexico." Speaker's Series, no. 20. Washington: Republican Party National Committee, 1920.

Robinson, Edgar Eugene, and Victor J. West. The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-17. New York: Macmillan, 1917.

Schulz, E. E. El porvenir de Miexico y sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos. Mdxico: n.p., 1914.

Turner, John Kenneth. Barbarous Mexico: An Indictment of a Cruel and Corrupt System. London and New York: Cassel and Co., 1911.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231

"U.S. Lack of Policy in Mexico Under President Wilson." Journal of Race Development, 7 (Oct. 1916), 175-86.

Wilson, Henry Lane. "How to Restore Peace in Mexico." Journal of International Relations, 11 (Oct. 1920), 181-89.

------. "How Can Peace be Restored in Mexico?" World Outlook, 6 (July 1920), 4.

. "Errors With Reference to Mexico and Events That Have Occured There." Annals of the American Academy, 54 (July 1914), 148-61.

. "Last Phases in Mexico." Forum, 56 (Sept. 1916), 257-67.

------. "Latest Phase of the Mexican Situation." Independent, (13 Nov. 1913), 297-98.

------. "Mexican Difficulty." The Nation, 97 (July 1913), 92.

------. "Our Latin American Neighbors." Mentor, 13 (Feb. 1925), 60.

------. "President Buchanan's Proposed Intervention in Mexico." American Historial Review, 5 (1900), 687-701.

------. "What Must Be Done With Mexico?" Forum, 62 (Sept. 1919), 257-64.

G. Secondary Works (1919-72)

Adler, Selig. "Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetration." Hispanic American Historial Review, 20 (May 1940), 98-226. A study of Bryan's transformation from anti-imperialist to a believer in military intervention (Bryan became the protagonist of exactly the policy he had opposed earlier).

Alpervovich, M. S., and B. T. Rudenko. La Revolucion Mexicana de 1910-1917 y la Politica de los Estados Unidos. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1966.

Amaya, Juan Gualberto. Madero y los autenticos revolucionarios de 1910. Mexico: por el autor, 1946.

Amaya Moran, Arturo. Examen historico-juridico del gobierno de Huerta. Mexico: por el autor, 1952.

Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York: Appleton, 1964.

Bemis, Samuel Flagg, ed. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy. 10 vols. New York: Knopf, 1927-29.

------. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York: Holt, 1965.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232

------. The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation. New York: Harcourt, 1943.

Bernstein, Harry. Modern and Contemporary Latin America. Chicago: Lippincott, 1952. Contains invaluable further reading suggestions (pp. 3-158 concern Mexico through Aleman's early years).

Blaisdell, Lowell L. "Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero." Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 43 (Sept. 1962), 126-35. Standard liberal-left fare— nothing original.

Blum, John Morton. Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality. Boston: Little, 1956.

Bonilla, Manuel, Jr. El regimen Maderista. Mexico: Talleres Linotipograficos de El Universal. 1922.

Braceda, Alfredo. Mexico revolucionario, 1913-1917. 2 vols. Madrid: Tipografia Artistica, 1920-41.

Brandenberg, Frank R. The Making of Modern Mexico. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Ha11, 1964.

Brenner, Anita. The Wind That Swept Mexico: The History of the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1942. New York: Harper, 1943.

Callahan, J. M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: Macmillan, 1932. Excellent chapters on the Diaz regime, the U.S. economic invasion, and the decade of adjustment.

Calcott, Wilfrid Hardy. Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929. Palo Alto: Stanford Univ. Press, 1931.

Calvert, Peter A. "Francis Stronge en la Decena Tragica," Historia Mexicana, 11 (julio-septiembre 1965), 47-68.

------• The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo- American Conflict. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968.

Carreno, Alberto M. La diplomacia extraordinaria entre Mexico y Estados Unidos. 2 vols. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1951.

Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars. New York: Macmillan, 1969.

Cline, Howard F. The United States and Mexico. New York: Atbeneum, 1963.

Coker, William Sidney. "United States-British Diplomacy Over Mexico, 1913." Ph.D. diss. Univ. of Oklahoma, 1965.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233

Nebraska History, 44 (Sept. 1968), 167-87.

------. William Jennings Bryan. Vol. 2: Progressive Political and Moral Statesman. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1969.

Cosio Villegas, Daniel. "Sobre Henry Lane Wilson." Memoria del Colegio Nacional. Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1961.

Cumberland, Charles C. The Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1952.

------. Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968.

Daniels, Josephus. Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947.

------. "Wilson and Bryan." Saturday Evening Post, 5 Sept. 1925.

De Bekker, Leander Jan. The Plot Against Mexico. New York: Knopf, 1919. Based on a series of articles in The Nation, a defense of Woodrow Wilson's policy.

Dougall, Richardson, and Mary Patricia Chapman. United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973. Washington: GPO, 1973.

Dunn, Frederick Sherwood. Mexico in International Finance and Diplomacy. Vol. 2: The Diplomatic Protection of Americans In Mexico. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1933.

Fabela, Isidro. Historia diplomatics de la Revolucidn Mexicana. 2 vols. Mexico: Fondo de Culture Econdmica, 1958-59.

Fowler, W. B. British-American Relations, 1917-1918: The Role of Sir William Weisman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.

Freud, Sigmund, and William C. Bullitt. Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study. Boston: Houghton, 1966.

Galddmez, Luis. A History of Chile. Trans, and ed. Isaac J. Cox. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1941.

Garcia Granados, Ricardo. Historia de Mexico desde la restauracidn de la Republica en 1867 hasta la caida de Huerta. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1956.

Glaser, David Philip. "Pacific Northwest Press Reaction to Wilson's Mexican Diplomacy, 1913-1916." Ph.D. diss- Univ. of Idaho, 1965.

GonzAlez Ramirez, Manuel. La revolucidn social de Mexico. Vol. 1: Las ideas— la violencia. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 234

Grieb, Kenneth J. "The Causes of the Carranza Rebellion: A Re­ interpretation." The Americas, 25 (July 1963), 25-32.

------. "Regiland Del Valle: A California Diplomat’s Sojourn in Mexico." California Historical Society Quarterly, 48 (Dec. 1968), 315-28.

------. The United States and Huerta. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1969.

Gruening, Ernest. Mexico and Its Heritage. New York and London: The Century Company, 1928.

Guzman, Martin Luis. "Henry Lane Wilson: Un Embajador Malvado." Cuademos Mexicanos, 129 (July-Aug. 1963), 203-08.

------. The Eagle and the Serpent. Trans. Harriet de Onis. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.

Haley, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in Mexico, 1910-1917. Cambridge: MITPrec.-, 1970.

Harrison, John P. "Henry Lane Wilson, el tragico de la Decena." Historia Mexicana, 6 (julio 1956 - junio 1957), 374-405.

Heinricks, Waldo H., Jr. "Bureaucracy and Prof'\ss_onalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy." In Tvmtieth Century American Foreign Policy. Edited by John Braeman et al. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1971.

Herring, Hubert, and Herbert Weinstock, eds. Renascent Mexico. New York: Covici Friede, 1935.

Hill, Larry D. Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson’s Executive Agents in Mexico. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1973.

Hulen, Bertram D. Inside the Department of State. London and New York: Whittlesey House, Division of Macmillan, 1939.

Ilchman, Warren Frederick. Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1961.

James, Daniel. Mexico and the Americans. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Johnson, William Webber. Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modem Nation. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968. Glorification of the Revolution by a professor of journalism.

Junco, Alfonso. Carranza y los origenes de su rebelidn. Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1935.

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Kemmerer, Edwin W. Inflation and Revolution: Mexico’s Experience, 1912-1917. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940. Effects of civil war on the Mexican monetary and economic system.

Kenny, William Robert. "Mexican-American Conflict on the Mining Frontier, 1848-1852." Journal of the West, 6 (Oct. 1967).

Kestenbaum, Justin Louis. "The Question of Intervention in Mexico, 1913-1917." Ph.D. diss. Northwestern, 1964.

King, Ross. Tempest Over Mexico. Boston: Little, 1935.

Lieuwen, Edwin. Mexican Militarism, 1910-1940: The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army. Albuquerque: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1968.

Link, Arthur S. Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1912-1915. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964-

------• The New Freedom. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1956.

------. Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1957.

------. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era. New York: Harper, 1954.

Livermore, Seward W. "Deserving Democrats: The Foreign Service Under Woodrow Wilson." South Atlantic Quarterly, 69 (Winter 1970), 144-60.

Lopez Gallo, Manuel. Economia y politica en la historia de Mexico. Mexico: Ediciones Solidaridad, 1965.

Lopez Rosado, Diego G. Curso de historia economica de Mexico. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1963.

Lowry, Philip H. "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson," Ph.D. diss. Yale, 1949. (Cline, The United States and Mexico, seems to have depended heavily on this work for his chapters dealing with this topic.)

McCamy, James L. The Administration of American Foreign Affairs. New York: Knopf, 1950.

MacCorkle, Stuart A. American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1933.

McKernan, L. W. "Special Mexican Claims From 1910-1920." American Journal of International Law, 32 (July 1938), 457-66.

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Mancisidor, Jose. Historia de la revolucion mexicana. Mexico: Editorial Gusano de Luz, 1958. Marxist view of the Revolution.

Maria y Campos, Armando de. Episodios de la Revolucion: de la caida de Porfirio Diaz a la Decena Tragica. Mexico: Libro Mexicano, 1957.

Masingill, Eugene Frank. "The Diplomatic Career of Henry Lane Wilson in Latin America." Ph.D. diss. Louisiana State Univ., 1957.

Meyer, Eugenia. Conciencia histdrica norteamericana sobre la Revolucidn de 1910. Mexico: Institute Nacional de Antropologxa e Historia, 1970.

Meyer, Michael C. Huerta: A Political Portrait. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1972.

------. Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Morales Jimenez, Alberto. Hombres de la Revolucion Mexicana: Cincuenta semManzas biograficas. Mexico: Biblioteca del Instituto Nacional de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1960.

Morenos, Daniel A. Francisco I. Madero, Jose M. Pino Suarez, el crimen de la embajada. Mexico: Libros Mexicanos, I960.

------. Los hombres de la Revolucidn: 40 estudios biograficos. Mexico: Libros Mex Editores, 1960.

Mosk, Sanford Alexander. The Industrial Revolution in Mexico. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1950.

Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1937.

Parkes, Henry Bamford. A History of Mexico. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton, 1950.

Pike, Frederick B. Chile and the United States, 1880-1962. South Bend, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1963.

Proda, Ramon. La culpa de Lane Wilson, embajador de los E. U. A., en la tragedia mexicana de 1913. Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1962.

Pringle, Henry F. The Life and Times cf Wilson Howard Taft. New York: Farrar, 1939.

Rausch, George J. "The Early Career of Victoriano Huerta." The Americas, 21 (Oct. 1964), 136-45.

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------. "Victoriano Huerta: A Political Biography." Ph.D. diss. Univ. of Illinois, 1960.

Rippy, J. Frank. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1924. New York: Crofts, 1931.

Robles, Miguel Alessio. Historia poiitica de la Revolucion. 3d ed. Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1946.

Rojas, Luis Manuel. La culpa de Henry Lane Wilson en el gran desastre de Mexico. Mexico: La Verdad, 1928.

Ross, Stanley R. Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1955.

Schlarman, Joseph H. Mexico, Land of Volcanoes. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1950. Heated and avowedly polemic view by a U.S. Catholic bishop.

Sherman, William L., and Richard E. Greenleaf. Victoriano Huerta: A Re­ appraisal . Mexico: Mexico City College Press, 1960.

Silva Herzog, Jesds. Breve historia de la Revolucidn Mexicana. 2 vols. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econdmica, 1960-62.

Simpson, Lesley Byrd. Many Mexicos. 3d ed. Berkeley: Univ of California Press, 1952. Tough and objective history of Mexico.

Stephenson, George M. John Lind of Minnesota. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1935.

Strong, Josiah. Our Country. Quoted in Great Issues of American History, pp. 183-87. Edited by Richard Hofstadter. New York: Vintage Books, 1958.

Stuart, Graham H. American Diplomatic and Consular Practices. New York: Appleton, 1952.

------. The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel. New York: Macmillan, 1949. Excellent account of the reorganization of the Department of State under President Taft.

Summers, Natalia. Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 1879-1943. Washington: National Archives, 1943.

Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. New York: Knopf, 1964. Nostalgic appeal for return to Cardenas' policies.

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------. Peace by Revolution: Mexico After 1910. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964.

Taracena, Alfonso. Madero, victima del imperialismo Yanqui. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1960.

------. La verdadera Revolucion Mexicana. 6 vols. Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1960.

Teitelbaum, Louis. Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 1913- 1916. New York: Exposition Press, 1967.

Vela Gonzalez, Francisco. "La quincena tragica de 1913." Historia Mexicana, 12 (enero-marzo 1963), 440-53.

Vera Estanol, Jorge. Historia de la Revolucion Mexicana. Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1967.

------. La Revolucion Mexicana: orxgenes y resultados. Mexico: Ediciones Pcrrua, 1957. Sober critique of the Revolution by a former cabinet minister under Diaz and Huerta; essential for an'objective evaluation; not easily dismissed.

Weinstein, Edwin A. "Woodrow Wilson's Neurological Illness." Journal of American History, 57 (Sept. 1970), 324-51.

Womack, John, Jr. Zapata and the Mexican Revolution. New York: Knopf, 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.