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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75-28,938 RANGEL, Rudolph Stone. 1924- HENRY LANE WILSON AND THE FALL OF FRANCISCO I. MABERO. The American University, Hi.D., 1975 History, modern Xerox University Microfilms,Ann Arbor. Michigan 48106 © COPYRIGHT by RUDOLPH STONE RANGEL 1975 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. HENRY LANE WILSON AND THE FALL OF FRANCISCO I. MADERO by Rudolph Stone Rangel Submitted to the Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Signatures of Committee: Chairman Dean ox tne ooxxege Dat^ 1975 The American University Washington, D.C. 20016 TEE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LIBRARY tro 7? Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CONTENTS Chapter I. HENRY LANE WILSON Family background, education, early career; involvement in politics; appointment to the diplomatic service. Changes in American foreign policy. Wilson’s views. Problems of the Chilean post. Wilson’s successes in Chile. Interlude in Belgium. II. WILSON IN POKFIRIAN MEXICO. Wilson's appointment to Mexico: importance of the post; his assessment of the Mexican problem. Revolutionary ferment. The election of 1910. Wilson in the twilight of the Diaz regime: daily tasks, anti-American demonstrations, neutrality violations. Gathering strength of the Revolution. The resignation of Diaz. III. WILSON AND MADERO Wilson's sorrow for Diaz. The interim government of De la Barra. Wilson's favorable attitude toward Madero; the Plan de San Luis Potosi; Madero's pecularities. Wilson's gradual disenchantment with Madero: massacres and disorders, offenses against American life and property, Maderista corruption, incompetence of Madero, the spread of anarchy. IV. LA DECENA TRAGICA - CUARTELAZO: 9-12 FEBRUARY 1913 , The plots; outbreak of revolt; the first four days; Wilson's activities. V. LA DECENA TRAGICA - STALEMATE: 12-17 FEBRUARY 1913 Wilson's increasing concern and efforts to stop the fighting; conviction of a coming rebel victory; first contacts with General Huerta; fears of U.S. intervention; diplomats' suggestion that Madero resign. VI. LA DECENA TRAGICA - GOLPE DE ESTADO: 17-18 FEBRUARY 1913 . 116 General Huerta; Huerta's contacts with rebel leaders; increasing demands for Madero's resignation; Madero's intransigence; Huerta's decision and action. The Pact of Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Embassy; Wilson's efforts on behalf of Madero; the assassination; reactions to the assassination. VII. DAYS OF TRANSITION: 19 FEBRUARY - 12 MARCH 1 9 1 3............ 147 Taft's acceptance of Wilson's suggestions on recognition of Huerta; Wilson's aid to Huerta; Taft's delay in extending recognition; the Huerta regime not reactionary; rise of Carranza. The Woodrow Wilson administration; President Wilson's views; Bryan and the Department of State; the new administration's disinterest in foreign affairs. VIII. IN SEARCH OF A POLICY - 4 MARCH - 27 AUGUST 1913............ 167 President Wilson's tacit recognition of the Huerta regime; statement of 12 March 1913; the administration's paralysis; press attacks on Ambassador Wilson; the State Department's concurrence with the ambassador; the president's increasing doubts; controversy over the ambassador and recognition; the first emissaries to Mexico; Hale's report; the president's decision; the ambassador's recall. AN ESSAY ON SOURCES AND CONCLUSIONS.............................. 201 SELECTED 3IBLI0GSAPHY ....................... 219 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE The major problem of research of this study has been to analyze and appraise Che role of Henry Lane Wilson during the adminis­ tration of Mexican President Francisco I. Madero, with special reference to Wilson’s actions during the barracks revolt of February 1913 and the subsequent overthrow and assassination of Madero and Vice- President Pino Suarez. In order to evaluate the ambassador’s role properly, we must describe and evaluate his view of his role and duties in light of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America • not only during the Taft administration but also in light of Wilson’s successful career as a diplomat prior to the Mexican appointment. There are supporting problems to be solved. What evidence is there that the ambassador was an accomplice— and perhaps even master­ minded the plot to overthrow President Madero and, later, to have him murdered? Why were the accusations made and widely disseminated and believed? Why was there a conflict between the Woodrow Wilson administration and the ambassador over the Mexican policy of the United States? Finally, what did partisan political reasons of a purely domestic nature have to do with the recall and discrediting of Henry Lane Wilson? The "rehabilitation" of Henry Lane Wilson is important for a number of reasons. In sixty years, four generations of Mexicans (while maintaining deep personal friendships with individual citizens of the United States) have grown up with ill-concealed resentment of v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vi the U.S. government— partly because of the picture of the ambassador commonly presented. His alleged actions intensified the resentments caused by repeated interventions in Mexican internal affairs.^" As Howard F. Cline states, "In the rise and fall of Madero from 1910 to 1913, Henry Lane Wilson spoke for the whole United States in Mexico. Every United States ambassador since his day has lived under the ..2 shadow of Wilson . s actions during the first stages of the Revolution. U.S. friends of Mexico (especially those who have sympathized with the legitimate goals of the Revolution) have in turn been forced to exist under the cloud of Wilson1s alleged misbehavior. It is not easy to live with the knowledge that a U.S. citizen was instrumental in (and was perhaps the instigator of) the death of the "Christlike" Madero. A redefinition of Henry Lane Wilson's role is important for another reason. Until recently, most historians have accepted the view that President Wilson's refusal to extend recognition to the provisional government of Gen. Victoriano Huerta was based primarily on idealistic, moral grounds. While recent scholarship has largely discarded this view, an examination of a number of recently published U.S.^history textbooks for undergraduates reveals that most of them still hold to 3 the older view. Indeed, specialized monographs are still being published which insist that Woodrow Wilson's actions in the field of 1No U.S. official in Mexico had before been accused of helping to overthrow a Mexican government. 2 The United States and Mexico (New York: Atheneum, 1963), pp. 130, 133. ^See, for example— among others— Allen Weinstein and R. Jackson Wilson, Freedom and Crisis: An American History (New York: Random House, 1974); and David Burner, Robert D. Marcus, and Emily S. Rosenberg, America: A Portrait in History (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vii foreign affairs were "determined by moral purposes and guided by 4 idealism. By taking the president s public statements