T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

WHEN DOES A MILITARY DEFECT? A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S BEHAVIOR DURING POPULAR PROTESTS OF 1977 BREAD INTIFADA, 2008 RIOT, AND 2011 ARAB UPRISINGS.

MASTER THESIS

AYTEN ÇETER

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2020 T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

WHEN DOES A MILITARY DEFECT? A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S BEHAVIOR DURING POPULAR PROTESTS OF 1977 BREAD INTIFADA, 2008 RIOT, AND 2011 THE ARAB UPRISINGS.

MASTER THESIS

AYTEN ÇETER

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SUPERVISOR: DR. ÖMER ASLAN

ANKARA, 2020 ONAY SAYFASI

Ayten Çeter tarafından hazırlanan “When Does a Military Defect? A Comparative Case Study of Egyptian Military’s Behavior during Popular Protests of 1977 Bread Intifada, 2008 Riot and 2011 Arab Uprising” adlı tez çalısması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği/oy çokluğu ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Ünvan Adı Soyadı Kurumu İmza

Ankara Yıldırım Dr. Ömer Aslan Beyazıt Universitesi

Ankara Yıldırım Dr. Sevinç Alkan Özcan Beyazıt Universitesi

Dr. Buğra Sarı Polis Akademisi

Tez Savunma Tarihi: 11.09.2020

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda Yuksek Lisans tezi olması için sartları yerine getirdiğini onaylyorum.

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürü Ünvan Ad Soyad

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PLAGIARISM

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. 11.09.2020

Ayten ÇETER

ii

To my father, mother, sisters and brothers.

“The family is very important. Look after your families…”

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank and express my deep and sincere gratitude my supervisor Ömer Aslan for his priceless support and invaluable guidance which help to completion this study from beginning of the process to end. Without his encouragement, observation and knowledge, I would not have able to finish to this work. It was a great privilege and honor to study under his guidance. I am extremely grateful his patience and empathy through preparation this thesis

I also wish to thank my father Abdulhakim Çeter, my mother Habibe Çeter, my sisters and brothers for their support and encouragement. Their love, caring and understanding clearly made it to possible complete this work.

Finally, thanks to all my friends who have supported and share their knowledge with me during this process.

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ABSTRACT

When Does a Military Defect? A Comparative Case Study of Egyptian Military’s Behavior during Popular Protests of 1977 Bread Intifada, 2008 Riot, and 2011 Arab Uprisings

In 2011, the MENA region experienced uprisings and social movements that culminated in either regime change or devastating civil wars some of which have continued to date. Several studies that emerged since then, argue that armed forces in the region played a key role in how riots proceeded and ended. Despite being possibly different from Arab Uprisings, several countries from in the MENA region such as Jordan and Egypt had witnessed significant riots, chief among them being in the form of bread riots, several times before. This thesis considers multiple cases of riots in Egypt under different presidents over the last forty years and aims to analyze and explain the role of the Egyptian armed forces in the development and end of these riots. It discusses how these uprisings broke out and assesses differing respones of the Egyptian military during these multiple cases, namely, the Bread Intifada in 1977, riots in 2008, and The Arab Uprisings in 2011. The question of why the Egyptian military abandoned President Mubarak in 2011 during Arab Uprisings while siding firmly with him in 2008 and Sadat earlier in 1977 forms the puzzle this thesis tries to untangle.

Keywords: Arab Uprisings, Bread Riots, Civil-Military relations, Egypt, Military Defection.

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ÖZET

Bir Ordu Ne Zaman Desteğini Çeker? Popüler İsyanlar Sırasında Mısır Ordusunun Davranışına Dair Karşılaştırmalı Bir Vaka Çalışması: 1977 Ekmek İsyanı, 2008 İsyanı ve 2011 Arab İsyanı.

2011’de, Ortadoğu bölgesi hem rejim değişikliği hem de yıkıcı savaşlarla sonuçlanan ve bir kısmı bugüne kadar devam eden isyanlar ve sosyal harekentlenmeler yaşamıştır. O zamandan beri ortaya çıkan birçok çalışma, bölgedeki silahlı kuvvetlerin ayaklanmaların gidişatında ve sona ermesinde kilit rol oynadığını öne sürüyor. Arap ayaklanmalarından muhtemelen farklı olmasına rağmen, MENA bölgesindeki Ürdün'den Mısır'a kadar birçok ülke önemli isyanlara tanık olmuştur, bunların en önemlisi, daha önce birkaç kez ekmek isyanlarıydı. Bu tez, son kırk yılda Mısır'da farklı başkanlar tarafından yürütülen çok sayıda isyan vakasını ele alıyor ve Mısır silahlı kuvvetlerinin bu ayaklanmaların gelişmesinde ve sona ermesinde rolünü analiz etmeyi ve açıklamayı hedefliyor. Bu ayaklanmaların nasıl patlak verdiğini tartışmakta ve Mısır ordusunun 1977'deki Ekmek İntifadası, 2008'deki ayaklanmalar ve 2011'deki Arap Ayaklanmaları gibi bu çoklu vakalarda farklı tepkilerini değerlendirmektedir. Mısır ordusunun 2008 ve 1977’nin başlarında Sadat ile sıkı sıkıya savaşırken, Başkan Mubarak'ı 2011'de Arap Ayaklanmaları sırasında neden terk ettiği, sorusu bu tezin çözmeye çalıştığı bulmacayı oluşturuyor.

Anahtar kelimeler: Arap İsyanları, Ekmek İsyanları, Sivil-Asker ilişkileri, Mısır, Ordunun Desteğini Çekmesi.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ONAY SAYFASI ...... i PLAGIARISM ...... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... ix LIST OF TABLES ...... x 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Literature Review ...... 3 1.1.1 Civil-Military Relations in MENA ...... 5 1.1.2 Military Responses to Popular Protests: Defect or Defend? ...... 8 1.1.2.1 Military Institutionalization ...... 9 1.1.2.2 External Actors ...... 9 1.1.2.3 Economic & Political Privileges...... 10 1.1.2.4 Level of Mass Mobilization ...... 12 1.2 Research Methodology ...... 15 2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT ...... 20 2.1 Civil-Military Relations under Gamal Abdel Nasser ...... 20 2.1.1 Military Activities in Nasser Era ...... 24 2.2 Civil-Military Relations during Sadat Era ...... 27 2.2.1 Infitah (Open Door Policy) ...... 28 2.3. Civil-Military Relations during Mubarak Era ...... 30 2.3.1 Military Activities during Mubarak Era ...... 33 3. PROTESTS IN EGYPT: BREAD IS LIFE ...... 36 3.1 Bread riots in MENA ...... 36 3.2 Bread riots in Egypt ...... 39 3.2.1 Bread Intifada in 1977 ...... 41 3.2.2 2008 Riots ...... 46 3.2.3 The Arab Uprisings: Background and Timeline of The Uprising ...... 49 4. US INFLUENCE ON EGYPTIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS 55 4.1 U.S. Foreign Assistance ...... 56 4.2 The US Response to the Arab Uprisings ...... 59 4.3 The Defection of the Egyptian Military during The Arab Uprisings...... 68 4.4 The Civil-Military Relations: Post-Mubarak Period...... 74 5. CONCLUSION ...... 77

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6. REFERENCES ...... 82

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MI Military Intelligence

GID General Investigations Directorate

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

EGIS Egyptian General Intelligence Service

CSF Central Security Forces

SSI State Security Investigations

ASU Arab Socialist Union

MoI Ministry of Interior

MIBCC Military-Industrial-Business-Commercial Complex

AID Agency for International Development

IMF International Monetary Fund

EATSCO Egyptian-American Transport and Service Cooperation

SCAF Supreme Council of Armed Forces

AMOCO American Oil Company

EDA Excess Defense Articles

IMET International Military Education and Training

USAID The United States Agency for International Development

ESF Economic Support Funds

OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation

FGF Future Generation Foundation

PC Policies Committee

NDP National Democratic Party

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LIST OF TABLES

Table1……………………………………………………………………………………73

x

1. INTRODUCTION

After three decades in power (1981-2011), Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign on January 25, 2011 as a result of massive popular mobilization of people against his rule. Escalating anger and dissatisfaction forced thousands of people into the streets. Crowds gathered in Cairo and other Egyptian cities because of poverty and political repression. Protestors blamed Mubarak for corruption, the brutality of the regime’ security forces and bureaucracies, unemployment, and injustice. Mass mobilization reached huge participation within a short time as protestors increasingly demanded for the downfall of the regime. Mubarak's response to these demonstrations was violence and suppression which caused 846 deaths and many injuries. The importance of these demonstrations is seen in the shift of military’s position, from appearing pro-Mubarak at first to siding with the people for the first time in the recent Egyptian history (Noël, 2013: 4-5).

Such a riot was in fact not unprecedented for either Egypt or the MENA region. The region had witnessed several riots before especially in regard to issues such as access to the daily basic needs. A key example in this case being the bread riots. The nature of these protests also implied that the Egyptian military or any strong factions within it, could seek to use and manipulate such riots to undermine and even topple the president. However, the Egyptian military firmly sided with President Sadat and Mubarak in 1977 and 2008 respectively while, as widely agreed in the literature abandoned Mubarak in 2011(Abdelrahman, 2014: 2; Gardner, 2012: 188; Wilson, 2012: 65). Why? In a country such as Egypt where the police have been historically weak and therefore, the military often assuming policing functions during disturbances, the decision of the army to side with the government or not, is usually a very political decision.

There are several studies, as will be identified in the literature review section, that attempt to contextualize the rationality behind the decision of the Egyptian military to defect

1 during the Arab Uprisings. Nonetheless, some common underlying factors cutting across the literature in regard to the actions of the Egyptian military include economic and political privileges of the military; its identity; nature of administration by political leaders; the international system; corporate interests of the military; and, the United States as an external factor.

The role of bread as a basic and lifeline commodity will also be examined in this study in order to better understand the relations between citizens and governments in the region, and how it significantly affects their daily lives. The Arab Uprisings are as much about bread as they are about human dignity. When the first outbreak occurred in Tunisia, it was ignored and seen as one among other domestic problems facing Tunisia. However, the same events challenges and public response quickly spread to other Middle East countries. In Egypt the popular protests drew global attention as it quickly culminated in the removal of a regime leader who had been in power for a long time. Just like in other countries in the region, access to basic or lifeline commodities such as food is regarded as a significant catalyst for upheavals given that it was not the first time the country was experiencing such protests. In 1977 and 2008, uprisings broke out because of government decision to cut down subsidies on bread. Therefore, the concept of bread and its meaning for Egyptians, is central to understanding the political uprisings in the country.

The justification of selecting Egypt as the focus of this study, is to better understand the role of armed forces within a state in the context of induced or abrupt radical changes during uprisings such as the Arab Uprisings. In addition, Egypt provides a unique case study because for the first time, the military chose defection against their Commander-in-Chief after previously supporting the state in two occasions and instead opted to stand with the protesters. Thus, Egypt's case will give answers about the reasons behind military responses against the regime and why the military chose defection during the Arab Uprisings. The civil-military relations in Egypt and military responses against Arab Uprisings will be examined next chapters.

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1.1 Literature Review

Many scholars believe that the military is one of the significant factors which determined the fate of Arab Uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa. Earlier debates focused more on why military intervenes in politics or withdraws from politics. However, recent scholars focus on how armed forces respond to uprisings and investigate the main reasons behind the military's motivations when they try to make decision regarding who to support between uprisings and their regime. But even more significantly, the advent of the Arab Uprisings has reinvigorated the scholarly attention towards the civil-military relations in the Middle East which were neglected for a long time in the Middle East.

This study contributes different perspectives towards the Egyptian case as it aims to explain defection of the military during Arab Uprisings in 2011 by providing a comparison with other riots in recent Egyptian history. In each of the cases this thesis will study, military is one of the most important actors. This is not to say that these three riots have been the same- to the contrary, the Arab Uprisings shared some similarities while also having significant differences from past riots. From the perspective of similarities, deteriorating economic conditions in Egypt contributed and partly sustained the uprisings. On the other hand, the Arab Uprisings in 2011 can be distinguished from past riots by four points. First, the riots were designated the most significant event in recent Egyptian history in which mass protests were experienced in multiple cities such as Cairo, Alexandria, Suez City, Ismailia, Asyut. This was epitomized by the inclusion and participation of hundreds of thousands of people from all sectors and social cadres of Egypt – not just students or workers gathered in streets.

Second, organizational abilities of protesters were different due to improved technology such as ability to access mobile phones and social networks instead of the traditional techniques of mass mobilization that involved largely the distribution of fliers, newspapers of secret letters. Third, international support coming from the U.S. and Europe was a major boost for the protestors against the government. Lastly, The Egyptian military decision to publicly announce that they will not be involved in the suppression of protestors or demonstrators, only served to embolden and build the confidence of the public to take on the regime. It is plausible to argue that it is indeed this decision by the military, that ultimately decided the fate of the Mubarak regime.

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However, despite these differences on the surface, the Egyptian military in 1977 or 2008 could still take advantage of emerging popular riots, inflate their importance, and allow or even encourage the riots to grow to the extent of being capable of replacing the regime. The 2008 riot also witnessed a gathering of huge number of demonstrators in different cities (Abdelrahman, 2014: 126). For a military to defect, protestors do not have to have social media at their disposal; riots in the absence of social media or instant communication technologies allowed military shirking behavior or defection in the past in other places. If this is the case, then the Egyptian military defection in 2011 stands out from other two cases and deserves a careful comparative historical study.

The literature review in this section presents different explanations for military defection while examining civil-military relations in Egypt from 1952 to 2011, and explaining many variables which may influence the military’s decision making. Besides, the U.S is preferred as the most important external factor to be studied for Egyptian military’s response. Instead of focusing on huge size of protests, organizational abilities of protesters and international support, which is highlighted for achievements of the Arab Uprisings, this study gives different perspectives for each riot by examining the background and timelines of uprisings, and military status under different presidency. Also, it distinguishes the Arab Uprisings from former riots as focus is placed on role of the U.S and Egyptian Military capabilities with their own privileges and prerogatives as autonomous entities.

This section of literature review is divided into two parts. First, it explains civil- military relations in the Middle East and secondly, it focuses on how military institutions react to uprisings and more specifically, why they decide to abstain from intervening on behalf of the regime and choose to defect the regime. Various views will be exploited in an attempt to generate explanations towards finding rational answers that can contribute to this dissertation.

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1.1.1 Civil-Military Relations in MENA

The study on civil-military relations gained momentum in the 1960s and 1970s when a wave of military coups were popular Middle East and Africa after the end of colonialism which created several new independent states.

It is appropriate to start discussing civil-military relations by referring Huntington’s landmark study, The Soldier and the State. According to Huntington, professionalism in the army is key to keeping armies in the barracks. Huntington's definition of civilian control over the military is that, "it is the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by a civilian authority." (Huntington, 1957: 27). Civilian control is divided by Huntington into two categories: subjective control and objective control. Subjective control refers to, "the general concept of civilian control identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups". It means that civilians’ place legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy (Huntington, 1957: 80-84). On the other hand, objective control refers to when civilian authorities get enhanced military roles in the state as strong and neutral partners in order to professionalize them. In this context, the military is perceived and accepted as an autonomous unit functioning on behalf of civilians.

According to Huntington, professionalism means the autonomy of the military. Huntington notes that despite existence of professional militaries such as in Egypt and Turkey, the same cannot be said of other several Middle East countries because of frequent military interventions within the region. However, he notes that the military as an institution developed positive changes in during the early years of independence in Middle East countries during the 1960s and 1970s. Under the Modernization theory, military contributions to the process of industrialization showed that strong civil-military relations in some countries such as Egypt triggered a new wave of military coups in other countries. For example, in Iraq (1958, 1963, 1968), Syria (1963, 1970), Yemen (1962) and Libya (1969) (Cleveland, 2004: 333-335).

However, in examining different debates on civil-military relations in Egypt, as explained by Amos Perlmutter for instance, is that Egypt can be alluded to the 'praetorian state' concept. In other words, the military has a key role in the state as a repressive force that can easily intervene in politics. Perlmutter distinguished praetorian armies in two types: - ‘arbitrator army’ which indirectly intervenes in politics; and the ‘ruler army’ which

5 directly influences politics. (Pearlmutter, 1981: 8-40). On the other hand, Finer states that if civilian authority is weak, there can be military intervention in each and every aspect of society and politics. However, if society is strong and civilian authority has a powerful political culture that cannot be easily challenged by armed forces, then the military will not prefer intervention in civil affairs of the state (Finer, 1962: 20-21). In the MENA region, many states do not have strong civilian control and lack of strong political culture. What characterizes the region is the presence of robust political authoritarianism in which leaders are preoccupied by the need to protect their supremacy on society by holding onto absolute power.

Militaries in Middle East countries do not reflect similar structures and the importance of these militaries have been explored by scholars particularly since the 1980s. Robustness of authoritarian regimes and the lack of democracy in the region have emerged as the leading issues while the different nature of military institutions also received considerable attention. In discussing military power in politics, Kamrava produces a typology of civil-military relations by categorizing them into military democracies, autocratic officer-politician regimes, regimes with dual militaries, and tribally dependent monarchies.

Firstly, military democracies such as Turkey and Israel, the state is a dominant actor but allows participation of the military in domestic politics. Secondly, in autocratic officer- politician regimes which include Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, presidents or the heads of states come from a military background, and the military has a key role in the state. Not only is politics dominated by the military, but also the economy and social life is influenced indirectly by the military. This type of military regime will be significant in comprehensively explaining the Egyptian case in the following chapters. Thirdly, regimes with dual militaries are bounded by ideology such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and there is often more than one security service. Their goals are to protect regimes from any threat at home or abroad and they mostly have a strong connection or consist of relatives of regimes. This type of state has both a regular army and a parallel army such as the Revolutionary Guards of Iran, or Militias People. The last category is that tribally dependent monarchies which compose of oil-rich monarchies such as the Persian Gulf states, Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Kamrava, 2000: 71). In the countries in this category, the military completely depend on the regime.

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It is clear that the military plays a key role in Middle East countries, and they have greater influence in political, economic, and social life of the people. However, what is also of great significance is the question regarding the main reason for the different activities of the military in those states which experienced uprisings. In Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Bahrain, all the states had different outcomes of the uprisings and different military attitude towards regimes and protesters largely due to the differences in military typologies. For instance, the Tunisian army refused to attack protestors and defend the regime; armed forces in Libya, and Yemen were split; and, both the Syrian and Bahraini military forces exploited force to suppress protestors and defend the regime during the uprisings.

The institutionalization level of the military is given as a significant factor in explanations of different types of civil-military relations in the MENA region. This institutionalization connotes that that processes such as recruitment into the armed forces is based on meritocracy and governed by a set of rules. Subsequently, career development and promotion become anchored on performance. Additionally, there is clear separation between public and private realms, opposition to corruption and a strong commitment to country’ national interests rather individual militay leaders or certain groups in the society. Military with a patrimonial character runs opposite to an institutionalized ones.

While, institutionalization implies to a distinct identity of regimes, patrimonialism means cronyism and political favoritism of security forces often characterised by the lack of a clear distinction between private and public realms and instances of involvement of security apparatures in corruption are rampant. Militaries which are based on patrimonialism sytem are often against regime changes because their loyalty belongs to regime. Therefore, in the absence of patrimonial regime, patrimonial militaries cannot expect to survive in the event there is a radical or abrupt regime change. However, highly institutionalized militaries have an identity which is separate from regime. In the MENA region, Egyptian and Tunisia militaries are highly institutionalized (Albrecht & Ohl, 2016: 40). They are not directly involved in state apparatus or political issues and maintain a distance between politics and military affairs. On the contrary, civil-military relations in Syria and Bahrain are not as institutionalized as in Egypt and Tunisia. Instead, the military is directly controlled by the regime and lacks operational autonomy. As a result, during the Arab Uprisings, the Egyptian and Tunisian army refused to attack protestors, while armed forces in Libya, and Yemen

7 were split. In Syria and Bahrain, armed forces were used force to suppress protestors ( Barany, 2011: 25).

Other scholars such as Lutterbeck and Bellin argue that historically, being the center of the nation and based on their deep connections or relations with society, they will often abstain from using force. Alternatively, if the regime develops weak relations with the society, it often become a difficult task to overcome during uprisings or conflicts. Therefore, the will of people and the nature of the ties between the government and society shouldn't be underestimated during riots (Lutterbeck, 2012: 33).

In his studies, Rubin describes two phases in civil-military relations in Arab states. The first phase is that the military was dominant over governments between the 1950s and 1960s and the second phase is that role of a military can transform into that focused on protecting only the regime (Rubin, 2000: 1-22). Cook also emphasizes the same ideas and argues that the role of the military in politics is strong in a military-dominated regimes where they are indirectly involved in government affairs. In countries such as Egypt and Algeria, the military control political affairs and protect its own privileges within over other ministries and state agencies. (Cook, 2007: 15). As a result, studies on civil-military relations in the Middle East explains different perspectives on which countries have different structures and historical backgrounds.

1.1.2 Military Responses to Popular Protests: Defect or Defend?

Several countries within the MENA region have been inovlved in numerous incidences of political uprisings. The experience of these countries with uprisings has seen some military forces choose to defend their regimes while other have opted to defect. Many scholars present various reasons behind the motives and incentives for influencing military intervention in politics. Emeging variablesin literature reflect arguments in the four broad categories military institutionalization, external actors, economic and political priveleges and level of mass mobilization.

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1.1.2.1 Military Institutionalization

Bellin in her analysis of why military forces support or oppose uprisings, identifies four variables. These include: level of institutionalization versus the patrimonial character of the armed forces; level of external support; the fiscal health of the coercive apparatus; and, the level of popular mobilization. Foremost, the level of institutionalization is relative to how security forces react during uprisings. If the level of institutionalization of the army is deep, the military would often not engage in politics and therefore not capable of easily intervening in the political affairs. A military which is largely patrimonial in nature, would most likely crush reformist movements and show no tolerance to popular changes. On the other hand, Bellin also highlights that if institutionalization is high and relationship to society strong, the military will side with protestors and support popular defections (Bellin, 2004: 145). Arab Uprisings in Egypt perhaps provides the best reflection of this relation. The different perspectives offered by understanding the levels of institutionalization in the armed forces and how they relate with society is a way to bring out the idea demonstrating the different responses to uprisings. However, whereas the institutionalization factor is essential for explaining the decisions to defect by the military, it is not sufficient to explain their motivation or why the military chose to defect during the Arab Uprisings.

1.1.2.2 External Actors

External support should also be taken into account. When security forces lose international support, their capacity and willingness of supporting the regime also tends to reduce significantly. In Egypt, the US did not support the regime because of growing popular protests during the uprisings. The attention of global media during the uprising and decreasing international support showed that indeed, the chances of supporting the regime out of the crisis was very limited. For the Egyptian regime, loss of international support from allies such as U.S. which provides significant amount of aid and arms became a significant blow in countering the uprising. The response of the international community to the protests, is important in how the military perceive the regime as fragile or not. In the case of U.S. as an external actor in Egypt, its influence reflected more broadly when Barack Obama called

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Mubarak to resign despite previously having close relations with Washington (Nepstad, 2013: 343).

1.1.2.3 Economic & Political Privileges

Economic and political privileges is also given as an important reason for military defection during uprising. Security forces want to protect their interests which are given by the state. If they face any threat against their privileges, they will respond as a means of trying safeguard those interests or regain them again, thereby providing support to the regime.

To examine the social and economic backgrounds of the officer corps, is crucial in demonstrating comprehensively, the connection between civilians and the military. In Egypt, the cohesion of the army came from its own ethnic and religious homogeneity. A system in the army based on kinship and patron-client relationships shows that there is a strong tie among officers. However, all presidents of Egypt manipulated aspect of the military on behalf of their interests, to prevent any opposition activity of the military against their authority. But a strong identity provides internal cohesion and stability and this can be enhansed through the professionalism of the army which is built through education and training which help to solidify identity.

The Egyptian military is also active in the economy and benefits from some privileges and allowances. During the Sadat administration, economic liberalization policies caused concerns among military officers because of fears that they would lose economic advantages and privileges. When financial difficulties had forced to civilians, the same effects observed among military (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008: 4). However, economic privileges alone, does not offer comprehensive reasons as to why the military took part in the downfall of Mubarak after 30 years and not have attempted to defect earlier.

Military defections during non-violent conflict are another issue. The main question is whether or not, military defections occur because troops enjoy political or economic privileges from the regime, or is it because they perceive a regime as being fragile and therefore, want to protect its interests. There have been many examples where troops give

10 up support for their regime and shifted to opposition groups such as in Tunisia and Egypt. This is a turning point in terms of civil struggle because in the absence of military protection, the power shift from away from the regime can ultimately lead to its collapse. Besides, economic incentives that provide loyalty of the people to the regime, political incentives can also establish support on the basis of identity politics which may be sustained by a regime. But, protestors also have certain ways or mechanisms that they can use to solicit the support of the military during during periods of civil disobedience. One of such means is referred to as the cost of regime loyalty which is attached to how the international community responds to the conflict. International sanctions and embargo can influence government decisions and actions towards society. Additionally, the perception that the regime would unavoidably fall can trigger defections within the military.

Gelvin in his analysis of why Egyptian military abandoned the regime and sided with protestors, argues that financial concerns was the main factor because if Mubarak stayed in power, they feared losing huge financial assets given by the regime especially given that approximately 40% of the Egyptian economy is dominated by the military (Gelvin, 2012: 34-66). One reason for this sort of concern was that Gamal Mubarak- son of Mubarak, extended his business connection to the U.S. and build his economic power through business and political cronies rather than the military. People who were around him gained more profit and joined from government monopolies and foreign investors (Kandil, 2014: 227).

The military uses its key role in the country and protects its positions when its interests are threatened by the regime. Oftenly, when the option of defection has is seen as having more advantages than defending the regime, they choose the most appropriate option. For example, the military has a huge budget, autonomy, and institutional survival (Nordlinger, 1977: 66-68). These factors become essential during the uprisings in 2011 when compare to the previous upheavals of 1977 when autonomy of the military was very limited because of close regime control. Military involvement in Egypt as a key actor in public issues started with Nasser when the military became involved in bureaucratic affairs. This increasing role advanced further when economic privileges were introduced to the military by Sadat and during the Mubarak reign. For instance, a big number of commanders who were retired, we reappointed to different state agencies. As such, when the military felt that its economic interests were threatened during the eminent fall of the Mubarak regime, relations became more fragile leading to the defection of the military (Nassif, 2013: 529).

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These similar views are argued William C. Taylor but from a much narrower perspective. He argues that militaries take a position on whether to defect or not based on the factors that threaten their interests and existing restraints particularly in regard to military autonomy and interests (Taylor, 2014: 128-132). This argument will contribute to our study about the main reason which led to the military's decision-making to intervene on the behalf of protesters.

On the other hand, autocratic regimes always aim to prevent abrupt occurrences such as military defections. Thus, they develop coup-proof strategies to gain and sustain the support of the military such as establishing strong coalitions between the regime and the military. Often, economic and political privileges are welcomed by militaries or other discreet branches or dual militaries are established to control regular army and security services. Three coup-proofing strategies which are building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties, are used by Makara to develop a theory of military defection to understand civil-military relations and military behavior in Egypt under different coup-proofing measures. Makara argues that when these coup-proofing strategies ultimately lose influence on the military, the military may shift loyalty from the regime. For example, when the military's budget and economic privileges which were provided by the regime through the ministry of interior declined, it caused resentment within the military apparatus (Makara, 2016: 5).

1.1.2.4 Level of Mass Mobilization

The level of popular mobilization has a decisive role in security forces when they face small or huge uprisings because the number of people involved become costly when compared to small groups. Through processes such as institutionalization of security services, there can be a strong link between the military and society. Popular mobilization became an essential part of the Arab Uprisings because of the amount of mobilization as well as the moral considerations it could have on the military. Syria and Egypt offer good illustrations of this view because of the experiences they had during the uprising. Whereas the military defected from supporting the regime in Egypt, the military defend the regime in Syria. 12

Egypt has a special connection with the society and a majority if not all members of the military are drawn from the middle class. As such, they easily understand why popular uprisings emerge, and what their real intentions are. However, the Syrian army was divided because of moral dilemma and military actions which were seen unacceptable by some troops as it was ethically and morally inappropriate. Some Military officers took side with the regime, while others left the country or participated with opposition groups in fighting the regime. In other countries such as Bahrain, the military remained loyal to the state despite facing similar difficult dilemmas such as the cost of regime loyalty or not, and strong or weak ties with society (Nepstad, 2013: 338). While these factors may not be adequate enough to explain military defection during the Arab Uprisings, they nonetheless give us perspectives regarding the uprising.

The divergent responses of the military require us to find out new explanatory factors. Barany remarks that there are many countries which militaries despite being institutionalized, are involved repression and support their repressive leaders. Barany highlights this perspective using case studies of Iran (1979), Burma (1988), the 1989 uprisings in China, and the Arab Uprisings (2011). This shows that institutionalism is not enough to understand defection. Barany therefore includes other factors categorized as: military factors, state factor, societal factors, and external factors. He rejects directly focusing only on what causes military attitude and, instead of argues that all factors ought to be considered in any case (Barany, 2016: 19). He argues that only one factor is not influential in the military's decision making and therefore, there should be many variables considered by the military to calculate their privileges and interests which enhance military autonomy and supremacy during uprisings. In regard to the Egyptian case, Barany notes that Mubarak's son- Gamal, was a factor as to why the military refused to protect Mubarak. This is because he was largely seen as a threat by the military top brass who were worried about alienation; the spreading of Islamic radicalism; and extension of more privileges to the police and other security apparatus (Barany, 2011: 24-35).

Other views given by Holmes, allude that there is a misunderstanding of military reactions during Arab Uprisings. According to Holmes, what happened in Egypt was misunderstood by some scholars who compare the Egyptian military actions to an uprising. Instead, he argues that the military did not overthrow the regime, but instead, overthrew Mubarak in order to save the regime. The decision by the military during the early days of

13 the uprising not to intervene was viewed and accepted by some people as defection (Holmes & Koehler, 2018: 2-22). As such Holmes’ account emphasizes that the military never defected from regime but instead the military was neutral until in the later stages when it intervened using force to disperse protestors.

However, this study is based on the defection of the military in Egypt and finding out sufficient answers by accounting for the evidence in order to clarify what can drove the changing of military attitude during the Arab Uprisings. In other words, examining whether it was a case of 'democratic coups,' ending of the uprisings, or just about regime consolidation. Brooks notes that the nature of civil-military relations plays a key role on whether the military choose to defect or defend. They consider the output of uprisings which can either provide gains or cause loss. After weighing the pros and cons, a decision can be shaped and taken in that regard (Brooks, 2013: 205-220). Therefore, the Egyptian military as a rational and autonomous institution chose the best options which did not threaten is survival. As such, the military acted as a protector of Egyptian people and takes responsibility for stabilization domestic life by trying to project itself as a powerful agent above all the other state apparatuses. The uprising therefore provided a good opportunity for the military show again its central role in the country not only towards the regime, but also to the Egyptian people.

Besides examining the role of structure and agency as the main pillars of revolutions, how mass mobilization was attained in Egypt, draw attention on elites split about economic management which caused disagreement between a supporter of Mubarak policy and supporter of state to own economic policy, not privatization. And unquestionably the power of social media such as Facebook and the United State as a foreign influence (Holmes, 2012: 391-410). Actually, there was not any international pressure or withdrawal of US support for Mubarak at the beginning but President Obama calls the phone to Mubarak in on February 1 and allegedly impulse resign. “It is time to present to the people of Egypt its next government," he reportedly said (Gerges, 2013: 301). In chapter three, the U.S. role and influence on the Egyptian military will be taken as a factor. U.S.-Egypt has been close relations and diplomacy, economic and military cooperation enhanced this relation permanent. Thus, as an external factor, the U.S. response toward the Arab Uprisings in Egypt helps to understand and contribute to explanation Egypt's case very well.

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1.2 Research Methodology

This study explains the defection of Egyptian military against regime in 2011 using an in-country across-time comparison. Three significant bread riots in Egypt history are compared though an in-depth analysis of the background and timeline of uprising and different actors to enhance a better understanding of Egyptian military behavior. Bread riots in 1977, 2008 riots and the Arab Uprisings, are deeply explained and an attempt is made to find similarity or differences between the case studies.

The bread riots which appeared in Egypt, broke out at different times. Some of them were triggered during the Cold War such as the 1977 bread riots during the Sadat era. And some of them begun after the Cold War in a new structure of the international system such as the 2008 riot and the Arab Uprisings in 2011. The outbreak of riots in Egypt was significant given the status of the country in world politics particularly in regard to its influence in Middle East which is crucial to Western countries especially the U.S.

The justification for including the bread riots in this study is because during the 1977 bread intifada, 2008 riots and Arab Uprisings, all the upheavals were founded on the commonality of economic grievances. Economic problems epitomized by government decision to cut on subsidies such as bread, sparked uprisings in different cities and spread to Cairo. There are several differences among these riots. The 1977 bread intifada registered the most violence and huge number of protesters since 1952 military coup and for the first time, major uprising poured into streets after increases in the price of bread. This riot continued for 2 days with participation of hundreds of thousands of protestors. Anwar Sadat called military for restore order and the military violently suppressed protesters. It is estimated that eighty people were killed, hundreds were wounded, and 1,200-2000 others arrested.

On the other hand, the 2008 riot begun at Mahalla city and spread to other cities such as Cairo and the Nile Delta. The riot was the largest with more than a million Egyptians participating including women and men workers- such had never been experienced again since World War II. Like the bread riot in 1977, it did not last more than three days, but suppression by military was highly intense. Lastly, The Arab Uprisings in 2011 was different from earlier riots in terms of size, timeline and outcomes. First of all, the riots continued for

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18 days, and broke out at Cairo. The number of protesters was around nearly two million people at first week of movement and protestors fulfilled at Tahrir Square first time. Similar pictures observed in other cities such as Alexandria, Suez, el-Mahalla, el-Kubra, and el- Mansura. The most significant difference of the Arab Uprisings was the defection of the military against the regime which cornerstone of this study.

Popular protests make coup attempts more likely because protests provide opportunity for elites to test ability of leaders to withstand a coup or not, and also to realize the incumbent’s strengths. Thus, while popular protests focus attention on the elites in an attempt to overthrow the regime, and the elites concentrate on supporting the regime, an ideal opportunity emerges that allows for successful coordination within the military who aims to conduct a coup (Casper & Tyson, 2014: 3). That is why, when protesters appeared, armies engaged in the planning and conducting of coup d'états. According to the theory about endgame coups, militaries intervene for regimes to consolidation their power and to prevent a regime change. This kind of coup also aims to remove a leader who has no capability to govern the state, and to establish a new regime with different leaders (Koehler & Albrecht, 2019: 12-15). During earlier bread riots in Egypt, military could attempt coup, but they did not. I will explain in next chapters why military only intervene regime in 2011, not others.

It is worth noting that the cases of riots taken into account in this study allowed military defection. In other words, regardless of the scale of respective popular riots witnessed under President Sadat or Mubarak, the Egyptian military could use those moments of instability to oust the President and take over. Both Presidents experienced rivalry and perceived the existence of powerful rivals emerging from within the military, as will be discussed in this thesis. It seems that Sadat’s future depended on what the U.S. opted to do, when riots deteriorated (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977). This also means that there was the existence of close ties between U.S. and Egypt and as such, Egypt depended on U.S. assistance to escape political turmoil. The liberalization policies that were being pushed by the U.S. and her Western allies had created negative impact on the economy thereby putting Sadat in a weak position. At the given period, the military could attempt a coup, but it did not. Moreover, U.S. aid to Egypt estimated at around $190 million after riots, raised suspicious about role of US on Egypt (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977). This has necessitated investigation of the role of U.S. influence on other riots in Egypt. Consequently, only one protest became successful in removing Mubarak in 2011. So, each

16 riot will explain why riots failed, what makes the Arab Uprisings special. The role of US will be examined during these riots.

The data for this research comes from a variety of sources. To begin with, this thesis consults closely with the US diplomatic archives and the Central Intelligence Service (CIA) archives available online. It additionally utilizes several interviews done with past members of U.S. diplomatic service in Cairo available online through Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. The secondary sources compiled from the literature will be covered as well. There are three limitations for this research. First, a study that covers Egypt should ideally consult British archival material as well. However, not only that British archives, unlike American material, are not easily available online, but also the current COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible to visit British diplomatic and military archives at Kew. Second, since this is a sensitive subject and Egypt is a facing insecurity challenges and therefore is not suitable for academic visits at the moment, it has been impossible to conduct interviews with Egyptian military personnel. Finally, due to the identified scope of study, this study does not cover all bread riots in modern Egyptian history (Sadiki, 1996: 418). Egypt has witnessed several riots every decade such as riots by Nasser and his groups who attacked government with military coup in January 1952, a student rebellion against Nasser regime in 1968 and after the unsuccessful war against Israel in 1967. Protestors blamed military officers and demanded punishment officers responsible for devastation of war which put Egypt in bad situation. Besides, 1972 students riot against Sadat regime was not mainly about economic issue. Students demanded for the removal of secret agents who worked for the government in the universities. And violent strikes in including al-Mahalla al-Kubra (1975), Kafr al-Dawwar (1976 and 1984), police conscripts in Central Security Forces against government (1986) and Hulwan (1989). There were also other riots in 1968 and 1972 which were not mainly because of economic issues and the 1986 riot was not by civilians. However, these riots mentioned above were not major uprisings. They were short and could not called serious riots. Therefore, this thesis rather relies on what is considered here major riots to make a comparison.

The theory of civil-military relations is used to understand military response and attitude during riots in Egypt. This theory will be applied to this study to examine the many riots in the history of Egypt in order to obtain a coherent and coprehensive understanding of the topic. Bread riots in 1977, 2008, and the Arab Uprisings provide and help to examine how military behavior was influenced by different variational factors. There are independent

17 and dependent variations which affect the direction of riots and military behavior. Data is gathered data and analysed to support the analysis of why the military chose defections during the Arab Uprisings and support civilians during the 2011 uprising, while on the other hand, remained loyal to the regime during the Bread riots of 1977 and riots of 2008. This thesis will explore these contraditictions in military responses to the uprisings and riots using dependent and independent variations such as economic and political incentives, common ties with society, international system, global media, or external factors such as the U.S role.

In brief, this study makes two contributions; first, it examines military behaviors in different riots that have a critical role in Egyptian history; bread riots which are called 1977 bread intifada, the 2008 riot, and Arab Uprisings. Second, this study will make a contribution by examining why military behavior changed during the Arab Uprisings leading to the downfall Mubarak. Military interests are a decisive factor behind these conflicts. Economic and political privileges might be a reason and any threat against their interests could encourage defection during riots. Also, the administration of leaders is influenced by military activities. Although Sadat regime depoliticized military, during the Mubarak regime, the military was politicized compared when to the past when the military was more autonomus. Besides, mass mobilization of the society, and institutionalization of the army can be percieved as more of an opportunity than a reason for defection.

Characteristic of civil-military relations and typology of the military in different levels, helps to understand the military background, even thought they will no be able to offer a comprehensive answer arguments for the research question. The variables that will be used in this study will enhance the understanding of riots in Egypt and help future studies to predict a new event that may appear with different reasons and outcomes. One argument that will be advanced in this study is that external factors such as the U.S. had little impact and not sufficient pieces of evidence that prove that the U.S. influenced the Egyptian military to defect from defemding the regime. The close relation of US towards Egypt caused ambigous and different anouncements by U.S officials about Mubarak but did reflect more tangible influence of US on the Egyptian military responses. The main reason for defection is that understanding of military's motivations and response to uprisings are more dependent on military aims to preserve the status quo and its interests when popular protests attention to regime threatens the surivival of the regime itself.

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The Structure of the Thesis

This dissertation is organized in five chapters. The first chapter will provide introduction, research methodology, and literature review. The second chapter explains civil- military relations in Egypt. The third chapter is divided into major bread riots in Egypt and the historical background of the Arab Uprisings with its different outcomes. The fourth chapter gives answer which try to find reasons behind of military defection with extra focus on the role of the U.S. on Egyptian military’ responses against the uprising as well as focus on reasons of military defection. And final chapter will be conclusion.

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2. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT

The role of military influence on the Middle East countries in each aspect of life has been a significant factor in history. Egypt is one of the countries in which the military was a strong player in domestic politics, economy, and social life. Egyptian military ensures not only national defense, but also identifies with the Egyptian people and often supports and cares deeply about its autonomy and modernization. This chapter will attempt to explain the relation between political leaders and military leaders and how the military operates in this relationship within the framework of state apparatuses and their activities under different presidencies. This chapter also provides information about military structures and their historical developments from past to the end of Mubarak's tenure. Conversely, three leaders who have ruled Egypt for a long-time such as Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak will be given attention in regard to their attitude towards the military. Therefore, under different internal and external factors in Egyptian history, three different periods of governance will be taken into account.

The civil-military relations are an important indicator to analyze and explain the characteristic of armed forces and their relations with society and government and show how militaries penetrate the state as strong or weak institutions. Additionally, it affects the fate of nations because of their decision-making mechanisms and motivations towards events such as coups or uprisings. The Egyptian military was emerged as powerful institutions under Nasser and still hold its power in Egypt today. Therefore, this chapter will be useful and responsive to understanding among Egyptian military-regime-society relations.

2.1 Civil-Military Relations under Gamal Abdel Nasser

Since the overthrow of the royal regime which was ruled by King Farouk in 1952, the military has been a mainstay on the country's political, economic, and security institutions after monopolizing power in the country after the 23 July 1952 coup. The civil-military relations in Egypt had transformed considerably and showed a different level of the military over bureaucracies in political control. Gamal Abdel Nasser was one of the charismatic

20 figures in Egyptian history with a stunning military background. He was not only the major voice of Egyptians, but also enhanced his influence on regional affairs when Arab-socialism was exported abroad as Nasser's ideology. The state was governed under a one-party regime which embodied Arab Nationalism. Besides, the economy was nationalized to break away from the colonial system and become independent and self-sufficient. Centralization of all decision-making processes and strengthening of the armed forces as part of a new authoritarian project provided a social contract between the state and the ruling elites. The state-provided healthcare, education, social services, and in exchange of sweeping authority in the country including those that reduced extensively, political freedoms in society. Despite these attributes, his regime enjoyed popular support from the public. For example, workers, rural landlords, elites benefited from reforms that made life easier for people (Harris, 1967: 93-94)

With Nasser gradually consolidating his power, the military intelligence became most powerful agency in country. Zakaria Muhi al-Din, known as the father of the modern Egyptian intelligence, was appointed as new director of Military Intelligence (MI). Many missions of MI required a new civilian intelligence service. Internal security was priority on Nasser agenda. Thus, the internal security forces were firstly expanded by creating a new General Investigations Directorate (GID) which was called the new political police (Mabahith al- ‘Amm), and later, the State Security Investigations Service (Mabahith ‘Amn al-Dawla) was created to ensuring security towards Foreigners, Zionism, Communism and Internal Affairs. The Muslim Brotherhood was a formidable challenge for government, as such, GID was a kind of eyes and ears for the regime responsible for arresting and monitoring foreigners and ensuring security of national domestic affairs. Note that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with its training and funding to the Egyptian army, were during the early days of involvement in Egypt, a key partner. Intelligence services, equipment, and money which was shared by CIA, helped Americans as significant player in Egypt during the 1950s (Sirrs, 2010: 31).

The Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) (al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma) was another security service created to provide and collect economic and political intelligence services both internally and externally in 1954 (Sirrs, 2010: 44). Importantly, rise of Salah Nasr as a new director of EGIS meant that for many Egyptians, a police state was introduced in the country by Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser who created the Mukhabarat state. Because, Salah

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Nasr became synonymous with the Mukhabarat excesses of the Nasser era, he was mentioned in Naguib Mahfouz’s novel (and film) Karnak as a corrupt spy boss (Sirrs, 2010: 60). For Nasser’s subversion plan against external ‘enemies’, EGIS, MID, the Republican Guard, the Egyptian police, the Central Security Forces (CSF), the State Security Investigations (SSI), the Republican Guard, and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID) all played prominent roles. These security forces were responsible initially for the protection of the president, preventing coups and defending the country both internally and externally. The Egyptian military became equipped and expanded in size, mission, as well as provided with advanced training programs. Military officers were trained outside the country and also they participated in Western states or mostly the Soviet Union military schools. This enabled the Egyptian military to convert into a professional military. This was the beginning of the military to gain significant status in the country under Nasser. The military did not only preserve its position in military spheres but also gradually became a popular actor in different sector social and economic sectors. Nasser used the Mukhabarat for establishing his authority to against oppositions and conspiracies against his regime.

During the Nasser era, while the military did not face any opposition groups against its supremacy, serious struggle appeared within the military itself. While social life was managed successfully, Nasser faced over time significant challenges within armed forces, especially by Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer. While Nasser had power, Abdel Hakim Amer appeared as a strong commander during the 1960s and took more control of the military. When Amer was appointed as a commander of the military in 1953, the military depended on his leadership and friendship with Nasser and this provided stability and secured political environment for a while. thus, enabling Nasser to concentrate more in domestic policies. Amer on the other hand, had the power to make military appointments or dismissals. This enabled the military to be unified under Amer with given prerogatives and privileges. For example, good salaries and expansion more involvement of the military to the civilian sectors such as access to consumer goods. All these ensured loyalty to him and secured his position against any threat from outside.

However, this situation changed when Nasser felt those prerogatives were becoming a threat to his administration. The growing influence of Amer was perceived by Nasser as an attempt to establish of alternative center of power. In 1962, the Arab Socialist Union was created to check military activity. The organization had deep penetrations in social spheres

22 of the Egyptian society and developed new mechanisms such as Youth Organization. One of the activities of this organization was to control or deter any coup threats. In this manner, civilian support was created under Nasser's strategy thus giving him both military and civilian support at the same time (Harb, 2003: 279-280).

Disagreements occurred within years and the resignation of Amer, as the commander of the chief, was requested by the council. The aim was to consolidate power under the Nasser presidency again and shrink the dominance of Amer in the military force. Nevertheless, Amer protected his position on military and all attempts used to deter to him resulted in failure. Conflicts between Nasser- a political leader and Amer- a military leader, led to the emergence of two actors in Egypt and rivalry continued for years especially during the 1967 war with Israel which was a turning point Egyptian history. Before the war, competition between two the leaders were characterized by extreme suspicion. This bad relation was reflected in the heavy defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war because of poor political connections and mistrust. During the war, coordination between the two leaders was weak and unsystematic command structure and disregards of information on both sides led to failure against Israeli attacks (Brooks, 2010: 411-419). For example, MID was engaged in several rivalries amongst its military ranks services. Mohamed Ahmed Sadiq who was the director of MID, recalled War Minister Shams Badran while Salih Nasr who was a former director of EGIS and Marshal Amr, were obsessed with loyalty of military to themselves. Several investigations by MID against military officers triggered instability within army. Thus, problems inside internal security services impacted on the outcome of the war with Israel.

After the war, Nasser offered to resign but demonstrators poured onto the streets for demanding Nasser to remain in power. As Felix Houphouet- Boigny, former president of the Republic of Ivory Coast, once remarked “Nasser is the only head of state whose prestige grows with each defeat” (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1970).

Therefore, Nasser was a strong figure even during times of crisis. Nasser still had civilian support and loyalty of the population and to not to the army or military elites. Because of the defeat during the war, the profile of the military for the first time changed in the eyes of the Egyptian society. Failure of the military during the war raised questions about the leadership capabilities of Amer and even more importantly, highlighted the lack of military professionalization and its poor training. This failure was accepted and interpreted

23 as a result of constant political engagements of military leaders instead of focusing on their responsibilities on strengthening military soldiers and improving military facilities. After the devastating outcome of the war, Nasser lost his power and there was need to rectify the bad image of the government and particularly, the military for the Egyptian society. Thus, Amer and his acolytes were subsequently arrested and were later reported to have allegedly committed suicide. Additionally, many military officers retired and other resignations occurred. More than 1,000 officers who were charged for being involved in Amer’s conspiracy, were purged (Beattie, 1994: 212). A new Intelligence state was revived under Nasser’s last years with his close colleagues such as Sami Sharaf who controlled presidential intelligence apparatus; Amin Howeidi who commanded EGIS and MID; and Sharawi Guma’a who supervised the GID. The Mukhabarat tried to flourishe again (Sirrs, 2010: 106).

However, internal unrest emerged after 1967 defeat against Israel because of lenient sentences for military officers who participated in war. For the first time, large demonstrations started in Helwan and then spread to Alexandria and Cairo. People demanded the removal of secret police inside Universities and called for free elections. However, the 1968 protests were suppressed, and many people were arrested by security forces. The result of war and unrest shows that the military significantly lost its popularity in society. Therefore, until Nasser’s death, he was the most powerful and influential political and military leader in Egypt. Nasser’s personality shaped the Egyptian intelligence state. He created an internal security apparatus and monitoring oppositions and external enemies under EGIS. His subversive policy exposed plotters within army. Intelligence and security forces reached into almost every corner of Egyptian society. This the Mukhabarat state which created by Nasser, became a new problem in the early years of Anwar Sadat presidency.

2.1.1 Military Activities in Nasser Era

The military reached every layer of the Egyptian society during the Nasser era and Free Officers used its power and leadership position in the head of state, to become an important actor in state institutions, as well as play an active role in state institutions. Egypt

24 transformed and become the second largest arms manufacturer in the region during the era of Nasser as military interests were supported and protected. The Egyptian military expanded and was comprised active armed forces and reservists. The active armed forces were composed of around 470,000 men and approximately the same number under reservist departments which were under the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. This was in addition to the Central Security Services which was comprised of 325,000 officers and the National Guard under the Ministry of Interior with an additional 60,000 officers. These three institutions shaped the Egyptian military. But the lack of a solid civil-military relations, ensured that the military acquired a permanent role in society only as a powerful actor to guide the nation and ensure sovereign independence (Krieg, 2011: 14).

Egypt under King Faruk was ruled by civilian control until the 1952 revolution by Gamal Abd Al-Nasser and the Free Officers movements. The civilian control was replaced with military control in almost each and every state institution or department and this created political privileges for the military. They had rejected the old-style parliamentary democracy, monarchy and disbanded political parties. In 1956, Egyptian free officers under Nasser became institutionalized within the constitution which created a presidency with centralized power. The military became a vanguard for Nasser.

Civil-military relations were not strong enough because of dominance of the military. Nasser’s strategy of politicization and professionalization of the army shows that civil- military relations were weak. During the era of Nasser, Egyptian politics for first time became militarized. It controlled government with radical economic, social and political changes until end of his reign in 1970 (Arafat, 2003: 278).

Between 1952 and 1970, cabinets were headed only headed once by Ali Mahir as a civilian and staffed by civilians. A culture of military dominance and control by officers on state institutions and organizations emerged and proceeded as part of a military ideology. Especially, institutions such as the foreign affairs ministry were dominated by military members as well as other ministries of War, Interior, National Guidance. Most of the ambassadors to the deployed to Western countries were also military men. Moreover, al- Ahram and Al- Hilal which was press organizations were also controlled by the military (Harb, 2003: 278).

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Despite having the second-largest army with equipment and personnel in the region, the outcome of the 1967 war was clear indication of the existence of poorly trained soldiers and lack of professionalization in Egyptian army. In the 1960s, Nasser combined military and political leadership in his office to enhance its effectiveness. The military involvement of politics and influence on decision-making processes as well as extensive involvement in political maneuvering both internally and in external policies, hindered effective performance of the armed forces.

In the economic sector, the role of the military was expanded under Nasser's presidency. Banks, public transportations, factories, theatres, cinemas, companies are just a few places where the control of the Egyptian military extended (Galvin, 2008: 241). And Nasser also had some strategies for controlling military under his presidency. Thus, politicization and professionalization were an important plan for making the military loyal to him. Almost all state institutions were filled with officers from the military. The professionalization of the army and training officers was provided by the Soviet Union through education advice and training programs (MacFarlane, 2012: 19-20). Nasser era was the beginning of the militarization of politics in Egypt. Therefore, civil-military relations deteriorated because of the lack of civilian participation process of governance.

The military supremacy on politics, society and economy prevented the establishment of military professionalization. That became a significant reason why Egyptian military suffered heavy defeat during the 1967 war with Israel.

In brief, civil-military relations during the Nasser era was weak because military officers had a role in almost all state institutions or agencies. This was influenced by the fact that Nasser and his allies who conducted a coup in 1952, all had military backgrounds. When the state was reconstituted under Nasser’s authority, he appointed military officers in strategic position in state sectors. Therefore, the military emerged as a powerful agent under Nasser's presidency.

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2.2 Civil-Military Relations during Sadat Era

Military efficiency and effectiveness which flourished in all layers of the state and the officers who adhered to the ideologies of Nasser continued under Anwar Al-Sadat when Nasser died on September 28th 1970. When Sadat took over, there was uncertainty whether he would hold on to power. The primary threat to Sadat’s rule emanated from the military, and Sadat was well aware that an attempted coup was very likely. As a result, several military officers who headed different ministries and public agencies were dismissed by Sadat. For example, in May 1971, under the ‘Corrective Revolution’, Sadat dismissed Minister of War, Chief of Staff, and many other military officers such as the Commanders of the Navy, Central Military, and the Director of Military Intelligence, in an attempt to establish a powerful presidency (Arafat, 2003: 43-44).

In the nine years of the Sadat presidency, he appointed seven Ministers of Defense between 1971 and 1980. Sadat was very suspicious of the former officers who were loyal Nasser. Therefore, to transform this psychological insecurity, he acquired new military officers loyal to him through the Corrective Revolution, and for those officers who did not show full commitment or loyalty to his presidency, they ended up facing imprisonments. Sadat’s main agenda was to bring to an end to the influence of the military in government, and through his strategy to marginalize pro-Nasser elites, Sadat accomplished his agenda of gaining military support (MacFarlane, 2012: 23-24). The essence of depoliticizing and professionalizing the army for Sadat, is that it would help to him prevent any disagreements with the military in regards to the decision-making processes of domestic and foreign policy. The military officers who he perceived as threats such as the Minister of War General Muhammad Sadiq, was replaced by General Ahmad Hasan Ali who was more apolitical as a person (Harb, 2003: 282).

These changes gave Sadat more control which enabled him to not only wage a rather successful campaign against Israel in the 1973 war, but also, enabled him to enact significant changes in the way the Egyptian economy functioned. New legislations were passed to promote private investment, labor legislations and tax benefits for investors which enabled him to gain support of the rural middle class and entrepreneurs. The civil-military relations shifted from the military control to that of political leaders. ‘Open door policy’ became perhaps the most important legacy of Sadat era.

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2.2.1 Infitah (Open Door Policy)

Infitah which connotes an Open-door policy, was a new approach to encourage certain values that were considered as being Western in regard to goods, services, and private investment. In other words, a new economic model without too much restrictions and one which encouraged increase of imports from other countries especially the United States. This is an important event because it not only improved the Egyptian economy, but also, marked a new era in which Egyptian foreign policy shifted from the Soviet Union to an American partnership. Sadat's new domestic policies changed the state's institutions and also effected military apparatuses. The economic initiatives and political reforms encouraged the emergence of political parties, a culture of tolerance for political debates, and also enhanced Sadat's popularity (Reid, 2020: 390-391). These were part of a bigger strategy for Sadat to sediment his public support especially amongst the middle class while also transforming the economy and politics of Egypt. Thus, several measures were taken to benefit people in both the public and private sectors. In brief, the middle class was a priority for Sadat and all reforms aimed to revived social life (Waterbury, 1983: 304). These activities by Sadat improved the civilian arena rather than the military sector. Thus, there were no military elites who could prevent his liberalization policies.

The bread riots in 1977, provided perhaps the best opportunity to test whether the loyalty of the military was vested to Sadat’s regime or not and whether attempts to professionalize the military were successful. When Sadat called on the army to restore order and suppress the uprising, the military responded in defense of the regime against riots and after the protests were managed, soldiers returned to their military barracks. This reflected that the military was completely controlled by Sadat. The professionalization of military and the shrinking number of military officers within the state decreased the role of the military in politics. For example, while the military in the cabinet comprised approximately 66% during Nasser’s regime, this significantly reduced to about 22.2% military officers during the era of Sadat (Abdalla, 1988: 13).

Sadat's policy confined the military to issues strictly within their domain, thereby, eliminating the chances of opposition within the military that could influence domestic and foreign policies as well challenge the country when it comes to its defense as was experienced during the war with Israel in 1973. The protection of country against foreign

28 enemies was a priority for the military especially during the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula and Suez Chanel which had become endangered by Israel. Sadat had the absolute prerogative to appoint military officers based on his personal criteria and preference. Like Nasser's relation with Amer and Mubarak's relation with Ghazala, Sadat had a strong officer figure in the military, General Saad el Shazly as the Chief of Staff. Shazly emerged as a hero from the 1973 war and was perceived as an ambitious man. The end of 1973 war brought disagreements between Shazly and Sadat and the latter removed Shazly from the army by dispatching him as Egyptian ambassador to the United Kingdom and later Portugal. Thus, Sadat got rid of a strong military figure in the army who opposed Sadat’s policy of achieving peace with Israel, known as Camp David Accords. (Al-Jazeera, 2016)

The final years of Nasser, the position of civil-military relations in Egypt changed, and Sadat used this opportunity to control establish control over seniors of commander and reimpose political control over the military. The budgetary allocation to the military was also significantly reduced. In contrast to the performance of the military during the 1967 war, the 1973 war is analyzed as having improvement in terms of military effectiveness during as well as in civil-military relations. Unlike Nasser, sharing and consultations between the political and military leadership was significantly systematic. However, Sadat retained the absolute power on the final decisions to be undertaken by the military on strategic issues. Those who disagreed with his decisions were fired as was reflected during the initiations of plans he was preparing for the war with Israel. About 100 senior officers and the minister of war General Sadiq were fired (Gawrych, 2000: 11) and after the war, major changes were observed in the military structure. Sadat controlled the appointments unilaterally and selected people who were not enthusiastic to participate in politics.

Egypt under Sadat's presidency brought about several changes within social, economic, and military fields. Especially, the military was considered as having undergone very major changes. Between 1971 and 1980s, out of the six people who ruled the state as prime ministers, four were chosen by civilians and two came from the military ranks. Additionally, out of the 163 ministers, only 32 ministers appointed from their active military posts or were former officers. In general, just about 13% of ministers had military backgrounds while the number of governors who had military background was about 5% during the 1980s (Springborg, 1987: 5).

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The Camp David accords was another significant foreign policy development in Egyptian politics during the Sadat era. It provided U.S. financial and military assistance, and the Egyptian military increased ties both with the U.S. and Israel. On the other hand, this policy caused the emergence of Islamic groups inside the military. That is why Sadat's assassination was related to junior officers who did not support the U.S. alliance and liberalization policy in Egypt.

In conclusion, under Sadat's tenure, the civil-military relations were comparatively stronger than during the Nasser era. People who don't have military backgrounds were appointed different state apparatuses and this enabled the Sadat regime to confine military authority under the control the regime. The depoliticization and professionalization of the army were enhanced and this led to increase in the role of civilians on politics. The military had a limited role and their activities were frequently monitored by the regime in order to prevent any coups within the military. Conversely, Sadat's strategies created successful foreign and domestic policies during his presidency and any divisions with the military were hidden. But the assassination of Sadat proved that some military officers were not elated with his reforms and that there were active and strong desires to also remove him from the presidency. But even more importantly, it showed that even if the military was restricted in its influence and its political power greatly diminished, the military is always in a position to fight back.

2.3. Civil-Military Relations during Mubarak Era

When Sadat was assassinated by Islamist officers on October 6th 1981, his presidency ended, and his vice-president Hosni Mubarak became the new president of Egypt. Like Sadat, the military represented biggest threat to Mubarak who also became concerned about coup attempts against his presidency. After all, Sadat was assassinated by military officers during a military ceremony. His immediate priority therefore became ensuring the continuity of government and management of threats to his presidency.

As such, Mubarak also embarked on developing new strategies and techniques to bring the military under his absolute control. But unlike the strategy adopted by Sadat which exploited manipulation within military ranks, Mubarak did not choose military commanders

30 for appointments or governorships inside state institutions. Rather, he developed a strategy anchored on four important pillars. First, he monitored military officers in order to prevent any formation of political groups that aimed to spread within the military or other threats such as those posed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafist groups, and other opposition groups that desires division within the military. Secondly, confined the influence of ambitious military officers and purged members whom he perceived as potential threats against his tenure was one. For example, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Aber who headed the military during Nasser, became a strong military figure and threatened the Nasser regime. Therefore, Abu Ghazala who was the head of the military, was removed by Mubarak because Abu Ghazala was often called as the second commander of Egypt after Mubarak. He had studied war tactics in Moscow between 1957 to 1961 and served as chief of state before taking over as defense minister. Despite the existence of previously cordial relations between him and Mubarak, he did not gain Mubarak’s trust because of his rising popularity in the military. In this regard, Mubarak offered him the position of vice-president as an attempt to separate him from the military. In the public, Ghazala was considered as a patriot and war hero and his descriptions as being pro-Western countries reflected a man who had aspirations for the presidency (CIA, 1986: 1).

Abu Ghazala had increased the army's prestige and living-standards in many ways. He used his cooperation with West, especially his close ties to the United States that dated from his years as an attaché to improve military training for t-officers, acquire more military equipment such as vehicles that were provided to Egyptian officers, allocation of standard quality weaponry and development of military infrastructure (CIA, 2012: 5-6). The establishment of military factories, construction of housing for military families, selling of goods which were not easily available for ordinary citizens, and selling such goods at subsidized prices to the military, transformed the Egyptian military into a hegemonic institution. Additionally, the enormous size of the Egyptian armed forces, also meant that it became one of the biggest sources of employment in Egypt. Other critical sectors of the society such as military hospitals, services, education systems, agriculture, construction, and industry, became dominated by the military. For example, as a reflection of the extent of military intervention into the civilian industry, General Motors offers a good example. Agreements between foreign arms manufacturers and Egyptian military emerged as a new contributing branch of the economy (Springborg, 1987: 10).

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The third pillar aimed to prevent the military from being a strong agent and as such, he diversified security apparatus with different roles in the society. For example, the role of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) was strengthened to decrease dependency of the regime on the military. The Central Security Force (CSF) was empowered and secret services divided into three institutions which namely the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), the Security Investigations Services (SIS), and the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). All these strategies were planned counter the influence of the military.

The fourth pillar that was introduced was called the 'loyalty allowance' which was given to military officers for ensuring loyalty to Mubarak (Arafat, 2003: 45). However, this caused the military to become more economically independent as former officers who had retired became involved in state agencies and institutions where they continued their respective careers in different sectors.

The military officer appointments under Mubarak's presidency have been given significant scholarly attention. For example, according to a study by Bou Nassif, during Mubarak’s tenure as president, retired military officers occupied over 2,000 posts in local governments. They also held 63 of 156 governorships; even where the governor was not a retired officer, key positions on his staff were often held by former military personnel (Nassif, 2013: 516). Mubarak offered many opportunities to officers who are active or retired. For example, under the Office of the President, the military was represented by officers who had appointments within the Commander of the Republican Guard and the Senior Protocol Officer. Officers who were retired or in active duty also served in the General Intelligence Directorate, four out of 29 in the cabinet, 14 of 27 governors, 11 out of the 13 key leaders in the Ministry of Civil Aviation, 15 of the 19 leaders in the Ministry of Military Production, 9 of the 10 Chairmen of the Arab Organization for Industry, the CEO of the Suez Canal Authority, and all 13 of the key posts of the Seaport Authority in the Ministry of Transportation. Besides, the Egyptian cabinet was consisting of military officers approximately 25 percent and 20 percent of the national bureaucracy (Taylor, 2014: 135).

Unlike his predecessors, Mubarak considered controlling the military and perhaps that is why he transformed the Central Security Forces into a parallel military force and additionally enhanced the role of internal securities such as police. The military was henceforth to provide defense against external threats, while other security services or agencies were to focus on internal threats. That accounts for a division of responsibilities

32 among the security apparatus. While the military was significant and powerful under Mubarak's tenure, significant resources were transferred to the Ministry of Interior in-charge of internal security forces. The Ministry of Interior was divided into thirty-four subcategories and was given autonomy by Mubarak. Conversely, the military's budget was reduced, and the Ministry of Interior's budget was increased with more privileges. For example, number of employees in the MoI started with 124,000 people in 1951, but employees rose to 1.4 million people while its budget allocation was growing at triple rate of the military until 2011. These prerogatives encouraged police forces to be engaged in corruption, bribery and unprofessional behavior against civilians (Kandil, 2012: 335-336). This became one of differences between the military and Mubarak that increased relational tensions (Tuininga, 2013: 93-94).

The loyalty of security forces especially in the MoI and its police agencies belonged to Mubarak rather than Egyptian people. Preserving the regime was a priority for them rather than being a defender of people. And the relations between Mubarak and the members of internal security forces such as Habib al-Adly who was a former head of the Minister of Interior, and Omar Suleiman who was the director of the General Intelligence Directorate, were closer than that with the military. Like the military, the internal security forces gradually became involved in all aspects of the Egyptian society as a strong agent.

However, the Military is most popular than other forces because of its historical background and the strong connection with society. Police forces were unpopular and in the eyes of society, the military is more professional and reliable rather than police forces.

2.3.1 Military Activities during Mubarak Era

Under Mubarak, economic benefits for the military increased. Unlike during the reign of Nasser and Sadat, the number of state-enterprises had increased in the civilian sectors. This was not only experienced in the production of military equipment, but the military engaged in other different sectors where they produced goods and services without being subjected to paying taxes. All these were Mubarak Strategy to ensure officers to loyal to him. Besides, retired officers also had benefited from economic and privileges appointments after they retired. 33

Mubarak's loyalty allowance system which was called the “crony system” at the same time, empowered the military inside the economy, state institutions, and judicial systems. The loyalty of the military and commitment to not intervene in politics, were exchanged with economic privileges given by Mubarak (MacFarlane, 2012: 41-42). It was a kind of corporate system between the military and Mubarak. Thus, a parallel military economy was carried out on behalf of military officers during Mubarak's tenure.

The role of the Egyptian military in the economy consisted the control of several industries involved in the production of military equipment, agriculture, development of national infrastructure, and civilian industries. The Egyptian arms industry produced or assembled pieces of high-quality arms, guns, warships, the US M1A1 Abrams tank, British Lynx helicopters, Aerospatiale Gazelle helicopters, European Alpha Jet aircraft, Chinese F- 7 fighter aircraft, aircraft engines, and military electronics such as radars and night vision devices. Military industries included many factories and companies which employed over 100,000 people and the value of products produced annually in the 1980s was approximately $400 million. Besides, the value of annual exports was $191 million and all profits from these exports were channeled back to the military budget without being taxed (Gotowicki, 1997: 5).

Under the National Service Project Organization (NSPO), projects were established to control civilian sectors by the Ministry of Defense. Civilian industries were transformed into sectors where the military became involved in the production of civilian goods with a variety of products such as washing machines, heaters, clothing, doors, stationery, pharmaceuticals, and microscopes. The Food Security Division of the NSPO was another auspice where the military set out to achieve self-sufficiency in food production and ended up developing a v-broad network of dairy farms, milk processing facilities, cattle feedlots, poultry farms, and fish farms. Reportedly, about 18% of the nation's total food production was produced by the military during the 1980s. National infrastructure also was dominated by the military under different construction projects that included power lines, sewers, bridges, overpasses, roads, schools, and installing and maintaining telephone exchanges (Springborg, 1989: 112).

Not only did the economic activities by the military enhance self-sufficiency and improve productivity in the country, but also, it maintained the military's public image with its economic performance and initiatives in the civilian sectors. For the military, engaging

34 in industrial and infrastructure projects enabled it to present itself as being capable of managing and developing the national economy (Hashim, 2011: 106-128). The Military- Industrial-Business-Commercial Complex (MIBCC) is a military enterprise that has a huge budget amount between US$4 billion to US$5 billion a year (Al-Arabiya 2012, Global Security 2013). In addition, approximately 20% of Egypt's GDP consisted of military- economic activity. The military revered controlling its budget with its annual expenditures approximated to be at 3.4 percent of GDP in 2007, 2.9% in 2008, and 2.2% in 2009 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011: 474). While it is evident that there was a decline during the years, military assistance which was being given by the United State since Camp David Accords in 1978, was provided extra contribution to the military budget of about 1.3 billion dollars annually (Taylor, 2014: 130). The continued economic contribution to the military budget was as a way to keep the military loyal to the Mubarak regime (El- Fegiery, 2012: 1-2).

Military production accounted for 30% of the total production in the country. For example, the National Organization for Military Production with 14 factories, not only produced medical and diagnostic equipment, but also produced computers and cars (Ministry of Defence, 2020). Additionally, the military became involved in producing other consumer electronics, construction materials, furniture, cosmetics, energy exploitation, gas stations, hotels, resorts, tourist cruise operations, farms, and food production (Taylor, 2014: 136).

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3. PROTESTS IN EGYPT: BREAD IS LIFE

This chapter will examine the concept of bread and its presence for Middle East countries when it became political phenomena during uprisings. The bread riots is selected for this study, because several bread riots have appeared in the Middle East and Egypt. Thus, understanding the bread riots that occurred in Egypt provides an important perspective of the uprisings and how the nature of such riots influenced government institutions such as the Egyptian military. Bread riots emerged as a significant for the emergence of revolutions and subsequent overthrow of governments and authoritarian regimes. They leveraged power on governments to drive changes in the political, economic, and social dynamics of the country. Therefore, this chapter strives to illuminate the differences and similarities between all the Egyptian riots and how they influenced the response of the Egyptian military.

For many countries in the Middle East, bread is a symbol of dignity, justice, and life itself (Martínez, 2018: 175). Moreover, it is linked to customs, communal relations of societies, and their health. However, at the same time it has led to revolutions in different countries such as Iran (1942), Egypt (1977), Morocco (1984), Tunisia (1984), Sudan (1985), Algeria (1988), and Jordan (1989). In these countries, bread is a mirror of the society, the people, and it is a basic measure of the circumstances of their living standards as an indicator to decide whether the society is called as poor or rich. Therefore, the cost and access to bread have been considered as very important. As such, when people suffer from economic problems such that their basic demands not are not met or considered by their government, they may engage uprisings. For example, the French revolution (1789) offers an ideal case study on how the power of bread can lead to revolutions that can overcome kings and regimes.

3.1 Bread riots in MENA

In the Middle East, when countries encountered economic problems, generally its effects are reflected on bread prices. Governments tend to bring in austerity measures on

36 foods which is so significant for the Middle East societies. In Iran for example, bread riots of December-1942 were very critical to the history of Iran. Domestic challenges and foreign interference caused an economic depression, that resulted in diminished food supplies and increasing prices of food and other basic commodities. While Iran imported wheat from Azerbaijan, Britain and Soviet Russia controlled the transportation routes. After 200,000 Iranians additionally migrated to Tehran, life became more difficult. Demonstrations and protesters demanded change in food prices. As a result of the rising protests, the army opened fire and 600 people were killed or wounded by the military (McFarland, 1985: 51-65). Weak civil-military relations only served to fuel the protests against elites, foreigners, and an ineffective political regime.

The other bread riot in 1944, emerged when relations between Syria and Lebanon grossly deteriorated because of the disagreements on custom revenues, taxation, and price of imports which had been decided at 20 percent for each country. However, Syria attempted to increase rate thereby creating tensed relations between the two countries. Simultaneously, the prices of bread were increasing thereby creating dissatisfaction among Lebanese who were buying bread for 125 piasters per kilo in Beirut, 80 piasters in Damascus and 50 piasters in Palestine (Chaitani & Seale, 2007: 36). Whereas bread was the staple meal for many families, the daily wage of Lebanese working-class could only afford one meal in day. As such, when the government attempted to reduce the proportion of bread, demonstrations were expected by government officials. Consequently, the government undertook some measures such as increasing imports, implemented policies to curb inflation.

However, persisting problems between Syria and Lebanon caused many obstacles which created more resentments inside two countries and criticism emerged against Syria’s grain policy towards Lebanon. This is because while Syria was selling grain to the United Nations for 20 piasters per kilo, Lebanon had to pay 47 piasters per kilo. Lebanon demanded that grain price be reduced to 34 piasters per kilo and specified it market demand for 110 tons annually. Additionally, some regulations were offered about lower prices on other necessities such as petrol, sugar, tobacco and kerosene. With increasing economic problems, Lebanon’s grain price remained lower than that of global prices for grain. Therefore, “bread, aside from being a nutritional staple, was characterized as a benchmark of Lebanon’s price index” (Chaitani & Seale, 2007: 58). In other words, the price of bread in Lebanon, was disproportionate when compared to global prices of grain and flour.

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The same conditions were experienced in Karak, Maan, and Tafila in Jordan between 1989-1996. The Bread dearth caused anger and unrest amongst people and subsequently transformed into an issue of popular demand within a short period of time. Access to bread and the prices had an economic impact on Jordan because majority of Jordanians work in diaspora in other Arabian countries and as a result, the economy is highly dependent on external revenues in the form of foreign aid from the US and UK. The close relations with Israel caused disagreements between Jordan and the Arab States and these problems were reflected in the decrease in remittances and foreign aid. This is especially so during the Iran- Iraq war, Iran Revolution, and the global changes in oil markets that only caused more economic and political instability. External borrowing of Jordan only led to an increase in debts. (Ryan, 1988: 54-65).

Increasing domestic economic pressures sparked resentment amongst Jordanians when higher unemployment rates emerged as well as implementation of austerity measures such as cutting down on government subsidies. For instance, bread prices jumped from $0.12 to $0.26 per kilogram, and the prices of over 300 other food commodities increased. The economic challenges became heightened further when relations with Gulf states deteriorated when it supported Iraq during the Gulf War. Despite attempts by Jordan to establish cordial bilateral relations in order to increase its economic relations, this did not reflect on the economy as unemployment rates rose to between 20-25 percent. The country was also hit by water shortages, low agricultural and mining output, which are central to the Jordanian economy. These challenges ultimately led to mass protests that were met by brute force from government security forces and dozens of civilians were killed (CIA, 1996: 3).

Generally, riots are identical, but under different circumstances and motivations, they may show up for different reasons and outcomes of uprisings may differ from country to another. For example, the Bahrain population is composed of %70 Shi'ite Muslims, yet, it is the Sunni who have dominated the military and state institutions. The Shias have often alleged the lack of equal educational opportunities, access to housing and suffering from unemployment in comparison to the Sunnis. During the decline of oil prices that created an economic crisis, unrest spread the center of Man-ama and Shia villages. Consequently, approximately 2000 people were arrested, and 20 others were killed by the military (Taggart, 1995: 13).

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In Syria, secterian identities were also central to how the bread riots turne out. Syrians population is divided into approximately 11% Alawite, and 75% Sunni. Alawites are a minority, yet they also have control of majority of the positions within governmental institutions. Over 90% of military officers in Syria are Alawite (Nepstad, 2013: 344). Whereas the transformation and diffusion of riots in the Middle East seem to have negative perceptions, political or economic conflicts sometimes offers opportunities for positive changes. Thus, the Arab Uprisings was an important moment for Middle East countries to experience democratic transitions and this was witnessed in some countries that had positive changes like Egypt and Tunisia.

Social polarization between rich and poor is another factor in accelerating conflicts. In 1985 in Sudan, people decided to protest the growing inequality, injustice, and unemployment. Similarly, in Algeria in 1988, because of high unemployment, the housing crisis, and foreign debt (Sadiki, 2000: 71-95). These revolts in different countries should not be underestimated. How and why uprisings occurred, give answers to questions that contribute to understanding the social structures and values of peoples who live in the Middle East. And political and economic conflicts in a country allow these peoples to be aware of their rights and keep the democratic struggle alive in the region.

3.2 Bread riots in Egypt

Egypt was one of the biggest food importer countries in the world from 1965 to 1988. Only 22 percent of food was produced by Egypt. Egypt imported 32 percent of its sugar, 78 percent of its wheat, 79 percent of its cooking oil, and all of its tea. For example, with 9 million tons of wheat, Egypt was fourth largest importer after Soviet Union, Japan, and China. Any serious increase in bread price, could therefore change into an issue of life and death because bread is as a foundational necessity in the Egyptian diet. The ‘aysh which means bread, refers to ‘life’ in Egyptian language. Therefore, protests are also easily triggered generally by food shortages and increase in food prices in Egypt (Sadowski, 1991: 15).

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Egypt has been several internal crises by civilian uprisings in history, and each of them helping to understand the difference between past uprisings and Arab Uprisings in 2011, as a perspective on how non-intervention of military or intervention military influence on the fate of uprisings. Because, for the first time in Egypt history, the military did not intervene in protests during the Arab Uprisings.

Explaining the central role of bread in the Egyptian society and the larger Middle East region, it will be easy to make a correlation between military behavior and the decision- making process during uprisings in Egypt which has been ruled by presidents who come from military backgrounds with minimum trust in democratic civilian control of armed forces (Karawan, 2011: 41). This dynamic makes Egypt a suitable example for examining military attitude towards uprisings and how the military's reactions were conducted differently in earlier bread riots and the Arab Uprisings in 2011. The uprisings which occurred in Egypt, not only provides understanding of military motivations and their abilities, but also the behavior of people and their demands which are explained by comparing different cases.

Although Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, uprisings initially have been about the issue of bread. Generally, explaining the reasons of riots and the increasing deterioration of the economy could be linked to the increase in external assistance, decrease in the quality of living standards, growth in import, rising debts, high prices, and ungovernable foreign payments which greatly impacted on the crisis (CIA, 2011: 7-8). In the history of Egypt, there were large riots or conflicts between the Egyptians and the British. Later, a socialist system which was introduced by Nasser collapsed causing a new crisis. Some measures were suggested by the U.S. (World Bank), but this advice was rejected by the Egyptian government. During Sadat and Mubarak's tenure, been economic crisis continued leading to serious uprisings. In 1977 bread intifada, 2008 riots and the Arab Uprisings are the most important events in Egypt to caused many difficulties in politics, economy, and social life.

The political effectiveness of uprisings is significant because outcomes bring about new changes for states and societies. In the Arab Uprisings, the bread riots became an economic and political phenomenon (Cooper, 1982: 240). When economic grievances and demands by the people, combined with inflation problems, it became a political issue. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood is a very significant factor in the economy and political

40 life in Egypt. They have a powerful ability to influence government policy. Nonetheless, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the government swung between accommodation and repression. When the government becomes moderate, activities of Muslim Brotherhood became more repression and extremist. If the government acted in a repressive way, then the Muslim Brotherhood chose the more moderate way (Hamid, 2014: 38-60). But in the riots which appeared during Sadat and Mubarak’s term, the government used force to prevent the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood largely because the government was worried about the Palestinian issue which could be easily catalyze unrest by other economic grievances (CIA, 2013: 2-3).

Therefore, economic and political issues are correlated with each other. For example, when the bread issue occurred during economic crisis, it was seen as temporary and insignificant issue. That is why there were minimal expectations that the Arab Uprisings would spread all over North Africa to all over the Middle East and become a global issue. Today, any movements in one corner of the world can significantly influence other parts of the world.

3.2.1 Bread Intifada in 1977

When Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970, he inherited weak economy characterized by low investments, heavy defense spending and low commercial activities. Sectors such as transportation, communications and other services had fallen with the removal government of subsidies. On the other hand, public sector suffered from inadequate competition and huge numbers of employees.

Sadat believed that fundamental changes were needed for Egypt in order to reboot the economic system. The core of economic problem in Egypt was related with poor administrative policies which were implemented during the Nasser regime which depended on an economic system anchored on social contract between state and society. The aim was depoliticization of people under one-man rule but in which the government had responsibility of providing good, services and subsidized prices on basic goods. It was a paternalistic state which was accepted by society. After Nasser’s death, Sadat inherited a

41 poor and economically stagnant country that needed a reevaluation of economic policies. According to Sadat, the main reason for Egypt’s economic problems was that Marxism. He stated that, “We had, with crass stupidity, copied the Soviet pattern of socialism, although we lacked the necessary resources, technical capabilities, and capital (CIA, 2003: 4).

After the 1973 war, Egypt began developing very close relations with the U.S. and massive economic assistance was given to Egypt between 1974 and 1990. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) cumulatively provided $17 billion to Egypt during this period making Egypt the largest AID mission of U.S. to receive assistance more than any other countries in the world. At the same time, World Bank also expanded its facilities and hundreds of millions in spending for new factories, water supply, irrigation, transportation and power plants. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended financial and advised the government on economic policies (Access to Archival Databases, 2014: 2).

Sadat's new economic program became known as the infitah or "open door policy" as an alternative to Nasser’s Arab socialism. It integrated the capitalist system inside Egypt's economic system. When Sadat opened new policies like liberalization of the economy with the open-door policy in 1974, this policy of economic openness was not welcomed by anti- Sadat groups. Sadat’s plan was to reconstruct the economy in the model of the Western countries. Given that without the U.S. aid, the Egyptian economy would be in tatters because Sadat had broken relations with the Soviet Union. The establishing of free economic zones in Egypt would help economic growth through increased productivity and private investments in the capital market. This program was not a rejection of Nasser’s socialist system but rather, it was just a revival of the national economy.

New policies removed many regulations which were imposed on trade and currency exchanges. Egyptian economy unquestionably concluded prosperity through the number of banks increased, hotels and the casino at the Nile Hilton was full of entrepreneurs and free- trade zone in Port Said was revived for importers (Sadowski, 1991: 104). However, the new policies by Sadat failed to meet the expectations of growing the Egyptian national economy. Instead, it led to problems for government such as very large trade deficits, investors who Americans or other nationalities remained leery and the increasing import bills caused financial crisis.

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Importantly, economic liberalization created a new political situation in which the U.S. became part of the Egyptian economy and also influenced the society. With liberalism, the amount of wealth generated in the public was by a small class of individuals also referred to as open-door mafias who had close relations with Sadat and his family. Those people who engaged in trade, were mainly profiteers and considered the detrimental effects of liberalization policies. Because they were accepted as the nouveau riche and caused potential economic problems for private sector. In every area which include students, military, religious groups, professional and intellectual elites, the bureaucracy, public sector, private- sector groups, worker associations, journalists and writers, women’s groups, and large landholders, had dissidents or supporters of the wave of liberalization in Egypt.

However, economic concerns became common among those groups. Inadequate employment opportunities, housing shortages, declining of services in different fields such as health, education, transportation, sewage and water. On the other hand, other groups such as the “open door mafia”, expanded their dominance in Egypt and had capabilities to attempt counter people or groups who did not welcome the liberalization policy (CIA, 2007: 12). In brief, liberalization policies which were pursued by Sadat, could not move the Egyptian economy with a new coherent system to provide fundamental changes in economic growth. Unlike, instability in the country, social disparities and corruption flourished. In particular, corruption was captured at all levels. Sadat’s open-door policy gave privileged groups with deep links to the state, unequal access to imports and this tremendously increased corruption instead of benefitting the larger public. Corruption therefore became so rampant that common people labeled receivers of such privileged access and easy wealth as “Sadat Mafia”, “open door fat cats”, “rabbits” (millionaires) and “elephants” (multimillionaires) (CIA, 2011: 1). For example, businessmen were often willing to pay officials directly or through middlemen to access better services. Corruption ensured the loyalty of elites to regime.

Because of corruption, there was need for the were establishments of some institutions by Mubarak when he became president. Mubarak’s anti-corruption campaign initiated some regulations in country. For example, his administration established the Central Audit Organization, the Tax Evasion Department, and the Administrative Control Organization. These organizations investigated corruption cases inside government and private sector. Several members of Sadat’s cabinet were accused of illegal business deals. His wife, Jehan

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Sadat was accused for being involved in several corruption scandals with charitable organizations. Moreover, other politicians who remained during both Sadat and Mubarak era such as the Prime Minister and NDP Secretary General Fuad Muhi al-Din, parliamentary speaker Sufi Abu Talib, Minister of Defense Muhammad Abd al –Halim Abu Ghazala and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Hasan Ali, were all accused and investigated for illegal profits from the Egyptian-American Transport and Service Cooperation (EATSCO).

Some Egyptian officials believed that corruption prevailed because Sadat’s open-door policy enabled U.S. involvement in Egypt and this played a role in corrupting local middlemen in order to preserve the interests of U.S. corporations. On corruption issues, the U.S.-Egypt relations had frictions because Egyptian officials and businessmen were accused and charged for acquiring illegal profits from U.S. aid programs. Importantly, the EATSCO corruption scandals show that the U.S. pressed on Mubarak to take up affirmative actions on preventing corruption, while on the other hand, some Egyptians believed that the U.S. government did not want Mubarak anti-corruption campaign because it would damage U.S. interests and image of its officials. Nonetheless, U.S. military and economic assistance helped Egypt when it struggled against inflation, and Egyptian leaders appreciated this support (CIA, 2008: 4). Besides, when riots occurred in 1977, aid packages by U.S. was given to Egypt to help rescue Sadat from the crisis (Brownlee, 2012: 11).

Economic difficulties, corruption and unemployment affected citizens who complained about the regime's inability to overcome existing social disparities. A large segment of the population was resenting the administration because of rising prices and inflation. Inflation in 1977 was between 20 to 25 percent and remained at this level for a long time leading to higher import prices and government budget deficits soared (Access to Archival Databases, 2014: 6). Therefore, slogans emerged in crowds such as “You who live in palaces: where’s our breakfast?” or “He wears the latest fashion, while we live ten to a room!” (Sadowski, 1991: 159). There was deep anger about injustice in the society and especially about why Sadat’s friends enjoyed wealth and got richer without working while workers had to pay the price of bad economy.

Therefore, subsidies were perceived as very important in the political economy of Egypt. Sadat's infitah policy created more economic problems and the austerity plans which were introduced by regime only increased tensions among people. In 1977, the outbreak of the bread riots was different from earlier uprisings. This is because it was the first serious

44 outbreak of violence to threaten the Sadat regime especially at a time when economic factors loomed large behind protests. Egypt had a higher consumption of bread than many other countries. For the first time after Nasser, the number of people poured into streets to protest in over 25 years. The regime was challenged in 1977 when Anwar Sadat attempted to cut subsidies which consequently provoked protesters even as the government responded heavily through security agencies to suppress the protests. Not only did university students participate in the protests, but also other people drawn from various social groupings in the Egyptian society also joined riots against the government. Between the 1960s and 1970s, youth activism which consists of leftist students advocating for open political participation gained strong momentum when the state encountered economic and political difficulties. They actively participated in the 1977 bread intifada.

During a speech by Sadat on February 3, 1977 in which he was condemning riots that had occurred two weeks earlier, he initiated several regulations to control riots. To regulate political actions institutions such as jails and the regulations on jail sentencing were strengthened to cater for issues such as demonstrations, strikes or riots. Increasingly, the deteriorating conditions in Egypt endangered Sadat’s tenure and this necessitated him to take some measures to prevent any attempts of a possible coup against him since his relations with the military was also becoming more fragile. Significantly, relations with the West was questioned as the situation became serious and observations were being made that Sadat’s future depended on the United States (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977). Hence, in exchange for patronage and protection from the U.S. Sadat took the risk of normalizing relations with Israel at the protest of all other Arab countries. This enabled him to protect his presidency. As such, despite the existence of ideal opportunities for the military to remove Sadat though a coup, they did not. It is also plausible to argue that the military was also in very weak position to attempt a coup against the regime following several dismissals and changes in the military leadership undertaken by Sadat. Therefore, the failure of the military to defect from the regime can also be attributed to the influence of the U.S. as a powerful actor in Egypt.

The Arab-Israel dispute was a critical point for Sadat’s prestige. One side peace process was in danger because of non-support of Arab world, on the other hand, the IMF reforms and the reduction of some subsidies were caused economic problems which were occurred riot. For the U.S. side, the peace process had to be successful, otherwise Sadat’s position would be in danger (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977). Therefore, the

45 demands for economic aid by Egypt after the 1977 riots was accepted by U.S. and about $190 million was given in order to help Egypt. This is because of the strategic position of Egypt which made Sadat a key ally to American Middle East policy. There were legitimate concerns by the U.S. that a weak Egyptian economy could produce instability in the country and bring a radical regime to power. These concerns influenced U.S to strengthen the position of Sadat and help him to avoid a similar fate to that of Shah in Iran (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977). As result, protests ended when Sadat cancelled new policies such returning the subsidies on price of bread.

3.2.2 2008 Riots

1986 riots must have confirmed President Hosni Mubarak’s cautious attitude towards the security actors in the country. In 1986, police conscripts of the Central Security Forces (CSF) rioted because of a rumor that their mandatory term of service was to be extended from three years to four. According to the conscripts, this kind of extension caused less payment to CSF police conscript than the Army’s conscripts. On the other hand, low wages and living standards also led to complaint by the officers. On February 25, 1986, 22,000 policemen in the CSF took to the streets, attacked and burned buildings such as hotels, nightclubs and other public buildings in Cairo. General Abd al-Rahman al-Faramawy who was head of the CSF chief, informed the rioters the rumors were not true. The president called on the army to control riots. When military restored order, 107 conscripts had been killed and 715 others injured. In a short time, the mutiny was controlled and after an effective response from the military who then retreated back to the barracks after managing the crisis. This crisis is important because the riot was much bigger than the 1977 intifada. The military role in this mutiny was crucial because despite the possibility and opportunity for them to engage in a coup against the regime, they did not get involved (CIA, 2011: 1-2). Mubarak faced several problems during his final years like economic troubles which provoked unrest inside country. Prolonged and high levels of unrest could lead to calls for Mubarak’ resignation and was enough for the army to replace Mubarak before the October election (CIA, 2012: 4-5).

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Furthermore, the growing prestige of the military made Mubarak uneasy. Strong military figures such as Abu Ghazala, was in a position to remove to Mubarak if he desired. Abu Ghazala’s popularity was so high and the success of the military in managing the police riots successfully made him more powerful and popular in the country. Egyptian Field Marshall Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala recounted his opportunity to stage a coup when he was asked by Hosni Mubarak to quell the Central Security Forces mutiny on February 1986. Ghazala said that if he had an eye on the President’s seat, getting it ‘would not have required more than dispatching one officer, no more (even a lieutenant), to the [state] television and radio studios to deliver a communiqué on my behalf. The whole story would have been over in five minutes.’1

However, a report that came out on September 5, 1988 in Israeli Yediot Aharonot about Abu Ghazala’s alleged secret negotiations with North Korea about a missile deal and develop chemical weapons without Pentagon’s permission strengthened Mubarak’s hand against Abu Ghazala. After one year, Abu Ghazala was removed from being the minister of defense position and became presidential aide, a demotion through appointment into a passive position and cutting his links with the armed forces. Besides, he was accused by the Interior Ministry for being involved in some scandals such as the Lucy Artin affair2, bribery and political abuse. He was cleared of these allegations after a court ruling in which all the charges against him were dropped. However, his power was already weakened (Kandil,2014: 217-218). Thus, Mubarak protected his presidency, and got re-elected for a second six-year term in 1987 and reestablished his dominance.

After the CSF conscripts’ riot, Mubarak encountered another riot which was different from the conscript riot in 1986. The main reasons for this riot which will be examined, was also generally based on economic issues. After the 1977 riots, Egypt still had subsidized bread under Mubarak's presidency. And before the 2008 uprising broke out, Egyptian

1 Hassanein Heikal quoted in Kandil, p.143

2 The Lucy Artin Affair was an explosive case of sex, bribery, and political harassment that shook Cairo in April 1993. Abu Gazala was accused by Rose al-Youssef, a weekly magazine close to the government because he helped her win a land dispute in court against her ex- husband. The magazine added that in an effort to permanently tarnish his religious image, the police recorded several open sexual interviews between the two.

47 workers had been complaining about economic problems encountered during work. Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra, which is a big company on textile and clothing, had its workers demanding for bonus payment but which they did not receive because of restriction orders from Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. (El- Mahdi, 2011: 387).

Besides, the amount of bread in shops started disappearing and prices had risen by 48 percent. On the other hand, Mubarak' son who was a businessman, enhanced his dominance on public firms and this led to intensification of strikes and protests (Diehl, 2008: 13). Approximately 24,000 workers began the strike on 7 December 2006. This riot was kind of precursor of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Textile workers conducted strikes in Mahalla for three days and their struggle continued into 2007. While Privatizations and economic cuts were given as the main reasons for the protest, there were also political demands behind the riot. For example, in 2007, textiles workers highlighted their political demands saying: ‘We are challenging the regime.’ and ‘I want the Mubarak regime to come to an end.’ (Beinin, 2009: 449-454).

Bread riots in 2008 occurred in Mahalla and triggered other cities such as Cairo, Nile Delta. It was unprecedented strikes and protests with huge participation of civilians and factory workers. Young activists expanded their power with collective cooperation on social media such as Facebook to call for solidarity. However, the response by the regime was harsh on the protestors and the people who were also protesting on social media were arrested while many other people were killed by police forces during confrontations (Shehata, 2008: 5-6). Meanwhile, this was the largest and most politically motivated strike in which both women and men workers participated in 2007-2008 since World War II. More than a million Egyptians participated this action (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2020).

Workers who were textile factories demanded optimum wage and remedies for food prices. Armed forces attacked protesters with tear gas, bullets and arrested 331 people while hundreds of people were beaten and injured (Bohstedt, 2014: 16-20). However, Mubarak wanted to end this chaos and promised a month's bonus pay, and that healthcare facilities would be provided in towns. In addition, they ordered the military to distribute more bread and remove some tariffs on food imports. After the bread riots, the status quo was the establishment by Mubarak, but this kind of riots always triggered new uprisings until the accomplishment of democracy will revive in the region. The participation of workers was

48 around 1.7 million between 2006 and 2009. And largest and influential uprising was the 2008 riots since the 1977 bread riots.

3.2.3 The Arab Uprisings: Background and Timeline of The Uprising

When mass protests occurred on Cairo streets on January 25, 2011, it subsequently spread to other cities in Egypt. Mubarak lost control of the military when military officers behaved in an ambivalence manner towards the uprising. After forces loyalty to Mubarak such as police forces and the Ministry of Interior and some of the military officials failed to suppress protests, Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took control and for the first time behaved differently in Egyptian history when the military took side of the citizens and announced that they would not fire against people.

When the uprising broke out first time in Tunisia, no one expected it to spread throughout Middle East regions. A young Tunisian vegetable seller fired himself in front of the public in 2010, after the police took his stock. These events not only were resulted in the 'Jasmine Revolution' and overthrow of Bin Ali in Tunisia, after weeks protests appeared in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Syria, Bahrain, and Jordan. For example, Abdou Abdel Hamid, who was a restaurant owner and conducted an act of self-immolation in front of Parliament building because of the dispute with the local government regarding the subsidization of bread (Khalil, 2012: 125-126).

The wave of uprising began to spread among people through the social media. Mass protests diffused in the streets on 25th January on a national holiday which is very symbolic in Egyptian history. Protesters chose this day intentionally and referred to the day as "the Day of Rage." The protesters planned and organized the protests through announcements in social media that drew thousands of people to meet outside of the Ministry of Interior building. According to this account, government officials and security forces established checkpoints around this place.

However, this plan was a strategy of the protesters and their real intention was confusing security forces because the protesters had planned to march to Cairo's center- Tahrir Square. Security forces were unprepared for this plan and the measures taken by the

49 government failed. Huge numbers of protests observed in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Suez in the east, and in the small southern town of Beni Surf. Importantly, people from different sectors or parties organized against the regime to demand their rights which for aa long time, had been abused by the regime. Their demands did not only cover reforms about corruption, social disparities, poverty, justice, but also, they demanded overthrow Mubarak’s regime (Hazen, 2017: 131-132).

Arab Uprisings was an important turning point in Egypt's history. The motivation behind demands such as Mubarak’s resignation and the non-intervention of the military was differented the Arab Uprisings from earlier riots. When people poured into streets to demand for hurriya (political freedom), adala ijtima’iyya (social justice), and karama (dignity), the background of uprisings was mainly related to the Middle East people who are sensitive about bread. Apart from these uprisings, when mass mobilization gathers in streets and were confronted with armed forces, different reactions were observed by the military. The economic motivation was one of the common reasons which forced people to participate in the riots. The state's inability and economic factors can be decisive when people cannot find jobs and confront the unemployment problem in the market. And the unequal distribution of economic growth among people generated social problems. According to statics, 22% of Egypt’s population are categorized as poor and 40% of residents earn $2 in a day. Although the unemployment records in Egypt are 8,94%, the reality is much higher (International Monetary Fund, 2010). And limited subsidies also a negative effect on people and let riots. For Government, overcome economic crises would be difficult when inefficient economic plans did not able to stabilize the current situation. The disparity among people increased and the liberal economy became advantageous to the people who were close to the Mubarak regime and his son Gamal Mubarak.

The resentment increased every single day because of the regime's unfair policies and many people believed that they did not have a voice in political processes. This was manifested especially during the 2010 elections when Mubarak won elections by suppressing opponents with force. This was considered as an attempt by Mubarak to prepare his dynasty for his son, Gamal Mubarak to take over.

When protesters took over the streets on January 25, police forces and the Central Security Forces (CSF) took positions and raised up barricades on streets to deter protesters. Huge numbers of protesters prevented government attempts which aimed to take control of

50 the uprising in a short time. Egyptian security forces and police appeared exhausted when crowds attacked police stations, government, and public buildings. Revolts become bloody when Mubarak's actions did not satisfy people. Soon after, the regime was preparing to deploy the Egyptian military to suppress protests. Tanks and soldiers who took positions in the Cairo streets and showed different actions by staying neutral. The first week of protests, the military was neutral, and pro-Mubarak supporter and security forces whose riding on camels and horses attacked the protesters into Tahrir Square. Conversely, the military did not intervene and calling people to leave to square (Lutterbeck, 2012: 24-30).

After a week, Mubarak failed to deter protesters and mass mobilization had intensified on the streets with demands his presidency's ouster. On 1 February, Mubarak announced that he would not be a candidate for next elections (Al-Jazeera, 2011):

“I have spent enough years of my life in the service of Egypt and its people…I am now absolutely determined to finish my work for the nation in a way that ensures handing over its safe-keeping and banner…preserving its legitimacy and respecting the constitution.”

However, protesters were so determined about removing Mubarak from power. They demanded for Mubarak’s resignation and that of other NDP members. In an attempt to appease the protesters, Mubarak fired for example, Ahmed Ezz who was the NDP Secretary for Organizational Affairs and Omar Suleiman- former Intelligence Chief was appointed as Mubarak's new Vice President. These changes show that Mubarak was trying to fulfill some of the protesters’ demands. Conversely, this did not satisfy people and they insisted on the resignation of Mubarak because majority of Egyptians were very frustrated by the Mubarak's presidency and were increasingly becoming concerned about Egypt’s future (Taylor, 2014: 121). Even though other prerogatives by Vice President Omar Suleiman were announced, and new Prime Minister- Ahmed Shafiq who was the former head of Egypt's Air Force and Minister of Civil Aviation, were appointed by Mubarak, it did not yield much in restoring calmness during the protests.

After several measures and warnings to protesters, Mubarak finally called to the army to maintain the stability and security of Egypt. This was a critical moment that because that is how the military action would be shaped. This is because protesters had turned mass mobilization for the first time in Egyptian modern history as they demanded for a regime change through popular protests also for the first time in over 60s years. The earlier uncertainty of protests put the military in a neutral position as it was not clear which side

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(Mubarak or the protesters) would be beneficial for military in the long-term. At this point, when the critical moment appeared for the military, the decision was taken on behalf of the military can clearly be observed. On February 1, Egyptian military officials announced that they would not use force against protesters and that they would be the side of Egyptians. A released statement highlighted that (The Guardian,2020):

"The presence of the army in the streets is for [the people's] sake and to ensure [the people’s] safety and well-being…the armed forces will not resort to using of force against our great people."

While the military supported the regime for a long time, it was time again to demonstrate to the Egyptian people how the military regards its own people. The military realized that Mubarak's day was numbered and that his rule would fall in a short time as the protesters were gaining advantages. The military decided that the best options would be that which would protect their own interests, and that which when the government became unable to stabilize the protests, the military would be able to intervene and control. In the beginning, military inaction was not anticipated by anyone, especially its reluctance created shock- effect to the regime and even the protesters. While the Military was acting as an arbiter the first days of the protests, it gradually chose the side of protesters because it became clear that only the removal of Mubarak would satisfy the demands of the protestors. For the first time, Mubarak lost military support after thirty years. The key role of the military in Egypt once again showed its significance in domestic and international arena (Sharp, 2012: 8). This was a distinct change by the military side.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) negotiated the issue behind closed doors that addressed people's demands. On February 10th, the first communiqué by the SCAF meeting was announced and stated:

Based on the responsibility of the Armed Forces, and its commitment to protect the people; oversee their interests and security; and, with a view for the safety of the nation and the citizenry; the achievements and properties of the great people of Egypt; and in affirmation and support for the legitimate demands of the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened on, 10th February 2011 to consider new developments and a decision was made to remain in continuous session in order to consider what procedures and

52 measures may be taken to protect the nation, and the achievements and aspirations of the people of Egypt (Crethi Plethi,2020).

When President Mubarak left Cairo, Vice President Suleiman informed the Egyptian people that Mubarak was removed, and the military was in complete control of the country under Field Marshal Tantawi. This was welcomed by the Egyptian people and millions of Egyptians celebrated in the streets.

In conclusion, the Arab Uprisings was not only more severe than the riots of 1977, the 1986 CSF riot, and 2008 riots in terms of duration and size of protesters, but also, differed in the process and outcomes. The economic grievances were a common reason that enabled the protester to challenge the regimes of the grounds of either lack of economic or political rights. The 1977 riots continued for 2 days and generally people complained about poor economy and widespread injustice and therefore, were demanding for reforms. However, military was called to restore order by Sadat and the protests were heavily suppressed. The reason why military opted to side with regime is that the U.S. supported the Sadat regime with economic assistance in order to stabilize the uprising before getting out of control. According to U.S., Sadat’s situation deteriorated, and he needed help while at the same time, the U.S. also did not want to put the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel at risk given the hostility towards Israel was high amongst other Arab countries in the region.

On the other hand, the 1986 CSF riot was different because it was by conscripts who refuted the extension of mandatory service from three to four years and it was a significant riot due to the existence of a high opportunity to remove Mubarak from power especially given the powerful role of Abu Ghazala who was often called the ‘second man’ in the country. However, the political regime of Mubarak damaged his image with several accusations against the state thereby eroding his influence which would have been critical to conduction a successful coup against the regime. The other major riot which appeared during Mubarak presidency, is the 2008 riots and the nature of the riot shares significant similarities to the one that sparked the Arab Uprisings in 2011. These similarities range from the demands to remove Mubarak, economic grievances and the size of protestors involved. However, this riot lasted for less than 3 days and the military did not support the protestors and instead, Mubarak used the military to end the uprising.

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While these three riots could be able to influence defections from the regime, they failed to materialize except for the 2011 Arab Uprisings that successfully ended with Mubarak overthrown from power. In January 2011, when people marched onto the streets calling for ‘bread, freedom, and social justice’, it reflected similarities with the 1977 bread intifada and the 2008 riots that were also epitomized by Egyptians making demands for human rights and freedoms. The Arab Uprisings that continued for 18 days, saw more than one million people occupy the Tahrir Square on the first week of riots. Call for reforms and improved livings standards were underlined by unfied calls for the unconditional resignation of Mubarak from power. Indeed, it was not until the military sided with the protestors thereby forceing Mubarak to resign that protests ended in Egytp.

Whereas these provide strong evidence on how the Egyptian society is sensitive to social and economic issues, they also demonstrate military behavior under the different contexts of riots before the Arab Uprisings. During Sadat era, the loyalty he commanded from the military was manifested when he called on the military to suppress popular protests and restore civilian order. It can therefore be argued that riots during Sadat's presidency were suppressed by the military that defended the interests of the regime instead of Egyptian people. This can also be analyzed from the perspective of weak civil-military relations which enabled the regime to have control over the military particularly in the 1970s. Despite the occurrence of several protests, some of which involved massive mass mobilization, lack of autonomy in the military to make unilateral decisions ensured that the military sided with the regime.

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4. US INFLUENCE ON EGYPTIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS

In Egyptian history, there were many military interventions to suppress uprisings such as the 1977 bread intifada, the 1986 CSF riots in which Mubarak called on the army to restore order domestic stability, and the 2008 riots were dominated by military intervention. However, for the first-time, the military abstained from intervention when the government called upon it to social restore order. There are several narratives given to explain why soldiers refused to forceful or otherwise, remove protesters form Egyptian streets during the Arab Uprisings and on behalf of the regime. There are two plausible arguments to explain this situation. First, that the United States played a role in Egypt and secondly, that the military acted with the main aim of preserving its status quo.

This chapter examines at what points did military behavior change and its engagement with the U.S. and assistance during the long-period of Mubarak’s administration and that of President Obama in the U.S. The Arab Uprisings not only impacted on domestic policy of Egypt but also changed the international foreign policy dynamics in the MENA region. Thus, examining the role of the United States in this study will help to understand the Egypt as an important factor in the Middle East and as a critical American ally.

Military intentions and motivations during the Arab Uprisings will be examined and the factors that influenced the defection of the military from the regime analyzed. Military prerogatives and privileges given by various previous regimes have been mentioned in the previous chapters and the significance of these interests for the military highlighted. Today, the same privileges have a presence on the Egyptian Military. Instead of the focus on economic, political, and social factors which occupied prominent positions in regard to why the military defected, this study differentiates that it was the need to maintain military autonomy against the regime that influenced the military defection in the 2011 Arab Uprisings in Egypt. Also underlining the popular protests, attention will be given to elites and they respond to the regime in the face of mass protests or movements. When elites believe that a leader is fragile, they may attempt a coup to overthrow the remove leader. On the other hand, if they observe that the regime is strong and stable enough to suppress protests, then they may stand firm and support the regime. In 2011, Egyptian military understood Mubarak as being weak.

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4.1 U.S. Foreign Assistance

The United States maintains an aim to advance democratic systems of governance in countries which struggle against the threats communism or other percieved threats to American values since Cold War. At the same time, U.S. has also been accused of supporting of autocratic regimes. Despite the presence of autocracy in Egypt and other Middle East countries, U.S provided significant support to the regimes that were critical to its interests in the region. However, understanding the role of the U.S. in Egyptian authoritarianism is difficult because of failed or incomplete transition into democracy. Instead, what can be said is that bilateral relations between U.S. and Egypt provided a platform that both preserved U.S. interests in the Middle East and retained Egyptian leaders in power for long time.

The United States strengthened incumbents in Egypt in three respects: economic, military assistance, and promotion of democracy. Egypt is one of the most significant actors for the U.S. to preserve its interests and ensure stability in the Middle East region and has been a key influence in the Arab world and regional affairs. For the United States, a strong partnership with Egypt would create peaceful diplomatic relations with the region. In exchange for this strategic partnership, Egypt is a recipient of significant amount of U.S. foreign aid in both economic measure and military assistance. Part of the economic relations also involve commitments on the part of Egypt to undertake economic liberalization reforms so as to increase trade relations the US and Egypt.

The 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was rewarded with military and economic packages by the United States and established stronger diplomatic relations between the two countries. Israel receives $3 billion and Egypt receive $2 billion annually. Besides, Egypt is a second largest country after Israel to take the assistance of US and since 1987, $1.3 billion military aid is given annually by the US to contribute Egyptian Military budget (Snider & Faris, 2011: 50).

Under military aids, between 1976-1979, Egypt bought light weapons, 350 gas grenade launchers, more than 150,000 gas grenades, more than 2,400 handguns and 328,000 rounds of ammo. Moreover, the United States provided Egypt with officer training programs in the United States, provided C-130s and 40 F-5E fighter jets at the request of Sadat to help

56 build an “Africa Corps” patrol in country. The U.S. aid program aimed to keep the Egyptian military loyal and discourage civil disobedience against Sadat after 1977 uprising. America was determined to assist Sadat avoid the fate of Shah who was overthrown during the 1979

Iranian revolution. Events in Iran served as a catalyst for the strengthening of the US-Egypt relations (Brownlee, 2012: 27-29).

The United States and Egypt these ties with co-production of tanks in 1988. The U.S facilitated Egypt military with Excess Defense Articles (EDA) which was part of the US aid program that provided millions of dollars annually from the U.S. Department of Defense. With the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, U.S.-Egypt military relations were planned to continue in a long time. It is imperative to highlight that both Mubarak and the military shared same anti-Soviet views and preferred U.S. equipment and close relations with U.S administration. The United States has a role in diminishing hostile coup against Egyptian leaders. For example, Sadat and Mubarak worried about enemies within army and they tried to develop “coup proof”’ strategies to protect their regimes. Consequently, $1.3 billion military aid given by the U.S. to Egypt helped to keep the army from interfering in the management of government. This relation with the U.S. continued even after Mubarak was removed from presidency.

During Nasser era, the U.S.- Egyptian alliance was enhanced through aids which offered military, economic and food program that also offered certain advantages to the U.S. interests. The Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) program granted access for U.S. grain into Egypt which consequently became the largest consumer of American food aid in the world (Brownlee, 2012: 17).

As economic aid, Egypt received economic assistance in the form of loans and grants by the U.S. to develop infrastructure in sectors such as education and telecommunications during the 1980s. Several other projects under the United States Agency for International Development, (USAID) have continued for years. Economic relations were boosted further by the establishment of the Presidents' Council. These institutions had representatives both from the U.S. and Egypt and became key platforms that contribute to resolution of economic issues for both sides and was consulted independently. The Council consisted of thirty representatives drawn from 15 American and 15 Egyptian companies. Some of the American companies involved included: Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Citibank, General Electric, Pfizer, and Babcock and Wilcox. On the other hand, Egyptian companies were represented

57 by companies such as the Egyptian British Bank, Ezz Group, Fine Foods Group, Nile Clothing Company, and the Orientals Group. These companies had a close relation with elites and the Mubarak regime particularly through the link of Gamal Mubarak (son of President Mubarak) who was part of the Egyptian capitalist elites. is part of the capitalist realm (Momani, 2003: 94).

When government encountered economic problems and resentment from the people, Mubarak feared a repeat of the January 1977 riots which was caused by increasing bread prices. According to U.S. archives, Egypt was seeking the assistance of the U.S. to resolve the economic crisis. In this regard, Mubarak asked for delay in repayment of past military debts, asked for military aid in the form of grants rather than loans and sales on U.S. wheat flour with $1 billion economic aid program (CIA, 2010: 4). These linkages transformed the U.S. into the largest donor of economic aid to Egypt with $7 billion since 1975 for supporting balance of payments and infrastructure projects. In 1980s, Egypt imported 75 percent of its wheat from outside, and 45 percent of wheat came from the United States. U.S. companies such as AMOCO discovered, developed and produced oil. Approximately 75 percent of Egyptian oil was obtained through this firm for internal consumption and exports (CIA, 2007: 8-9).

After the end of Mubarak's tenure, the U.S. offered proposals that covered economic and political transition assistance in Egypt. Obama administration aid program included supporting Egypt's economy with $100 million and the political transition $65 million under Economic Support Funds (ESF). Additionally, to help the Egyptian economic infrastructure and stabilize capital markets, U.S. provided $1 billion. In the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an additional $2 billion was provided to support private investments. These measures by the U.S. not only promoted integration with Egypt, but also enhanced its partnership as an ally in the region in the long term (Huber, 2014: 63).

Through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. has been promoting democracy in the region since the 1990s. This program facilitated the consolidation of fair elections, rule of law and encouraging political participation in the countries that had relations with the U.S. Under the democracy aid program, $20 million was given by the US to Egypt. However, there were challenges to this assistance by Egypt (Sharp, 2012: 15-18). Whereas economic and military assistance was welcomed by Egypt, the strategy to promote democracy by the United States was not, because Mubarak did not

58 tolerance U.S influence on domestic policies such as human rights and reforms for democratic movements. For example, during George W. Bush’s administration, the President told the NDP reformists that, “…we give your country $2 billion a year in order to keep it stable and prevent it from turning into a theocracy.” The efforts by U.S. to spread democracy in Egypt were further highlighted by Bush during a talk show during which he was asked about Egypt and he replied, “…I would say fits and starts; good news and bad news. In other words, there’s been some moments where it looked like Egypt was going to continue to lead the Middle East on the democracy movement, and there’s [sic] been some setbacks.” (Brownlee, 2012: 126). The aim of the United States’ strategic framework in Egypt was to keep peace between Israel and Egypt and also ensure that there is continuity of with Sadat’s regime even as efforts were being made towards improving the democratic space in Egypt. Therefore, the promotion of democracy has come second priority for the US.

That is why some sides within Egypt claimed that the U.S. had the role of The Arab Uprisings in the Middle East, because U.S policy aims to export to U.S norms and values in the Middle East. Mass mobilization and their demands turn on uprisings because the wave of democratization which was introduced by The United States affected Middle East people to robust to their authoritarian regime leaders.

4.2 The US Response to the Arab Uprisings

There are many debates about why the military refused to fire and suppress the protests, and their reluctance to side with the Mubarak regime. One of the reasons given by some sides in the United State army, was the U.S relation with the Egyptian military. Egypt had been a good ally with the U.S for a long time. Especially, after the Camp David peace treaty, the relationship between the two countries became deeper. Not only for partnership in the region, but also domestic partnership was established for several years. That is why, the connection between the two countries was explained that Egyptian army supported street protests because of U.S cooperation with Egypt such as in foreign aid, training of Egyptian officers in the U.S army, and strategic partnership in region.

Importantly, Mubarak had a good ally with America and they bilaterally supported each other. Mubarak kept the peace process between Israel and Palestine with the 1979

59 treaty, supported American policy towards Iran and helped to build the American struggle against al-Qaeda for years. Besides, it joined with the U.S side against Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 and supported U.S policy against the war on terrorism after the 9/11 attack. In brief, the Mubarak regime and the U.S had good alignment.

When Obama became the new president of United States, his speeches at Cairo University in June 2009, reflects a new American policy towards Egypt when he said: “I have come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” Obama's mention of democracy was ranked fourth in the issues he evoked in his speech. Reiterating U.S support for universal values of free speech, rule of law and good governance. Obama nevertheless stressed that “no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other” (Obama, 2009).

Obama and his team (including Samantha Power, Dennis Ross, the Senior Director responsible for the Middle East; Gayle Smith, the Senior Director for Development and Democracy; and Jeremy Weinstein, a political scientist who worked under Gayle) aimed to suggest to authoritarian regimes to respond to their citizens who were demanding for reforms and protect American economic and political interests in a stabile Middle East. On the other hand, experts on Middle East within the U.S government, warned of Obama policy which could lead negative consequences and change the status quo. Thus, they disagreed on encouraging Middle Eastern countries to change (Power, 2019). On the other hand, Robert Gates, Tom Donilon, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton were officials who were concerned about Obama’s policy towards Arab Uprisings in Egypt. Gates suggested an orderly transition, and he argued that Obama should not use word “now” and asking for change like “sooner rather than later” but this was rejected. In addition, White House staffers worried about Obama for being in the wrong side of history. Internal debate continued inside U.S government. The phone calls between Gates and Tantawi highlighted that the military had control and there was no more violence. About Mubarak status, Tantawi told of the possibility of leaving the palace and moving to Sharm el-Sheikh. At the same time, the military gave assurance that people would be protected (Gates, 2014: 512-514).

When protests occurred on 25 January 2011, the demands of the people were that of immediate resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and an end to his 30-year old rule. The

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United States was cautious about how protests were encountered by the Egyptian State. That is why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton statement was kind of supporting Mubarak's regime when she said that: “I assess that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people”. (Clinton, 2011). The similar statement came by Biden, a few days later, on January 27, 2011, Vice-President Biden stated Mubarak is not a dictator, nor was it time for Mubarak to step down from office (PBS Newshour, 2011)

However, when uprisings turned into violence, not only did Egypt get involved in turmoil but also, the U.S. foreign policy shifted in a different way that influenced its interests and values. It was a critical moment that the Obama administration became involved in a difficult position. On one side, the United States didn't want to lose an ally in Mubarak, while on the other hand, they didn't want to stay against democratic movements as a country which always support democracy in the international system. That is why the Obama administration's response to uprising was ambivalent and hesitant.

Privately, President Obama had sympathies to the people who were protesters, and demanded some changes in Egypt when he was telling people around him. And he did not mean it literally but, he told Mcfaul, he would prefer that Wael Ghonim, who was also called “the Google guy”, (a prominent activist who helped to lead the protest movement), to run Egypt. The United States believed that Mubarak did not represent stability anymore in Egypt. Hence, the U.S believed that they had a responsibility to be on right side of history which Obama represented during elections. When instability and chaos increased on Egyptian streets and Mubarak’s intentions were observed as not resigning from the presidency by U.S, Obama decided call Mubarak:

“I want to share my honest assessment about what I think will accomplish your goals, I say this with the greatest respect. I’m extraordinarily proud of my friendship with you. It is my belief that if the transition process drags out for several months and you continue in your office, that the protests will continue. It will make [the situation] harder to control, and I think your role and the role of the Army will be made much more difficult. I think now is the time to present Egypt to its next government. I think now it is time for you to move in a timely fashion in not allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to take advantage of the situation.”

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Mubarak responded to Obama: “You don’t understand the culture of the Egyptian people, Egypt is not Tunisia, these protests will be over soon.” Obama’s last word s to Mubarak was that “Mr. President, I always respect my elders. You’ve been in politics for a very long time. There are moments in history—just because things have been the same way in the past doesn’t mean they will be the same way in the future.” (Rhodes, 2018).

Besides, when demonstrations sparked in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, the United States policy towards these countries differed from each other. For example, U.S. intervened in Libya, on the other hand, approached the crisis in Egypt using a different style. Senior U.S. military officers were however dispensed to counsel Egyptian counterparts on the sidelines during the uprising through close ties between U.S. and Egypt (Perry, 2017).

On the other hand, there were divisions within the White House. Presidential speechwriter Ben Rhodes and Samantha Power who was a defender of human rights, favored the United States support the protesters. However, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates disagreed about abandoning Mubarak (Brownlee, 2012: 144). This caused mixed messages which came out from the U.S. government, and particularly people thought Obama had been uncertain and betrayed an ally because of ambivalence within his government.

This dilemma forced the United States to make difficult decisions to allegedly replace realist interests with values. Besides, the Obama administration also announced that about $1.3 billion of military assistance which given by the United States to Egyptian military would be cut, if armed forces use violence and suppress against on people (Atlas, 2012: 365). Therefore, the United States foreign policy towards Egypt was changed and affected by domestic issues within Egyptian society. The Arab Uprisings did not only change the fate of Egyptian people but also gave a new direction of the United States approach to Egypt and in the Middle East region. Under the Obama administration, a policy which supported Mubarak's tenure gradually shifted, and turned into supporting transition with reforms and stability in Egypt (Fabbrini & Yossef, 2014: 67).

However, there was no evidence that the U.S had a strong influence on the military's response towards uprising. Importantly, the military response took time and was slow. On the other hand, several calls were made between U.S. and Egypt through diplomatic channels such as from the Departments of State and Defense and National Security Council during

62 the uprising. According to Lynch, the White House remained largely silent because in order to protect its image. At the same time, they did not hesitate to tell that Egyptians should choose their leaders and support reforms. Obama suggested to the Egyptian government not avoid reforms and in fact, provide more support for fair elections, ending emergency law, and amend the constitution. All these expectations were expressed as good for future partnership (Lynch, 2011: 8).

While the United States seems to have supported protests and signaled to close relations with military according to military and economic assistance, there are no strong statements to indicate U.S influence on military decision to overthrow Mubarak. Because, after Mubarak, the SCAF and US relations were faced with some challenges which caused disputes between the two countries especially when SCAF controlled state, the crisis between military and U.S occurred with the invasion of Egyptian security forces into American NGOs which advocated for democracy in Egypt. Personnel who were working in these NGOs, were charged with criminal activities, and were not allowed to leave Egypt. This problem was solved by the payment $330,000 for each American personnel to leave Egypt (Reuters, 2012). Instability in Egypt is not welcomed by the U.S because, if mass demonstrations take long, it will put US interests at risk. Therefore, U.S can be said to have been in fine with the military status quo in country, and this makes the Egyptian military and the U.S on the same side.

Despite negotiations, these phone calls and diplomatic channels did not yield much to influence the political crisis even though high-ranking members of the American government such as Secretary of State- Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joseph Biden, and President Barack Obama, all had a speech about the uprising and they had a different comment on either supporting Mubarak or protesters. But there was also a confusing comment made by Frank Wisner who was a special envoy of America to Egypt. After he met with Mubarak, his public speech had an undertone of support to the Mubarak regime (Taylor, 2014: 126). However, when countries have troubles inside their territories or international arena, other countries may give advice or suggestion to solve problems especially, if two countries have diplomatic and economic relations, such that involving the second country to the situation is seen as an acceptable normal. For example, the United States made several phone calls or speeches related to Mubarak and uprising in Egypt. But this does not mean that the United States had a direct influence on the Military's response

63 against the uprising and Mubarak regime because there is no strong evidence linking the U.S army to intervention in Egypt or military assistance to suppress protesters.

During the Arab Uprisings, western influence on the military's decision making in Middle East countries is significant for understanding military motives. Especially, U.S military schools accommodative for many Middle East countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria who send their military officers to take military training. Arguments have been made to the extent that the reason behind Tunisian military refusal to use force against its own citizens during protests was because several military officers were trained in U.S military school. According to this idea, U.S schools and training of the military influenced the military's response to uprisings. Earlier years of Mubarak presidency, Egyptian military personnel between 400 and 500 officers were trained in the U.S. military school (Campbell, 2009: 106-107).

Besides, 811 Egyptians received training in the U.S. in 2010 (Hazen, 2016: 164). However, this was just a generalization and inconclusive in regard to making a correlation with US– Arab military cooperation on uprisings. Besides, many Arab leaders heading authoritarian regimes such as Muammar Gaddafi received education in the west, but they had an anti-U.S. policy. Tunisia's Ben Ali also received training in France and the United States and his policy did not display regard for Western norms. The best example for clarifying this is the case of Egypt. While General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi was attended America's Army War College, he removed Egypt's democratically elected president Mohammad Morsi in a coup in July 2013 and refused to support people demands (Taylor, 2014: 181).

In brief, receiving training in U.S or western schools by Arab militaries did not display that they were influenced during the unrest. Rather, they did not have sympathy with U.S. norms and policies in the Middle East region. Military training was just limited to military equipment, organizing, and advanced military education of officers. This is a kind of transfer of military-technical knowledge among countries and trading military equipment and training programs. Many other countries have a partnership in military training in different countries. The close US- Egypt relations led to an increasing scenario in which the US had a role in the military's response, but this is not clear enough for this kind of claim.

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Conversely, different U.S government agencies such as the Pentagon, White House, National Security Council, and State Department officials, have a different opinion on policymaking at the same events. During the Arab Uprisings, officials who worked within different institutions, had suspicious opinions about Egypt. This is a reminder of a coup by Egyptian officers in 1952 when the CIA had a role within the military training program and the young Egyptian military officers' participation in plotting a coup led by Nasser. Six officers who were involved in a coup to overthrow King Farouk, had received US training, and this generated some speculation about U.S role or encouragement to coups in Egypt from the past to Arab Uprisings (Aslan, 2018: 126).

The US as an external actor is a significant indicator before and after political transition within a country that has military intervention or coups. During the Cold War, the US was a powerful country and coups in different countries were an interest for the U.S who wanted to protect its dominance in regions against the Soviet Union. Military and economic assistance by the U.S may be seen as giving green light to coup or knowledge about any coup possibilities within countries. The strong relationship of the US with some countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan are crucial examples for understanding how militaries became powerful agents and their relations with the US, influenced their domestic policy, and brought structure changes such as enhanced US role on coup possibilities. US strategy which is military to military relations with other countries displayed the importance of armed forces as a political actor.

Thus, Arab Uprisings was a significant event in the Middle East and Egypt, and the reasons behind of military non-intervention, caused several scenarios. The role of the US on military response against uprising stays ambiguous because of insufficient findings. However, Egyptian leaders continued to take advice from America's Chief of the Joint Staff, Admiral Mullen to preserve military effectiveness during this significant period. Noteworthy, military priority was stability, safeguard its status and its interest more than the interests of Western powers (Taylor, 2014: 126). The arguments about the U.S role on the defection of the military and overthrow of Mubarak would be insufficient because the Obama administration and Morsi relations were not good when compared to Mubarak. That is why there is not a comprehensive explanation for the U.S support to end Mubarak's tenure. The US lost its influence on the government to newly elected government and relations

65 turned off worse. Morsi enhanced relations with countries such as Saudi Arabia, China Iran, and Hamas.

In importantly, during 2013 popular mobilization, military defected from Morsi and ousted him. When Morsi was removed by the military in 2013, the United States tried to influence military decision to not remove the president who was elected democratically. Besides, they warned the military that the annual $1.3 billion aid given to Egypt would be cut. Barack Obama offered that Egyptian military “to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible […] and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of President Morsi and his supporters” (Reuters, 2013). However, this shows that the United States had little impact on the Egyptian military on decision- making. When the United States provided Egypt with economic, military assistance, and aims to democracy promotion, it also aims to create good relations with Egypt. The way it protects its interests for long-time in the region depends on strong and permanent connection with the leader of Egypt such as Mubarak. Mubarak was a good partner for the United States and the removal of Mubarak was not welcomed. Because, whatever the U.S. allegedly supported democratic movements in Egypt, he knew the overthrow of Mubarak means that U.S. interests would be in danger.

The new leader of Egypt means the re-establishment diplomatic, economic, and political relations again. And the United State was right to be concerned about ties between the U.S and Egypt after the coup. After removing Mubarak, Egypt has passed through a difficult transition period and the relationship between SCAF and U.S. did not display strong partnership, while at the same time, the democratically elected president Morsi also did not establish a close relation with America. Therefore, it is not difficult to make inference about how the U.S. impacted on the Egyptian military to responds to the regime (Taylor, 2014: 141). Rather, if the United States cared about its interests and protection of policies with Egypt, it would choose to support Mubarak instead of the military because the U.S. was closer to Mubarak than the military.

On media, the resignation of Mubarak was suggested by President Obama's special envoy to Cairo who asked Mubarak to transfer power to the next president through democratic elections (New York Times, 2011). This statement was accepted as a symbol of U.S support to the people's demands and that a peaceful transition would be achieved through democratic elections to the next president of Egypt. However, recently some officers such

66 as Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish, the former commander of the Egyptian navy and the current head of the Suez Canal Authority, stated in the Egyptian newspaper- Al-Masry Al- Youm, that the Egyptian military prevented a potential U.S. military intervention during Arab Uprisings. This show that the U.S- Egyptian military did not have very close ties at the time or coordinated together and had an influence on the military's response (Wahid, 2015: 70- 71).

The important nature of the Arab Uprisings was to gather groups who belonged to different structures within society. People who believed in different ideology and members of the political parties and social class for the first time agreed to remove Mubarak from power. Besides, there were other people who supported an alliance of the United State, while on the other hand, the number of anti-American people was huge. The scenario in which the role of the U.S. was or was not related to these different sides which come up with these beliefs, without evidence, will cannot advance comprehensively the research objective of this study.

In brief, the U.S. aimed to ensure the territorial status quo and political order in Egypt. Friendship with Mubarak for a long time, helped to protect U.S. regional interests because Mubarak could not be able be able to maintain absolute control the country. However, when anti-Mubarak protests reached the peak and threatened to topple the Mubarak regime, the U.S. realized that siding with the regime would be a mistake for American interests and values. The peace process with Israel and Palestine, Iran and counter-terrorism are regarded as significant topics by the US, and Egypt has been a key partner in a long time for the U.S. to maintain the status quo (Pinto, 2012: 116). Therefore, the U.S. role is accepted as neither support to Mubarak nor to the protesters indirectly. His expectations were indirectly non- violent transition in a democratic way. Of course, different statements by U.S. officials were announced, but these cannot be tantamount to claiming that the U.S. influenced Egyptian military response. In brief, the U.S. influence on Egyptian military response is at best ambiguous and uncertain.

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4.3 The Defection of the Egyptian Military during The Arab Uprisings

In Egypt, the military is professional organizations which penetrates almost every sector and protect its interest and its members. After the 1952 Free Officers coup, military was leading role in country, and redistribution of agrarian lands under the reclamation policy was decided by military among successful peasants. After the 1973 war, families of military casualties received free plots. Businessmen and officers shared collaboration and reciprocally made each other rich. With raising of army salaries, building special houses, stores, the military lifestyle was exposed to ordinary people.

Sadat consolidated his authority with patronage which was highly personalistic, exploited state assets and encouraged other government members. Thus, there were many officers exercised into state resources and independent patronage who made themselves rich while in public office. Hence, graft became commonplace in Egypt. For example, many officials show their intention to open bribe. That is why, citizens knew scale of graft of officials through underground communication. Corruption was a problem during Nasser era, but it deteriorated in all sectors of government during Sadat. This patronage and corruption reached the highest level of state such that even Sadat’s wife- Jihan, his brothers and sons became part of it. Therefore, people called Sadat as a “new Pharaoh” who made corruption.

In 1980s, Egypt had a different the political-economic system which was called “crony capitalism”. Businessmen and bureaucrats were close allies and mutually benefited from state-intervention in the economy system to make each other rich and powerful. And when food security became primary problems for government, opposition parties criticized the government for the failed progress in food production and food security. The officer corps resisted the idea of using its forces against Ethiopia when it threatened Egyptian water supplies, because of developing plans to build mega-dams on the Nile. At the same time, the military extended its revenue on its economic arm, the National Service Projects Organization and Food Security Division. This helped to military self-sufficient in food (Sadowski, 1991: 121-122).

The relation with state and unique characteristics of the military such as discipline, hierarchy, and self-sufficiency make it a powerful organization. And, the military always wants to protect its prosperity when any attempts endanger its interest. In understanding the why military defected from Mubarak's regime during the Arab Uprisings, the most

68 significant narrative is that it wanted to protect the status quo and military interests was a priority instead of Mubarak. That is why, the removal of Mubarak was easier in exchange for the survival of the military regime which was more important than Mubarak. Note that, military having developed a strong autonomy and economic independence, it gradually developed a political interest in the country (Kandil, 2014: 182-184).

Military as most respected institutions tried to maintain its position to stay as neutral. Instead of taking sides with the regime or the street, according to John Abizaid, retired General and former Commander of CENTCOM, the "Army took the side of the Army. The Army put its interests over those of the state. The Army views itself as the state." (Taylor, 2014: 127). The military was enjoyed privileged and restraints from Mubarak were little. In contrast, the status quo was intensely desired to perceive by military (Lutterbeck, 2013: 29- 30). Apart from this point, the military defection was not related to U.S. influence, its behavior was shaped throughout the uprisings and the military was reluctant about seeing changes in the status quo.

The Military's ambiguity toward the 2011 Arab Uprisings is interlinked with the main factor which is that the military aimed to status quo for the preservation of military autonomy. And Military was stronger than the Nasser era, even coup-proofing strategies by Mubarak did not prevent militarily politicized. During Arab Uprisings, the military showed that its survival does not belong to Mubarak, with or without Mubarak, the military has capacity to respond to the uprisings and stay side with the Egyptian People. This demonstrated that the military did not completely disengage with politics (MacFarlane, 2012: 41). Militaries behave was shaped by a belief in which the person who the head of the regime was temporary, they remove with a new one. And militaries and regimes are permanent in Egypt. After thirty years of Mubarak as president was observed as fragile. Under these circumstances, there is no need to be the side with a regime that lost its power and desire to overthrow by mass mobilization.

Hence, Gamal Mubarak built his image as Egypt’s youth leader when he and his close friends established the Future Generation Foundation (FGF) which is a civil association. Soon Mubarak appointed his son the NDP’s general secretariat, as head of the Youth and Development Committee in 2000. Then, He created a new political body which is called the Policies Committee (PC) within the NDP. This was a new step for creation of capitalists and neoliberal intellectuals. Gamal became a symbol of nepotism and economic liberalization

69 without political liberalization. That is why people called his committee as “Gamal’s cabinet”, but later it was converted “businessmen cabinet”. In 2006, he became NDP assistant secretary-general. On the other hand, business elites pushed ideas about Gamal’s presidency. For example, in 2005 and 2007 some constitutional amendments placed for presidential elections. And these only signaled Gamal as suitable candidate. The campaigns rise behalf of Gamal, even his name mentioned during NDP conference in 2010 as “Gamal, the leader of the modernization revolution” (Kandil, 2014: 252-253).

Also, last decades of the regime were observed as regressive and manipulation of elections, for example, the 2010 elections were dominated by National Democratic Party (NDP) Which was ruled by Mubarak, against opposition parties. Gamal Hussain, son of Mubarak, became a strong figure within politics and economic fields. Gamal Mubarak was a significant person in liberal elites. The growing of influential power within the capitalist system and regime had caused resentment among military officers and Egyptian people. Even, some military officers claimed that most of the power transfer his son Gamal when he had relations with NDP's young business members. His activities and power would not be ignored by the military, he was accepted as a strong threat as next Egypt president without a military background (Arafat, 2017: 53). For example, when Defense Minister Hussein Tantawi stated Mubarak about an “unpopular figure” for presidency would not be rational decision and force people to accept this decision by military. However, this was ignored. In addition, Francis Ricciardone who was the U.S. ambassador told what he heard from one of cronies about Tantawi had concerns about Gamal’s candidacy. Adding to, Mubarak could dismiss the defense minister because Tantawi is not stronger than Abu-Ghazala (Kandil, 2014: 227). According to Samantha Power, Mubarak planned to replace presidency to his son Gamal Mubarak. This was not welcome by many Egyptians. And the US also had not pushed Egypt for fair elections which could jeopardize the Israel-Egypt peace and cooperation with the United States in terms of counterterrorism (Power, 2019).

Thus, military's prerogatives which exercised control over U.S military assistance, budget, military-owned business and access to resources within country. So, any changes by outside accepted like a threat to status quo which is considered by military

Conversely, according to the US army record, Tantawi was not a person who desire to change Egypt and exciting political aspirations. He was called the apolitical person and his loyalty belongs to Mubarak’s regime (Taylor, 2014: 135). That is why speculations about

70 military attempted coup during The Arab Uprisings is not supported by any shreds of evidence which signal military intervention and desire to remove Mubarak. For the military, playing middle ground was a good option until the calculations result in the uprising. Thus, the ambiguous role of the military continued until realized which side provided military interest as a much gain or little to lose. The numbers of people during uprisings may influence on military's decision because perception about protesters' victory was estimated by the military. And military also knew that using force against mass protesters would be difficult. However, this not means the military could not suppress it. Rather, the Egyptian military was powerful more than the past and had the capacity to overcome The Arab Uprisings like it did during 2008 riots. Therefore, remove one person as Mubarak instead of millions of people was the best option for the protection status quo. Also, the Egyptian military knew that If military defected regime and control over the situation, it will welcome by protesters and embraced the military.

Size of uprisings and prediction about Mubarak's ouster are just opportunities for the military to take decisions not behalf of Mubarak. Notwithstanding, the military did not defect the incumbent regime because of the large-protester or non-violent character of the uprising. Mainly, it was about calculations of military interests and obtain to best profits from uprising under the status quo.

The important implications of military aim that as protection of status quo and own interest that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been continuing to protect its priority over president Morsi who was elected by the democratic way. And the revolution was not overthrown regime, just its leader. Under the SCAF, democratic transition and people's demands were encountered obstacles. The hope for democracy shifting to the region with The Arab Uprisings seems to follow various dramatic events. The unprecedented role of The SCAF in the transition period creates a paradoxical power vacuum within Egypt.

According to Robert Springborg: "Protecting its businesses from scrutiny and accountability is a red line the military will draw. And that means there can be no meaningful civilian oversight”. This displays that the military considers only its privileges and interests. And the only way to protect all these was to maintain the status quo during Arab Uprisings behalf of military (Kurtzer & Svenstrup, 2012: 45). The studies which was on Third World coups, indicate that military which intervene government justify their intervention with government corruption or economic mismanagement. Thus, militaries attempt to overthrow

71 their regime generally occur when these kinds of factors are combined and if a government threat to military interests, internal structure of military apparatuses, resources and their operations may be the catalysts for military action.

Militaries in different countries are not regardless of or reckless institutions within the country. Conversely, they have own mechanism whose has rational, thinking and observing on events and able to take decision-making (Subaşı, 2004: 17). The Egyptian military has a long history and its institutionalization begun during Gamal Nasser. And relation with their regime and society provide strong and popular images. This help to military self-sufficiency and self-confidence against other state agents. They have rationality which provides how their reaction will be shaped against wars, uprisings, or conflicts. When uprising raised in 2011, their reactions were taken time. This shows that the military as an independent body calculated the situation and decided on how to behave.

The Arab Uprisings only where the Egyptian military defected authoritarian regime leader and succeeded in mass uprisings. And the first time, observed that military-protests alliances against their leader. In the beginning, military behavior was linked with introducing democratic movements or support to reforms that demand by people. Even, this was called "democratic coups" (Kuehn, 2017: 783-800). However, this kind of perspective does not include Egypt's case. The ideas which suggestion by some scholars as coups against authoritarian regimes provide an opportunity for democratic movements. In Egypt cases removal of Mubarak during The Arab Uprisings and coup against Morsi’s presidency, the best two examples show that the military aims not to support democracy or demand of people. It is just about the protection of self-supremacy and status quo which provide to the protection of military privileges (Thyne & Powell, 2016: 192-213).

Notwithstanding that the theory about endgame coups which is defined as a military intervention against authoritarian regimes attempting to consolidated power, is another scenario about how military intentions were shaped during the uprisings. After a long time, the military sidelined from Hosni Mubarak, and aimed to preserve the military's control during the transition process and over the state. Besides, endgame coups are a kind of consolidated regimes that are also trying to obstruct a regime change. They are also referred to as conservative rollback coups that are supported by powerful elite officers during coups. In fact, these kinds of coups proceed with the existing political order or establish new authoritarian regimes under different leaders instead of supporting democracy like has been

72 the case with Egypt. In 2011, revolutionary movements in Egypt did not create democratic transition nor implement reforms. It instead preserved the political status quo and reproduced autocracy (Koehler & Albrecht, 2019: 12-15)

Table 1. Variables for military defection or defense against their regime during uprisings in Egypt

Variables

Riots in Economic Political International Level of Level of military Defect or Egypt popular institutionalization Defense? privileges privileges Support for mobilization protestors

1977 Yes Yes No High High Defense Bread Intifada

2008 riot Yes Yes No Higher Higher Defense

2011 Yes Yes Yes Highest Highest Defect The Arab uprising

This table shows that the variables which influence military defections, are relate with three major riots of 1977 bread intifada, 2008 riots and the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Each variable has a different outcome and feature on these riots. Moreover, the common variables do not conclude with the same result of defection or defense. Therefore, these variables illustrate that the Arab Uprisings was different from other riots with different not only in regard to the underlying reasons, but also the outcome. Thus, this study focuses on the different variables on military response in 2011. According to table, economic and political privileges were similar during the three uprisings. As such, these cannot adequately be categorized as the main reason for the military for defection. In regard to the increase in the levels of mass mobilization and military institutionalization, it can be said that they had significant effects on all three uprising, but it is only in the Arab Uprisings that concluded in defection. On the other hand, international support was different during the Arab Uprisings. As such, this study examined this variable in the context of the role of the U.S. as an external

73 actor in Egypt. However, as earlier highlighted, the role of the U.S. in understanding the response of the military to the uprising was very weak. Therefore, this study argues that the response of the military to defect from the regime and support the protestors was mainly driven by the aim of protecting its own interest and that of the status quo

4.4 The Civil-Military Relations: Post-Mubarak Period

The dominance of the military continued after Mubarak's overthrow on February 11, 2011. In a short period, there were two different military actions observed during Mubarak and Morsi's tenure. While military sided with protesters and overthrew Mubarak during Arab Uprisings, the military suppressed mass protestors who demanded the resignation of Morsi.

After Mubarak, SCAF held onto executive power in order to oversee transition of power and parliamentary elections. A constitutional referendum was held after Mohamed Morsi was elected as president on June 30, 2012. After the elections, President Morsi took new measures adopted strategies that could ensure he gained the loyalty of the security agencies in the country. Foremostly, to cement his influence in government, he dismissed a large number of officials within armed forces such as Chief of Military Intelligence, head of SCAF (Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi), Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (General Sami Anan), Presidential guards, Minister of Interior. As a replacement, General Abdel Fatah Al- Sisi was appointed as the new Defense Minister. In the beginning, there were no significant resentments against Morsi's presidency within armed forces. Even the SCAF supported and sided with Morsi when he took a key decision-making to cancel the June 17th Constitutional Declaration in 2012.

Cooperation between civil-military relations during Morsi's tenure was going well in the short term because of the economic privileges given by Morsi to ensure that soldiers remained within the military barracks and abstained from political interference. Additionally, the 2012 constitution also reflected protection of military interests in comparison to the 1971 constitutions. The National Defense Council was represented more by the military and also managed the military budget. However, Morsi did not have the total loyalty of the Ministry of Interior and other intelligence ministries that opposition groups exploited to create further polarization within the government agencies. Increasingly, Morsi 74 was viewed as being dictatorial and his policies were not approved by the military especially in regard to his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood in military and cabinet. Morsi had appointed many Muslim Brotherhood members in cabinet and as governors. Morsi took unilateral decisions on foreign policy without consultations with the military council when he established ties with Iran, his policy on Syria, and growing disputes with Ethiopia on regarding the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile (Taylor, 2014: 139-140).

On the day of anniversary of the revolution (January 25th), many anti-Morsi demonstrators gathered at Tahrir Square and the military gave warning to Morsi to end the uprising and also gave other demands to opposition groups that wanted to remove Morsi from power. General Sisi who was the Minister of Defense at the time, gave a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi to address the problems on July 1, 2013. However, Morsi declared himself as the legitimate president of Egypt on national television thereby sparking more protests that ultimately led to the arrest of Morsi by SCAF. In his place, Adly Mansour was appointed interim president until Abdel Fatah Al Sisi was elected as a new president in May 2014. When Mansour was appointed as interim president, the dominance of the military enhanced more than the past. The 2014 Constitution reflects significant military prerogatives and its dominance on decision-making processes such as in budgetary and policy issues. The Ministry of Defense became independent from the presidency and appointments made only from military officers. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces and the National Defense Council were granted with significant privileges and enhanced as the primary authority including controlling and protecting military autonomy in economic enterprises. The SCAF re-emerged as a strong and independence institution after Morsi (Brooks, 2015: 20-25).

The Arab Uprisings was important because it gave the military opportunity to consolidate its position as the main figure in Egypt when the military anticipated that the Mubarak regime was not powerful enough to overcome the protests (Varol, 2012: 74). Although both Tunisia and Egypt are similar in the sense that the respective leaders were removed, the Tunisian military sided with protestors to remove Zein Ben Ali, while it took time for the Egyptian military to gradually decided to support the protesters. For Egypt, the military gave on Mubarak to save the bigger network of his regime and to preserve Mubarakism. Thus, Egypt presented a more complex case than Tunisia and other Middle East countries. For the Egyptian military, a primary objective was to ensure that in the event

75 of a regime change, their interests will not be threatened. It was more important to protect the status quo that preserves it military privileges and interests within the country.

The scenario about strong links between the military and Egyptians influenced the military behavior to support protesters. The Egyptian military was highly institutionalized and professionalized, and this sustained strong ties with the society. It was common that at minimum, each family had soldiers within the military. In the eyes of people, the military is well-respected as a defender and guardian of the society (Elhadad, 2012: 38-39). However, the military's defection was not related to these strong links with society or supporting the demands of the people. Previous riots in 1977 or 2008 were also intense and huge number of people poured into the streets and yet the military did not support the protestors. It can therefore be argued that the military supported protesters during the Arab Uprisings in 2011 because it wanted to preserve the status quo behalf of the military. And when the military was neutral towards both sides, it was clear that the military had confidence, ‘...the army is not only the most powerful institution left in Egypt but also the one that will determine whether the revolution…ends violently’ (Thompson, 2011: 24-25). This means that the side which will be supported by the military will ultimately win the contest. Therefore, the military will always choose the side which contributes more to its interests and that which can safeguard its supremacy.

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5. CONCLUSION

The Arab Uprisings was a transformative event for the Middle East countries when people poured into streets to demand for reforms or change in leadership. In the process of these popular protests, the role and attitude of the military became an important factor given that unlike in previous protests, the military defected from defending the regime and offered support to the protestors. In some countries such as Egypt and Tunisia, the civil disobedience concluded successfully partly because of the shift in power dynamics when the military defected regime, while in Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, the popular protests cannot be concluded as having been successful given that the military stuck with their leaders.

For the Egyptian people, the mass protests were not only the first time that they were making demands for economic and political rights, venting their grievances against corruption, and rebuffing government’s disregard for human rights and freedoms like in other countries, but also, they were demanding the removal for their leaders who have governed Egypt for the last three-year decades. This study has identified that among the key reasons for the military defection in support for the public struggle against bad governance include: military institutionalization; external actors; military economic and political privileges; and, mass mobilization.

Military institutionalization is correlated with Egyptian military by scholars because of the processes of institutionalizing the military which begun with Nasser continued until the era of Mubarak. According to scholars, if military is institutionalized, they may give different responses during uprising. Because, they are not patrimonial character which completely loyal regime whatever happens. That is why, military responses against regime is considered by scholar as role of military institutionalization. They accepted as reason why Egyptian military defected regime. However, Egyptian military is always institutionalized in 1977 Bread intifada, 2008 Riot and 2011 the Arab Uprisings. There is only three years between 2008 and 2011 uprising. Thus, military institutionalization is not a reason for defection. On the other hand, as Barany notes that Institutionalization of army is not means that military defect regime. For example; Iran (1979), Burma (1988), the 1989 uprisings in China, and 2011 the Arab Uprisings in Egypt, militaries which are institutionalized, showed different responses against during uprisings as defect or defend their regime.

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Secondly, external actors are given by literature as international support. If international support is siding with protestors, then military will most likely offer support to the side of the popular public movement and defect from the regime because they do not want lose international support or become exposed to any sanctions. In the Egyptian case, the U.S. is considered as an external actor because of the close relations between the two countries. This study has clearly shown why and how the US has been a significant actor in Egypt and Middle East region. How, the several ambiguous and uncertain announcements by U.S. officials do not allow to for a strong conclusion regarding the influence of the U.S. on Egyptian military response as defection during uprising. Insufficient evidence can however advance the argument that the influence of the US as an external actor on Egyptian military decisions regarding the uprising was weak.

Thirdly, economic and political privileges are deeply explained. Egyptian military have always enjoyed prerogatives and privileges in country until and these are crucial for military. Thus, declining economic and political privileges for the military by the regime is given a reason by some scholars for defection. Some of these privileges for the Egyptian military have been in existence since the eras of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak era and have only expanded with time until 2011. As a result, the Egyptian military cannot be said to have had any problems with Mubarak in regard to their economic interests. Therefore, it cannot be said that only economic and political influenced the Egyptian military to defect. Lastly, the huge participation of people in the Arab Uprisings, highlights and draws attention to the level of mass mobilization. When number of protestors is high, it is highly likely that they might register success in a political revolution that removes a regime from power. Some scholars believe that mass mobilization in Egypt changed military decision to defect because the military was unable control of demonstrators who were causing chaos across the country and showed determination for achieving their aim. However, 2008 riots also had huge participation when compared the Arab Uprisings in 2011 having been estimated to attract more than one million protestors. As such, this cannot be explored in singularity as cause for the military defection, but rather as one of the underlying factors.

I try to explore the events of the 1977 bread intifada, 2008 riots and the Arab Uprisings in 2011 which form the basis of this thesis, and compare the reaction of the military during the three periods with the main aim of understanding why the military defected from protecting the regime in 2011, while it defended the regime during the 1977 Bread intifada

78 and 2008 riot. According to the findings of this study, the main reason of defection of military is that military aims to protect the status quo who serve while also providing a guarantee of continued military autonomy in the country. The Egyptian military as strong and rational institutions, aimed to control uprisings on behalf of various military interests that have expanded significantly during Nasser’s to Mubarak’s presidencies. Even though during critical times in Egypt such as war and the uprisings, in which the influence of the military declined while that of political leaders increased, the military still maintained significant presence in the affairs of the state.

Military defection is related with protection of economic, political privileges and supremacy battles of the military as a whole. For the military, the elongation of the uprising, could thrust the country into further chaos thus threatening the instability of the country both within and outside its territorial borders. Additionally, given that Mubarak had lost his political influence and power in his decade, failure to manage the uprising would only reflect further on the weakness of the whole regime as fragile. The military also constructed that Gamal Mubarak (Mubarak son) as a threat especially after rumors spread throughout the country alleging that Gamal would succeed his father as the next president. As the uprisings continued for days without other powerful executive forces or leaders to control the protests except the military, the conditions presented an ideal opportunity for the military to play a major role in deciding the fate of Egypt. Instead of supporting the fragile leadership of Mubarak, supporting the protestors offered a quicker solution to end chaos which would be beneficial to both country and military. But even more significantly, is that the military could be able to reestablish and boost its image as protector of the people, show its supremacy, and protect its interests once more.

To understanding why the military overthrew President Mubarak in 2011 and support people with their demands during the uprisings, should be correlated and analyzed with Morsi’s overthrow by the military in July 2013. Even though this study has not focused on the 2013 case in which Egyptian military defected from Morsi and ousted him, it also clearly shows that indeed there is a pattern that leans towards the main argument of this thesis that the Egyptian military’s response to uprisings are anchored on the fundamental aim to protect its interests. The current civil-military relations in Egypt is completely different under the current regime of Al-Sisi. The Egyptian military had low interests in overturning the status quo in 2011. On the other hand, it appeared that the military had high interests to desire

79 changes in politics in 2013. Thus, these two events in Egypt perhaps give the best examples that support the argument that military defection was related to military interests. After the military defection, people expected that Egypt will be govern by a democratically elected president. However, when the SCAF took control from Mubarak, it seemed to have consolidated the transition period that was perceived to be peaceful because the military was seen as the hero in the eyes of people. Thus, the Arab Uprisings was hailed as successful democratic movements at the beginning. However, the SCAF struggled and delayed elections in order to enhance its role in government for almost one year to take control of the state. When Morsi was elected as president, the military continued with its traditional demand for more privileges and protection of its supremacy in government. The challenge of ensuring this by the Morsi regime created within a short time of his presidency, thereby, ultimately leading to his overthrow from power by the military.

This contradictory behavior causes confusion about the military's actual intention. Within a span of a short time, the military displayed different behaviors and responses to the regime. As such it is plausible to argue that the military is primarily preoccupied with the needs or demands of the popular majority in the country especially during protests or uprisings. The most significant observation is that the military has been regarded as more privileged institution with enormous economic outcomes through its numerous participations in the different sectors of the society as a key authority in Egypt. The military has strived to maintain its capacity and autonomy to make key decisions when necessary partly because of the realization that political leaders do not last while the military will always remain as a permanent entity regardless of military decisions. The decision not to back Mubarak can therefore be seen as a strategic decision by the military to sacrifice the Mubarak in order to protect the larger system of the regime. In the event of another outbreak of uprisings in future, it is very likely the continued influence of the Egyptian society in all layers of the society will remain a dominant feature. As such, should there be a new leader or head of state in Egypt who will not have close relations with the military, it is highly possible that frictional ties will exist between the political class and the military. In other words, the position of Egyptian leaders will depend on the goodwill of the military who still have the desire and drive to maintain and protect their military privileges.

In conclusion, this study has explored how the Egyptian military responded to the uprisings and military defection from supporting Mubarak's regime in 2011. For future

80 reference, analyzing civil-military relations in MENA, especially in Egypt, would be a useful perspective for researchers who aims to study the role of armed forces during uprisings in other countries. Particularly, this thesis would help understand Egyptian people and military relations under different circumstances which caused uprisings and overthrow regimes in during the different phases of leadership and how the Egyptian military has managed to preserve its status or position as a ley actor in the social, economic and political sectors of the country.

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