DOCSLIB.ORG

Lezione Ottava La Terza Guerra

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Lezione Ottava La Terza Guerra LEZIONE OTTAVA LA TERZA GUERRA La politica di Nasser ●Gennaio 1964 ●Summit della Lega Araba al Cairo sulla questione delle acque. Le acque del Giordano ●Piano di Israele: dirottare le acque per irrigare il deserto del Negev. ●Risposts araba: progetto di dirottare le acque vero l'affluente Yarmouk Il Giordano Il Giordano Il Giordano nel Mar Morto Verso l'unità araba ●Settembre 1964 ●Summit della Lega ad Alessandria: ●1. Comando militare unificato ●2. Organizzazione per la Liberazione della Palestina (OLP) ●Summit di Casablanca: ●Armata di Liberazione della Palestina ●La guerra a Israele va preparata bene. Opposizione a Nasser ●Tra le organizzazioni armate palestinesi emerse Al Fatah (La Conquista) sotto la guida di Yasser Arafat. ●Conflitto con Nasser sulla unità araba. ●Il Partito Ba'ath siriano in collisione con le monarchie e con Nasser (il prestito inglese) ●Siamo militarmente pronti alla guerra. Dopo l'Indipendenza ●La Siria conquistò l'indipendenza dalla Francia ●Il 31 dicembre 1946. ●Situazione del paese: ●Partito Nazionale (notabili di Damasco) ●Partito del Popolo (notabili di Aleppo) L'esercito ●Era stato creato dai francesi con le Troupes Spéciales ●Gli ufficiali reclutati soprattutto tra gli alawiti ●Setta religiosa scismatica degli shiiti ●Comprendeva il 10% della popolazione Colpi di stato ●La lotta politica in Siria dal 1946 al 1958: ●Tentativi di creare un regime parlamentare, regolarmente interrotti da colpi militari (5 in 10 anni) ●Infine si afferma il Partito B'ath. Il Partito Ba'ath ●Aprile 1947 ●Michel Aflak (crtistiano) ●Salah al-Bitar (sunnita) ●Zaki al-Arsuzi (ateo) Ideologia ●1. Rinascita del mondo arabo ●2. Unità della nazione araba ●3. Modernizzazione ●4. Anti Imperialismo ●5. Contro Israele In Iraq ●Luglio 1958 ●Il Ba'ath iracheno, guidato da Abdul Kassem rovescia la monarchia hashemita. ● In Siria ●Dicembre 1958 ●Il Partito Ba'ath, dopo aver vnto le elezioni in Siria, decide l'annessione all'Egitto. ●Si costituisce un nuovo stato: ●Repubblica Araba Unita (1958-1961) ●Ma Nasser non tollera altri partiti e scioglie il Ba'ath. Inaugurazione: Nasser e Al Bizli La Repubblica Araba Unita ●Una strana nazione Ritorno del Ba'ath ●Settembre 1961 ●Un gruppo di ufficiali siriani aderenti al Ba'ath compie un colpo di stato e pone fine alla UAR. ●Il Ba'ath siriano è però un piccolo partito (solo 2500 iscritti e per reggersi ha bisogno dell'esercito. ●La leadership ba'athista si scinde in un'ala civile (progressista) e un'ala militare (nazionalista) La vittoria dei militari ●Febbraio 1966 ●La fazione militare guidata da Salah Jadid e Hafez al-Assad sconfigge quella civile, la vecchia guardia guidata da Michel Aflaq. Il governo Jadid ●Alleanza con la Russia ●Contro monarchie arabe ●Contro Israele ●Protezione Al Fatah Le armi russe ●Dal 1955 in poi la Russia rifornì gli stati arabi ●Con le armi più moderne: ●1. Carri armati T-54 e T-55. ●2. Caccia Mig 19 e Mig 21 ●3. Bombardieri leggeri IL-28 ●4. Bombarideri a medio raggio TU-16 Le armi egiziane ●1200 carri armati dei quali 450 erano TU-54. Il T-54 sovietico I bombardieri TU-16 I Mig 19 I Mig 21 I mirage francesi I mystere Il Patton M 48 L'inizio della crisi ●17 maggio 1967 ●Nasser ordina il ritiro delle truppe Onu di interposizione. ●22 maggio ●L'Egitto vieta il passaggio di naviisraeliane nello stretto di Tiran. Il Golfo di Aqaba Lo stretto di Tiran Perchè il blocco? ●Discorso di Nasser al Congresso dei Lavoratori egiziani 26 maggio 1967: ●"La verità è che io fui autorizzato dal Supremo Comitato Esecutivo ad eseguire il blocco in qualsiasi momento; e il momento venne dopo le minacce israeliane contro la Siria". La reazione israeliana ●Eban inviato a Washington ●Johnson chiede una settimana di rinvio La posizione israeliana ●Richieste di Eban: ●Dichiarazione tipo Nato, oppure... ●Vendita di armi moderne La risposta Usa ●Mah!...... Divisioni nel governo Usa ●1, Il progetto "Regata" ●2. L'azione diplomatica (Dipartimento di Stato) ●3. Lasciar fare gli Israeliani (Pentagono) Johnson riflette... ●Le stime degli uffici militari: ●Vittoria israeliana di 5-7 giorni ●Rchiesta di ripetere le stime: ●Al massimo 10 giorni. Dal Diario del Presidente ●Non homai nascosto il mio disappunto sul fatto che gli israeliani decisero di fare quel che hanno fatto. ●Comunque non accetto la tesi per cui gli israeliani avrebberocompiuto un atto di aggressione. La guerra guerreggiata ●Lunedì 5 giugno ●Forze aeree israeliane attgaccano gli aeroporti egiziani distruggendo al suolo la maggior parte dell'aviazione nemica. ●In tal modo le forze di terra possono inizire l'invasione del Sinai. Guerra lampo ●Nei giorni successivi vengn conquistati il Sinai a sud, la West Bank a est, le alture del Golan al nord. L'incidente ●Affondamento per errore della nave Usa Liberty ●Pericolo di escalation Intrviene la diplomazia ●Cessate il fuoco o ritiro? La Risoluzione parola per parola ●1. Withdrawal of israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict. ●2. Riconoscimento della sovranità e integrità territoriale di tutti gli stati dell'area. Le due versioni ●Richiesta russa: "da tutti i territori" ●Testo plausibile: from the territories ●Teaso approvato: from territories L'enigma russo ●La storiografia tradizionale: ●Timore di un attacco alla Siria Una singolare scoperta ● Isabella Ginor e Gideon Remez, "Foxbats Over Dimona" In 1967, the Soviet Union deliberately instigated the crisis that led to the Six Day War. As part of a grand design, the USSR also planned to bomb and invade Israel with its own strategic bombers and naval forces. This is what Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez claim in their book whose publication coincided with the fortieth anniversary of the war. La tesi Ginor Remez When the Egyptians got carried away by their initial successes at the end of May 1967 and intended to strike Israel first despite the plan, the Soviets pulled out their hidden ace to placate them: a prototype of the ultra-secret MiG-25 reconnaissance plane, 擢oxbat�in NATO parlance, was sent on its maiden mission, flying over the Israeli reactor in Dimona and thus proving the seriousness of the Soviets�commitment. Commenti The problem with Ginor and Remez’s thesis is that it rests on very flimsy evidence. More bluntly, they have no real documentation to back it up. They may well be right, but they do not prove their case. The Jerusalem Post recently reported that a senior official in the Rus- sian air force confirmed the book’s claim that Soviet pilots flew secret aircraft over Israel’s nuclear reactor before the War. [5] This confirmation strengthens Remez and Ginor’s claims about Soviet aerial intervention and suggests that there are still significant facts about the conflict that are unknown and hidden by the archives. A further investigation could radically change our understanding of these historical events. Circum-stantial arguments have their limits, of course, but the pilot’s story suggests that the book and its thesis, despite their shortcomings, deserve our attention and the further investigation of historians. Un tecnico aeronautico I was researching some topic about the MiG-25 Foxbat when a friend told me to checkout the book "Foxbats Over Dimona, the soviets’ nuclear gamble in the six- day war" by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez. But I remain highly skeptical about this part, since the alleged profile of these flights doesn't match the advance capabilities of the Foxbat but is at the uper edge of the capabilities of the MiG-21 La versione egiziana From May 25–28, 1967, a high-level Egyptian delegation visited Moscow to discuss the evolving crisis in the Middle East with the Soviet leadership. The Egyptian delegation was headed by Shams Badran (Minister of Defense) who was accompanied by Amin Howeidy (Minister for Cabinet Affairs), Ahmed Hassan Elfiki (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Salah Bassiouny (Diplomat) and several military officers. Nasser’s trusted Ambassador to Moscow, Mourad Ghaleb, accompanied the delegation to their meetings. Egyptian sources provide a corroborated and detailed picture of what went on during that visit. La risposta di Kosygin “K [: Kosygin]: . My view is that the situation is as follows: Politically, you prevailed. Militarily you prevailed. What do you want now? My view is that what you achieved is enough. The Emergency Forces withdrew [: from Sinai]. You are in control of the Straits. Your troops are in Gaza? What more do you want? Sh [: Shams Badran]: Nothing” “K [: Kosygin]: . I prefer discussions [: diplomacy] instead of military confrontation. This is not a suggestion but a continuation of our discussions because it might be the case that we don’t know all the different aspects of this issue. We think it important to take measures that give the enemy an image of your strength and not your weakness. From this position of strength, you will consolidate the success you achieved without the need to go into war. If you accepted this, then we are thinking along the same lines but if you have another point view please tell us” I colloqui di Mosca Siamo messi male!! Semyonov pleaded that Egypt not start a war. He said the Soviet Union was not ready for war and, to the astonishment of his Egyptian interlocutor, said it was no match to the United States. Semyonov even provided painfully candid accounts of his own life in the Soviet Union to make his point. The two astonished Egyptian diplomats decided to report that discussion back to Cairo. ShareTweet Did the Soviet Union Deliberately Instigate the 1967 War in the Middle East? June 5, 2017 By Hassan Elbahtimy • 39 Shares • Egyptian sources suggest Moscow was taken aback by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War The origins of the 1967 Six-Day War have long been a source of controversy among historians. Discerning the motives of regional and international actors through the thick fog of war and the preceding crisis is a challenging task.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Muslim Brotherhood
    ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND DOMINANT IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN EGYPT: A CASE STUDY OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy IN WEST ASIAN STUDIES (POLITICAL SCIENCE) BY AFSAHN UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. MOHAMMAD GULREZ PROFESSOR Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (U.P.)-202002 (INDIA) 2016 DEPARTMENT OF WEST ASIAN STUDIES & NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, ALIGARH-202002(U.P) India Date: Certificate This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis entitled “Islamic Movement and Dominant Ideological Trends in Egypt: A Case Study of Muslim Brotherhood” submitted by Ms. Afshan under my supervision is his own original contribution and suitable for submission for the award of the degree of Ph.D. It is further certified that Ms. Afshan has been engaged in fulltime research and that he has put in required attendance as prescribed by the University. (Dr. Mohammad Gulrez) (Dr. Mohammad Gulrez) Maulana SupervisorAzad Library, Aligarh MuslimChairman University i PREFACE & ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The purpose of this study on “Islamic Movement and Dominant Ideological Trends in Egypt: A Case Study of Muslim Brotherhood” is not to give a modern history and contemporary trends of all kinds of thought expressed by the Egyptian scholars since the second half of the nineteenth century. The emphasis however is on the ideological trends about politics and society within a certain context. This thought process was influenced by the growth of European and the Islamic resurgence movements calling for radical social reforms and for changes in the system of government.
    [Show full text]
  • Memoirs of Pre-Yom Kippur War Egyptian Generals, 1967-1972 : Strategic Insights: V.4, Issue 3 (March 2005)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 2005-03 Book Review. Learning and Rebuilding a Shattered Force: Memoirs of Pre-Yom Kippur War Egyptian Generals, 1967-1972 : Strategic Insights: v.4, issue 3 (March 2005) Aboul-Enein, Youssef Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Strategic Insights http://hdl.handle.net/10945/25385 Book Review: Learning and Rebuilding a Shattered Force— Memoirs of Pre-Yom Kippur War Egyptian Generals, 1967-1972 Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 3 (March 2005) by LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. For a PDF version of this article, click here. Introduction Dr. Mohammed Al-Jawadi has made a major contribution to the understanding of the strategic and tactical thinking of Egyptian generals. His famous Arabic work, Al Nasr Al- Waheed (The Only Victory) which collects the memoirs of five Egyptian generals who planned and fought the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, was published in 2000. His 2001 volume, Fee Eikaab Al-Naksah, Muzakiraat Qaadah Misr Al-Askariyah Sabaa wa Siteen ila Ithnain wa Sabaaen (In Between the Catastrophe, Memoirs of Egyptian Military Commanders from 1967 to 1972, (Cairo: Dar-Al-Khiyal Press, 2001, 555 pages)) features the memoirs of five Egyptian generals who were involved in the reconstruction of the Egyptian military establishment after the 1967 Six-Day War.
    [Show full text]
  • Infantry U.S
    PB 7-12-1 COL WALTER E. PIATT Commandant, Infantry U.S. Army Infantry School JANUARY-MARCH 2012 Volume 101, Number 1 RUSSELL A. ENO Editor FEATURES MICHELLE J. ROWAN 25 BUILDING ON THE PAST AS WE PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE: THE Deputy Editor ARMY’S NEXT TRAINING MODEL LTC Chris Budihas and MAJ Kevin Broadnax TIFFANY M. NABORS 30 CCROWDSOURCING:ROWDSOURCING: A NNEWEW PPERSPECTIVEERSPECTIVE OONN HHUMANUMAN IINTELLIGENCENTELLIGENCE Editorial Assistant CCOLLECTIONOLLECTION IINN A CCOUNTERINSURGENCYOUNTERINSURGENCY MAJ Nick Mumm MARK THOMAS 36 MMURPHY’SURPHY’S LLAWAW — AANYTHINGNYTHING TTHATHAT CCANAN GGOO WWRONGRONG WWILLILL GGOO Editorial Intern WWRONGRONG LTC George B. Inabinet III FRONT COVER: DEPARTMENTS A Soldier with Company A, 1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry 2 INFANTRY NEWS Regiment, 172nd Infantry Brigade, watches as members 7 PROFESSIONAL FORUM of the Afghan National Army 7 SHONA BA SHONA (SHOULDER TO SHOULDER): THE COMPANY’S ROLE set up a traffi c checkpoint in IN DEVELOPING INDEPENDENT LOCAL NATIONAL FORCES Paktika Province, Afghanistan, on 9 March 2012. (Photo by CPT Erich J. Almonte SGT Ken Scar) 13 OPERATION HOMESTEAD: TRANSITIONING THE MISSION IN IRAQ FROM DOD TO THE STATE DEPARMENT LTC Chip Daniels and CPT James R. Vance BACK COVER: 19 COMPETENT TOW/ITAS TEAMS CREATE UNMATCHED LETHALITY 1LT Nicholas P. Orzechowski A Soldier with the 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division conducts a security patrol in Paktya 20 EGYPTIAN GEN MOHAMED FAWZI — PART I: REFLECTIONS ON DEEP Province, Afghanistan, on 30 January 2012. (Photo by SSG STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS LEADING TO THE 1967 SIX-DAY WAR DEFEAT Jason Epperson) CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • 179 1 Proper Nouns Are Not Transliterated in This Book Unless
    Notes 1 Proper nouns are not transliterated in this book unless they form part of a longer phrase or sentence in Arabic. Place names follow contemporary media usage, while personal and organisational names use either the stan- dard Egyptian spelling or, if known, the preferred spelling of the individual or body in question. Unavoidably, there are sometimes variations in the spelling of names in quoted material. 2 The ambiguous role of Nasser’s friend and rival Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer is discussed at length in later chapters. 3 On the composition of this core elite, see Hinnebusch, R. Egyptian Politics under Sadat (Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15–16; Auda, G. ‘The State of Political Control: The Case of Nasser 1960–1967’, The Arab Journal of the Social Sciences, 2.1 (1987), p. 102. 4 Amin Howeidy Interview. 5 Heikal, M. H. Autumn of Fury (London: Andre Deutsch, 1983), pp. 37–8; Dia al-Din Dawud Interview; Frankel, N. ‘Interviews with Ismail Fahmy, Ashraf Ghorbal and Mohamed Riad’, American Arab Affairs, 31 (1990), p. 99. 6 Kenneth Boulding predicts that images will diverge farther from reality under authoritarianism, because feedback from lower levels of the elite is indirect and largely controlled by the upper levels. Boulding, K. E. The Image (University of Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1956), p. 100. 7 McLaurin, R. D., Mughisuddin, M. and Wagner, A. A. Foreign Policy Making in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 42; Dabous, S. ‘Nasser and the Egyptian Press’, In Tripp, C. (ed.) Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes (London: Routledge, 1993); Ahmed Said Interview.
    [Show full text]
  • THE COLD WAR's LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW and WHY the USSR INSTIGATED the 1967 WAR by Isabella Ginor*
    THE COLD WAR'S LONGEST COVER-UP: HOW AND WHY THE USSR INSTIGATED THE 1967 WAR By Isabella Ginor* The Soviet warning to Egypt about supposed Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border in May 1967 has long been considered a blunder that precipitated a war which the USSR neither desired nor expected. New evidence from Soviet and other Warsaw Pact documents, as well as memoirs of contemporary actors, contradicts this accepted theory. The author demonstrates that this warning was deliberate disinformation, part of a plan approved at the highest level of Soviet leadership to elicit Egyptian action that would provoke an Israeli strike. Soviet military intervention against the "aggressor" was intended to follow and was prepared well in advance. "The truth of anything at all supposed Israeli reinforcements after doesn't lie in someone's account inspecting the Syrian front.(3) of it. It lies in all the small facts of In order to reconcile this Soviet the time." provocation with the accepted view that --Josephine Tey, The Daughter of Moscow had no intention to precipitate a Time(1) war, various theories have been proposed.(4) An especially noteworthy It is well-accepted in Middle Eastern version was offered recently by Karen historiography that the 1967 war's Brutents, a former CPSU Central immediate trigger was disinformation fed Committee counsellor,(5) who claimed by the Soviet Union to Egypt in May that Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 1967 about massive reinforcements Israel Semyonov "couldn't control himself" and was supposedly concentrating on its prematurely revealed yet-unconfirmed border with Syria.
    [Show full text]
  • The Six Day War
    LIMUN HS 2017 25TH – 26TH NOVEMBER 2017 CRISIS: THE SIX DAY WAR CONTENTS Introduction to the Directorate ......................................................................................... 3 Introduction to the Committee .......................................................................................... 2 The Six Day War ................................................................................................................ 5 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5 Background ................................................................................................................................ 6 Political Background ...................................................................................................................... 6 Economic Background ................................................................................................................... 8 Religious Background .................................................................................................................... 9 Current situation and aims ....................................................................................................... 10 Egyptian and Syrian cabinet ..................................................................................................... 11 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Missing the Consequences Misperceptions of the 1967 Six-Day Israeli-Arab War
    University of Central Florida STARS HIM 1990-2015 2011 Missing the consequences misperceptions of the 1967 six-day israeli-arab war Jonathan Miniello University of Central Florida Part of the Psychology Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015 University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIM 1990-2015 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Miniello, Jonathan, "Missing the consequences misperceptions of the 1967 six-day israeli-arab war" (2011). HIM 1990-2015. 1165. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses1990-2015/1165 MISSING THE CONSEQUENCES: MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE 1967 SIX- DAY ISRAELI-ARAB WAR. by JONATHAN SAMUELE MINIELLO A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in Psychology in the College of Sciences and in The Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term 2011 Thesis Chair: Dr. Houghton 1 © 2011 Jonathan. S. Miniello 2 Abstract In recent times, the issues surrounding the “67 borders” have become part of the public debate. In recent speeches, President Obama has suggested that Israel should return to pre-1967 borders with “land-swaps” in exchange for some form of peace with the Palestinians living within current Israeli territory. The validity of Obama’s suggestion has been questioned by both members of the political left and right and in the opinion of this author, with considerable merit.
    [Show full text]
  • King's Research Portal
    King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1438893 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Elbahtimy, H. (2019). Allies at Arm’s Length: Redefining Egyptian-Soviet relations in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(1), 91-113. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1438893 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • UC Irvine UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    UC Irvine UC Irvine Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Autocratic Accountability and the Arab-Israeli Dispute Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8b34f193 Author Wolf, Albert Burton Publication Date 2014 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE Autocratic Accountability and the Arab-Israeli Dispute DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Political Science by Albert Burton Wolf Dissertation Committee: Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Chair Professor Edwin Amenta Professor Russell J. Dalton 2014 Portion of Chapter 4 © 2014 Wiley-Blackwell All other materials © 2014 Albert Burton Wolf TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv CURRICULUM VITAE v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION vi CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1 CHAPTER 2: Authoritarian Institutions, the Arab Street, 18 and the Middle East Peace Process: Do Non-Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? CHAPTER 3: Autocratic Accountability in Wartime: 75 Popular Punishments for Defeats on the Battlefield in Non-Democracies CHAPTER 4: Peacemaking and Political Survival 122 in Sadat’s Egypt CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 147 WORKS CITED 151 ii LIST OF TABLES PAGE Table 1 Authoritarian Political Constraints and the Likelihood of Cooperation 25 Table 2 Overview of Hypotheses 35 Table 3 Hypotheses and Observable Implications 46 iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to the members of my dissertation committee for their help, guidance, and patience throughout the process of writing this dissertation. My greatest debt goes to my adviser and mentor, Prof. Caesar D. Sereseres. Caesar combines a background in International Relations theory with his deep knowledge and appreciation for policy relevant problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Nasser and the Missile Age in the Middle East
    Nasser and the Missile Age in the Middle East This book demonstrates how Egypt’s persistent efforts to acquire long- range surface-to-surface missiles from the early 1950s to the present day provide an important case study in the field of proliferation studies. It commences with Cairo’s initial forays into indigenous rocketry with the successful recruitment of German scientists who had prior experience in Hitler’s V-1 and V-2 missile projects. The book then demonstrates how Israel directed its formidable security apparatus to collect intelligence on and defeat Egypt’s missile ambitions through covert action. It explores how this intelligence sparked a political crisis in Israel, an event which trig- gered fresh Israeli demands to the West German government to order the scientists’ recall and a determined effort to engage the US in resolving Israel’s security dilemmas. The concluding chapters examine the use of Egyptian missiles in the wars with Israel, the ill-starred Egypt–Iraq– Argentina Condor II program of the 1980s, and Cairo’s most recent efforts to acquire North Korean No Dong missile technologies. Drawing on material from recently declassified US government docu- ments, this volume demonstrates how Egypt’s missile program not only played an instrumental role in cementing the US–Israeli national security relationship but also formed the basis for present day efforts to counter missile proliferation. The concluding chapter highlights several important lessons concerning the global proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. This book will be of great interest to scholars of proliferation, inter- national relations, the Middle East, disarmament and security studies in general.
    [Show full text]
  • FAO JOURNAL VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 3 September 2004
    FAO JOURNAL VOLUME VIII, NUMBER 3 September 2004 U.S. Global Power and Future Middle East Challenges General Murtaji: Lessons From Egyptian Operational Failures During the 1967 Six-Day War Chinese Media Coverage Of Nepal’s Insurgency DISCLAIMER: FAOA Journal, a quar- terly professional publication for Foreign Area Specialists, is printed by the Foreign FAO JOURNAL Area Officer Association, Herndon, VA. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the Department of De- A Professional Journal for fense, the Armed services or any DoD Regional Specialists agency. The contents do not reflect the DoD position and are not in any way in- tended to supersede information from official military sources. Use of articles or September 2004 VOLUME VIII, NO. 3 advertisements constitutes neither affir- mation of their accuracy nor product en- ISSN 1551-8094 dorsement by FAOA or DoD. PURPOSE: To publish a journal for dis- seminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote INSIDE THIS ISSUE understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision- makers. It is intended to forge a closer ARTICLES bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities. U.S. Global Power and Future Middle East SUBSCRIPTIONS / ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the jour- Challenges nal comes with membership in the asso- ciation. Membership information may be obtained through FAOA, P.O. Box Major (P) David D. Wisyanski, USA pg 3 710231, Herndon, VA 20171. The office telephone/fax number is (703) 913-1356. E-Mail address is: [email protected] or General Murtaji: Lessons From Egyptian [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • A Comparative Case Study of Egyptian Military's Behavior
    T.C. ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES WHEN DOES A MILITARY DEFECT? A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S BEHAVIOR DURING POPULAR PROTESTS OF 1977 BREAD INTIFADA, 2008 RIOT, AND 2011 ARAB UPRISINGS. MASTER THESIS AYTEN ÇETER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ANKARA, 2020 T.C. ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES WHEN DOES A MILITARY DEFECT? A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF EGYPTIAN MILITARY’S BEHAVIOR DURING POPULAR PROTESTS OF 1977 BREAD INTIFADA, 2008 RIOT, AND 2011 THE ARAB UPRISINGS. MASTER THESIS AYTEN ÇETER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUPERVISOR: DR. ÖMER ASLAN ANKARA, 2020 ONAY SAYFASI Ayten Çeter tarafından hazırlanan “When Does a Military Defect? A Comparative Case Study of Egyptian Military’s Behavior during Popular Protests of 1977 Bread Intifada, 2008 Riot and 2011 Arab Uprising” adlı tez çalısması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği/oy çokluğu ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda Yüksek Lisans tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir. Ünvan Adı Soyadı Kurumu İmza Ankara Yıldırım Dr. Ömer Aslan Beyazıt Universitesi Ankara Yıldırım Dr. Sevinç Alkan Özcan Beyazıt Universitesi Dr. Buğra Sarı Polis Akademisi Tez Savunma Tarihi: 11.09.2020 Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı’nda Yuksek Lisans tezi olması için sartları yerine getirdiğini onaylyorum. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürü Ünvan Ad Soyad i PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.
    [Show full text]