Lezione Ottava La Terza Guerra

LEZIONE OTTAVA

LA TERZA GUERRA La politica di Nasser

●Gennaio 1964

●Summit della Lega Araba al Cairo sulla questione delle acque. Le acque del Giordano

●Piano di Israele: dirottare le acque per irrigare il deserto del Negev.

●Risposts araba: progetto di dirottare le acque vero l'affluente Yarmouk Il Giordano Il Giordano Il Giordano nel Mar Morto Verso l'unità araba

●Settembre 1964

●Summit della Lega ad Alessandria:

●1. Comando militare unificato

●2. Organizzazione per la Liberazione della Palestina (OLP)

●Summit di Casablanca:

●Armata di Liberazione della Palestina

●La guerra a Israele va preparata bene. Opposizione a Nasser

●Tra le organizzazioni armate palestinesi emerse Al Fatah (La Conquista) sotto la guida di Yasser Arafat.

●Conflitto con Nasser sulla unità araba.

●Il Partito Ba'ath siriano in collisione con le monarchie e con Nasser (il prestito inglese)

●Siamo militarmente pronti alla guerra. Dopo l'Indipendenza

●La Siria conquistò l'indipendenza dalla Francia

●Il 31 dicembre 1946.

●Situazione del paese:

●Partito Nazionale (notabili di Damasco)

●Partito del Popolo (notabili di Aleppo)

L'esercito

●Era stato creato dai francesi con le Troupes Spéciales

●Gli ufficiali reclutati soprattutto tra gli alawiti

●Setta religiosa scismatica degli shiiti

●Comprendeva il 10% della popolazione Colpi di stato

●La lotta politica in Siria dal 1946 al 1958:

●Tentativi di creare un regime parlamentare, regolarmente interrotti da colpi militari (5 in 10 anni)

●Infine si afferma il Partito B'ath. Il Partito Ba'ath

●Aprile 1947

●Michel Aflak (crtistiano)

●Salah al-Bitar (sunnita)

●Zaki al-Arsuzi (ateo) Ideologia

●1. Rinascita del mondo arabo

●2. Unità della nazione araba

●3. Modernizzazione

●4. Anti Imperialismo

●5. Contro Israele In Iraq

●Luglio 1958

●Il Ba'ath iracheno, guidato da Abdul Kassem rovescia la monarchia hashemita.

● In Siria

●Dicembre 1958

●Il Partito Ba'ath, dopo aver vnto le elezioni in Siria, decide l'annessione all'Egitto.

●Si costituisce un nuovo stato:

●Repubblica Araba Unita (1958-1961)

●Ma Nasser non tollera altri partiti e scioglie il Ba'ath. Inaugurazione: Nasser e Al Bizli La Repubblica Araba Unita

●Una strana nazione Ritorno del Ba'ath

●Settembre 1961

●Un gruppo di ufficiali siriani aderenti al Ba'ath compie un colpo di stato e pone fine alla UAR.

●Il Ba'ath siriano è però un piccolo partito (solo 2500 iscritti e per reggersi ha bisogno dell'esercito.

●La leadership ba'athista si scinde in un'ala civile (progressista) e un'ala militare (nazionalista) La vittoria dei militari

●Febbraio 1966

●La fazione militare guidata da Salah Jadid e Hafez al-Assad sconfigge quella civile, la vecchia guardia guidata da Michel Aflaq. Il governo Jadid

●Alleanza con la Russia

●Contro monarchie arabe

●Contro Israele

●Protezione Al Fatah Le armi russe

●Dal 1955 in poi la Russia rifornì gli stati arabi

●Con le armi più moderne:

●1. Carri armati T-54 e T-55.

●2. Caccia Mig 19 e Mig 21

●3. Bombardieri leggeri IL-28

●4. Bombarideri a medio raggio TU-16 Le armi egiziane

●1200 carri armati dei quali 450 erano TU-54. Il T-54 sovietico I bombardieri TU-16 I Mig 19 I Mig 21 I mirage francesi I mystere Il Patton M 48 L'inizio della crisi

●17 maggio 1967

●Nasser ordina il ritiro delle truppe Onu di interposizione.

●22 maggio

●L'Egitto vieta il passaggio di naviisraeliane nello stretto di Tiran. Il Golfo di Aqaba Lo stretto di Tiran Perchè il blocco?

●Discorso di Nasser al Congresso dei Lavoratori egiziani 26 maggio 1967:

●"La verità è che io fui autorizzato dal Supremo Comitato Esecutivo ad eseguire il blocco in qualsiasi momento; e il momento venne dopo le minacce israeliane contro la Siria". La reazione israeliana

●Eban inviato a Washington

●Johnson chiede una settimana di rinvio La posizione israeliana

●Richieste di Eban:

●Dichiarazione tipo Nato, oppure...

●Vendita di armi moderne La risposta Usa

●Mah!...... Divisioni nel governo Usa

●1, Il progetto "Regata"

●2. L'azione diplomatica (Dipartimento di Stato)

●3. Lasciar fare gli Israeliani (Pentagono) Johnson riflette...

●Le stime degli uffici militari:

●Vittoria israeliana di 5-7 giorni

●Rchiesta di ripetere le stime:

●Al massimo 10 giorni. Dal Diario del Presidente

●Non homai nascosto il mio disappunto sul fatto che gli israeliani decisero di fare quel che hanno fatto.

●Comunque non accetto la tesi per cui gli israeliani avrebberocompiuto un atto di aggressione. La guerra guerreggiata

●Lunedì 5 giugno

●Forze aeree israeliane attgaccano gli aeroporti egiziani distruggendo al suolo la maggior parte dell'aviazione nemica.

●In tal modo le forze di terra possono inizire l'invasione del Sinai. Guerra lampo

●Nei giorni successivi vengn conquistati il Sinai a sud, la West Bank a est, le alture del Golan al nord. L'incidente

●Affondamento per errore della nave Usa Liberty

●Pericolo di escalation Intrviene la diplomazia

●Cessate il fuoco o ritiro? La Risoluzione parola per parola

●1. Withdrawal of israeli forces from territories occupied during the recent conflict.

●2. Riconoscimento della sovranità e integrità territoriale di tutti gli stati dell'area. Le due versioni

●Richiesta russa: "da tutti i territori"

●Testo plausibile: from the territories

●Teaso approvato: from territories L'enigma russo

●La storiografia tradizionale:

●Timore di un attacco alla Siria Una singolare scoperta

● Isabella Ginor e Gideon Remez, "Foxbats Over Dimona"

When the Egyptians got carried away by their initial successes at the end of May 1967 and intended to strike Israel first despite the plan, the Soviets pulled out their hidden ace to placate them: a prototype of the ultra-secret MiG-25 reconnaissance plane, 擢oxbat�in NATO parlance, was sent on its maiden mission, flying over the Israeli reactor in Dimona and thus proving the seriousness of the Soviets�commitment. Commenti

The Jerusalem Post recently reported that a senior official in the Rus- sian air force confirmed the book’s claim that Soviet pilots flew secret aircraft over Israel’s nuclear reactor before the War. [5] This confirmation strengthens Remez and Ginor’s claims about Soviet aerial intervention and suggests that there are still significant facts about the conflict that are unknown and hidden by the archives. A further investigation could radically change our understanding of these historical events. Circum-stantial arguments have their limits, of course, but the pilot’s story suggests that the book and its thesis, despite their shortcomings, deserve our attention and the further investigation of historians. Un tecnico aeronautico

I was researching some topic about the MiG-25 Foxbat when a friend told me to checkout the book "Foxbats Over Dimona, the soviets’ nuclear gamble in the six- day war" by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez. But I remain highly skeptical about this part, since the alleged profile of these flights doesn't match the advance capabilities of the Foxbat but is at the uper edge of the capabilities of the MiG-21 La versione egiziana

From May 25–28, 1967, a high-level Egyptian delegation visited Moscow to discuss the evolving crisis in the Middle East with the Soviet leadership. The Egyptian delegation was headed by Shams Badran (Minister of Defense) who was accompanied by Amin Howeidy (Minister for Cabinet Affairs), Ahmed Hassan Elfiki (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Salah Bassiouny (Diplomat) and several military officers. Nasser’s trusted Ambassador to Moscow, Mourad Ghaleb, accompanied the delegation to their meetings. Egyptian sources provide a corroborated and detailed picture of what went on during that visit. La risposta di Kosygin

“K [: Kosygin]: . . . My view is that the situation is as follows: Politically, you prevailed. Militarily you prevailed. What do you want now? My view is that what you achieved is enough. The Emergency Forces withdrew [: from Sinai]. You are in control of the Straits. Your troops are in Gaza? What more do you want? Sh [: Shams Badran]: Nothing” “K [: Kosygin]: . . . I prefer discussions [: diplomacy] instead of military confrontation. This is not a suggestion but a continuation of our discussions because it might be the case that we don’t know all the different aspects of this issue. We think it important to take measures that give the enemy an image of your strength and not your weakness. From this position of strength, you will consolidate the success you achieved without the need to go into war. If you accepted this, then we are thinking along the same lines but if you have another point view please tell us” I colloqui di Mosca Siamo messi male!!

Semyonov pleaded that Egypt not start a war. He said the Soviet Union was not ready for war and, to the astonishment of his Egyptian interlocutor, said it was no match to the United States. Semyonov even provided painfully candid accounts of his own life in the Soviet Union to make his point. The two astonished Egyptian diplomats decided to report that discussion back to Cairo.

ShareTweet Did the Soviet Union Deliberately Instigate the 1967 War in the Middle East? June 5, 2017

By Hassan Elbahtimy

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Egyptian sources suggest Moscow was taken aback by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

The origins of the 1967 Six-Day War have long been a source of controversy among historians. Discerning the motives of regional and international actors through the thick fog of war and the preceding crisis is a challenging task.

Many historians see the war as part of a deliberate, premeditated plan by specific regional actors (either Israel, or Egypt and Syria). However, historians also emphasize the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in the war. Much has been written on the US providing an ‘amber light’ during the visit of Meir Amit (Chief of Mossad) to Washington, as well as of Soviet warnings to Egypt of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria. Whether through tacit or explicit encouragement, provision of arms or political backing, many argue that the superpowers were intertwined in the unfolding of war.

Egyptian records of contact between Cairo and the Soviet Union immediately preceding the war help to clarify a key question: whether Moscow pushed for an Arab-Israeli war during the crisis leading up to the 1967 War. These sources suggest that the Soviet Union, rather than fanning the flames of war, was a force for restraint and de-escalation in its contacts with Egyptian officials.

As the tensions in the Middle East escalated in the early months of 1967, it was natural for Egypt and the Soviet Union to be in close consultation. Since 1955, Egypt had relied on Soviet arms and training, and had incorporated many of its war doctrines. The Soviet Union also became Egypt’s willing partner in many industrialization projects. However, the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union was also mired in differences, particularly related to the spread of communism in Arab countries, most notably in Syria and Iraq.

It is widely acknowledged that the Soviet Union provided Cairo with warnings about Israeli intensions to invade Syria. On May 13, 1967, the Soviet Union provided information that Israel was amassing around 11 brigades to attack Syria through at least three channels. It was first communicated to Anwar Sadat, speaker of the Egyptian parliament, during his short stop in Moscow following an official visit to North Korea. It was directly communicated twice more in Cairo, through Egyptian intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As this information accumulated on Nasser’s desk, by May 13, Egypt was considering how it could come to Syria’s rescue.

At the time, Syrian-Israeli relations were particularly tense after a series of border skirmishes. Cairo watched anxiously as Israeli government and military officials made public threats to bring down the Syrian government in Damascus.

Yet the information the Soviet Union provided on Israeli brigades proved to be false. Did the Soviet Union intentionally mislead Cairo? Did Moscow want an Egyptian-Israeli confrontation? Or, was this simply an intelligence failure that unintentionally precipitated war in 1967?

Egyptian-Soviet consultations during the height of the crisis illuminate how the Soviet Union approached the prospect of war in the Middle East. From May 25–28, 1967, a high-level Egyptian delegation visited Moscow to discuss the evolving crisis in the Middle East with the Soviet leadership. The Egyptian delegation was headed by Shams Badran (Minister of Defense) who was accompanied by Amin Howeidy (Minister for Cabinet Affairs), Ahmed Hassan Elfiki (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), Salah Bassiouny (Diplomat) and several military officers. Nasser’s trusted Ambassador to Moscow, Mourad Ghaleb, accompanied the delegation to their meetings. Egyptian sources provide a corroborated and detailed picture of what went on during that visit.

My own interviews with Shams Badran, as well as detailed testimonies from Mourad Ghaleb, Salah Bassiouny, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal (who had a direct link to Nasser), and Egyptian minutes of the consultations paint a consistent picture of the messages the Soviet imparted to Egyptians, as well as their position on the escalation in the Middle East. In all these accounts, the Soviet Union comes across as a cautious and measured ally.

Shortly after announcing the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, Nasser gave the Egyptian Minister of Defence instructions to fly to Moscow for consultations with Soviet officials. Nasser’s instructions to Badran emphasized that the primary aim of the consultations was to give the impression that Egypt had the backing of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the delegation took a list of needed armaments and military hardware to present to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets had arranged for the delegation to hold consultations with Marshal Andrei Grechko (Minister of Defense) and Andrei Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs). However, as soon as the delegation landed in Moscow, Badran insisted on raising the profile of the consultations by meeting the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. Ultimately Badran met with the Soviet Premier twice, in addition to meeting with Grechko and Gromyko.

On May 25, the Egyptian delegation was taken to a dinner, hosted by Marshal Grechko and attended by the high brass of the Soviet military. At that first encounter, the Egyptian delegation came face to face with how tense the Soviet military was at the prospect of a war in the Middle East. Through rounds of vodka, Soviet generals emphasized how it was not the right time for a military confrontation with the forces of capitalism and imperialism. When Deputy Minister Elfiki mentioned his son was serving in the army and was ready to offer his life to defend Egypt, the meeting became even tenser. The Egyptian delegation realized that, despite rhetorical support, the Soviet military wanted to avoid confrontation with the US. In response, Badran felt he needed to reassure them that Egypt had no plans to either stop or attack US vessels passing through the Straits of Tiran.

This same sentiment was repeated the following day, in meetings with Soviet Premier Kosygin. The Premier asked the Egyptian delegation many questions about the distribution of Egyptian troops, how close they were to Israeli positions, and Egypt’s long-term intentions for the Gulf of Aqaba. Kosygin toed a thin line. On one hand, he expressed support to Egypt and was sympathetic to Nasser’s position. On the other hand, he wanted Egypt to avoid any provocation or escalation. He told the Egyptian delegation “Politically, you prevailed. Militarily you prevailed. What do you want now? My view is that what you achieved is enough.”

Excerpt 1: Minutes from meeting between Egyptian Delegation and Soviet Premier Kosygin, Moscow 26th May 1967

“K [: Kosygin]: . . . My view is that the situation is as follows: Politically, you prevailed. Militarily you prevailed. What do you want now?

My view is that what you achieved is enough. The Emergency Forces withdrew [: from Sinai]. You are in control of the Straits. Your troops are in Gaza? What more do you want?

Sh [: Shams Badran]: Nothing”

Excerpt 2: Minutes from meeting between Egyptian Delegation and Soviet Premier Kosygin, Moscow 26th May 1967

“K [: Kosygin]: . . . I prefer discussions [: diplomacy] instead of military confrontation. This is not a suggestion but a continuation of our discussions because it might be the case that we don’t know all the different aspects of this issue. We think it important to take measures that give the enemy an image of your strength and not your weakness. From this position of strength, you will consolidate the success you achieved without the need to go into war. If you accepted this, then we are thinking along the same lines but if you have another point view please tell us”

In response to Egyptian arms requests, the Soviets were very cautious and less than forthcoming. The Egyptian military wanted new and advanced anti-aircraft missiles, but these requests were met with Soviet reluctance. Grechko emphasized that the arms Egypt already had seemed to be working well in Vietnam, but this argument infuriated the Egyptians. The Egyptian delegation was so disappointed by the Soviet response that Badran sent a message to Cairo from Moscow urging Nasser and Amer to meet with the Soviet Ambassador in order to apply pressure on Soviet leadership to response to their request.

In the second meeting with Kosygin, the Soviet position on providing arms became slightly more flexible. Although the Soviet Union provided favorable payment terms, many of the items that the Egyptian military needed, including some spare parts, remained out of bounds. The Soviet Union’s decision to accelerate the delivery of arms shipments to Egypt in July and August demonstrated how they treated the crisis with a lack of urgency. As the delegation was leaving Moscow, Grechko felt the disappointment in the Egyptian delegation. He bolstered Badran, telling him not to worry about the Americans, and reassuring him that the Soviets were not far away and could come to their aid.

According to a transcribed interview with Salah Bassiouny from 1997 in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (and corroborated by Badran and Ghaleb), Semyonov, valued in Egypt as a friendly voice in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asked to meet Elfiki for a private discussion. Semyonov pleaded that Egypt not start a war. He said the Soviet Union was not ready for war and, to the astonishment of his Egyptian interlocutor, said it was no match to the United States. Semyonov even provided painfully candid accounts of his own life in the Soviet Union to make his point. The two astonished Egyptian diplomats decided to report that discussion back to Cairo.

Excerpt 3: Transcript of a translated interview with Ambassador Salah Bassiouny (Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 25/02/1997

As far as external optics, Egyptians may have achieved what they wanted from their visit to Moscow: three days of high-level meetings in the public eye at the height of the crisis. However, their aims in terms of arms requests were not met, and the meetings emphasized the limitations of Soviet support.

These limitations, however, did not prevent Nasser from capitalizing on public Soviet support. Rhetoric aside, the Soviet Union was both concerned and wary about any further escalation. This was communicated to Egypt in a clear and direct manner. The faulty intelligence provided by the Soviet Union early in the crisis may have played a key role in the chain of events that led to the Egyptian closure of the Tiran Straits. However, the Soviets became a force for restraint rather than confrontation as the full extent of the crisis took shape. There is no space here for a lengthy engagement with the academic literature on the role of the Soviet Union or the many puzzles relating to the origins of the 1967 war. Examination of Egyptian sources offers crucial insights into some of these debates. My reading of the sources lead me to raise serious questions about Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez’s argument (developed more succinctly in this essay) that portray the Soviet Union as a behind-the-scenes force manipulating events to precipitate a war in the Middle East. Michael Oren’s references to a split between Kosygin and the Soviet military over support to Egypt does not sit comfortably with Egyptian accounts that identified a consistently cautious attitude in Egypt’s meetings with Soviet politicians and military officials.

Questions about the full extent of the Soviet Union’s role remain, but Egyptian sources suggest that the Soviet Union, rather than being in the driver’s seat, was taken aback by the unfolding events in the summer of 1967.

Ever since the beginning of the crisis, the Soviet Union had publicly supported the actions of Syria and Egypt. Soviet press reports put the responsibility for the crisis on Israel. Official statements blamed Israel for the tension. On 26 May, Premier Kosygin addressed a Note to Prime Minister Eshkol. He ignored the concentration of Egyptian troops in Sinai and the reimposition of the blockade on the Straits of Tiran, and called on Israel to prevent military confrontation. In his reply, Mr Eshkol called on the Soviet Union to use its influence to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East based on principles espoused by the Soviet Union over the years.

Soviet Premier's Note Mr. Prime Minister, According to the latest information reaching the Government of the USSR, the tension on the borders of Israel, the UAR and Syria is mounting more and more, with the two sides increasing their forces and in Israel the situation is sharpening as though there was no alternative to acts of war. It would be a tremendous error if circles eager for battle, unrestrained by serious political thought, had the upper hand in such a situation, and arms were to begin talking. Guided by the interests of peace and the desire to prevent bloodshed, the Government of the USSR decided to send you this Note. We would like to appeal to you to resort to all measures to prevent a military conflict, since such a conflict would have a major effect on the interests of international peace and security. We turn to you so that no new threat of war may be created in the world, which would bring to nations immeasurable suffering. We are convinced that, however complicated the situation in the area of the borders of Israel, Syria and the UAR may be, it is necessary to find means to resolve the conflict by non-military means, as it is easy to ignite a fire but putting out its flame may not be nearly as simple as those pushing Israel to the brink of war imagine. We hope that following a serious consideration of the evolving situation and of the responsibility lying on the shoulders of that side which will initiate the aggression, the Government of Israel will do everything in its power to prevent a military conflict in the Middle East. Sincerely, A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Prime Minister Eshkol's Reply Mr. Prime Minister, I beg to acknowledge receipt of your Note of 26 May 1967, delivered to me by the USSR Ambassador in Israel. We appreciate the desire of the Government of the USSR to make known to us the Soviet evaluations concerning the present crisis in the region. We are very glad that, as expected, the USSR is desirous of peace. As is known the present situation has developed since Syria began her overt hostile activities against Israel's territory and citizens. These activities have been denounced by the majority of members of the Security Council in the meetings which it held last October and also in the Report submitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Security Council on 19 May 1967. A fortnight ago Egypt, which is associated with Syria in a mutual aid agreement, began concentrating its forces in the Sinai peninsula, near the Israeli border. At the same time Egypt removed the UN Emergency Force. The decisive point is not the removal of that force, but the Egyptain explanation accompanying it, namely that Egypt's intention was to "go to war" against Israel. These aggressive steps reached their climax when a war-like blockade was imposed on the free passage through the Straits of Tiran. This, of course, is a classical war-like act, and there is no need to emphasize that it also is in absolute contradiction to the rules of international law and the rights of nations. This situation cannot be tolerated. These activities on the part of Egypt forced the Government of Israel to take security measures, to mobilize its forces and to station them to protect the security of its frontiers. The Egyptian military preparations, accompanied by unrestrained incitement to war by all Egyptian and Syrian propaganda organs, are continuing. Large-scale Egyptian units, composed of infantry divisions and armoured divisions, are stationed along our frontiers. In a speech delivered on 26 May the President of Egypt, Colonel Nasser, declared: "The blockade of Sharm el-Sheikh means our waging an all-out war against Israel. This is going to be a total war. Our fundamental aim is the annihilation of Israel." I beg you, Mr. Prime Minister, to express to the Governments of Egypt and the world the opinion of the USSR Government regarding such declarations. When Egypt declares that it is not prepared to co-exist with Israel, and that it means to wage a war of annihilation against it, only a considered and objective approach can contribute to the interests of peace. We much regret that on various occasions, such as for instance the participation of the USSR delegates in the discussions now going on in the Security Council and in publications in the Soviet Press, the USSR has adopted the false claims and accusations of Israel's enemies. When the organs of Arab propaganda raised the contention that Israel is concentrating forces in order to attack Syria, I invited your Ambassador in Israel to visit the frontier and to find out for himself that there was no truth in this allegation. To my regret, the Ambassador did not respond to our invitation. The Chief of Staff of the UNTSO checked these claims and informed the Secretary-General of the UN and the capitals of the region that there were no Israeli concentrations at the Syrian border. The Secretary-General even included a statement to this effect in the Report which he submitted on 19 May to the Security Council. Nevertheless, the representatives and the press of the USSR continued to make the false accusation current. They also voiced the claim that the leaders of Israel, in their speeches, threatened Syria. All those who peruse the declarations made by Israeli statesmen will see that they only constitute a reaction to the threats which the Arab States have poured upon us during the last 19 years, and that even in very grave situations our declarations have always included an appeal to peace and the expression of the hope that it will be established.

Exploring the Six Day War’s Soviet Angle

Foxbats over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War, by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, Yale University Press, 2007, 287 pp. Reviewed by Rolf Behrens

In 1967, the Soviet Union deliberately instigated the crisis that led to the Six Day War. As part of a grand design, the USSR also planned to bomb and invade Israel with its own strategic bombers and naval forces. This is what Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez claim in their book whose publication coincided with the fortieth anniversary of the war. According to the authors’ thesis, when the Soviets learned of Israel’s intention to produce an atomic bomb in November 1965, they decided to prevent the Jewish state from acquiring this weapon. Consequently, it was decided to spark the flames of war in the region; to draw Israel into carrying out a strike against Egypt, thus turning it into an aggressor in world public opinion; and then to seize the moment and bomb the Israeli reactor. The details of this conspiracy were laid down in a plan that Soviet defense minister Andrei Grechko and Egyptian vice-president Abdel Hakim Amer agreed upon during the latter’s visit to Moscow in November 1966. The plan foresaw Soviet strategic bombers being repainted in Egyptian colors and destroying the Israeli reactor under false flag. A small- scale landing of Soviet naval forces in Haifa was also planned so as to tip the scale in Egypt’s favor. Meanwhile, the Egyptians would lure Israel into the trap by implementing the agreed-upon steps of: remilitarizing Sinai, expelling UNEF (the United Nations Emergency Force), and closing the Straits of Tiran. This sequence of events was to be initiated at a secret signal: the warning of an impending Israeli attack against Syria by Soviet officials. When the Egyptians got carried away by their initial successes at the end of May 1967 and intended to strike Israel first despite the plan, the Soviets pulled out their hidden ace to placate them: a prototype of the ultra-secret MiG-25 reconnaissance plane, “Foxbat” in NATO parlance, was sent on its maiden mission, flying over the Israeli reactor in Dimona and thus proving the seriousness of the Soviets’ commitment. Only the swiftness and extent of the eventual Israeli preemptive strike prevented the actual implementation of the Soviet war plan: for lack of intact airbases, fighter escort, and any chance of success the Red Army’s missions were canceled at the last moment. Instead, extremely successful measures were implemented to cover up the existence of the plan. An Unorthodox Approach This, of course, runs counter to all orthodox Western historiography about the Six Day War, according to which it was a war that no one wanted, a product of errors, misunderstandings, and mutual miscalculations on the part of Egypt, Israel, and other players involved. Ginor and Remez are unlikely revisionists: a down-to-earth husband- and-wife team, they “fell into this role…like Alice into her rabbit hole” (2) by stumbling upon an article about a Soviet naval officer who self-allegedly was to take part in a landing on the Israeli coast in 1967. What ensued were more than six years of intense and determined research in which the two authors began to view the all-too-known story of the war from a dramatically different angle. Their own skepticism about their findings shines through their writing in the first few chapters and adds to the authors’ credibility. But in the course of the writing, the confidence in their unusual thesis grows markedly-and sometimes leads them to far- reaching conclusions that do not always seem to be backed by actual facts. Take, for example, the claim that attracted the most media attention and gave the book its name: that the Soviet Union sent its newest and most secret experimental jet on a field trial over Dimona. Using wars as an experimental ground for secret weapon systems is not unusual. The U.S. F-117 stealth fighter, for example, was first used in the Panama invasion of 1989, several months before the plane was officially disclosed to the public. But in the case of the MiG-25’s mission, the authors’ proof is inadequate. Two facts led them to believe in the secret flights in the first place: (a) that neither Israeli fighter jets nor missiles were able to intercept the plane during the overflights of 17 May and 26 May 1967, and (b) that an online CV of a former Soviet air force general says he flew reconnaissance missions over Israel in that very plane in 1967. Both conclusions are less than convincing. In almost all prior literature, the flights of 17 and 26 May are attributed to Egyptian MiG-21s. And there is really no reason why these jets should not have been capable of the feat: the performance levels that Ginor and Remez (127) give for the intruders are in full accordance with the capabilities of a MiG-21. The fact that Israeli fighter jets were unable to intercept the reconnaissance planes is also not entirely surprising: since the aircraft in question, the Mirage III, is one with a very similar range of performance to the MiG-21, it might not have been possible to catch up with the intruders in the short time it takes to get from Egypt just over the border to Dimona and escape to safety. Dubious Claims Another aspect is striking: although the authors do mention that only one year earlier an Iraqi MiG-21 pilot had defected to Israel with his plane, thus providing Israel and the West with decisive intelligence, they fail to heed the deep shock this must have caused in the Soviet Union. It is thus more than dubious whether the Red Army would really have risked one of its most coveted assets in such a dangerous environment, even more so since the MiG-25 was still in an experimental stage, lacking technical reliability and running on engines with a known tendency to overheat at high speeds. Nine years later the Soviets’ nightmare came true when a Soviet “Foxbat” pilot defected to Japan. One reason for the Soviets to risk their secret plane was, according to Ginor and Remez, for it to provoke an Israeli missile launch, enabling the jet’s cameras to film the missiles’ flight path while not being threatened because of its own high flight altitude. This version is also less than plausible: later reconnaissance versions of the MiG-25 were only carrying photo, not film, cameras. It is therefore very dubious that an early prototype could have been fitted with film cameras. The bio of Aleksandr I. Vybornov was originally published on the website of the U.S. Air University (the link Ginor and Remez provide in their footnotes does not work, as is frequently the case with dated websites). It claims that: He was placed in charge of training for all air defense pilots in 1965, and two years later, was identified to command a possible Soviet Air Force deployment in support of Arab air forces in the Middle East. In Egypt to study the feasibility of the plan, Vybornov flew 12 operational sorties in three months. These sorties were so sensitive that the Soviet Ministry of Defense approved each sortie. He twice flew reconnaissance missions over Israel in a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 “Foxbat” and was again decorated with the “Order of the Red Banner.”[1] The text does not claim that Vybornov flew his missions shortly before or during the Six Day War. In fact, as the authors point out, a writer who had interviewed Vybornov put the time of his stay in Egypt after the war. But the authors insist it must have been during the war, since Vybornov claimed he had witnessed an Israeli attack on an Egyptian airfield (86, 131). Given the fact that again no exact date is given, he might very well also have witnessed an Israeli aerial attack in the opening phase of the War of Attrition, right after the Six Day War. But at this stage, the authors have seemingly abandoned their early skepticism. Another example of far-reaching conclusions on the basis of soft evidence is the so-called “Finnish document,” a central piece of evidence that the authors claim “shows that the USSR’s premeditated moves included a break of diplomatic relations with Israel after the latter was to be provoked into a first strike against Egypt”(157). The document in question is a letter from the Soviet Foreign Ministry asking the Finnish embassy in Moscow to forward “the original of the letter from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, addressed to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr. Levi Eshkol, dated 5 June 1967” (154). The date on the document is not specified (“< > June 1967”). The note rightfully caught the authors’ eyes since Moscow cut off diplomatic relations with Israel only on 10 June 1967, asking Finland to represent it diplomatically from that day on. Although the document is certainly interesting, it does not necessarily prove beyond any doubt-as the authors claim-that Moscow had a premeditated plan to break off contact with Israel. A potential different explanation that the authors do not entertain at all is the possibility that, just as the note states, the Soviets asked the Finnish embassy to forward the originalof the letter-after having sent it as a cable to Israel on 5 June.

Unanswered Questions There are other instances in which the authors do not prove conclusively that the Soviet Union instigated the crisis and war of 1967. In the first place, they fail to explain why the Soviet Union was so afraid of an Israeli A-bomb that it was allegedly willing to risk a potentially fatal military confrontation with the United States. It is also unclear why the intended naval landing was so amazingly ragged in its conception and planning and why, after the war, the Egyptians saw the USSR as their only possible savior after they had been let down so badly by the very same superpower during the war. Although the book does not convince on most counts, Ginor and Remez deserve credit for their extensive research into a hitherto neglected aspect of the Six Day War: that the Soviet Union was a player with its own policy and strategic objectives. The authors have unearthed a multitude of information and hints that point to a more direct involvement of the USSR in the Middle East War of 1967 than had been previously thought. It is the reviewer’s position that the evidence at hand does not support some of the authors’ main conclusions. Nevertheless, it may be better to reserve judgment for the present in the hope that new and more conclusive evidence will in due course be discovered. This should not detract from the fact that Remez and Ginor have produced a work of pioneering research that will influence the future development of the field.

What are your thoughts about the book "Foxbats Over Dimona"?

Hello AskHistorians, I was researching some topic about the MiG-25 Foxbat when a friend told me to checkout the book "Foxbats Over Dimona, the soviets’ nuclear gamble in the six-day war" by Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez. Admittedly, I didn't read the whole scope of the book, but it already put some doubts in my mind regarding its credibility. I know that investigative journalism is regarded as a lesser form of historical research, yet I feel I lack some context to make proper critic judgement of this work. In this book the authors claim that the "Six Day War" (1967 Israeli-Arab war) was instigated by the USSR. All of the actions made by Egypt and Syria were designed to escelate the situation and provoke a militairy reaction from Israel which would enable the USSR to try and bomb the Dimona reactor and stop Israel from obtaining nulear arms. The authors also claim that the USSR was prepairing to actively intervene in the war to accomplish that. One of the claims in this book is that the recon flights made over israel and the site of the reactor itself were done by the then highly classified and experimantal MiG-25R or its experimental versions (Ye-155R-1 to 3 ?). But I remain highly skeptical about this part, since the alleged profile of these flights doesn't match the advance capabilities of the Foxbat but is at the uper edge of the capabilities of the MiG-21 (~50,000 ft at mach 2), and because israeli pilots who managed to spot the recon aircraft identified them as MiG-21s. I'd still very much like to know your thoughts about this books and the claims made therein. Thanks.

Levi Eshkol, repeatedly invited Dmitri Chuvakhin, the Soviet ambassador to Israel, to inspect the border area for troops concentrations. Chuvakhin declined, remarking that “it isn’t a diplomat’s assignment to tour frontiers and see whether forces are being massed there.” The Egyptians also knew that this was a lie. They sent their army chief of staff, Muhammad Fawzi, to Damascus to check, and he reported back to Cairo, on May 14 or 15, that “there was no sign of Israeli troop concentrations and the Russians must have been having hallucinations.” The Syrians also knew it was a lie; and so did UNTSO, the U.N. truce force that supervised the borders.

Yet the Soviet move set the cat among the pigeons, leading directly to the sequence of Egyptian moves that resulted in the war. Starting on May 14, Egypt sent into the Sinai Peninsula four army divisions, undoing the de facto demilitarization of the peninsula that had prevailed since 1957. On May 1618, the Egyptians expelled UNEF, the U.N. peacekeeping force deployed along the Egyptian side of the border between Sinai and the Negev. And on May 2223, they closed the Straits of Tiran, at the northern end of the Red Sea, to Israeli shipping and aircraft, thus substantively cutting Israel off from Africa and Asia.

The problem with Ginor and Remez’s thesis is that it rests on very flimsy evidence. More bluntly, they have no real documentation to back it up. They may well be right, but they do not prove their case. They argue, correctly, that the relevant Soviet documentation–from the KGB, the Communist Party presidium, the GRU, the Soviet Air Force and Navy–is closed; and they add, for good measure, that it is quite possible that the whole design may well never have been recorded on paper. (I doubt that: modern armies cannot march against foreign countries, nor can air and naval fleets deploy to attack them, without a great deal of political, logistical, intelligence, and operational paperwork.) Almost the only backup that Ginor and Remez have is a handful of Soviet memoirs or interviews with former soldiers that allege Soviet preparations for ramshackle, two-bit commando landings (by units including ships’ “cooks and medics,” without maps or specific targets) on Israel’s shores, and some circumstantial evidence that may or may not be relevant (such as the Soviets’ reinforcement of their Mediterranean fleet in the months before the war).

But the “almost” is important. Ginor and Remez do adduce one (almost) hard and troubling piece of evidence: aircraft flying out of Egypt did, on May 17 and May 26, fly over the Dimona reactor site on photography and intelligence-gathering missions, and Israel’s Hawk anti-aircraft batteries and Mirage III fighters failed to intercept, catch, or shoot down the intruders. The planes flew too high and too fast; and this fact, combined with several additional snippets of information, leads Ginor and Remez to conclude, persuasively, that at least some of the intruding aircraft were MiG-25 Foxbats, advanced aircraft that only Soviet pilots could have flown–and, let me add, that only Soviet ground crews could have serviced and only Soviet ground control officers could have directed to target. These overflights, along with Amer’s order to the Egyptian Air Force to attack Israel, including Dimona, on May 26 (an order immediately rescinded by Nasser), caused consternation, almost panic, in the Israeli General Staff and Cabinet. Ginor is a Ukrainian-born researcher who immigrated to Israel in 1967; Remez, her spouse, is an Israeli radio journalist. They stress that their book “has no present-day political agenda”–though, curiously, they compare Russia’s “dilemma” in 1967, when facing Israel’s imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons, with that faced by “the United States in 2006” when confronting Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Still, this book goes a way toward further blackening the image of the Evil Empire in the heyday of the cold war, portraying a mendacious regime that would stop at nothing to instigate a proxy war so as to achieve its military and political purposes.

The Jerusalem Post recently reported that a senior official in the Rus-sian air force confirmed the book’s claim that Soviet pilots flew secret aircraft over Israel’s nuclear reactor before the War. [5] This confirmation strengthens Remez and Ginor’s claims about Soviet aerial intervention and suggests that there are still significant facts about the conflict that are unknown and hidden by the archives. A further investigation could radically change our understanding of these historical events. Circum-stantial arguments have their limits, of course, but the pilot’s story suggests that the book and its thesis, despite their shortcomings, deserve our attention and the further investigation of historians.