The Six Day War
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LIMUN HS 2017 25TH – 26TH NOVEMBER 2017 CRISIS: THE SIX DAY WAR CONTENTS Introduction to the Directorate ......................................................................................... 3 Introduction to the Committee .......................................................................................... 2 The Six Day War ................................................................................................................ 5 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5 Background ................................................................................................................................ 6 Political Background ...................................................................................................................... 6 Economic Background ................................................................................................................... 8 Religious Background .................................................................................................................... 9 Current situation and aims ....................................................................................................... 10 Egyptian and Syrian cabinet ..................................................................................................... 11 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 17 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE Dear Delegates, Welcome to the LIMUN-HS Crisis Simulation! You are now acting as decision-makers in the events leading up to the Six Day War in the Middle East, a time that can be best described as convoluted and tense. The Six Day War (also referred to as the 1967 War) began on the 5th June 1967, and the true causes of the war remain unclear to this day – the amount of theories and conclusions is simply overwhelming. Nevertheless, the 1967 War bears similarities with many of the “proxy” wars of the Cold War, as well as numerous conflicts that began after the Cold War. This conflict is a good example of the fact that diplomacy is an extremely intricate and difficult skill to master; neither side of the Six Day War acknowledged the importance of this skill. Thus, due to the lack of diplomacy, each side assumed the worst about the other, which only heightened the tension, and eventually resulted in a large-scale eruption and war, the results of which we still see in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip today. The crisis simulation will begin a little earlier than the actual war, so you will have a chance to ‘change history’ and, perhaps, avoid the actual war. Remember delegates, that wars are not all about the military. The Six Day War happened in 1967, which was still one of the hotter (more tense) phases of the Cold War, and the superpowers (USA and USSR) were greatly invested in the outcome of the conflict. Or, rather, for a long time they wished to avoid it altogether. So delegates, do bear in mind all the nuances of the build-up to war. We sincerely hope you enjoy the Six Day War crisis. No matter who wins and who loses, crisis is about exploring new possibilities and enjoying yourself. Never be shy to suggest an idea or send in a directive – you never know how it can help your bloc or your character. We are all looking forward to welcoming you at the conference in November! Katrina Marina Crisis Director 2 INTRODUCTION FROM THE CHAIRS Dear Delegates, Looking forward to meeting everyone in the Israeli cabinet as this is my fourth crisis involving the Zionist state. At WarMUN, I chaired the 1948 Israeli cabinet and had an excellent time as PM David Ben-Gurion, however for this crisis I will not have a character but will be there to support you throughout committee session. I have studied the history and diplomacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the interference of global superpowers. This crisis committee will also be an introduction to the Cold War in the Middle East and how it had monumental effect on the conflict. Feel free to ask me any questions about the Israeli cabinet, your position, your directives or rules and procedure. Also feel free to ask about my views on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hamzah Sheikh, Chair of the Israeli Cabinet. Dear Delegates, My name is Kinza Khan and I am a second-year student at City University of London. I am delighted to introduce myself as the Assistant Chair for the Israeli Cabinet. Since the age of 13 I have been engaged in the London Model United Nations Conference (MUNC). Starting as a delegate, I won awards for my debating skills and I was soon promoted as a chair. This led me to the prestigious role of chairing the Security Council. Alongside Chairing, I became Undersecretary General which I enjoyed thoroughly and soon I was honoured to become Secretary General. Throughout the years, my passion for MUNC has flourished. I have enjoyed meeting new people, creating strong friendships, working in a team and being knowledgeable about our world. I hope you enjoy the next conference and create a lasting resolution which reflects your hard work. Good luck delegates. Kindest Regards, Kinza Khan, Assistant Chair, Israel Cabinet 3 Dear Delegates, Hello and welcome to LIMUN - HS and the Egyptian/Syrian Cabinet! My name is Ivan and I will be your chair during this crisis simulation. As members of the cabinet, it is important that you all work together efficiently, look out for details, but also don’t lose sight of the bigger picture. “Knowledge is power” and a great tool, so research is necessary for any effective cabinet. We hope you enjoy the conference and take advantage of the great opportunity presented to you. We look forward to seeing you all, and good luck! Ivan Srbulov, Chair of Egyptian/Syrian Cabinet. Dear Delegates, My name is Muslima and I am a second year Medical Geneticist at Queen Mary University of London. I have been taking part in Model United Nations since the age of 14. Since then, I have been a Delegate, Chair, Secretary General and I am currently serving as a Director for several High school conferences. I hope you all make the most out of the conference and, leave with the everlasting MUN- fever. I look forward to meeting you all! MuslimaSheikh Ummay, Assistant Chair of Egyptian/Syrian Cabinet. 4 THE SIX DAY WAR INTRODUCTION By May 31st 1967 the situation in between Israel and Egypt was very tense and war seemed almost inevitable. What happened over the past few months to raise the tension and let the situation get this far? Here are the key events between Israel and its neighbours: On the 13th May 1967, the Egyptian government was given top secret information by the Kremlin that Israel was going to attack Egypt, which subsequently led to a full militarisation (preparation for war) in Egypt. This, in turn, meant that Syria was also building up its forces, as a result of the 1966 Syria-Egypt Pact (a Pact which stated the in case of an attack on one country the other would defend it). On the 23rd May, the Israelis encountered another big problem, when President Nasser (of Egypt) declared that two islands on the Straits of Tiran would be blocked by Egypt. This inconvenience came at a great cost for the Israelis, who used the Straits for export purposes. The Israelis, extremely reliant on the support of the US, asked Lyndon B. Johnson (then President of the US) for permission to lead an offensive against Egypt. On the 26th May, Lyndon B. Johnson issued a statement prohibiting Israel from doing so; the US president declared that if Israel were to attack Egypt, they will not get any support from the US. In the meantime, the Egyptian government was acting similarly to their adversary. President Nasser sent an Egyptian delegation to Moscow, to ask Kremlin for support and permission to go to war with Israel. Moscow denied this request. The situation seems critical, as both sides are adamant in waging war against each other. The key note above is that during this period there was almost no direct communication between Israel and Egypt. They could only see the actions that the other were taking and try to guess what was happening. Israel seeing Egypt and Syria start to mobilize meant that they could only assume the other was preparing to attack them and try to make further preparations for an invasion. Overall, diplomacy is weak, and both Defence Ministers have every reason to believe that one side may attack the other in no time, not knowing that both superpowers are very afraid of sending their allies to war. Nevertheless, wars can still be avoided, if decisions are made with extra caution, and the government thinks not one, not two, but three steps ahead. 5 BACKGROUND Political Background Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, many Palestinians were forced to permanently leave their homes in the land that became known as Israel. Tensions remained between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries in the coming years, including during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, wherein Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser sought to nationalise, and block Israel’s trade utilisation of, the Canal running through Egypt. This blockade, while partially successful on a strategic front, nevertheless significantly increased hostilities between Egypt and Israel. Along with regional tensions, global conflicts also increased the scope of dangerous uncertainty for the Arab countries. The Cold War tensions of the era, during the 50s-60s