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Vol. 4 (2016) Issue 10 available for subscribers only $4.99

Russia's Political Drama Heading Into 2018

by Yuri Korgunyuk Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russian Duma elections recently wrapped up in September, and those results have led 03. Elections without surprises to increased speculation about what’s next for Russia’s political future. Next up, are the by yuri korgunyuk 2018 presidential elections. As Russia prepares for these elections, it’s worth taking a closer look at the many of the themes and ideas that are likely to persist between now 09. Interview with Andrei Kole- and 2018. For example, it’s clear that the current party of power – United Russia – is snikov: Hawks vs. doves: Who will looking for a new identity that will resonate with voters. Moreover, the Kremlin is look- dominate in the Kremlin before the ing for the right mix of liberals and conservatives to push forward important domestic 2018 elections? and foreign policy initiatives. As part of the new Russia Direct report, we also interviewed Andrei Kolesnikov of the 15. Interview with Mikhail Zygar: Carnegie Moscow Center, who is among the foremost authorities on Russian domestic Understanding Russian politics, politics. As he points out, many of the recent moves in the current political arena – without the conspiracy theories such as the replacement of key Kremlin insiders and the co-opting of slogans and ideas from the opposition – can be viewed as attempts to maintain top-down control over 21. Further reading Russian society while providing the semblance of transparency, efficiency and order. Finally, Mikhail Zygar, author of “All the Kremlin’s Men,” explains how policymaking at the highest levels reaches of the Russian government actually works. While Western political observers typically assume that much of Russian foreign policy is the calcu- AUTHOR lated strategy of one man – Vladimir Putin – the reality is often much different. There are many competing clans and many competing ideas, meaning that many moves are simply reactive rather than proactive. Ultimately, that may be the greatest mistake that Western analysts make in analyzing Russian politics. They will mistake the constant tweaks, changes and adjustments made by the Kremlin between now and 2018 as the clear signs of a deliberate, me- thodical plan rather than tactical responses to emerging problems.

Yuri Korgunyuk

Ph.D. in History, Doctor of Political Science, Head of the Political Science Department at the Mos- cow-based Information Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foun- dation. Since 2012, he has been chairman of the Scientific Coun- cil for the Comparative Study of Party and Electoral Systems at the Russian Association of Political Science. Korgunyuk is the author of numerous publications on the Russian political system and do- mestic politics. reu t er s

| 1 | russia-direct.org FROM THE EDITOR

Opening a new chapter in the Kremlin’s policy

Another man’s mind is a closed book, reads a In this report, Russia Direct gives voice to well-known Russian proverb. Likewise, it can well-known Russian political expert Yuri Kor- be extended to the field of Russian politics. gunyuk from the Moscow-based Information After all, both Russian and foreign experts Science for Democracy (INDEM) Foundation. have always seen the Russian decision- He discusses the Kremlin’s different tactics making process as obscure and full of se- and schemes in the latest political campaigns crecy. Because of the lack of information on as well as the implications of the 2016 par- what is going on behind the Kremlin’s walls, liamentary elections on the country’s political political science has turned into a sort of future. At the same time, in an extended inter- guesswork. Instead of facts, pundits rely on view with Russia Direct, Andrei Kolesnikov from speculations and assumptions. the Carnegie Moscow Center analyzes the links Oddly enough, it is normal for Russian po- between the parliamentary elections and the litical analysis — it would be strange if this upcoming presidential campaign, while giving process worked otherwise. Yet, at any rate, some hints of what political forces – conserva- this complicates the work of those who seek tives or liberal technocrats – will dominate in to understand the logic of Russian politics. the Kremlin in 2018 and beyond. Despite these challenges, Russia Direct has Finally, the report features an interview with provided new analysis of the ins and outs of Mikhail Zygar, the former chief editor at inde- the Kremlin’s politics in an attempt to shed pendent TV station Dozhd, who discusses his light on Russian policymaking. It is crucial to latest book “All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Pavel Koshkin, Editor-in-Chief understand the scenarios of Russia’s politi- Court of Vladimir Putin.” cal future, especially given the parliamentary I hope you enjoy this report. Please, do not hes- election that took place in September, and itate to reach me directly at p.koshkin@russia- the upcoming presidential elections, sched- direct.org with your questions. Thank you for uled for 2018. being our loyal reader.

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Eugene Abov Chairman, Russia Direct, Deputy Director General, Rossiyskaya Gazeta Publishing House, Publisher, Russia Beyond The Headlines Julia Golikova Director for Development, Russia Direct, Deputy Publisher, Commercial and Foreign Partnership Director, Russia Beyond The Headlines Elena Potapova Deputy Publisher, Circulation, Digital Strategy and Operations, Russia Beyond The Headlines Pavel Koshkin Editor-in-Chief Ksenia Zubacheva Executive Editor Dominic Basulto Executive Editor, U.S. Andrei Zolotov Executive Editor, Europe Alexey Khlebnikov Senior Editor Maria Stambler Social Media Director Olga Fastova Associate Publisher, Sales, Marketing, Events Ekaterina Belan Digital Marketing Manager Anna Sergeeva Representative, New York Olga Guitchounts Representative, Washington, D.C. Andrey Shimarskiy Art Director Nikolay Shiyanov Senior Designer Alexander Kislov Designer Milla Domogatskaya Production Designer Andrey Zaitsev Head of Photo Department Nikolay Korolev Photo Editor

© Russia Direct 2016 All rights reserved. ISSN 2412-8171. A product of No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, or by any information storage and retrieval system. The views expressed are those of certain participants in the discussion and do not necessarily reflect the views of all participants or of Russia Direct.

| 2 | russia-direct.org Elections without surprises

The success of the United Russia ruling party in September 2016 parliamentary elections is unquestionable. But does it mean that the party of power is actually growing in popularity?

Vladimir Smirnov/TASS

vladimir smirnov / tass

Yuri Korgunyuk he main surprise of the Sept. 18 elections to the Russian State Duma, the lower chamber of the Russian parliament, was an al- Tmost total absence of any surprises. The only surprise, in fact, was how effective the Kremlin’s preventive measures had been in the run-up to the elections. These measures can be divided into three main groups: liberal measures, repressive measures and manipulative measures. The liberal measures primarily included the “party reform” of 2012, which sharply lowered the entry barriers for the creation of new politi- cal parties and their participation in elections. In 2011, new parties were required to have as many as 40,000 members; with the reform, only 500 members were necessary to register a new political party.

| 3 | russia-direct.org United Russia benefited from Another measure that falls into this category was the co-opting of the political agenda of the left con- the dozens of new political servative (“patriotic”) opposition by the leaders of the ruling party. It started in 2012 with the adoption parties that largely played of the law on “foreign agent” NGOs and “the Dima the role of “spoilers,” drawing Yakovlev law,” a ban on the adoption of Russian or- phans by Americans. The culmination of this was the away votes from the main propagandist coverage by the state mass media of parliamentary opposition the operation in Eastern Ukraine and the incorpora- tion of Crimea.

Tactics used by the Kremlin to public In addition, in 2012-2013 it was not necessary to maintain control support collect signatures for a party to take part in regional All these measures proved their effectiveness in the and local elections. However, this rule was modified regional elections of 2012–2015, and it’s easy to see in 2014 — only those parties that were already rep- how they worked in 2016. The appointment of a single % resented in their respective regional legislature were voting day to take place in the second week of Sep- 56 admitted to the election. Yet, even after that, the tember resulted in a lower voter turnout: The elec- conditions for the admission of parties to elections toral campaign fell during the summer period, when were more liberal than before 2012. voters’ interest in politics is at a low. In September Repressive measures included increasing the pen- many city residents are busy with their dachas, which of Russians trust alties for conducting unauthorized street rallies or are a higher priority for them than attending a poll- Putin (WCIOM, Oct. violations during authorized street events; adopting ing station. At the same time, the ability of regional 2016). laws on “foreign agent” nonprofit organizations and and local administrations to mobilize the controlled introducing a roster of “undesirable” international electorate (i.e. public sector employees, rural popula- NGOs in Russia; and blocking any Internet resources tion, etc.) remained the same, as lowering the voter % that, according to the Federal Service for Supervi- turnout mainly affected the “uncontrolled” voters. 45 sion in the Telecom, Information Technologies and Only once had the reliance on lower voter turnout Mass Communications Sector (Roskomnadzor), vio- failed to work, but that was an exceptional case that late the “anti-extremist” laws. concerned the election of the mayor of Moscow in In terms of clamping down on liberal themes in the 2013. At that time, as a result of a low-profile electoral of the population media, the government cleaned up the TV media campaign, it was the ruling party electorate that was supports United space. For example, the last independent TV chan- demobilized while Navalny managed to rally all his Russia (WCIOM, nels, namely Dozhd and Tomsk TV-2, were taken off supporters and gain 27 percent of the votes as op- Oct. 2016). the air. The authorities also prosecuted the partici- posed to forecasted 9 percent. pants of the 2011–2012 protests in Moscow’s Bolot- That was an exceptional situation because it was naya Square — including popular opposition leaders Moscow where, after the protests of 2011–2012, it such as Alexei Navalny, who was prohibited from was much more dangerous for the authorities to ma- participating in the elections as a result. nipulate the figures without looking at the real voting Manipulative techniques primarily included chang- results, and because the main opposition candidate es to the electoral law. For example, a single voting was none other than Navalny. His charismatic appeal day was scheduled for September, the State Duma had not shrunk, but rather, had grown considerably elections were shifted from December to September, after he had been convicted in a corruption case. and elections to the lower chamber of parliament United Russia also benefited from the dozens of were held through a mixed member system, when new political parties that largely played the role of half of the seats are elected in single-member dis- “spoilers,” drawing away votes from the main par- tricts (plurality system) and the other half are elected liamentary opposition — Communist Party (CPRF), from party lists allocated by proportional representa- Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) and A Just Russia. tion. Meanwhile, United Russia candidates received As a result, United Russia retained a majority in all the most favorable conditions through the adoption the representative bodies on the regional and local of single-member districts. levels.

| 4 | russia-direct.org the outcomes of Parliamentary elections

Voter turnout in 2016 % of Popular Vote United Russia 54.19% Communist Party 13.34% LDPR 13.14% A Just Russia 6.23% Communists of Russia 2.27% Yabloko 1.99% Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice 1.73% Rodina 1.51% Party of Growth 1.29%

<10% 10-20% 20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% Greens 0.76%

60-70% 70-80% >80% PARNAS 0.73% Patriots of Russia 0.59% The shift of the elections from December to September led to Civic Platform 0.22% a decline in the voter turnout by almost 10 million — from 60.21% Civilian Power 0.14% in 2011 to 47.88% in 2016. source: RBC / central election commission of the russian federation alyona repkina

The authorities’ bet on a plurality voting system (in for the ruling party exceeded 70-80 percent in the which each voter is allowed to vote for only one can- regions — primarily in the ethnic republics — where didate) also proved effective. Before 2014 members the level of falsification was massive. As a result, the to the Moscow City Duma were elected by a mixed proportional system helped United Russia to surpass member system. Since 2014 they started to get elected its previous result by gaining 54.2 percent as com- through single-member districts. As a result, the liberal pared to 49.3 percent in 2011. parties, namely Yabloko and PARNAS, which would Even more effective was the return to elections ac- have been certain to gain a representation in Moscow cording to single-member electoral districts. They City Duma according to a proportional system (in had been abandoned in the mid-2000s, but not which divisions in an electorate are reflected propor- because a plurality system was disadvantageous to tionately in the elected body), failed to have any pres- United Russia. On the contrary, although during the ence there at all. At the same time, United Russia kept 2003 elections the “party of power” gained less than an absolute majority in the Moscow City Duma. 37 percent of the votes by party lists, it was still able The 2016 State Duma elections provided even more to form a constitutional majority (i.e. over 300 seats) evidence of the effectiveness of the political tactics in the 4th State Duma (2003–2007), owing it precise- chosen by the Kremlin. ly to the single mandate candidates. At that time, however, the Kremlin saw the main threat not in the political opposition but in the gov- Changing the system in favor ernors of some major regions that were donors of the of United Russia federal budget. In the opinion of Russian President The shift of the elections from December to Septem- Vladimir Putin and his close circle, those governors be- ber led to a decline in the voter turnout by almost 10 haved too independently and had to be “put in their million — from 60.21 percent in 2011 to 47.88 percent place.” The governors fully controlled single mandate in 2016. This decline primarily affected the regions candidates elected on their territories, so this instru- with low support for United Russia and the strong- ment had to be taken away from them. The switch to holds of the liberal opposition — Moscow and St. Pe- a proportional system in the State Duma elections in- tersburg. By contrast, the voter turnout and support tended to solve that problem by giving the Presidential

| 5 | russia-direct.org The State Duma elections were dull and lacked intrigue. This is a worrying sign and not just with respect to the theory of democracy, but because today the country is going through very serious challenges.

Elena Shestopal, professor and head of the Political Sociology and Psychology Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University

Administration predominant control over the process Communist Party and A Just Russia got seven depu- of nominating candidates from the ruling party. ties each, the LDPR got only five deputies. Among However, after the governor elections were can- other elected deputies were the leaders of the Rodina celed and the practice of appointment of heads of and Civic Platform parties (Alexei Zhuravlyov and Ri- regions by the President was established, there were fat Shaykhutdinov), but there is a suspicion that their no longer any threats to the absolute power of the election was ensured by the local administrations (it Presidential Administration in selecting candidates is simply impossible to explain victory in their respec- from United Russia for Duma elections. tive districts in any other way). So, the long attachment of the Kremlin to the pro- The same kind of administrative support was appar- portional system and its mistrust of elections by ently enjoyed by the only independent candidate to single-member districts can only be explained by its get to the Duma: A member of the United Russia’s inertia in thinking and phobia of changes. Even after Supreme Council, Vladislav Reznik distanced himself United Russia received less than half of all votes in from the party exclusively because he did not want to the 2011 Duma elections, the federal administration “cast a shadow on it.” In March this year he was put on was in no hurry to return a mixed system: Initially, the the international wanted list by Interpol, as in Spain plan was to transform the plurality system by break- he was charged with being involved in a criminal ring ing the party lists into a number of regional pieces and money laundering. to match the 225 single member districts. The plan was not implemented for a purely technical reason: The introduction of such requirements would deny all Russia’s “spoiler” parties parties except United Russia the possibility of partici- The consequences of the “party reform” also played pating in elections. into the government’s hands. In particular, each oppo- Apparently, the Kremlin lost its hypersensitivity to sition party (not only among the parliamentary par- the plurality system only after the 2012 elections to ties but also non-parliamentary ones) had a spoiler the parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) in which twin, sometimes even a few twins, in these elections. Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions got a mere Thus, for the Communist Party, it was not only the 30 percent of the votes by party lists but was able Patriots of Russia party that played the role of such a to form a solid parliamentary majority thanks to the twin (similarly to the elections in 2007 and 2011) but single-mandate candidates. also the recently registered Communists of Russia Due to the return to the mixed system, United Rus- party that tried to appear as even greater apologists sia benefited even more in 2016 than the Party of of the Soviet past than the Communist Party, which Regions did in 2012. While Yanukovych had to win they constantly stigmatized for its opportunism and over independent single-mandate candidates, United i st “conciliatory” tendency. o Russia used the majority system to push through 203 v The Rodina party acted as a spoiler for LDPR while deputies (out of 225). Along with the 140 deputies the Russian Party of Pensioners for Justice was a v / ria no elected by the plurality system, the party received the o spoiler for A Just Russia. The liberal Yabloko and y an k largest parliamentary majority in the history of post- al the People’s Freedom Party (PARNAS) parties had

Soviet Russia. Moreover, all the ruling party’s single © v i t as many as three spoilers: the Party of Growth, Civic mandate deputies owe their election exclusively to Also read Platform and Civilian Power. Thereby, half of the 14 United Russia and its administrative resources, so parties that participated in the elections were spoiler Want to know more there is no chance of a “riot” on their part. about Russia’s Other parties were not so successful, with few can- political system? didates elected in single-mandate districts: While the Read it here: www.russia-direct.org/tags/politics.

| 6 | russia-direct.org the “crimean-ukrainian” narrative seemed to have been a decisive factor in the electoral defeat of the Yabloko and PARNAS parties. Yabloko got an almost twice smaller share of the vote than it had in 2011 parties. The 7.75 percent of the votes that they gained can be considered as “taken away” from the parties for which they acted as spoilers. The Communist Party suffered the greatest: As Communists of Russia managed to snatch 2.27 percent of the votes, CPRF nearly lost the second place to LDPR as a result.

The patriotic agenda Grigory Yavlinsky, the The outcome of the elections was significantly affect- leader of the Yabloko vyacheslav prokofiev / tass ed by the fact that Putin and the “party of power” had party. co-opted the “patriotic agenda” from the Communist Yabloko and PARNAS parties. Yabloko got an almost Party and LDPR. Of course, the “patriotic” wave raised twice smaller share of the vote than it had in 2011 — by the events of 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 1.99 percent against 3.43 percent in 2011 — despite had subsided by the time of the Duma elections and the fact that this time its claim for the role of a unit- the state-controlled TV channels did not exploit the ing force for all democrats appeared more convincing “Ukrainian” or international agendas in general dur- than five years ago. ing the last week before the election, fully aware that In 2011, the list of Yabloko was rather a friendly get- the audience was tired of them and could react in an together, with only the old Yabloko activists included. unpredictable way. In 2016, the party’s first ten candidates included such Nevertheless, the imperialist rhetoric that had domi- authoritative figures of the liberal opposition move- nated Russian television for the past two years appar- ment as Dmitry Gudkov and Vladimir Ryzhkov, not to ently played into the hands of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s mention the leader of the Yabloko Pskov division, Lev LDPR: It was the only opposition party that gained a Shlosberg, who had grown into a national-level politi- greater share of the votes by the proportional repre- cian during the past two years. sentation system as compared to the previous elec- PARNAS, which had long been a competitor of tion cycle (13.14 percent vs. 11.67 percent in 2011). All Yabloko for the role of “gatherer of democrats,” had the other parties, with the exception of Yabloko, PAR- lost its position by the spring of 2016. After the 2015 NAS and the Greens, also tried to exploit the “patriot- murder of opposition figure Boris Nemtsov — the ic” agenda in their campaigns, but it was Zhirinovsky main public face of that liberal party — his co-chair who was particularly good at it. Long before 2014 he Mikhail Kasyanov became the sole leader of PARNAS. had demanded to reintegrate not only Crimea but He is a good bureaucrat but an unsuccessful public also the whole of Eastern Ukraine into Russia. politician totally devoid of charisma. In his struggle for power in the party Kasyanov forced out almost all of his potential competitors. Defeat of the liberal opposition As a result, it was Vyacheslav Maltsev — a nationalist The “Crimean-Ukrainian” narrative seemed to have blogger from Saratov region and someone who had been a decisive factor in the electoral defeat of the no relation to PARNAS — who won the primaries held

| 7 | russia-direct.org by the party in the spring of 2016. At first, Kasyanov intended to declare the primaries void, but then he decided that Maltsev could attract part expert of the nationalist electorate to Parnas and agreed to include him as a comment number 2 in the party list. However, both Yabloko and PARNAS were wrong in their calculations: The former gained under 2 percent of the votes, and the latter — a mere 0.73 per- cent. This failure cannot be attributed solely to the activity of their spoilers: Party of Growth, Civic Platform and Civilian Power together account for only James Sherr 1.65 percent of the votes. Even the total of these figures does not reach Associate fellow and former head the 5 percent necessary to overcome the entry barrier to the parliament. of the Russia and Eurasia programme (2008-2011) at Chatham House Implications for 2018 Most probably, the main factor here lies in the general demoralization My prognosis before the elections and demobilization of the liberal electorate that started under the in- was that there would be no repeat of fluence of events in Ukraine. Putin actually managed to split not only 2011-2012, there would be no ma- the united opposition front, which had been campaigning against him in jor protest and that people who were 2011–2012, but also the liberal electorate as a whole. dissatisfied would demonstrate their Apparently, a greater part of it simply ignored the elections. The disap- dissatisfaction by sitting at home. pointment of the liberal voters was due both to the slowdown of the pro- And this is exactly what happened. test wave of 2011–2012 and to the “patriotic” euphoria of 2014–2015, which So, I read the low turnout as an indi- developed smoothly into a propaganda-fueled hysteria. Part of the vot- cator of how many people in Russia ers probably fell for the slogan “Crimea is ours!” while others came to the are dissatisfied or at least under- conclusion that no changes were possible in this country. One way or the stand that their vote is not going to other, they expressed their attitude towards the elections by abstaining change anything. It is not because from using their votes. And thus, they deprived the liberal parties of the the elections are rigged. The main last hope to bring about changes through elections. factor is that the Russian elector- The success of Putin, his administration and United Russia in these ate knows whomever they elect to elections is unquestionable. However, this begs the question: Could this the Duma, these people are either victory be a Pyrrhic one, a victory inflicting such a devastating toll on the puppets or they are representatives winner that it is tantamount to defeat? of local power structures and they After all, a reduction in the popular support of the opposition is not at all do not govern for the people, they identical to growth in the support of the government. Quite the reverse, in govern for themselves. absolute figures, the number of voters that voted for United Russia fell by And therefore having a stable elec- 4 million. Considering that a sizeable proportion of votes was falsely cred- tion does not mean that Russia ited to the “party of power” in the zones of mass, sweeping falsification, it is stable because the real issues can be concluded that in reality the support of the government in Russia is in Russia involve the relationship not growing, but rather reducing. That means that gradually, the essence between people and power at vari- of the regime is changing: It is evolving from open (electoral) authoritari- ous different levels. In some places anism to closed authoritarianism. That is a kind of a dead end, which is that might look like a good, firm impossible to overcome through democratic procedures. and predictable relationship, but in Apparently, the apathy that has spread over Russian society and par- other places of Russia, where there ticularly, its most active, educated part is a fairly good guarantee that are over 80 regional subjects and Putin will be seamlessly re-elected as President in 2018. One cannot localities, things are not that good. exclude that the administration will try to strengthen these guarantees There is still a real possibility of dis- by taking measures to further tighten the regime, since such measures cord rising locally at different levels helped stop the protest wave in 2011–2012 and, later, remove the most in ways that people had difficulties dangerous opposition figures from the political arena. predicting before. So, I think the But such measures will only cement the problems accumulated in the Kremlin can draw some confidence economy and society, while erasing the traditional ways of solving them from these elections, but not a great within the existing system. That means that in the future, solving those deal. problems will only be possible under extraordinary conditions.

| 8 | russia-direct.org INTERVIEW Hawks vs. doves: Who will dominate in the Kremlin before the 2018 elections? Carnegie Moscow Center’s Andrei Kolesnikov discusses the links between the 2016 parliamentary and 2018 presidential elections, focusing on Russia’s political future and the ongoing rivalry between the “hawks” and “doves” within the Kremlin’s inner circle.

from personal archives

Andrei Kolesnikov Pavel Koshkin

Senior associate and the chair of the ussia’s recent parliamentary elections were, by and large, a dress Russian Domestic Politics and Political rehearsal for the more important presidential elections coming up Institutions Program at the Carnegie Rin 2018. Between now and then, members of the political estab- Moscow Center. His research focuses on lishment will be able to try on new roles, experiment with new campaign the major trends shaping Russian domestic slogans, and determine who will play a starring role within the Kremlin’s politics, with particular focus on the fallout inner circle. The central consideration is how to consolidate power in a from the Ukraine crisis and ideological way that balances the interests of the government and the population. shifts inside Russian society. Kolesnikov To get an inside look at Russia’s current political landscape, Russia also works with the Gaidar Institute for Direct sat down with Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Economic Policy, sits on the board of the According to him, the 2016 parliamentary elections provide a preview of Yegor Gaidar Foundation and is a member what to expect in 2018 and beyond. of the Committee of Civil Initiatives. Russia Direct: To what extent were the 2016 parliamentary elec- tions fair and legitimate, in your view? Andrei Kolesnikov: In fact, they were juridically legitimate because they were conducted in accordance with Russian law. However, the de- gree of the political, not juridical legitimacy is a debatable question be-

| 9 | russia-direct.org take into account all positions and sig- nals that were coming from the regions during the electoral campaign and could not ignore them. There were so many of these signals that she objectively and physically could not control the ­elections throughout the country, espe- cially, in the distant regions.

RD: What kinds of violations took place during the 2016 elections, if any? A.K.: Violations took place, even though they were not large-scale, like

© mikhai l k im en ti ev / ria novos previously during the 2011 elections. These violations included the use of administrative resources for influence, rigged and fabricated voting, stuffing the ballot box, and dirty political tech- niques against the liberal and commu- nist parties during the political cam- ti

Tactically, Duma elections were aimed at preparing the groundwork for the 2018 presidential elections. paign and before Election Day. There was also orchestrated voting, cause of the low turnout: It means that To a lesser extent, these when cadets, students and governmen- the representation of Russian citizens in elections were fair and tal employees were ordered to vote. This the parliament became even less than transparent in the distant also should be taken into account. All previously. About one-third of the Rus- Russian regions or — in the these violations took place not only in sian population voted at the elections. words of political expert distant regions, but also in those under Even though the United Russia rul- Dmitry Oreshkin — “zones of the steady control of the Central Election ing party garnered four million fewer peculiar electoral culture.” Commission. votes than during the 2011 elections, it received more seats in the parliament. RD: Why did the United Russia party In addition, liberal politicians are not in- win despite its declining popularity cluded in the parliament at all. Thus, po- lesser extent — no wonder that people throughout Russia? litically, the legitimacy of the elections is were compelled to vote in accordance A.K.: The fact the United Russia won a matter of question. with the orders of local authorities. The the majority in the State Duma and the Regarding honesty, these elections were violations in these regions were likely to party’s popularity are basically different fair in the polling stations with observers, be common. things. Its popularity has been decreas- to a large extent. They were honest in ing indeed. It is one reality. But it doesn’t the regions, in which the Central Election RD: Does Russia’s Central Election prevent the party from winning most of Commission controlled the electoral pro- Commission have any tools to influ- the seats. That is the other reality. cess in cooperation with observers. ence voting in the distant regions? Russian citizens don’t see the party To a lesser extent, these elections were A.K.: There are some instruments, but as a body that deals with the problems fair and transparent in the distant Rus- local authorities limit and restrict them. of the population. The credibility and sian regions or — in the words of promi- I don’t think the administration of the approval rankings of almost all govern- nent political expert Dmitry Oreshkin Russian president hampered the work of mental bodies, except law enforcement — “zones of peculiar electoral culture,” the Central Election Commission Head, agencies and the president himself, are which saw an abnormally high electoral Ella Pamfilova. She tried to balance the dropping. And United Russia is not the turnout. I mean, for instance, the repub- interests of Russian President Vladimir exception, because people perceive it lic of Tuva in southern Siberia, the North Putin and the interests of the country’s not as a party, but as a kind of a govern- Caucasus, Kemerovo region etc. civil society. mental body. Its rating will keep going These regions were controlled by the This is the middle-of-the-road position down, but slowly, step by step. Central Election Commission to a much and it is very difficult. She just tried to Usually, if you vote for United Russia, it

| 10 | russia-direct.org means a mechanical, symbolic process, a relations between the litical freedoms, but feed you instead”) sort of political law-abiding ritual. If you government and the people — doesn’t work anymore and might be are law-abiding and go to the polling not so relevant. That’s why the authori- station, you are likely to vote for United ties find it necessary to feed people Russia, because it is necessary. This is with imperial pride, wars, Crimea and the very logic and motivation that drive % % increase political control and establish average voters to elect United Russia. 66 7 a political monopoly, which also means Even though some people preferred not creating fake liberal parties such as the to vote for the ruling party, they voted Party of Growth. After all, it is a good ex- for the current authorities, because there ample of the spoiler artificial party cre- were no real alternatives: They voted ei- ated within the Kremlin’s test tube. And of Russians rely only of respondents think ther for one of the three systemic par- on themselves and that communicating this control is likely to persist as long as liamentary parties or the spoiler parties, avoid any contact with the authorities this regime exists. which aimed at distracting the attention with the authorities helps to achieve their of voters and preventing the opposition (Levada, Aug. 2016). goals. RD: What will the 2016 parliamentary from gaining parliamentary seats. elections change in Russian politics? A.K.: Basically, there won’t be big RD: Why did the Russian opposition ocratic forces as well as well-educated changes. Tactically, these elections fail and what is its key problem? intelligentsia, they might succeed in the aimed at preparing the groundwork for A.K.: The reason why they failed can future. But in reality it’s hardly probable. the 2018 presidential elections and test- be traced back to the personal ambitions ing Russia’s current political system. of the opposition leaders. They couldn’t RD: You said that the Kremlin would And in this regard, this task was fulfilled. team up and compete with each other. prevent the emergence of a new pow- By 2018 Putin is going to look for new In addition, they have different values, in erful liberal political force in Russia, faces and figures to renew his team, but fact. I mean right-leaning liberals and left- because the existence of such a force this is going to be a different political leaning liberals don’t always agree. This contradicts the nature of the authori- process, even though it is partly related does matter, after all. Moreover, these tarian regime. Yet why are the Russian to the parliamentary elections. leaders don’t have enough political heft. authorities afraid of everything that Most of them cannot be considered pow- is associated with liberals, if those RD: You said the 2016 parliamentary erful and influential political figures. within the Kremlin are pretty confi- elections were a proving ground for Another problem is that the authori- dent, if their approval rankings are the 2018 presidential elections and tarian regime in Russia will prevent the high among the majority of Russians, tested Russia’s current political sys- emergence of new powerful liberal forc- if people don’t trust liberals and the tem. Could you be more specific? es in Russia. If such a party emerges and idea of liberalism is totally discredited A.K.: These elections confirmed the le- poses a serious challenge to the authori- in the country? gitimacy of the current Russian authori- ties like opposition leader Alexei Na- A.K.: Well, first, it is a matter of the ties. Once again, the Kremlin sees that it valny did, it will be either destroyed or logic of development of any authorita- does have the mandate to rule the coun- discredited and marginalized. So, in such tive regime. It adds up to total political try. Putin himself does have this man- a situation, it is very difficult to come up control. Second, in fact, the authorities date, because the ruling party is asso- with a pragmatic solution. However, this are not so confident that they are so ciated with his name, and the country’s year’s parliamentary elections proved popular among the people, as implied political unity is based on the Crimea that the only political democratic force by the words of Russian President Vladi- narrative and the parliament itself. noticeable on a scale of a whole coun- mir Putin, who came to the United Rus- The system passed the test success- try is the Yabloko party and its leader sia headquarters after the elections and fully. So, it can work for a certain period Grigory Yavlinsky, no matter how you said that, despite economic challenges of time as long as everybody is satis- view them. and the difficult situation, people voted fied with this model. Thus, the system is Indeed, it is losing popularity year after for United Russia. If you read between ready to live for another 18 months until year, but this party remains firmly within the lines, you can detect the feeling of the 2018 presidential elections, with the the country’s political landscape and if the lack of confidence. parliament organically embedded in this the opposition is able to persuade vot- It means that the social contract — system and ready to fulfill blindly all or- ers that Yabloko brings together differ- economic well-being in exchange for ders from the president. ent representatives of liberal and dem- political freedoms (“we restrict your po- The other question is how will these

| 11 | russia-direct.org elections be conducted in terms of ob- vious predictability and the absolute absence of interest toward them given the fact that nobody can compete with Putin. In fact, he is the only candidate who will win. So, there is the lack of mo- tivation for voters to come to the polling stations in 2018.

RD: Do you mean that the turnout at the presidential election will be low? A.K.: The turnout is going to be the key question. In fact, the 2018 election is a ref- erendum that will test the credibility and approval of one person [Putin]. In this situation, the authorities have to create an artificial rivalry to Putin, but it is hardly o likely to work. The real rival won’t be al- t lowed to compete with Putin openly, if we -p h o o ck are talking about Navalny. Thus, if Putin is t

once again elected president, there is no A/vos motivation to vote. e P On the other hand, as indicated by this year’s parliamentary election, those who to power once again, depriving them of A.K.: Statistically, it is difficult to make came to the polling stations observed a the opportunity of a choice. Eventually, any conclusions, yet the correlation does sort of political ritual. It is a matter of car- they took to the streets. exist. Indeed, Crimea helped to mobilize rying out a law-abiding commitment. And Yet their protests failed to bring chang- people, even part of the liberal-minded this might drive people to vote in many es among the authorities. Moreover, citizens. It became the key narrative that Russian regions and have an impact on these protests brought about a series mobilized the nation. Those who didn’t the electoral turnout. However, I expect it of arrests, which had a chilling effect on support the incorporation of Crimea are to be lower than during the parliamentary the protesters. Afterwards, the authori- seen as outcasts. They are considered to elections, especially in Moscow and St. ties took very repressive legal measures be outsiders. Petersburg. Importantly, the turnout will — including “the Dima Yakovlev law” be low not because people do not trust that bans foreign families from adopting RD: How long will the Crimea effect Putin — it will be low because of the ab- Russian orphans, the laws that restrict be able to unite people around the au- solute predictability of the elections, be- the right to organize rallies, laws on for- thorities? cause of the absence of competition. eign agents and undesirable organiza- A.K.: It is difficult to say for sure. Prob- tions, and other restrictive measures. ably, the abrupt worsening of living stan- RD: To what extent were this year’s Thus, by the beginning of this year’s dards and drop in income might influ- parliamentary elections different from elections, people had been very discour- ence the behavior of the population. Yet the ones in 2011 — and why didn’t they aged. They didn’t believe that they could this is just a hypothesis, because people lead to protests? change something. They were not ready are still very satisfied with Crimea’s re- A.K.: Well, the situations are totally dif- to take to the streets. They were totally turn to Russia: They see themselves as ferent. In 2011, people were waiting for apathetic and disappointed politically. being part of a great power. changes and the continuation of mod- On top of that, there was the incorpora- According to the polls of the Levada ernization, with urbanites frustrated by tion of Crimea. This narrative played its Center, people are still supporting the the rigged voting and obvious violations role in bringing people together around Kremlin’s foreign policy, they don’t want during the parliamentary elections. They the authorities. the sanctions to be canceled, and they were also disappointed with the presi- believe they are above these sanctions. dential swap, when then President Dmi- RD: Remarkably, those who took to They think that Russia should keep the try Medvedev decided not to stand for the streets in 2011 supported Crimea’s counter-sanctions policy instead of try- the 2012 presidency and let Putin come incorporation. ing to persuade the West to lift these

| 12 | russia-direct.org sanctions. This mobilization — being in stakeholders within the Russian politi- provide Putin with security when he ei- the state of quasi-war — helps them to cal elites are not interested in it, given a ther retires or hands over power to his deal with the economic crisis and ad- great deal of solidarity and unity around successor. just to it. Honestly, there are no signs of the Crimea narrative. Even though Pu- political indignation, which means that tin is autocratic in his nature, neverthe- RD: There is also speculation that Pu- people won’t orchestrate large-scale less he is very popular among the elites. tin is trying to fuel an artificial rivalry political protests. He builds such a political machine that between different law enforcement guarantees him security and prevents agencies to strengthen his positions in RD: Shortly after the parliamentary any possibility of a coup d’état. the Kremlin. Do you agree? elections, Russian media reported A.K.: Partly, it is the case. The logic of about the Kremlin’s plans to create the MGB is to control this rivalry, watch the Ministry of State Security (or MGB Crimea helped to mobilize over it closely and make it more trans- in the Russian abbreviation), which is people, even part of the parent within one big entity. After all, expected to bring together all Russian liberal-minded citizens. It Putin is an observer. He is like a weigh- law security agencies. So, it seems to became the key narrative ing-machine that takes into account be a reanimated version of the old KGB. that mobilized the nation. all views and tries to balance them. He What does it mean for Russia’s political Those who didn’t support the gives them room to compete with each future? incorporation of Crimea are other up to a point and makes certain A.K.: Russian law enforcement offi- seen as outcasts. conclusions. It is a matter of effective cers play today a significant role [in the political management. country’s decision-making process]. So, Look at Alexander Bastrykin, the chair- if these plans come true, it means that man of the Russian Investigative Com- the authorities are trying to hedge po- mittee. He has been very influential until litical risks: It is a matter of the system recently, but he started expressing po- defending itself in advance. One of the RD: Yet recently Putin reshuffled his litical claims and got in trouble [In July goals [of the MGB] is to provide security political deck and asked his chief of 2016 the Federal Security Service (FSB) for the President and this problem will staff, Sergei Ivanov, a former KGB of- conducted a series of inspections in the be more relevant by the end of the State ficer, to resign. Anton Vaino, who was Investigative Committee’s offices and Duma’s tenure, by 2021, because it will seen by some experts as a political arrested high-profile officials suspected be the time when the future of Putin will unknown and a neutral technocratic of corruption and embezzlement — Edi- be determined. political figure, replaced Ivanov. Does tor’s note]. After 2021, there will be the questions this resignation mean that Putin hedg- Today, Putin doesn’t need independent from people and political elites if Putin es the risks and just wants to get rid of and very corrupt figures. He is ready to will remain at the helm after 2024 or those who might compete with him? put up with the riches of his govern- not, if he will nominate his successor A.K.: Actually, this is the trend, which mental oligarchs, but as long as they or not, if he will be a lame duck or not. means the 2018 new team of the presi- can hide it and fulfill their commitments All these questions need to be clarified. dent will consist of docile, absolutely loy- within their governmental corporations. And to feel more confident and secure, al bureaucrats, who will be distant from Summing up, Putin is creating the envi- he needs absolute control. And the cre- the leader and won’t have any claims for ronment that can provide him with secu- ation of such a monstrosity like the MGB power. This is in contrast to Putin’s cro- rity and insurance and control the wars is quite logical in such a situation. But nies — governmental oligarchs and his this leak about MGB was no more than close friends. Also read proving public and elite’s opinions. Pre- This team will also comprise the bu- sumably, right now this body will not be reaucrats and average men from law created. enforcement agencies, including secu- How do Russians see rity guards and representatives of the themselves in the RD: There is some speculation that special services. This is how Putin sees changing world order? Find out in Russia effective governance; this is how he is Putin might be concerned with a plot Direct report ‘National prepared by some members of Rus- going to reform the governance system. Identity: The 25-year sia’s political elite. Is it really the case? This is part of his strategy to save his search for a new A.K.: In fact, today there are not any personal security during his next presi- Russia’ available at signs of a conspiracy against Putin. The dential term. These people will have to www.russia-direct.org/archive

| 13 | russia-direct.org with the Kremlin’s inner circle. Russia’s political elites have already received a The dynamic of public trust in state, law enforcement and social lot of signals from him: If somebody be- institutions (2012-2016) haves in a wrong way, he will be either dismissed or accused of corruption. 80 In % 70 RD: How do you see the role of Med- vedev, given that he has acquired the 60 reputation of a very weak and docile 50 politician? To what extent does he fit into the system? 40 A.K.: His weakness is his power. His 30 purposefully technocratic nature is his President competitive capability. He is convenient, 20 Government docile. He is between the loyal systemic 10 liberals and law enforcement officials. In Police 0 addition, his informal agreement with Media 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (print, radio, TV) Putin is still intact and relevant. Political- source: levada-center alyona repkina ly, it is not in Putin’s interest to replace Medvedev with a more powerful and in- dependent politician. The nuance is Putin can monalities. After all, all of them support In this case Putin should choose between accelerate the transition to the Crimean consensus. They support liberals and “hawks” — between [former democracy only if it brings Putin’s domestic and foreign policy, Finance Minister] Alexei Kudrin and Igor benefits to him to save his even though some of them [liberals] Sechin [the head of Russia’s largest oil personal security. don’t approve it. They are just adjusting company Rosneft]. Yet Putin cannot do it to the current political situation without right now. He has to choose a middle-of- openly expressing their disagreement. the-road, technocratic and docile figure like Medvedev, who will become a very RD: Sooner or later Putin will have convenient way to shift responsibility for to step down. To what extent will the the economic crisis after 2018. especially, law enforcement officials transition of power be difficult in Rus- In this regard, the ideal candidate to [“hawks”] are involved in clan wars to sia? replace Medvedev is Anton Vaino, Pu- a larger extent than the liberals, who, A.K.: This transition will be very dif- tin’s current chief of staff, or his deputy basically, have nothing to compete for ficult at any rate. After all, there hasn’t Sergei Kiriyenko, who in the eyes of Rus- (if we don’t take into account the de- been a rotation of power for years. The sians was responsible for the 1998 eco- bates between the Economy Ministry, nuance is Putin can accelerate the tran- nomic default. However, Medvedev is a Finance Ministry and the Central Banks sition to democracy only if it brings ben- much more experienced politician. about the nuances of Russia’s economic efits to him to save his personal security. policy). If technocrats and liberals are able to RD: You mentioned the “hawks” and The closer we look at the political persuade him that his security depends liberals within the Kremlin’s inner cir- groups within the Kremlin, the more on democracy, he might chose this path, cle. Who is more influential today? obvious it becomes that all these play- yet, again, not because he likes democ- A.K.: You can look at this hierarchy ers are included in Putin’s team: In fact, racy. Today he is not ready for liberaliza- both simplistically and from a more so- they have less differences than com- tion. phisticated point of view. If we tend to simplify, there are the “hawks” or con- servatives and “doves” or liberals: While the former are responsible for politics ss and foreign policy, the latter deal with What is behind the changing of the political guard in Russia? How will it the economy, business, the budget and a lev / ta influence the society in Russia? Find out ov fiscal policy. on our website: tr k o

y Also read

On the other hand, all these players, p www.russia-direct.org/tags/society.

| 14 | russia-direct.org Understanding Russian politics, without the conspiracy theories Mikhail Zygar, the former chief editor at independent TV station Dozhd, discusses his latest book, “All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin.”

INTERVIEW

Mikhail Zygar Russian journalist, writer and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of the Russian independent news TV channel, Dozhd (2010-2015). In 2014 he received the CPJ International Press Freedom Award. k o mmersa n t

Pavel Koshkin

he recent shakeup in the Kremlin’s Published in 2015 in Russian, his “All the inner circle, including the appoint- Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladi- Tment of a new head of the presi- mir Putin” is available in English since dential administration to replace Russian September. The book provides insights President Vladimir Putin’s close team- into how Russia’s political system has mate Sergei Ivanov, has reinvigorated evolved under Putin. interest in Russia’s political elites and Russia Direct recently sat down with how the decision-making process works Zygar to discuss his book and hear his in the country. thoughts on how the Russian political All of this makes the new book by system really works. Mikhail Zygar, a well-known Russian journalist and former chief editor at in- Russia Direct: Why and when did you dependent TV station Dozhd, relevant decide to write such a book? for both Russian and foreign audiences. Mikhail Zygar: In fact, I was writing

| 15 | russia-direct.org this book for approximately seven years. for a publication or television. At any rate, the book would not end that way and it That is, I was collecting information for I had to meet with different newsmakers was too early to come up with conclu- this book for seven years: I had to meet and understand what was behind that sions. Only in 2014, I understood that a with numerous newsmakers and conduct pseudo-news in Russia’s news feed. certain political epoch ended and it was off-the-record interviews with them. So, at the earliest stage, in 2007, I came high time to release the book to remind During all these years, I was working as to an idea that I had to come up with a readers about the events that had been a political journalist for different media book that would include these off-the- taking place during Putin’s three presi- outlets. I started this book when I worked record interviews. At that moment, it dential terms and what was the origin of for Kommersant. Then, I became deputy seemed to me that it would be easy and this political epoch. So, I had to finish the editor-in-chief of Russian Newsweek fast enough to fulfill this task: I planned book. and, afterwards, I moved to the Dozhd to sum up the results of Putin’s two pres- TV channel as editor-in-chief. idential tenures. RD: You mentioned that most inter- Dealing with Russian political jour- However, afterwards, [with the third views were off-the-record. Is this the nalism means that newsmakers can be presidential tenure of Putin and the start reason why your book is primarily relatively outspoken only during off-the- of the Ukraine crisis] it became clear that based on assumptions without refer- record interviews. It is impossible to have ring to primary sources, as some skep- honest and sincere conversations on the tics claim? record. That’s why, in order to be political Although almost the M. Z.: Those people who think in such journalist in Russia and fulfill the com- entire book is based on a way might not be well aware about the mitments of an editor, I had to conduct anonymous sources and nuances of Russia’s political journalism. off-the-record interviews to learn all the on their narratives, I don’t In fact, since the beginning of the 2000s, ins and outs of Russian politics and un- see it as a flaw; instead, I there hasn’t been [reliable] information see it as an advantage. derstand what is important and what is based on primary and open sources in not, what is really going on under the Russia’s political press. If you open high- surface of Russia’s political agenda. quality newspapers in Russia such as Ve- This is one of the most important parts domosti or Kommersant, all journalistic in the editorial routine of working either investigations are based on anonymous sources. This is the reality that has exist- ed in Russia for more than 10 years. And there is no other reality. In such a situation, I had several alter- natives: either I could give up writing the book or I could write an official and boring account about Russian politics or Putin, which would be released but would fail to attract an audience, be- cause it would not reflect the reality — it would be something like ZhZL [a Russian abbreviation for “the life of remarkable people,” a series of Russian books de- scribing the biographies of outstanding people — Editor’s note]. Another option was to come up with the book that I wrote, one based on off- the-record conversations. At the same time, the book contains references to pri- mary sources; in fact, I clearly identified them in my book and mentioned many interviewees. Nevertheless, although almost the en- ap tire book is based on anonymous sourc- Any claims that Russians are not ready for democracy are very dubious, according to Zygar. es and on their narratives, I don’t see it as

| 16 | russia-direct.org a flaw; instead, I see it as an advantage, the russian political elite are affiliated with the country’s key po- because this is the only opportunity opinion poll (Hamilton college) litical movers and shakers. [in Russia] to find out true information On the other hand, there are those who about what is happening behind the- are more independent, but less informed. scenes of Russia’s politics. Most importantly, despite the fact that % % there are many high-quality books and RD: The name of your book — “All the 32 42 reports on this topic, written by journal- Kremlin’s Men” — is intriguing. It seems ists and political experts, none of them to refer to the famous movie “All the has targeted a broader audience until re- President’s Men,” about the Watergate cently; none of them has written some- scandal and corrupt politicians in the thing complete, solid from the point of of respondents regard of representatives view of plot and narrative. high ranks of power, or to “All the King’s the inability to solve of Russian elite find Men,” a novel by Robert Penn Warren, domestic problems as the current political Meanwhile, my book firmly follows the which portrays the rise of cynical politi- one of the top threats system most suitable plot and the [chronological] narrative cians and demagogues. Is it an attempt to the security of for the country. — and it targets not those who keep up to describe Russian politics through Russia. with Russia’s political agenda on a daily symbols, allusions, and memories? basis, but rather ordinary, politically un- M.Z.: The name of the book conveys motivated and rather unbiased people, a lot of references. In fact, it is a hint to Vladimir the Saint. How can you ac- who might be interested in politics — at the quote from the famous English count for this? who seek to know what happened in re- writer Lewis Carroll’s “Through the Look- M.Z.: It is rather an irony: it is about the ality and why. ing Glass” — “Humpty Dumpty sat on a [psychological and behavioral] chang- I wrote this book for those who will wall: Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. All es inside of one person; it is about the read it in a hundred years and under- the King’s horses and all the King’s men changes in his mindset, his outlook, his stand it; who have just started express- couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty back to- self-assessment; it is about the changes ing interest toward politics and see it as a gether again.” in how others — his environment — treat tabula rasa, a blank sheet of paper, to be So, it could be anything. On the one him. And all these changes can be so interpreted in new ways. So, my book is a hand, it might mean that a big group of drastic, I mean, beyond recognition. sort of executive summary of the previ- people with a great deal of power cannot ous episodes in a long-running television resolve a trivial task. At the same time, RD: The Kremlin’s inner circle is one series, which they just started watching. there are multiple layers of meaning. Yes, of the most popular topics among ex- it refers to Penn Warren’s novel, which perts and academics. For example, RD: Some compare your book with deals with the ways of how power func- University College London professor the one by New York Times reporter tions; what effect it has on human psy- Alena Ledeneva with her book about Steven Lee Myers (“The New Tsar: The chology; how human behavior changes, “Sistema” as well as well-known Rus- Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin”), when one gets access to power; what sian expert Evgeny Minchenko with his despite the fact that your book offers is primary — the impact of the human “Politburo 2.0,” shed light on how the totally different explanations of Rus- psyche on political decision-making or system of power in Russia works. They sia’s politics and alternative narratives. the impact of political calculations [on seem to provide a very detailed analy- You argue that there is no intention in human behavior]. sis of the problem. What new aspects what happens in Russia, that Russia’s In addition, it’s possible to mention of the topic does your book reveal? politics are situational in nature and the famous movie about the Watergate M.Z.: In fact, there hasn’t been any respond to domestic and foreign chal- scandal, even though it is related to the popular book, which tries to explain lenges depending on circumstances. In book to a lesser extent. So, there could how the system of Russian power works, contrast, Myers seems to search for an be a great number of allusions embed- how and why Russia’s political decision- explanation in the intentional schemes ded within the name of the book. making has been evolving for the last 15 in Putin’s behavior and Russia’s poli- years. Even though the previous works — tics: Everything is predetermined and RD: The structure of your book is like the ones from Minchenko — contain has a certain design. Why do you avoid based on the comparison of each of nuggets of information, but they don’t such an approach? Putin’s tenures with different histori- reveal the whole story. The problem is M.Z.: If you compare my book with the cal monarchs — from Richard the Lion- that both journalists and pundits in Rus- one by Steven Lee Myers, it is important heart to Ivan the Terrible and, finally, sia can be very knowledgeable, but they to keep in mind that they are written in

| 17 | russia-direct.org © dmitry astakhov / ria novosti

According to Zygar, “Putin” is the collective judgement of the dozens of politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, intelligence chiefs, and military and business leaders, who surround him. different genres. While he wrote a book by incorporating Crimea. Unfortunately, by demonizing about Putin, I came up with a book not and idealizing Putin, many Unfortunately, by demonizing or ideal- about Putin per se. The main character journalists have come to izing Putin, many journalists have come of my book is the collective environment wrong conclusions in an to wrong conclusions in an attempt to around Putin; it is rather about the Rus- attempt to follow the rules of follow the rules of the genre they choose. sian system of power. the genre they choose. For example, if you make a movie, let’s It is not the biography of a person. And say about Alexander the Great, you will if you write the biography of this per- have to focus primarily on him and — to son, everything should be related to this a lesser extent — on his environment, person. Involuntarily or purposely, you which is less interesting than the major might either idealize or demonize him; character. Thus, you create an image of you put him in the center of the world. After all, never ever does life add up to a celestial half-god, which is put in the I see such an approach as a key mistake, a simple black-and-white picture; I firmly center of the world. It is a logical and ar- committed by about 99 percent of both believe that it is more nuanced. chaic artistic approach, which has been Russian and foreign journalists who write To illustrate this, I always give an ex- used by many writers throughout history. about Putin. ample: During numerous sessions in the Unfortunately, they purposely distort beginning of Putin’s first tenure, the Rus- RD: Ok, how do you describe the gen- the reality just because they put them- sian president frequently reiterated that re of your book? selves in the framework of the genre that Russia needed to care about Ukraine oth- M.Z.: Let’s describe it as a historical chron- they choose. Instead of trying to describe erwise Moscow would lose it. It is a clear icle. It is a sort of “medieval chronicle” that the real political processes, they draw the indication that reveals his initial plan. It reveals the details of how the king’s court is same artificial and improbable schemes. was to control Ukraine not to alienate it working and functioning. That’s why in my

| 18 | russia-direct.org book I use hints and reminiscence to me- place is a gift for conspiracy theorists, tics to inanimate objects like entire na- dieval historical characters like Richard the because it is always convenient to find tions. Lionheart and other monarchs. My goal is necessary facts to come up with expla- But there is no reason to do it. It is too to convey its “medieval” nature. nations, which fit one’s theory. That’s naïve, it is an oversimplification, some- why I would prefer to avoid giving any thing like looking over clouds and trying RD: Your book looks like a counter- political analysis on the recent political to find the shapes of animals in the sky balance to numerous conspiracy theo- appointments and resignations within while sprawling on the lawn: This cloud ries, which abound today in Russia and the Kremlin’s inner circle. looks like an elephant, this one resembles abroad. Why do you think they are In this regard, I would rather say that a crocodile. Yet the cloud neither turns popular among the Russian political the American version of my book ends into an elephant nor into a crocodile no elite? Do they really believe in conspir- up with a chapter about Syria and Tur- matter what you think about it. It doesn’t acy theories or don’t they — maybe, key. It highlights that the whole Russian reflect the reality. So, again, there is no they just use them to manipulate and conflict with Turkey is not the result of an need to oversimplify and claim that a na- impose their own agenda? industrious, overarching plan. tion has certain and predetermined char- M.Z.: Based on my numerous conver- And today’s events [the reconciliation acteristics and fate. sations with key Russian politicians and between Moscow and Ankara] is another In my view, Russian society is much officials, I would argue that many of proof that it is the case, because if one more sophisticated and it brings to- them do believe in conspiracy theories has a certain plan of how to behave in gether different groups of peoples with just because it is such an easy answer to the Middle East and what kind of policy different values. While some stick to difficult questions. They just see it as a it is necessary to choose toward Turkey, democratic values, others prefer to af- simple and logical explanation: that we the recent fluctuations in Moscow-An- filiate themselves with a great power and are right, while others are wrong; or even kara relations, which we have been wit- share imperialistic values, they feel pride though we are wrong, it is not our fault nessing for the last half a year, would be for their country. These people are very — it is the fault and plot of our enemies. just impossible. However, initially, a cold different in their mindset. Yet such behavior is common not only war started between Russia and Turkey, At the same time, there is a group of for Russian politicians, but also for their but afterwards they suddenly reconciled people who are politically apathetic, who foreign counterparts. and fraternized. try to shy away from politics and power; It seems to me that the explanation, they are preoccupied with routine, mun- which presents Putin as a politician with RD: Some argue that there is demand dane burdens and they don’t think about an artful and skillful plan to conquer for paternalism in Russia, which means democracy; they just don’t want to be the world, is another example of a con- that Russians are not ready for true de- bothered. And such people represent spiracy theory, which is very popular in mocracy. However, it is not clear what the majority of the population. They are the West. For example, some Western comes first — the demand for a pater- ready to agree automatically with any journalists frequently ask me why I don’t nalistic leader from the population or initiatives and calls, because it requires pay attention [in my book] to a special the Kremlin’s information campaign less effort. In this situation, a lot depends operation of the Federal Security Ser- that imposes this agenda. It is like the on the current political situation. So, it vice (FSB), which allegedly sought to chicken-or-the-egg problem. What is would be wrong to oversimplify and put integrate then agent Putin into the struc- your take on it? nations into boxes. tures of Russian government and, after- M.Z.: This is the very question that pre- wards, conquer all its institutions. This is occupied people in the early 20th cen- a good example of a fantastic conspiracy tury, during the events, which preceded that is unfortunately in vogue among for- the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution (Now I am eign journalists. Alas, it usually hampers writing a book on this historical period Also read a well-balanced and reasonable analysis. in Russia). Likewise, they were debating the question whether the Russian people RD: The recent reshuffles in the Krem- were ready for democracy or not. Inter- lin’s political elite and the increasing estingly, in 100 years these doubts — influence of law enforcement repre- whether Russians are ready or not — still Want to know more sentatives seem to be a gift for the fans persist. In my view any claims that Rus- about Mikhail Zygar’s of conspiracy theories who argue that sians are not ready for democracy are book? Read our review Putin has a certain plan. very dubious: It is an attempt to ascribe of his book at M.Z.: In fact, everything that takes anthropomorphous, human characteris- www.russia-direct.org/reviews.

| 19 | russia-direct.org Further Twitter accounts for the russian books and articles on the russian reading political system political landscape

@RU_President Official news from the Kremlin. 1. Alena V. Ledeneva. Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge @CarnegieRussia Latest insight into the developments in Russian University Press, 2013. politics provided by experts from Carnegie Moscow Center. 2. Steven Lee Myers. The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir @Navalny_En Tweets in English from the Russian opposition leader Putin. New York: Knopf, 2015. Alexei Navalny. 3. Karen Dawisha. Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New @tvrain_en News and opinions on Russian politics, economy and York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2014. society from the independent television network TV Rain. 4. Tatyana Stanovaya. “Kremlin-Duma Reshuffle Offers False Hope @dumagovru Official Twitter account of the Russian State Duma. to Russian Reformers,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 12, 2016. (In Russian) http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64834. Russia Beyond The Headlines offers the latest news @russiabeyond 5. Ivan Timofeev. “From Authoritarianism to Democracy? The and expert opinions on developments in Russia. Future of Political Regimes,” Russian International Affairs Council, @MedvedevRussiaE Updates from the leader of the United Russia October 25, 2016. http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=8273. party, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. 6. Ekaterina Grobman. “Inside the Power Struggle Within the @YablokoParty An English-language Twitter account of the Russian Russian Elite,” Russia Direct, August 5, 2016. http://www.russia- liberal Yabloko party. direct.org/analysis/inside-power-struggle-within-russian-elite. @MoscowTimes News from Russia provided by The Moscow Times. 7. The Russian Elite 2016: Perspectives on Foreign and Domestic Policy. Hamilton College Poll, May 11, 2016. https://www.hamilton. @Gaidar_fund The Yegor Gaidar Foundation is a nonprofit edu/documents/russianelite2016final.pdf. institution established in 2010 that promotes dialogue and knowledge in the areas of economics, modern history and 8. Vladislav L. Inozemtsev. “The Russian Opposition Should Do humanities. Its Homework,” Kennan Institute, September 22, 2016. https://www. wilsoncenter.org/article/the-russian-opposition-should-do-its- homework. 9. Vladimir Gel’man. Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. 10. Ivan Kurilla. “The Return of Stalin: Understanding the Surge of Historical Politics in Russia,” PONARS Eurasia, Policy Memo 429, May 2016. http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/return-stalin- understanding-surge-historical-politics-russia.

| 20 | russia-direct.org MOST RELEVANT TOPICS: Russia’s national identity Russia’s foreign policy outlook Best Russian studies programs Russia in the Middle East The magnetic push and pull of the Russian economy Terrorism

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