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Who's Who in Russia's Parliamentary Elections

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Who's Who in Russia's Parliamentary Elections 22 WebMemo Published by The Heritage Foundation No. 1706 November 20, 2007 Who’s Who in Russia’s Parliamentary Elections Yevgeny Volk On December 2, an estimated 100 million Rus- a clear message that the integrity of Russia’s dem- sian voters are expected to elect 450 deputies to the ocratic process will largely determine the direc- State Duma, the Russian Federal Assembly’s lower tion of its development and the future U.S.– house. Unlike every parliamentary election since Russian relations. 1993, all the deputies will be chosen from the party Peculiarities of Existing Electoral Law and lists compiled by the leaders of 11 parties formally Campaigning. To Russians, parliamentary elections registered to run in the election. The 450 seats will are not as critical as the presidential election. This is be distributed on a proportional basis among parties 1 a result of many factors, including the Russian Con- that receive at least 7 percent of the vote. stitution, a feeble civil society, a weak system of In Russia, parliament is seriously circumscribed checks and balances, dramatic strengthening of the by presidential rule. The Duma is almost completely executive branch under President Vladimir Putin, subservient to the incumbent regime, rubber and the Kremlin’s control over large parties. stamping laws initiated by the Kremlin. At the same In contrast to the four preceding State Duma time, parliamentary elections are important to the elections, the upcoming parliamentary vote will see Kremlin, because they retain some semblance of an the electorate’s choices significantly restricted. enduring democratic institution in Russia and indi- Amendments to the election law have eliminated cate that the country belongs to a civilized demo- individual candidates for majority (single mandate) cratic community. Yet, Russia’s electoral process is districts. The electoral threshold for political parties entrenched in corruption, and the government has was increased from 5 percent to 7 percent, effec- curtailed observation by international watchdogs. tively denying representation to supporters of the Now that President Putin has agreed to lead the center-right Union of Right Forces and liberal-left pro-government United Russia ticket, the upcom- Yabloko. In addition, the mandated minimum voter ing elections look like a referendum on the credibil- turnout required for a valid election was abolished.2 ity of the President and his Cabinet. Since victory is Political parties face tough registration requirements a forgone conclusion, the regime will undoubtedly designed by the Justice Ministry and the Central use the election results as a justification to keep Putin in power. Although Putin is required by the Constitution to step down in early 2008, a resound- This paper, in its entirety, can be found at: ing victory by United Russia will give him a man- www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1706.cfm date to promote his protégé to the presidency. Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies While it should avoid choosing sides in the Published by The Heritage Foundation election, the United States must send the Kremlin 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002–4999 (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. No. 1706 November 20, 2007 WebMemo Elections Commission. A Putin-approved law from serious trump cards. Inflation has climbed 10 per- July 2000 raised the minimum nationwide mem- cent this year and eats up the better part of bership for registered political parties from 10,000 increased incomes. Reforms related to pensions, to 50,000; the threshold was just 100 in the mid- self-government, and municipal issues fell flat; 1990s.3 These regulations implicitly favor the par- privatization was aborted. Administrative reforms ties that toe the Kremlin line, as the authorities ended in failure.5 The government has stepped up tended to turn a blind eye to their manipulations by its crackdown on business. strong parties. At the same time, the parties critical The social apathy of the better part of Russia’s of the regime, like the Republican Party, headed by voters is another peculiarity of the present cam- independent State Duma deputies Vladimir Ryzh- paign. Most voters do not believe the elections will kov and Vladimir Lysenko, were denied registration affect their lives. Polls show that nearly half the pop- and are now defending their rights in the European 123 ulation is sure that most Duma deputies discharge Court of Human Rights. their duties poorly or very poorly.6 The State Still, 11 parties have been registered for the Duma’s approval rating is one of the lowest for Rus- elections: the Agrarian Party of Russia, Civil sian government and public policy institutions. Force, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Com- Poor ratings for live election debates on govern- munist Party (KPRF), the Union of Right Forces ment-run television channels further reveal the lack (SPS), the Party of Social Justice, the Liberal Dem- of public interest in the Duma and its deputies.7 ocratic Party of Russia (LDPR), A Just Russia, United Russia as Clear Frontrunner. Accord- Patriots of Russia, United Russia, and Yabloko. ing to most forecasts, United Russia is likely to win Only two to four of them are likely to win seats in a hands-down victory in the upcoming election. the Duma: United Russia, the Communist Party, The fact that its federal ticket includes President Just Russia, and LDPR. Putin has dramatically boosted its ratings. Ultimately, the key campaign issues are popular United Russia is a major league bureaucratic support for Putin and the living standard of the party that was designed for Russia’s officialdom in population. Putin and his United Russia are parad- the image and likeness of the former Communist ing the following achievements before the public: Party of the Soviet Union. Membership in the party high economic growth rates (an average of 6.5 per- is mandatory for rising to key government positions. cent for 2000–2007, with 6.7 percent in 2006); a Significantly, “in 62 of the 83 regions, it named the wage surge (13.4 percent in 2006); a pension hike governors to head its party lists.”8 It is common (21 percent in 2007); a spike in appropriations for knowledge, though, that none of these governors social services, primarily for education, healthcare, has any intention of stepping down and working in housing, and the depressive agricultural sector; and 4 the Duma. Upon getting elected, they will simply a rise in defense allocation. give up their Duma seats to candidates ranked next At the same time, the opposition—both on the to them on the party lists. Their role is that of an right and the left flanks—is also in possession of engine to promote United Russia’s candidates. 1. Moscow Times, “11 Parties Registered,” October 29, 2007. 2. Izvestia, “Floating 7-Percent Threshold,” September 5, 2007. 3. “On Political Parties,” Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 95-FZ (July 11, 2001), Art. 3, at www.democracy.ru/ english/library/laws/parties_fz95_eng/index.html, and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 1996-1997 (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 1997), p. 423. 4. President Vladimir Putin. “Our Plans Are Not Just Big, They Are Grand,” Izvestia, October 19, 2007. 5. Vladimir Milov, “Years of Reforms: Resume,” Vedomosti, November 14, 2007. 6. Dmitri Kamyshev, Viktor Khamrayev, “Idlers, Idiots, Swindlers,” Kommersant, July 7, 2007. 7. Arina Borodina, “Viewers Unconnected to Elections,” Kommersant, November 13, 2007. 8. Moscow Times, “The Faces of United Russia,” October 23, 2007. page 2 No. 1706 November 20, 2007 WebMemo The Party of Millionaires. Under the electoral In regions with largely non-Russian ethnic pop- code, every State Duma aspirant must declare his or ulations and strong clan traditions—such as the her income and holdings. United Russia candidates’ North Caucasus and Western Urals—the fact that incomes, at least by Russian standards, are signifi- local leaders run for parliament on United Russia’s cantly higher than those of most other parties. Pres- regional ticket serves as a voting model for the rest ident Putin’s 2006 annual income of $80,000 ranks of the local populace. In such provinces, the num- among United Russia’s lowest. Then again, Samara ber of votes cast for “the party of power” is normally Provincial Governor Vladimir Artyakov earned $57 significantly higher than the country’s average. million last year; Duma deputy Vladislav Reznik United Russia’s candidate list contains quite a made $47 million; another deputy, Vladimir few popular Russian personalities. Apart from Gruzdev, made $38 million. Putin is presented as Putin, it includes Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov; being much poorer than most provincial governors, Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu; Tatar- whose annual incomes are significantly higher than 9 stan President Mintimer Shaimiyev; and prominent $1 million. These incomes are substantial by Rus- athletes, scholars, and entertainers. Loyalty to Putin sian standards; Russia’s average monthly salary of is their common feature. The other trend is connec- $600 is comparable with the U.S. poverty line. tion to business: “…an analysis of United Russia’s United Russia’s structural and status criteria are party list shows that at least 72 of the 600 candi- not the only parameters likening it to the extinct dates, or 12 percent, have direct links to large or Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communist medium-size businesses. Many of the candidates traditions are clearly visible in its campaign drive. occupy high posts on the lists, indicating that they United Russia’s campaign platform, named “Putin have good chances to win Duma seats.”11 Plan is the People’s Plan,” echoes Communist slo- United Russia is raising its election campaign gans that go back 30 to 40 years.
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