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Russian Analytical Digest No 127: Putin 3.0: One Year Later

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Russian Analytical Digest No 127: Putin 3.0: One Year Later No. 127 8 May 2013 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/rad www.laender-analysen.de PUTIN 3.0: ONE YEAR LATER—EXPERT PERSPECTIVES ■■ANALYSIS Developed Putinism: Change without Development 2 Richard Sakwa, Canterbury ■■ANALYSIS Vladimir Putin’s Civilizational Turn 5 Andrei P. Tsygankov, San Francisco ■■ANALYSIS The Impact of Party Primaries and the All-Russian Popular Front on the Composition of United Russia’s Majority in the Sixth Duma 8 Paul Chaisty, Oxford ■■OPINION POLL Ratings of President and Government and Trust in Politicians 2000–2013 12 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 2 ANALYSIS Developed Putinism: Change without Development Richard Sakwa, Canterbury Abstract One of the key features of Putinism is it adaptability to changing circumstances, in part derived from sensi- tivity to shifts in the balance of power between the various factions. What was a strength has now become a vulnerability, since intra-systemic change is severely constrained in terms of both policy scope and societal depth. The limits on evolutionary potential are now evident by a growing inability to respond to the new challenges in creative and progressive ways. Neither Black Nor White But Grey from this perspective, is reflected in an aggressive and Putin’s leadership remains the subject of intense and counter-productive foreign policy. polarised debate. For many he remains the saviour of Neither of these views does justice to the complex Russia. He presided over years of unprecedented growth, reality. Putin has been able to respond to some of the and even weathered the economic crisis from late 2008 very real challenges facing Russia in a relatively compe- with relatively little damage because of textbook macro- tent and coherent manner. Thus his critics who accuse economic management. Improvements in health care the regime of failing to deliver the basics of effective gov- and welfare policies, accompanied by family support, ernance are off the mark. Even the various forthcom- have ameliorated the predicted demographic crisis. In ing mega-projects, from the Sochi Winter Olympics in international affairs Putin is seen as having restored 2014 to the World Cup in 2018, however wasteful the Russia’s status as an independent player, defending its construction costs, are something in which the country interests while avoiding becoming boxed into some sort can take pride. Nothing is black and white about a gover- of ‘pariah’ status. After a string of still-born integration nance system caught up in the whirlpools of policy con- efforts in its neighbourhood, moves towards the creation flicts over the most appropriate developmental path, the of the Eurasian Union by 2015 look finally like a via- country’s place in Eurasia and in energy markets, and in ble supranational project. Russia has allied with China general the position that Russia should adopt in a world in defence of the traditional postulates of state sover- torn between conflicting geopolitical blocs and weak- eignty and non-interventionism, while avoiding becom- ened institutions of international governance, notably the ing the junior partner in what is becoming an increas- United Nations system. However, the adaptability of the ingly unequal relationship. regime and its ability to provide public goods in a reason- Putin’s critics take a very different view. His most ably efficient and cost effective manner is declining, and intransigent opponents consider him the conscious exe- the country finds itself increasingly locked in stalemate. cutioner of Russian democracy from the very beginning, offering instead only the form while gutting political Stages of Putinism life of the competiveness, dynamism and pluralism that Putin remains the dominant political figure in Russian a great nation deserves. Economic growth and rising politics, and thus talk of ‘Putinism without Putin’ is living standards, declining poverty, and national inte- off the mark. However, neither he nor the country has gration are ascribed to buying off the population and stayed the same. Although there are profound conti- opponents with the windfall energy rents. These rents nuities in Putin’s leadership style, at least four different allowed corrupt and self-serving elites to consolidate phases in his rule can be identified, coinciding with the their power, using the language and forms of democracy classic cycle of leadership politics in general. to suppress dissent and pluralistic contestation. Fraudu- The first phase was of remedial politics. In March lent elections have deprived the regime of the final ves- 2000 Putin won election in a hard-fought ballot, and tiges of legitimacy. The chimera of post-Soviet integra- quickly set upon stamping his vision of ‘remedial’ poli- tion is little more than a distraction from the very real tics on Russia. Although Putin was careful not to attack challenges facing the long-term viability of a resource- Yeltsin personally, his politics was based on the idea that based and undiversified economy. Anti-Western rhetoric in the 1990s the Russian state lost the ability to man- acts as a substitute for a genuine forward-looking pro- age affairs, the economy declined, and powerful special gramme, while Russia’s ‘cockiness’ on the world stage interests had emerged that threatened governance in its reflects not a defence of traditional norms of interna- entirety. The era is presented as a new ‘Time of Troubles’ tional politics but the self-serving interests of an illegit- (smutnoe vremya), which takes an act of supreme con- imate ruling class. Authoritarian consolidation at home, centration to overcome. The latent powers of the Rus- RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 3 sian state, eclipsed by powerful oligarchs and gover- In the third phase, between 2008 and 2012, Rus- nors in the 1990s, were re-activated. However, the only sia was governed by the ‘tandem’ form of rule. Dmitry effective carrier of these powers was not the new forces Medvedev was constrained by the terms of the deal, but unleashed by Russia’s capitalist revolution, notably lib- from the first showed signs of political independence and eral political parties, an independent business class or advanced a distinctive programme of his own. From his an active civil society representing the forces of demo- condemnations of ‘legal nihilism’ to supporting what he cratic modernity, but the bedrock of the Soviet system, called ‘modernisation’, including measures to ease the which had been overthrown with so much fanfare in pressure on businesses, Medvedev shaped a policy that 1991: the vast bureaucracy and the equally vast secu- was not anti-Putinite but represented a modification of rity apparatus (collectively known as the siloviki). From some of the key features of classic Putinism. As a lawyer the first the Putin system was marked by the contrast by profession, Medvedev was above all concerned with between the declared goals of the administration, and re-asserting the independence of the judiciary as part the means by which its aspirations were implemented. of a broader programme of strengthening the constitu- The turning point that inaugurated the second phase tional state against the arbitrariness of the administra- of Putinite politics, a period of regime consolidation tive regime. While it is now customary to mock Med- marked by intensified constraints, was the assault against vedev’s ineffectual style, in fact he represented a form of the Yukos oil company and the arrest of its head, Mikhail evolutionary development that could have maintained Khodorkovsky, on 25 October 2003. Two logics of moder- the achievements of the remedial aspects of Putinism nity collided. Khodorkovsky came to represent a more lib- while pushing back against the excesses of the consol- eral and open style of politics and economic governance. idation period. Although the creation and development of Yukos in the Just as Putin had transcended what he considered 1990s was accompanied by the shortcomings and sharp the limitations of Yeltsin’s rule, so Medvedev, without practices typical of that era, nevertheless in the early 2000s condemning Putin the man, reflected the potential of the company was transformed and presented itself as the the system to evolve by strengthening the institutions modern corporation that Russia needed to become a devel- of the constitutional state, while clipping the wings of oped and diversified economy. Unfortunately, this pro- the partisans of the administrative regime. This was an gramme became a sort of crusade, which was perceived idealistic but realistic possibility, and gained the sup- to threaten once again the prerogatives of the state. The port of a growing band of adherents who had been at response of the statists and siloviki was not long in com- the heart of the creation of classic Putinism. In the end ing. The regime destroyed not only a political opponent the option of intra-systemic reform was scuppered by but also the oil company. the constraints of the tandem arrangements, which did The gap between the regime and the state became not allow the reformist programme to take political form increasingly apparent. The distinction between the two to challenge the power of the siloviki and other defend- wings of the ‘dual
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