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The Impact of Party Primaries and the All-Russian Popular Front on The

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The Impact of Party Primaries and the All-Russian Popular Front on The RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 8 ANALYSIS The Impact of Party Primaries and the All-Russian Popular Front on the Composition of United Russia’s Majority in the Sixth Duma Paul Chaisty, Oxford Abstract Duma scandals involving members of United Russia—notably the Vladimir Pekhtin affair—have further undermined the credibility of Russia’s parliamentary elite over the last year. This is despite measures that were taken before the 2011 parliamentary elections to clean up the ruling party: party primaries and the creation of the All-Russian Popular Front. This article examines the impact of these initiatives on the com- position of United Russia’s parliamentary majority, and it considers the problems that will face attempts by party leaders to improve its image. Introduction The process of selecting candidates for the new Duma Since the early 2000s, the centre of legislative decision began in earnest in the summer of 2011. Primaries had making has moved to the ruling parliamentary organs been used by United Russia in the 2007 parliamentary of United Russia, and successful legislative initiatives contest, but they did not become part of the party’s by opposition parties and rank-and-file members rely statute until 2009, when the XI Party Congress ruled to a large extent on the support of the party of power. that internal party voting could be used to select candi- Although the reduction in the size of United Russia’s dates. The formation of the All-Russian Popular Front majority to just twelve seats has weakened this domi- in May 2011 added a further dimension to the process nance in a number of respects—not least within parlia- of candidate selection. Half of the 200, 000 or so indi- mentary committees—the party retains the upper hand viduals who were chosen to vote in the primaries—in in legislative decision-making. rather unclear circumstances—were representatives of But, to what extent did the 2011 election change the organisations that comprised the All-Russian Popular characteristics of United Russia’s majority in the lower Front. Vladimir Putin also announced that one-third of house? This article presents data on the new United Rus- all candidates included in the final list would be mem- sia majority and considers whether efforts by the Krem- bers of the Front (see gazeta.ru, September 5, 2011), even lin to revive the party’s appeal—through measures such if they had not previously been members of the party. as the holding of party primaries and the inclusion of As the leader of United Russia at that time, Putin was social activists in candidate selection (in the form of responsible for compiling the final list of candidates that the All Russian Popular Front)—have introduced a new was submitted to party’s Congress in September 2011. cohort of deputies into the lower house. It will also dis- Over 4700 candidates participated in the pri- cuss whether these new members are likely to revive mary process (see lenta.ru, July 27, 2011). This number the party’s image. included a large number of independents and represen- tatives of public organisations, and this fact was heralded Selecting Candidates for 2011 by the party leadership as an important step towards the By recent Russia standards, 2011 was a bad year for creation of a more representative party elite. Speaking United Russia. According to most pollsters, the party’s to an inter-regional conference in North Western Rus- support fell during that year and it struggled to shake sia in September, Putin called for the renewal of more off its association with privilege and corruption. This than half of the membership of United Russia’s parlia- negative connotation was captured to damaging effect mentary faction, and announced that the party’s list by opposition blogger Alexey Navalny’s moniker of the would include representatives of many different profes- party of “crooks and thieves”, and party managers took sional and social groups: “doctors, teachers, engineers, several measures to revive United Russia’s appeal. Over workers, farmers, military personnel and entrepreneurs, the course of 2011, the party sought the cooptation of pensioners and the young” (see obshchaya gazeta.ru, Sep- social activists through the formation of a coalition of tember 5, 2011). public organisations—the All Russian Popular Front— The primary process drew supportive commentary which had the power to select candidates for the party, from some unlikely quarters. While acknowledging their and internal party primaries were used on a scale far shortcomings, the analysts Nikolai Petrov and Boris greater than in previous elections. Both measures were Makarenko—both known for their critical reporting aimed at attracting new people to United Russia. of the authorities—argued that the primaries were an RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 9 improvement on previous practice and had the potential Despite Putin’s pledge that there would be a signifi- to weaken the power of regional governors over candi- cant turnover of parliamentary personnel, the proportion date selection (see Kommersant, August 15, 2011; Mos- of returning deputies actually increased in December’s cow Times, August 16, 2011). However the primary pro- 2011 elections (see Figure 1). Around half of the United cess was also flawed in many respects and drew sharp Russia members who took up seats in December 2011 criticism from other commentators. Despite the party’s had served in a previous parliament; this compares with stated aim to increase intra-party democracy, attention around one-third in the previous Duma. While a num- was drawn to the lack of openness and genuine discus- ber of long-serving and influential deputies like Pavel sion during the primaries (see lenta.ru, July 27, 2011). Medvedev and Valerii Draganov were denied places in This led to a number of high-profile scandals. The former the final list in rather controversial circumstances during governor and Duma deputy Alexei Lebed questioned the primary process, many familiar faces returned. Influ- the transparency of the process and refused to take part ential economic lobbyists from previous parliaments (see Moscow Times,September 5, 2011), and there were like Valerii Yazev (the energy sector), Vladislav Reznik other examples of politicians who declined the oppor- (finance) and Gennadi Kulik (agriculture) all held on to tunity to participate. Moreover, analysis at the time sug- their seats. Furthermore, the primary process enabled a gested that the results of the primaries were not decisive number of established Duma deputies to gain seats in in terms of the drafting of the final party list. The news- other regions. This led to criticism from local social activ- paper Izvestiya conducted an analysis of the candidates ists that the primary process actually benefitted party selected for the final list and found large inconsistencies insiders (see politcom.ru, August 15, 2011). with the results of the primaries (Izvestiya, September 25, 2011). According to the newspaper, of the 80 regions Figure 1: Percentage of United Russia Deputies Who Served analysed the final list matched the results of United Rus- in Previous Parliaments, Fourth–Sixth Dumas sia’s primaries in only eight cases. They uncovered par- ticularly large discrepancies in Permskii Krai, Primor’ye 100% and Stavropol. For instance, in the case of the Perm- skii Krai, the researchers found that just one of the top 80% ten candidates from the party’s primaries was included 60% in the final regional party list. Rather, it seems that key decisions over the final party lists were not taken until 40% 50,9% 45,0% the eve of the party’s Congress in September, and the 37,0% protracted deliberations did not make for more consis- 20% tent reasoning when it came to the exclusion or inclu- sion of candidates. In terms of increasing the number 0% of Popular Front candidates, the results of the process 2003 2007 2011 were ambiguous. In some cases the final decision bene- fitted Front candidates, in others it worked against them. Therefore to what extent did the widespread use of Nor has the new parliament significantly changed in primaries and the inclusion of the Popular Front trans- terms of the professional characteristics of those deputies form the parliamentary party cadre? Has the composi- who make up the parliamentary majority. The propor- tion of United Russia changed in significant ways from tion of deputies who held senior business careers before previous parliaments? their election to parliament, or held a leading position in a trade or business association remains broadly con- The New Duma sistent with previous Dumas (see Figure 2 overleaf). In The December elections did result in the election of a the last three Dumas, around one-third of United Rus- large number of candidates from the All-Russian Pop- sia deputies have entered the parliament from business ular Front. Consistent with Putin’s declared aim before backgrounds. Moreover, notwithstanding the public the December ballot to select one-third of the party’s campaign to rid the party of its association with wealth candidates from the Front, eighty deputies were cho- and privilege, the 2011 election contest continued to sen via this route. Yet, data compiled from the biogra- reveal the party’s financial reliance on private business phies of United Russia deputies in the Fourth (2003– candidates. During the contest it was widely reported 07), Fifth (2007–11) and current Dumas suggest that that business candidates were expected to fund regional the representativeness of United Russia’s parliamentary campaigns to the cost of five million Euros (seeNezavi - party has not been radically transformed. simaya Gazeta, October 4, 2011). RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 127, 8 May 2013 10 Figure 2: Percentage of United Russia Deputies with Busi- a good standing in local communities, notably teach- ness Backgrounds, Fourth–Sixth Dumas ers and doctors.
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