Nicolae Titulescu ROMANIA’S FOREIGN POLICY – 1937 THE ROMANIAN MINISTERIAL CRISIS OF AUGUST 1936 On August 29, 1936, without previous warning or communication of any kind from the Romanian Government, I ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was suddenly removed from ministerial activities which I had carried on for almost twenty years1. I have often wondered if, in view of the manner in which I was treated, it would not be preferable to maintain complete silence with regard to my departure2 from M. G. Tataresco’s3 Government. I must confess that I should have preferred to remain silent. There are some men with whom one does not discuss, and some matters of which one does not speak. But, having thought the question over, I cannot fail to realise that this is not a personal matter with which I can deal as an ordinary private individual according to the dictates of my personal pride. It is a matter which concerns at the same time international public opinion and national public opinion. In what way? Could I possibly allow those who have known me abroad, those who have placed in me such trust that, because of it, I have been able to serve my country and work in the general interest of peace, to let their imaginations run riot as to the cause of my departure? Could I, on the other hand, allow thousands of Romanians to explain my departure according to the dictates of partial insinuations, after the sympathy they showed me during my grave illness4, which acquainted me with human kindness5 to an undreamt- of extent and gave me a new lease of life? 1 Minister of Finances (July 10, 1917–January 28, 1918; June 13, 1920–December 16, 1921). Minister for Foreign Affairs (July 6, 1927–November 23, 1927; November 24, 1927–November 9, 1928; October 20, 1932–January 13, 1933; January 14, 1933–November 13, 1933; November 14, 1933–December 29, 1933; December 30, 1933–January 2, 1934; January 10, 1934–October 1, 1934; October 10, 1934–August 29, 1936. 2 On August 29, 1936, in wake of actions perpetrated by hostile domestic and foreign forces, Carol II decided, in collusion with Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu, to eliminate Nicolae Titulescu from Romania’s political life. This was achieved by resorting to a political manoeuvre – “the homogenisation of the Government”. Political and diplomatic circles, the Press and public opinion, both in Romania and abroad, in Europe and on other continents interpreted this act as Nicolae Titulescu’s dismissal. Opinions on the reasons of this decision, and particularly on its consequences, differed widely, being often antipodal. 3 Gheorghe Tătărescu. 4 Nicolae Titulescu’s health condition worsened permanently in the second half of August and early September 1936. The emotional shock suffered by him due to his dismissal from the Government would destabilise even more his precarious health. The second half of September would witness a dramatic moment in his existence, physicians discovering that they had to handle a strange case, whose ethiology could not be established with precision. 5 Expressions of sympathy in those difficult moments, addressed to Nicolae Titulescu, were various and in great numbers: messages from the League of Nations Assembly and Council, cables, phone calls and letters from numerous heads of state and of governments, ministers, diplomats from various countries, messages No, such a course is unthinkable. As long as I did not return to public life, there was a reason for silence. Today, that reason no longer exists. Those who live on the other side of the frontiers must know that, if I left, my departure was not due to any misdemeanour on my part. And those who live within the country must know that, if I refuse to be a Minister again under the same conditions as during latter years, it was not because my country had become foreign to me, that the interest of my nation was less dear to me today than yesterday, that my devotion to the Romanian people acknowledged today limits which I did not know yesterday; but rather that my experience – a statement of which may be heard by anybody who likes to listen – has shown me that the ministerial chair in Romania today is a chair placed upon a trap-door which cannot be sat upon with confidence, because of the secret machinery worked by discreet hands which ejects you from it just at the moment when you think yourself most securely installed. The compromise between my personal tendency towards silence and the political necessity to speak in order to enlighten public opinion leads me to give a simple statement of the facts as they arise from the written documents, without attacking anybody. As a matter of fact, these facts are so eloquent that the conclusion will appear evident to everyone. If other tactics are used in answer to this, I naturally reserve the right to change mine and to use all weapons in my possession. In order to confirm my statement to this method, I should like, at the outset, to make the following declaration: His Majesty the King being above all such questions, President Georges Tataresco has afforded me opportunity of owing him a great debt of gratitude. Thanks to him, I have recovered something very precious which I had lost for the past twenty years, the most precious thing of all, which one does not readily surrender when one has tasted it again: Freedom. And now let us deal with the facts. On June 27th and 30th, 1936, I sent President Tataresco two telegrams showing that the international situation of Romania was not such as that country deserved. The idea of harming the Government of which I was a member was so far from my mind that I take the liberty of quoting the following passage from the telegram of June 30th: “And when I think that the responsibility for the new situation does not fall on us, on those who govern, but on those who, in order to take our place, are making use of foreign policy as a weapon for purposes of internal policy, my sorrow is still greater.” This did not prevent M. Georges G. Tataresco from wiring to me on June 30th on a tone of accusation, in order to make me responsible for the state of international public opinion with regard to Romania, because of the lack of propaganda, and from giving me detailed instructions, even including punctuation, as to the course of action to be taken – from a great many international societies and various national unions of journalists; messages from Romanian organisations and political parties, academic establishments and universities, cultural societies, professional associations, urban and rural communities. a thing which has never happened to me in any other ministry of which I had been a member: those of John I.C. Bratiano1, Marshal Averesco2, Vintila Bratiano3, I. Maniu4, A. Vaida5 and I.Gh. Duca6. I immediately replied to M. Tataresco: “I have communicated to the Government of which I am a member the sorrow I felt on hearing the erroneous conclusions drawn in foreign countries from certain facts relating to Romania. If, when I exercise my rights to communicate to my colleagues what is happening as well as what I myself feel, instead of deducing therefrom that there should be a cessation of our internal strife, which is the sole reason for alarming news abroad, I am told, even including punctuation, how I should act, and if it is thought that there is no special body defending us in the foreign Press, when… your telegram number… presents to me conclusions which I understand and which I do not in any way refuse to draw.” This time, M. Tataresco wired to me on July 3rd in a more friendly way, saying he was very sorry to learn how I had interpreted his telegram, but again referring to the lack of any organisation to react against the ravings of the foreign Press. Propaganda with regard to Romania? Events in Romania are immediately known by all foreign correspondents in Bucharest, who telegraph without delay to their papers. Is it not a fact that, for more than a year, M. G. Tataresco’s Government has been managing foreign propaganda through people other than myself? I should very much like to know what article, unfriendly to Romania, the Romanian Government has succeeded in suppressing in the foreign Press once the latter had decided upon its publication? Faced with the state of affairs outlined above, I decided to take my stand on the grounds of facts, and, on July 9th, 1936, I left the Montreux Conference7. On July 11th at 2 p.m., I arrived in Bucharest by the Orient Express. Since M. Tataresco telephoned to me that he could not see me between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. – at which time His Majesty the King had granted me an audience – I sent my resignation to M. Tataresco by a trusty messenger and handed to His Majesty the King not, as has been said, my resignation, but a copy of the letter of resignation which I had sent to M. Tataresco. Here is a copy of the letter of resignation: “Bucharest, July 11th, 1936 Mr. Prime Minister, It will soon be three years since I gave my collaboration as Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Government formed from the ranks of the Liberal Party, first under the presidency of the unforgettable I.G. Duca and later under your presidency. 1 Ion (Ionel) I.C. Brătianu. 2 Alexandru Averescu. 3 Vintilă I.C. Brătianu.