United States Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 World: Crafting a Grand Strategy in the War of Ideas

CEU eTD Collection

United States Cultural Diplomacy In partial the In of fulfillment Crafting a Grand Strategy in the War of Ideas Department of International Relations ofDepartment International an European Studies

Supervisor:Erin Central European University European Central

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revent the spread of terrorism: “W terrorism: of spread revent the See alsoSee

litical Influence and Integrated Strategy,” 6. Strategy,” Integrated and litical Influence 30

Waller, Scholars have also highlight also have Scholars

was not a conventional political conventional a not was Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real Real a Like Ideas Warof the Fighting nrtd h government’s the enerated — 29 “madrasas”

The report goes on to on goes report The e itself in the Islamic the in itself e — Lenczowski, “Cultural “Cultural Lenczowski, and continue to see continue and , ” e must also look e also look must b te 9/11 the by t —

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. Let me me Let […] 28 ed

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Eisenhower quoted in in quoted Eisenhower “Neo Hulsman, and Lieven 310. Freedom,” “Enduring Lucas, and Kennedy Lieven and Hulsman, “Neo Hulsman, and Lieven Evera, Van vn oe eakbe s that is remarkable more Even

“Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 13 Terror,” on War the in Strategy U.S. “Assessing Ibid., 66. Ibid., - - Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror.” on War the and Hawks, Liberal Conservatives, 65. Terror,” on War the and Hawks, Liberal Conservatives,

33 rt Srtge o bt 20 ad 06 scedd in succeeded 2006, and 2002 both of Strategies urity al Qaeda” since they “had no operational ties and did not work in work not did and ties operational no they “had since Qaeda” al

ad n mlcbe eie o vengeance.” for desire implacable an and s

37 h noosraie xoet o American of exponents neoconservative the e peetv wr dtiig h hypothetical the detailing war, preventive sed

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Truman, “Address on Foreign Policy at a Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.” Newspaper of American the of Society Luncheon a at Policy Foreign on “Address Truman, Ninkovich, Ninkovich, 51. Minds,” and “Hearts Osgood, Ibid. Ninkovich, ar diplomatic arsenal”

Cultural diplomacy initiatives became “full became initiatives diplomacy Cultural whatistrue and what is not encourage manymorepeople other from countries visit to us here, to see forthemselves should aid…We economic or strength armed as important doing…as are we all of part peoples….must other We to everyuse command,private our must means at the governmental,as welltruth toas get We men… of minds the for else, all above struggle, a is This communism. imperialistic being is freedom of cause The

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n clua dpoay paau, eutn i te salsmn o the of establishment the in resulting apparatus, diplomacy cultural and 47

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48 trueabout this great countryof ours.

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Schneider, “Culture Communications,” 6. Communications,” “Culture Schneider, Power,” 98. Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, Richmond, Schneider, Although there was some debate among deci among debate some was there Although 51

Diplomacy That Works That Diplomacy Cultural Exchange and the Cold War Cold the and Cultural Exchange

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which reached millions of rank of reached which millions 17

the DoS, sent dance and musical groups, groups, musical and dance sent DoS, the ional environment, elite perceptions elite environment, ional

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Osama bin Laden’s Fatwa, or Declaration of War, quoted in of orDeclaration War, Fatwa, binLaden’s Osama Probers.” Ample, Say Finances Qaeda’s “Al Farah, “Global Unease With Major World Powers.” World Major With Unease “Global Power.” Declining to Hyperpower “From Image.” Global “Reviving America’s The

military actions “helped fulfill the p the fulfill “helped actions military - enhl, anti Meanwhile, despite GWT, the of decade first the in comparison, By September 11 World,” 247. 11 World,” September Gl obal on War Unidimensional a Terror: -

mrcns skyrocket Americanism policy

pn hc plcmkr cud rw o omlt an formulate to draw could policymakers which upon

- 9/11 world, the Bush Administration relied on force on relied Administration Bush the world, 9/11

rophecies of al Qaeda’s ideology, which claims claims which ideology, Qaeda’s al of rophecies 18

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Grand Strategy Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in in Strategy US Grand Better a “Crafting Gregg, the GWT began immediately with a a with immediately began GWT the - errs efforts terrorism s in Morocco, Turkey, Pakistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, in s truments

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CEU eTD Collection 61 60 59 neve and GWT the of outset the at million $285 paltry a at started diplomacy cultural for Funding below). 7 figure (see Terror on War Global the of beginning the to (NICs) Countries Independent Newly the in aftermath immediate its and War Cold the of end information cult for breakdowns including diplomacy, public for levels funding of survived, programs migr exchange flagship the of many though abroad, centers cultural and libraries American many of closure the and division America Arts the of termination institutional of assessment qualitative a as st well as levels staffing and spending strategy grand integrated an of T diplomacy ideologies, extreme such to alternative an offer and U.S. the of impressions “o ref seek [could] autocratic rulers, and corrupt own their of critical and identity their about confused “deeply force military through than other contact meaningful establish and tide this reverse to attempts feeble only methods.” larger his support far actively not do a who number with powerfully resonates and Muslim young disaffected of thousands

he diminished level of commitment to cultural diplomacy instruments as a component a as instruments diplomacy cultural to commitment of level diminished he utrs ructures. Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy,” 20. Diplomacy,” Cultural for Case “The Finn, for Case “The Finn, Report Commission 9/11 The e f h ms ptn waos n h Uie Sae' roy t cliae favorable cultivate to armory” States' United the in weapons potent most the of ne ating to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. And yet a yet And Affairs. Cultural and Educational of Bureau the to ating was “downplayed in favor of of was in dramatic favor displaysmight. “downplayed of military

rgas rvas daai dcie n pnig f ery 0 fo the from 50% nearly of spending in decline dramatic a reveals programs, h dsouin f h Uie Sae Ifrain gny n 99 a the saw 1999 in Agency Information States United the of dissolution The Cultural Diplomacy Cultural g i aohr xrm ideology. extreme another in uge , 362. ,

,” 15. ,” can be measured measured be can –

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Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 17. Terror,” on War the in U.S.Strategy “Assessing Evera, Van 500 Justification for FY 2008, FY 2009, FY 2010 FY 2009,FY 2008, FY for Justification Source 0

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CEU eTD Collection 67 66 65 64 strategyideologicalgrand defeatingthreat in by the posed the SovietUnion. of component crucial a as many by recognized diplomacy, cultural for heyday War Cold Ir on the security; national of interest the in U.S. the about world Arab and Muslim the in attitudes shape help to diplomacy cultural long a primarily was GWT the that consensus growing the given GWT the of threat imminent long a as efforts diplomacy cultural of integration deeper toolbox. diplomatic in exchange participants also ECA programs 199545,000 from in fell in 29,000 to 2001. th less to 1990s the in year per percent 10 from reduced was universities American at students exchange of increase the Consequently, America. to exposure and education higher th twenty from people State. of Department the in staff FSO public diplomacy 614 only were there 2005, by USIA, in (FSOs) officers Service Foreign 1200 were there 1960s, the in While State. of Department the with USIA of merger the

Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy of Public Linchpin The Cultural Diplomacy Schne Rugh, Diplomacy of Public Linchpin The Cultural Diplomacy atd udes fclua exchanges cultural of hundreds warted - q lyd pvtl oe n obtig h GT ad h hsoia rcr o the of record historical the and GWT; the combatting in role pivotal a played aq em ideolo term ider, “Culture Communications,” 19. Communications,” “Culture ider, American Encounters with Arabs with Encounters American niptby sf pwr eore ae ny n o te ntuet i the in instruments the of one only are resources power soft Indisputably, 2003. and 2002 in year per percent 1 an and cuts budget the by affected significantly also was staff field diplomacy Public gical battle with global reach; the repeated calls for a regeneration of regeneration a for calls repeated the reach; global with battle gical

- ie rb n Msi countries, Muslim and Arab five eetees t s upiig ht oiyaes ol ot against opt would policymakers that surprising is it Nevertheless

, 153. ,

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CEU eTD Collection Power.” America’s Soft of Decline “The Nye, Policy”; Foreign American Powerand 70 69 Power,” 101. Soft and Diplomacy orpolls interviews in shown 68 instruments from diplomacy cultural stemming threats security with deal adversaries. ideological to tools diplomatic of a in arsenal instruments state’s many the of one constitute resources power soft that assumption we being as criticized thoroughly evaluation, to attempt thecausalof determine or relationship between end. means and o question the address to paper this diplomacy.” cultural advantage). initia diplomacy (cultural means from path causal a of evidence hard providing of incapable are measures these but as such barometers qualitative on reliance to nations. foreign develop mutual and foster interests, to national aims promote intended understanding, its achieving in success gauge to which by metric significant a Undeniably, diplo cultural facing battles. obstacle ideological winning an in been tool has power or be soft can effective diplomacy cultural whether assess to not is investigation

Nye contends that t that contends Nye Nye addresses these criticisms in these criticisms addresses Nye Cummings, Nor is it my goal to test the validity of soft power as a concept, which has been has which concept, a as power soft of validity the test to goal my it is Nor at Hopefully Cultural Diplomacy and the US Government US the and Diplomacy Cultural 68

Milton Cummings conceded that “a certain degree of faith is involved in involved is faith of degree certain “a that conceded Cummings Milton

Most attempts to attempts Most he effective 69 hs ucue i hs eoe la ta te ups o this of purpose the that clear become has it juncture, this

, not Given the measurement predicament, it is outside the scope of scope the outside is it predicament, measurement the Given

Rather, the overarc the Rather, on “

ness of public diplomacy can only be measured by minds changed changed by minds measured be only can publicdiplomacy of ness ay fot ses rm dfcec rgrig viable a regarding deficiency a from stems efforts macy dollars spe dollars Nye, “Soft Power”; Nye, “Pub Power”; Nye, “Soft Nye, were ie) o n (uul nesadn ad strategic and understanding (mutual end to tives) measure the direct impact of cultural diplomacy resort resort diplomacy cultural of impact direct the measure k udreeoe, r convoluted. or underdeveloped, ak, f effectiveness, tackle the issue of lacking methods lacking of issue the tackle effectiveness, f

employed nt or slick production packages.” production orslick nt 23 , 2. , hing aim of this research is to to is research this of aim hing

media media

s at of part as lic Diplomacy and Soft Power”; Nye, “Soft “Soft Power”; Nye, Soft and lic Diplomacy coverage, surveys, and interviews, and surveys, coverage,

long

the Cold War War Cold the

- term

See eainhp with relationships Nye, “Public “Public Nye, 70

acp the accept I explain why explain attempts a s to

CEU eTD Collection 75 policy.” foreign of gearbox the cogin “minor as diplomacy cultural 74 73 72 71 communication, strategic divergent the out on The States. United the often most states, single on focused has and nature in descriptive a as part ofdiplomacy.”serious regarded “not practice a as diplomacy cultural references only power soft and cultural on one only included 2005 diplomacy. and 1995 between published Diplomacy, in diplomacy. Ad by diplomacy of topic subject. the ignore entirely almost theory relations international of schools various the while practice the discusses barely diplomacy of massive the as well s by practice the as in investment subjects numerous with intersection its despite expected diplomacy cultural strategy into grand GWT the in emerged adversary conquer

Watson, Watson, Peila, and Burgess, Wyszomirski, Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, Peila, and Burgess, Wyszomirski, Riordan, Power.” Soft “Wielding Melissen, American Most of the of Most be might as attention scholarly much as received not has diplomacy Cultural Diplomacy The New Diplomacy New The the 73 72

cultural dip cultural Shaun Riordan’s work on on work Riordan’s Shaun Papers Discussion Clingendael hundred one over of series exhaustive An opposi .

existing nesadns f h rltosi bten utrl diplomacy cultural between relationship the of understandings g ideology ng , 121. l

omacy

has either has 74

n pbi diplomacy, public and

International Cultural Relations Cultural International Relations Cultural International

literature on the topic of cultural diplomacy cultural of topic the on literature

m asn os o ee mk mnin f cultural of mention make even not does Watson am Ninkovich, in Ninkovich,

everal countries. everal

falls into falls , but was not resurrected after the new ideological ideological new the after resurrected not was but , –

one that seemed to to seemed that one been been .

US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy Cultural and Policy Information US New Diplom New

one of three of one a 24 comparative study of numerous states numerous of study comparative

Scholarship about the traditional field traditional the about Scholarship ; Chartrand, “International Cultural Affairs.” Cultural “International ; Chartrand, .

with

acy n o te eia wrs n the on works seminal the of One

categories

that evaluates public diplomacy public evaluates that the main focus favoring U.S. U.S. favoring focus main the ead epr inte deeper demand majority of of majority . . The first theme first The

has , 1. ,

, dismisses , dismisses scholarship been more been rto of gration 75 lays

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CEU eTD Collection S America’s Decline of Schneider, Diplomacy”; ofCultural Potential 78 Government US 1993 for Diplomacy Cultural Support of State Trends Department in 77 Diplomacy Public Practicing 76 by a offering foreign policy a this how outlines followingchapter strategy. grand of component a as initiatives diplomacy cultural examining GWT, irrational seemingly literature the in efforts bordered has approach government about ambivalence deep cultural surrounding machinations States political domestic United the examining to diplomacy, made changes administrative and legislative of analysis as (e.g. era Cold War the and II War during programsWorld information

Arndt, Arndt, Cummings, Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy”; Schneider, “Culture Communications”; Schneider, “The Unrealized Unrealized “The Schneider, Communications”; “Culture Schneider, Diplomacy”; Cultural for Case “The Finn, O ad RFE and VOA

to counter the declining government support for the practice. the for support government declining the counter to The First Resort of Kings FirstThe Resort Cultural Diplomacy and the US Government US the and Diplomacy Cultural .

Mulcahy, “Cu Mulcahy, oft Power”; Grincheva, “U.S. Arts and Cultural Diplomacy.” Cultural Arts and “U.S. Grincheva, Power”; oft come - RL). oeg policy foreign .

Cull, Cull, ltural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs.” Exchange the and Diplomacy ltural s 76

; Ninkov

on advocacy or lobbying for for lobbying or advocacy on The Cold War and the United States Information Agency Information States United the War and Cold The o h for the to

Seco nalysis approach political approach sciencefrom a perspective.nalysis ich, ich, nd Diplomacy That Works That Diplomacy

US Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy Cultural and Policy Information US research contribution fills the lacunae i lacunae the contribution fills research strategies , that e rtn o te oi ivral ofr a historical a offers invariably topic the on writing involvement in the the in involvement 25 ; Kennedy and Lucas, “Enduring Freedom.” “Enduring Lucas, and ; Kennedy ek t epan h pzl surrounding puzzle the explain to seeks

o combat to - ; Schneider, “Cultural Diplomacy”; Nye, “The “The Nye, Diplomacy”; “Cultural ; Schneider, 2002 ; Cummings, ; Cummings, a practice. h ielgcl tuge f the of struggle ideological the

return

77 Cultural Diplomacy and the the and Diplomacy Cultural to to

Finally . 78

utrl diplomacy cultural ; Sablosky, ; Sablosky, broadcasting such broadcasting

No investigation No policy n the literature the n , a normative normative a ,

Richmond, Richmond, Recent Recent

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CEU eTD Collection 80 79 rational a of predictions to lead response government would adversaries ideological such defeating as diplomacy cultural of recognition long a primarily was GWT achieving analysts from attention most expla the to received attempting has model this that contends Allison making actor rational unitary a predict findings might model each outcome policy what out lay I section, this exp to developed level. domestic the at process the of dimensions explain to aim evaluate to which from framework ideal an provides it achieve to which by means a as instruments diplomacy analysis decision underlying policy foreign of models politics bureaucratic Theory Testing 2.1

Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile 690. Cuban Crisis,” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual Allison, The The A Essence of Decision of Essence C pply reveal HAPTER ainl neet ad iiiig ot. h goig osnu ta the that consensus growing The costs. minimizing and interests national Rational ing

to theto be result. actual

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- 2:

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. that made use of the most effective most the of use made that T

HEORETICAL -

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M - em dooia btl wt goa rah ope wt the with coupled reach global with battle ideological term

odel contrary to the national interest national the to contrary

decision

n h fc o a crisis a of face the in operates under the assumption that the state act state the that assumption the under operates

to o saerf epesy ogd o sit in assist to forged expressly statecraft of tool a s in response to the strategic problem it faces. it problem strategic the to response in s F RAMEWORK ANDRAMEWORK 26

policy His mo His

these changes because his because changes these ,

dels also seem to be expressly be to seem also dels raiainl rcs, and process, organizational , s national interests. national s

in à grand grand il clarify will

M of democratic democratic of vis its reliance on cultural on reliance its vis osdrto of consideration ETHODOLOGY strategy

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79 especially

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CEU eTD Collection 81 that reveals expansion fascist preventing response procedural archetype procedural the as the using GWT the to response diplomacy int an of outcome expected an to lead would procedures determined notion (SOPs) procedures operating standard political and goals, organizational goals, objectives. national of conceptions compatible partially only of variety a of service the in organizations bureaucratic of levels various actions smaller conflicting often and innumerable of “consequences decision differentiated an “gears of up made are governments that account into takes solvingin empiricalpuzzle insufficient out the sketched renders maximization utility and interests national overlooked interventions. cost low relatively the given expectations interests. national relied cultural that diplomacy heavilyon one

Ibid.

His to order In that that ” Organization 81 after , states

h seigy rainl outc irrational seemingly The

distinguish

h dwszn o te dainl ol o saerf sc a cultural as such statecraft of tools ideational the of downsizing the

a ol dcae oiy pin ta ae led i tee pre these in already are that options policy dictate only can Moreover ul o te ol Wr II War World the on built - al aig tutr” n ta plc atos r otn the often are actions policy that and structure” making

rcs Model Process

alternative explanations for g for explanations alternative n Europe in a ipe cost simple a , o upes h sra o cmuit ideology, communist of spread the suppress to

Ad yet And . ht etit hi actions their restrict that

27 sue ta te subun the that assumes historical success of the of success historical

f utrl ilmc cmae t military to compared diplomacy cultural of –

to enhance enhance to national advancesecurity and - m o te W gad taey that strategy grand GWT the of ome eei aayi would analysis benefit

utrl ilmc initi diplomacy cultural a deeper deeper a

in discussion this overnment behavior, Allison behavior, overnment the Rational Policy Mode Policy Rational the exploration . d Cold War apparatu War Cold its of a state state a of its

t is gac, t glance, first At ees n highly a in levers y niiul at individuals by niid cultural ensified atives produce .

f hs model this of

ie at aimed

itself itself similar follow he a s - l

CEU eTD Collection 83 82 offer model efforts diplomacy cultural bolstered for called threat the that consensus of model this of application an House, White the and of CIA, Defense, Department the also but State, of Department the only not including government effort diplomacy issue an of faces different see who officials government among confusion and competition, coalition, compromise, predictable t policyin outcomes make responsibilities state various leaders these among and negotiations position, presenttheir on based arguments of charge in elites government players among games bargaining overlapping “various of outcomes produce that government the uniqueaddress characteristics ofthe modify Model Process terrorist the against defense primary the as C operating led leadership, thethreat to and a deep of poor coordination, misunderstanding before diplomacy

onsequently Ibid., 708. Ibid., Ibid.

the GW the

Allison’s h oeaig rcdrs f h Cl Wr utrl diploma cultural War Cold the of procedures operating the ragd irrhcly n h ntoa government national the in hierarchically arranged

T case would case T procedures procedures s

, h greatest the

the United States government government States United the testing ueurtc oiis Model Politics Bureaucratic t cma te W puig n rm ery l isiuin of institutions all nearly from in pouring GWT the combat to s h troit tak o Spebr 11, September of attacks terrorist the hat are “not chosen as a solution to a solution a problem, chosenbutrather result a to hat as from “not are specifically fashioned fashioned specifically reveals that institutional rules restricted policymakers’ ability to to ability policymakers’ restricted rules institutional that reveals pre

xlntr pwr n nesadn plcmkr decisions policymaker understanding in power explanatory dict . ” 83

an absence of bureaucratic infightingbureaucratic of absence an With recommendations for for recommendations With present 28 to to

turned to turned

oue o te nenl oiis f a of politics internal the on focuses otn wt transna with contend tak i 2001. in attacks - day

ideological struggle. state - centeredm rgnrto o cultural of regeneration a

inadequate .

” 82

to explain the puzzle the explain to T

due to the growing the to due tional e Organizational he

y paau to apparatus cy In this model, model, this In . And yet, t yet, And . ilitary strategies ilitarystrategies

adversaries. interagency a

lack of

result his

CEU eTD Collection 86 85 84 of chain the on light sheds analysis this way, another Put policy. of implementation betwee connections evaluating intervening which producecausal mechanisms test through effects causal variables variable. dependent the in outcome single a beyond differences assessing by comparison case the of strength the to pertaining doubts assuage further case GWT the in response similar a of predictions a established that War strategy Cold grand integrated the in developments the of comparison controlled variable. independent primary the isolate to theories three employing of approach methodological Allison’s following Terror, on agenda research my framework, my test ultimately and outcomes policy Case 2.2 Selection over policy outcomes hawks liberal and conservatives wrangling when GWT the during

Bennett a Bennett 4. chap. Ibid., Bennett, George and research n nlss ht mly tee oes provide models these employs that analysis An 84 nd George, “Process Tracing in Case Study Research.” Study Case in Tracing “Process George, nd

over

lhuh hs netgto cnttts snl cs study, case single a constitutes investigation this Although

ol n t test to and goal

how Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences Social the in Development Theory and Case Studies

best best tha

t h individual the at t reliedt

n orde in to respond to the rising Islamist threat, threat, Islamist rising the to respond to

aibe f neet ht a acut o te different the for account may that interest of variable

variables that may cause the variation in the dependentthe in variation the cause may that variables more h vldt ad cp cniin o te theoretical the of conditions scope and validity the relies on an on relies te niomn, ecpin o tra, and threat, of perceptions environment, the n to r ultimately ultimately s 85

the val the

heavily on heavily on military strategies sals a eprcl uze ht ol la to lead would that puzzle empirical an establish Furthermore leadership leadership 29 idity of the models themselves. themselves. models the of idity ucee in succeeded

intensive

, level,

In additio In process tracing helps identify and identify helps tracing process case case

s as as

wielded lentv epaain of explanations alternative analysis o analysis government officials were officials government n, process tracing should should tracing process n, .

h ms influence most the mnrt of minority a f the Global War War Global the f it relies To achieve To

n a on 86 neo

by n - CEU eTD Collection 2002.” t threat is a clearly sympathizers their and extremists Islamic West the toward anger increasing the But States. United the assessment: 89 88 87 as shocks strateg concentrate comparison encomp understandingofthe their threat criticalis that analysis. this most in be to non a is fundamentalism Islamic as such influenced religiously is that one with communism as such ideology political on based threat a comparing that contend may critics First, characteristics One Network. Qaeda Al the outside the from faced has States United the threats security important most two the arguably reinvestment culturalof diplomacy in post the in rationale policymaker and events

George Tenet, director of Central Intelligence for the CIA, emphasized this notion in his 2002 threat threat 2002 his in notion this emphasized CIA, the for Intelligence Central of director George Tenet, “The Post Ahrari, Hughes, -

sequitur.

s h ms esnil ou o ti suy I tep t cnrl o te disparate the for control to attempt I study, this of focus essential most the is a eod t cnrl o te smerc ierms f h two the of timeframes asymmetric the for control to Second, GWT the and War Cold The y

assing more than four decades the other just a decade decade a just other the decades four than more assing perversion of the faith as a political ideology. political a as faith the of perversion – Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas Warof the and Extremism Islamic was

the communist threat from the Soviet apparatus and the terrorist threat f threat terrorist the and apparatus Soviet the from threat communist the “ “Let me“Let unde critical 88 being being

- 9/11 American Conundrum,” 97. Conundrum,” American 9/11 f h two the of Yet many U.S. government elites understood the Islamist terr Islamist the understood elites government many U.S. Yet

junctures constructed. rscore what the President has affirmed: Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to to threat a enemy nor an is neither itself Islam affirmed: has President the what rscore 87 s

on the incipient years of each conflict during conflict each of years incipient the on Although the ideological battle dimension battle ideological the Although

conflict ”

that triggered the emergence of response of newin emergence triggered strategies that the

T s o determine the periods of study, of periods the determine o

n re t rne ter oprsn oe ro more comparison their render to order in

initiatives. were selected for comparison because they are are they because comparison for selected were .

30 -

9/11 period that period 9/11 — o us. “ “ us. o and toward governments friendly to us to friendly governments toward and

See more at at See more 89

And, as previously stated, it is is it stated, previously as And, “DCI Worldwide Threat Briefing Briefing Threat Worldwide “DCI w ere

grounds for the lack the for grounds – I rely on exogenous relyon I

laid out in Chapter in out laid

h soe f the of scope the which a a which wars orist threat orist — among among

– grand grand

bust. rom one

CEU eTD Collection 90 a military legitimate a faced States provid United should the 2001, that 11, substantiation September of attacks terrorist the However, ideals.its defend to reason little have would States United the where world unipolar a in diplom public a that argue to some lead would the millennium of turn the by hegemon global the as States the United rise of the to War administration War establish to East. Middle reference subsequent the since terms presidential minor only which after and strategy, grand U.S. the into integrated and established point which by term, presidential the trace underway were GWT the and War Cold the before show to administrations and Bush Truman analysis my alth of points starting the as serve 9/11 of new a to

Collier and Collier, Collier, Collierand uh I ough cultural diplomacy cultural Third

international environment international

ntttoa ad oiy eeomns t developments policy and institutional changes osdr the consider

, the ,

the GWT the n nertd rn srtg t fgt h GT ie te ucsfl Cold successful the given GWT the fight to strategy grand integrated an A could lso Shaping the Political Arena the Political Shaping

shift in the international context from a bi a from context international the in shift , I contend I ,

draw in practical terms practical in as such such as models

months .

that an eight an that and initiated drawdowns to put an end to both wars in the wars end both inthe an to drawdowns put and initiated to , assembled in less than a decade, a than less in assembled ,

edn u t tee vns t h bgnig f the of beginning the at events these to up leading the cultural diplomacy apparatus was apparatus diplomacy cultural the . 90 .

. The end The

For the GWT case, I case, GWT the For

31 the - Barack year presidency would hav would presidency year

existing acy effort of any kind wou kind any of effort acy

of World War II and the terrorist attacks terrorist the and II War World of bm administration Obama . the o

state of cultural diplomacy effortsculturaldiplomacy of state For the Cold War War Cold the For

for each each for

- polar world during the Cold the during world polar n of end only

upon which the Bush the which upon conflict examine Bush’s two Bush’s examine

Eisenhower e been sufficient been e

ld be irrelevant be ld effectively d ideological nd comparison

it respectively e sufficient sufficient e eue its reduced

underwent s first ’s

fully fully I , , CEU eTD Collection marty of acts in their gloried contrast, by Qaeda, Al of soldiers The democracies. the advanced of arsenals countervailing bythe power military formidable hostility allits unyielding for Union, Soviet “The respects. in some dangerous more was but even communism, Soviet by posed threat the to analogous was political strategy, and ideology trulytransnational 92 91 long establish and attitudes public foreign context. War Cold the purport diplomacy’s in enemy state clear a combat to tactic logical more a been have arguably would strategies defense military conventional as cannot it “a since that contends Angstrom threat. transnational a such to response anachronistic an seem would Afghanistan and reasoning of anti with survival Al the like organizations diplomacy cultural includes bottom on emphasis diplomacy’s cultural with But borders. national by defined clearly enemy an of absence target to expected been have would national borders. by definable not enemy transnational a produced GWT the of outset the at Unio Soviet the from opposition U.S.relative powerof internationally decline extremism Islamic of form the in adversary

Carnes Lord in in Lord Carnes Angstrom, “Mappin

to the West, was a prudent player on the international scene, and could be deterred from using its using its from deterred be could and scene, international the on player prudent wasa the to West, the Finally,

hs ruet ass lgcl unay f hm n at h Uie States United the fact in whom of quandary logical a raises argument This

, the , easily be deterred by the US nuclear and conventional arsenal.” conventional and nuclear US the by deterred be easily Losing Hearts and Minds? and Hearts Losing - g the Competing Historical Analogies of the War on Terrorism,” 237. Terrorism,” on War of the Analogies Historical Competing g the

Americanism as the fuel for their success. Also, success. their for fuel the as Americanism military response of the Bush administration in its campaigns in Iraq in campaigns its in administration Bush the of response military otnin ht hl te ntd tts ae cer sovereign clear faced States United the while that contention ed soft power potential lies primarily in its ability to manipulate manipulate to ability its in primarily lies potential power soft ed - up relationship up

- ad ntok ht eis n rsros upr fr their for support grassroots on relies that network Qaeda

efforts would actually seem better suited to combat terrorist combat to suited better seem actually would efforts n l

Qaeda does not have a geographical center of gravity, of center geographical have a does not Qaeda during the Cold War Cold the during , 3 - , contends th , contends building targeting the public at large, a strategy that that strategy large,a at public the targetingbuilding

t clua dpoay fot i te W i the in GWT the in efforts diplomacy cultural its rdom enemy.’” ‘far the against rdom 32

. – -

em eainhp i odr o hp the shape to order in relationships term

one at this new terrorism, placed in the service of a of service the in placed terrorism, new at this

to be taken seriously taken be to , the nascent international system international nascent the , 92

according to this this to according ie ta cultural that Given

considering the considering 91

Such line line

CEU eTD Collection 94 the twenty of challenge strategic greatest is the […] world Muslim s the strengthening and reforming and of radicalism of Islamist reversing task 93 extra for allowed that 2000s exhaustively not are explanatoryfactor an as considered constraints budgetary utility, its maximize would government and analysis Model, Policy Rational to commitment dependent my in variation the for explanation causal provide may selection case my 2 explanatoryan thatacc framework factors unique the of any Ultimately threat Soviet that combat would to States diplomacy United the why of table the on question ideologyextremist GWT context. the in to is focus examine primary my ideologies, opposing of spread the contain and field playing .3 Methods Sources.3 and

Waltz, Waltz, of in Foreword the Ajami Hill and vital O The Man, the State, War and State, the Man, , utlin

testing .. cultur U.S. neet a te tt level state the at interests

conundrum ing

utrl ilmc i te omto o gad strategy grand of formation the in diplomacy cultural

the theoretical framework framework theoretical the for the impact of impact the for has l ilmc efrs agtd t tts ihn h obt f Islamic of orbit the within states at targeted efforts diplomacy al laid the groundwork the laid illustrated by the the by illustrated piaiy prt within operate primarily I

- budgetary military campaigns, campaigns, military budgetary Hughes, Hughes, key independent key ounts the divergentfor policy outcome

Islamic Extremism and the War of Ideas Warof the and Extremism Islamic inherent in inherent given that the U.S. economy enjoyed a boom in the in boom a enjoyed economyU.S. the giventhat . 94 93

osdrn ti mdls supin ht the that assumption model’s this Considering ,

33 oprsn f h to conflicts two the of comparison to but for

be applied applied be

the the isolating es o o conquer to so less

GWT case GWT variables related to related variables ent Waltz’s Kenneth - first century.” first

the independent variables that variables independent the n poiig utfcto for justification providing and

putting defense spending at at spending defense putting rely so heavily on on heavily so rely

may be incorporated into incorporated be may tate across the entire across tate

, 592:xi , variable

h troit one. terrorist the . eod mg of image second , contend that “the that , contend domestic forces domestic . n plig the applying In

–

the level of level the evs the leaves cultural

CEU eTD Collection unilateralism. and leadership, uniploarity” U.S. of legitimacy shaky the underpin also would it struggle, global new great theas at thesaw 97 96 95 in plays diplomacy cultural role potential the of perceptions elite into insight providing stateme and speeches of analysis policy the for officials government and policymakers from reports, media polls, opinion public secondary, ideologiesand ambitionsofthe leadership.personal most powerful political i I Model, Politics Bureaucratic the leadership, Process image). (third determinants institutional and structural international from emanating opportunities and threats of and image) (first leadership throu behavior macro of potency conceptual the considers also analysis non with interact to obliged increasingly is U.S. the activities, Security.Homeland levels high historically mperial ambitions to maintain the U.S. hegemonic position as a global power global a as position hegemonic U.S. the maintain to ambitions mperial

Waltz, Waltz, 8 figure See Buzan, Buzan, hs eerh project research This that, Recognizing Man, the State, War and State, the Man, in in tacks of 9/11 as a solution to a “threat deficit,” that if “successfully constructed and embedded embedded and constructed “successfully if that deficit,” a “threat to a solution 9/11 of as tacks Model, I specifically consider institutional (mis)management institutional consider specifically I Model, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?,” 1101 War?,” Cold New Terrorism’Bethe on War ‘Global the “Will

and misconceptions about the nature of theideological adversary. nature of the about and misconceptions o me to

decisions made in made decisions gh a detailed detailed a gh sr tee needn vrals A rtcl ulttv aayi of analysis qualitative critical A variables. independent these asure

u t te epnn lvlo goaiain n transnational and globalization of level deepening the to due .

and

assessment

relies loig o te rain f h nw eatet of Department new the of creation the for allowing the GWT the t md b plcmkr i ti period this in policymakers by made nts

o n utpe ore o data of sources multiple on evaluate fficial government documents, government fficial

f h ielg ad miin o te political the of ambitions and ideology the of 34

contexts. contexts. has been has

factors related to to related factors

consulted to provide explanations provide to consulted I

96 also conduct qualitative content qualitative conduct also

- n etn te Organizational the testing In level factors and micro and factors level ,

argues that the United States States the United that argues - state actors, the actors, state ueurtc rivalry bureaucratic , both primary and and primary both , , lack of competent of lack , along with along 97

In testing In , and the and , empirical f study, of

memos memos - level ,

CEU eTD Collection concept, a diplomacy as chapter following the in proceed I tested, be cultural establishe Having and professional, educational, as exchanges such instruments diplomacy cultural diver each of study.period of environments the in initiatives such in investing against and for arguments di cultural follow allow format interview structured the in process making sources policymakers classified still deeper eschewed combatting gent outcome on the dependent variable dependent the on outcome gent - up questions questions up h vrac aog h idpnet variables independent the among variance The the given Additionally,

from the early GWT period GWT theearly from plomacy tools in combatting ideological battles as well as to deconstruct the deconstruct to as well as battles ideological combatting in tools plomacy

ideological battles battles ideological s cmoet f n nertd rn strategy grand integrated an of component a as

and cultural diplomacy practitioners practitioners diplomacy cultural and rm the from

d a robust empirical puzzle and outlined the theoretical framework to framework theoretical the outlined and puzzle empirical robust a d integration of cultural diplomacyintegration of strategy grand into a that formation of foreign policy and institutional changes. The semi The changes. institutional and policy foreign of formation

Bush provide material to assess elite attitudes toward the efficacy of efficacy the toward attitudes elite assess to material provide critically literature on thetopic reviewing the iie acs to access limited and era s ,

for a more relaxed setting that elicit that setting relaxed more a for illuminating

semi that could shed light from the inside on the decision the theinside on couldthat light from shed - tutrd neves ih omr n current and former with interviews structured 35

the –

ay oenet ouet ta are that documents government many the ih n prtoaiain f cultural of operationalization an with

rationale behind behind rationale were

diminished

odce t icue primary include to conducted ultimately

n obtig h GWT the combatting in

level of commitment to commitment of level policy decisions decisions policy .

s con fr the for account .

responses and responses that that - - .

CEU eTD Collection 4 99 3. Strategy,” Integrated and 98 this achieve To communication. strategic and propaganda, relations, cultural it distinguish discussion present The implicit. and explicit entail goals specific its what and diplomacy cultural constitutes precisely what understanding” success.themutual basis of as of requirement the [with] people a of culture and life the of comprehension complete others to communicating successfully of act “the as diplomacy cultural of explanation understanding.” mutual foster to order in peoples their and nations among culture of aspects other and art, information, ideas, of exchange “the as diplomacy cultural to refers who University, Hopkins Johns pol Jr., Cummings, C. Milton of that is definition cited widely most The limitations. c timeframe, and audience, target practitioners, goals, its outlining diplomacy, cultural it policies, diplomacy . onceptualizing it as a soft power tool, and power advantagesacknowledging and and soft tool, onceptualizing a purported as its it

Robert Thayer (1959) quoted in in quoted (1959) Robert Thayer Cummings, n yt an yet And consistent. remarkably are diplomacy cultural on literature the in definitions The cultural changing America’s of analysis institutional an conduct to order In

Cultural Diplomacy and the US Government US the and Diplomacy Cultural

from related concepts such as public diplomacy, soft power, international power, soft diplomacy, public as such concepts related from

C in

HAPTER ecagn ue f em c terms of use terchanging s n is

csay o rvd a oe opeesv dfnto of definition comprehensive more a provide to ecessary Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence and Integrated Strategy,” Strategy,” Integrated and Influence Political Diplomacy, “Cultural Lenczowski,

3 : 98

ONCEPTUAL n o te alet definit earliest the of One 36 , 1. , seeks to operationalize the term in order to order in term the operationalize to seeks

; 99 Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence Influence Political Diplomacy, “Cultural Lenczowski,

ets osdrbe ofso about confusion considerable reates

D EVE LOPMENT ions provides a similar similar a provides ions

itical scientist at at scientist itical

– ol I goal,

both CEU eTD Collection reference. of frame characteristic attitudes, perceptions, own his based on message within the ideas neces o of consequence logical the model, to this According dissonance. in plays communication intercultural the role of more a furnish to model theoretical Szalay’s Lorand employs He motives. interpreting to meaning unintended attributing assumptions, grounded culturally with inconsistent information obscuring reality, of perception one’s altering by negotiation effective 101 100 of knowledge to regards with “g Office, Accountability Government U.S. the As filter. cultural the through passing when results different produce therefore and side. other the on country target the to values or message their transmitting when filter cultural a through communicate to attempting agents these of all level, (societal) II Track the at actors th at officials elite among occurring find mutually to acceptablesolutions challenge. a common to parti related somehow is practice and intention government of theelement “an implies conceived, broadly that which, diplomacy, assumption the on rely must definition any speaking, Semantically end. an to means the implying “diplomacy” and context deconstruct Cultural Conventional Relations3.1 versus Diplomacy the primary and diplomacy cultural of mechanisms functional the delineating taxonomy a generate

In the book book In the Crossroads,” 7. a at Diplomacy “Public McDowell, cipation” sarily convey the intended meaning of the sender since the receiver will inexorably interpret the the interpret inexorably will receiver the since the sender of meaning intended the convey sarily ilmc cud e niae a a two a as envisaged be could Diplomacy T arv a a oe succinct more a at arrive o

agents involved agents wielding in them. Negot the concept into its constitutive parts with the term “cultural” providing “cultural” term the with parts constitutive its into concept the 100 perating within different cultural frameworks is that a transmitted message willnot message is that a transmitted frameworks cultural different within perating

in an effort to gain strategic advantage, advance national interests, or interests, national advance advantage, strategic gain to effort an in iating Across Cultures 101

Agents a Agents

foreign policy objectives, in objectives, policy foreign t each level have distinct advantages and shortcomings and advantages distinct have level each t , Raymond Cohen substantiates that culture can indeed interrupt interrupt indeed can culture that substantiates Cohen , Raymond Tak (lt) ee ad ih non with and level (elite) I Track e eiiin f utrl ilmc, t s eesr to necessary is it diplomacy, cultural of definition

37 vrmn aece hv a taei ed strategic a have agencies overnment

- tier game of chess with interactions interactions with chess of game tier

words or actions, an oractions, words - d

depth intelligence on regional on intelligence depth

eliefs that make up his make that eliefs

systematic analysis systematic d incorrectly d incorrectly - governmental

the the ge CEU eTD Collection 107 106 state diplomacy that He argues that 105 104 103 102 community global the in States United the for “distaste more stimulate can example, bl undermine, potentially that effects producing risk and own, their of agenda an assume strategy, government non communication, their of content governme home mission, propaganda. as than rather credible, as perceived being of chance greatest the has transmitted being message bu governments, for as independently non a characterized have some withou organically,and relations cultural to akin more be would but all, at diplomacy constitutes hardly practice this economic or political “theagenda, isto be successful.” program more likelythe Gienow pe skills, relations to comes it when advantage an enjoys sector private The officers. local and

See See Arndt, Gienow and Domfried Diplomacy Public U.S. Ibid., 10. Ibid., Gienow and Domfried ‘‘the state is incoherent, and this incoherence necessarily extends itself to statist diplomacy to statist itself extends necessarily incoherence this and is incoherent, ‘‘the state

centered one centered “US Center for Citizen Diplomacy.” Center for “US Yet if interactions in no wa no in interactions if Yet - The First Resort of Kings FirstThe Resort eh reiterates Hecht

conditions, and a worldwide network of broadcast resources and public and resources broadcast of network worldwide a and conditions, ” (p. 533). (p. ”

– citizen diplomacy citizen

, 1. , cie idpnec and independence rceived - - encounters between nations and their peoples that grow “naturally “naturally grow that peoples their and nations between encounters Hecht, Hecht, Hecht, t the greatest potential return. Without government affiliation, the affiliation, government Without return. potential greatest the t

‘‘functions much more fully and consistently in fully consistently and more much ‘‘functions t government intervention” government t

policy. and interests state multiply or ur, Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy Cultural for a Searching Diplomacy Cultural for a Searching , xviii., h point the t gi te ot Bt akn etra cnrl vr the over control external lacking But most. the gain nts

106

f non If

- In John In John y involve the governments of either interlocutor, then interlocutor, either of governments the involve y tt atrs teps o ar ot ilmtc goals diplomatic out carry to attempts actor’s state

. 105 ht h frhr h dsac bten gn and agent between distance the further the that - state interlocutors are free to act in opposition to opposition in act to free are interlocutors state

- state actors operate consistent with the state state the with consistent operate actors state After all, this practice provides the highest risk highest the provides practice this all, After Hoffman's 38

rdblt, and credibility, “ 104 Reconstructing Diplomacy, Reconstructing

, 23. , 4. , (see figure 2 below). Nevertheless, below). 2 (see figure

a stateless context than in a in a than context a stateless resources.”

marketing and public and marketing 107

”

the author contends contends the author Pop culture, for for culture, Pop international 102 103

” (p. 525). 525). (p. ” Jessica Jessica

affairs CEU eTD Collection 112 111 110 109 108 foreign influence and “inform communicatio skilled and negotiations entails diplomacy conventional summits, and discussions, demarches, as such means level. I Track the at states different representing pol diplomats, between filter cultural repuls a nudity of full films understanding”mutual to contributethan rather

Grincheva, “U.S. Arts and Cultural Diplomacy,” 180. Diplomacy,” Cultural and Arts “U.S. Grincheva, McDowell, “Public “Public McDowell, Studies.” Diplomacy in Made Gains the “Consolidating Murray, Hunt Alexander by Graphic So and Diplomacy “Public Nye, ion.” ovninl diplomacy Conventional 109

Diplomacy at a Crossroads,” 7. a at Diplomacy Figure d ilne o osraie ulm countries Muslim conservative to violence nd

ftPower,” 95.

4 governments : : International CulturalRelations ,

at at h other the

iticians, policymakers, and other government elites government other and policymakers, iticians, n by “trained envoys of governments” to directly to governments” of envoys “trained by n

39 .” 112

n o te pcrm ocr truh the through occurs spectrum, the of end

108 The diagram below (figure 1) serves to to serves 1) (figure below diagram The

considering that “ex that considering

111

Usually pursued through formal formal through pursued Usually 110

porting Hollywood porting

a produce may

CEU eTD Collection 115 114 113 s which better diplomacy, understand must we diplomacy, cultural execution and formation the on attitudes public of influence the with “deal to governments of actions term the coined first who Gullion, A. Edmund conceptu were foreign influence and “inform indirectly or directly to attempt 3.2 diplomacy. cultural from it distinguish later to order in diplomacy traditional of understanding our aid

“What Is Public Diplomacy?” Is Public “What Crossroads,” a at Diplomacy “Public McDowell, Hunt Alexander by Graphic

Mechanisms of G overnments can also engage with interlocutors at the Track II level in an an in level II Track the at interlocutors with engage also can overnments

ally formalized by Ambassador and former Dean of The Fletcher School Fletcher The of Dean former and Ambassador by formalized ally of foreign policies.” foreign of m shlr have scholars ome Public Diplomacy

Figure

5 : Conventional : Diplomacy 115

8. Before we can arrive at a workable definition of definition workable a at arrive can we Before

loosely 40

public diplomacy public hrceie t icue ntig a anything include to characterized

h ubel cnet f public of concept umbrella the 113

publics

in 1965 to describe the describe to 1965 in .” 114

These efforts These

CEU eTD Collection National Government the US and Diplomacy 11; 120 119 118 117 116 scholar Neoliberal Even Relations. International of School Neorealist the by outlined culture and diplomacy are elements by soft power. extension of resources power’ ‘soft its as policies and values, culture, on capitalizing attraction, for strive also and must (sticks) but (carrots), coercion payments on rely only not must states outcomes, desired attain to that, policies.” and attitudes side, of in the othera image opinion to the targetaccept favorable public society ispersuaded flourish” can policies specific [its] which in climate political intellectual the create[s] state] [a debates, social and political country’s [foreign] a in engaging “by national achieve inte to others influence to ability the that is implication overarching the policies.” current i ideals, and ideas nation’s its for understanding about bring to attempt an in publics foreign with communicating of process government’s “a as it describes who Tuch, by given is definition succinct projec to does government

Gilboa, “Searching for a Theory of P of Theory a for “Searching Gilboa, Riordan, quoted in Tuch of Potential Unrealized “The Schneider, Communications”; “Culture Schneider, Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power”; Clinton, “Senate Confirmat “Senate Clinton, Power”; Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, Report of the Defense and Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication Strategic on Force Task Board Science and Defense of the Report rests is paramount for diplomatic success. The underlying assumption follows that follows assumption underlying The success. diplomatic for paramount is rests [the target audience] target [the

l ti tl o pwr n sae neet s vctv o te dooia tenets ideological the of evocative is interest state and power of talk this All diplomacy, of instrument an as utility its maintains diplomacy public that Given Interest.” The New Diplomacy New The

Melissen, “Wielding Soft Power,” 8. Power,” Soft “Wielding Melissen, 117

119 , 122.

; Pwono, “Fostering a Cultural Diplomacy Policy Dialogue”; Walt, “In the the “In Walt, Dialogue”; Policy Diplomacy Cultural a “Fostering ; Pwono,

will exert pressure on its government to alter existing hostile existing alter to government its on pressure exert will ts institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and goals national its as well as culture, and institutions ts ned mn shlr ad policym and scholars many Indeed, is mg ad xli is policies. its explain and image its t

ublic Diplomacy,” 59. Diplomacy,” ublic

41 to project them. project to

ion Hearing”; Hearing”; ion 120

Cultural Diplomacy.” Cultural Hence, public diplomacy public Hence,

; Cummings, ; Cummings, 116 kr hv concluded have akers The 9/11 Commission Report Commission 9/11 The

Perhaps the most most the Perhaps 118 Cultural gi e ta “if that ven

CEU eTD Collection 127 126 delib 125 124 123 122 121 resources disposal power.” soft degen diplomacy that audiences.” foreign with dialogue on based short at aiming public situates who Melissen, Jan to ranging “continuum andmanipulative crude as being a propaganda propaganda on from turn to useful be might it another’s. injure or cause an the into straying communicate to attempt government to turn readily would that interests national of pursuit power. international of category one as opinion’ over ‘power recognized Carr H. E. as such realists traditional at hints certainly that suggestion a do to countries getother and environment the political “control to order in resources ideological and cultural, scientific, economic, military, its of use efficient make to was War Cold the after States United the for challenge the that argues Nye Joseph

personnel d Frederick Barghoorn (1960) quoted in in quoted (1960) Barghoorn Frederick McDowel in Nye by referenced Carr Power,” 155. “Soft Nye, Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 108. Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, Publi on “Reflections Melissen, “The erately to further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause.” opposing an damage or to cause one’s to further erately Free Merriam Free – l, “Public Diplomacy at a Crossroads,” 9. a at Diplomacy “Public l,

are only effective if hypocrisy is avoided in political values, in of the embodiment are only hypocrisy avoided effective if is its political values, foreign policies, and culture and policies, foreign values, political its 127 ”

124

- em oiia efcs o two to effects political term His realm of propaganda of realm - Website Dictionary Website

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08 ril otie seii sf pwr eore a a country’s a at resources power soft specific outlines article 2008 erates into propaganda not only fails to convin only to erates into propaganda not fails 122 Yasunshi and McConnell, “Foreword.” McConnell, and Yasunshi

125 c Diplomacy Today,” 8 Today,” c Diplomacy How then is public diplomacy differen diplomacy public is then How

To assess public diplomacy’s relationship to propaganda, to relationship diplomacy’s public assess To ”

defines propaganda as “ideas, facts, or allegations spread spread or allegations facts, “ideas, as propaganda defines (Donfried and Gienow and (Donfried the

123 iety ih frin oit rn te ik of risk the runs society foreign a with directly

Neorealist

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Ibid. Interest.” National the “In Walt, Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” 256. Policy,” Foreign American Power and “Soft Nye, “Fosterin Pwono, So and Diplomacy “Public Nye, 267. Policy,” Foreign American Power and “Soft Nye, uent, sustained, and strategic. and sustained, uent,

The The rrotsto in move them your direction.” ns n mltr itreto o ter w ae nrnial lmtd nt to not limited, intrinsically are own their on intervention military and ents Put another way, i way, another Put limitations hs rltosis r peevd hog two through preserved are relationships these skeptical of government messages government of skeptical 132 g a Cultural Diplomacy Policy Dialogue”; Arndt, Arndt, Dialogue”; Policy Diplomacy Cultural g a

As Joseph Nye puts it in explicating this integrated approach, “when approach, integrated this explicating in it puts Nye Joseph As ”

128 of public diplomacy certainly must presupposed in be of must public diplomacy certainly convince the rest of of rest the convince 129

Even Realist schola Realist Even ftPower,” 102

a state’s a must also emphasize relationship emphasize also must 131

– 103. Soft power thinking also acknowledges that, while that, acknowledges also thinking power Soft

“

foreign policy i policy foreign 43 133 the world that “it that world the

r Stephen Walt agrees that “power is most most is “power that agrees Stephen Walt r

, ” 130

The FirstThe of Kings Resort but Nye argues that, argues Nye but s insensitive to the interests of interests the to insensitive s - a cmuiain ht is that communication way is really acting in the best the in acting really is - ” no amount of public of amount no ” building to ensure an ensure to building .

in additi in “a world that on to on CEU eTD Collection Canada.” 137 long of the development with concerned diplomacy third cultural is tier The months. which takes strategic communications, term t first The 136 135 134 first The thevarious in reflected of forms public diplom the of timeframe the relationship, by characterized tiers three into diplomacy public of concept action. into resources power soft indirection.

Joseph Nye also adopted Leonard’s co Leonard’s adopted also Nye Joseph Diplomacy.” Public of Theory a for “Searching Gilboa, Power”; Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, Diplomacy of Public Linchpin The Cultural Diplomacy Graphic adapted from from adapted Graphic ulc ilmc esnily prts n w sprt bt lsl lne ways. linked closely but separate two in operates essentially diplomacy Public by work to attempts that strategy a offer to purport resources power soft short, In

ier is short term, reactive news managements, taking hours or days. The next tier is medium tier next The ordays. hours taking managements, news reactive ier term, short is

s h “riuain f oiy … i a mn media many as in […] policy of “articulation the is 134 136

By extension, public diplomacy is tendered as a means to translate these translate to means a as tendered is diplomacy public extension, By the Figure

- ntutv diagram instructive term relationships, which can take take which can relationships, term “Evaluation of the Arts Promotion Program of Foreign Affairs and International Trade International Affairs and of Foreign Program Arts Promotion the of “Evaluation 6

: Continuumof Public Diplomacy Strategies

135 nceptualization of public diplomacy in publicdiplomacy of nceptualization

Buildi

below , 15. , 44 g n ak enr’ sgetto o the of segmentation Leonard’s Mark on ng

acy efforts (seeacy below). efforts figure 3

illustrate years.

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n lnugs s are as languages and Nye, “Soft Power,” 107. “Soft Nye, 137

- CEU eTD Collection Interest National The and Diplomacy “elite population.” butthe anything target or desired outcomes,” 140 139 138 the through elite break never or propaganda as received be likelyto most the also is 4 it However, below). figure (see misrepresentation of risk least the wagers and messages government of transmission direct most the is it agencies, governmental by Conducted planning. communication opportunity an exploit or mini to usually events, developing to days few a or hours within [reacting] of techniques on based campaigns. media and web training, language publications, programs, information libraries, broadcasting, international through primarily audiences foreign influencing received,” is message the that ensure to necessary

Ross, Ross, American researcher and diplomat and researcher American 72. Diplomacy,” Public of Theory a for “Searching Gilboa, “Public Diplomacy Comes of Age,” 77. Age,” of Comes Diplomacy “Public

t h medium the at - societal barrier to reach societal barrierto widera audience. T

es management news ermed

. .

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139 Bill Ivey -

em ee, loig o wes r ots o proactive for months or weeks for allowing level, term media diplomacy media h mdl te mcaim represents mechanism tier middle The

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45 “hc oeae a te meit level, immediate the at operates “which ,

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doubting that this practice “can produce produce this “can practice that doubting the the Ivey, Cleggett, and Hurlburt, Hurlburt, and Cleggett, Ivey, 138 mechanism

y nomn, dctn, and educating, informing, by 140 - based s based

ocial media output, media ocial in the upper tier upper the in mize da mize Cultural

strategic mage

is CEU eTD Collection 143 261. Diplomacy,” 142 141 can diplomacy “cultural that underscores Arndt diplomacy, of instrument an is practice “two a as operates and more much istherefore objective and its achieve to culture media government through diplomacy media (i.e. programs strat information government from distinct is but c triangle, the of tier through continuum

Figure Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, Peila, and Burgess, Wyszomirski, 171; Schne Diplomacy,” Cultural and Arts “U.S. Grincheva, Hunt Alexander by Graphic gc communication egic C lua diplomacy, ultural “educational, p “educational, 7 , : Strategic : Information or MediaDiplomacy of subset(a Public Diplomacy)

employs the “expression and exchange of ideas, information, and people” and information, ideas, of exchange and “expression the employs

ultural diplomacy certainly fits within the sphere of public diplomacy, public of sphere the within fits certainly diplomacy ultural rofessional, and arts exchanges arts and rofessional, i ta i fcss es n rmtn acpac o policy of acceptance promoting on less focuses it that in )

a cmuiain process.” communication way

h mcaim fpbi diplomacy public of mechanism the International Cultural Relations Cultural International n ulc eain atvte ta on than activities relations public and 46

ider, “The Unrealized Potential of Cultural Cultural of Potential Unrealized “The ider, , 1. ,

. “ . 143 142 implicated in national identity implicated national in

Represented in the lower the in Represented cnwegn ta the that Acknowledging

t h ohred f the of end other the at

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141 and

CEU eTD Collection 146 145 144 an theconcept of aspect Agency Information States United o images and values, culture, the understand to try and information receive to as well as peoples and countries other to values and image nation’s a project to “efforts incorporates that a audience(e.g. mass has sports) culture’ ‘popular include also may but music), and dance, incl may organization social of system transmitted group’s the practice, In ideas. and behaviors, group,” or country a define whichvalues an on anthropological relies which term, the of conceptualization Arndt’s Richard on build to useful most be may it investigation, this of purposes the For diplomacy. cultural of concept necessarynonetheless it but define, to sciences social and human the in concepts difficult most the of one shape to try governments, national serving diplomats, formal when place take to said be only

d psychology d Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila, Peila, and Burgess, Wyszomirski, Ibid. Arndt,

Cultural notoriously is Culture ‘cultural?’ diplomacy public of form this makes what But and channel thisinterest.” natural advance national to flow The First Resort of Kings FirstThe Resort d wa hs en emd hg clue (.. iul rs ltrtr, theatre, literature, arts, visual (e.g. culture’ ‘high termed been has what ude f other countries and their peoples.” their and countries other f

diplomacy has been viewed as an interactive communication enterprise communication interactive an as viewed been has diplomacy underpinning of the people with whom we wish we whom with people the of

stating that stating to establish a working definition in order to better the order to understand in workingdefinition a establish to

, xviii.,

International Cultural Relations Cultural International

o ecie t s te ope o fcos f id and mind of factors of complex “the as it describe to

“we must –

or even domains.or and professional academic ifr Mln reinforced Malone Gifford 145

who first understand the motives, culture, history, history, motives, the culture, first understand 146

finds Former deputy assistant director of the of director assistant deputy Former , 1. , to communicate and certainly their certainly and communicate to

expression in artifacts, institutions,artifacts, in expression

–

that cultural activity which activity cultural that the importance of this this of importance the 144

CEU eTD Collection action.” civic collective as propaganda state glossed that fiction was convenient a together banding Americ private of invocation Kennan’s and subject, a as diplomatic compromised nonetheless 153 See communication.” of channels useful be can they control, do, an governments than trust more enjoy may] [who withactors private work 152 151 150 149 148 147 between societal act relations cultural international of that rivaling legitimacy, of level increased an with it substitutes but received, and transmitted is message the how over control arms This to attempt an in proxy a as non these using filter cultural the through message its transmit to citizenry stat credibility, and legitimacy leverage.” […] reduce further and fester to tend distrust of attitudes [and] others of eyes the in credibility and legitimacy their “lose can policies and authority of skeptical generally “ reach to in just policyforeign and conducted. being are language

Nye emphasized this point, arguing that “it behooves governments to keep in the background and to to and background inthe to keep governments behooves “it that arguing point, this emphasized Nye 267. 257, Policy,” Foreign American Power and “Soft Nye, Power,” 105. Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, 171. Diplomacy,” Cultural and Arts “U.S. Grincheva, Up.” Piling Bodies Keep the and Theories These “All Zalewski, Malone, Kennedy and Lucas, Lucas, and Kennedy the “gre the In short, c short, In ” Political Advocacy a Advocacy Political international citizens on a personal rather than political level political than rather personal a on citizens international

- in order to better understand the environment in which international politics international which in environment the understand better to order in lengt ors thatis ors of(seegovernmentfree influence 1 above).figure at power settings” of statesmen, of settings” power at apoc ntrly eurs tts o urne a eti aon of amount certain a surrender to states requires naturally approach h ultural diplomacyultural endeavors in in “Enduring Freedom,” 315 Freedom,” “Enduring nd Cultural Communication Cultural nd

transcend es entrust agents from its civil society, private sector, or sector, private society, civil its from agents entrust es

, 147 the

oenet otn mistrusted, often governments argue that “the autonomy of the ‘private’ individual was individual ‘private’ the of autonomy “the that argue

elite 12., to to

diplomats - eng society barrier society

Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” 105. Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, ag e in the arena of “low of arena the in politics,” e , and policymakers, and , 151

In an effort to regain this this regain to effort an In

(see figure 5 below). 5 figure (see d though they are difficult to are difficult they d though . ” 153 149 150

- With publics With government state actors state 148 an citizens an citizens

in order in

not 152

CEU eTD Collection 154 implication implicit an is there fostering in diplomacy cultural of role the stress literature the in definitions many While conceived. broadly more diplomacy of objectives overarching traditions, state’s their ideologies, values,and of identity. aspectsculture other or promote or project and skills their manifest who academics musi artists, as such non of range wide a of exchanges involves practice The ministries. foreign national to links funding and governance of degree some with either are that programs

Graphic by Alexander Hunt Alexander by Graphic The goals of these exchanges these of goals The and exchanges include scope diplomacy’s cultural within undertaken Activities Figure 8 : Cultural : Diplomacy of subset(a Public Diplomacy) in, tlts sekr, rtr, orait, tdns and students, journalists, writers, speakers, athletes, cians, government

that - enhanced sponsored or administered by stand by administered or sponsored –

implicit and ex and implicit 49

long - - state practitioners and participants and practitioners state term plicit

eainhp wl sae the shape will relationships –

are closely linked to the to linked closely are m ta understanding, utual 154 -

alone entities alone

CEU eTD Collection 158 157 156 155 non by out carried and alone, elites beyond audience foreign wider a targeting culture, of manifestations of range wide a and values, ideas, of and exchange deployment international the initiate to government a of practice diplomatic the as diplomacy cultural of conceive to possible now is it objectives, and communication, and understand theirfriends adversaries,foreign and their intentions, cross enhance […], relations international lubricate to as so cultures enco foreign of understanding [citizens’] to “designed also is it diplomacy, cultural of nature reciprocal potentially adversaries. foreign with conflicts in prevail and manage, prevent, to and of policies the adjust to people, state; a with its cooperation improve to state, values; and policies, a culture, of view positive a have to ways: several in foreigners influence solid havebase a from work.” whichto and confidence build also You small. are seem implementation Secret Former policy foreign to conducive interests, national vital of advancement more it making field, playing

Ibid. 7. Strategy,” Integrated and Influence Political Diplomacy, “Cultural Lenczowski, in Quoted 7. Strategy,” Integrated and Influence Political Diplomacy, “Cultural Lenczowski, foreign governments in a state’s favor; to induce political or cultural change abroad; change cultural or political induce to favor; state’s a in governments foreign s

Having delineated its practitioners, target audience, scope, mode of of mode scope, audience, target practitioners, its delineated Having The particularly applicable to to applicable particularly Sablosky, Sablosky, practice seeks to harness the range of cultural elements within a society to society a within elements cultural of range the harness to seeks practice ary of State George Schultz’s analog Schultz’s George State of ary - utrl omncto, mrvs n’ itliec cpblte, and capabilities, intelligence one’s improves communication, cultural Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy 1993 for Diplomacy Cultural Support of State Trends Department in Recent

cultural diplomacy: cultural 156

and overalland

understanding. Then, when a crisis arises, you arises, crisis a when Then, understanding.

y comparing y enhancement of national security national of enhancement

“You get the weeds out when they when out weeds the get “You

diplomacy to gardening to diplomacy capabilities.” - tt atr in actors state 157 - 2002

Due to the to Due , 2. , 158

urage the ,

. 155

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tional security. Graphic by Alexander Hunt Alexander by Graphic cnwegn te ifcly n salsig uiesly a universally a establishing in difficulty the Acknowledging of characteristics unique the illustrates 6) (figure below chart The

Figure s .

: Two : Mechanisms of Public Diplomacy - em eainhp, mrvn te mg and image the improving relationships, term 51

- on involvement on in the field, the workingthe thein field, 159 cpe dfnto of definition ccepted

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CEU eTD Collection cultural diplomacycoherence of implementation as a strategic on effect their understand and developments these behind logic the uncover to seeks follows that chapter final the analysis, policy foreign of models three Allison’s makin decision GWT exploring By GWT. the in outcomes of understanding better a build to possible

t he ir

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component of strategy.grand g through the lens of Graham of lens the through g e oeg policy foreign he

CEU eTD Collection 161 160 Jihadists radical of dogmas threatening the to succumbing adversa ideological persuading in substantiate Figureillustrated 9) thisfurther assertion. of time. period in same the miniscule over was intelligence and that defense cost for expenditures a with at comparison States, United the with exchanges and contacts Soviet of consequences were communism of collapse the and War Cold the of end the Richmond cost. human and capital both of terms in policy foreign of tools other than cheaper are diplomacy, cultural as such statecraft, of instruments ideational diplom cultural of integration deep a include to expected be would radicalism Jihadist of threat ideological nascent benefit related unitary a as treated governments governments. national references of frames standard 4 .1 .1

Richmond, Richmond, Missile Cuban Crisis.” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual RationalPolicy Model 161 Second, Second, a revealed, has far so discussion the As Allison’s of origins The , C

goals, and then HAPTER Spending levels on cultural diplomacy as a proportion of military spending (as spending military of proportion a as diplomacy cultural on levels Spending Cultural Exchange and the Cold War Cold the and Cultural Exchange evaluates a

rationally 4 utrl diplomacy cultural :

U NDERSTANDING

possible possible

selects selects

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53 P many

OLICY

that examines

s ctl tree a atatn and attracting at targeted acutely is

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D according to their to according (RP) ECISION

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– .

eiin ae ae by made are decisions uh s hs a rs of risk at those as such h ivsiain above investigation The S

utility IN T

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CEU eTD Collection 162 wi faced when leaders, government 4 GWT that action of course Model RP the the such, As utility. their maximized take to failing interests, national overlooked as essentially such statecraft of tools ideational non logic. defied actual to this the GWT policythe responses rhetoric,p and the in they are as policy to committed as always not are states But diplomacy. cultural of regeneration power ideational tools the of 2004to her address U.S.in Institute ofthe Peace: strategy integrated an of importance the heralded Rice Condoleezza challenges. such to claimed also but ideologies, in rooted conflict a as GWT the perceived only not elites government that shown has .2 .2

Rice, “Address on War on Terror.” on War on Rice, “Address OrganizationalProcess M - state ideological threat posed by the GWT GWT the by posed threat ideological state

policy decisions. h frt lentv mdl lio ofr oeae udr h asmto that assumption the under operates offers Allison model alternative first The recognition the and threat the of nature ideological the surrounding rhetoric The terror. might democracy and freedom of values The only separated. be won cannot security was and values War that Cold remembered West the the when in freedom of victory The threat. the than complex we more challenge the because comprehensive, be must strategy Our 162 --

won the Cold War. And those same values will lead us to victory in the war on war the in victory to us lead will values same those And War. Cold the won

l ike rocess tracingrocess odel

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as much, if not more, than economic power an power economic than more, not if much, as

h cii, ra down break crisis, a th 54 utrl diplomacy cultural outlined in in the previous chapters outlined

cannot convincingly explain convincingly cannot

possess to defeat it would suggest a a it would defeatsuggest to possess n pursue and The USG to USG failed The . the threat threat the

epr nerto of integration deeper oenet leaders Government ae s rae and greater is face no thematic into

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CEU eTD Collection 164 163 targe coordination an settle leaders government run, long the in utility their maximize that decisions policy making which national security thr the urgency addressing in Pentagon. the and Center Trade World the on attacks the up leading stripped been having GWT, the of beginning the at prevailed that diplomacy howe impeded, were routines Organizational anti the defeating in efforts diplomacy cultural of record track successful the given GWT the of threat emerging the t Sovi the against fight the in adapted be to procedures operating standard as Fascism of spread the combat to employed tactics the to turned (SOPs). Procedures dictated often is outcome final the and limited, are actions nation’s a bureaucracy, governmental large a within action precept H pre to function each delegate and elements his aspect of the OP m OP the of aspect his is

d adequately address the issue. issue. the address adequately d Ibid., 698. Ibid., Missile Cuban Crisis.” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual Organizational Process Model Model Process Organizational t audience and how to exert influence o influence exert to how and audience t on the solution proposed by government bodies that limits short limits that bodies government by proposed solution the on SOPs SOPs T

he model’s second proposition, buildin proposition, second model’s he of this model asserts that d that asserts model this of

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overnment leaders during the Cold War War Cold the during leaders overnment n eat applied additional applied eat -

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rather than rather

inability to to inability Operating et threat, et 163

CEU eTD Collection 168 167 166 165 her during by who, Beers filled Charlotte first executive advertising was Affairs Public and Diplomacy Public for State retreat this explains further throug half a and year a nearly for empty sat which of raging the around ideas world.” “ma consolidation the that asserting ineffectiveness institutional to pointed also Diplomacy side.” information or press the with c of estimated GWT the government.” people definition by fragmented more is cultural “policy so that centralized, longer reiterated no is Mueller, diplomacy Sherry Visitors, International for Council National government.” of branches various the across initiat spread diplomacy public and GWT], the combat [to strategy coherent a without USG the left USIA the of dissolution “the Visitors, International of Office the of by filled be cultu threat. terrorist new the of complexities the to quickly adapt

Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy of Public Linchpin The Cultural Diplomacy Interview. Telephone 1, US Diplomat Interview. Mueller, Skype Interview. Telephone Minnick, rked the end of a formal cultural policy and the beginning of a retreat from thewar of from retreat a beginning of the policy cultural a and formal of theend rked onsolidation. By bringing [USIA] into the department, they diluted the cultural side cultural the diluted they department, the into [USIA] bringing By onsolidation. ral diplomacy strategies, which in turn created a vacuum in U.S. grand strateg grand U.S. in vacuum a created turn in which strategies, diplomacy ral T

he aaig utrl ilmc programs diplomacy cultural managing

frequent turnover of leadership at the Office of Public Diplomacy Public of Office the at leadership of turnover frequent military 166

One

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government official government

“the guiding “the

at the Pentagon the at

from cultural diplomacy cultural from

168

force of cultural diplomacyof had cultural force 167

intimately di cultural involvedin , 8. , 56 . h US Avsr Cmite n Cultural on Committee Advisory U.S. The

According to Brad Minnick, former director former Minnick, Brad to According

The position of Undersecretary of of Undersecretary of position The

otte uh administration Bush the hout 165 r “ are eue f ut vr n year, one over just of tenure

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CEU eTD Collection 172 171 170 169 required work painstaking the all to leadership American the and people American the 11September the t of fall the between diplomacy public American in ingredient missing diplomacy cultural like cultural diplomacy public to than approach rather media through done programs.” was audience Muslim the “informing 2006. by suspended largely were initiatives programs. channel news television satellite a Alhurra, outlets media new two place of dismantling the oversaw is projection power hard unlikely succeed.” to for dressing window mere be to “appears that consume diplomacy a of manner the in overseas sold be cannot values “American But abroad. distribution for America in Muslims on documentaries America of brand ov relations public for preference a by characterized short produce to effort an In problem. relationship a than rather issue communications a as conflict the approached

US Diplomat 1, Telephone Interview. Telephone 1, US Diplomat 101. Ibid., Po Soft and Diplomacy “Public Nye, 176. Strategy,” Diplomacy Public Cultural “A Rosendorf, Keeping focus on the form rather than the content of the message, the of content the than rather form the on focus Keeping

172 iey cetd s propaganda as accepted Widely

Senator Richard Lugar understood the fallacy of applying an applying of fallacy the understood Lugar Richard Senator

and the th

attacks was not advertising cleverness. It was a firm commitment bycommitment firm a was It cleverness. advertising not wasattacks 170 . At a hearing on public diplomacy and Islam, he observed: “The observed: he Islam, and diplomacy public on hearing a At .

GWT GWT

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171

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Beers also Beers To advertising sell the sell CEU eTD Collection 176 175 174 173 long with programs exchange So now. right on going what’s on is focus One long a as limitation its given results” instant demonstrate to ability an lacked it that and fluff just was diplomacy cultural that felt GWT the during policymakers address settling instead diplomacy, cultural of strategy poor vision,and the the public diplomacy goal. adversary, ideology,the the define to struggle a was there GWT] the in while message,” Soviet a counter to entity known a and agency freestanding a was there War, Cold the audience. its of understanding superficial a only displayed that suggest efforts diplomacy values. American of proselytizing presumptuous her resenting in travels her in reception mixed received office, the oversee to director third the Hughes, Karen offer. Street Wall a accept to months few o visions our advance opportunity.” and overseas relationships lasting build to

Minnick, Telephone Interview. Telephone Minnick, Interview. Telephone 1, US Diplomat forU.S.Envoy. Message WomenHave “Saudi Weisman, in quoted Lugar

gover edrhp et decision left leadership Ultimatel the to appointee successor The ed

mn official nment h is the 173

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der, “Culture Communications,” 18. Communications,” “Culture der, n h immediate the in

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CEU eTD Collection 181 world. the dominating and Israel, protecting governments, Muslim unfriendly targeting oil, Eastern Middle of a “smokescreen but rather effort, was a sincere GWT anti U.S. opposed nations Muslim in many surveyed majorities 180 179 178 177 “have didn’t policymakers in recognize that the about practices aside. non at targeted effectively statecraft of tool military leaders, Qaeda al on strikes drone targeting its accelerated government goals. these thwarting goals enemies Afghan and Iraq in campaigns military wage to m repertoire reasoned was surrounding equation the of top the at really never was diplomacy Cultural support. much as receive didn’t isperceptions of the threat posed by al Qaeda and its network led government leaders government led network its and Qaeda al by posed threat the of isperceptions

According to the Pew Research Global Attitudes report, report, Attitudes Global Research Pew the to According Missile 702. Cuban Crisis,” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual Interview. Personal 2, US Diplomat Interview. Telephone 1, US Diplomat “Drone Strikes Killed High Killed Strikes “Drone a

” ede o hte soe a te g the at stoked hatred of seedbed ,

A A n te nrae hte te invasion the hatred increased the and s a consequen a s

. .” lwd understanding flawed ,

177 ” The decision to invade Iraq invade to decision The 179

national security, t security, national

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cultural diplomacy tools are expressly suited to win expressly to over are cultural adversariesdiplomacy bred tools suited hs eoig h piay opnn o US gad strategy. grand U.S. of component primary the becoming thus to

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“the most appropri most “the - 180 value Targets, US Tells Pakistan.” US Targets, value c e

, c , Not until the final year of year final the until Not

onsidering its function of minimizing immediate uncertainty immediate minimizing of function its onsidering

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delivered ate of the programs in a a in programs the of ate asot lvl level. rassroots

military reaction to the September 11 attacks 11 September the to reaction military 59

to hide the real objectives, real to hide the

pre i te ulm world Muslim the in spurred

dubious connection dubious “Fro - sa bsd n the on based istan state enemies, normative enemies, state - terrorism efforts and did not believe the andbelieve not efforts did terrorism the Bush Administration, when the when Administration, Bush the m Hyperpower to Declining Power, Declining to m Hyperpower s clua dpoa pt it, put diplomat cultural a As previously developed developed previously

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CEU eTD Collection 184 236. Terrorism,” on the twenty of struggle Pres address, Union the of State 2008 his in Also, in strategy. US dominant theywere nor alone means military by notwas fought it in that 183 182 e which organization of routines the nor action, of course a support according g that p as such factors image first consideration by negotiation and politicking of result 4 diplomacy in thefighting the explain to policymakers’ radicalis Islamic of threat global the mind properly change Yet War context. Cold the in employed SOPs to according diplomacy cultural as such statecraft battle ideological victory, instant or economical an be not would beneficial.” be might programs] .3

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report termed the GWT ‘the long war’ similar to the Cold War Cold tothe War ‘thewar’ similar long GWT the termed Report Review Defense 2006 Quadrennial The Telep 1, US Diplomat Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Cuban Crisis.” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual

Bur or or vrmna bhvo de nt rspoe neto b ay niiul r group or individual any by intention presuppose not does behavior overnmental The final conceptual model model conceptual final The ” eaucratic Model Politics

to emphasized by the OP model OP the by emphasized refashion . Rather, Rather, . regenerate cultural diplomacy at levels proportionate to the threat posed by posed threat the to proportionate levels at diplomacy cultural regenerate , decision

s h troit het evolved, threat terrorist the as ev epai o mltr tcis vr dainl ol lk cultural like tools ideational over tactics military on emphasis heavy , - 183

first century.” See See century.” first hone Interview. hone the Cold War War Cold the

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ident Bush insisted that “We are engaged in the defining ideological ideological defining the in are engaged “We that insisted Bush ident .

the OP the 182

Angstrom, “Mapping the Competing Historical Analogies of th Analogies of Historical Competing the “Mapping Angstrom, utrl diplomacy cultural

Allison Once it became clear that the war in Afghanistan Afghanistan in war the that clear became it Once ect

model he t tp leaders top its

oiyaes to policymakers developed lp 60 ersonal interest and and interest ersonal

Considering Considering explain the constraints on constraints the explain

provides a partially a provides but rather the GWT the rather but

the regards lmtd fle “limited apparatus apparatus . 184

the

un o te rprors of repertoires other to turn hl ti mdl takes model this While

government actions as the as actions government procedural xibility and incremental incremental and xibility background, it accepts it background, ih h nw agt in target new the with

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policymakers to policymakers

etans on restraints long e War e War -

term into rk

CEU eTD Collection 188 187 186 a with unaffiliated were 9/11 185 of perpetrators the that fact the of spite in soil, U.S. on w the perceiving instead alone,” muscle use cannot “you that realize to failing and terrorism” mid the until up Washington reputat organizational, player’s each for but problem, strategic the for only not consequences Ultimately leader. the by made decision the of framework such, As approval. but advisors, advi from input seek not will decision policy a about sidelines effectivelythe of it policy,foreign making impotent. M Politics Bureaucratic efforts, government of branch every infighting of advantage to circle commander the as such power case question.” t are in follows What actions the of opponents and proponents of skill and power the but

Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile 710. Cuban Crisis,” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual Interest.” National the “In Walt, 18 footnote see 707. Ibid., os ekn t eecs ifune n oiy ucms ut prt wti the within operate must outcomes policy on influence exercise to seeking sors .

ars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a proportionate and adequate response to attacks to response adequate and proportionate a as Afghanistan and Iraq in ars A theoretical proposition related to the first is that the proposition to first related theoretical A First, 186 iona avoid

and yet top leaders did not heed their unanimous advice, unanimous their heed not did leaders top yet and l ad esnl stakes.” personal and , this theoretical framework contends that contends framework theoretical this

aig n or an having he primary claims put forth by this model this by forth put claims primary he odel does not explain why cultural diplomacy cultural why explain not does odel .

Given that that Given

e msnesod or misunderstood der - 00 a big ruh wt fa o apaig sf on “soft appearing of fear with fraught being as 2000s - n h 2000s the in in - chief chief 188

ay needn bde alon bodies independent many

– inc caatrzd h post the characterized Minnick

ideally gain ideally 61

ald o increased for called

goe, or ignored, s a leader leader a

consensus within his or her inner inner her or his within consensus

a leadera with conviction enough ” 187

as they apply to the GWT GWT the to apply they as , –

“eiin a critical has “decision a aig poet take opponents having ev en one with absolute absolute with one en utrl diplomacy cultural

this aspect of the of aspect this was with g - /1 utr in culture 9/11

“ relegated to relegated practically practically 185

CEU eTD Collection 191 190 189 issue the interests.” human universal or national strategy grand the into for calling were who voices moderate the out administration the in intellectuals policy defense “unipolarist” other Libby Lewis Dobriansky, Paula Adelman, Kenneth Bolton, John Wolfowitz, outcomes. hawks liberal policy and on neoconservatives impact significant a have security tangibleas terrorism threat statecraft of lo a feared soil. U.S. on attacks terrorist the for reprisal a a for support public general the to due backlash political and t Bush interest allowed personal that reflect made.” be to had tradeoffs because didn’t diplomacy public for appreciation decisions funding […] side, Democrat su government. national foreign

pr, n apeito fr ulc ilmc [] n oh h Rpbia and Republican the both on […] diplomacy public for appreciation and pport, Noon, “Cold War Revival,” War 81. “Cold Noon, Missile Cuban Crisis.” the and Models Allison, “Conceptual Interview. Telephone Minnick, e o a o o bobc fo te il eas te cniee clua diplomacy cultural considered they because Hill the from blowback of lot a got We funding in shift a was there 9/11, following that doubt No Depar Defense the [but] place, in run the In model BP the to according Finally, confirmed that: ss of political capital as the only recompense for incorporating ideational tools as incorporatingss of ideational politicalthe onlyfor capital recompense

uh s utrl ilmc it a rn srtg t cnrn a national a confront to strategy grand a into diplomacy cultural as such o make what they considered unwise moves because of concerns over concerns of because moves unwise considered they what make o - up to the Iraq war, we had a team of retired diplomats with their war their with diplomats retired of team a had we war, Iraq the to up ,

which they saw as “insufficient to the task the to “insufficient as saw they which

189

He added He tment did away with the public diplomacy action plan. action diplomacy public the with away did tment .

191 t h top the at

, the compos the , 62 A diplomat privy to the debates surrounding debates the to privy diplomat A

that, although “there was genuine interest, genuine was “there although that,

deeper integration of of integration deeper

n short, In , such as as such , 190 ition of a leader’s entourage will entourage leader’s a of ition

unilateral usataig hs claim this Substantiating

m o h Dfne Department. Defense the to drt decision oderate ihr Cee, Paul Cheney, Richard

military response as response military were able to drown to able were of defending either defending of cultural diplomacy cultural Hence, o Hence, , and many and , - time plan time - makers fficials ,

CEU eTD Collection 198 197 196 195 194 193 192 investigation – agendas political with those by eagerlyfilled perception public in gap a left abroad presence cultural American of “waning the while one largely a wage to left was States United the short, In enemy state a P an power of continuation a saw administration Bush “the cou who guys good the but guys, bad the at targeted not is diplomacy cultural But guys. bad the after go to effort an was there administration, identity. t American winning values to central path America’s legitimate of only the spread represents the promotes that policy foreign aggressive opportunity the policy foreign regime. dangerous as deterrence regarded they world, unipolar a

entagon, particularly world.” theIslamic in extremists

Ibid., 95. Ibid., Revival,” War 93. “Cold Noon, Interview. Telephone 1, US Diplomat Cultural Diplomacy The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy of Public Linchpin The Cultural Diplomacy 20. Terror,” on War the in U.S.Strategy “Assessing Evera, Van Ibid. Interview. Telephone Minnick,

aig etd ah f rhm lio’ mdl o frin oiy nlss m analysis, policy foreign of models Allison’s Graham of each tested Having in necessary longer no as containment of policy a see leaders these did only Not approach was lacking. T money. of waste initiativesa

” 196

has shown that the the that shown has

p lead to a heavy reliance on them them on reliance heavy a to lead references ” 193 194

The attacks in 2001 offered the promoters of neoconservative of promoters the offered 2001 in attacks The

inc pt t oe ipy asrig ht I te Bus the “In that asserting simply, more it put Minnick

by hawkish leaders leaders hawkishby

192

to to surprising grand strategy formulated formulated strategy grand surprising he military became more prominent more became military he r eclaim , 8. , 63

diametrically at odds with the United StatesUnited the with odds at diametrically 198 A

merica for military tools of statecraft of tools military for

in th in

an e a o tro ad preserving and terror on war he ’ e gra e s

moa rfsl o hleg a challenge to refusal immoral hegemony, d influence moving towards the the towards moving influence d nd strategy to fight the GWT. the fight to strategy nd - ld go bad.” go ld dimensional war on terror on war dimensional [ a while 195 sserting in the the in

] Ultimately, a Ultimately,

an ideological an designed for designed for GWT

ht “an that

i n the n 197 h s y

CEU eTD Collection 199 integration of “the with unidimensional Allison’s the surrounding factors context GWT the to apparatus diplomacy cultural War Cold opponent the of misunderstanding factors Actor Rational War Cold the to analogous struggle ideological an of face

Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” 17. Terror,” on War the in U.S.Strategy “Assessing Evera, Van

related to procedural constraints inherent in inherent constraints procedural to related

ueurtc Politic Bureaucratic mailed fist and and fist mailed

ideational such as tools cultural diplomacy.

theoretical framework theoretical rn srtg cultivated strategy grand aks personal hawkish

the framework s ald it alone” fist mailed

o xli te oenets nblt t aat the adapt to inability government’s the explain to . . Rather,

n h Bs Administration Bush the in 64

neet o tp leadership top of interests ,

r isrcie in instructive are the Organizational Process Model Model Process Organizational the

governmental structures governmental 199

ahr than rather

s nxlcbe using inexplicable is Alternatively conig for accounting

hog a through

o ih terrorism fight to ,

repres ,

a first nd ented

deeper a deep a image offers

the the

CEU eTD Collection nature classified the to due data to access limited puzzling policy decisions. strategy grand of formation the over influence adversary to related C States. United the in decision the behind rationale the of understanding deeper a for allowed GWT the to analysis Union. Soviet the by posed th ideological the defeating in strategy grand of component substantial a as efforts thesuccessful diplomacy cultural cultural diplomacy,thehistorical of as record such and r global long constituted conflicts both that consensus elite the perspective. literature intensive thisin investigation lies of contribution The Cold the War. ideologycommunist during fa the in ones ideational over statecraft of tools military emphasized that strategy grand a developed etn Alsns lentv mdl ws atclry hlegn i lgt f the of light in challenging particularly was models alternative Allison’s Testing conflicts The why reasons the investigate to out set study present The ah te rwn pes o dee itgain f dainl ol o statecraft of tools ideational of integration deeper for pleas growing the each, -

making process of policy of process making , analysis of of analysis throug

and

institutional mismanagement, mismanagement, institutional

personal ideologies ideologies personal e f n mrig a o ies oprbe o h btl against battle the to comparable ideas of war emerging an of ce a assmn of assessment an h

examined were particularly illustrative of an empirical puzzle given puzzle empirical an of illustrative particularly were examined rn srtg frain n h GWT the in formation strategy grand oe eaiain f h eprcl aa eeld ht factors that revealed data empirical the of examination loser

Applying - makers to justify changes in cultural diplomacy cultural in changes justify to makers of the political leadership who succeeded in wield in who thepolitical leadership succeeded of C ONCLUSION Graham Allison’s Allison’s Graham

cultural diplomacy from a a from diplomacy cultural 65 ipretos bu te aue f the of nature the about misperceptions

have the explanatory power to clarify the clarify to power explanatory the have

f ay nenl government internal many of three models of foreign policy foreign of models three - em dooia btls with battles ideological term adesn a a i the in gap a addressing , Bush - era era oiia science political policymakers

p olicy reat ing its

CEU eTD Collection performance. in deficiencies s statecraft of tools power soft America’s to improvement serious any of element the lead to is mission sole whose USIA, from strategy. grand diversified and integrated more a ensure would War Cold the during spending defense to proportions similar of revital in the followingways. significant ideas progresstoward war winningmake of the extremism Islamic The grand diversified on. head threats such implications target to designed specifically statecraft of an security national research F limitation a makes theories decision these of apply interpretation thorough to needed information of amount massive the that himself Allison information. incriminating potentially or sensitive who elites, government internal of interviews about from bargaining information valuable garnering in difficulty the as well as documents t loig h dcasfcto o declassification the ollowing ogr leadership ronger

woeful interagency cooperation, cooperation, interagency woeful ized cu ized The findings of this research this of findings The

c os o jsiy rgeso bc t a aoha ratio parochial a to back regression a justify not does ould

of this discussion should be clear. In order to develop develop to order In clear. be should discussion this of ltural diplomacy effort demands effort diplomacy ltural further further

taey ht etr nerts utrl ilmc efrs o combat to efforts diplomacy cultural integrates better that strategy as well as well as d vital state interests demand a proportionate response using tools using response proportionate a demand interests state vital d f mrcn utrl ilmc efforts diplomacy cultural American of c ontribute

future ideological adversaries ideological future

f to this investigationto this fiil documents official - aig ifcl. e, he Yet, difficult. making suggest that ideological adversaries who threaten who adversaries ideological that suggest h rcnttto o a aec rsmln the resembling agency an of reconstitution the

66 eod t Second, cultural

a substantially

ilmc efrs i a essential an is efforts, diplomacy rm h GT eid a period, GWT the from oecm iefcece arising inefficiencies overcome o m ay have been have ay

, future administrations can administrations future , bolstered also also would a atr perspective. actor nal accepted the criticism the accepted a more effective and effective more a maintained maintained

budget. Funding budget.

wary of sharing of wary ep overcome help . Finally, . dditional that

First, a First, policy this

CEU eTD Collection as cultural such diplomacy an effective developing in gran instruments ideational on heavily more rely instead and statecraft of tools military the from away move it that crucial is it But GWT. the as The United States cannot win every heart and mind in ideological struggles such struggles ideological in mind and heart every win cannot States United The

one d

strategy. - dimensiona

l commitment to commitment l CEU eTD Collection 200 Appendix

Adapted from from Adapted

1 : Tools : ofStatecraft Gregg, “Crafting a Better US Grand Strategy in the Post the in Strategy Grand BetterUS a Gregg,“Crafting

200

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