134 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

Populist Conspiracy Narratives and Other Forms of Disinformation in

DANIEL HINŠT DANIEL HINŠT 135

isinformation affects many activities derive primarily from populist ad- Western liberal democracies. vocates of authoritarian solutions, includ- It undermines public trust in ing the Kremlin regime. important values of free soci- eties, the institutional frame- In this context, populist conspiracy narra- worksD of the European Union (EU) and tives in the Croatian political context may NATO, civil liberties, different minorities, also be relevant for a broader EU and NATO and the market economy. Disinformation framework.

The article describes the context of disin- formation and populism, the EU and Croa- tian policy to counter disinformation, the Croatian political context and mentions certain examples of disinformation.

DISINFORMATION Policy solutions for Croatia and the Europe- an Union could include counterintelligence IS FALSE measures focused on detecting, confront- ing, containing, and downsizing this issue, OR MISLEADING all in line with the EU policy framework. INFORMATION, While Croatia has started to develop its in- stitutional structure and tackle disinforma- WHICH IF LEFT tion by fostering media literacy, there is still an open space for a comprehensive policy UNVERIFIED, HAS direction, which could include nongovern- mental and the private sector, and create THE POTENTIAL a multidisciplinary policy network.

TO SOW Such an inclusive solution would foster voluntary cooperation and a strong civil CONFUSION society, instead of restricting freedom of IN PUBLIC expression. This article represents the first Croatian initiative in the liberal policy direc- DIALOGUE, tion. POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION AND POPULISM POLARIZATION Disinformation is false or misleading infor- mation, which if left unverified, has the po- AND DISTRUST tential to sow confusion in public dialogue, political polarization and distrust of the po- OF THE POLITICAL litical system and democratic institutions1. It SYSTEM can also be used to question the existence AND DEMOCRATIC 1 Atlantic Council, Disinformation. Available [online]: INSTITUTIONS https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/disinformation/ 136 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

mind that: “Democracy is not given, and we have to fight for it if we want to preserve it”3.

POPULISTS Disinformation is often connected with populism, according to which a society is OFTEN USE divided into two homogeneous and oppos- GENERALIZED, ing groups – honest people and a corrupt elite. Although they may acknowledge dif- SIMPLIFIED ferences between individual political elites (e.g. Christian Democrats, Liberals, or Social AND POLARIZING Democrats), populists do not differentiate politicians and claim that all of them are “the CONCLUSIONS same”. They often use the rhetoric of cha- os, crisis, and hopelessness, blame “corrupt WITH REGARDS and incompetent” political elites (“oligarchy, cliques”) for the situation, and they want to TO POLITICAL, “return alienated politics to the people”.4

ECONOMIC Populists often use generalized, simplified AND SOCIOLOGICAL and polarizing conclusions with regards to political, economic and sociological facts, FACTS, AS WELL as well as standards of liberal democracies throughout the Western world. Therefore, AS STANDARDS they often trivialize specific (positive) in- formation about public policies, in order OF LIBERAL to justify their completely negative under- standing of reality, which consists of creat- DEMOCRACIES ing exaggerated, irrational, imprecise and THROUGHOUT meaningless ideological dilemmas. THE WESTERN At the same time, it is worth to mention that a growing number of organizations, think WORLD tanks, and institutions have been involved in the detection of and fight against dis- information, such as the Czech think tank European Values within the Kremlin Watch project, The Kremlin Playbook5 of the

of the European project2. Moreover, as Eu- 3 Jourová, V. (2020) Dinsinfo Horizon: Responding to ropean Commission’s Vice President Věra Future Threats, a conference paper. Available [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ Jourová framed it: most disinformation ac- en/SPEECH_20_160

tivities aim to "blur lines, polarize, make us 4 Grbeša, M. and B. Šalaj (2020) Ideološki izazov; Agen- indifferent". Moreover, it shall be borne in cija za elektoničke medije, UNICEF. Available [online]: https://www.medijskapismenost.hr/wp-content/up- loads/2020/06/ideoloski-izazov.pdf 2 European Commission (2018) “Action Plan Against Disinformation”, [in]: JOIN, No. 36. Available [online]: 5 European External Action Service, EU vs Disinfo. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_ Available [online]: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinforma- against_disinformation.pdf tion-cases/ DANIEL HINŠT 137

Centre for Strategic & International Studies’, agitation, subversion, repression, decep- the European External Action Service with tion and murder. The Cheka and its suc- the EU vs Disinfo portal6, and the Atlantic cessors sowed chaos abroad with prop- Council’s Disinfo Portal7. aganda, disinformation and sabotage while managing mass arrests and gulags DISINFORMATION’S 100+ YEAR-OLD at home. Indeed, the Kremlin deployed BACKGROUND an army of spies and recruited inform- One could claim that there is nothing new ants around the world to steal secrets, regarding disinformation. It is true. How- spread disinformation and support ter- ever, such generalizations often ignore, rorists and rogue regimes”8. relativize, and trivialize this increasingly common political phenomenon, which has The methods Cheka used were continued a specific source. Although not always, dis- after the Cold War by the KGB, mainly by information activities often derive from ad- confronting the CIA as the central place vocates of authoritarian solutions, includ- for confronting the spread of communism. ing the Kremlin regime. There is a deep and One K.G.B. spy is current Russian President complex background, which has already Vladimir Putin. He ultimately had a hard created narratives before, mostly by Soviet time with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then Russian intelligence, in order to as well as his entire secret service. As Sipher undermine liberal democratic institutions adds: and civic values of open societies.

The background of modern disinformation 8 warfare is rooted in the world’s premier Sipher, J. (2019) “Putin’s One Weapon: The ‘Intelli- gence State’”, [in]: New York Times. Available [online]: communist regime, more than hundred https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/putin- years ago. The most relevant source is John russia-security-services.html Sipher, head of the CIA station in Moscow, with a 28-year career in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. As he explained,

“[a]fter the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin established a secret po- DISINFORMATION lice service called the Cheka to be his main weapon of repression and terror. ACTIVITIES Over the decades, the Soviet and Rus- sian secret services developed tools and OFTEN DERIVE habits based on their Chekist experience that set them apart from their counter- FROM ADVOCATES parts in the West. Rather than focusing on collecting and analyzing intelligence, OF AUTHORITARIAN they developed expertise in propaganda, SOLUTIONS,

6 Atlantic Council, Disinfo Portal. Available [online]: htt- ps://disinfoportal.org/ INCLUDING

7 Sipher, J. (2019) “Putin’s One Weapon: The ‘Intelli- gence State’”, [in]: New York Times. Available [online]: THE KREMLIN https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/putin- russia-security-services.html REGIME 138 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

“A decade after the Soviet Union fell, rope region face the same national security Mr. Putin rose to power and recruited challenge. many of his former K.G.B. colleagues to help rebuild the state. The result is a re- EU POLICY AGAINST gime with the policies and philosophy DISINFORMATION of a supercharged secret police service, Based on the previously mentioned vul- a regime that relies on intelligence op- nerabilities towards disinformation it is im- erations to deal with foreign policy chal- portant to look at the role the EU plays in lenges and maintain control at home”9. fighting the influences of disinformation. The European Commission’s Action Plan The Baltic and the Central Eastern Euro- Against Disinformation provides four policy pean countries that belong to the Three guidelines for the EU and its member states: Seas Initiative immediately turned to the West when the totalitarian Kremlin-led I. Improving the capabilities of Union control disappeared. In addition to close institutions to detect, analyze and relations with the neighboring Nordic and expose disinformation – the Strategic Western European countries, these states Communication Task Force and Intel- have developed a strong and geopoliti- ligence and Situation Center within cally important foreign policy partnership the European External Action Service, with the United States, without which com- Member States); munism would not have fallen. The spread of U.S. led liberal democracy, the EU and II. Strengthening coordinated and joint NATO enlargement to these countries has responses to disinformation - Rapid been a source of disappointment for Rus- Alert System for addressing disinfor- sia. Therefore, President Putin has used mation, working within the existing the strengthening of his authoritarian and networks, the European Parliament crony regime to put pressure on Baltic and and NATO, stronger Member States’ Eastern European countries that are now communication on Union values and part of the EU and NATO, or have ambitions policies, strategic communications in to become members, such as the countries the Union’s neighborhood; of the Eastern Partnership. III. Mobilizing private sector to tackle Croatia is a part of the Three Seas Initiative disinformation (online platforms and and its EU and NATO membership addi- advertisers tackling the disinformation tionally serves as an obligation for solidar- and increasing transparency of political ity with Eastern European countries, which advertising); have suffered under Soviet rule. Although Croatia, within former , was not IV. Raising awareness and improving so- a part of the Soviet bloc and had a domestic cietal resilience (better understanding “peoples” style of communism or socialism, of the disinformation sources, special- Croatia has been facing populist advoca- ized trainings, conferences, debates, cies for closer ties with the authoritarian supporting independent media and Russian regime while undermining the EU- quality journalism, supporting mul- NATO framework. Therefore, Croatia, the tidisciplinary teams of independent Western Balkan and the whole Eastern Eu- fact-checkers and researchers, cross- border cooperation and functional 9 Ibid. European network of fact checkers, DANIEL HINŠT 139

digital platforms connected with fact dia pluralism, and reduced transparency of checkers, rapid implementation of the financing political campaigns10. revised Audio-visual Media Service Di- rective which requires promotion of Moreover, the Council’s 2020 conclusions media literacy skills. (during the Croatian EU Presidency) state that In short, it can be seen that the Commis- sion’s Action Plan is focused on strength- “the exposure of citizens to a large ening European and national institutions, amount of disinformation, especially in especially policy coordination among dif- times of a major global crisis, such as ferent institutions, improving online media the COVID-19 pandemic. They also em- transparency and raising awareness, espe- phasizes the importance of a systematic cially through media literacy, quality jour- approach to the development of media nalism and supporting fact checkers. literacy, the importance of collaboration between online platforms, experts and Besides the Commission, the Council of competent authorities as well as the im- the EU regularly provides its conclusions portance of developing an independent regarding disinformation related topics. The fact-checking procedure in order to limit Council’s 2019 Conclusions on democracy the spread of online disinformation cam- see disinformation as a growing challenge paigns, while respecting freedom of ex- to democracy, together with issues related pression.. it is necessary to intensify work to the undermining of democratic institu- on empowering citizens of all ages with tions and legitimizing autocratic regimes, media literacy and critical thinking” and interference with judiciaries, reducing me- even “strengthening professional jour- nalism, independent media, investigative reporting and media pluralism, facilitat- ing citizens’ access to quality, credible and diversified information sources and building public trust contribute to the THE SPREAD protection of democracy”11. OF U.S. LED In short, Council conclusions focus on the importance of media literacy, professional LIBERAL quality journalism, including independent media pluralism and information diver- DEMOCRACY, sification. This clearly proves that the EU does not aim to reduce freedom of media THE EU AND NATO by regulating their content, but to foster its ENLARGEMENT transparency and responsibility in relation

HAS BEEN 10 Council of the European Union (2019) Council Con- clusions on Democracy, October 14, No. 12836/19; Available [online]: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/ A SOURCE doc/document/ST-12836-2019-INIT/en/pdf

11 Council of the European Union (2020) Council Con­ OF DISAPPOINT- clusions on Media Literacy in an Ever-Changing World, May 26, No., 8274/20. Available [onine]: https://www. MENT FOR RUSSIA consilium.europa.eu/media/44117/st08274-en20.pdf 140 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

to the challenge, which undermines demo- cratic institutions, including free media.

CROATIAN POLITICAL CONTEXT POPULISM AND RISKS OF DISINFORMATION Since Croatia is a member of the European HAS POLITICAL Union, a closer look will be taken at Croa- tian policy towards disinformation. Accord- AND ECONOMIC ing to the findings featured in the Kremlin CONSEQUENCES Watch12, a strategic project conducted by the Czech think tank European Values13, which includes policy assessments of Cro- atia with regards to Russian disinformation activities, Croatia has signed a letter, which warns about disinformation problems, its building public trust contribute to the efforts to discredit the EU and the trans- protection of democracy”15. atlantic community. As the authors of the analysis observe: “Croatian leadership thus Taking this fact into account, the Croatian understands the threat posed by Russia, government’s political commitment to even if actions fall short of the required tackle disinformation is a very important efforts”14. Moreover, first step to deal with this rising problem for the whole EU. While Croatia wants to keep “a systematic approach to the develop- good relations with Russia, it “understands ment of media literacy, the importance the threat posed by Russia”16. Although Rus- of collaboration between online plat- sia is aware of Croatia’s commitment to the forms, experts and competent authori- EU and NATO, and therefore mostly focuses ties as well as the importance of devel- on trying to block , oping an independent fact-checking and Montenegro on their EU paths, procedure in order to limit the spread of Russia is still playing its role in supporting online disinformation campaigns, while disinformation in Croatia. So far, this prob- respecting freedom of expression…it lem is not as large as in the Baltics or in the is necessary to intensify work on em- Czech Republic. Therefore, Croatia has powering citizens of all ages with media a solid footing on which it can tackle this literacy and critical thinking” and even problem, so long as it is not large and to “strengthening professional journal- learn from experiences from Eastern Euro- ism, independent media, investigative pean countries. reporting and media pluralism, facilitat- ing citizens’ access to quality, credible Regarding the risk of disinformation, it is and diversified information sources and important to describe the 2020 Croatian political situation. After the July 2020 par- 12 https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/ liamentary elections, the newly elected

13 The project “aims to expose and confront instruments of Russian influence and disinformation operations fo- cused against Western democracies”. See: https://www. 15 Council of the European Union (2020) Council Con- kremlinwatch.eu/ clusions on Media Literacy in an Ever-Changing World, May 26, 8274/20. Available [online]: https://www.con- 14 European Values, Kremlin Watch. Available [online]: silium.europa.eu/media/44117/st08274-en20.pdf https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/countries-compared- states/croatia/ 16 Ibid. DANIEL HINŠT 141

majority once again17 gave support to the national interest of the sovereign Re- moderate conservative Andrej Plenković public of Croatia”18. (Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) / Eu- ropean People’s Party) as the Prime Min- In other words, these right-wing populists ister. The parliamentary majority includes see a problem in 20 years, which could all eight representatives of national mi- be characterized by as at least semi-con- norities, HDZ’s pre-election classical lib- solidated democracy (according to the eral partner Croatian Social Liberal Party Freedom House19) and not in the first ten (HSLS), as well as post-election support years of Croatian statehood, which were from two centrist liberal parties (Reform- also characterized by a certain level of ists and Croatian People’s Party – Liberal authoritarianism. During that era, political Democrats (HNS)). structures were creating barriers to the EU integration, due to the promotion of ethnic The new center-right conservative-liberal nationalism and denying Western values government, approved in the parliament, of individual liberty and liberal democracy. remains in power without the ex-majority Therefore, many populists promoted anti- blurring mandates of socialist populist Za- Western propaganda. greb mayor Milan Bandić. Moreover, despite many poll predictions, the new majority will Finally, Živi Zid (Human Shield), once the not need support of the Homeland Move- third largest party in the country, has disap- ment, which consists primarily of national peared from the parliament. This party was conservative populists and Euro skeptics. openly anti-EU, anti-NATO, and in favor of In particular, the Homeland Movement is in close ties with Russia. Its policy positions its essence a strong opposition to pro-EU undermined property rights and banking political elites, which derives from Croatian system’s stability, which have been carriers foreign and European policy “establish- of political and economic freedom. ment” and their policies of developing lib- eral democracy since 2000. Disinformation is not tolerated among the mainstream parties, especially by the According to the Homeland Movement’s center-right government. Moreover, disin- programme, the past twenty years have formation is not a widespread problem in been marked by degradation and collapse Croatia. However, there are populist parties of fundamental values, institutions, and the and groups, which combine disinformation political system of a modern and demo- and populism in order to undermine values cratic society. Therefore, the Homeland of liberal democracy (as described further movement is “a response to the political in the text). These messages are mostly elites, which do not develop the Croa- spread via non-mainstream online portals tian state in accordance with its historical, and social media. economic, geostrategic and demographic needs, but rather in the interest of foreign headquarters of power that do not respect

18 Domovinski pokret (2020) Program djelovanja. Avail- able [online]: https://www.domovinskipokret.hr/pdf/ program-djelovanja.pdf

19 Freedom House (2020) Nations in Transit 2020, 17 Andrej Plenković has been the Croatian Prime Minister Dropping the Democratic Façade. Available [online]: since 2016. The new 2020 Parliament approved his sec- https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020- ond (consecutive) mandate. 04/05062020_FH_NIT2020_vfinal.pdf 142 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

CROATIAN POLICY AGAINST While Croatia has defined its institutional DISINFORMATION framework, which cooperates with Euro- Even though disinformation is not an im- pean institutions, and works on promoting mediate threat, Croatia has developed its media literacy and quality journalism, there institutional framework for tackling disin- is still space for developing concrete poli- formation led by the Ministry of Culture and cies for supporting multidisciplinary teams Media20, the Agency for Electronic Media21 of researchers and fact checkers, including and the Ministry of Foreign and European their cross-border cooperation. Therefore, Affairs22. the policy should focus on civil society and private sector solutions. This model In relation to the European Commission’s of inclusive participation in detecting and Action Plan and the Council conclusions, countering disinformation can strengthen Croatian policy concretely deals with dis- institutions, further develop the civil soci- information by focusing on promoting ety sector, and widen market opportunities media literacy, with specific portal “Medi- for private intelligence services, policy ana- jska pismenost”23, which provides useful in- lysts, journalists, researchers, fact checkers, formation. The portal was founded by the digital marketers, teachers and academics. Agency for Electronic Media, in coopera- tion with several institutions, including the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb (Uni- versity of Zagreb) and two private schools (VERN and Edwards Bernays).

Prior to the Croatian EU Presidency, the Prime Minister Andrej Plenković empha- MANY POPULISTS sized that we are faced with “ever larger spread of fake news, disinformation, in- PRODUCE tolerance and hate speech on digital plat- forms”, and added that this is a “direct threat NARRATIVES to our democratic order because it under- ON “NEO- mines citizens’ trust in institutions”24. LIBERALISM”, WHICH USUALLY 20 Ministry of Culture and Media, International confer- SERVE TO RESIST ence “Combating Disinformation in the Digital Media Era”. Available [online]: https://min-kulture.gov.hr/ vijesti-8/medjunarodna-konferencija-suzbijanje-dezin- STRUCTURAL formacija-u-eri-digitalnih-medija/18776 21 https://www.aem.hr/vijesti/zakljucci-vijeca-eu-a-o- REFORMS medijskoj-pismenosti/

22 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2019) Press FOR INCREASING release, March 19, Brussels. Available [online]: http:// www.mvep.hr/hr/mediji/priopcenja/,31980.html COMPETITIVENESS 23 https://www.medijskapismenost.hr/

24 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (2019) Press AND ECONOMIC release, October 30, Zagreb. Available [online]: http:// www.mvep.hr/hr/mediji/priopcenja/,32404.html FREEDOM DANIEL HINŠT 143

All these expert groups would be impor- society, and transatlantic alliance within the tant since they can work on detecting dis- EU and NATO framework. Through disin- information, taking into account different formation, there also lies a risk for human scientific perspectives. For example, policy rights, the position of minorities, competi- analysts and political scientists could de- tiveness, and the geopolitical security of tect how disinformation affects institutions Croatia, Southeastern Europe and the en- of liberal democracy and concrete public tire EU. Therefore, the CEA regularly moni- policies, while journalists could participate tors social media, media portals, and other in fostering media literacy and include fact open sources in order to detect and expose checkers. Digital marketers could help dif- disinformation. ferent organizations in designing and pro- moting content quality, transparent online PRO-RUSSIAN AND POPULIST advertising and work on analyzing mislead- CONSPIRACY NARRATIVES ing online ads. Teachers and academics in IN CROATIA both public and private educational institu- Populist narratives depend on particular tions would have an important role in in- stakeholders. There are many examples, forming new generations and adults how which have been repeated. Overall, popu- to differentiate facts from fake information list messages in Croatia may be described and values of open society from attempts through the following narratives: to undermine its foundations. a. the European Union is falling apart and Such inclusive policy solution would foster has ceased to exist; voluntary cooperation and a strong civil b. NATO lost its meaning after the Cold society, instead of restricting freedom of War; expression. A growing liberal oriented com- c. the EU and NATO enlargement is an munity would especially support this solu- aggression towards Russia; tion because it opens space for the civil and d. the CIA and the U.S. military produced private sector, while avoiding new regula- COVID-19 as a biological weapon; tions. This article represents the first Croa- e. unlike Russia, the European Union has tian initiative in the liberal policy direction. not helped member states, nor has it responded to the economic crisis (in Regarding civil society’s contribution, one times of COVID-19); of the Center for Public Policy and Eco- f. the EU is a neoliberal creation that nomic Analysis’s (CEA) strategically impor- looks at the interest of capital instead tant project is the Think Tank Detektor25, of people; which aims to gather open source informa- g. the economic crisis was caused by ne- tion, which can contribute to the education oliberal capitalism, which is coming to of the Croatian and broader EU public about an end; geopolitical risks and examples of growing h. the government has sold everything disinformation and populist activities. This through privatizations and colonized is vital since these disinformation activities the economy in favor of foreigners; have been focused on weakening funda- i. the state government should control mental values of individual liberty, open imports from the EU market, etc.

However, this is just a general overview 25 Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis (CEA) Think Tank Detektor. Available [online]: https://www. of the prevailing narratives in the Croatian cea-policy.hr/cea-think-tank-detektor/ public sphere. Needless to say, there are 144 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

many more, which appear mostly in non- provides anti-British narratives, by claiming mainstream media and social media com- that someone in the Croatian government munications. Basically, there is a standard wants a conflict with Putin, that a Russian obsession of conspiracy theories (re-)pro- diplomat was expelled due to the impu- ducing anti-American and anti-European tation of British secrete services towards narratives, which may often include disin- Kremlin. Finally, a revenge in a form of eras- formation about the Freemasons. ing Croatian identity is now coming from Brussels because Franjo Tuđman (first Cro- I. DISINFORMATION ABOUT atian President during the 1990s). BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND THE UK, WHILE ADVOCATING FOR PUTIN’S Certain Croatian right-wing conspiracy the- AUTHORITARIAN REGIME orists are preoccupied by the United King- Proponents of the Croatian right-wing dom and its secret service (MI6), perceiv- movement are influenced by the TV show ing it as the enemy of Croatian statehood. Bujica (Flash Flood). One episode provides Moreover, since 2000, they have blamed narratives that COVID-19 is a form of bio- Croatian political structures, for pushing logical warfare, China is a victim of “glo- for certain political changes needed for balist financial oligarchy”, Iran is a target of the European integration, including full U.S. establishment motivated by Zionism, cooperation with the war crimes tribunal while Italy was chosen because of the Vati- and reconstruction of houses where ethnic can and Freemasons who want to remove Serbs lived until 1995. Their target is primar- believers from churches, scientists are con- ily pro-EU Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, trolled by an occult oligarchy, all is done by since he is a moderate EPP conservative. algorithms and that Putin will save us from Therefore, right-wing populists have con- the occult oligarchy26. sidered the process of European integration and moderate political positions to be in di- This narrative starts with COVID-19 disin- rect opposition to the interests of the Croa- formation, and then blames the West and tian statehood. Thus, it becomes clear that of course, the Freemasons as fictional rul- they have a very narrow nationalistic and ers and ultimately provides the solution: authoritarian understanding of a nation- Vladimir Putin will save Croatians from the state, which cannot be accepted within the secret rule of liberal oligarchs. This theory EU framework of liberal democracies. is based on a premise of blaming globalists for producing the virus, while the solution Populist advocacy in favor of Putin can lies in the authoritarian leader, instead of also be clearly seen at the Portal Geopoli- the assistance from the EU. tika (Geopolitics). Examples include state- ments that only Putin can preserve Russia’s The European Commission mentions an stability in turbulent global times, that Rus- example of a conspiracy theory with re- sia does not need a new fight for power gards to COVID-19: the claim that the and that many Russians that support Pu- coronavirus is “an infection caused by the tin question the purpose of democracy28. world’s elites”27. Moreover, another episode Therefore, the suggestion in this article is that there is no need for democratic Russia,

26 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rFlIsExgrUc

27 European Commission (2020) Tackling Coronainforma- 28 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/zoran-meter- tion Disinfomation. Available [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/ putin-na-celu-rusije-i-nakon-2024-pod-ovim-uvjeti- info/sites/info/files/corona_fighting_disinformation_0.pdf ma/ DANIEL HINŠT 145

and the loss of sovereignty, especially with regards to foreign owners and investors. Therefore, protectionist economic nation- DESPITE THE LARGE alism, spiced with xenophobic disinforma- ECONOMIC tion, directly affects the weakening of com- petitiveness and economic freedom, thus PRESENCE delaying the transition to a market econo- my and an open society. OF STATE-OWNED Examples for this discourse, which actually COMPANIES, blames neoliberalism, can be also found on the Portal Geopolitika (Geopolitics). Its POPULISTS CAN narratives blame moderate European elites for being: “preoccupied with struggle for EXPRESS ECONOMIC power in the conditions of neoliberal sin- XENOPHOBIA gle-mindedness”29. BY TRYING It is common for populists to produce nar- ratives about political elites, while they TO RESIST FOREIGN represent the people. This position un- dermines the legacy of liberal democracy, OWNERSHIP which consists of representatives elected by the people. When these representa- AND INVESTMENT tives aim to be in moderate positions, this helps to consolidate democracy. Moreo- ver, many populists produce narratives on “neoliberalism”, which usually serve because many Russians favor authoritar- to resist structural reforms for increasing ian democracy (Vladimir Putin’s regime), competitiveness and economic freedom. which grants unlimited power to the au- While the Soviet Union was a protector of tocratic leader. Although this narrative is communism, which includes political and not prevalent in Croatia, it is widely present economic single-mindedness, proponents among right-wing populists, who also in- of Russian authoritarian regime can easily fluence young people. claim that “neoliberalism” is a form of sin- gle-mindedness. II. DISINFORMATION AND POPULIST NARRATIVES ABOUT NEOLIBERALISM Moreover, the same portal claims that: AND PRIVATIZATIONS Populism has political and economic con- “politics left the economy” which “fur- sequences. For example, it can lead to ther degraded relations between the resisting necessary structural reforms to- government and the people”. In par- wards the market economy. Such narra- ticular, the portal is blaming the process tives and myths typically refer to, at least in of demonopolization (liberalization of the Croatian context, a national treasure or family silver that is supposedly completely 29 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-sanja- sold out. Almost any privatization is equat- vujacic-eu-politicke-elite-zarobljene-izmedu-vlada- ed with the betrayal of national interests vine-prava-i-neoliberalnog-jednoumlja/ 146 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

sectors and opening to competition) as A clear connection between narratives a reason why “politics is no longer at the about neoliberalism and privatizations can center, but on the margins of events”30. be seen in a portal’s article which mentions that the Federation of Independent Trade As a follow-up to the previous comment, Unions of Russia proposed the Russian gov- this narrative tries to explain that people are ernment to start with nationalization. Then, not in democratic control of their govern- the portal states that, “restructuring of the ment, since politics lost its mediating role current neoliberal capitalism begins, which and left the economy. This is a typical nar- has completely exhausted itself and led to rative of critics of neoliberalism. Despite serious global problems" and shows “total the fact that increasing economic freedom insensitivity to the problems of ordinary reduces the government’s political control people who were brought “to the average over the economy, politics is still present stick”. since people can decide which option to choose. Moreover, functional liberal de- Further, the portal predicts bankruptcies of mocracies combine high levels of political first large corporations during 2021. This is and economic freedom. a reason for proposing “a new economic model” and suggesting that, “the Croa- The portal then mentions “the neoliberal tian government should consider similar revolution”, run by Reagan-Thatcher poli- measures, although they would probably be cies of “deregulation, delocalization, and immediately characterized by eternal critics privatization”, whose goal was “to bring of everything and everyone as a return to the USSR to its knees.” In this context, the Bilderberg Group and the Trilateral, togeth- er with Poland, has been blamed for neolib- eralism. Further in the text, Poland is con- nected with Croatia because of the Three Seas Initiative, a way of providing a com- petitive alternative to Russian gas supply31. The portal questions Croatia's interest in IN GENERAL, supporting this initiative and launching the LNG on the Croatian island Krk32. DISINFORMATION

The aim of many pro-Russian populists is OFTEN INCLUDES to gain public support for Russian gas sup- ply as the only or at least dominant source POPULISM of supply, in order to make European states AND IS ROOTED more dependent on Russia. IN CONSPIRACY 30 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/geopolitika/ globalno-socijalno-zatopljenje-u-eu-demokracijama/ THEORIES, 31 Atlantic Council (2019) The Three Seas Initiative Ex- plained. Available [online]: https://www.atlanticcouncil. WHICH CAN BE org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-three-seas-initiative- explained-2/ POLITICALLY 32 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-sanja- vujacic-europsko-jedinstvo-u-vrtlozima-weimarskog- trokuta-i-inicijative-tri-mora/ VERY SEDUCTIVE DANIEL HINŠT 147

socialism”. Finally, in relation to the issue of telecommunications and the retail sec- privatizations, the portal doubts how these tor), which lowers the potential for invest- measures (nationalization) will help Croatia ment led GDP growth. Although the Croa- “if there is nothing strategic in her hands tian government has been run by formally anymore and if everything is in foreign mainstream parties (and its junior partners), hands”33. Lastly, and this is a typical narrative both centre-right and centre-left large par- among populists and even larger masses, it ties have showed a lack of policy immunity is mentioned that Croatian government has to widespread resistance against market re- sold (privatized) everything. forms, including privatizations, while resist- ances to FDI are present in cases of certain Contrary to these myths and disinforma- local administration (and not in the central tion, there is government’s decision on legal government any more). persons of special interest for the Republic of Croatia34. In 2020, 39 legal persons were III. DISINFORMATION ABOUT NATO, government-run, including large com- THE U.S., AND THE EU panies in transport infrastructure, woods, Croatia is a part of the EU and NATO. All water, transport and energy sector, as well mainstream parties support both mem- as one bank and one IT company. Beside berships, while the populist Homeland these so-called strategic entities, Croatian Movement, even though not particularly central government has minority or ma- enthusiastic, is at least not openly against jority shares in more than 300 companies. EU membership. Therefore, Croatia in They are a part of CERP portfolio35 where 2020 should not fear any significant Croxit the government tries to privatize at least movement. However, there are examples of a part of numerous companies. Moreover, populist narratives, which spread myths and a large presence of state-owned enterprises disinformation against the EU and NATO. (SOEs) is clearly visible in the OECD’s PMR Portal Geopolitika claims that report where the “Scope of SOEs” regula- tory restrictiveness score is 3.75 (out of 6), “NATO serves American interests and which is among the highest numbers within speculates about “America's withdrawal the EU and the OECD36. from NATO” which would “raise tensions within the EU and further undermine the Despite the large economic presence of unity of Member States”37. state-owned companies, populists can express economic xenophobia by trying It is true that NATO serves American inter- to resist foreign ownership and invest- ests (where the U.S. is the largest contribu- ment (which is mostly present in banking, tor) and it is true that NATO serves Euro- pean interests for 70 years now. However, 33 https://www.geopolitika.news/razgovori/uoci-puti- populists do not understand and/or try novog-obracanja-naciji-ruski-sindikati-predlazu-na- cionalizaciju-strateskih-tvrtki/ to undermine and trivialize the postwar security architecture of Europe, which also 34 Official Gazette (71/2018) Decision on Legal Persons of Special Interest for the Republic of Croatia. Avail- led to the creation of the European Union. able [online]: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluz- The U.S. withdrawal from NATO is simply beni/2018_08_71_1450.html not on the agenda. 35 http://www.cerp.hr/portfelj-cerp-a/dionice-i- poslovni-udjeli/114

36 OECD (2019) Indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR). Available [online]: https://www.oecd.org/econo- 37 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-sanja- my/reform/indicators-of-product-market-regulation/ vujacic-nakon-brexita--exit/ 148 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE

Furthermore, an article with the headline working together in detecting, downsizing, “Occupation of Europe in the shadow of and disposing disinformation. This network the corona” is criticizing the U.S. Army’s should work together in exchanging and exercise Defender Europe 20 and the EU’s exposing detected information about par- aims to foster military mobility through ticular disinformation. A model of inclusive infrastructural adaptations. “While the cor- participation in detecting and countering onavirus crisis paralyzed European socie- disinformation can strengthen institutions, ties, the Anglo-Saxon war fever did not die. further develop the civil society sector, and Perhaps, on these few pages, a chronicle widen market opportunities for private in- of the EU's death is written. Which is not telligence services, policy analysts, jour- the worst”38. The article tries to convince nalists, researchers, fact checkers, digital the public that the U.S. Army has occupied marketers, teachers and academics. Such Europe (as the title of the article itself sug- inclusive policy solutions would foster vol- gests), while European societies are para- untary cooperation and a strong civil so- lyzed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Further- ciety, instead of restricting freedom of ex- more, it states that the EU is dead, which is pression. a very common populist fiction for seduc- ing people and their distrust towards the European institutions.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A CROATIAN CALL TO ACTION In general, disinformation often includes populism and is rooted in conspiracy theo- ries, which can be politically very seductive. Populism usually uses simplifies and trivial- izes conclusions without a deeper under- standing of facts, as well as standards of liberal democracies. This article provides certain examples of disinformation mixed with illiberal populism occurring in Croatia.

It can be expected that there will be con- tinuous Croatian government support to the EU actions against disinformation. While Croatia’s policy response against dis- information has been focused on creating its institutional framework and promoting media literacy, there is still space for creat- ing a comprehensive and inclusive solution.

That kind of solution should mean creat- DANIEL ing a strong policy network of government, HINŠT non-governmental, and private sector Vice-President of Croatian free market think tank Cen- tre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis. A graduate 38 https://www.geopolitika.news/analize/dr-sc-sanja- of Advanced Master of European Studies and Political vujacic-okupacija-europe-u-sjeni-korone/ Science at the University of Zagreb