134 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE Populist Conspiracy Narratives and Other Forms of Disinformation in Croatia DANIEL HINŠT DANIEL HINŠT 135 isinformation affects many activities derive primarily from populist ad- Western liberal democracies. vocates of authoritarian solutions, includ- It undermines public trust in ing the Kremlin regime. important values of free soci- eties, the institutional frame- In this context, populist conspiracy narra- Dworks of the European Union (EU) and tives in the Croatian political context may NATO, civil liberties, different minorities, also be relevant for a broader EU and NATO and the market economy. Disinformation framework. The article describes the context of disin- formation and populism, the EU and Croa- tian policy to counter disinformation, the Croatian political context and mentions certain examples of disinformation. DISINFORMATION Policy solutions for Croatia and the Europe- an Union could include counterintelligence IS FALSE measures focused on detecting, confront- ing, containing, and downsizing this issue, OR MISLEADING all in line with the EU policy framework. INFORMATION, While Croatia has started to develop its in- stitutional structure and tackle disinforma- WHICH IF LEFT tion by fostering media literacy, there is still an open space for a comprehensive policy UNVERIFIED, HAS direction, which could include nongovern- mental and the private sector, and create THE POTENTIAL a multidisciplinary policy network. TO SOW Such an inclusive solution would foster voluntary cooperation and a strong civil CONFUSION society, instead of restricting freedom of IN PUBLIC expression. This article represents the first Croatian initiative in the liberal policy direc- DIALOGUE, tion. POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING DISINFORMATION AND POPULISM POLARIZATION Disinformation is false or misleading infor- mation, which if left unverified, has the po- AND DISTRUST tential to sow confusion in public dialogue, political polarization and distrust of the po- OF THE POLITICAL litical system and democratic institutions1. It SYSTEM can also be used to question the existence AND DEMOCRATIC 1 Atlantic Council, Disinformation. Available [online]: INSTITUTIONS https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/issue/disinformation/ 136 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE mind that: “Democracy is not given, and we have to fight for it if we want to preserve it”3. POPULISTS Disinformation is often connected with populism, according to which a society is OFTEN USE divided into two homogeneous and oppos- GENERALIZED, ing groups – honest people and a corrupt elite. Although they may acknowledge dif- SIMPLIFIED ferences between individual political elites (e.g. Christian Democrats, Liberals, or Social AND POLARIZING Democrats), populists do not differentiate politicians and claim that all of them are “the CONCLUSIONS same”. They often use the rhetoric of cha- os, crisis, and hopelessness, blame “corrupt WITH REGARDS and incompetent” political elites (“oligarchy, cliques”) for the situation, and they want to TO POLITICAL, “return alienated politics to the people”.4 ECONOMIC Populists often use generalized, simplified AND SOCIOLOGICAL and polarizing conclusions with regards to political, economic and sociological facts, FACTS, AS WELL as well as standards of liberal democracies throughout the Western world. Therefore, AS STANDARDS they often trivialize specific (positive) in- formation about public policies, in order OF LIBERAL to justify their completely negative under- standing of reality, which consists of creat- DEMOCRACIES ing exaggerated, irrational, imprecise and THROUGHOUT meaningless ideological dilemmas. THE WESTERN At the same time, it is worth to mention that a growing number of organizations, think WORLD tanks, and institutions have been involved in the detection of and fight against dis- information, such as the Czech think tank European Values within the Kremlin Watch project, The Kremlin Playbook5 of the of the European project2. Moreover, as Eu- 3 Jourová, V. (2020) Dinsinfo Horizon: Responding to ropean Commission’s Vice President Věra Future Threats, a conference paper. Available [online]: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ Jourová framed it: most disinformation ac- en/SPEECH_20_160 tivities aim to "blur lines, polarize, make us 4 Grbeša, M. and B. Šalaj (2020) Ideološki izazov; Agen- indifferent". Moreover, it shall be borne in cija za elektoničke medije, UNICEF. Available [online]: https://www.medijskapismenost.hr/wp-content/up- loads/2020/06/ideoloski-izazov.pdf 2 European Commission (2018) “Action Plan Against Disinformation”, [in]: JOIN, No. 36. Available [online]: 5 European External Action Service, EU vs Disinfo. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/action_plan_ Available [online]: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinforma- against_disinformation.pdf tion-cases/ DANIEL HINŠT 137 Centre for Strategic & International Studies’, agitation, subversion, repression, decep- the European External Action Service with tion and murder. The Cheka and its suc- the EU vs Disinfo portal6, and the Atlantic cessors sowed chaos abroad with prop- Council’s Disinfo Portal7. aganda, disinformation and sabotage while managing mass arrests and gulags DISINFORMATION’S 100+ YEAR-OLD at home. Indeed, the Kremlin deployed BACKGROUND an army of spies and recruited inform- One could claim that there is nothing new ants around the world to steal secrets, regarding disinformation. It is true. How- spread disinformation and support ter- ever, such generalizations often ignore, rorists and rogue regimes”8. relativize, and trivialize this increasingly common political phenomenon, which has The methods Cheka used were continued a specific source. Although not always, dis- after the Cold War by the KGB, mainly by information activities often derive from ad- confronting the CIA as the central place vocates of authoritarian solutions, includ- for confronting the spread of communism. ing the Kremlin regime. There is a deep and One K.G.B. spy is current Russian President complex background, which has already Vladimir Putin. He ultimately had a hard created narratives before, mostly by Soviet time with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then Russian intelligence, in order to as well as his entire secret service. As Sipher undermine liberal democratic institutions adds: and civic values of open societies. The background of modern disinformation 8 warfare is rooted in the world’s premier Sipher, J. (2019) “Putin’s One Weapon: The ‘Intelli- gence State’”, [in]: New York Times. Available [online]: communist regime, more than hundred https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/putin- years ago. The most relevant source is John russia-security-services.html Sipher, head of the CIA station in Moscow, with a 28-year career in the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. As he explained, “[a]fter the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin established a secret po- DISINFORMATION lice service called the Cheka to be his main weapon of repression and terror. ACTIVITIES Over the decades, the Soviet and Rus- sian secret services developed tools and OFTEN DERIVE habits based on their Chekist experience that set them apart from their counter- FROM ADVOCATES parts in the West. Rather than focusing on collecting and analyzing intelligence, OF AUTHORITARIAN they developed expertise in propaganda, SOLUTIONS, 6 Atlantic Council, Disinfo Portal. Available [online]: htt- ps://disinfoportal.org/ INCLUDING 7 Sipher, J. (2019) “Putin’s One Weapon: The ‘Intelli- gence State’”, [in]: New York Times. Available [online]: THE KREMLIN https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/24/opinion/putin- russia-security-services.html REGIME 138 DISINFORNATION: DISINFORMATION PRACTICES IN CEE “A decade after the Soviet Union fell, rope region face the same national security Mr. Putin rose to power and recruited challenge. many of his former K.G.B. colleagues to help rebuild the state. The result is a re- EU POLICY AGAINST gime with the policies and philosophy DISINFORMATION of a supercharged secret police service, Based on the previously mentioned vul- a regime that relies on intelligence op- nerabilities towards disinformation it is im- erations to deal with foreign policy chal- portant to look at the role the EU plays in lenges and maintain control at home”9. fighting the influences of disinformation. The European Commission’s Action Plan The Baltic and the Central Eastern Euro- Against Disinformation provides four policy pean countries that belong to the Three guidelines for the EU and its member states: Seas Initiative immediately turned to the West when the totalitarian Kremlin-led I. Improving the capabilities of Union control disappeared. In addition to close institutions to detect, analyze and relations with the neighboring Nordic and expose disinformation – the Strategic Western European countries, these states Communication Task Force and Intel- have developed a strong and geopoliti- ligence and Situation Center within cally important foreign policy partnership the European External Action Service, with the United States, without which com- Member States); munism would not have fallen. The spread of U.S. led liberal democracy, the EU and II. Strengthening coordinated and joint NATO enlargement to these countries has responses to disinformation - Rapid been a source of disappointment for Rus- Alert System for addressing disinfor- sia. Therefore, President Putin has used mation, working within the existing the strengthening of his authoritarian and networks,