Major Roy Lower, Luftwaffe Tactical Operations at Stalingrad, Air War
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REPORT NUMBER 87-1595 TITLE LUFTWAFFE TACTICAL OPERATIONS AT STALINGRAD 19 NOVEMBER 1942-02 FEBRUARY 1943 AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROY W. LOWER FACULTY ADVISOR MR HARRY FLETCHER, GS-12 SPONSOR LT COL DAVID L. McFARLAND, ACSC/EDCH Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112 UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE IsAEPCIbyU1Y CLPSFIFI CAT ION 1b. RESTRICTIIVE MARKINGS 2& SeCUpirY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. OISTRISUTION/AVAlLABILITY OF REPORT SAnMW~4 "A" 2b DEICLASSIF ICATION/0OWNIGRAOING- SCHEDULE Aub r-b." 4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBERIS) 87-1 595 6&- NAME Of PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Ob. OFFICE SYMBOL 7&. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION ACSC/EtDCC (if Gpoffeeble) 6c- ADDRESS [C,?)'. $lse*t*Gd ZIP Code) 7b. AOOREBS (City. Stage and ZIP Code) Maxwell AFB AL 361l2-5542 8a, NAME OF FUNOINGISPONSORING O0b.OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION Of,IaeDlicabl Sc. ADDRESS 1C.?). S(taf amvdZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS. _______ PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK VJNfl I I 1-, LE (Iflciu4e Sorcurily CtautpealoUnei LUFTWAFFE TACTICAL OPERATIONS 12 PERSONAL AUTHORIS) Lower, Roy W., Major. USAF Q&. TYPE OF REPORT GLb TIME COVERED 14 AEOF REPORT 1Yr. 48.. Din,) 1i. PAGE COUINT F ROM _ TO ____1987 April j 70 IS. SUPPLEMENTAAY NOTATION -- '.-i ITEM 11s AT STALINGRAD, 19 NOVEMBER 1942-02 FEBRUARY 1943 17 COSATI COOES 18 SUBJECT TE RMS IC '.lhlnhf anl f14vero if nec*UO~i and Idenlify by block mu~rnbltJ lIt LD GROUP sue. GR 19 ABSTRACT 'COn(Imuf 00', frwerge if necessary and Identify by blocN nm.mborl This project examines the pivotal role played by Luftwaffe tactical operations in support of the German Sixth Army during its encirclement at Stalingrad, 19 November 1942-02 February 1943. These operations are separate and distinct from the aerial resupply missions flown by VIII Fliegerkorps and represent close air support, air interdiction, and air superiority. Their failure was just one element of the German combined arms failure at Stalingrad. 20 OISTRIBIUTiON/AVALABLlry OF ABSTRACT 21. AB3STRACT SECURI1TY CLASSIFICATION VNCLASSIFiEO/UNLIMITEO 0 SAME AS MPT.C OTIC USERS C UNCLASSIFIED 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE NUMBER 22.OFFICE SYMBOL ACSC/EDCC Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5542 1'" d Aov Code4 DD FORM 1473.,83 APR EDITION OF I JAN 73 ISOBSOLETE. UV ~Ab-±r 15L.0J PREFACE _ _ __ _ Whenever historians congregate and discuss World War II, inevitably someone broaches the topic of most decisive battles. For Americans names like Midway, Guadalcanal, and Normandy merit special mention. However, the first name cited by Russians and Germans is often Stalingrad. It was here, from 19 November 1942 until 2 February 1943, that the tide of battle irrevocably shifted in Russia's favor. This shift took place not only on the ground but in the air. During those wintry days Germany fought and lost its second great aerial battle of the war. Unlike the "Battle of Britain" which resulted in a strategic draw, the aerial loss at Stalingrad signaled a change in momentum from which Germany never recovered. As a result, much of the world we have today can be traced to the fateful decisions made on the Volga 45 years ago. For this reason, historians and profes- sionals have analyzed and reanalyzed this critical battle. Unfortunately, most of their studies centered on the aerial resupply effort of VIII Fliegerkorps and virtually ignored the role of German tactical airpower. The purpose of this paper is to fill this void. Hopefully, this examination of tactical airpower will yield more than sterile lessons and be of more than passing interest to future Air Force leaders. Students of the Stalingrad campaign will immediately recog- n•ize that I have excluded Germany's allies from my discussion. %hile it is true that Croatian, Slovakian, Hungarian, Rumanian and Italian air forces assisted the Germans, their contributions at this stage of the war remained mediocre. At one time during the campaign, the Croatian staffel, 15/JO 52, had no serviceable aircraft (Appendix B). The Italian contingent of 90 aircraft flew only 6000 sorties during their &tire 17 months in Russia (42:112). To put this figure in perspective, Luftflotte IV flew nearly 24,000 sorties during June 1942 alone (8:242). The Rumanian contribution might have been greater had not most of their aircraft and airfields been overrun during the initial Soviet counterattacks on 19 November. Lastly, the Hungarians had only one fighter squadron, 1/1 Fighter Squadron, attached to Luftflotte IV. Equipped with semi-obsolete Re-2000 "Hejas," 1/1 suffered much the same fate as her Rumanian ally. After abandon- ing almost all their aircraft to the advancing Russians, the Hungarians withdrew to Stary Oskol where they began conversion to Bf-109 F and Bf-109 G fi.ghters. They did serve briefly in the Stalingrad area flying their newly acquired Bf-109 F-4s, but their contributions were negligible (33:34). iii _____________CONTINUED_ Because of the symbiotic nature of Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe operations in the East, I found it necessary to include a running commentary on the primary ground operations. However, the major thrust of this paper remains Luftflotte IV's combat contributions to the Sixth Army during its encirclement. To accomplish this, I relied heavily on wartime diaries of key participants such as Generals Pickert, Fiebig, and von Richthofen. I complemented these perspectives with the combat diaries of notable pilots such as Helmut Lipfert and Hans Waldmann of JG 52, Hans-Ulrich Rudel of StG 2, and Kurt Ebener of JG3. My special thanks go to several people: Mrs Ruth Griffin of Air University Library whose patience and constant efforts with interlibrary loan made much of this project possible; to Mr Harry Fletcher and Mr Jim Kitchens of the Simpson Historical Research Center for their very knowledgeable assistance and expertise on the Luftwaffe;' to'Hauptmann Gerd Groneman, German Air Force, who translated several primary and secondary sources; and to Major T.C. Lerntz whose meticulous scrutiny assured a quality product. Lastly, my special thanks to my combination secretary, confidante, critic.., my wife Ann. iv ______ _ "_ ABOUT THE AUTHOR _ Major Roy W. Lower graduated from the USAF Academy in June 1974 and went on to attend Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT) a. Mather AFB, Califc:nia. After UNT he underwent combat crew training for the KC-135 at Castle AFB, California, and then reported for d'ity at Kincheloe AFB, Michigan. He upgraded to instructor navigator in December 1976 and by December 1978 he had again been assigned to Castle AFB, and was flying as an evaluator in the 93rd Bomb Wing Standardization/Evaluation Division. While flying at Castle, he completed his M.A. in History at the University of California, Stanislaus. Major Lower is a bonafide expert on the history of the Luftwaffe, having spent the past 20 years studying its development, tactics, operations, and ultimate decline. Since first reading Toliver and Constable's Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe in 1968, he has spent thousands of hours during his academic and leisure time trying to fill the historical gaps left in the Luftwaffe's operational history. He couples this knowledge with unique qualifications in Russian history and military theory. During 5 years as first an instructor, then course director, and finally Assistant Professor of Military Studies, he spent thousands of hours developing, teaching, and refining a core curriculum course on military theory and Soviet force analysis at the USAF Academy.