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IIIII IIII II IIIIII Ill II Ill II Ill II Ill I IIII IIIll II Ill II Ill II Ill IIIII II Ill II Ill I IIII IIIll II IIIII Ill II IIIII Ill I IIII S-0899-0015-15-00001

Expanded Number S-0899-0015-15-00001

Title Items-in-Middle East Peace Conferences [treaties between Egypt, Israel, and others] - pre-Geneva meeting at Cairo

Date Created 09/12/1977

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0899-0015:Peacekeeping - Middle East 1945-1981

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Prohaska asked me to let you know that during the Austrian Foreign Minister's recent visit to Kuwait, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait very warmly supported your suggestion regarding a preparatory meeting on the Middle East in New York. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion that arab unity could only be restored within the UN framework.

A similarly positive reaction was encountered in Abu Dhabi.

~ F. Mayrhofer

15 March 197 8 FMG/SR BEU/dmc

cc: SecGen ✓ REG BEU

16 February 1978

NOTE FOR THE FILE

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt called the Secretary-General from Washington at approximately 1700 hours on Tuesday, 7 February .. The President apologized that the weather conditions had made it impossible to come to New York to see the Secretary­ General as he had intended to do. He briefed the Secretary-General on the talks in Washington, and they had an exchange of views on the current situation in the Middle East and future prospects. ~~it ~~"-ti~~

~~ ~~ ~-

~ ~ \_.oM.

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~~ -J )----1.....__\, 7~ \'D"' •

Note on Meeting with President Sadat scheduled for 8 p.m. on 8 February 1978

1. It will be useful to find out President Sadat's evaluation of current situation and his ideas for the future of the negotiating process. In this connexion, agreement appears to have been reached in Washington that Atherton will resume his shuttle between Jerusalem and Cairo for the next few weeks.

2. Obviously time should be allowed to see if this effort can ' make progress and provide for an effective resumption of neg- otiations.

3. Should this effort fail, everything must be done to maintain momentum and to avoid a vacuum from developing. It would be useful to have President Sadat's ideas on this eventuality. One possibility certainly is the suggestion already made by the Secretary-General at the time of the Cairo conference concerning a meeting at United Nations Headquarters or any other agreed location of all of the parties who were invited to the Cairo conference. This initiative had always been envisaged as a follow-up to the Cairo process, whatever its results, in order to provide continuity to the ultimate aim of a Geneva conference on the Middle East.

4. The Secretary-General is always ready to provide whatever assistance the parties may think useful and is following the situation with the greatest of interest and concern.

5. The Secretary-General hopes to remain in close contact with all of the parties, and in particular with President Sadat with whom he has maintained close contacts through the years. NNNN

ZCZC DBL0919 NAL2461 JRS0698 IN413 SP NYI< .CAIRO (OPI) 240 07 1013 PRESS OMNIPRESS NEWYORK

41 INFO FERNANDEZFROM SHOUKRY. PLANNED MEET! NG BETWEENSADAT AND SECGENWALDHEIM PROMINENTLY REPORTED ON FRONTPAGESOF ALL CAIRO DAILIES TUESDAYUNDER FOLLOWING 2-COLUMN HEADLINES: - SADAT STOPSOVER IN NEWYORKTO MEET WITH UN SECGENWALDHEIM. - SADAT-WALDHEIMMIDEAST TALKS TOMORROW.STOPPARA BANNERLINES OF CAI RO DAIL l ES READ: -- SADAT: 1SRAEL IS HAVE TO ACCEPTTHE

FULL WITHDRAWALAND RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMlNATIONFOR PALESTINIANS AS waLAs MAKING AVAILABLE SECURITY GUARANTEESFOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES. -- SADAT: ISRAEL ENDAGERSPEACE. -- ISRAEL WANTSTO INTO A VICIOUS Cl RCLE AND USE OBSOLETETACTICS. ISRAELI .. POSITION HARDENING. - NEXT MOVEUP TO TELAVIV. IF ISRAELI ATTITUDE CHANGEDWE COULD REACHA PEACE AGREEMENTIN DAYS. -­ - ISRAELI SETTLEMENTSARE AN ACT OF CHALLENGE.-- WE ACCEPT INTERNATIONALSUPERVISION ON JERUSALEMIF THIS APPLIED TO BOTH PARTS OF THE CITY. ~- CARTERSHOULD DOUBLE UNI STATES PEACE EFFORTS. -- AMERICANSHAVE TO SUPPORTRIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATIONFOR PAESTIN!ANS AND STAND FIRM AGAINST ISRAELl EXPANSION. -- CARTER lS FOR SELLING PLANES TO EGYPT. STOPPARAIN A DISPATCH FROM ITS SPECIAL CORRESPONDENTIN WASHINGTON, ALAHRAMSAYS THAT SADATSTALKS TUESDAYAND vJEDNESDAYWITH CARTER AS WELLASWITH AMERICANHIGH OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN,WILL BE THE FINAL Al~D MOST IMPORTANTSTAGE

lN HlS PEACE TRIP TO UNISTATES. RESULTSOF THESE TALl

=□ 2071534 PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEWYOR~ January 29, 1978

PERSONAL

Your Excellency,

Upon instructions from my Government and pursuant to the deliberations of the Cairo Preparatory Meetings in which General Sillasvou as the Representative of the Secretary General has participated, I would like to convey to you, personally, a summary of the developments that took place within the framework of the current peace efforts aiming at the achievement of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle. East conflict establishing a just and lasting peace in the region.

1. During the Ismailia talks, Egypt presented a Draft Declaration on the principles which w6uld govern the negotiations of a comprehensive peace settlement. The Cairo Preparatory Meeting was elevated to the Ministerial Level. It was decided to continue its work through political and military committees.

2. The Political Committee met in Jerusalem from 17 to 19 January 1978. Its work was based on the following agenda proposed by the United States:

A) Declaration of the principles which would govern the negotiations of a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.

B) The guidelines for negotiations relating to the issues of the West Bank and Gaza.

C) The elements of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors in accordance with the principles of Security Council Resolution 242.

3. On 17 January, the Egyptian Delegation to the Political Committee submitted a Draft Declaration of the principles which would govern the negotiations. (Annex 1)

.. I .. Page 2

4. Due to the continued opposition by Israel to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self determination and to certain public Israeli statements at the highest level which confirmed such attitude, the Egyptian Government decided to recall its Delegation to the Political Committee. This decision was taken, as the Government's statement emphasized, after it became clear from the declaration of the Prime Minister of Israel and its Foreign Minister that Israel insists on partial solutions that cannot lead to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the area. The full text of the statement is contained in Annex 11.

5. President Sadat said in his speech before the Egyptian Parliament on 21 January 1978 that negotiations were halted when evidence confirmed that Israel's negotiators, be it in Cairo Conference, in Ismailia peace talks or in the Political Committee in Jerusalem have planned their stance on the basis of two main trends: First, to utilize the time factor and second to take advantage of Egypt's recognition of the importance of the security measures, both trends indicate Israel's persistance for the old concept of territorial expansion and its insistence on holding to the occupied territories.

President Sadat added, the peace initiative is still standing and the door to peace would be open if the fundamental rules of peace are in accordance with the basic international norms, i.e. the non-violation of sovereignty and territorial inviolability and the basic rights of people.

6. The President also affirmed that no lasting solution could be reached without the realization of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian peoples.

7. On the security issues the President expressed Egypt's willingness to solve it on the basis of reciprocity along the following lines:

Establishment of limited forces and limitation of armaments zones

Deployment of United Nations Peace Keeping Forces

•• I •• ------

Page 3

Installation of early warning stations

Creation of a Joint Commission under the Chairmanship of a United Nations Representative to resolve the practical difficulties that might arise from the application of the peace agreements.

8. As for the meetings of the Military Committee,its work is still inconclusive due to the insistence of Israel on certain positions that are contrary to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Egypt.

Egypt remains ready to continue its efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Resolution of its complement organs.

Please accept, Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours, JJ;«IJ/1 Dr. A. Esmat vfu.1/Meguid Ambassador Permanent Representative

His Excellency Mr. Kurt Waldheim Secretary General of the United Nations United Nations Headquarters New York, N.Y. 10017 PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

ANNEX 1

DRAFT DECLARATION

THE GOVtRNMENTS OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND

ISRAEL ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORT RO REACH A

COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION.

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORKOF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, THEY EXPRESS

THEIR WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE PEACE AGREEMENTS ON THE BASIS

OF THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

242 AND 338 IN ALL THEIR PARTS.

THE TWO SIDES AGREED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS JUST

AND LASTING PEACE REQUIRES THE FULFILMENT OF THE FOLLOWING:

1. WITHDRAWALOF ISRAEL FROM SINAI, THE GOLAN, THE WEST BANK

AND GAZA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION 242 AND THE PRINCIPLE

OF INADMISSIBILITY OF ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR

2. THE NECESSITY FOR GUARANTEEING THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY

AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EVERY STATE IN THE AREA THROUGH

MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES ACCORDING TO

THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY.

• • I •• PAGE 2

3. RESPECT OF THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA TO

SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL

INDEPENDENCE.

4. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN

PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS ON THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO

SELF-DETERMINATION, THROUGH TALKS IN WHICH EGYPT, JORDAN,

ISRAEL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

WOULD PARTICIPATE.

5. TERMINATION OF ALL CLAIMS OR STATES OF BELLIGERENCY AND

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS AMONG ALL THE STATES

IN THE AREA THROUGH THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. PERMANENT MfSSfON OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORI<,

ANNEX 11

PRESIDENT ANWAR EL-SADAT THIS MOMENT INSTURCTED MR. MOHAMMED

IBRAHIM KAMEL, THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HEADS EGYPT'S DELEGATION

TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN JERUSALEM, TO RETURN

IMMEDIATELY TO CAIRO AFTER IT BECAME CLEAR FROM THE DECLARATIONS

OF MR. MENAHEM BEGIN, THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, AND MR. MOSHE

DAYA, THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THEY ALL AIM AT MAKING

THE SITUATION FLUID AND PRESENT PARTIAL SOLUTIONS THAT CANNOT

LEAD TO ACHIEVING A JUST, LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE

MIDDLE EAST REGION.

THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN THIS DECISIVE DECISION TO AVOID THE

TALKS CONTINUING IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE OR GOING INTO SIDE ISSUES,

MOVING FROM AN ISSUE WHOSE EXAMINATION HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED

TO ISSUES NOT UP FOR DISCUSSIONS, SO AS TO ENGROSS THE NEGOTIATIONS

IN OBSCURE AND VAGUE QUESTIONS NOT SERVING THEIR AIM.

EGYPT'S POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR AND FRANK SINCE THE PEACE

INITIATIVE STARTED, AND THE EGYPTIAN STAND ABSOLUTELY DID NOT

CHANGE, SO AS TO AVOID ANY OUTBIDDING. THE HOPE THAT THE

OTHER SIDE WOULD MEET THIS CLARITY WITH SIMILAR CLEARNESS •

• • I •• ------

PAGE 2

FRANK AND STRAIGHTFORWARD POSITIONS ARE THE ONLY ADEQUATE

MEANS TO REACH A SOLUTION MEETING THE HOPES OF THE MILLIONS

AT THE WORLD LEVEL FOR AN UNSHAKEN PEACE. ANY OTHER ATTITUDE IS

NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE AFTER THE COURAGEOUS PEACE INITIATIVE.

EGYPT HAS STATED ITS PRINCIPLED POSITION FROM THE BEGINNING.

IT WAS A STAND EGYPT TOOK DURING ITS $'TRUGGLE IN THE LAST EIGHT

YEARS. THIS STAND IS BASED ON THE NECESSITY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AFTER THE FIFTH OF JUNE 1967,

INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AND ACKNOWLEDGINGTHE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS,

INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

WHO WERE DISPERSED AND DISENFRANCHISED BY AGGRESSION DURING

APPROXIMATELY HALF A CENTURY.

IF THE WORLD CONSCIENCE HAS SETTLED FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF

THESE PRINCIPLES, WRICH CONFORM WITH JUSTICE AND THE PRINCIPLES

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS, THEN IT IS NO

LONGER ACCEPTABLE THAT BARGAINING, OUTBIDDING AND WASTING TIME AND

ENERGY ARE THE WAY OF ACHIEVING THEM. IF THE JEWS OF THE WORLD

WERE DISPERSED AND DISENFRANCHISED, THERE IS NO MEANING IN THAT

THEY RENDER THE PALESTINIANS DESTITUTE, LIVING UNDER OCCUPATION,

TO PAY THE PRICE OF THE SUFFERING OF THE JEWS.

IF ISRAEL BELIEVES THAT A SETTLEMENT HERE OR A SETTLEMENT

THERE, OR AN AIRPORT HERE OR AN AIRPORT THERE, IS BETTER IN ACHIEVING

•• I •• PAGE 3

ITS SECURITY THAN CONVINCING ITS NEIGHBORS TO LIVE WITH IT IN

PEACE, THEN THIS MEANS IT PREFERS A PEACE IMPOSED BY MILITARY

FORCE TO A PEACE BASED ON THE CONVICTION OF THE USEFULNESS OF

PEACE.

THE NARROW SPACE OF ISRAEL AND THE CLOSENESS OF ITS TERRITORY

TO ARAB LANDS ARE NOT A PHENOMENONLIMITED TO ISRAEL AND COULD NOT

BE A JUSTIFICATION TO IMPOSE THE STATE OF TENSION IN THE REGION

ON THE PRETEXT OF SELF-DEFENSE OR TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE FROM

DESTRUCTION. EUROPEAN STATES NEIGH~OR EACH OTHER AND ARE EVEN

INTERMINGLED, BUT THIS DID NOT PREVENT THESE STATES FROM LIVING

IN PEACE AND FAR FROM WAR SENSITIVITY AND FEAR OF DESTRUCTION.

MANY WORLD STATES IN ADDITION TO EUROPE HAD PASSED THROUGH STAGES

OF HATRED AND BITTERNESS EXCEEDING THOSE RESULTING FROM THE

BATTLES BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL.

IN TAKING THE DECISION, EGYPT CONSIDERS IT PART OF ITS CLEAR

AND FRANK STAND IN FACING THIS SITUATION, IT LEAVES THE SITUATION

TO THE WORLD'S CONSCIENCE, HAVING EXONERATED ITSELF FROM ANY

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF FAILURE, WHICH IT DID NOT

CAUSE,~AND FROM BETRAYING THE HOPES OF THE MILLIONS, WHICH IT

DID NOT CAUSE IN ANY WAY.

EGYPT, HOWEVER, HAD PASSED THROUGH MANY SUFFERINGS AND LEFT

THEM BEHIND THROUGH ITS LONG HISTORY AND DID NOT ACCEPT THE

•• I • ,, ' . '

PAGE 4

ATTITUDE OF CHEATING, MANEUVERING AND OUTBIDDING BECAUSE THIS

WAS NOT THE AIM OF THE INITIATIVE OF ITS BRAVE PRESIDENT.

THE AIM OF THE INITIATIVE WAS TO SPARE BLOOD AND TO MAKE

PEACE NO LONGER IMPOSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE.

THE PEACE WHICH EGYPT ASKS, BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE, IS A

PEACE FOR THE REGION AND THE WHOLE WORLD. IN DOING WHAT IT HAS

DONE, EGYPT MAY HAVE OFFERED ALL IT CAN AFFORD. IT WILL,

NEVERTHELESS KEEP ITS WORD. JUST, HONORABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE

PEACE IS ITS DEMAND AND SECURITY OF THE REGION IS ITS GOAL IN ORDER

TO ACHIEVE SECURITY OF MANKIND IN THIS ERA IN WHICH WE LIVE.

PRESIDENT ANWAR EL-SADAT HAS INVITED THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

TO CONVENE IN AN EMERGENCY SESSION AT 11:30 SATURDAY MORNING

THE 12TH OF SAFAR, 1398 OR THE 21ST OF JANUARY, 1978 TO PLACE

BEFORE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE ALL THE FACTS OF THE

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. rI

CONFIDENTIAL 24 January 1978

NOTE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST FILE

General Siilasvuo telephoned me in Ankara on 8 January to say that Mr. Evron of the Israeli Foreign Office had .., expressed the hope on behalf of Foreign Minister Dayan that T the Secretary-General would be present at the Political Committee meeting in Jerusalem on 16 January, or that he would continue to be represented by General Siilasvuo. Mr. Evron expressed the hope that there would be a positive response because any discontinuation of United Nations representation would be hard to understand and would be detrimental to the United Nations image. There was also the question of the future United Nations role in the Middle East. General Siilasvuo was informed that he would be given more precise instructions on the following day. On 9 January, the Secretary-General addressed a letter to Secretary of State Vance on this matter and General Siilasvuo was informed that the Secretary-General would not attend the meeting in Jerusalem, but that all aspects of other arrangements were being reviewed. Meanwhile, a message was relayed through Bill Buffum from Secretary of State Vance, who had evidently not yet received the Secretary-General's letter. This message stated that Secretary of State Vance believed it would be a serious and major mistake if the United Nations withdrew from par­ ticipation in the negotiations which he (Vance) considered to be an extension of the Cairo talks. He felt that it would be widely misunderstood if after Cairo the United Nations did not have a representative at the Jerusalem,meeting. If the Secretary-General was considering such a change, he would welcome a chance to discuss it personally on the telephone. On 10 January in Teheran, the Secretary-General telephoned Secretary of State Vance at 1830 hours. In this conversation he briefed Vance on the talks with Prime Minister Ecevit and then went through the various "Points for Discussion" - 2 -

and the draft statement on the relationship of the United Nations __ to the working Political Committee in Jerusalem, pointing out that it was impossible for the United Nations to participate in such a bilateral meeting. Secretary of State Vance expressed understanding for the Secretary-General's position and said he would consider it and communicate his views. The Secretary­ General said that his statement would be issued as late as possible in order not -to discourage other possible participants in the Jerusalem meeting. It would probably be issued on Friday, 13 January. Secretary of State Vance's reply to the Secretary-General's letter was received in Teheran on 11 January. The Secretary­ General sent a detailed reply to this letter through the American Ambassador in Teheran, Bill Sullivan, on Friday, 13 January. The reply was in fact given to Sullivan at a reception given by Prince. Reza. Sullivan was inclined to argue with the Secretary­ General's position on the grounds that the Jerusalem meeting was exactly the same as the Cairo meeting. When I pointed out that, among other differences, none of the other parties - including the Soviet Union - had been asked to the Jerusalem meeting, he gave up. The Secretary-General also called in the Soviet Ambassador in Teheran, Vinigradov, to explain the situation to him and to give him a note concerning the Secretary-General's response to invitations to participate in the Jerusalem meeting.

Brian E. Urquhart UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: The secretary-Gener DATE, 21 ,Ianuary 1978 A: Mr. w. Powell, Sp' man'"•" REFERENCE, 1 . Jo p. m. THROUGH: Mr. R. Stajduhar, Spokesman S/C "DE:

FROM: Information support Section, ERD/OPI DE:

SUBJECT: Sadat's address to EgY}?tian Parliament OBJET:

- . 1744:URGENT' ' ' ':MIDEAST--SECOND NIGHTLEAD SADAT' ': r CAIRO, JAN 21, REUTER -- PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT DECLARED TONIGHT HE WOULD NOT GIVE UP ONE SQUARE INCH OF EGYPT IAN TERRITORY TO ISRAEL "EVEN IF' I HAVE TO FIGHT TO THE END OF THE WORLD." IN A SPEECH TO EGYPT S PARLIAMENT, HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THIS TO ISRAEL I DEFENCE MI NIST ER EZER WEIZMA N DURI NG NOW-STALLED MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE TWO DISCUSSED ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED SINAI DESERT. THE 360 LEGISLATORS APPLAUDED WILDLY WHEN MR SADAT DECLARED: "I WOULDRATHER GO TO THE END OF' THE WORLD TO AVOID SHEDDING ONE DROP OF' THE BLOOD OF ONE OF MY SOLDIERS. "BUT I TOLD WEIZMAN I WOULD NOT ALLOW ONE SQUARE INCH OF MY TERRITORY TO BE GIVEN AWAY EVEN IF I HAVE TO FIGHT TO THE END OF THE WORLD." MORE NM/DN/ AEM. 1801:MIDEAST--SECOND NIGHTLEAD SADAT 2 CAIRO: (MAYBE BYLINEDNICHOLAS MOORE) PRESIDENT SADAT CALLED THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF PARLIAMENT TO EXPLAIN HIS REASONS FOR BREAKING OFF' THE JERUSALEM PEACE TALKS WITH ISRAEL LAST WEDNESDAY. HE DECLARED THAT THE CLASH WITH ISRAEL HAS NOT ONLY OVER ITS WISH TO RETAIN SETTLEMENTS OF ABOUT 2,500 JEWS IN THE SINAI DESERT. "WE ARE NOT CALLING FOR A UNILATERAL AGREEMENT," l-!E DECLARED. TO MORE APPLAUSE MR SADAT SAID ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FROM ALL ARAB LAND OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 MIDDLE EAST WAR AND THAT HE WANTED PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION. LEGISLATORS ALSO APPLAUDED AS THE PRESIDENT SAID EGYPT WANTED ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM SYRIA S GOLAN HEIGHTS, THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN AND THE GAZA STRIP "BEFORE SINAI." HE DENOUNCED THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ARAB ALLIES FOR CLAIMING

1 HE SOUGHT ONLY AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DEAL. EGYPT SAYS IT IS SEEKING AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. REUTER NM/RT/ AEM.

CAIRO, JAN 21, REUTER - PRE2IDENT ANWAR SADAT SAID TODAY

HE HAD FORMALLY ASKED THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPLY EGYPT WITH ALL,

THE TYPES OF MODERN WEAPONS IT HAS ALREADY SUPPLIED TO ISRtiEL. MORE tJM RT PCR - 2 -

1826:MIDEAST--ARMS 3 CAIRO: IN CALLING FOR MORE U.S. ARMS, PRESIDENT SADAT CITED HIS COUNTRY S POOR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION -- WHICH OPPOSES HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AND HAS IMPOSED AN EMBARGOON SUPPLYING WEAPONS TO EGYPT. "I DO NOT WANT THE UNITED STATES TO IMPOSE AN EMBARGO ON us," PRESIDENT SADAT DECLARED. HE SAID THE ISRAELI ARSENAL OF U.S. WEAPONS, AND THE KREMLIN EMBARGO ON SUPPLIES TO EGYPT, TOGETHER E:NABLED ISRAEL TO RESIST WHAT HE SAW AS JUST ARAB DEMANDS FOR T'-IE RETURN OF OCCUPIED ARAB TERR IT ORY. REUTER NM/RT/ AEM.

I ••• - 3-

(MIDEAST) CAIRO (UPI) - PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT TOLD M-l EMERGI::CY SESSiat-: OF PARLIAMENT TODAY EGYPT WOULD FIGHT "UNTIL THE n,rn OF THE WORLD" RATHER THAN ACCEPT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS 01\J ITS SOIL. CHARGING ISRAEL HAD USED THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE TO ATTEMPT TO "OVERTURN THE EGYPTIAN PEACE I\'ITIATIVE," SADAT SAID HE HAD TOLD ISRAEL'S DEFENSE MINISTER: 1 1\iJr'=11;'D 1·.1 0 f:, ... n=1·VLL,.._,, \. ·PR1Tr·,JP.1;;,.. lVJI "" 0 .c.... h 1\1·r.:·TA1-Jc'i') ....,.1'\~'-1.t.1.,L..,i..t B-t",..I.l....,l;i; ~l ;;:o;lHAi1~ .... I ..),4HALL ti \'.0~1d ii/J.LLOP h' ~~ SIN£iLE SEJTLEMENT OR (ISRAELI PRESPJC~) o~.J A S r,JGL[ SQ UPi2E: C 'i:'TTI'.~ETE:R HJSIDE OUR INTERNATIONAL EOUMDAJIES1 EVE~J IF THIS MEM:S HAVnlG TO FIGHT YOU UNTIL THE END OF THE WORLD." IN A SPEECH THAT THE STATE-CO~TTROLLED PRESS HAD PRE:DICTEI' l·JOULD ANNOUNCEnIMPORTANT MOV£S0 PJ THE MIDDLE EAST, SADAT SAID HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS "WERE JOKING 1\T FIRST" WHEN THEY REFUSED TO GIVE UP SETTLEMENTS Ir) THE S INP, I. - ... SADAT S/UD HIS DECISION WEDNESDJ\Y TO BREA;( OFF JERUSALEM PE:ACI TALKS WITH ISRAEL STEMMED FROM "CONCR.C:TEEVIDENCE" ISRAEL WAS ''PLAYI>JG FOR TIME At.:D EXPLOITING EGYPT'S AGREDJE'JJ TO THE '.JECI:SSITY OF SECURITY FOR ISRAEL.n .., . ... - SADAT WHO RECEIVED A STAt-TDI\lG OVATIO'.·: AT THE L-lERG:::·:cY s:sSIO:T HE CALLED T6 EXPLAD! THE WALKOUTFROr-1 THE JERUSALE:I TP.Ll(S Cr:ARGZD THAT ISRAEL HAD BEE~) STALLING DURING THI SERIES OF XE:GOTIATtm;s THAT GREU OUT OF HIS NOV. 19 VISIT TO JERUSALEM. HE REPEATED HIS RECENT DENUNCIATIO:J OF ISRAELI I:'JSISTPJCF. 0~1 MAINTAINDJG SETTLEMENTS, \'lITH ISRAELI 11ILITARY FRC'TECTirn•, I'.'l EGYPT'S SrNAI UNDER AN EVENTUAL PEACE ACCORD. ATTACKI!·~GTHE STAND AS A VIOLA TI ON OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGc: TY AI~D TER)HTORY,_ SADAT SAID n I THOUGHT THEY WERE JOKn~G AT FIRST ••• I>I ORDER TO GIVE WEIGHT to_ THEIR :·:EGOTIA TING POSIT IO'.··JS. TEZS E THP'1GS ARE NOT UNKNOWN IN INTERNATIO~.JAL PQLITICS.n SPEAKING IN CLASSICAL ARAGIC2. HE 3R_QKEFROM A PREPARID T'E:XT FOR 1 HIS CRITICISM OF ISRAEL'S HARDLHJE STAND1 REAFFIRMI\JG EGYPT'S DE:'-1A'D FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWALFROM OCCUPIED A2AE U\~1D AND 3ZLF-DETER:1I'.·:ATIO~J FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE COUPLED PRAISE FOR U.S EFFORTS TO MEDIATE: 3ETWEBJ EGYPT AND ISRAEL WITH RE~!EWED ATTACKS ON MOSCOW. HE SAID POD\JTEDLY THAT HE PAD RECEIVED WORLDUIDE SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACE INITIATIVE "EXCEPT FOR ONE SUPERPOWERWHICH WE Kr-:ou MOUNTED SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY_AGAI'.'1ST P~P1CE.. " HE CRITICIZED Wl~T HE TERMED THE SOVIETS' "STUPID!TY" I~ fORKI~G- AGAINST THE PEACE MOVESo ,... ~ SADAT MET WITH SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE FRIDAY A~D LATER TOLD A !'JEWS CONFERENCE nTHE DOOR TO PEll.CE IS NOT CLOSED. BUT AT THIS POI;··JT THERE SHOULD BE. A HE-EVALUATION OF THE WHOLE THING .. n _ UPI 01-21 01:10 PES

I ... - 4 - LE CAIRE9 21/1/AFP-- L= r:ESIDENT fACtTE ESTI~E r~F ''Lt flUPTURE" DFS ['JEG(jCHTIOi:s FGYPTC-I~.'.;2/\ELIEti::?S ,;;~~:TDur· P.U Fi:,IT rr.iE LE SEUL OBJECTIF' D'IS11AEL EST ''D'ETEri.NISF'r(n SCN "t:CCUPPTICiN f.'•E8 T~RRITOIRES ARAAES'' ET DE ''PERPETUEP Sf CCNCEPTICN DU GPARD ISRAEL' '~ DAt--1S SO~l DISCOURS PROt:ONCE SA"-1EDI f'C:IF DE\U1tlT LE Pt-J'LE~·1Ef"lT E:GYPTIEN, LE CHEF DE L'ETAT A DECLAPE QU'ISR!-\EL A P'.':Uff'UI 1!I ''CF SEUL BUT'' AU COURS DES NEGOCIATIOfSDU CAIRE, D'IS~AIL!A, ~r rE JER USALE:Mo . 1 ''POUR CELA 9 A AJOUTE LE PFESIDnJT r-'.t\DtTF 9 I8P.t\EL A ESf'/'YF: 9 11 1 T AU L0 ~1G DC'~ 't"(.!QCIA'fI'"'t· C n'•r:·vr,Ln-1Tr;"C-, l ...... 1 , ... -,-•l\'fC: TOU... t-1 u L :1 i.:,~ ~·J.,2. ..J · u 1 "~· 9 ~ i:. t\ · l• L .. r '--'r.. r 1·\ L rru~-.. t. ~··. .t t. .i - ,.... r:-rr__ L'IMPOF:TANCE QUE NOUS AVO[\JS ACChLDEE A LA ~FC!JPITJ:'. D'If'.PPZL''o

. IL A AFFIHME 9 D·AuTnE Pt1RT 9 QUE LE PRESIDEN;.f HAFEZ '.IL t\SSAD DE' SYRIE !'\\It.IT DECLARE AUX CHEFS D'ETAT ARAijES 0UF L'URSS ET Lt sv:IF N'AV~If~T JAMAIS EU L' INTENT ION DE Pl\F/f ICIPE:F A LA CGNFERFt{CF DF GF:i·'EVFo /SUIVRA) VM l AFP 17e29

LE C{\IREo LE PRESIDENT SAD/l,TE A DECLf._RE 0U'IL ?;\Jt•IT ETE "Tl:ES SURPRIS'' PAR LES f;,FFIRf,1ATIC'NS Ft-ITE:S JEUDI FT UENDRFDI P/IR iv:. MENAHEM BEGIN SELON LES1::iUELLES IL A\/JHT DISCUTE f-1\l[C LUI DU PROBLEMEDES COLONIESJUIVES AU SINAio IL A PRECISE QU'AVANT L'ARRIVEE DE Mo BEGIN t IS¥tILit, I NGEL, IL AVAIT DEMANDEAM. EZER WEIZMANN,MIRISTHE ISnPELIE~ D~ L~ DEFENSE, D'INFORMEP. tv1. BEGH: GlU'IL .. N'ACCFPTEPA rrs L'rlf SFUL:: COLONIE ISR?1ELIFNt'-:E !~U SINAI MEME SI CELA EXIGE: DS LUI l!LF LZP?ISE DE LA GUERRE•'. SUIVRA BAY/ AFJ' 17.51 BULLETIN SADATE

LE CAIHE 21/1 ,AFP) LE PRESIDF:NT SADATE h DECL?'.PE rnF Lr PCRTF DE~~ NEGOCIATIONF RFSTE:-:p_ GUVF:PT~ t: Lt CC'.·!DITIG!: • •.0 t;•,tUC:ll:·;F :'\TT:H'TE PlE .SOIT POFiTEF !', LL\ SC:UVEEAif0ETE l!I /, L'H!TEG:':IT,.., DEST:" nnn:~s DE rous LES PAYS DE LA REGIOK''. MK AFP 13.09 BULLETIN ARMES

BULLETIN ARMES''•••••••

LE CAIRE ,f~FP) • 'J AI DE'1i~NDEC;FFICIFLLfi';}EFT AU-X:ET:1TS UNI[' f: '_AF~:E:11 L'EGYPTE AVEC DES ARMESSEMBLABLES A TOUTEf CELL?S rcrT DISPSr~

ISRAEL'', A REVELE LE PRESIDENT SADATEDANS SCN CISCOUHS 0 • 'JE N AI PP,S DEMANDE CES F'OUJH'ITURES D P,2~':ES FC!J? tTT t,G'LIP_ ISRAEL'', A AJOUTE LE PRESIDENT SADATE. NJ/MK AF'P 18.14 zc;zcIUl.,11~.25 VIF~1 ., VI Ei~NA ( UNi DO) 305 20/1 1225 ---~--

PRESS OMN!PRESS NEWYORK_./ '"' 2333 POWELL, GlULiANI, COP MAYRMOFER ARA SECGENLEFT VIEMN.~THIS MORNING(20 JANUARY) AT 09u:35 FOR NEWYOfU

MADEBY SADATHAVE NOT BEEN FOLLOWEDWITH EQUl!il~ iMiTlATIVES BY I .Sf.lAELlJNQUOTEe ACCORD! NG TO THE INTERVIEWSECGEN HaD THE VIEW

THAT THE BREAl<-OFF OF TALKS BETWEENEGYPT AND ISRAEL HAD CREATED A

QUOTEVERY SERl OUS Sl1"UATl ON UNQUOTES,~iE, THEREFORE, \\/OULD l~EPf::/ff HIS PREVIOIJS PROPOSALTO CONVENEAN i NTERMEDlATE ROUNDOF

T1Vi..KSBET~IEEN ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN NEWYOR!(OR ANY OTHER crrv - QUOTE WHICM COULD ALSO BE VIENNA UNQUOTE~PARA SECGEWALSO IS REPORTEDTO EXPECTA QUOTEMORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE UNC~UOTEFROM BEGIN~ IN THE HffEREST OF CONTINUINGTHE CONTACT

BETWEENEGYPT AND ISRAa WHICH STARTED $0 PROMiSINGLY, N011J CONCES-

SI ON.SFROM ISRAEL WERENEEDED@ IN TH IS REGARD.,THE QUESTI ON

OF ISR/.\Ell SETTLEMENTSIN StNJ\I WAS A KEY ISSUE~ PRESIDENT SADAT HELD THE VIEW THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPTFOREIGN SETTlEMEtffS WITH

FOl1E!GN SOLDIERS ON THE SOIL OF THE SOVEREIGNfffATE OF EGYPT,

.AtTHOU(1MBEGIN'S REQUESTTO MAl!•JTAIN THESE SETTLEMENTSAFTER THE liffTW'IDRAWALFROM SINAI WOULDMEAN EXACTLY TH I Sf> PARA

THE SECONDMAIN ISSUE, FOR WHICH NOWCONCESSIONS FROM JSRAEL COULD BE EXPECTED, WASTHE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE

PAtESTilHANS .. QUOTE SADAT FINDS HIMSELF DEEPLY DISAPPGINTEJ UNQUOTE,.PARA

! SRAEl \~AS NOT PREPAREDTO GO BEYOND ITS AUTONOMYOFF'l:R FOft THE INl!ABtTANTS OF WEST JORDAN AND GAZA,. QUOTE SHOULDTHIS Vlf:W NOT BE

CH;\NGEDAND SHOULDSADAT BE STIL.L DISAPPOINTED, AND SHOULD CONTACTBETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAa FINAL.LY REMAIN CUT-OFF, TrlEN THIS MIGHT G!VF. CAUSE TO FEAR A NE~,JRADICALIZATION IM THE M!DfilE EAST UNQUOTE"THE FINAL AIM SHOULDREMAIN A QUOl'E GLOBAL SOLUTIONOF THE Ml ODLE EAST PROBLEMUNQUOTE. HIS PROPOSALTO CONVENE

.~,ROUND OF TALKS VJITH ,QLL.PARTIES INVOLVEDBETWEEN Tr·IE CURRENT

EGYPTI ,01N-·tSRAU. I 1'PLKS AND A NEW CONFEF?LNCEIN C,ENEVA1\S P. SORT

OF SECURITY NET \~fi111 D SERVE TH IS PURPOSE.. ENDALL ( STROH.ALUN IS Vi EMMA) NNNN0MTOPXM IT f XMITALL TFC AFTERNO 0000

MZCZC DAl.1282 NBL2830 JRS0C'96 I SM:JQ6

SP NYK

u CA i RO (UNI C) 380 18 10462

P l~ESS

OMNIPRESS NEWYORK 21 INFO FERNANDEZFROM SHOUKRY~ BANNERLINES OF CAIRODAILIES WEDNESDAYFOLLOW: MAJOR DIFFERENCES ON WITHDRAWALAND PAL ES-

T IN f ANS. -- EGYPT ASSERTS IN JERUSALEMMEETINGS HER FR I RMSTAND

ON PEACE CAUSE,. -- ISRAELI STATEMENT IS FULL OF lNTERPRETAT!ONS ALRE.ADY REJECTED BY EGYPT • -- EGYPT AND ISRAEL E~

BY VlCEPRESIDENT MUBARAKTO FOLLOWUP SITUATION .. -- SADAT FOL-

LOWS ON SPOT JERUSALEMTALKS .-- ISRAELS POSITION ! S NOT POSI-

TIVE -- UNI STATES PRESENTSMORE THAN OME FORMULA'fO BRING CLOSER

THE TWO SI DES STANDS~ -- MESSAGESTO SADAT FROM CA.RTERAND

I

SADATS PROPOSALTHAT EGYPT CAN GUARANTEEI SRAE:l.S SEGURITY AND

SAFETY AND SAID HOW CAN TH IS BE ACHIEVED IN CONNECTI ON WITH

GOLAN, \vESTBANKAND GAZA IF PALESTINIAN LIBERATION OHGANIZATION

BECAME IN CHARGEsPAPER SAYS THAT DAYAN STATEMENTS.SPARKED OFF

A HEATED DISCUSSION BETWEENDAYAN /1.t\JDA GROUPOF EGYPT!AN AND

P Al ESTIN I AN JOURNALI STSo PAPER ALSO QUOTES ISRAEL IS SOURCES AS SAYINGTHAT WEIZMAN WILL LEAVE FOR CAIROTHURSDAY CARRYING WITH HIM NEW !SRAELI PROPOSL.~SDEALING WITH ISRAal SETTLEMENTS ·ANDAIRPORTS IN SINAI TO BE DISCUSSEDBY MILITARYCOMMITTEE

v✓H I CH ESUMESMEETINGS THURSDAY EVENING,. STOPPARA COMMENTING

ON VI E\vPOI NTS PUT FORWARDTUESDAY BY EGYPTII UNI STATES AND I SRAEL AT OPEN l NG SESSION OF POLIT I CAL COMMITTEE, ALGOMHOURl A

QUOTESPOLITICAL OBSERVERSAS SAYING THAT EACH EGYPT AND UNI~~ STATESWAS KEEN TO DEFINEBASIC PRINCIPLES FOR THE SUCCESSOF

THE COMMliT~ES 1401:H.. EGYPTIAN FOREMINfSTER, IBRAHIM KAMEL, OBSERVERSSAY, SUMMEDUP EGYPTS STAND IN QEAR-CUT AND DEFINITE

PO I NTS BY WHICH HE TOUCHED ALL SI Df:S OF THE PROBLEM AND DEALT

WITH THE ISSUE IN ALL FRANKNESSAND CLARITY~ HE ALSO UNDERLINED

SOLi CiTY OF EGYPTIAN STAND \vHICH IS BASED ON POLITIC/'.\L PRINCl·­

PLES AFFIRMED BY SADAT. PAPER ALSO NQTES THAT EGYPTl.6.N FOREMl~JI•=

STER LINKED ISRAELS RECOGNITION OF PALESTINE ENTITY ~vlTH EGYPTS PREPAREDNESSTO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS P1~RTOF Ml DEAST AREA~ HE

ALSO ASSOCIATED REAL PEACE IN PALESTINE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF

PALESTINE AND ISRAELI PEOPLE ON EQUAL FOOTING~ ON OTHER HAND1-

p APER ADDS, VANCE ADHEREDTO THE POSIT l ON DEQ ARED BY C.~RTER

IN ASl•/AN ESPEC I ALLY AS REGARDSPAL FST I NE PEOPLES R ! GHT TO

DETERMINATION OF.THEIR OWN FUTURE. IT IS BELlEVED, PAPER CON~­

TINUES, THAT VANCE THROUGHHIS PARTICIPATION l~J THE TAU

SEE TO THAT DECLARATIONOF PR I NCIPL ES SHA.LL EMBODYA SOL.UTION

OF f' AL.EST I NE PROBLEM IN All ITS ASPECTSoo AS FOR ! SRA8.. I FORE­

MIN I STER, DAYAN, PAPER SAYS IGNORED QUESTION OF WITHDRAWALAS

\\TELL AS PALESTINE QUESTION AND RIGHTS OF PALESTINE PEOP! F..

BUT HE DID REFER TO MANY RELEVANT SUBJECT: AAA MEANS OF ARRIV·­ ING AT PRINCIPLESFOR REACHING PEACE AGREEMENTS, SOLUTION OF AF~ABPAI_ESTINIANS PROBLEM IN WHATHE CALLED JUDEA AND SA­ MARIA (WESTBANK) AREA, AND ACHIEVE~ENT OF A PEACE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. HE A

SO SPOKE OF NORMALIZATION OF RELt1TIONS. BUT

IN ITS ENTIRETY, DAYANS ADDRESSDID.NOT REFLECT POSITIVE

STAND ON PART OF I SRAEL, PAPER CONCLUDESSTOP END (OMNIPRESS CAIRO)

COL CKED

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El' ATPRIORITE UNATIONS NEWYORK · , UNCC !00 HUYER/URQUHART/AHMEDhKATANI/POWELl../STAJDUHAR/RAISABIN PHILLIPP/KHALIL/CHAIRMAN/ACT!NG CHAIRMAN/LO/CHIEF UNMOREP FROM MIZUNO. MAIN ARTICLE JERUSALEMPOST OF 18 JANUARY HEADED WEST BANK MAJOR HURDLE, SINAI ISSUES QUOTE CAN BE SOLVED UNGuOTE REPORTS Ql:P.TE THE ISRAEL•EGYPT POLITICAL COMMITTEETAI.KS WILL . RECONVENEIN JERUSALEMTHIS AFTERNOONAl' THREE;, WlTH THE PARTIES HAVING DIGESTED EACH OTHER'S OPENING STATEMENTSAND INITIAL WORKINGPAPERS AND PREPAREDTO ENTER INTO THE NITTY-GRITTY OF NARROWINGGAPS. THOUGHON THE FACE OF IT THE SITUATION DID NOT LOOK GOOD LAST NIGHl • THE DIFFERENCES OVER PALES'E!N!AN RIGHTS AND OVER WITHDRAWALWHICH BOGGEDDOWN THE ISMAILIA SUMMIT WERE ONCE AGAIN POINTED UP YESTERDAY - SOURCESON BOTH SIDES MAINTAINED THAT THERE WASNO ROOMAT THIS EARLY STAGE FOR DESPONDENCY. THE VERY FACT THAT ACTION HAD BEEN JOINED, WITH SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AT LAST Blil3:tJN, SEEMEDTO BUOY ALL PARTICIPANTS WITH A SENSE OF SATISFACTION. PARA THE PROBLEMOF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN NORTHERNSINAI COULD P~OBABLY BE SoLVED WERE IT NOT FOR ISRAEL'S INSISTENCE ON HAVING ZAHAL DEFEND THEM, A WELL-PLACED EGYPTIAN SOURCETOLD THE POST YESTERDAY. BUT THE DEMANDFOR AN ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA MADE A SUBQUOTEMOCKERY UNSUBQUOTE OF ISRAEL'S ASSERTION THAT IT RECOGNIZED EGYPT'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PENINSULA AND WISHED ro ESTABLISH NORMALIZED RELATIONS 2NTHAT BASIS. PARA THE EGYPTIAN SOURCE INDICATED THATTHE f>ALES,INIAN PROBLEM• SPECIFICALLY ISRAEL'S REJECTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION EVEN AS A LONG•TERM PROSPECT • WAS SEEN IN CAIRO AS A MUCH TOUGHER HURDLE TO OVERCOMETHAN THAT OF THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS. PARA EVEN IF THE IDEA Or A LAND-SWAP IN SINAI, WHICH HAS BEEN SPORADICALLY FLOATED IN RECENT DAYS CAME TO NOTHING, THE EGYPTIAN SOURCESAW, THE SETTLEMENTSPROBLEM THERE COULD BE SOLVED SOMEHOW• PROVIDED THE SUBQUOTEPRINCIPLE UNSUBQUOTEOF WITHDRAWALWERE AGREED UPON. UNQUOTEPARA QUOTE HIGH UUSS SOURCESCAUTIONED, HOWEVER, AGAINST EGPECTING INSTANT AND DECISIVE AMERICANINTERVENTION. SECRETARY VANCE DID NOT FEEL, THEY SAID, THAT HE MUST PRODUCEA BREAKTHROUGH BEFORE LEAVINGTHE TALKS AT THE WEEICEND.HE AND HIS TOP ADVISERS ------ffi:.-iIS AND ENABLE THEMTO PARTICIPATEIN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE. UNQUOTE?ARA QUOTE IF THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE 0 0 ~:~t~'i:~¥g~A~yofuHfHt~gs:~~TJ~:iRlA~f~I~g \:iKf~}pIr~ugrMsl,HEM WITHPRESIDENT SADAT. UNQUOTE THE THIRD ARTICLEHEADED ~~~~~JmE!QEi:T-S- -QJl(l.TE,,21?,ES,J;DRNZ, C:Aiii.ti'Jl....- ___ ;,;.! DAIDON JANUARY 4 IN ASWAN THAT THE SOLl:ITIOW SUBQUO'f.EMUST . . RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLEAND ENABJ..ETHE PALESTINIANS, TO PARTICIPATE IN,_THE DETERMUIAT!ON OF THEIR OWN FUTURE. UNSUBQUOTEIT IS THIS KEY.PHRASEOF GRANTIWG THE PALESTINIAN ARABS THE RIGHT TO SUBQUOTEPARTICIPATE IN THE, DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN FUTURE UNSUBQUOTEWHICH MAY IN SOME REWORDEDFORN BECOME ACCEPTABLETO ISRAEL AS PART OF' THE REVlEW AFTER FIVE YEARS WHICH IS FORESEEN IN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN•s SELF-RULE PLAN FOR JUDEA. SAMARIAAND THE GAZA SliRIP. rnis '.f'HRASE. WHICH UUSS SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE MENTIONED YESTERDAY · COULD AT THE SAMETIME SATISFY EGYPT•s DEMAND FOR GRANT! NG SELF-· DETERNINATION, PARA AS THERE IS AGREEMENTIN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL THAT A TRANSITION PERI-°D rs NEEDED TO FORM A MODERATEPALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE WESTBAWK AND THE GjlZA $TRIP, A MOREOPEN-ENDED INTERPRETATION OF ISRAEL'S SEL.F-RUL.E PLAN MAY Ul TURN BE ACCEPTABLE 1'0 EGYPT• PRESIDENT SADAT HAS GONE ON RECORD .. 4

PARA A PEACE SETTLEMENT, HE SAID, SUBQUOTECAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ..( BY CONCESSION,COMPROMISE~ AND MUTU L AGREEMENT. ANY ATTEMPT TO J SOLVEOUR PROBLEMS AND DIFFERENCES BY ULTIMATUMS WOULDMISS THE i ,WHO.LEPOINT, DESTROY THE VERY PURPOSE OF THE PEACE TALKS. UNSUBQUOTE·· PARA · Ml:!ASUREDBY THE STANDARDS PROPOSEDBY MR. DAYAN, THE t,Or,'\-t''f:!i~ ... ,._ J,T T~•-•,,..,l,.t ,.._ ..... ,...... _..,. • - - ..., -- -- • ------•- l'tl!.l"'UHU, ©U!J"!J;; l''JR. l:JEUN P'JADE REFKRENCETO THE SUBSTANCEOF THE DIFFERENCES, NOTING THAT PEACE COULD NOT BE REACHEDSHOULD ISRAEL REsTORE THE SUBQUOTEFRAGILE .MID AGSRESSION-PROVOKINGBORDERS UNSIJBQUOTEOF 1967. HE ALSO WARNEDTHAT THE PRINCIPLE OF SEI..F.,. DETERMUlA!IONSHOULD NOT BE APPLIEil IN THE MAli!NEFi:'OF THE 1930'$ THAT LED TO WORLDWAR HJO. UNQUOTE' THESFitH ARTICLE HEADED NO ULTIMATUMSFROM E!THER SIDE - DAYANREPORTS QUOTE FORE:IGNMINISTER MOSHEDAYAN YESTERDAY TOLD NEWSMENCOVE.RING THE JERUSALEM ...· POLITICAL COMMITTEETALKS THATISRAEL WAS READY SUBQUOTETO LISTEN TO, TO DISCUSS, TO NEGOTIATEANY PROPOSALtJlllSUBQOOTE PUT FORWARD BY THE OTHER PART!li:S. IT DOES NO! REGARDITS· OWNIDEAS AS Ali! l!.TINATUM, AND SIMILARLY IT WILL NOT ACCEPT UI.TIMATUMSFROM EGYPT COUCHEDIN SUBQUOTETAKE--IT•OR•LEAVE-Il' UNSt!BQUOTETERMS, HE SAID. THE SIXTH ARTICLE HEADED WEIZ!ilANTO DISCUSS EXCHANGE OF TERRITORY REPORTS QUOTE DEFENCE MINISTER EZER WEIZMANIN ALL flROBABILlTY WILL DEAL WITH A CONCRETEPROPOSAL FOR Ml EXCHANGEOF TERRITORYBETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT WHENHE ARRIVES HERE TOMORROWFOR THE RESUMPT-ION OF THE ISRAEL-EGYPT MILITARY COMMITTEE TALKS. PARA THE DEFENCE MINISTERWILL ALSO PROBABLY INFORMHIS EGYPTIANCOUNTERPART, GEN. TAHAMAGDOUB, THAT IF EGYPT IS PREPARED TO EXCHANGETERRITORY, ISRAEL WILL CONSIDERGIVING UP ITS SETTLEMENTSALONG THE RED SEA COAST,INCLUDING SHARMEL SHEIKH. NOOii'F,'!CI/\1. CONFIRMATION COULDBE RECEIVEDHERE OF THIS PROPOSALYESTERDAY, BUT. IT WAS INDICATED TO THE JERUSALEMPOST THAT THE REPORT WASACCURATE. UNQUOTEFINALLY, THE EDITORIAL HEADEDBRIDGING THEGULF REPORTS QUOTETHE OPENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE'~ DELIBERATIONS IN JERUSALEMYESTERDAY PROMPTSA WHOLEHEARTEDENDORSEMENT OF THE SENTIMENTS AIRED IN HIS .WELCONUGADDRESS BY FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN. PARA A PEACE SETTLEMENT, HE SAID, SUIBQUOTECAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED ;_ BY CONCESSION, COMPROMISE, AND MUTU.L AGREEMENT• ANY ATTEMPT TO j SOLVE OUR PROBLEMSAND DIFFERENCES BY ULTIMATUMSWOULD MISS TliE / 'i .WHOl.EPOINT, DESTROY THE VERY PURPOSEOF THE PEACE TALKS. UNSUBQUOTE- PARA ·· MEASUREDBY THE STANDARDS PROPOSEDBY MR. DAYAN, THE EGYPTIANVISION OF lHE ROADTO PEACE, AS SET FORTH BY FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL, wAS SORELY LACKING IN PROMISE. IT REPRESENTED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME OLD ULT!MATIVE APPROACHTHAT HAD BLOCKED PROGRESSTHROUGH NEGOTIATION Hl THE PAST• IT SUl.40ESTEDNO FORWARD MOVEMENTIN EGYPTIAN THINKING SINCE PRESIDENT SADAT*SVISIT TO .JERUSALEMLAST NOVEMBER. UNQI.O.TEPARA QUOTEPLAINLY, IF THE JERllSALliM TALKS •·THE MAIN PRESENT FORUM OF THE CAIRO PEACE CONFERENCE•ARE NOT TO BREAK DOWNIN FRUSTRATION, AND TRAGEDY, TO THE DELIGHTOF ALL SUBQUOTEREJECTIONISTS, UNSUBQUOTEEGYPT· AND ISRAEL MUST AT ONCE GET DOWNTO THE BUSINESS OF A TRUE GIVE•AND•TAKE. TO START SUCHA PROCESS, THE EGYPTIAN SIDE MUSTOVERCOME A ' POWE:RFULMENTAL BLICK. BUT !H!i: ISRAEL SIDE, TOO, MIJSTQRAPPL"E ; --iti~SME-"r'0ftM-WirBi:.£•--£H·F-Fi-s¼:IY'-!ES--OP:--l-'.f6.OWN-.-MAn~s. lM,2A .£1.00I..'f-~ ENOUGH,EGYPT'S VERYINTRANSIGENCE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED TO JUSTIFY A TOUGH ATTITUDE ON ISRAEL•s PART. THE ENTIRE,,~@\'T!ONALEOF MR. BEGIN'S AUTOl~OMYPLAN ... APART FROMTHE Cl.AIM OF AN HISTORIC RIGHT .. HASBEEN lill:.YPT'S, AND JORDAN'S, OSDURATEREFUSAL TO CONSIDER A TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. UNQUOTEPARA QUOTEWE MUST NOT,HOWEVER, RUSH TO JUDGMENT.THE PARLEY HAS JUST STARTED, AND THE PARTIES, ACCOMPAINEDB'l THE UUSS AS A POTENTIAL MEDIATOR, ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO GET DOWNTO BRASS TACKS. THE FIRST REPORTS GIVE REASONTO BELIEVE THAT THEGULF MAYYET BE BRIDGED. UNQUOTE. COLCKO :t.01191001 .- .. ------,c..- ,--- .- - ·- .-.;--- •• -

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t9 INFO FERNANDEZFROM SHOLH

AMERICANPROPOSALS - EGYPTIAN DELEGATION FLIES TO JERUSALEM~

V.ANCESTAKES PART fN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE.. - SADATWILL HAVE TALKS WITH VANCETHURSDAY MORNJNGij .... _ El..GAMASSVSAYS: CONTACTSARE UNDERWAYFOR A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTIONOF THE

MIL iTARY COMMITTEESTOPPARA FEATURHJG THE :STORY, ALAHRAMSAYS

THAT GRAVE DEVaOPMENTS TOOK PLACE f N PAST 2l} HOURSTHAT WERE ABOIJTTO BRING TALKS BETWEENEGYPT At~D ISRAEL TO A STANDSTILL

AS A RESULT OF Dt FFERENCESt N VIEWS CONCERNi NG AGENDAOF POL! •H TICAl COMMITTEE. COMMITTEEMEETING WASPOS1'PONED Till TUESDAY P.ENDlNGARRIVAL OF VANCE,,.ACCORDING TO ALAr!RAM, URGENTAND HJTENSJVECONTACTS WERE HELD ALL NIGHT SATURDAY, SADAT FOLLOWED ·rHESE CONTACTSMINUTE BY MHJUTE AND GAVE HIS DIRECTIVES AT ONCE,. UNI STATES INTERVENEDAND SUBMITTED A DRAFT AGENDATHAT WA,SCOMMUNICATED TO SADAT. THE AMERJGANDRA.FT AGENDA WAS APP.ROV­

ED BY SADAT AND WAS REJECTED BY !SRA.Et.. PAPER SAYS THAT fSR.~Et RETRACTEDA11.AST MI NUTE AFTER VANCE DEClA~E]) HIS DEC!S ION TO POSTPONEHt S DEPARTUREFOR JERUSALEMAND PROPOSEDAMENDMENTS TC>THE AMERICANDRAFT AGENDA.. fSRAat CABINETHELD AN EMERG­ ENCY M£ETHIG AND APPROVEDOF THE AMENDMENTSTHAT WAS COMMUNl·­

ClffED TO Cid RO THROUCI,.,rlER I CAN AMBASSADORIN i SRAE:l..,SADAT, -~----•-~•--~-••=ti-•--o~•~•'"' ----•·•"•-··••..··-'"··~---··-----L-- ... · -·--···· ···--••- ·· •••--·------THEN, DECIDED TO PUT WHOLE ISSUE WITH ALL ITS DIMENSIONS BEFORE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT SUITABLE

DEC!SION BEFORE DEPARTUREOF EGYPTI AN DaEGATION FOR JERU= SALEM., ALGOMHOURIAREPORTER LEARNS THAT AMERICANPROPOSAL THAT

WAS APPROVEDBY EGYPT INCLUDES THE FOLLOWINGPOINTS., AAA A

SET OF BASIC PRINCIPLES .. BBB NATUREOF PEACE,. CCC WESTBANKAND

GAZA.. DDD TERMINATION OF OCCUPATION~EEE IMPLEMENTATIONOF SECCOUNCILRESOLUTION 242a IT IS LEARNTAS Wal THATSADATS DIRECTIVES TO FOREMINISTER, IBRAHIM f

TO AVOID PROCEDURALCOMPLICATIONS SO THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE

A REASONTO DaAY PEACE TALl

IN AN INTERVIEW WITH WEEKLY "OCTOBER" MAGAZINEm IN HIS STATEM••

MENTS., SADAT SUNDAYSAID HE NO LONGER HAS ANY HOPE THAT NEGO­

TIATIONS INITIATED WITH BEIGIN WILL RESULT IN A JOINT DECLA­

RATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR A MIDEAST PEACE. EGYPT., HE ADDED WILL THEREFOREADOPT A DIFFERENT STRATEGY,. SADAT SAID THAT HE HAD ()FFERED SECURITY AND LEGITIMACY TO ISRAa, AND RECEIVED NOTHING JN COMPENSATION,.n; STRETCHEDOUT MY HANDS AND MY INTENTIONS WEREHONORABGE. 11' SEEMSTHAT ISRAH.IS WANTTO TAKE WITHOUT GIVJNGH., SADAT Al.SO SAID THAT ISRt,El WILL REGRETTHAT IT HAS

OPENED ' S NEW CHANNELSOF HATREDNBITTERNESS AND FANATICISM

At~AH\JSTITSB..F" STOPPARAALAHRAMS EDITORIAL UNDERLINES IMPOR­

TANCE OF MEETINGS OF EGYPTI AN-i SRAE-1.1POL IT i CAL COMMITTEEAND SAYS THAT ISRAa WILL JBERESPONSIBLE IF PEACE TALKS FAIL AS EGYPT DID HER BEST TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTSTOP END (OMNJPRESSCAIRO) COL CKD

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ZCZ.CDAL.0835 I SM163 SP NYI( ~CAIRO (UNiC) 500 14 1121 PRESS ~N iP RESS NEWVORi(,,

15 UffO FERNANDEZFROM SHOUKRY., CA t HO DAfl I ES SAT'tlRDAY REPORT ON FRONTPAGES STATEMENTS BY UN SPOKESMANTO EFFECTTHAT SECGEN \JJ/.iLDtlEJMU~STRUC1'ED GEN SI tLASVUO TO FOLLO\tiPROCEEDlNGS Of EGYPTI.AN/lSRAal POLITICAL COMMITTEEIN JERUSt\LEMAND TO RECEIVE !NFORMAT!ONFROM PARTIES CONCERNINGTHE NEGOTIATIONSPARTICULAR't.Y

WITH REGARDTO ANY MATTERS DIRECTLY AFFECT!NG llNAT IONS STOPPARA IN A s·ti~TEMENTTO WEEKLYAKHBAR ELYOM, FOl:i:EM!NISTERtBRAHIM i{AMEL SAiD THAT TALKS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEEWOULD NOT BE EASY., BUT EGYPTWOULD EXPLAIN lTS VIEW f'OINT AND WOULD !NS! ST ON COMPREHENSIVESETTLEMENT CONCENTRATING ON TOTAL. ISRAa . .~J \rdTHDHAWALFROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITOHY AND RIGHT OF ,_ ScLF,·-DETERM I NAT I ON TO PALESi' IN i AN PEOPLE111 DEALHilG WtTH MEETINGS OF MlLIT/.\RY COMMITTEE.,!{AMEL SAID THAT THERE WAS FULL COORD-

•=• !NAT!ON BETWEENPOLITICAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEESAND THAT SUC!-lCOORDINATION WILL CONTINUE THROUflH MEETINGS OF THE TWO C:OMM!TTEESSTOPPARA FRONTPAGE PROMINENCE GIVE~i BY ALL PAPERS TO F;f:SULTSOF MEETINGSOF MILI.TARY COMMITTEEAND STATEMENTSBY ELGAMJ~SSVAf~D WEIZMANN.,ACCORDING TO a_GAMASSY, NO SPE-CiFIC l)EClSIONS-\\!EREREACHED DURING 148-HOURMEETINGS OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE,DUE TO AGREEMENTON SOMEPl1INCIPLES AtiD DIFFERENCE O~JOTHER·S., ELGAMASSY 'E~PLAI NED THAT SUBJECTSDi SCUSSEDBY THE

COMMITTEEARE CLOSa Y RELATEDTHOSE TOBE DISCUSSEDBY POLIT IC\~­ COMMJTTEE, AS BOTH COMMITTEESAIM AT REN_ISIN~; SAMEOBJECTIVES.,,

HE \\1AS ALSO QUOTEDAS SAYING THAT THE COMMITTEEHAS DI $CUSSED T\tJOMA~W:R TOPICS, ISFlA!:l.l WITHDRAWALFROM SINAI , AND MUTUI\L

SECUliI TY MEASURESF0f1 BOTH EGYPT AND I mtAELo 1"Hf~SEl SSUES, HE f,,DDED, NEED ( LONG AND DETAJLED DISCUSSilONSDUE TO THEIR COMPLEXITYAND THEIR BEING JNTERWOVEflliNORDER TO REACHAN AGRE£M1-:NT).. HE FURTHER SAID in~T EGYPTIAN SIDE,, DURING 1"ALl

BY ELGAMASSYINCLUDE ESTABLISHMENTOF DEMILITARISED ZONES

ON BORDERS, ACCORDI NG TO SECCOUNCIL RESOL UT I ON 242.. STOPPARA

BEFORELEAVING CAIRO TO JERUSALEM, WEIZMANNWAS QUOTEDAS SAYING THAT NEGOTIATIONSBY THE TWO SIDES HAVE ACHIEVED A TANGIBLE PROGRESS, BUT ST ILL THERE WERE DIFFERENCES STOPPARA BANNERL INES OF CAl RO DAIL I ES REPORTSADATS STATEMENTSTO EFFECT THAT ISRAEL \/JILL UNJlERMINEPEACE INITIATIVE IF SHE DID NOT WITHDRAWFROM

SINAI AND \f.JESTBANKmIN THE FIRST INTERVIEW GIVEN Tt) AN ISRAELI

PAPER, SADAT SAID THAT THE NEW SPIRtT SPARKEDOFF BY HIS PEACE INITIATIVE HAS NOT SOFARTOUCHED MENTALITY OF !SRAal

STATESMAN..AL AH RAM HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOWINGSIX POI NTS DEFI NED BY SADAT IN CONNECTIONWITH SECURITY IN SINAI: AAA ESTABLtSHMENT OF

DEMIL JTAR I ZED ZONES ON BOTH SI DES BBB Es·rABL I SHMENTOF EARLY ~I/ARN1NGSTATIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF BORDERSAND THE MANNINGOF THESE STA,TJONSBY A THIRD PARTY. CCC ESTABLISHMENTOF AREAS IN WHJCH KINDS OF ARMS ARE TOBE DETERMINED. DDD STATIONING OF UNATIONS FORCEStill tt(, Bei~r~ $aiP9f.ii\~Q~iit[fi., EEE INCLUSION OF A PROV!S!ON IN PEACE AGREEMENTSSTIPULA1"IN13 THE AQABA STRAIT IS AN INTERNATIONALWATERWAY .. FFF ESTABLISHMENTOF A PERMANENT

EGYPTIAN-ISRAal MILITARY COMMITTEETO MEET REGULARLY IN AL.~~ARISH ' '•

f.11NDBEER SHEBA STOPPARASPEAKING AT A PRESS CONFERENCEFOLLOWING

TALKS WITH CALLAGHAN, WHOSTOPPED OVEH IN ASWANFOR FOUR HOURS,

SADAT SAID THAT MIDEAST IS PASSING THROUGHA CRUCIAL STAGE OVER

QUESTION OF iSRAELl SETTLEMENT IN OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND OPPOSITION TO saF-DETERMINATION FOR PALESTINIANS~ ll\lOTHER PRESS CONFEHENCEBEFORE LEAVING ASWAN, CALLAGHANSAID THAT ISRAEL IS ., REQUI HED TO MAKE DECISIVE DEC!SIONS .. tiE ADDEDTHAT HE f S

CONVi NCED THAT THERE IS A REAL CHANCEFOR PEACE AND IT IS THE

DUTY OF ALL WHOARE CONCERNEDNOT TO WASTETH IS CHANCE.. HE AFFIRMED THAT H l S COUNTRYS POL I CY WITH REGARDTO MIDEAST Wl LL REMAIN UNCHANGED.,ANY SETTLEMENTMUST BE BASEDONSEGCOUNCIL RESOLUTIONS242 AND 33 STOPPARAiil.AHRAM SAYS IN ITS EDITORIAL

THAT NOWTHAT EGYPT HAS VERY CLEARLY DEFINED HER POSITION, IT IS

UP TO BElGlN TO PICK HIS CHOICE: EITHER JUST PEACE FOR ALL OR A

RETURN TO ERiNl< OF :bANG~RFOR ENTIRE MIDEAST AREA STOPEND {OMN!W>.RESSCAIRO) United Nations, New York

SG/SM/2529 13 January 19'78

•----.--•-••----•••--•n••• .... •••• ...... ,u ...... n••••••o•o•n•••n•uoo, ...... _. .. ,._ ...... _...... •nNa•u••I-U~ .... • .. •- ..-••••n-••••

STATEMENTBY UNITEDNATIONS SPOKESMAN R.-SG.A.F.DTilG POLITICAL COMtvuTTEE IN ,JERU81.f,_R~

The Secretary-General is continuing to follow with the closest interest current efforts to achieve progress towards a solution in the Middle East.

It will be recalled that the Secretary-GenerB,l designated Lt. General Ensio Siilasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of United Nations Peace-keeping Operations in the Middle East, to be present at the Cairo plenary meeting in preparation for the Geneva Conference so as to keep him informed of current developments in Middle East negotiations.

The Cairo conference has now split up into two working committees, one in Jerusalem and one in Cairo. The Secretary-General has been invited either to attend or to send a representative to the political committee in Jerusalem. The Secretary-General will not himself be present at this meeting.

Taking into account these new working arrangements, and having in mind the existir1g involvement of the United Nations in peace-keeping in the Middle East, the Secretary-General will instruct General Siilasvuo, whose headquarters is in Government House, Jerusalem, to follow the proceedings of the political committee. For this purpose General Siilasvuo will be instructed to receive information from the parties concerning the negotiations, and particularly with regard to any matters directly affecting the United Nations. He will be instructed to transmit relevant information to the Secretary-General so that he in turn may keep the compe-tent organs of the United Nations informed as appropriate.

._ ... - ...... •••••• ...... •u•n••••u ...... •••••u• ...... ••••• ...... , ...... u• .. ••••• .. ,n ...... _ I For information media - not an official mcord / ,,__,/:/ ,...- ·.' - / ~ r '! .,.... ✓- ·::./l ,,,,:;:,,,-,_ ( C( II ~f 5 L---ct. ·/,I/ ;·., - / /~ ;·· /. :~ ~ ...:!/.' "'·(.~ ,' {;, '··~{

Meeting in Teheran with the Shahnshah Aryamehr On Thursday, 12 January 1978, at 12 noon

Present: His Imperia1 Majesty the Shahnshah Aryamehr Foreign Minister Abbas Ali Khalatbary The Secretary-General Mr. Brian Urquhart

The Secretary-General explained his views concerning the current situation in the Middle East and, in particular, the question of United Nations participation in the Jerusalem meeting of the Political Committee. The Shah said that Iran had traditionally always helped the Israelis. He agreed that an independent Palestinian state would be a threat not only to Israel but also to all moderate Arab governments. Such a state could only go to the extreme left. The PLO was now strongly attacking him. He did, however, recognize the right of the Palestinians to choose the fonn of their future administration, but any such entity should be linked to Jordan. Israel should give back the West Bank to Jordan in accordance with Resolution 242, and King Hussein would know what to do with it. This would be with the understanding of Iran, Israel and President Sadat. The West Bank should have links with Jordan and Gaza and should be demilitarized. There should be some rectifications of the border. The defence and foreign relations of the West Bank would be the responsibility of Jordan. The Shah felt that the current behaviour of Israel was ridiculous. Especially the policy on settlements was dangerous and unacceptable to any sovereign state. If the Israelis persisted in this policy, Sadat would go back to the hard Arab line, or else resign or be overthrown. At the present moment the Arabs were making all the concessions and the Israelis none. He backed Sadat 100% and admired his courage. The first country to be threatened by an independent Palestine would be Saudi Arabia. He had therefore tried to rally Saudi Arabia in support of Sadat. Israel must be more forthcoming or they would be directly responsible for restoring the Soviet influence in the Middle East. - 2 -

The Secretary-General said he thought it was a mistake to hold the Political Committee in Jerusalem. He had the highest regard for President Sadat's initiative, but felt that the follow­ up had been too hurried and unprepared. If more time had been taken, it might have been possible to include Jordan in the ,- negotiations. The Shah said that Hussein could not possibly accept the Israeli plan for the West Bank. ~twas essential to bring all P?Ssible pressure to bear on Israel. The United States had asked Iran to influence Israel, but it was the United States which was giving Israel money and arms)and the Jewish lobby was very powerful in influencing U.S. policy. The Secretary-General explained that he had sent General Siilasvuo to the Cairo meeting without any authorization from the Security Council and that the USSR, Syria and the PLO had all objected. He had done this in order to help Sadat. He had also suggested a follow-up meeting at United Nations Headquarters of all those invited to the Cairo meeting originally as a sort of safety net. Jordan had immediately accepted this arrangement but Israel had refused it. The question of United Nations participation was even more difficult in the Political Committee to be held in Jerusalem 1and the objections were likely to be much stronger. The Shah suggested that the same arrangement should be made as in Cairo. It was important to keep the United Nations umbrella and to emphasize Resolution 242. It was not necessary to worry about the USSR and Syria. The joining together of the Syrian and Iraqi Baath would represent the greatest possible danger for the entire region. The Secretary-General said that he had seen Boumedienne for three hours just before Christmas and that he was in a highly emotional state about the Western Sahara, which he regarded as a personal challenge. The Shah said that the Cubans and the Vietnamese were organisin the Polisario. - 3 -

The Secretary-General said that Boumedienne was anxious to remain non-aligned. The Shah said Algeria had no claim on the Western Sahara but-merely wanted to establish one in order to create a link between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Secretary-General explained that Boumedienne felt that the 75,000 Saharouis must be given self-determination. Foreign Minister Khalatbary said they had received a message from Algeria about improving relations with France. The Secretary-General said he had·been asked to help in a similar way. The Shah, referring to self-determination, said Algeria defended the United Nations Charter only when it suited it. The Secretary-General asked for clarifications about King Hussein's views on the Middle East. The Shah said that King Hussein felt that since the Rabat decision he had no responsibility for the Palestinian issue, but he was sure that the responsibility would eventually return to King Hussein. It was essential to do something about the Holy Places. It was the time now to make peace and for Israel to become responsible. The Secretary-General referred to his talks on Cyprus in Ankara. The Shah said the Turks had asked Iran to ask the Secretary­ General to insist that the Greeks were not too demanding. If the Turks made a realistic offer, Iran would be their champion with the United States. Iran supported Turkey as a neighbour because if Turkey disintegrated and went left it would be a very serious matter for Iran." The North-South dialoguEt°'\~ discussed and the Shah said that he had written a book ....e ng with this among other ..'t)t~Jt\'i~~}\t~~ matters, which would be publisheii.'"'"~6~~'t26 January. He had included '' ;;~,,:~~t~":'\: quotations from some of the Secretary-General's speeches in this book. Iran would be a part of the North in the North-South dialogue, but would reflect the views of the Third World. He was proposing a new organization consisting of twelve members of

OPEC, twelve arlvanced countries and twelve developing countries. The Secretar,1-General appreciates the message from the Soviet Governmenttransmitted to him on 30 December1977 bv ..Ambassador Trcyanouaky. He fully underetands the prmmcupation

~ the Governmentof tha USSRin this important matter.

,:·i ,- : .._;,,,, . -,... -. - Since that time the Secretary-General has received .1nv1tatirJns from the Gove~a or Egypt and Isnml to bra ·_. . present at the meeting which is to take place on 16 January

that he has no mandate to participate in auch a meeting and · no substantive role to play in it •

.". The Secretary-Gsnersl was subsequently invited to send a representative to participate in this tneating. ln the present cin:umstancee the Saeretary-G~nera! has also declined -.L:;· -. ,. this invitation. However, attff serious ccmsidsration of' ~~$!"""i!<"[1°i'1?•J~t.\A~·,.', .,,"':¥ - ...... 1 ...... all thv factors inWlved, including the fact that the Middle ·. ·. Eeat situation 1s an important item on the agenda of the · ~. · ,~ ~:..~ ~ -._·_-.. . --~+~~i)~f~·. •... . '; 1 · • ·.v. )-·' Security .Council end that the Cc~l is deeply involved in

..~ ~-~ ...~ e East, the Sears:tary­ for him, and for o$ 'i.-'-,;:•;'f:;t the Members of the Secu,:1 ----~,,- .the developments s~ the ·'i,ro~ ingj which,\,Jhatever the

•• : " • ' • ;> • .. • •• • •·. < • • ' ·~ ,' 1 ~ ·."!/~:·. .: ~ . . ..- . . '.,._. , ":result, has ·a bearing on t11e··mt1dleEast aituaticm. -.· • :f';• .. _, .. ''t · He has therefore decided to instruct General Siilasvuo, the Chief Co-ordinator of UNPeace-keeping Operations in the Middle East, whose Headquarters is in Government House, Jerusalem, to follow the pro~eedinga and to receive information from the parties concerning the negotia,tions, particularly :'i:~~:<...~,,,,,·:.:,~,ii,;t.-7\.1:;:r:/se_''.lt. with regard to any matters directly affecting the United Nations. · Such information will be transmitted to the Secretary-General so that ha may keep the appropriate organs of the United Nations, .. and especially the members of the Security Council, informed.

'. ".,,t_•~~ • ~··, ... .i . '

·,. 12 January 1978

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20 December1 1977 b.f.cc: Mr.RAf Guyer Mr Urquhart tii-- MIDDLE EAST ..'.-<~\1'\,.,

NOTES ON A MEETINGHELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON 20 DECEMBER1977. AT 10.30 A.M.

Present: Ambassador o. A. Troyanovsky One Aide The Secretary-General Mr. A. Rohan

The Secretary-General told Ambassador Troyanovsky that he wanted to inform him of the developments at the Cairo Meeting and showed 'him the latest cables from General Siilasvuo. '.rhe Secretary-General pointed out that a breakthrough could obviously not be achieved by the "technicians" present at Cairo, and that everybody was now awaiting the results of the Begin-Sadat meeting. There was a clear difference of approach of the two parties. While Israel wanted to negotiate a peace treaty, Egypt was txying to establish a set of principles concerning withdrawal/ · creation of a Palestinian State and the nature of peac~. There was an astonishing display of optimism in the media which did not seem to be justified ~y reality. The Secretary-General then informed the Ambassador of his meeting with Prime Minister Begin • . Ambassador Troyanovsky pointed out that his Government was sceptical and critical of th~ recent developments which had only resulted in a division of the Arab World and in new obstacles on the road to Geneva. A.Rohan/'( CONFIDENTIAL

Meetinq at the Waldorf Astoria at 5.45 p.m. on Monday, 19 December 1977

Present: Prime Minister Begin Ambassador Dimitz Ambassador Herzog Ambassador Eliav ~r. Yehuda Avner, Adviser

The Secretary-General Mr. Guyer Mr . Urquhart ·

Mr. Beqin said that he felt there was a real chance for peace. He hoped that Jordan and later Syria would join in the negotiations. He was encouraged that Syria seemd to be keeping the door open but it might take a few months. ·He had excellent personal relations with President Sadat, whose visit to and reception in Israel were unprecedented. It was important not to lose time and to speak of the great problems concerned in simple language. An estimated 250 million people had listened to the speeches in the Knesset and he had had a world-wide reaction to them, including an eloquent letter from Madame Chiang Kai-shek. The Secretary-General asked about the relationship between the Cairo Conference and the summit meeting in Ismailia. Mr. Beqin said the Cairo meeting would probably be up-graded to the Foreign Minister level after the summit. The Egyptian Acting Foreign Minister's invitation to Cairo had been confusing since he invited the Foreign-Ministers to send representatives to Cairo. Cairo was a success from a morale point of view since both sides were very friendly and talking in a serious manner, although there was a fundamental difference over the agenda. Israel could not discuss the Palestinian problem. This was a matter of terminology because the problem was the Palestinian Arabs. For this reason he was perturbed at the General Assembly action setting up a section in the Secretariat on Palestinian rights. , - s fnw mwmz•e 5¥:f&

- 2 -

As reqards the Jewish community in Syria, Israel was prepared to set free several hundred Syrian PLO prisoners in exchanqe for the Syrian Jews. He had asked General Siilasvuo to take up this matter and he hoped the Secretary-General would also do the same~ It was a question of 800 families or approximately 3,500 people. Canada, France, the U.S. and other countries would be prepared to accept them if the Syrians did not want them to go to Israel. He was surprised at President Assad's intransigence in this matter. Even the Iraqis had been more flexible. Secretary of State Vance was also taking the matter up. It need not be a simple exchange and, if necessary, the prisoners could be released first and the Syrian Jews allowed to leave later. The Secretary-General asked about Mr. Begin's peace proposals. Mr. Beqin said that he could only talk of them in confidence since he wanted President Sadat to hear them directly from him first. The first proposal basically was a bilateral one to re-establish Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai. This would include a United Nations force in Sharm el Sheikh which could be removed only by unanimous agreement of the Security Council or with the agreement of both parties. The second proposal was for home rule or self rule or administrative autonomy for Judea, Samaria and Gaza, an arrangement under which the population would elect their own representatives to conduct their own affairs. The Secretary-General mentioned the successful solution of the South Tyrolean question by giving the South Tyroleans complete autonomy within the framework of the Italian state. Mr. Begin showed great interest in this precedent and asked for all the relevant documents. The Secretary-General mentioned his suggestion of a follow-up meeting to Cairo. Mr. Beqin said that Israel had objected to this being suggested as a fait accompli and urged that in the future such suggestions should be the subject of consultation before being published. - 3 -

The Secretary-General asked what Mr. Begin envisaged after Cairo. Mr. Begin replied that he foresaw a series of negotiations culminating in the signing of a comprehensive settlement in Geneva. Israel was definitely not aiming at a separate treaty with Egypt although, as a practical matter of timing, the negotiations would take place in stages like the Armistice Agreements in 1949. Israel wanted a comprehensive settlement with all her neighbours. It would, for example, be possible to sign an agreement with Lebanon that very day were it not under Syrian occupation. The important thing was to start negotiating. He asked the Secretary-General to try to convince the General Assembly not to adopt irrelevant resolutions such as the one requiring the return of refugees to their camps in Gaza when they were much better housed elsewhere. The Secretary-General pointed out that his reports on this matter had reflected clearly the actual situation and the position of Israel. As regards the resolutions of the Assembly, he felt that substantial progress towards peace would fundamentally change the situation. Mr. Begin asked that complete confidentiality be maintained on his proposals. He asked about the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The Secretary-General said that one or two heads of state and government and a number of foreign ministers would attend. Mr. Begin said that he would attend if invited. Office of Public Information Press Section ress elease United Nations7New Y or~t

Note No. 4106 14 December 1977

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

STATEMENTBY LT. GENERALENSIO SIILASVUO AT THE OPENING OF T"BE C.AIRO CONFERENCE

11I am honoured to be present at this Conference. My designation demonstrates the concern of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the problems of the Middle East and for all efforts which may contribute to this noble aim.

aThe United Nations has been deeply involved in the history of the Middle East for more than thirty years. Its involvement has included peace-keeping, peace-making, good offices and humanitarian tasks. Developments in the Middle East are of vital concern to virtually the entire membership. Although there may be differences on specific issues, there is general and heartfelt agreement on the ultimate objective, namely a just and lasting peace.

:JI shall follow with keen interest the deliberations of this meeting and shall keep the Secretary-General fully informed of developments. May I express my earnest hope that the efforts made here will achieve their aim of making progress towards the Geneva Peace Conference and a comprehensive settlement of the problem of the Middle East. u

* *** *

For information media - not an official record This letter was handed by Mr. Urquhart cc: SecGen✓· REG to Arnb. Herzog at 4.00 pm 14 Dec 77 BEU

BEU/MD 14 December 1977

My dear Prime Minister, I was glad to learn of your visit to·the United· States during w~ich you will ~pend some tiioo in New York. I am'fuliy··aware that your time is limited and that your programme·will certai~ly be extremely full. I would, however,·be most happy to have the opportunity to continue the exchanqe of views which we had during your last vasit, and which I recall with great pleasure. I therefore ask whether-you would be able to have ✓·- either luncheon or dinner with me when you are in New - - York. If, as I could well understand, that were not po~_gb..l.e=,-·I would be very happy to meet with you at any place convenient to you for ·a brief talk. Such a talk would provide a welcome opportunity to discuss the situation in the Middle East.in the light of the recent historic devel~pments. . \ 1 ,_ With wann.•personal. regards_ and good wishes, · Yours sincerely, ,.

Kurt Waldheim

His Excellency Mr. Menahem Begin Prime Minister of Israel

, ,;." • .....r,

14 December 1977

My dear Ambassador,

I shoula be most grateful if you would give the enclosed letter to Prime Minister Begin on his arrival in New York. I also enclose.a copy for your information.

Yours sincerely,

Kurt.Waldheim

His F.xcellency Mr. Chaim Herzog Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations

.- ..:~ . .. . - •-, . - ··_-~,.,._\_-~'..;._: ~~~~:·~~::.:~,i~~-~~w~~r1~~=~~"-~ 14 December 1977 ,.

AFTER CAIRO A TALK WI'I'H KURT WALDHEIM

As recently as early November, all taik of Mideast

peace negotiations centered on "going to Geneva" --

the UN-sponsored c?nference which is chaired by the US and

the Soviet Union. Then the entire diplowatic landscape

of the Mideast was changed by Egyptian Presid~nt Anwar

el-Sadat's journey to Jerusalem later that month and his

invitation to all parties to meet in Cairo in mid-December.

On the eve of this meeting, the Inter D~pendent interviewed

UN Secretary-G~neral Kurt Waldheim on the subject of the F . future course of Mideast peace \alks in the wake of Sadat's

. . dramatic moves •

Mr. Secretary-General, some feel that progress in Cairo

could eventually lead to peace through a series of bilateral

agreements between Israel and her neighbours. In your view,

is. this a ·,credible scenario ?

Let me first say that { consider the visit by

President Sadat to Jerusalem as an historic breakthrough

in the efforts to achieve peace,,(in. the Middle East.

It was a very bold, courageous initiative, and I hope that

~ • _' ·~ 0 ·.:~t~\,zit.t • it will contribute to paving ~he';':~~y for a settlement

a global settlement, a comprehensive settlement--

of the Middle East question. - 2 - , r Ji

Having said this, I think that we have to keep in mind

that the Geneva Conference still offers the best possibility

for a comprehensive settlement. You rightly said that

the conference in Cairo does not comprise all the parties.

It is a limited meeting. And therefore we have to be aware

of the fact that we will. need efforts beyond~airo t9 gGhieve

a comprehensive se~tlement.

We must recognize the need for par~icipation of all

the parties in the negotiating process. Therefore,

I attach greatrimportance to bringing those parties ... ~-

~ who have refused to go to Cairo back to the negotiati~g ✓ ~- table because I am convinced that only thro~gh_ a_ global

settlement, even if it is reached in stages, can lasting

peace be _achieved in the Middle East.

Would you say then that, in the wake of President Sadat's

~, we are closer to or further away from a comprehensive

settlement?

I think nobody can give you a clearcut answer to : - . "C:Ot'15;~i¾l~~- th is question, because we now r:~ye""to see what kind of result

<", ~ •. Cairo wiil produce. But let me say this. The visit of ·.:..,;~(~~:tJJJ:~;~ President Sadat in Jerusalem has certainly achieved an

enormous breakthrough psychologically. But, as far as

'•··-~--:~~-i~~~--~-;~,_i-: ... ~ , --~.:..._..~s...... ' . L r < - 3 -

substance is concerned, we have not seen until now

and I stress "until now 11 because I still hope that it will come -­

any rapprochement of the two positions. Both sides stick

to their well-known positions. Therefore we have to see

whether the futur~ negotiating process will bring us

• nearer to a settlement or not.

Will your -envoy to the Cairo meeting, General Siilasvuo,

be putting forth suggestions or prqposals on your behalf . or will he merely be there as an observ.er?

--..-

> ... Obviously, the UN is not a.party to the conflict;

""ttierefore his position, or his task, will be to closely follow

the negotiations between the two parties and report to me,

and to see in what way the United Nations can be helpful.

At your most recent press conference you suggested

that all parties might meE:t at UN headquarters to

to further preparations for Geneva. Since then, of course,

Egypt has severed relations,with five Arab nations and

tensions seem to be mounting between the two cochairmen of

the Geneva Conference, the US and., What is the

status of your proposal 'meeting ?

•J• .

. . ~. ·• ~ ...._ ·:-;:, t. '. '. '. C I • - 4 -

Well, let me first of all say that I did not make a

formal proposal but a suggestion to consider the possibility

of having a meeting in United Nations Headquarters or any

other place agreed by the p~rties so that all parties can

participate. I have made this suggestioB out of a deep

concern about the chances for maintaining the momentum and

. ~ continuing the ne~otiating process. I don't think that . . a partial solution can solve the prpblem. And it was in

the light of this very serious preoccupation I had that

I considered i~ my duty to offer to the parties, in an I ~ --... informal way, an idea ·how one could overcome possible difficulties

after Cairo. I did not say, let's replace Cairo by another

meeting here in New York, or in any other city agreed upon.

I said, after Cairo, as a sort of follow up, as a sort of

safety net ..•••

The general reaction was positive. As you know, practically all parties have reacted rather favourably to

the proposal, with the exception of Israel. Israel has

rejected the idea, saying they see no useful purpose in

having a meeting in New York; ···0 _the directly . ,.

I feel that one cannot go directly to Geneva. If it is

decided to continue in a bilateral way, this is another story.

That is then a new approach,_ giving up Geneva and saying,

well, we will do it bilaterally. Whether the other Arabs , . - 5 -

are ready to do this, I have my doubts. So if you want

to have a comprehensive settlement, if you want to go back

to Geneva, you'll need more preparations. My suggestion

has to be seen in that light.

Was the possible stumbling block to univ-ersal

participation in the meeting in New York that you suggested

the same as what faces the Geneva Conference itself; namely,

that Israel will not sit down at the same table with the PLO?

Was it not assumed by all parties that yours was a general

invitation that wou.ld.._have included the PLO ?

I do not, think that this tvas the stumbling block. I was i~d that the PLO was invited by President Sadat

to the conference in Cairo. And still, knowing this,

Israel accepted to go to Cairo. So I don't think that

this was the stumbling block. I rather feel that, the \, Israelis preferred a new approach. They say, we have now

direct negotiations, why should we go back to the previous

procedure?

You mentioned the psychological impact on the Israelis

of President Sadat's visit. There might well be a P.?YChological

problem in Israel's attitude toward the multilateral forum

that the UN provides, in the sense that some actions of the ...... --... ·. General Assembly -- most recently with the resolution asking " ,, ., .. - 6 -

that an information unit be set up within the Secretariat to

publicize the rights of the Palestinians are, in the words

of the Israeli Ambassador, an impairment of the UN's capacity

to act as an"honest broker" in the Middle East. Is there not

something that you might do to change that psychological factor

to assure Israelis of the neutrality of this •forum?.

First of all I wish to say that it is not up to the

Secretary-General to comment on decisions of the General Assembly.

This is an autonomous body composed of sovereign states and ·-,, it is not up to me,ta..cornment on decisions taken by that body.

.,.However, .. we have to take note of this new situation • Keeping in mind the principles of the Charter and the

existi~iutions, we should try to approach the problem

in a pragmatic way to overcome the distrust existing between

the parties and to achieve practical results.

You have asked me about what I could do. I think I have

given a good example -- I have shown my positive attitude

toward the new negotiating effort by sending General Siilasvuo to Cairo, and on the other hand, by indicating a procedure

which could help to achieve a comprehensive settlement.

4 So, in conclusion, you would not say that Geneva is

out of the picture? - 7 -

No, I would not say this, because I think it's still

the best forum for a comprehensive settlement. Of course,

it has to be well-prepared. I think we must know what we

are going to do in Geneva. Not only the procedural aspects

, will have to be clarified -·- who should go there, etc. --

but also substance; we must know what we are going to-discuss

in Geneva. So; my .approach is, whatever happens now in Cairo,

we have to think beyond that meeting and if we still want

a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question,

I think Geneva can help us, but only after' careful preparation. And that means' that ~t cannot take place this year; this is ....t.E:_chnically not feasible. In the new situation, it's evident that we have to wait for the outcome of the new developments

) and ori~- can we see whether and when a Geneva Conference

can take place.

And in the meantime, you are keepi~g alive y~ur suggestion

fur-an interim meeting in New York or in any other place

agreed upon by the parties .•••

Oh yes, by all means. It is on the table. And I hope it

can help the parties to agree on a settlement.

Do you think there would be any sense in having a

conference like that without the participation 0£ Israel? - 8 -

I don't think that that would solve the problem.

But I feel that this suggestion should be re-considered

in light of the outcome of the Cairo conference. Therefore

I am not pressing my ideas in any way now. I put these ideas to the parties so that they can study them and

I think after Cairo they,will have a new oppo~tunity to look for the follow-up procedure?. And in this regard my ideas may perhaps be of help.

. . Have you had any inkling at all from the Israelis that - they're willing to re-consider this option? -._

No I haven't. But I fully understand that they want to wait.-a1=ieF-~ree what Cairo will bring. Therefore I think the best now is to wait for Cairo and then we will see how the parties will react.

E N D 'iM C: - %-J"-t!l-~_,,.--;:_e,,v,.--,g:{ Office of Pub Uc Information Press Section ress elease United Nations, Nev\/ York

Note No~ 4106 14 December 1977

NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS

STATEMENTBY LT,, GENERALENSIO SIILASVUOAT THE OPENINGOF THE CAIROCONFERENCE

''I am honoured to be present at this Conference" My designation demonstrates the concern of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the problems of the Middle East and for all efforts which may contribute to this noble aim.

11The United Nations has been deeply involved in the history of the Middle East for more than thirty years. Its involvement has included peace-keeping, peace-making, good offices and humanitarian tasks. Developments in the Middle East are of vital concern to virtually the entire membership" Although there may be differences on specific issues, there is general and heartfelt agreement on the ultimate objective) namely a just and lasting peace.

:,tI shall follow with keen interest the deliberations of this meeting and shall keep the Secretary-General fully informed of developments. May I express my earnest hope that the efforts made here will achieve their aim of making progress towards the Geneva Peace Conference and a comprehensive settlement of the problem of the Middle East~ u

* *** *

For information media - not an official record Office of Public Information Press Section ress elease United Nations, New York

SG/SM/2520 13 Decanber 1977

-·--·- ..•·• .. •H· ...... ••·••·•• .. •l••••••••· ...... _U•• ...... U ...... - ......

STAT:EMENTBY SECRETARY-GENERALON CAIROMEETING

The following statement was made today by a United Nations spokesman:

Reports that Lt. General Siilasvuo vill act as Chairman of the forth­ coming meeting in Cairo are unfounded. It is correct, however, that such a possibility was raised, but this would not be in line with the function of Lt. General Siilasvuo who will be present at the Cairo Conference for the purpose of observing and keeping the Secretary-General informed of this meeting.

••H•••-•• ...... · u ...... ~ .. -•••• .... • .. ••• .... •• .. u•• .. ••• .. ••n•Hu•• .. •• ..••• ...... ••••uo••••• .. •• .. uu• .. • .. • .. n•••• .. ••••• ...... ••••••••• .. •• ..n•••••• .. •.. •n•••••• .. •• ...... ,,0, 0 ~n•nuoo•u•no•••••--••• For information media - not an official record Reports that Lt. General Siilasvuo will act as Chairman of the forthcoming meeting are unfounded. It is correct, however, that such a possibility was raised but this would 1 not be in line with the function of Gene~S~svuo who will be present at the Cairo Conference~ Nie~ of observing and keeping the Secretary-General informed of this meeting. I

J ~~ /~-~

1. The Secretary-General demonstrate~pport for the

Cairo Conference by designating General Siilasvuo to be

present. It is normal for the Secretary-General to designate

representatives in response to invitations from Governments.

2. The invitation for his representative to be Chairman

of the Cairo Conference raises serious legal difficulties. ' T,.,..~=~~~~?-,1.,,~.-,.•;';?"~~~ In the first place he has no authorization from the Security

Council or any other organ of the United Nations to assume

a leading role in the Cairo Conference, as was the case,

for example, over the Geneva Peace Conference.

~~~""""~-.~:.;:,,,;,;iW'>.<'"~~"'--t,r~~~.¢'l!":"'~A.«l'.'1"'1';r,;r;,11?!'~,~~11-;•1,•;~~~~~•~t,:;."~~~r•r<.•'::.s>"'>!>M:-""•,:-,,;,!Wt!"~.ry,,Y~-,,,_...,,_y;_,,. ..• c· ... ,,.. 3. The Cairo meeting itself has not been sponsored or

recognized by the United Nations. In fact five out of the

eight invitees have not accepted the invitatien, including ~~... ~--- ~..,__--. ------..~•,,_.,__,,,,_,,--,-"'",~""....,_.,:..,.;;,.;" ...._,_ .. ,·....,'.•'_,,",....,..-~.,-,<" ,,:.,.C-••"J<:,;-,C:,.''4-·,,.«,.c"•l•';.c; .,,., •-~•."-•'·"'~f-..,_._,.,,;._..·S-~',;•,,c,•,.-··•.~~-••,•,... '•" • ',''',.- • • ~ •--, • "• • • .,:;:-",.. one of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference.

4. In his efforts with regard to the Middle East problem

it is essential for the Secretary-General to maintain good

working relations with all of the parties concerned and with

the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference. One of the

Co-Chairmen has already expressed reservations even about

the appointment of General Siilasvuo to be present at the

Cairo Conference.

5. In these circumstances the Secretary-General would

feel it necessary to consult with the parties concerned ~ a Slffh,_~.i!h-~•~~~""'~~i:l);·,-;s;~;>,1--Jb:c.L,,,,...,,,,1- ... :~•J....~V»..-J·,,.;,,,.,:._;.,., ....,,,..,..,..,...-,,.,,.,_~ and with the two Co-Chairmen before responding to the ~:U~".,,,.....,:.

9 December 1977

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear General,

I am sending this letter to you by the hand of Mr. James Jonah, whom I have instructed to explain to you further my position concerning the forthcoming conference in Cairo.

As you know, in the announcement of your designation for this conference, I stated that I had designated you "to be present at the Cairo Conference". By this phrase I intended to convey that you would be at the conference, in response to the invitation of the Egyptian Government, to observe the proceedings on my behalf and to keep me informed. United Nations participation in meetings between the representatives of sovereign states presents a difficult problem since we do not have the sovereign authority to engage or participate in negotiations directly. We are normally present to maintain observation on behalf of the Organization, and, on some occasions, to be available to the participants in the conference to facilitate their work at their request.

In the present instance, there is no problem about the first of these functions since it is normal for the Secretary­ General to accept invitations from Member States to be present at meetings organized by them. As regards the second function, the current situation is more difficult. As you know the convening of the Cairo conference, and the refusal of the invitation by five of the pa:c;,tt.~s involved, has in itself re­ sulted in a very heated and pub~icized international controversy.

Lt. General Ensio Siilasvuo Chief co-ordinator of the United Nations Peace-keeping Operations in the Middle East - 2 -

It has also resulted in other developments such as the Tripoli conference, breaks in diplomatic relations and other measures taken by the Egyptian Government. A major split among the Arab countries has developed which will certainly take some time to heal. In addition to this, from their public statements, there would not appear to be a coincidence of view between the two principal participants as to the exact nature and objective of the Cairo conference.

All of these considerations contribute to my difficulty, in the first place, on deciding upon united Nations representation, and in the second place on determining the correct role for my representative. The holding of the Conference is in itself a matter of acute controversy, and there is no specific covering decision of the Security council or any other organ of the United Nations for your presence in Cairo. Nonetheless, I felt that it was important to accept the invitation of the Egyptian Government and to be represented at a meeting, which, whichever way it goes, will have an important bearing on future negotiations, notably the Geneva conference, as well as on future developments in the Middle East in which the United Nations will be very much involved.

In the situation which I have outlined, it is not feasible to give you precise instructions, as you will have to feel your way in the light of further developments. You should feel free to consult me at any time as to how you should carry out your mission. It might, however, be useful at the ?Utset to lay down a few general principles. In my view these ~re as follows:

1. You are representing the secretary-Ge.:.. ~-·-·, i:-.: Cairo as an Observer in pursuance of the Secret ..:..:-::,'--G~neral ts interest both in the Middle East question and in international peace and security.

2. You are not a participant in the negotiations. .-.... ~::~}c;~/~{i~~~: 3. Your main function is-to observe and keep the Secretary-General infomed.

4. You should react extremely carefully to any requests for more active participation, as for instance to act as chairman of the Conference or any sub-group, and· should refer any such suggestions to Headquarters for guidance. .r.; ......

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5. In all formal contacts you should make clear that I regard the conference basically as an attempt to facilitate the reconvening of the Geneva conference, and have accepted the invitation of the Egyptian Government in this light. As you know, in the statement of your designation I also suggested a more broadly based meeting, possibly at United Nations Headquarters, for all those invited to Cairo, as a possible follow-up to the Cairo meeting with a view to facilitating the reconvening of the Geneva conference. Your pre~ence in Cairo therefore should be seen as part of this continuing effort to resume, on a comprehensive basis, the negotiating process.

6. since you are an Observer, I do not think you should be called upon to make public statements in the conference or to play any formal role.

7. If at any time it becomes clear that the Conference has turned into a purely bilateral negotiation of an agreement between Egypt and Israel, our attitude towards, and your role in, the conference would have to be reconsidered. I shall count on your advice if such a situation should emerge.

Mr. Jonah will be discussing the above questions with you at length. Indeed, it is the main purpose of his visit to Cairo. Although I have no objection to him maintaining informal contacts with the parties, he should not forma~ly be a rnei~ber of your delegation or attend formal meetings, and should return to New York to report to me at an early date.

In conclusion, I wish to send you my best wishes for this very delicate and important assignment. I am sure you will carry it out with your usual skill.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely, !ta{/ Kurt Waldheim