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Case #2 United States of America (Respondent)
Model International Court of Justice (MICJ) Case #2 United States of America (Respondent) Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. United States of America) Arkansas Model United Nations (AMUN) November 20-21, 2020 Teeter 1 Historical Context For years, there has been a consistent struggle between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine led by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In 2018, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. embassy located in Tel Aviv would be moving to the city of Jerusalem.1 Palestine, angered by the embassy moving, filed a case with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2018.2 The history of this case, U.S. relations with Israel and Palestine, current events, and why the ICJ should side with the United States will be covered in this research paper. Israel and Palestine have an interesting relationship between war and competition. In 1948, Israel captured the west side of Jerusalem, and the Palestinians captured the east side during the Arab-Israeli War. Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. In 1949, the Lausanne Conference took place, and the UN came to the decision for “corpus separatum” which split Jerusalem into a Jewish zone and an Arab zone.3 At this time, the State of Israel decided that Jerusalem was its “eternal capital.”4 “Corpus separatum,” is a Latin term meaning “a city or region which is given a special legal and political status different from its environment, but which falls short of being sovereign, or an independent city-state.”5 1 Office of the President, 82 Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem § (2017). -
Bab Iv Motif Hias Kerajinan Perak Kotogadang
Kerajinan Perak Kotogadang Sebagai Bagian dari Destinasi Wisata di Sumatera Barat Oleh M. Nasrul Kamal i ii Kerajinan Perak Kotogadang Sebagai Bagian dari Destinasi Wisata di Sumatera Barat Dr. M. Nasrul Kamal, M. Sn. 2018 iii Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia No 19 Tahun 2002 Tentang Hak Cipta Pasal 72 Ketentuan Pidana Saksi Pelanggaran 1. Barangsiapa dengan sengaja dan tanpa hak mengumumkan atau memperbanyak suatu Ciptaan atau memberi izin untuk itu, dipidana dengan pidana penjara palng singkat 1 (satu) bulan dan/atau denda paling sedikit Rp 1.000.000,00 (satu juta rupiah), atau pidana penjara paling lama 7 (tujuh) tahun dan/atau denda paling banyak Rp. 5.000.000.000,00 (lima milyar rupiah) 2. Barangsiapa dengan sengaja menyerahkan, menyiarkan, memamer- kan, mengedarkan, atau menjual kepada umum suatu Ciptaan atau barang hasil pelanggaran Hak Cipta atau Hak Terkait sebagaimana dimaksud dalam ayat (1), dipidana dengan pidana penjara paling lama 5 (lima) tahun dan/atau denda paling banyak Rp 500.000.000,00 (lima ratus juta rupiah). iv Kamal, M. Nasrul Kerajinan Perak Kotogadang sebagai Destinasi Wisata SB Penerbitan dan Percetakan. CV Berkah Prima Alamat: Jalan Datuk Perpatih Nan Sabatang, 287, Air Mati, Solok Email: [email protected]; [email protected] Editor, Nasbahry C., & Rahadian Z. Penerbit CV.Berkah Prima, Padang, 2018 1 (satu) jilid; total halaman 217 + xxiv ISBN: 978-602-5994-06-7 1. Kerajinan 2. Perak 3. Kotogadang, Pariwisata 1. Judul Kerajinan Perak Kotogadang Sebagai Bagian dari Destinasi Wisata di Sumatera Barat Hak Cipta dilindungi oleh undang-undang. Dilarang memperbanyak atau memindahkan sebagian atau seluruh isi buku ini dalam bentuk apapun. -
Report Security Council
REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 16 June 1976 -15 June 1977 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-SECOND SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/32/2) UNITED NATIONS - REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 16 June 1976 -15 June 1977 GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS: THIRTY-SECOND SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/32i2) UNITED NATIONS New York, 1977 .----------- ............_..,,__...........iiiiii:""""=~_"""" -=~=>=== NOTE Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters com bined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. Documents of the Security Council (symbol SI . .. ) are normally published in quarterly Supplements of the Official Records of the Security Council. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which infor mation about it is given. The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council. The new system, which has been applied retro actively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date. [Original: Chinese/English/French/Russian/Spanish] [29 November 1977] CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1 Part I Questions considered by tbe Security Council under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security Chapter 1. QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST ••••••••••.•••••••••••••• 2 A. The situation in the Middle East .. .. ... .. 2 B. The question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights , " , , .. 7 C. The situation in the occupied Arab territories 8 2. QUESTIONS RELATING TO SOUTHERN AFRICA. •. •• •••• .• .• .• ••• . •• • ••• 10 A. Situation in South Africa: killings and violence by the apartheid regime in South Africa in Soweto and other areas , . -
Peacekeeping Operations and Other Missions - UNEF II
UN Secretariat Item Scan - Barcode - Record Title Page 31 Date 14/06/2006 Time 9:23:23 AM S-0899-0003-12-00001 Expanded Number S-0899-0003-12-00001 Title items-in-Middle East - peacekeeping operations and other missions - UNEF II Date Created 21/01/1976 Record Type Archival Item Container s-0899-0003: Peacekeeping - Middle East 1945-1981 Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit ITED NATIONS Distr. GENERAL S/REEA38 (1978) COUNCIL W^W 23 October 1978 RESOLUTION ^38 (1978) Adopted by the Security Council, at its 2091st meeting on -23 October 1976 The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 3^0 (1973), 3^1 (1973), 3^6 (1971*), 362 (197^), 368 (1975), 371 (1975), 378 (1975), 396 (1976) and Ul6 (1977), Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Ernergency Force (S/12897), Recalling the Secretary-General's view that the situation in the Middle East as a vhole continues to be unstable and potentially dangerous and is likely to remain so unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached, and his hope that urgent efforts will be pursued by all concerned to tackle the problem in all its aspects, with a view both to maintaining quiet in the region and to arriving at a just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973), 1. Decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of nine months, that is, until 2U July 1979', 2. -
The Contribution of Two Yohanas Oemar Signs in Contingen Garuda Viii in the Middle East 1978-1979
THE CONTRIBUTION OF TWO YOHANAS OEMAR SIGNS IN CONTINGEN GARUDA VIII IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1978-1979 Fitri Elna, Drs. Ridwan Melay, M.Hum, Bunari, S.Pd., M.Si, Email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Phone Number: 082384664451 History Education Program Department of Social Sciences Education Faculty of Teacher Training and Education Riau University Abstract: Yohanas Oemar is a Struggling Learner in Developing Education. In order to fulfill his desire to deepen his knowledge, he willingly tried to persevere and to get what he wanted, as long as the status of students at the University of Riau, he also active in various Campus Organizations, as a student at the Faculty of University of Riau he followed the entrance to the University Student Regiment Riau and became a Member of the Student Regiment. From Member of Student Regiment he got the Opportunity to join Candidate School in Bandung Pangalengan, Yohanas Oemar Graduated School of Candidate with the rank of Second Sergeant, He also get the Opportunity to Contribute to Middle East Peace Sinai joined in Garuda Indonesia Ind Bat Force under UN auspices . And He is in Nobat As Veteran of Peace. This study aims to find out the biography of Yohanas Oemar, Sgt Sergeant's Contribution Two Garuda VIII Contingent as UN Peacekeepers in the Middle East, knowing the end of Yohanas Oemar's Struggle. The method used is the Method of History, namely by using Interview Techniques, Techniques Library Studies, and Documentation. The result of this research is that Yohanas Oemar was born in Strait of Panjang Meranti on 07 Mai 1956 and died on June 25, 2017 is buried in Kahluma Dharma Pahlawan Pekanbaru. -
Air Strike at Osirak
Air Strike at Osirak Rumors have been circulating for years that Israel was getting ready to n the fall of 1980, Israeli military launch a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s emerging nuclear weapons capability. intelligence reported that the Osirak The speculation intensified as Iran prepared to move its uranium enrichment nuclear reactor, 12 miles southeast plant into a hardened mountain bunker. Iran continued to resist diplomatic of Baghdad, would become opera- and economic pressures to cease its quest for an atomic bomb. tional between July and November In February, Israel warned that the window of opportunity for a successful Iof 1981. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein military operation was closing, and an attack could not be delayed much had no need for a reactor for electric longer if it was to be done at all. News reports said the Pentagon believed power production or other peaceful Israel might attack as early as April. purposes; Iraqi oil reserves were ranked There were inevitable comparisons to a situation with marked similarities sixth in the world. 30 years ago, when the Israeli Air Force wiped out a nuclear reactor in Iraq What Saddam really wanted from the just before it was to be activated. This is the story of the air strike at Osirak. reactor was the spent atomic fuel, from which plutonium could be extracted to manufacture the core of an implosion- 58 AIR FORCE Magazine / April 2012 relations with the Arab world. In the Iraq’s nuclear reactor was about to go hot. wake of severe gasoline shortages in If the Israelis were going to take action, the United States and Western Europe following the Arab oil embargo of it had to be soon. -
Israel-Iran Short-Term Potential for Conflict
Executive Summary Monday, August 27, 2012 SPECIAL ANALYSIS: Israel-Iran Short-Term Potential for Conflict EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Despite comments by some Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, that the window for attacking Iran’s nuclear program is closing, it is unlikely that Israel will conduct a unilateral attack in the short-term. Any attack would strain Israeli military capabilities to the limit, invite costly counterstrikes from Iran and/or its proxies, worsen global economic conditions (impair oil transshipments, Middle East instability, etc.), and severely damage the Israeli economy which, to-date, has been a success story for Prime Minister Netanyahu. Political Considerations Prime Minister Netanyahu’s comments indicating that Israel will take unilateral action and not rely on allies is assessed as an effort to force President Obama’s hand in supporting future Israeli action or, optimally, pressuring the U.S. to take the lead in military action against Iranian nuclear facilities o Based on the perception that President Obama is vulnerable during the pre-election period on support-to-Israel issues with some voters Much of the Israeli government (including President Shimon Peres), leaders of the Israeli Defense Forces, and the Israeli public are not in support of an attack (61% oppose without U.S. support)i U.S. support, or acquiescence, does not seem to be in place as evidenced by recent trips to Israel by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, both of whom urged restraint -
Vol L. No. 2. Desember
Voll. No.2. Desember VeteranMendambakan Damai karena Mengenal Perang -,p VrruRm Salam Redaksi Maialah Veteran No. 2. ini Daftar Isi diterbitkan dengantetap menjelaskan keadazn dan kegiztzn palr^ Veteran SalamRedaksi dan organisasinya Legiun Veteran Amandemen UUD'45 Harus Dikaji Ulang Republik Indonesia, di samping LVRI 54 Tahun menyampaikan pikiran-pikiran dan LVRI SiapkanUji Materi Undang-UndangNo.20l2009 11 hanpan-harapan p^ra Veteran. Pembantaianoleh NICA di TemanggungTahun 1948/1949 1,4 Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa, baik Pertempuran di Bangka Belitung 18 pembant^t^nNICA di Temanggung, Pertempuran Margarana di Bali 21 Pertempuran di Bangka Belitung dan Desa Marga, Bali serta liputan LVRI Peringati Hari Pahlawan kegiatan-kegiatan dalam nngka Tali Asih untuk Veteran peringatan 10 Nopember 2010 Pahlawanitu ditenrukan oleh Sflaktudan Tempat dengan berbagzt m^c^m kegiatan Veterandalam Gambar 29 sosialnya merupakan beberapa di \Telcome Cambodia 33 antarany^. Lebih khusus adalah Konferensi InternasionalKe-7 WVF di Paris 36 mengenaiHUT LVRI ke-54. Medali WVF untuk D. Ashari 39 Sebagai harapan kami kepada Afganistan pembaca, apabtla mempunyai Hati yang Tenang catatan-catatan, i de-id e, p engalaman- 45 pengalaman atau-pun tulisan-tulisan Hidayat Tokoh di Balik PDRI y^ng bersifat perjuangan, sangat Obrolan Masalah ESB @konomi, Sosialdan Budaya) diharapkan untuk menambah isi HIPVI Tetap Eksis Majalah Veteran terbitan selanjutnya. Ragam Kehidupan Semoga majalah ini dapat SKEP Hymne Veteran memenuhiharapan pan pembaca. Hymne Veteran 55 Himawan Soetanto, Prajurit Kujang Asal Magetan, Telah Tiada 56 Redaksi Gugur Bunga PenerbitDEWAN PIMPINAN PUSAT LVRI, DPP LVRI . GedungVeteran Rl "GrahaPurna Yudha" Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 50 Jakarta12930 . Telp.(021 ) 5254105,5252449, 25536744 . Fax. (021 ) 5254137Pembinal PenasehatRais Abin - KetuaUmum DPP LVRI, Gatot Suwardi - Wakil KetuaUmum I DPPLVRI, HBL. -
Israel, Iraq, and Operation Opera
Chapter 8 Preventive Strikes: When States Call the Wrong “Bluff” On June 7, 1981, fourteen of Israel’s best fighter pilots gathered at Etzion air base, near Israel’s southernmost point. At 3:55 pm local time, the pilots entered their F-15 and F-16 fighter jets and took off. Their target: Osirak, a nuclear facility on the outskirts of Baghdad. Less than an hour later, the fighters had destroyed the facility. Israel had successfully executed one of the cleanest acts of preventive war in history. This book’s core theoretical model shows how a credible threat of preven- tive war heavily shifts bargaining power to the declining state. But thus far, the declining state has used that leverage to achieve better peaceful outcomes; the threat alone deterred the rising state. But Israel’s 1981 attack, dubbed Operation Opera demonstrates that rising states do not always successfully internalize a declining state’s preventive intentions. Why not? Operation Opera was neither the first nor last preventive assault.1 Nor- way’s Vemork Hydroelectric Plant was one of the earliest facilities capable of producing heavy water. On the eve of Nazi Germany’s invasion of Norway, French special forces smuggled the plant’s entire supply out of the country. When Nazi officials ordered the Vemork plant to produce more heavy water, Allied forces and Norwegian resistance sabotaged the its machinery, dealing a significant blow to Germany’s nascent nuclear program. Similarly, during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran executed Operation Scorch Sword. With French assistance, Iraq broke ground the 1See Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010 for an exhaustive list of attacks on nuclear facilities. -
46C3029050c42e1e916cffe5fc65
MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN The coming 2009 elections have contributed quite a force in this year’syear’s activitiesactivities at The Habibie Center. It is the moment for leadership change and acceleration of the consolidation of democracy. A general election is a democratic instrument to select leaders that will serve in both the legislative and executive bodies. It also becomes an important medium for the development of a democratic political culture in society. The 2009 General elections are expected to present a national leader that can guide the nation to solve various problems, overcome crises and usher in a new and better era. Through 2008, in the midst of the extremely dynamic political and economic envi- ronment in Indonesia as well as in the world, The Habibie Center has succeeded in implementing fruitful programs and producing useful research and publications. The consolidation of various institutions under the Center was proven useful for the Center’s 2008 activities and undoubtedly will provide a stronger foundation for future programs and activities. As our commitment for the process of democratization must be held, The Habibie Center has made sure that the routine programs that focused on issues of democ- racy and human rights continued. Issues ranging from politics, legal reform, media, justice and human rights to information technology and education became the focus of the numerous discussions, seminars and workshops held by the Center. These discussions were held not only within the national scope but also internationally with the cooperation of our international partners from Asia, Europe and all over the world. In nine years, The Habibie Center has succeeded in accomplishing a number of important activities and it will continue to conduct activities on efforts to uphold the values and principles of human rights, democracy and good governance in Indonesia. -
International Journal of Education and Social Science Research
International Journal of Education and Social Science Research ISSN 2581-5148 Vol. 4, No. 04; July-Aug 2021 ARRANGEMENT OF THE POSITION OF DIVISION COMMAND FOR HIGHER OFFICERS IN THE MONUSCO UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF STRENGTHENING INDONESIAN DEFENSE DIPLOMACY Soegeng¹, Rodon Pedrason², Sutrimo Sumarlan³ and Tofan Hermawan⁴ 1Graduate School, Faculty of Defense Strategy, Indonesia Defense University, Jl. Sentul - Citeureup, Sentul, Kec. Citeureup, Bogor, Jawa Barat 16810, Indonesia 2Senior Lecturer of Graduate School, Indonesia Defense University, Jl. Sentul - Citeureup, Sentul, Kec. Citeureup, Bogor, Jawa Barat 16810, Indonesia 3Senior Lecturer of Graduate School, Indonesia Defense University, Jl. Sentul - Citeureup, Sentul, Kec. Citeureup, Bogor, Jawa Barat 16810, Indonesia 4Graduate School, Faculty of Defense Strategy, Indonesia Defense University, Jl. Sentul - Citeureup, Sentul, Kec. Citeureup, Bogor, Jawa Barat 16810, Indonesia DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.37500/IJESSR.2021.4407 ABSTRACT Based on the phenomenon, the problem is that the defense diplomacy executing agency has done the best in the United Nations for all missions. However, it creates a gap because there is one mission whose Division Commander has never been served by the TNI, namely MONUSCO. The formulation of research problems on the effect of strengthening Indonesia's defense diplomacy on the arrangement of the position of Division Commander at the United Nations on the MONUSCO mission for TNI High Officers? Basis for Resolution 1925/2010 MONUSCO, Permenlu No.1 / 2017 Roadmap 4,000 peacekeepers, Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Foreign Policy, Law No.34 / 2004 OMSP TNI, Skep Commander TNI No.4 / I / 2007 PMPP TNI. "The sending of UN troops is a real example of a global partnership (Retno Marsudi: 2019). -
Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success
Journal of Strategic Security Volume 3 Number 4 Volume 3, No. 4: Winter 2010 Article 8 Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success Joshua Kirschenbaum [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons pp. 49-62 Recommended Citation Kirschenbaum, Joshua. "Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success." Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 4 (2010) : 49-62. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.4.3 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Operation Opera: an Ambiguous Success Abstract To assess the efficacy of Israel's strike on Osirak, one must determine Israel's strategic objectives and their material effects on Iraqi capabilities. The capacity of the facilities to produce fissionable material without detection remains in dispute. So, too, does the timeline—and therefore the imminence—of Iraqi acquisition of a nuclear option. The political cost-benefit equation in this case requires a fair dose of subjective judgment. How much did the Israelis delay the program? How much did Iraqi motivation increase post facto? Is military counter-proliferation a viable strategy? Was the potential Iraqi bomb worth risking a bold, unprovoked attack that inevitably drew the condemnation of the world? Did the raid, in toto, raise or lower the risk of regional proliferation in the Middle East? All of these considerations must factor into an informed opinion on the retrospective wisdom of Begin's decision.