Security Council Report

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

2007 No.4 SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT 17 December 2007 This report and links to all of the relevant documents are available on our website at www.securitycouncilreport.org The Middle East 1947–2007: Sixty Years of Security Council Engagement on the Israel/Palestine Question

1. Introduction cil played in the early years and which is and the US and a number of other discussed in section 5 of this report. western members as biased against For sixty years, the Security Council has Israel, also coloured the situation. It seems that there are a number of had the issue of peace and security n With the 1991 Madrid Peace Confer- reasons for the historical pattern that in the Middle East on its agenda. A ence and the 1993-95 Oslo Peace has occurred and especially the relative central issue throughout the period has Process it seems that a new rationale lack of Council action over the past been what the Council now calls the for keeping the issue out of the Coun- two decades. And it seems also to be Palestinian question. cil emerged. It seems that proposals the case that, over time, the reasons for Council discussion were often Since 1947, a great deal has been written have evolved. deflected based on the argument that about the Council’s involvement at various n In the 1970s and 1980s cold war con- quiet diplomacy, orchestrated off stages. But it is hard to find any published siderations clearly played a large part. stage, seemed to be working. A account of its overall involvement. These were reflected not only in the renewed UN role risked rocking the cold war induced deadlock which From the outside—and perhaps also to boat. (And the persistence of UN Gen- characterised virtually all Council elected members who serve only two eral Assembly resolutions, seen by activity at that time, but also in quite year terms—Council action on the Mid- Israel and the US as biased against specific concerns by Israel and the US dle East often appears fragmented, Israel, continued to be a factor. Per- both about the Council’s failure to limited to the crisis of the moment or a haps the most notable example was condemn terrorism and about the distinct phase of the situation and, often, the General Assembly resolution possibility that UN mandates and UN absent altogether. equating Zionism with racism (A/ peacekeeping in particular could lead RES/3379) of November 1975. It is easy to overlook the fact that the to openings for deployment in the n After the Oslo process stalled in the UN’s involvement in this issue began in region of troops by cold war adversar- late 1990s (and not withstanding the 1948 and that for more than 25 years ies. The failure of the Council in 1979, fact that the General Assembly had by the Security Council was intensively due to the position of the USSR to this time revoked the Zionism and rac- involved. By contrast, over the past approve a UN peacekeeping force as ism resolution (A/RES/46/86 of 1991) twenty years there has been relatively envisaged in the Egypt-Israel peace it seems that new reasons emerged little Council action on the Palestinian agreement, seems to have been for sidelining the Security Council. In question, despite significant events on another factor in building disillu- other conflict situations small groups the ground. This relative Council silence sionment. Another significant factor, variously called “Contact Groups” or seems to have given rise to concerns discussed in detail below, flows from “Groups of Friends” had become the amongst many UN member states that the fact that from the late 1970s the tool of choice for conflict resolution— the Council is not living up to its respon- conflict became one not between although in some cases they operated sibilities. Many contrast the Council’s states but between Israel and various in close conjunction with the Security huge activism since 1990 on conflict and non-state actors—making it especially Council. In April 2002 such a group security issues all around the world, with difficult for the Council as it operated was formed for the Middle East situa- its relative inaction on the Palestinian sit- in those days to play an effective role. tion. It was called “the Quartet”. But, uation. Some contrast the recent period In addition, various UN General very unusually, the UN dimension in with the very active role which the Coun- Assembly resolutions, seen by Israel

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT

the Quartet was inserted not via the some experienced observers remain 7. A Vision for Two States: Israel and Security Council, but by inviting the very sceptical, based on history, about Palestine ��17 Secretary-General to be a member of the prospects. It remains to be seen how 8. The Impact of Vetoes ��18 the Quartet, along with the EU, Russia events will play out following the joint 9. UN Peace Operations in the and the US. In addition to these new understanding” signed at Annapolis. Middle East ��20 reasons, it seems that ongoing con- 10. Conclusions ��23 It also remains to be seen whether the cern by Israel about a balanced process in the coming months will Council position on terrorism remained In addition there are four annexes: involve any role for the Security Council. a key factor in its position. n A Limited Chronology of Israel clearly remains very sceptical Key Events Relevant to As explained in section 3 of this report, it about whether the Council could add Council Decisions ��25 would be a mistake to assume that the any value. In response, others argue that n Council Action on Israel/ relative absence of the Council from the it is precisely the absence of an active, Palestine 2000-2007 ��33 centre of action on the Middle East prob- prudent and principled support by the n A List of Peace Operations in lem means that it has been completely Council that has encouraged the pessi- the Middle East 1947-2007 ��34 disengaged—even in recent times. mism and fatalism that doomed some n Selected UN Documents ��36 Annex 1 contains a listing of the various past negotiating opportunities. The neg- occasions on which the Council has ative response by Israel on 30 November taken action under “the Middle East to the draft resolution submitted to the including the Palestinian question” Council by the US on 29 November 2. Recent Developments agenda item since 2000. What is espe- endorsing the Annapolis programme of cially notable, however, is that despite action has increased concerns. On 16 July 2007 the United States floated the efforts by various Council members the idea of a multilateral international Nevertheless, in light of the apparent described below and an important report meeting to advance the vision of the interest by some members—and the on 11 December 2006 (S/2006/956) by establishment of a “two state” solution— clear unanimous commitment of the outgoing Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a Palestinian and an Israeli state, side by Council members in 1990 to support a there was only one action in 2006 and in side living in peace. The Secretary-Gen- peace process once one became 2007 only two press statements. eral’s Personal Representative and active—this Special Research Report Special Coordinator for the Middle East Against this background, and in light of analyses the Council’s role in the past Process at the time, Michael Williams, in the steady deterioration in the situation and discusses this in the context of a Council briefing on 25 July character- in 2006-07, it seemed until very recently issues likely to arise in the future. It ised the development as leading to a that any prospects for a constructive ini- attempts to be balanced and objective. “…more positive atmosphere of trust.” tiative in the Council had become ever But it is not a comprehensive history. Our He concluded that: more remote. However, in recent months goal is to provide a report which is “…there has been a promising start to new developments (described in detail focused not on the situation as a whole, the new relationship of Prime Minister below) have emerged—in particular the but rather on the Security Council’s role. Olmert, President Abbas and Prime US sponsored international meeting in This report is divided into ten sections: Minister Fayyad” and that if certain Annapolis on 27 November 2007. 1. Introduction ��1 conditions occurred “…the interna- The US has called the Annapolis event a 2. Recent Developments ��2 tional meeting this autumn will “launching pad” for an intensive negoti- 3. Summary of Analysis and Issues ��3 hopefully be an important step to ating process and President Bush has 4. Procedural Aspects ��8 begin bilateral negotiations for a just, promised a sustained US commitment to 5. The Council’s Role in lasting and comprehensive peace.” support the negotiations. Both Palestin- 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973: (S/PV.5723) ian President Mahmoud Abbas and The Arab-Israeli Wars ��9 On the same day, an Arab League Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert have 6. The Period of Conflict Involving delegation composed of the foreign said that the current momentum repre- Non-State Actors: Terrorism ministers of Jordan and Egypt visited sents “a real possibility to achieve and Counter-Terrorism ��15 Israel for high-level discussions on the peace,” and will be maintained. However, Arab League Peace Initiative of the Arab

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org summit meeting in Riyadh in March the meeting US Secretary of State 3. Summary of Analysis 2007. The visit by the two ministers fol- Condoleezza Rice confirmed that other and Issues lowed their meeting with Israeli Minister important parties, like Syria, would be of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni in Cairo in invited. The Quartet Envoy Tony Blair This is not a summary of issues in the May 2007. said he believed the process now had Middle East—or even of all the issues “momentum.” relevant to the Palestinian question. The Arab League Secretary General Linkages are drawn in later sections to Amr Moussa said on 29 July that On 26 September the Chairman of the closely related situations, including the any international conference should Coordinating Bureau of the Non Aligned complex connections with the situations have UN involvement, either through Movement sent to the Security Council in Lebanon and between Israel and Syria. the auspices of the Quartet or a ministerial declaration (S/2007/581) The purpose of this section is to draw “…in the framework of the Security which “welcomed the initiative to con- together some threads which emerge Council…” vene a conference… actualizing the two from the analysis in this Special Research state solution.” The declaration also Report and to discuss some of the issues Intensive rounds of diplomacy in the called on the Security Council to “assume of relevance for the Security Council. region followed in order to set the stage its responsibilities” and on the Quartet to for the proposed international meeting. “engage the Security Council.” On 30 July, on the occasion of a visit to Reputation of the Security Moscow by President Abbas, President Following more diplomatic work in the Council Putin said that Russia will support Mah- region by US Secretary of State Rice, There seems little doubt that the reputa- moud Abbas as the legitimate leader of including meetings with President Abbas tion of the Security Council has suffered the Palestinian people, seemingly align- and Prime Minister Olmert, the United as a result of perceptions (by both sides) ing Russia’s position more closely with States confirmed on 20 November that that it has failed to adequately address that of the other Quartet member states. the proposed international meeting the underlying issues. An important would be convened on 27 November in issue therefore is whether the current The Secretary-General in August Annapolis, Virginia. On 25 November, situation offers an opportunity to redress appointed former British Prime Minister Syria confirmed that it would attend the that problem. A closely related issue is Tony Blair as the Quartet Representative Annapolis meeting. whether the risk of attempting something and in a letter to the Security Council, and failing could in fact worsen the provided details of the mandate and On 27 November, over forty states and situation and damage the Council’s rep- requested Council support for a small international organisations gathered in utation even further. team of experts to assist Blair. (The Annapolis. Immediately before the Council took note of the proposed meeting opened President Abbas and In this regard it is useful to recall an arrangements in a letter of 22 August, Prime Minister Olmert announced that important decision by the Council in S/2007/508.) In his letter the Secretary- they had agreed to a joint understanding 1990. In December 1990, after very long General said: committing themselves to an intensive negotiations in which Finland, Malaysia “Recent events in Gaza and the West negotiating process with a view to and Yemen played key leadership roles, Bank make it more urgent than ever to concluding a peace agreement before the Council reached consensus on reso- move forward with the search for the end of 2008 “…resolving all out- lution 681 which focused on a specific peace in the Middle East” (S/2007/507 standing issues, including all core issues deportation incident. Of much greater of 22 August 2007). without exception.” importance was the unanimous agreement reached on a Council statement Members of the Quartet met in New York On 29 November, the US proposed a addressing the Palestinian situation in on 24 September, on the margins of the draft resolution in the Council welcoming general. The statement represented a General Assembly and gave the Novem- the outcome of the Annapolis meeting. major new step forward in terms of the ber meeting strong endorsement. After However, on 30 November the draft was Council commitment to the issue. It was withdrawn. The US explained that Israel 1 The Arab League summit that took place in Riyadh as follows: in March of 2007 reaffirmed the Arab Peace Initiative was opposed to such an action. “The members of the Security Council first adopted in 2002; see below the chronology and http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02. reaffirm their determination to support htm

an active negotiating process in which Role of Permanent Members would be both balanced and actually all relevant parties would participate This Report shows clearly the historical add value. A related issue for Washing- leading to a comprehensive, just and importance of P5 positions in determin- ton will be the position of Israel. The lasting peace to the Arab-Israeli ing whether initiatives on the Middle East traditional Israeli anxiety has been that conflict through negotiations which succeed or fail. An important issue at this the Council could tilt the negotiating field should be based on resolutions 242 juncture, therefore, is the position of P5 negatively. It is important to note how- (1967) and 338 (1973) of the Security members on any renewed Security ever that already this year the US has Council and which should take into Council engagement. shown some openness to renewed account the right to security of all Council engagement—most particularly states in the region, including Israel, It seems unlikely that China would have in January when Indonesia proposed an and the legitimate political rights of the national interest reasons for blocking an initiative described below and on 30 Palestinian people. initiative that could add value. And, in the November by proposing a draft resolu- post cold war era, the same seems likely tion welcoming the Annapolis outcome. “In this context they agree that an inter- to be true of Russia. However, Russia’s As the history outlined in this Report national conference, at an appropriate membership of the Quartet, and enjoy- shows, there have been important points time, properly structured, should facili- ing an equal role in that context with the in the past (1990 and 2003 being just two tate efforts to achieve a negotiated US and the EU, may be an important fac- examples) when other key US national settlement and lasting peace in the tor. Achieving this role was a significant interests intersected with the Israel/Pal- Arab-Israeli conflict. foreign policy success for Russia. An estine issue, and the US concluded that important issue for Moscow therefore is “However, the members of the Council for wider reasons there was positive likely to be whether any initiative relating are of the view that there is not unanim- value in a Council role. A key issue there- to the Council might change the dynam- ity as to when would be the appropriate fore will be whether a similar scenario ics and lessen its role in the Quartet. (On time for such a conference. could emerge at the current time. the other hand it is important to recall “In the view of the members of the that Russia has been open to various ini- Added Value Council, the Arab-Israeli conflict is tiatives on the Middle East in the Council Taken decade by decade it is easy to see important and unique and must be in recent years.) why the perception has taken root that addressed independently, on its own over sixty years the Council has never The UK and France are only indirectly merits” (S/22027 of 31 December really grappled with the Palestinian ques- associated with the Quartet (via the EU) 1990 and S/PV. 2970 part II). tion. A key issue, therefore, is whether but follow it very closely. It is possible this is actually true. The following is an At the time this statement did enhance that they may prefer their input to be attempt to distill from the analysis in this the Council’s reputation. And hopes exclusively via the Quartet, but perhaps Report and from the various threads of were raised for a new era of cooperation that should not necessarily be taken Council decisions over the years, what it in the Council on the Palestinian ques- for granted. is that the Council has decided on the tion. However within a few months the For Washington the Quartet role is of key Palestinian question which may be rele- momentum which had been secured importance. Procedurally the Quartet vant when considering whether the was overtaken by the events of the first is a very convenient forum for the US. Council has added value and what it Gulf War. Nevertheless many of the ele- It avoids the complications inherent could add in the future. ments that were agreed seem to have in a wider group. And for a time it lasting importance—not least the “… The following is a compilation and sum- seemed relatively successful in confer- determination to support an active nego- mary of many of the decisions taken by ring some multilateral legitimacy and tiating process…” And the Council the Council which may be relevant in sense of oversight—although for many demonstrated again on 30 November— light of current developments. (It is not states the positive role of the Quartet by the willingness of all 15 members to an exhaustive list. Many resolutions seemed to have waned well before the adopt a resolution welcoming the overlap and some are essentially Annapolis initiative. Annapolis outcome—that it was pre- repetitive. The list is not organised pared to take a further step in giving Substantively the US seems always very chronologically—but rather it groups effect to that commitment. concerned to be assured that any initia- together like decisions which are logi- tive in the Council on the Middle East cally related.)

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Overall obligations on all parties are condemned (resolution 1435 Key Issues Arising n The parties have a binding obligation of 2002) The emergence after the Annapolis under Article 25 of the Charter to nego- n Infrastructure responsible for terror- meeting of an active negotiating tiate a just and durable peace in the ism should be dismantled (resolution process gives added significance to the Middle East (resolution 338 of 1973) 1544 of 2004, this is also a feature of key issues which have been addressed resolution 1515 in 2003) by the Security Council in setting the Commitment of the Security Council n Those responsible for terrorist acts above framework. Many difficult ques- n The Security Council will support an should be brought to justice (resolutions remained unresolved. active negotiating process (20 Decem- tion 1435 of 2002) n The “appropriate auspices” for a ber 1990 presidential statement negotiating process has been a diffi- S/22027 and S/PV.2970) Normalisation of adjacent coastal areas cult issue since 1948. As described n Freedom of navigation in international Participation below, at various times the Security waterways in the area should be n All relevant parties should participate Council, the General Assembly, inter- recognised (resolution 242 of 1967) 1990. (20 December 1990 presidential national conferences and various statement S/22027 and S/PV.2970) Refugees and Displaced Persons mediators have all played important n The process should be comprehen- n The refugee situation should be roles. Appropriate auspices were sive and take into account the security addressed in a just settlement (resolu- never agreed in resolutions 242 and interests of all states in the region (20 tion 242 of 1967) 338 or the 1990 presidential state- December 1990 presidential state- n Displaced persons return should be ment. However, the latter indicated ment S/22027 and S/PV.2970) and a facilitated (resolution 237 of 1967) that a “properly structured interna- comprehensive peace must involve tional conference” should facilitate Cessation of Occupation the Israel/Syria and Israel/Lebanon efforts to achieve a negotiated settle- n Unilateral incorporation of occupied tracks (resolution 1515 of 2003) ment. Israel (and at times the US) has territory is inadmissible (resolution insisted on bilateral tracks. President Outcome should involve two indepen- 242 of 1967 and many subsequent Bush’s recent initiative and the multi- dent states resolutions) lateral character of the Annapolis n The vision should include two states— n Military forces should be withdrawn meeting suggest that the US sees Israel and Palestine (resolution 1397 from occupied territories (resolution value in a wider framework. However, of 2002 and resolution 1515 of 2003) 242 of 1967, although as detailed the difficulties with the draft US resolu- n The Council called on the parties to below differences in the interpretation tion in the Security Council on 30 achieve this vision (resolution 1515 of this obligation have been a persis- November underline that Israel’s of 2003) tent issue) attachment to a bilateral model Multilateral recognition of every state in Security Guarantees remains a major factor. It remains to the region n Guarantees should be put in place for be seen whether as confidence builds n The sovereignty, territorial integrity the territorial inviolability and political (or as problems emerge) there will be and political independence of every independence of every state in the further multilateral events. state in the region should be acknowl- area (resolution 242 of 1967) n A key issue identified by the Council edged (resolution 242 of 1967) is participation. This raises the issue Settlements of how and when an Israel/Syria Military security n Settlements in occupied territories track relating to the Golan Heights can n All belligerency should cease (resolu- have no legal validity (resolution 446 be opened and where this would fit tion 242 of 1967) of 1979 and many subsequent resolu- into the sequence. Issues involving n The right of every state in the region to tions in the 1980s) Lebanon also arise—including the live in peace within secure and recog- Status of Jerusalem Sheb’a Farms question and elements nised borders and free from threats or n The legal status, geography and which go back to 1948 including the acts of force should be recognised demography of Jerusalem cannot uni- significant burden that Lebanon has (resolution 242 of 1967 and resolution laterally be validly altered (resolution borne for almost sixty years in pro 1397 of 2002) 446 of 1979) viding sanctuary for about 410,000 n All terrorist acts against any civilians

Palestinian refugees. It is important to n A related issue is “comprehensive- n Borders, Refugees and the Status of note in this regard that in November ness.” The 1990 presidential statement Jerusalem—The Council has been 2003, in resolution 1515, the Council speaks of a comprehensive outcome. very explicit about the necessity for unanimously emphasised the need to Comprehensiveness arises in two recognised borders and the related include “… the Israeli–Syrian and senses. The first is participation—as issue of withdrawal behind those bor- Israeli-Lebanese tracks” in any com- described above. It also relates to the ders. But ambiguity and differences of prehensive just and lasting peace. comprehensive coverage of issues interpretation as to what this actually The willingness of the US to invite which are of key importance to the means have dogged the parties for Syria to participate in the Annapolis parties. This was the key issue divid- forty years since the adoption of reso- meeting and the positive Syrian ing the parties in preparation for the lution 242. This is one of the critical response seems to underline the Annapolis meeting. It seems that it has issues which will have to be resolved importance of this aspect. been resolved in the joint understand- in the negotiations. There is no ambi- n Next there is the extremely sensitive ing—at least in the sense that all core guity, however about the inadmissibility question of what participation may issues will be addressed. A key ques- of unilateral acquisition of occupied mean in respect of non-state actors. In tion which seems to have bedeviled territory. The Council’s position and the past the PLO was the principal past efforts to negotiate is whether international law seem very clear on entity of this nature. More recently and how to sequence the negotiations this. If Israel wishes to retain some of Hamas and Hezbollah have become —whether they are structured on the the territory it now occupies, this can factors in the security equation, but basis of a single package containing a only be achieved by consent as an they are shunned by many of the key sequence of deals or a sequence of outcome of the negotiating process. players. The international community possible separate packages. Both And it seems likely that that can only has found in many parts of the world sides have different issues on which be achieved—if at all—by offering sig- that threats to international peace and they want to make early progress. nificant and generous compensatory security cannot be resolved without Behind this issue is the link (foreseen provisions in the agreement. Similarly, finding ways to involve non-state in the 1990 presidential statement) the Council has been quite explicit actors in peace processes—at least between what the Council called a about the status of Jerusalem. Again indirectly. That is all the more so in “just and lasting” peace on one occa- the challenge for Israel, if it seeks an cases where non-state actors have sion and a “comprehensive” peace on outcome other than the status quo the military capacity and political will the other. Virtually all complex negoti- ante, is what to offer by way of com- to effectively challenge outcomes ations require, for practical reasons, pensation that would secure agreed between states. All cases have some kind of sequencing. Where agreement. The Council’s position their own unique features—especially there are many critical issues of differ- regarding refugees seems to have in the Middle East. It remains to be ent weight to the respective parties been more ambiguous. The stipula- seen how or if this aspect will be this is often resolved by putting all the tion in resolution 242 is for a “just addressed. But, as described below, issues on the table and agreeing to settlement” which leaves some room in the context of the 1973 peace con- negotiate on all issues but working on for negotiation. Resolution 237, which ference in Geneva, exclusion from any sequential deals within the overall deals with the rights of the 1967 dis- form of participation of a non-state package and based on the principle placed persons, is less flexible—it actor perceived to be hostile—then that no part of the package is consid- calls for their return to be facilitated. the PLO—was one of the rocks on ered final until all critical elements For the Palestinians it seems that what which the conference foundered. It packages are finalised. (The criticism is “just” is a solution based on General remains to be seen, therefore, whether that Egypt experienced in the region Assembly resolution 194(III) of 1948. the two situations then and now are after the peace agreement with Israel Again, in order to reach a compromise fundamentally different or whether in 1979 may be felt by many of the solution, it seems that something sig- history will repeat itself. players to be a compelling reminder nificant would need to be put on the about the risks of deals without suffi- table by the Israeli side. 2 The number of Palestine refugees registered with UNRWA in Lebanon is currently 409,714, or an esti- cient guarantees covering the other n Guarantees of Security—Closely mated 10 percent of the population of Lebanon. parts of the package.) related to the issue of borders is how to guarantee them and achieve the

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org vision articulated in resolution 1397 of guarantee that the Security Council (many of which are outlined above)— “…a region where two States, Israel has identified as being essential. The and to the extent possible—updating and Palestine, live side by side within requirement to also guarantee territo- these elements; and secure and recognized borders.” And rial integrity and political independence n avoiding entering into decisions on this issue also includes, as mentioned seems likely also to be a major issue substantive issues, but deciding in resolution 242, not just the absence which will have to be addressed. In instead on some procedural options of war, but also securing “…the right this regard control of its borders and to informally improve the framework to live in peace…free from threats or coastline and territorial sea will be for its regular discussions on the issue, acts of force.” In an age of “Qassam” important issues for the Palestinian better enabling it to give effect to its and “Katyusha” rockets, missile firing state as well as genuine political inde- commitment to ongoing supportive drones, tunnels under boundaries pendence. With respect to the latter, Council role, perhaps by: and radical non-state actors, even political independence of a modern • establishing a special informal recognised boundaries or dividing state often seems also to involve via- working group of the Council which walls seem unlikely of themselves to ble territorial units, as well as normal would be regularly briefed by the provide the kind of security guaran- communications and transportation Secretary-General or his Special tees envisaged in the Council links and infrastructure. Envoy based on the Secretariat par- resolutions. In other situations else- ticipation in the Quartet and other where in the world the international Security Council Support for the meetings and mandated to advise community has found that building Negotiating Process the Council at appropriate points and eventually guaranteeing security The Council’s decision in December on suitable opportunities for the usually means significant investment 1990 to promise determined support for Council to exercise a supporting in “winning hearts and minds” through “an active negotiating process” raises role; and peacebuilding, including economic the issue—as current developments • bringing the mandate for the Office development, creation of employment now move into an active phase—of what of the UN Special Coordinator and infrastructure and the presence of such support might involve in practice. (UNSCO) more directly in line with international personnel as monitors, the Security Council so that the peacekeepers, advisers and peace It seems highly unlikely that any propos- Special Coordinator could work builders. A key issue, therefore, will be als for the Council to directly and formally closely with the working group and, the extent to which these aspects are supervise the process would gain trac- as appropriate, the Council. factored into the negotiating process, tion. Nor is there likely to be any interest It probably goes without saying that at including the role of the Security or capacity for micromanaging any this very early stage of the new process Council in encouraging, facilitating aspect of the negotiations. However, any proposals for the Council to defini- and eventually authorising or estab- notwithstanding the withdrawal of the tively resolve—either way—any of the lishing such components. A related draft US resolution on 30 November, it issues of ambiguity arising from past question is whether Israel will con- seems likely that interest in options for a resolutions or matters left undecided tinue to argue that such components future Council role in providing useful would be contentious. Even with modest should follow the pattern of say the EU support will re-emerge. Options might objectives, difficult negotiations would monitors at the Rafah crossing rather include a sequence of supportive Coun- be inevitable. However, with respect to than a more conventional UN pres- cil actions over a period. Possibilities other possible options such as those ence. Another related issue is whether may include: outlined above, as history has shown, it some such components will be n a Council statement confirming ongo- is possible for the Council to play a use- needed at an early stage as part of the ing support for the negotiating process ful role through patient negotiation. The sequencing of negotiated packages, and seeking to help to move the pro- December 1990 Council statement took especially as confidence building cess forward, recalling or endorsing persistence and prudence but it pro- “milestones” and perhaps exploring the role of the Quartet and building on duced an outcome that can be seen as ways in which peacebuilding can be resolution 1515; an important contribution. It needs to be progressively implemented. n a Council decision bringing together into one document the various acknowledged that at that time—on the n Guarantees of Political Indepen- eve of the first Gulf War—there was a dence—Security is not the only threads of its key previous decisions

wider sense of regional crisis. It remains Despite this generally interconnected discussion of the Syrian initiative but at to be seen whether the current wider set approach, in practice when an issue on this point there was wider support within of problems in the region may create an the Middle East is taken up in the Secu- the Council as a whole including a num- environment in which a positive input rity Council, it seems that the substantive ber of elected members (Mexico, from the Council is welcomed. focus of the Council, and often the par- Singapore, Ireland and Norway.) This ties as well, is limited to the immediate was significant because the decision to crisis at hand—a ceasefire, a peace- hold such a briefing at a formal meeting 4. Procedural Aspects keeping presence, a disengagement was a procedural decision—over which plan. It has been rare that the Council there is no veto. It seems that in the face With the benefit of historical perspective it has taken up and proactively pursued of this increasing support within the is possible to see that the various phases the wider issues that underlie the con- Council a new compromise was able to of Council action—and inaction—regard- flict. Nevertheless, as outlined in the be crafted. It seems that agreement was ing the Middle East are linked together as previous section, the actual record— reached on holding the briefings in regu- part of an overall situation. when all the threads are pulled lar public meetings but as a quid pro quo This sense of linkage is reflected even in together—is perhaps more substantial that each meeting would be approved in the procedural lore of the Security Coun- than is commonly believed. advance in informal consultations. In cil. Contrary to much popular belief, addition no speakers list would be In February 2002 an important procedur- Council members have operated on the opened at such meetings and they al decision was taken by the members basis that most of the phases of the con- would not become an opportunity for of the Council that the Council should flict are in fact parts of the same overall members to express views or for action receive a “periodic” briefing on the Middle situation. An example is the now ritu- to be taken. East from the Secretariat. This decision alised presidential statement (see for was a compromise which followed In the five years that followed (Septem- example S/PRST/2007/20) which is an initiative by Syria seeking a more ber 2002-September 2007) 64 such adopted every six months in conjunction substantive Council role. The compro- public briefings have been held. with the extension of the UN Disengage- mise was that the Council should receive Interestingly exceptions to the under- ment Observer Force (UNDOF) mandate. briefings only and that these would standing about no action began to This statement records that the wider be in private in informal consultations emerge. In January and September issues in the Middle East must also be (S/PV.4474). The controversy which lay 2005 the Council not only heard the resolved. Another example is resolution behind this decision was signalled by briefing but also went on to adopt presi- 1515, adopted in November 2003, which the very unusual reference to the dential statements (S/PRST/2005/2 and emphasised the interconnectedness of difficulty in reaching agreementby the S/PRST/2005/44) at the same meeting. the various negotiating tracks. president of the Council, Ambassador On 30 November 2005, action was taken The Council procedural framework fur- Adolfo Aguilar Zinser of Mexico, record- on the same day as the briefing, but in a ther reflects the interconnectedness of ing the outcome in the formal session: separate meeting. In a meeting that day the situation. Over the years, when “Not without difficulty, the members of on “the situation on the Middle East, issues in the Middle East have arisen, the Security Council reached agree- including the Palestinian question” whether involving Lebanon, the Sinai or ment on holding periodic consultations (S/PV.5312), Under Secretary-General the Golan Heights, they have usually as to the situation in the Middle East, for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari been taken up by the Council procedur- based upon information and points of briefed the Council. Subsequently, in a ally under the single agenda item—“the view afforded us by the Secretariat.” separate meeting later on the same day Situation in the Middle East.” (S/PV.5313) the Council issued a presi- By August 2002 this process had evolved dential statement on the Rafah Crossing It is important to note, however, that even further. Although there was never (S/PRST/2005/57). And in 2006 a further from 2000 all agenda items relating to any formal announcement, the Council modification occurred when, following the Palestinian issues have been titled began a practice of holding a regular an initiative by Qatar, it was agreed infor- “the Situation in the Middle East includ- monthly public meeting at which the mally that every three months a speakers ing the Palestinian Question”. (Prior to Secretariat briefing would take place. It list would be opened on the occasion of that, it was “the Situation in the Occupied seems that this flowed from further the briefing allowing a debate. Arab Territories”.)

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 5. The Council’s Role in States) to help the Council supervise the were on the defensive, the Soviet Union 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973: implementation of resolution 46. submitted a draft resolution demanding The Arab-Israeli Wars a quick ceasefire (S/794/Rev. 1 and Despite the scale and intensity of the Rev. 2). The United States (S/773) had violence and the involvement of the taken a similar position. By contrast, the The 1948 Arab-Israeli War armed forces of several member states, United Kingdom, more sympathetic to The first step by the United Nations on the Council was cautious about formally the position of the Arab states, opposed the Middle East was taken by the Gen- determining that the situation consti- the ceasefire. eral Assembly. In November 1947, the tuted a threat to international peace and Assembly recommended to the manda- security. It was only after the events of Eventually, on 15 July, the Council finally tory state (the United Kingdom) the mid-May: the termination of the British adopted resolution 54 declaring the partition of Palestine into independent mandate, the Israeli declaration of situation to be a threat to international Arab and Jewish states (resolution 181 independence, and the declaration of peace and security and threatening to (II) of 1947). The resolution also war by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, take enforcement action. On 18 July, the requested that the Security Council “take Saudi Arabia, and Syria on Israel that parties complied and a second—and the necessary measures” to implement this step was taken. The Council’s initial more sustainable—truce came into the Plan of Partition with Economic call for a ceasefire, a week after the out- effect. Yet over the next few months, Union and take steps under articles 39 break of the declared war, had no despite two sizable increments of and 41 of the Charter should it consider apparent effect. UNTSO observers, whose ranks rose to that developments in Palestine consti- 572 before year’s end, the transition from The following week, however, resolution tuted a threat to the peace. war was slow. 50 was adopted. It threatened further In December 1947, with tensions in the action against the parties and established In September 1948, Count Bernadotte region mounting, the Council placed the UN Truce Supervision Organization was assassinated by Jewish terrorists. the Middle East on its agenda for the (UNTSO), whose initial 35 observers were The following month, fighting resumed first time. deployed in June 1948. At that point, nei- in the Negev. In response, the Council A succession of Council resolutions fol- ther side had achieved a decisive edge used a new tool. It established a commit- lowed in early 1948. In resolution 40 of 17 militarily but both apparently believed that tee of seven of its members to advise April, the Council called on the parties to they would benefit from a ceasefire as a “on further measures it would be appro- cease military activities and acts of vio- respite in which to rearm and rejuvenate priate to take under Chapter VII of the lence, to refrain from encouraging the their forces. Responding to the persistent Charter” should either party fail to com- transfer of people and arms into Palestine appeals of the UN Mediator, Count Folke ply with a troop withdrawal and the and from any political activity which might Bernadotte of Sweden, the combatants demarcation of truce lines and of neutral prejudice the rights of either community, agreed to observe a four-week ceasefire or demilitarized zones as needed (reso- and to cooperate with the Mandatory commencing on 11 June. Subsequently, lution 61 of 1948). the Arab side, mistakenly convinced that authorities for the maintenance of law and In November, the Council called for an the military tide had begun to turn in its order. It soon became clear that the Parti- armistice (resolution 62 of 1948), while favour, rejected the Council’s call for an tion Plan could not be implemented the acting mediator (Ralphe Bunche) extension of the ceasefire. When the fight- peacefully given Arab objections to the helped to facilitate the negotiation of ing resumed, the Israelis quickly gained two state formula. Accordingly, the Coun- separate armistice agreements between the upper hand in several sectors. cil, in resolution 44 of 1948, asked the Israel and its four neighbours: Egypt, Secretary-General to convene of a spe- By this point Council members found Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. In March cial session of the General Assembly “to they had little leverage over the parties. 1949, despite an abstention by the consider further the question of the future They could not find common ground on United Kingdom and a negative vote by government of Palestine.” the text of an enforceable Chapter VII Egypt, the Security Council took a his- Three weeks later, in an innovative step, resolution. And the differing positions of toric step, recommending to the General the Council in resolution 48 of 1948 the permanent members played a role Assembly that Israel be admitted as a established a Truce Commission (com- in this regard. For instance, at an early member of the United Nations (resolu- prised of Belgium, France, and the United stage of the fighting, when the Israelis tion 69 of 1949).

On 3 April 1949, Israel, in separate agree- n Three, the scope of Council action operation” as we now know it had not ments negotiated under the auspices of was largely conditioned by the politi- been invented.) the acting mediator signed armistices cal dynamics between the permanent n Finally, at each point in the crisis, as in with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, members of the Council and by the so many subsequent ones, percep- under which it acquired about 50 per- parties’ perceptions of their security tions of the military situation on the cent more territory than originally allotted interests at any point in time. Both of ground tended to define the scope for to it under the Partition Plan approved in these factors proved highly dynamic, Council involvement, as well as influ- 1947. But, the transition from war to real as well as interactive. encing the attitudes of Council peace never eventuated. n Four, the Council was rarely united on members. For instance, as noted how to respond to events. Only six of above, the first, brief, ceasefire came Low-level violence continued to be the Council’s members in 1948—less at a point when both sides were ready directed against Israel Palestinian fight- than the seven required (at that time) for a pause and an opportunity to ers who had taken refuge in Egypt to pass a resolution—had voted for regroup. Neither had been able to and Jordan. General Assembly resolution 181 (II), achieve a decisive breakthrough, recommending the partition of Pales- while both expected to emerge from Analysis of the Council’s Initial tine. Two permanent members, China the four-week interlude in a stronger Role in the Middle East Situation and the United Kingdom, had military position. The Council’s firm These early experiences of the Security abstained, along with Argentina and action in mid-July 1948, along with its Council in seeking peace in the Middle Colombia, while Syria had opposed call for an indefinite ceasefire, coin- East began to show a number of pat- the partition. The key resolution dur- cided with a surge in Israeli military terns and lessons that seem to have ing the conflict (54 of 1948) passed success on the ground. Those Council shaped its involvement in the region the Council with the minimum margin members most sympathetic to the ever since. of seven yes votes, with one no vote Arab side saw the ceasefire as a n One, the Council’s stance was largely (Syria) and three abstentions (Argen- means of forestalling further Israeli responsive, not preventive. Its rather tina, Ukraine and the Soviet Union). conquest of additional Arab territory. slow reaction to the initial violence, Of the ten Chapter VI resolutions on For those Council members champi- may have sapped its credibility in the the conflict in 1948, only one (43 of oning the Israeli cause, it appeared as eyes of the parties. But also, no doubt, 1948), a mild call for a truce, passed if the survival of the young state had the sheer complexity of the situation unanimously. Moscow, then support- been at least temporarily secured. which had led the UK to hand back its ive of Israel, abstained on most of While some in Israel may have been mandate also played a role in deter- these votes. eager to press their military advantage, ring the Council as a whole from more n Five, the Council was most deeply others undoubtedly recognised that it robust action. divided when it came to considering rested on a precariously thin founda- n Two, the Council failed to employ the use of those tools that might tion and that maintaining as much many of the strategies that would now have prevented the escalation of vio- international goodwill as possible be considered part of its standard lence, such as an arms embargo, would be essential to national security toolkit. It appeared markedly reluctant sanctions against states fuelling the over the longer haul. to move to Chapter VII, only moving conflict, or the creation of an interna- to this option late in the game. The tional military force to help establish This was an early test of the Council and, United Kingdom, having recently order in Palestine. The Chairman of in several ways; it exposed weaknesses withdrawn its forces repeatedly cau- the Palestine Commission had pro- that would cripple the Council so often tioned against using Chapter VII. The posed the creation of such a force, during the cold war years to come. Chapter VI tools the Council did but the Council demurred. Some del- employ—mediation, urging compli- egations even argued that such a The 1956 War—The Suez Crisis ance with proposed steps toward military intervention would have The next crisis came only eight years peace, and monitoring their imple- exceeded the Council’s jurisdiction later. In July 1956, Egyptian President mentation—may well have facilitated because the conflict lacked an inter- Gamel Abdel Nasser announced the the search for peace, but few carrots national character. (It must be nationalisation of the Anglo/French Suez or sticks were employed to convince remembered, however, that at that Canal Company. This came against the the parties to move in that direction. time the concept of a “peacekeeping background of a much more complex

10 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org situation in the Security Council. The n called for the withdrawal of all foreign Prior to the outbreak of war, the Council Korean War had just ended and had forces; and had remained silent as the UNEF I caused a further intensification of the n established the UN Emergency Force peacekeeping forces began their with- cold war. In the Middle East, Nasser had (UNEF I) to secure and supervise the drawal from the Sinai and Gaza in begun a tilt towards Moscow over the cessation of hostilities. response to Egyptian demands. Bilateral Aswan dam. Nasser was also seen as a British, French and eventually Israeli diplomacy was extremely active during problem by France as a result of his sup- forces withdrew from Egyptian territory. those days, as were informal consulta- port for Algerian rebels. In Israel there tions among the members of the Council. There were new lessons for the Security was a growing sense of a need to But the Council now deeply divided Council from its 1956 experience. respond forcefully to attacks by Palestin- along cold war lines, and with the Soviet n Overall the Council role had been ian groups operating out of Egypt. Union now supporting Egypt rather than a failure—the General Assembly had Israel, did not act to try to prevent the In 1948 both France and the UK had in the end responded to the chal- looming conflict. been more sympathetic to the Arab lenge of restoring international peace states in their conflict with Israel. But in and security. At the end of major hostilities, the Coun- 1956, faced with these new realities, they n The Council had also, while preoccu- cil—in a fifth unanimous resolution in decided in parallel with Israel, to inter- pied with the Middle East, ignored nine days—stressed the need to respect vene in the region in order to secure the another major crisis—the Soviet inva- “essential and inalienable human rights” Canal. They perceived Nasser’s action sion of Hungary in early November. … “even during the vicissitudes of war” not only as a challenge to their economic and called on Israel to observe interna- The period following the Suez crisis was interests, but also as a strategic risk to tional humanitarian principles in its marked by the growth of radical non- their global power, given the importance treatment of prisoners of war and of the state actors, including Fatah and the of the Canal as a sea lane to their colo- civilian populations in areas it had occu- Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) nial and other interests in the Far East pied over the course of the fighting (237 amongst the Palestinian communities in and Asia. of 14 June 1967). Egypt and Jordan and the growth of On 13 October 1956, the British and public support in Arab countries gener- In addition to this flurry of Council activ- French proposed a resolution in the ally for the liberation of Palestine. ity, the Soviet Union on 13 June asked Security Council seeking to guarantee Secretary-General U Thant to request an the free use of the Suez Canal without The 1967 War—The Six Day War emergency special session of the Gen- discrimination. The draft was vetoed by Eleven years passed before the next eral Assembly to address the Middle the USSR. The military intervention major outbreak of violence. In June East crisis. Moscow did not employ the began on 29 October, with an attack by 1967, suspecting an imminent attack Uniting for Peace procedures of General Israel on the Sinai. This was followed from its Arab neighbours—and stung by Assembly resolution 377A (V). Instead, it swiftly by a full scale invasion by British the demand by Egypt for the United cited article 11 of the Charter and indi- and French troops on 5 November. Nations to withdraw UNEF from the cated that it was seeking an Assembly boundary—Israeli forces attacked decision that would lead to Israeli with- The US and other Council members Egypt, Syria and Jordan and the so- drawal from the occupied territories. were taken by surprise and strongly criti- called Six Day War commenced. After many weeks of debate, it became cised the French and UK invasion. Two clear that there was no more likelihood draft Council resolutions calling for In the course of June, the Security Coun- of convergence in the Assembly than in ceasefire and withdrawal were vetoed by cil managed to pass unanimously four the Council. France and the UK. The action then resolutions (233, 234, 235, and 236) call- shifted to the General Assembly, which ing for a ceasefire. This demonstrated On 8 July the Council again took up the was convened in emergency session real Council concern and productivity. issue when Israel and Egypt both asked from 1 to 10 November and the UK and However, the Council was exposed yet the Council to address problems with France came under huge American again to the problem it encountered in the ceasefire arrangements. Within two pressure to withdraw. In the emergency 1948—the parties to the conflict largely days, a consensus statement by the session, the Assembly: ignored the Council’s edicts until their president of the Council called for bol- n called for a ceasefire; military situation made it advantageous stering the UNTSO deployment in the for them to do so. Suez Canal sector.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 11 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT

On 21 July, recognising that it would be There were, however, important differ- And it also affirms the necessity: unable to make a breakthrough on the ences between the drafts. The India, a. For guaranteeing freedom of naviga- underlying issue, the Assembly called Mali, Nigeria draft—the so-called three- tion through international waterways in on the Council “as a matter of urgency” power draft—affirmed that: the area; to resume “its consideration of the tense “occupation or acquisition of territory b. For achieving a just settlement of the situation in the Middle East” (A/RES/2256 by military conquest is inadmissible refugee problem; (ES-V)). under the Charter of the United Nations c. For guaranteeing the territorial inviola- and consequently Israel’s armed bility and political independence of In retrospect, it seems that this period of forces should withdraw from all the ter- every state in the area; through mea- interaction between the General Assem- ritories occupied as a result of the sures including the establishment of bly and the Council may have served a recent conflict.” demilitarized zones. positive purpose. First, it appears that allowing a wider airing of member state The US draft, on the other hand, referred Israel and the United States had argued views actually gave them a greater sense only to the “withdrawal of armed forces that the terms of a peace settlement of ownership in the peace process. Sec- from occupied territories.” Both drafts should be worked out through mutual ondly, and perhaps of more significance asserted the right of all states in the agreement between the parties, rather over the longer term, a number of the region to sovereignty, territorial integrity, than simply assuming that the basis for themes and principles that were eventu- political independence, and security. boundaries should be the armistice lines ally articulated in Council resolution 242 The American draft also spoke of mutual prior to the June 1967 war. Many Arab of 1967 were voiced and debated first in recognition, security guarantees countries, however, had still not recog- the Assembly’s emergency session. “through measures including the estab- nised Israel and refused direct lishment of demilitarized zones,” and negotiations with its representatives. The path to achieving resolution 242, arms limitations in the area. Last minute The creative ambiguity of the words of however, did not prove to be a smooth or Latin American and Soviet drafts gained the first operative paragraph in the Eng- quick one. Initially the Council did not little traction, and the United Kingdom lish text allowed possible different move expeditiously. In October, however, undertook to produce a new draft that interpretations as to whether it called for violations of the ceasefire, including the sought to bridge the differences between the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all or sinking of an Israeli destroyer, the Eilat, the three-power and US drafts by some of the conquered territories. The reminded the Council members of how employing elements from each of them. French version, however, tenuous and dangerous the situation Affirme que l’accomplissement des remained. Another unanimous reaffirma- The British compromise worked and principes de la Charte exige tion of the ceasefire soon followed resolution 242 was passed unanimously l’instauration d’une paix juste et dura- (resolution 240 of 25 October 1967). on 22 November 1967, albeit more than ble au Moyen Orient qui devrait five months after the conclusion of the For much of November, the Council comprendre l’application des deux Six Day War. It affirms that a just and last- struggled to find common ground on principes suivants : ing peace in the Middle East should principles to guide the search for a more a. Retrait des forces armées israéli- include the following principles: durable peace in the troubled region. ennes des territoires occupés lors i. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces Draft resolutions introduced on 7 Novem- du récent conflit ; from territories occupied in the recent ber by India, Mali, and Nigeria and by the b. Cessation de toutes assertions de conflict; United States had several common ele- belligérance ou de tous états de ii. Termination of all claims or states of ments. Both sought “a just and lasting belligérance et respect et recon- belligerency and respect for and peace,” called for a guarantee of free- naissance de la souveraineté, de acknowledgment of the sovereignty, dom of navigation and for a “just l’intégrité territoriale et de territorial integrity and political inde- settlement” of the refugee problem, and l’indépendance politique de chaque pendence of every State in the area requested the Secretary-General to des- Etat de la région et de leur droit de and their right to live in peace within ignate a Special Representative to aid vivre en paix à l’intérieur de fron- secure and recognized boundaries the peace process in the area (S/8227 tières sûres et reconnues à l’abri de free from threats or acts of force. and S/8229, respectively). menaces ou d’actes de force.

12 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org seems to allow much less scope for dif- assistance with re-supply, Israel suc- With respect to the northern sector, on fering interpretation. Perhaps this incon- ceeded in pushing back Syrian forces 31 May 1974 Syria and Israel signed a sistency reflected an agreement in the on the Golan Heights and recaptured disengagement agreement in respect of Council to disagree. But this key issue of the Sinai. the Golan Heights, which provided for interpretation of resolution 242 has never an area of separation and for two equal On 22 October 1973 Security Council been resolved and explains in part the zones of limited forces and armaments resolution 338 called for a ceasefire in ongoing debate about implementation. on both sides of the area. On the same the positions the parties then occupied, day the Security Council, in resolution Resolution 242 also clearly states that the implementation of resolution 242 in 350, established UNDOF to monitor both principles in operative paragraph all its parts and for immediate negotia- implementation of the agreement. In the one (recognition and the right to live in tions under appropriate auspices for a absence of agreement on the outstand- peace as well as withdrawal) need to be just and durable peace. ing issues in resolution 242, UNDOF has fulfilled. While important progress was Also on 22 October Israel accepted the continued to the present day. made by Israel, Egypt and Jordan, reso- ceasefire. Syria followed on 23 October, lution 242 remained to be implemented but fighting continued in various sectors. A Peace Agreement in full. Israel and Syria made no further A very important feature of the Council’s progress with respect to the Golan. On 23 October the Council, in resolution first call for a ceasefire in resolution 338 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza may be 339, requested the Secretary-General to in October 1973 was the third operative seen as a modest step—but it is clearly immediately dispatch observers to paragraph: not an end of the occupation and the supervise the ceasefire. “Decides that, immediately and West Bank issues remain. And various concurrently with the ceasefire, nego- non-state actors such as Hezbollah and On 25 October 1973 the Council upped tiations shall start between the parties Hamas do not comply with respect to the pressure by the adoption of resolu- concerned under appropriate aus- the obligations regarding recognition tion 340. The Council now demanded an pices aimed at establishing a just and and the right to live in peace. immediate and complete ceasefire and that the parties return to their previous durable peace in the Middle East.” Resolution 242 nevertheless endures as positions. And it enhanced the status of In December 1973, with the disengage- the most widely cited and accepted state- the observers by establishing the ment negotiations under way the Council ment of principles for long-term peace in observer as a formal United Nations mis- turned to the next stage of implementa- the Middle East. It also established the sion, UNEF, specifically under the tion of Resolution 338—negotiations for role of the Special Representative of the authority of the Council to supervise the a just and durable peace. Many mem- Secretary-General with a mandate to implementation of the resolution. bers were motivated in part because that establish and maintain contacts with the section of the resolution, having used the states concerned in order to promote On 8 April 1974 the Council, in resolution word “decides” was seen as binding on agreement and assist efforts to achieve a 346, noted that the disengagement the parties. The elected members of the peaceful and accepted settlement in between Israel and Egypt was only a first Council proposed that the Council accordance with the provisions and prin- step and it decided to extend the UNEF should support the convening of a peace ciples of resolution 242. mandate not only to maintain “quiet” in the southern sector, but also to assist in conference, which had been scheduled further efforts for the establishment of a in Geneva under the auspices of the The 1973 War just and durable peace. UNEF was United Nations. In addition the draft reso- Despite the historical achievement of extended by the Council under further lution encouraged the Secretary-General resolution 242, it was only six years resolutions until 1979 at which point the to play a “full and effective role at the con- before the next major crisis. On 6 Octo- Secretary-General observed in a letter ference in accordance with the relevant ber 1973, on the Jewish holiday of Yom dated 24 July that: resolutions of the Security Council”. Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched a sur- “I understand that members of the prise attack against Israel. Egypt retook On 15 December 1973, a resolution to Council are agreed that there should the Suez Canal and a part of the Sinai. that effect was adopted as resolution be no extension of the mandate of the Syrian forces drove the Israeli forces 344. It is notable that it was adopted by force, which, accordingly, will lapse at back from much of the Golan Heights. ten votes to none. But clearly all of the midnight on 24 July.” However, supported by significant US permanent members of the Council had

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problems with this resolution. Perhaps nised that a UN force would have value is still operative today with eleven contin- they saw it as a challenge to their leader- provided that: gents from Australia, Canada, Colombia, ship on the Middle East issue. France, n the Security Council had full opera- Fiji, France, Hungary, Italy, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom tional control; and Norway, Uruguay and the US. and the United States all abstained and n the use of the veto could only be used China did not participate in the voting. to block a decision to withdraw the The Problem of Settlements force not as an instrument to procure It quickly became clear that peace with The Geneva peace conference was con- its withdrawal. Egypt at the state to state level was not in vened on 21 December. The governments itself a formula for resolving the underly- of Egypt, Israel and Jordan attended. The parties also agreed, as a fallback ing issue. Indeed concerns about the Syria declined to participate. The PLO that should it prove impossible for expanding Israeli settlement policies in was not invited. Discussions focused on the Council to agree on and establish the occupied territories were causing disengagement of forces in the south, such a force, the United States was alarm and there was criticism of Sadat in which led to a military working group to create “an acceptable alternative many Arab countries for not extracting being established under the chairman- multinational force.” commitments from Israel on the Pales- ship of the UNEF II force commander. Subsequent events in the Security Coun- tinian situation. But there was little focus on the underly- cil confirmed that these apprehensions ing issues of a comprehensive settlement The Camp David accords had, of course, were well founded. The impact of cold which had been called for by the Coun- envisaged peace involving two ele- war politics meant that the Security cil. The issue of Palestinian representation ments: a peace treaty and a long-term Council was never able to agree on a seems to have been the key obstacle in solution to the Israel/Palestine situation. resolution establishing a United Nations this regard, with both Israel and the US However, it became increasingly clear presence in the Sinai. It seems that insisting that a prior condition for partici- as settlement activity expanded that the the prospect of a veto from the Soviet pation should be recognition of Israel. second element was disappearing— Union, combined with strong opposition especially after the Likud party victory in Although no breakthrough emerged in to the peace agreement from many other Israel in 1977 which led to a further accel- 1973-74 at the end of hostilities, an impor- Arab states, led the parties to consider eration of settlements. tant unilateral development occurred in other options. 1978 when Egyptian president Anwar In response the Council eventually Although Egypt and Israel’s intentions Sadat initiated direct peace talks with acted. In March 1979, in resolution 446, in the treaty were to have UNEF II per- Israel and made a dramatic visit to Israel. the Council determined that Israeli set- form the security tasks, these political This culminated in a peace process tlements in the territories have: difficulties led the Council to allow the under US auspices and the Camp David “no legal validity and constitute a UNEF II mandate to lapse in July 1979 peace accords of 17 September 1978. A serious obstruction to achieving a without renewing it. A substitute was formal peace treaty between Egypt and comprehensive, just and lasting therefore needed and the existing Israel was signed on 26 March 1979. peace.” US Sinai Field Mission undertook new The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt tasks, such as verification functions It deplored Israel’s failure to comply with and Israel was open to the possibility of specified in the treaty. More efforts were past resolutions, especially one relating a UN peacekeeping force similar to made during the following two years to to the status of Jerusalem and called UNDOF between their front lines, despite secure the UN Force and Observers on it: their unhappy experience in 1967. contemplated by the treaty, to no avail. A “…to desist from taking any action Indeed, it called for such a force, but protocol to the peace treaty was signed which would result in changing the stipulated that if it were established it by Israel and Egypt on 3 August 1981 legal status and geographical nature” should not be possible for it to be with- establishing an independent non-UN of the territories and “…not to transfer drawn without a decision by the Security Multinational Force and Observers, with parts of its own civilian population into Council. (This would mean that the con- the mission to supervise the implemen- the occupied Arab territories.” tinuation of the force would be protected tation of the security provisions of the by the veto.) In effect the parties recog- Peace treaty and prevent its violation. It It also established a Security Council commission to examine the situation.

14 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org In July 1979 the Council reviewed the 6. The Period of Conflict disappeared and was replaced by con- report submitted by the commission involving Non-State flict between Israel and non-state actors) (S/13450). In resolution 452 it accepted Actors: Terrorism and was the difficulty that the Council found the commission report and recommen- Counter-Terrorism in responding to this situation. At that dations and reiterated the strong legal time the United Nations had no tradition The disengagement agreement with and political rejection of the settlement of engaging with non-state actors and Syria, the peace agreement between policy in resolution 446. this was graphically illustrated at the Israel and Egypt and the establishment Geneva conference in 1973. (In hindsight In 1980, in response to a series of inci- of diplomatic relations between Israel it is perhaps possible to see that this dents and the enactment of legal and Egypt and Jordan essentially ended had a disempowering effect on the Secu- measures by the Israeli parliament to the era of state to state conflict. But after rity Council. It was not of course until the annex Jerusalem and parts of the Golan, 1973, the situation took on a different 1990s that the Council and the United the Council adopted a series of increas- dimension, largely characterised by con- Nations evolved strategies for dealing ingly strong resolutions condemning flict between Israel and non-state actors. with non-state actors because it was Israel’s non-compliance—including sev- Although Palestinian fighters had been by then deeply engaged in managing eral explicit reaffirmations of the attacking Israel intermittently since the responses to conflicts within states—sit- inadmissibility of acquisition of occupied 1950s, they were not the principal driv- uations in which non-state actors as territory and the unacceptability of ers of conflict and at times acted as combatants were major players.) changes to the status of Jerusalem. proxies for neighbouring states. How- These resolutions (468,469,476,478 and The difficulties the Council faced during ever, the emergence of non-state actors 484) were followed by a very long gap in this period are apparent when it is appre- as the principal combatants after 1973 Council consideration of the situation. ciated that it took 25 years after 1948 gave added focus to the tactics which before the Council again agreed on lan- It was really not until the emergence of had been used by such groups for some guage in a resolution responding to the the Intifada in 1987 that the Council again time. The growth in terrorism and the use of terrorism in the region. It even resumed consideration of the Palestinian responses by Israel to terrorism (some- took 22 years before the Council in 1970, situation. Resolutions 605, 607 and 608 times characterised by others in the in resolution 286 of 9 September—react- followed. But in 1989 Council attention region as “state terrorism”) became ing to the hijacking of several flights by again seemed to flag. The latter months important features of discussions on the the Popular Front for the Liberation of of 1990, however, were marked by a Middle East. Palestine (PLFP)—was able to make a number of important developments. The involvement of non-state actors and brief generic appeal for non-interference Resolution 672 encouraged the Secre- the resort to terrorist tactics had of with international travel and for the tary-General to send a mission to the course been a feature of events in the release of all hijacked passengers and occupied territories. However Israel Middle East prior to the mid-1970s and crews without exception. rejected the Secretary-General’s role and the two phases overlapped significantly declined permission for the mission to Indeed, for its first four decades, the in time. In fact, debates about terrorism visit. This was strongly denounced by the Security Council was frequently split and counter-terrorism first appeared in Council in resolution 673. December over the appropriate response to retalia- the Security Council’s approach to 1990 saw two very significant steps as tory actions taken by countries peace in the Middle East as early as outlined above. Three elected members threatened by terrorism— in particular 1948 when, in resolution 57, it con- (Finland, Malaysia and Yemen) played Israel. As a result the Council became demned the Jewish assassins of UN key leadership roles and the Council deadlocked, unable to condemn either envoy Count Folke Bernadotte as “a adopted resolution 681, which focused the terrorist acts or the counter-terrorism criminal group of terrorists”. on a specific deportation incident. How- measures taken in response. ever of much greater importance was the During the cold war period, these In the face of this situation, and in the unanimous agreement to a presidential matters deeply divided the members of absence of agreement in the Council, statement, which represented a major the Council— and they were inevitably the action shifted, in practice, to the Gen- new step forward in terms of the Council exploited as part of the East/West strug- eral Assembly which took up the issues addressing the underlying situation and gle. Another factor especially after 1973 in a thematic way. Three international is discussed in section 3 above. (when war at the state to state level

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anti-terrorism conventions, addressing imposed a variety of diplomatic, arms, However, it was clearly much easier for the bombing or hijacking of aircraft, and economic sanctions on Libya, the Council (like the General Assembly) entered into force between 1969 and Sudan, and the Taliban regime in Afghan- to address the generic problem of terror- 1973. Ten more United Nations conven- istan for their alleged support of terrorist ism than specific incidents in or related tions proscribing specific categories of acts and groups. The permanent mem- to the Middle East. Nevertheless, after terrorist acts followed in the years since, bers, however, varied in their enthusiasm the 2001 attacks against the US the along with seven regional conventions. for invoking sanctions. China abstained Council began to address more regu- But the General Assembly has been no on most of the sanctions votes, with the larly specific terrorist actions by non-state more successful than the Security Coun- exception of supporting the financial and actors. A series of resolutions and presi- cil in resolving fundamental differences aircraft curbs on the Taliban contained in dential statements followed. In March of definition, scope, and application— resolution 1267 of 1999, while Russia 2002, resolution 1397 demanded “imme- and these differences are inescapably joined China in abstaining on the two diate cessation of all acts of violence, related to the unresolved issues in the sanctions votes on Sudan (1054 and including all acts of terror, provocation, Middle East. 1070, both of 1996). When the Council incitement, and destruction.” Later that voted to add an arms embargo to the month, in a unanimous resolution, the In 1972, the then US Permanent Repre- existing sanctions on the Taliban in reso- Council coupled that latter phrase with sentative George HW Bush cast lution 1333 of 2000, China abstained, an expression of “its grave concern at Washington’s first sole veto in the Coun- resorting to its earlier pattern. the further deterioration of the situation, cil, over a draft resolution that the US including the recent suicide bombings in deemed to be too tepid a response to The Al-Qaida inspired attacks of 11 Sep- Israel and the military attacks against the the murder by terrorists of Israeli athletes tember 2001 on the United States headquarters of the President of the Pal- at the Munich Olympics. In this context, accelerated the trend towards a Council estine Authority” in resolution 1402. China and the Soviet Union vetoed a consensus against terrorism. In the wake Western European draft, while an Ameri- of the attacks, the Council passed two Six months later, the Council condemned can draft was not even put to a vote. generic resolutions. Resolution 1368 of “all terrorist acts against any civilians, 2001 affirmed the right of self-defence including the terrorist bombings in Israel Though terrorist incidents were much in against terrorism. Two weeks later, reso- on 18 and 19 September 2002 and in a the headlines through the 1970s and lution 1373 imposed a long list of policy, Palestinian school in Hebron on 17 Sep- 80s, the Council managed only a single legislative, and reporting requirements tember 2002,” reiterated its earlier unanimous resolution, without address- on member states to assist the global language on ceasing all acts of violence, ing any specific situation or act, struggle against terrorism. This resolu- and called “on the Palestinian Authority condemning “unequivocally all acts of tion was a major innovation for the to meet its expressed commitment to hostage-taking and abduction” and Council. In legal terms it universalised ensure that those responsible for terror- affirming the obligation of states to pre- obligations in various multilateral trea- ist acts are brought to justice by it” vent, prosecute, and punish such acts ties, regardless of whether countries had (resolution 1435 of 2002). This time, the “as manifestations of international terror- ratified those treaties or not. US abstained criticising of the lack of an ism” in resolution 579 of 1985. explicit condemnation of the groups Four further unanimous resolutions fol- With the end of the cold war, however, the responsible for the bombings and of lowed, 1390 of 2002 imposing Council found greater common ground those who support them. Following counter-terrorism measures against Al- on the unacceptability of terrorism as a attacks on Israeli civilians in Kenya later Qaida and the Taliban, 1540 of 2004 on tactic and increasingly came to the view that year, the Council, in resolution 1450, terrorism and weapons of mass destruc- that terrorism was actually a common employed its strongest language since tion, 1566 of 2004 on dealing with threat and should be seen as a threat to resolutions 1368 and 1373, condemning terrorist groups other than Al-Qaida, and international peace and security. “in the strongest terms the terrorist bomb 1624 of 2005 on incitement. Building its attacks” in Kenya, and the attempted own counter-terrorism infrastructure, the On three occasions in the 1990s, the missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines Council established three committees, a Council went beyond condemnations of flight 582. Moreover, it declared that the working group, and a cadre of profes- terrorist attacks and invoked Chapter VII Council ”regards such acts, like any act sionals and experts to help implement sanctions against governments and of international terrorism, as a threat to these wide-ranging resolutions. regimes that aided and abetted them. It international peace and security”.

16 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org This was the first time that the Security 1990s, it began to treat terrorism as a This came at a time when Washington Council had adopted a resolution with- common threat to international peace was seeking to build support for its out any reservations condemning and security and imposed sanctions on action in Afghanistan and it seems to terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians states and regimes accused of sponsor- have recognised the value of building and Israeli targets. ing terrorism. In the third phase, the common ground on Middle East Council not only turned to elaborating issues. The Council offered a platform Since 2002, the Council has acted unan- norms, standards, and implementation for translating the notion of peaceful imously a number of times in respect of mechanisms aimed at bolstering the coexistence articulated by US President terrorism in the Middle East. In Novem- legal and institutional capacities of indi- Bush in the Assembly into an interna- ber 2003, it repeated its call for ceasing vidual member states to counter tional resolution. all acts of violence (resolution 1515). Six terrorism, it also began to address explic- months later, it condemned “all acts of An American draft resolution found itly incidents of terrorism in the Middle violence, terror and destruction” (resolu- ready acceptance by all Council mem- East and the implications of terrorism for tion 1544). A presidential statement in bers except Syria, which abstained, the prospects of a durable peace. March 2005 (S/PRST/2005/12) called for complaining that the draft resolution did “full respect” of the understandings “not address the root of the question: the reached at February’s Sharm el Sheikh Israeli occupation.” The operative para- summit “that all Palestinians will stop all 7. A Vision for Two States: graphs of resolution 1397 demanded a acts of violence against Israelis every- Israel and Palestine cessation of all acts of violence, called where and that Israel will cease all its For most commentators resolution 242 is on Israeli and Palestinian leaders to military activities against all Palestinians a high-water mark in terms of Council implement the 2001 Tenet work plan on everywhere.” It reiterated its “demand action on the Middle East. There were security cooperation and the recom- for immediate cessation of all acts of vio- other points of major significance which mendations of the 2001 Mitchell Report lence, including all acts of terror, are described above, including resolution for ending the violence, rebuilding confi- provocation, incitement and destruc- 338 in 1973 and the presidential state- dence, and resuming negotiations, and tion.” A presidential statement of ment in 1990. But a core issue for most of commended the Secretary-General and February 2006 (S/PRST/2006/6), follow- the forty years from the adoption of reso- other mediators. The political heart of ing the Palestinian elections, underlined lution 242 was the Palestinian demand the resolution was its preambular lan- “the need for the Palestinian Authority to that a key outcome of a negotiated peace guage. It took the language of resolution prevent terrorist attacks and dismantle process should be an independent Pal- 242 a fundamental step forward by: the infrastructure of terror.” estinian state. This goal was fiercely “affirming a vision of a region where A statement was also issued following resisted by Israel and to a greater or two States, Israel and Palestine, live the terrorist bombing in Amman, Jordan lesser degree by the US as well. side by side within secure and recog- (S/PRST/2005/55 of 10 November 2005). In 2002, however, a major breakthrough nized borders.” The Council has also been particularly occurred when resolution 1397 was Israeli and Palestinian representatives outspoken in condemning terrorist adopted. It flowed from an important shift welcomed the resolution. The Council’s assassinations in Lebanon. Acting by in US policy which had been signalled in first reference to a Palestinian state was consensus, the Council established, in a speech to the General Assembly in recognised as a major development. resolution 1595 of 2005, an independent November 2001, by the United States The resolution also welcomed the contri- international commission (UNIIIC) to President George W. Bush. bution of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, assist the Lebanese authorities in their and encouraged the diplomatic efforts of investigation of the Hariri assassination He declared that: the US, the Russian Federation, the which it defined as a “terrorist act.” “We are working toward a day when two states, Israel and Palestine, live European Union, and the UN—the medi- In sum, the Council’s approach to terror- peacefully together within secure and ation group that soon became known as ism and counter-terrorism has evolved recognized borders as called for by the Quartet. through three phases. During the first the Security Council resolutions.” Resolution 1397 initially seemed to have phase—the cold war years—it was (A/56/PV.44) ushered in a new and more hopeful deadlocked. In phase two, during the

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period. By the end of April 2003, the Unanimity among the members of the one third of the total number of resolutions Quartet had produced a “road map” for Security Council on issues related to the vetoed over the more than sixty years of fulfilling the two-state vision of 1397 and Middle East is relatively rare. This is par- the Council’s existence (77 of 210). How- presented it to the Government of Israel ticularly evident when the Council seeks ever, only three of these early vetoes (less and the Palestinian Authority. In Novem- to go beyond surface appeals and gen- than 4 percent) related to the Middle East. ber 2003 the Council, in resolution 1515, eral norms and principles. Comparing As figure 1 illustrates, the situation has unanimously endorsed the Quartet’s the frequency with which permanent changed markedly in recent times. road map. It also reaffirmed the two state members veto resolutions on the Middle Over the past quarter century (1982– vision and called on the parties to East to their propensity to employ that 2006), more than half (34 of 62, or 55 achieve this vision. Despite Israel’s tool on other issues produces some percent) of the resolutions vetoed dealt objections about the UN getting too instructive findings. with the Middle East. Over the past much involved, the US seems to have As is well known, the use of the veto—at decade (1997–2006), that proportion decided to support the resolution, ulti- least in formal meetings of the Council— rose to more than two-thirds (11 out of mately finding it too awkward to veto a has declined over time, and particularly 16, or 69 percent). In that regard, the resolution endorsing a plan it had done since the end of the cold war. During the steep incline since 1995 of the thick bro- so much to create. Council’s first decade, from 1946 to 1955, ken line in figure 1, relating the percentage In the years that followed, as the road 77 resolutions were vetoed, all but two by of total vetoed resolutions that were on map sputtered to a halt and the Quartet the Soviet Union. That is well more than the Middle East, is particularly notable. seemed at times like a spectator on the sidelines, the Council also stepped back Figure 1 from the profile achieved in resolutions 1397 and 1515. Its Middle East focus 85 seemed to be on Lebanon rather than 80

NNumber u b e r o f ofR eResolutionss o lu t io n s V e t o Vee d toed( a ll s u (allb je c subjectst s ) ) implementing the two-state vision. The 75

question raised in section 3 of this report 70 NNumber u m b e r o f ofR eResolutionss o lu t io n s o n t hone M the id d le Middle E a s t East as to whether or when the Council will VVe e t o toede d 65 PPercentage e r c e n t a g o f Vof e t oVee dtoed R e s oResolutionslu t io n s t h a t w ethatr e o nwere reengage remains. t hone M the id d le Middle E a s East 60

55 8. The Impact of Vetoes 50 45 The Council has often been accused by both sides (usually at different times) of 40 being one-sided in its approach to 35 achieving peace in the Middle East. 30

Sometimes its resolutions or presiden- 25 tial statements have been called 20 unbalanced, but even more frequently it has been accused of inaction in the face 15 of mounting violence. Given the political 10

sensitivities of these issues, any resolu- 5

tion on the Middle East is likely to reflect 0 a series of compromises among the interested members of the Council. A balanced resolution under such circumstances is therefore likely to be one that Note: Over the 15-month period from January 2006 through March 2007, three draft all sides have some difficulty with. resolutions were vetoed. Two of these pertained to the Middle East. Both numbers suggest that the upward trend since the turn of the century is continuing.

18 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org All of the Middle East-related vetoes and murder of the Israeli athletes at the seems the Palestinians objected to since the end of the cold war have been 1972 Munich Olympics. the exclusion of the words “prison” cast by the United States. More often and “military attack.” In some respects the analysis of vetoed than not, American representatives have n On 25 June 2006, Hamas kidnapped resolutions is misleading. It does not explained that, in their view, the drafts an Israeli soldier. Israel responded by take into account resolutions not put to appeared to condemn Israeli actions shelling and then invading Gaza and the vote because of the clear threat of without acknowledgment or criticism of arresting elected Palestinian leaders. veto. Nor does it take into account the the acts by others that may have trig- More than fifty Palestinians, including blockage of drafts of presidential state- gered the reactions by Israel. Among the at least twenty civilians, were killed in ments (which by definition require matters addressed in recently vetoed the offensive. On 13 July, the Council consensus). “Blockage” in the Council draft resolutions have been military debated a draft resolution (S/2006/508) on the Israeli-Palestinian issue has also operations in Gaza (S/2006/508) and sponsored by Qatar, calling for the again become more frequent over recent (S/2004/783), the killing of a Hamas immediate and unconditional release years. Resolution 1544 of 2004, con- leader (S/2004/240), the construction of of the Israeli soldier, for the release of demning the killing of Palestinian civilians the security wall (S/2003/980), the treat- all Palestinian officials detained by in the Rafah area, and calling on Israel ment of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat Israel, for a halt to a “disproportionate” “to respect its obligations under interna- (S/2003/891), the destruction of a World military reaction by Israel and calling tional humanitarian law,” in particular, Food Programme warehouse upon the Palestinian Authority to take “its obligation not to undertake demoli- (S/2002/1385), the withdrawal of Israeli “immediate and sustained” action to tion of homes contrary to that law” was forces (S/2001/1199), and the creation bring to an end the firing of rockets the last resolution on Israel/Palestine. of a UN observer force (S/2001/270). from Gaza into Israel. The US vetoed Despite the deterioration in the situation the draft and Denmark, Peru, Slovakia In December 2001, the US vetoed a draft and the growing levels of violence Coun- and the UK abstained. The US said Security Council resolution, sponsored cil action in 2006 and 2007 almost that the text was “unbalanced” and by Egypt (Chairman of the Arab Group) disappeared from the public record. did not reflect important new develop- and Tunisia (a Council member), that Numerous initiatives for presidential ments (the kidnapping of Israeli focused on Israel’s treatment of civilians statements, including by Algeria in 2004- soldiers by Hezbollah in Lebanon). in the occupied territories. The US com- 2006, Qatar in 2006-2007, and Indonesia n On 8 November 2006, the Israel plained that the draft sought “to isolate in 2007, encountered blockage. But Defence Forces shelled the Gaza Strip politically one of the parties to the con- resistance has also come from the Pal- town of Beit Hanoun, claiming that flict” and would not “make a meaningful estinian side. Differences over words there had been a Qassam rocket contribution to improving the situation in often reflect deeply conflicting visions. attack from there. Nineteen Palestin- the Middle East.” Both sides have, at times, perceived the ians were killed, including civilians. On At earlier points, of course, other perma- Council to be one-sided, either because 11 November, Qatar proposed an nent members objected to draft Middle it has been unable to respond to Israeli Arab-backed resolution (S/2006/878) East resolutions. Moscow has vetoed violations of international standards or urging an immediate withdrawal of twelve such resolutions (compared to because it has failed to address threats Israeli forces from Gaza and condemn- Washington’s 41), including ten before to Israeli security. Several examples can ing the Israeli attack. Amendments to the US cast its first in 1972 plus one each be highlighted. the resolution were proposed by many in 1980 and 1984. France and the United n Following the Israeli attack on a prison Council members in order to have a Kingdom teamed in vetoing two draft in Jericho on 14 March 2006 and sub- more balanced text, and were incorpo- resolutions on the Suez Canal crisis in sequent kidnapping of a number of rated in the final draft with Qatari and 1956, though, as noted above, the mat- Palestinian prisoners, violence Palestinian agreement. For instance, ter was then sent to the General erupted in the West Bank and Gaza. “indiscriminate” was changed to “dis- Assembly for action under the Uniting for Qatar sponsored a draft presidential proportionate”; “military assault”, Peace procedure. China, in its sole dis- statement expressing concern over “aggression” and “massacre” to “mili- sension on Middle East matters, added the violence in Jericho and calling tary operations”; “demands” was its veto to Moscow’s on a draft Western upon Israel to withdraw its forces. After replaced with “calls upon.” The calls European resolution on the abduction an initial agreement on the draft, it for a ceasefire and for the dispatch of a

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UN observer force were replaced by 9. United Nations Peace The analysis that follows focuses on six calls for a halt of violence and for the Operations in the observations about the nature and impli- establishment of a fact-finding mission Middle East cations of these operations prior to the by the UN Secretary-General. There deployment of UNIFIL II in 2006, which in were also some alterations to the para- The Security Council learned quickly some respects represents a departure graph on the role of the Quartet. Finally, that UN Missions, mediators, military from previous practice. the condemnation of the firing of rock- observers and peacekeepers could play 1) Prior to 2006, none of the decisions to ets from Gaza into Israel was shifted to an important role. deploy a new peace operation in the the preamble and an operative clause UN operations in the Middle East began Middle East had the united support of only called for the firing to stop. The in 1948. Starting with UNTSO they have the five permanent members of the final draft, however, was vetoed by the taken a variety of sizes and shapes. Security Council—all involved one or US, which claimed that the draft was Some have been far more successful more abstentions. “biased against Israel,” “politically than others. But, the Council’s willing- 2) None of the missions has had an motivated,” and failed either to “dis- ness both to continue to be innovative as explicit Chapter VII mandate. play an evenhanded characterization well as to sustain some very longstand- 3) The deployments have always fol- of the recent events in Gaza,” or to ing operations (despite pressure to lowed, never preceded, the outbreak “advance the cause of Israeli- reduce the overall cost of the UN’s global of large-scale hostilities. Palestinian peace.” peacekeeping operations) confirms that 4) On the whole, the deployment of n Indonesia circulated a draft presiden- over the years its members see ongoing inter-positional peacekeeping units tial statement on 9 January 2007 in an value in such missions for helping to has been more effective in discourag- effort to re-engage the Security Coun- forestall the escalation of violence. ing a resumption of inter-state conflict cil and address the deteriorating than has the deployment of mobile situation in the Palestinian territories. The longevity of the three ongoing oper- military observers. The draft welcomed recent agree- ations—the 1948 UN Truce Supervision 5) Peacekeeping in the area has been ments between Israeli Prime Minister Organization (UNTSO), the 1974 more successful at helping to prevent Olmert and Palestinian Authority Pres- UNDOF, and the 1978 UN Interim Force inter-state conflict than at curbing the ident Abbas and between Olmert and in Lebanon (UNIFIL), testifies both to the use of violence by non-state actors. Egyptian President Mubarak, called unfinished business before them and to 6) The events of 1967 suggest that the on the parties to extend the November their continued utility in the eyes of the premature withdrawal of a UN force ceasefire in Gaza to other parts of the Security Council and most of the actors can have serious consequences for Occupied Territories and the West in the region. UNIFIL’s mandate, size, the maintenance of international Bank, underlined the importance of and capacity were substantially peace and security. exercising restraint and avoiding expanded in resolution 1701 of 2006. If The abstentions by various permanent actions that endanger civilians, and UNIFIL I and II are considered to be the members on mandates for Middle East referred to the importance of negotia- same mission, then there have been five peacekeeping deserve some further tions and the vital role of the Quartet. major UN peace operations in the Middle analysis. As indicated above, none of The US had difficulties with the use of East, including the two UN Emergency the initial mandates for the five principal the phrase “Occupied Palestinian Ter- Forces (UNEF I and II) deployed in the peacekeeping missions in the Middle ritories” (instead of “West Bank and Sinai following the 1956 and 1973 con- East received the unanimous support of Gaza”) and to the proposed call for flicts, respectively, in addition to the three the five permanent members of the extending the Gaza ceasefire to the currently ongoing missions. UNEF I Security Council. Resolution 50 of 1948, rest of Palestinian territories. But it received its mandate from the General which established UNTSO, was voted indicated it was willing to reach agree- Assembly, the other four from the on by the Council in parts. Operative ment. By contrast, it seems the Security Council. Palestinian side insisted on a reference to Israeli incursions in Gaza, and Voting on each operative paragraph was a rela- 3 Since this analysis focuses on the UN peace oper- tively common practice in the Council s seems to have indicated that in the ations most directly related to the Middle East peace early years, particularly when dealing with contro- absence of such wording the text was process, the observer missions in Lebanon (UNOGIL versial and nuanced issues. Unlike current practice, in 1958) and in Yemen (UNYOM in 1963-64) are not Council members would often debate alternative not worth having. included. wordings for key paragraphs in open session.

20 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org paragraph 6, which authorised the provi- has dissuaded Council members from followed the outbreak of conflict, rather sion of “a sufficient number of military putting language in resolutions or than anticipating it, suggests that their observers,” received nine favourable statements which might lead to UN potential as a preventive measure was votes, but the Soviet Union (and Ukraine) monitoring or peacekeeping roles in the never directly tested. Indeed, it was not abstained. In 1956, France and the West Bank and Gaza. Examples include until Secretary-General Boutros Boutros United Kingdom vetoed US and Soviet the shelving in May 2007 of an Organ- Ghali’s Agenda for Peace report in 1992 draft resolutions calling for a ceasefire isation of Islamic Conference (OIC) that the concept of preventive deploy- and then voted against resolution 119 of request for an observer mission ments of peacekeeping forces was really 31 October, calling for an emergency (S/2007/309) and a request from the articulated. UNTSO was established to session of the General Assembly under Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for a mis- help monitor steps towards a cessation the Uniting for Peace procedure. The lat- sion comprising Council members in of hostilities, but it was not designed, ter, however, was treated as a procedural March 2007 (S/2007/146). deployed, or equipped to form a barrier matter that did not require unanimity between potentially hostile forces. UNEF The five peace operations have also among the permanent members. Sub- I followed the 1956 war but was withdrawn, lacked robust mandates. They were sequently, London and Paris cast two of following military and political pressure deployed on the basis of consent of the the five votes in the General Assembly from Egypt, on the eve of the 1967 war. No member states on whose territory they against the creation of UNEF I. China did replacement force was established in its have operated. Though Chapter VII not participate in the voting on resolution wake, so none was on the ground in 1973. mandates have become more common 340 of 1973, which established UNEF II, After that war, and in response to that in recent years, this was not the practice or on any of the other subsequent lesson, UNEF II was deployed and it during the cold war era, when the five resolutions mandating or renewing Mid- helped keep the peace until its mandate missions were first launched. Therefore, dle East peace operations, including was allowed to lapse in July 1979 with it should not be assumed that the Coun- UNDOF and UNIFIL, until shifting policy the Camp David agreement and peace cil carefully weighed its options in terms in December 1981. The Soviet Union between Egypt and Israel. of choosing to act under Chapter VI abstained on resolutions 425 and 426, rather than VII, since the latter was not UNIFIL I was deployed in southern both of 1978 establishing UNIFIL I, on thought in those days to be appropriate Lebanon in 1978 to monitor and verify 427 of 1978, which called for strengthen- for the mandate of a traditional peace- the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore ing the force, and on every renewal keeping operation. The authorising international peace and security, and resolution for UNIFIL through 1985. In resolutions, again in keeping with what assist the Government of Lebanon in 1986, it started voting for the renewal, was then normal practice (and reflecting ensuring the return of its effective author- citing a request from the Lebanese gov- emerging cold war realities), generally ity in the area. However, its effectiveness ernment and UNIFIL’s role in restoring proceeded on the basis that peacekeep- was severely challenged by the fact that the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Mos- ing units were not to be drawn from any it also had to deal with non-state actors— cow has favored UNDOF consistently, of the five permanent members. (Indi- both Palestinian and local. Though it was as well as the periodic renewals of UNEF vidual military observers, however, were able to verify the pullback of Israeli II until the final one, a month after the sometimes the exception to this rule.) In forces, eliminating the security problems Camp David Accords (resolution 438 of assessing the effectiveness of these generated by the non-state actors that 1978), on which it abstained. operations in preventing or deterring had prompted the Israeli invasion in the The only permanent member to have conflict in the Middle East, it should be first place was never within its capability voted for every peacekeeping mission borne in mind that they had Chapter VI as a Chapter VI operation. Armed or renewal in the Middle East has been mandates, were largely populated with groups, some allied to Israel (the South the United States. However this record units from medium or small powers, and Lebanese Army) but most hostile to it only tells part of the story. As recently (until the reinforced UNIFIL in 2006) were (Hezbollah and the secular Lebanese as November 2006, the US vetoed a deliberately given limited arms and cau- Resistance National Front), continued to draft resolution (S/2006/878) in part tious guidance regarding the exercise of operate from bases in southern Leba- because it envisaged a UN observer rules of engagement. non. Though a UN-brokered July 1981 presence on the ground in Gaza. More- ceasefire initially seemed to be taking The fact that the deployment of the UN’s over, the prospect of a US veto has been hold, worsening tensions and escalating blue helmets in the region has always the factor which on several occasions violence between Israel and the PLO

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preceded a second Israeli invasion in Thant contended that he had little choice and UNIFIL experiences. Both sides June 1982. This was the first occasion— but to accede to this demand from Presi- incurred heightened risks and costs despite the decades of regional dent Nasser of Egypt, given that this was from the premature removal of the UNEF insecurity and tension—on which the a consent-based Chapter VI operation forces in 1967. It would appear that a armed forces of one of the countries in and that Egyptian forces were moving unilateral demand for the withdrawal of the region overran a standing UN peace- forward in any case. His critics, and there an international buffer force may actually keeping force. (As discussed below, a were many, especially in the West and increase the incentive for the other side to second such instance occurred on this Israel, countered that he should have at launch a pre-emptive attack, as happened same front in 2006.) Israel retained its least first employed his article 99 powers in 1967. However, as events in Lebanon in presence over a “security zone” in south to bring this matter to the attention of the 1978 proved, it can never be assumed Lebanon until 2000. Tensions and fight- Security Council and/or the General that a peacekeeping force will always ing with Hezbollah, which claimed to be Assembly, which had authorised the mis- deter an attack. In that case the Israeli leading a liberation war against the sion. Despite the legal justification for U army simply rolled over UN positions. Israeli occupier, peaked in 1993. Thant’s choice, there is little doubt that The UNIFIL example also suggests, the reputation of the UN, its Secretary- These experiences illustrate the fourth however, that states may sometimes be General, and its peacekeeping efforts and fifth observations: tempted to overrun peacekeepers where were damaged by this episode. n that standing, inter-positional UN it is perceived (whether reasonably or forces have had greater success in One of the reasons the Council has not) that the peacekeepers have proved discouraging inter-state conflict than turned to more robust missions in other ineffective in constraining provocative has the smaller, mobile UNTSO moni- parts of the world since the end of the actions by non-state actors on the other toring mission; and cold war, including Chapter VII man- side of the line of demarcation. That case n that even the standing forces have dates and contingents from some of the underlines the risks of deploying mis- found it difficult to curb non-state permanent members, has been to avoid sions that lack the mandate and/or armed groups, especially in places, the kind of dilemma faced by U Thant in capacity or associated resources for like southern Lebanon, where govern- 1967. That case also suggested that pre- political reconciliation to effectively influ- ment authority has not always been ventive deployments would be more ence the situation on the ground. Blue well established. credible if backed by a Chapter VII man- helmets in such circumstances can lose date that is not entirely consent the perception that they are a neutral sta- Similar conclusions could be drawn from dependent or if deployed on both sides bilising factor. In the face of continuing UN peace operations in other parts of of a disputed border, so that they could attacks and threats to civilian popula- the world. Challenges to security often not be removed by a change of heart on tions the willingness to respect a UN stem from the relationships (or lack just one side. In that regard, as explained force may erode—putting peacekeep- thereof) between states and non-state in section 5 of this report—contrary to ers at serious risk when subsequent actors. And in the Middle East the diffi- much conventional wisdom—the 1979 military action occurs. culty in establishing an effective peace treaty between Egypt and Israel international framework for bridging The Lebanon war in 2006 demonstrated did not exclude the possibility of retain- political differences seems to have been some of these problems. The origins of ing a UN peacekeeping force between an enduring reason for the continuation this latest round of fighting were familiar. their front lines, despite their unhappy of the situation. For many Council mem- Though Israeli forces withdrew from experience in 1967. Indeed, it actually bers this has been evidence of the fact South Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah envisaged such a force. The fact that it that there is only so much that peace- continued to argue that resort to violence proved impossible for the Council to keepers can do. was justified in light of its claim that Israeli agree on and establish such a force was occupation continued because of the Finally, the precipitate withdrawal of the due to cold war politics. In the end the dispute over the Sheb’a Farms, a small UNEF I force from the Sinai and Gaza on Multinational Force and Observers com- piece of territory along the Syrian- the eve of the 1967 war provides a mand was established instead. Lebanese border. (The Security Council reminder of the potential vulnerability of The parties, as well as the UN, may have had previously recognised this land peacekeeping. Secretary-General U learned some lessons from the UNEF I as Syrian—S/PRST/2000/21 of 18 June

22 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 2000—endorsing the Secretary- for ending the conflict. Most members of mile in the world, Israel continues to General’s conclusions that Israel had the Council had favoured calling for an express doubts about the effectiveness withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in immediate and unconditional ceasefire of the force. Its aircraft repeatedly cross accordance with resolution 425.) at a much earlier stage, but the United the Blue Line in violation of resolution States and United Kingdom contended 1701 (justified by Israel as a necessary In 2006, the crisis was multifaceted. On that it would be better to wait. measure because of the continued arms 25 June, Hamas gunmen from Gaza smuggling and until the abducted Israeli attacked an Israeli military unit, killing In several respects, resolution 1701 on soldiers are returned and until all militias two Israeli soldiers and kidnapping a Lebanon was path breaking. As noted in the south are disarmed), and there third. On 12 July, mimicking the Hamas earlier, it was the first time that the Coun- are even reports of a general re-arming action, Hezbollah fighters crossed into cil achieved unanimity on the mandate of all militias in Lebanon (S/2007/262 of northern Israel, killing three Israeli sol- for an essentially new peacekeeping 7 May 2007). diers and capturing two others. The mission in the Middle East. Though not Israeli response was massive. Sustained explicitly invoking Chapter VII, the reso- In terms of its size and military capacity air attacks were launched on Hezbollah lution articulates the most robust role to UNIFIL is an exceptional peacekeeping targets throughout Lebanon, including date in a Middle East operation. Opera- operation at the very robust end of the in densely populated urban areas. Bei- tive paragraph 12 authorises UNIFIL II spectrum. It is also exceptional, in this rut airport and other elements of “to take all necessary action” to protect day and age, in terms of the political Lebanese infrastructure were also its mission, personnel, facilities, installa- delicacy and ambiguity in its mandate. attacked. Substantial civilian casualties tions and equipment, and humanitarian Its presence seems to have been effec- were inflicted and a major ground cam- workers, as well as “civilians under immi- tive—at least in terms of the expectations paign followed. A major humanitarian nent threat of physical violence.” It is to of the Council members who drafted crisis ensued. Hezbollah fired rockets assist Lebanese government forces in resolution 1701. The parties complain, into population centres in northern establishing an area on the border free but peace has been preserved and Israel, also inflicting civilian casualties. of “armed personnel, assets and weap- space preserved for political solutions. Four UNIFIL military observers were ons” other than those of the government. killed during the fighting when Israeli air- To accomplish these tasks, the UN craft struck their outpost, possibly when troops were to be expanded six-fold, up 10. Conclusions attacking nearby Hezbollah positions. to 15,000, the level of forces the Leba- The Council responded with a presiden- nese government also committed to For all the parties in the Middle East, the tial statement (S/PRST/2006/34) initiated deploying in the south to re-establish its issues discussed here are literally mat- by China, as Chinese nationals were authority there. And the 1701 regime ters of life and death. It is never easy for among the casualties. But there was no was explicitly backed by various sanc- the Council to decisively influence events other Council action regarding the fight- tions measures. on the ground when the protagonists ing until almost a month after the consider that fundamental political and The perceived urgency of the deploy- hostilities commenced. security issues are at stake. The history ments and the leading role played by of the Council’s involvement over the Not only was UNFIL ill-equipped to deter Italy, France, and other European coun- past sixty years shows that nowhere is or prevent the original incursion, it could tries as initial troop contributors resulted that more true than in the Middle East. do nothing about the air attacks and mis- in additional innovations including a sile firings from both sides that followed, major naval component. A new “strate- A second reality is that the Council’s resulting in substantial civilian casual- gic cell” was established within the UN reputation in the Middle East has been ties. Ultimately Israel, chastened by Department of Peacekeeping Opera- affected by the recurrent perception on international public opinion over the tions, comprising a score of personnel both sides that it has often lacked bal- severity of the civilian losses, but proba- from the troop-contributing countries to ance in its approach to these issues. bly also due to its inability to force a reinforce the chain of command between Contrary to conventional wisdom, the decisive military outcome, accepted that the forces and New York headquarters. positions of the permanent members of the Council should act and that reinforc- Despite Lebanon now having the largest the Security Council, while often diver- ing UNIFIL was the only viable formula presence of peacekeepers per square gent, have nevertheless permitted the

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Council to take some very important elected members in the face of collective mobile, flexible, and intrusive capability decisions. As we have seen in 1948, only P5 abstentions is an important lesson.) than tended to be the case during the one of the ten resolutions under Chapter cold war. In some respects, therefore, History also shows the critical impor- VI concerning the war was approved resolution 1701 of 2006 and the expanded tance of the US role. The US has shown, unanimously and the single Chapter VII UNIFIL while they reflect a major depar- because of its close ties with Israel, that resolution passed with the bare mini- ture from past practice in the Middle East, it is willing to block decisions and is the mum of seven assents of the eleven are actually in line with developments in only permanent member to have vetoed possible votes. Over the years, none of the wider UN peacekeeping doctrine. a draft resolution on the Middle East the five peacekeeping missions were ini- The unanimity of the authorisation vote, since the end of the cold war, something tially authorised with the endorsement of the size of the force, and its relatively it has done thirteen times since 1990. On all of the permanent members. robust mandate are unprecedented for the other hand it has also demonstrated, this part of the world. All the local parties, History seems to show that consensus, both on the merits and at times when its moreover, welcomed its deployment. while always desirable, is not a neces- own wider interests were engaged, that Though its success is far from assured, sary condition for useful Council action. it is clearly willing to support outcomes its advent may offer some room for for- Indeed, if unanimity in the Council had in the Security Council. ward thinking. been a prerequisite its engagement on While the pursuit of common ground the Middle East would have been essen- Past peacekeeping efforts in the Middle among the five permanent members of tially non-existent rather than episodic. East have lacked a second component the Council remains a difficult, though Instead, the foregoing history suggests now seen as essential in more modern not impossible, quest, the non-perma- that at certain key turning points the per- forms of peace operations: a parallel nent members are also sometimes manent members of the Council have integrated and dedicated component for divided. And any one of them can block found opportunities, despite their dis- peacebuilding. Such programmes seek the adoption of a presidential state- tinctive approaches to the region, to to facilitate the development of political, ment—while the consent of at least four move forward resolution of longstanding economic, and social conditions condu- of them is required to achieve the nine conflicts in the region. Conditions on the cive to the peaceful resolution, over time, positive votes needed to adopt a resolu- ground, though often unfavourable, are of underlying differences and disputes. tion even if it is favoured by all five seldom static. Likewise, the politics The combination of robust peace permanent members. within the Council also tend to be enforcement and broad-based peace- dynamic and case specific. And it seems The role of UN military forces in the region building has proven helpful in some that external crises can also play a role. was historically very significant—espe- challenging environments, from Africa to It hardly seems a coincidence that the cially in the period of state to state conflict. the Balkans. It may be therefore that with breakthrough in 1990 with the unani- However, especially during the phase in the advent and the availability of a grow- mous presidential statement came at a which non-state actors have played key ing lessons-learned and best practices time of crisis nearby—Saddam Hussein roles in the violence, both Israel and the capacity a wider range of possible mod- had just invaded Kuwait and the Gulf US have been reluctant to agree to any els for peace operations in the region War loomed. Resolution 1397 in 2002 new UN role. Accordingly, until the may be available than had previously came at a time of crisis in the aftermath expansion of UNIFIL in 2006, it had been been appreciated. of the 9/11 attacks. almost three decades since the Council Council doctrine and practice are evolv- last authorised a peace operation in the On the other hand, the Council has not ing in another way that could be helpful Middle East. But in the last decade the managed to play a productive role in the in finding the way toward peace in the UN has learned a lot about peace opera- region at any point without the willing- Middle East. Its relatively recent interest tions and especially about conducting ness of all the P5 to at least acquiesce. in contributing to multilateral strategies operations in environments involving (The sad tale of resolution 344 in 1973 for countering terrorism and the non-state actors. Indeed, that has and the decision, adopted by the ten Council’s numerous counter-terrorism become the norm as have operations resolutions may go some way to dimin- As noted above, the only unanimous vote was for involving much more robust, assertive, the expansion of the UNIFIL force in Lebanon in ishing concerns about even handedness. 1701 (2006).

24 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org As chronicled above, the Council has Annex 1: A Limited Aligned Movement sent to the Security managed to approve, by large margins, Chronology of Key Council a ministerial declaration a string of resolutions and presidential Events Relevant to (S/2007/581) which “welcomed the initia- statements condemning violence and Council Decisions tive to convene a conference… actualizing terrorism in the region and, in some the two state solution.” The declaration 30 November 2007: The draft resolu- cases, acknowledging the victims on also called on the Security Council to tion welcoming the Annapolis outcome both sides of the conflict. During the “assume its responsibilities” and on the was withdrawn. 1990s, it mandated a series of sanctions Quartet to “engage the Security Council”. regimes against states or regimes 29 November 2007: The US proposed 24 September 2007: The members of alleged to have aided and abetted terror- a draft resolution in the Council welcom- the Quartet met in New York and gave ist groups. State support for terrorism, in ing the outcome of the Annapolis the November meeting strong endorse- part as a result, seems to have ebbed meeting. ment. After the meeting US Secretary of somewhat, though it remains a serious, State Rice confirmed that other impor- if less visible, problem. Since 2001, 27 November 2007: A US-sponsored tant parties, like Syria, would be invited the Council has made significant contri- conference convening Israeli Prime Min- and the Quartet Envoy, former UK Prime butions to the development of ister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Minister Tony Blair said he believed the counter-terrorism norms, has established President Mahmoud Abbas took place at process now had “momentum”. a series of committees, working groups, the US Naval Academy in Annapolis. Par- ticipants also included the members of and layers of experts and professional 19 September 2007: Israel declared the Quartet, members of the Arab League staff to address different aspects of this Gaza an enemy entity and indicated (including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi struggle, and employed a range of new possible intentions to interrupt all essen- Arabia and Syria), the G8, the P5 and tools, such as capacity-building, report- tial services to the civilian population, other key international actors. In a joint ing, monitoring, and lessons-learned such as electricity and fuel. The flow of understanding, both parties agreed to exercises. In 2007, therefore, it is no lon- people and commercial goods through engage in negotiations within the frame- ger so easy to criticise the Council’s track border terminals had already been cut work of a steering committee led jointly record in this area. sharply. The UN Office for the Coordina- by the delegation of each party, with a tion of Humanitarian Affairs said that, if The history of the Council’s involvement view to reaching an agreement before the realised, the threatened Israeli restric- in the Middle East described in this end of 2008. The parties also pledged to tions would most likely lead to a report seems to suggest that its failure to implement their respective road-map humanitarian crisis. help in the Middle East at certain junc- obligations to a permanent two-state tures has not precluded its potential for solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 9 September 2007: US Secretary of constructive engagement at other issued by the Quartet on 30 April 2003. State Rice undertook a further visit to the points, sometimes when least expected. region, stressing that the US expected 25 November 2007: Syria confirmed that The appearance of randomness in its the November meeting to be “serious it would attend the Annapolis meeting. ability to take action seems to reflect its and substantive”. tendency to react well when the political 20 November 2007: The United States 27 August 2007: Prime Minister Ehud constellations happen to be aligned. confirmed that the proposed interna- Olmert of Israel and Palestinian Presi- This was true in resolutions 242 and 338, tional meeting would be convened on 27 dent Mahmoud Abbas met in Jerusalem in the presidential statement in Decem- November in Annapolis. ber 1990 and again in 2002 in resolution to further prepare the ground for 1397. And resolution 1701 on Lebanon 4 November 2007: US Secretary of State the multilateral meeting scheduled in 2006, while it came only after agonis- visited the region and met with President for November. Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert. After ingly long delays, came at a point when 22 August 2007: the Secretary-Gen- the meeting President Abbas said that “I both Israel and the US could see that a eral, in a letter to the Security Council, agree with Prime Minister Olmert that there UN role—both a Council resolution and provided details of the mandate of the is a real possibility to achieve peace.” a presence on the ground—would help Quartet representative, Tony Blair, and to extricate them from an even more 28 September 2007: The Chairman of sought Council support for a small team dangerous alternative. the Coordinating Bureau of the Non- of experts to assist Blair. (The Council

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took note of the proposed arrangements perhaps with encouragement from the out in the West Bank and continued in a letter of 22 August, S/2007/508.) In Arab League—visited Israel for high- throughout January 2007 in Gaza. his letter the Secretary- General said: level discussions on the Arab League 26 November 2006: Israelis and Pales- Peace Initiative. “Recent events in Gaza and the West tinians announced a truce in the Gaza Bank make it more urgent than ever to 16 July 2007: The United States floated Strip. But Israeli incursions and arrests move forward with the search for peace the idea of a multilateral international continued in the West Bank, as well as in the Middle East” (S/2007/507 of 22 meeting to advance the vision of the Palestinian terror attempts. August 2007). establishment of a “two state” solution— 14 August 2006: Fighting between Israel a Palestinian and an Israeli state, side by 6 August 2007: Prime Minister Ehud and Hezbollah came to end after Council side living in peace. Olmert of Israel visited Jericho for a resolution 1701 was adopted, calling for meeting with Palestinian President Mah- June 2007: Hamas forces attacked an immediate cessation of hostilities, moud Abbas—the first time an Israeli Fatah forces and took control of the Gaza establishing an arms embargo over Leb- leader had set foot in Palestinian territory Strip. Fatah responded by reasserting anon, inviting the Secretary-General to since 2000. The meeting was held control of the West Bank. On 14 June, secure agreements from Lebanon and against the background of the proposed President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the Israel to the principles and elements for a multilateral meeting in November and unity government and declared a state of long-term solution and boosting the UNI- the parties discussed “fundamental emergency. A summit in Sharm el Sheikh FIL presence considerably. All Israeli issues” and the early establishment of attended by Egypt, Jordan, Egypt and troops withdrew by December. an independent Palestinian state. the Palestinian Authority pledged support 12 July 2006: In a raid over the Blue Line to the Abbas government. 30 July 2007: On the occasion of a visit border between Lebanon and Israel, to Moscow by President Abbas, Russian May-September 2007: After several mimicking the Hamas kidnapping of 25 President Putin said that Russia will sup- bombings in Lebanon allegedly linked to June, Hezbollah guerrillas captured two port Mahmoud Abbas as the legitimate the radical Sunni Islamist group “Fatah Israeli soldiers and killed three others. leader of the Palestinian people, seem- al-Islam” based in the Nahr al-Bared Pal- This operation sparked an Israeli military ingly aligning Russia’s position more estinian refugee camp and attacks on response against Hezbollah targets. The closely with that of the other Quartet the Lebanese army, the Lebanese army fighting quickly escalated into 34 days of member states. Also on 30 July US Sec- laid siege to the camp. More than 300 open war and ultimately led to the death retary of State Condoleezza Rice and people died and 40,000 residents fled of 1,187 Lebanese civilians and 43 Israeli Secretary of Defence Robert Gates before the army gained control of the civilians. 4,092 Lebanese were injured began an intensive round of diplomacy camp in September. and 33 Israelis were wounded seriously in the region to set the stage for the pro- and 68 moderately. The United Nations March 2007: A unity coalition government posed international meeting. Office for the Coordination of Humanitar- of both Fatah and Hamas took office. ian Affairs estimated that one million 29 July 2007: The Arab League Secre- 8 February 2007: Hamas and Fatah Lebanese were displaced between 12 tary General Amr Moussa said that any met in Mecca and reached an agree- July and 14 August, with some 735,000 international conference should have ment to form a new unity government. A seeking shelter within Lebanon and UN involvement, either through the aus- ceasefire was also agreed, but incidents 230,000 outside. On the Israeli side, pices of the Quartet or “…in the continued through March and April. 300,000 residents were displaced, framework of the Security Council”. according to official Israeli figures. 15 December 2006: After another fail- 25 July 2007: The Security Council ure to form a unity government between 28 June 2006: Israel launched an oper- was briefed on the Middle East by the Fatah and Hamas, Mahmoud Abbas ation in the Gaza Strip to recover the Secretary-General’s Personal Repre- called for a Palestinian general election, Israeli soldier kidnapped by Hamas and sentative and Special Coordinator for but Hamas refused, maintaining its right stop Qassam rocket fire into Israel. It the Middle East Process at the time, to hold the full term of its democratically turned into a large-scale conventional Michael Williams. On the same day the elected offices. Severe fighting broke foreign ministers of Jordan and Egypt— www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil/ background.html

26 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org battle between Hamas and the Israeli August-September 2005: Israel pulled last phase, Israeli-Palestinian negotia- Defense Forces (IDF) that lasted until out from four West Bank settlements and tions would be taking place. November. The operation did not suc- from Gaza. January 2003: Following a series of ter- ceed either in recovering the kidnapped 8 February 2005: Israeli Prime Minister rorist attacks in Israel, Israel initiated soldier or in stopping the rocket attacks. Ariel Sharon, Palestinian President Mah- incursions in the Gaza Strip and Nablus 25 June 2006: Hamas kidnapped an moud Abbas, President Mubarak of with numerous civilian casualties. Israeli soldier and killed two others, Egypt and King Abdullah II of Jordan 10 April 2002: The Quartet, comprising demanding the release of Palestinian met in Sharm el Sheikh. Abbas and Sha- the US, the UN, Russia and the EU, was prisoners. ron announced an end to violence. founded with the aim of mediating the 9 May 2006: The Quartet endorsed 9 January 2005: Mahmoud Abbas was peace process. It issued its first state- a temporary mechanism to funnel elected President of the Palestinian ment calling for a two-state solution. assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority. March-April 2002: In retaliation for a people, bypassing the newly elected 11 November 2004: Palestinian Author- series of suicide bombings, Israel con- Hamas government. ity President Yasser Arafat died. ducted operation “Defensive Wall” March-December 2006: After the Fatah re-occupying the West Bank—including 9 July 2004: The International Court of movement of the Palestinian Authority the city of Jenin—arresting Palestinian Justice ruled that the Israeli security bar- President, Mahmoud Abbas, refused to leaders and containing Palestinian rier violates international law and should join a government led by Hamas, ten- Authority President Yasser Arafat in a be dismantled. The UN General Assem- sions between the two factions escalated. compound in Ramallah. bly later adopted a resolution demanding Several Hamas and Fatah leaders were that Israel cease the construction of the March 2002: Saudi Prince Abdullah assassinated and violent street clashes wall and dismantle its structure (A/ announced a peace plan, according to erupted in Gaza, leaving many dead. RES/59/124 of 25 January 2005). Israel which Israel would withdraw from the 28 March 2006: Ehud Olmert was said it would ignore the resolution. occupied territories in return for Arab elected Israeli Prime Minister. recognition. On 12 March, the Security 8 December 2003: The UN General Council adopted resolution 1397, 26 January 2006: Hamas won the Pales- Assembly adopted resolution ES-10/14 demanding an “immediate cessation of tinian Legislative Council elections and asking the International Court of Justice all acts of violence” and “affirming a Ismail Haniya, Hamas leader, became the for an opinion on the legality of the Israeli vision of a region where two states, Israel Palestinian Authority Prime Minister. Israel, security barrier in the West Bank. and Palestine, live side by side within the US, the EU (considering Hamas a ter- 19 November 2003: The Council secure and recognized borders”. rorist organisation) and some Arab states passed resolution 1515 endorsing the suspended all foreign aid, upon which January-March 2002: Palestinian mili- roadmap for peace. Palestinians depend, promising to resume tants carried out an intense campaign of it if Hamas recognised Israel, accepts 30 April 2003: The Quartet released a attacks against Israelis. agreements made by the defeated Fatah roadmap to peace in the Middle East, April 2001: In an effort to calm the vio- regime and denounces violence. Despite composed of several phases monitored lence in Israel/Palestine, the US the suspension of aid and border interdic- by the Quartet with the ultimate goal of appointed George Mitchell to lead an tions imposed by Israel, Hamas was able reaching an Israeli-Palestinian perma- inquiry into the uprising. The Mitchell to smuggle enough money into the Pales- nent status agreement in 2005. The first Commission concluded that immediate tinian territories to maintain some basic phase would be dedicated to ending vio- ceasefire was necessary, along with a services. The defeated Fatah party main- lence, normalising Palestinian life and complete freeze on Jewish settlements tained control over most of the Palestinian building Palestinian institutions. The in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Mean- security apparatus. second phase would focus on consoli- while, CIA director George Tenet dating the achievements of the first 4 January 2006: Ariel Sharon suffered negotiated a ceasefire—but neither ini- phase and on the creation of a Palestin- a massive stroke, leaving the leadership tiative broke the cycle of bloodshed. ian state with provisional borders. In the of Israel in the hands of Ehud Olmert.

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6 February 2001: Ariel Sharon was October 1998: The Wye River Planta- Jordan’s western borders. It also had a elected prime minister in Israel by an tion talks under the aegis of US President normalisation and defense and security electorate favouring a tougher approach Bill Clinton resulted in an agreement for component. Finally, the treaty outlined a to Israel’s “Palestinian problem”. Sharon further Israeli withdrawals from the West number of areas in which negotiations intensified security measures. Assassi- Bank, release of political prisoners and would continue. nating Palestinian militants, air strikes renewed Palestinian commitment to the 4 May 1994: Israel and the PLO reached and military incursions into Palestinian Oslo accords. an agreement in Cairo on the initial imple- self-rule areas became common. Pales- 11-27 April 1996: The Israeli Defense mentation of the 1993 Declaration of tinian militants, meanwhile, stepped up Forces launched a military blitz against Principles. This document specified Isra- suicide bomb attacks in Israeli cities. Lebanon —operation “Grapes of el’s military withdrawal and envisaged December 2000-January 2001: Peace Wrath”—in an attempt to end shelling of further withdrawals during a five-year talks between Israelis and Palestinians northern Israel by Hezbollah. A UN instal- interim period during which solutions to began in Washington DC and continued lation was also hit causing the death of the key issues were to be negotiated— at Taba. They ended inconclusively. 118 Lebanese civilians. such as the establishment of a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, Jewish 28 September 2000: Palestinians Early 1996-1999: A series of devastat- settlements in the occupied territories initiated riots after Israeli opposition ing suicide bombings in Israel were and the fate of more than 3.5 million Pal- leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple carried out by Hamas. Israel’s new Prime estinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 Mount. This was the beginning of the Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who had wars. Subsequently, Israel withdrew from second Intifada. been campaigning against the Oslo a small area given to Palestinian sover- deals under the motto “peace with secu- July 2000: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud eignty; a larger area was given to rity”, lifted a freeze on building new Barak, US President Clinton and Pales- Palestinian civil control, while a third area settlements in the occupied territories. tinian President Yasser Arafat met at of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain- Camp David in a failed attempt to com- January 1996: Elections allowed the Pal- ed under total Israeli control. Israel, plete the final status negotiations. estinians to set up the Palestine National however did not dismantle any settle- Authority (PNA) as a negotiating partner ments. Terrorist bombings by Hamas May 2000: The Israeli army withdrew representing the Palestinians, and as an increased significantly in the 1990s. from South Lebanon in compliance with administrative authority over the Palestin- resolution 425 (1978). UNIFIL remained 13 September 1993: Israel and the ians. Yasser Arafat was elected President. in Lebanon to perform the two other PLO agreed to mutual recognition in components of its mandate: restoring 4 November 1995: Israeli Prime Minis- the Oslo Declaration of Principles. Yas- international peace and security and ter Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a ser Arafat and the PLO were allowed to assisting the government of Lebanon in right-wing Israeli, Yigal Amir. return to Gaza. ensuring the return of its effective author- 28 September 1995: The Oslo Interim 30 October 1991: Initiated by the US, ity in the area. Agreement was signed. It granted the the Madrid Peace Conference for peace- January 2000: Israeli-Syrian peace Palestinians right to self-government on ful resolution of the Middle East Conflict negotiations resumed at the initiative of the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in gathered Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The the West Bank through the creation of and the Palestinians. The conference negotiations broke down in March 2000. the Palestinian Authority. It called for a made little progress, but after the Yitzhak redeployment of the Israeli Army to allow Rabin Israeli government came to power 4 May 1999: The five-year interim period elections to take place. in 1992, Israelis and Palestinians opened defined by Oslo for a final resolution an independent line of negotiations. passed without being fully implemented. 26 October 1994: Israel and Jordan Further withdrawals from occupied land signed a peace treaty, guaranteeing Jor- Mid-December 1988: The PLO Chair- were hindered by disagreements and dan the restoration of its occupied land man Yasser Arafat accepted resolution final status talks (on Jerusalem, refu- and equitable share of water from the 242 and 338, recognised Israel’s right to gees, settlements and borders) stalled. Yarmouk and Jordan rivers, and defining exist and condemned terrorism. The US agreed to open dialogue with the PLO.

28 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 15 November 1988: The Palestine left defenseless. They were attacked by 15 March 1978: Israel invaded Lebanon National Council (PNC) of the PLO the Christian Phalange militia. Hundreds (operation “Litani”) after the PLO hijacked declared a Palestinian state in absentia of refugee civilians were killed. The a bus in Israel. On 19 March the Council and adopted the Palestinian Declaration camps were encircled by Israeli troops. adopted resolution 425 calling for the of Independence. The final communiqué withdrawal of Israeli forces and for the 6 June 1982: Israel launched a massive of the PNC formally committed the PLO strict respect for the territorial integrity, invasion of Lebanon—Operation “Peace to a two-state solution, called for an inter- independence and sovereignty of Leba- for Galilee”—to fight PLO bases near national peace conference on the basis non. It also decided on the immediate Israel’s northern border. Israeli Defence of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and for establishment of UNIFIL in resolution Minister Ariel Sharon decided to push all Israeli withdrawal from all territories 426, to confirm Israeli withdrawal. the way to Beirut, despite Council reso- occupied in 1967. lution 509 demanding that Israel 22 November 1974: The General July 1988: Jordan disengaged from the withdraw all its military forces forthwith. Assembly recognised the Palestinians’ West Bank. PLO forces were defeated and expelled right to sovereignty in resolution 3236 from Lebanon. and granted the PLO observer status in January 1988: The Hamas Islamic resolution 3237. The US rejected official Brotherhood was founded, advocating 6 October 1981: Egyptian President contacts with the PLO until the PLO the destruction of Israel. Anwar Sadat was assassinated by accepted resolutions 242 and 338. Islamic radicals. December 1987-1993: A mass upris- 29 October 1974: The Arab League ing—the first Intifada—against the Israeli 1979-1980: The Security Council meeting in Rabat declared that the PLO occupation began in Gaza and quickly adopted several resolutions deploring was the only legitimate representative of spread to the West Bank. It mainly took Israel’s failure to abide by previous reso- the Palestinian people. the form of civil disobedience and stone- lutions with particularly strong language throwing against the heavily-armed against Israel’s policy of settlements in 31 May 1974: Syria and Israel signed a Israeli troops. the occupied territories. Resolution 446 disengagement agreement over the of 22 March 1979 established a commis- Golan, which provided for an area of 16 February 1985: Hezbollah—or party sion composed of three Security Council separation and for two equal zones of of God—a Shi’a Islamic political and members to “examine the situation relat- limited forces and armaments on both paramilitary organisation based in Leba- ing to settlements in the Arab Territories sides of the area. Israel partially withdrew non was officially established. It had occupied since 1967, including Jerusa- and the Security Council, through reso- begun to emerge during the Lebanese lem.” In response to Israel’s enactment lution 350, established UNDOF to civil war (1975-1990) as a militia. Hezbol- of a “basic law” in 1980 proclaiming a implement the agreement. lah’s manifesto had two objectives: change in the status of Jerusalem, effec- eradicate Western colonialism in Leba- 25 October 1973: UNEF II was estab- tively annexing East Jerusalem, the non and establish an Islamic government lished with the mandate to supervise Council adopted resolution 478 of 20 in Lebanon. the implementation of Security Council August 1980. resolution 340 (1973), which demanded September 1983: The Israeli Army 17 September 1978: Israeli Prime Min- that a ceasefire between Egyptian and began a partial withdrawal from Leba- ister Menachem Begin and Egyptian Israeli forces be observed and that the non, maintaining a self-proclaimed President Anwar Sadat, meeting in parties return to their previous posi- security zone in the south, mainly con- Camp David under the auspices of US tions. Following the ceasefire, Israel trolled by the South Lebanese Army President Carter, signed a framework withdrew from parts of the Sinai in allied to Israel. agreement for peace. Israel agreed to stages, and from a small part of the 16-18 September 1982: After a cease- withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in Golan Heights. fire agreement, the departing PLO exchange for peace with Egypt. The 22 October 1973: Security Council fighters re-established their headquar- peace treaty was signed on 26 March resolution 338 called for a ceasefire and ters in Tunis. The Palestinian refugee 1979. The return of the Sinai to Egypt for negotiations for peace. camps in Beirut, Sabra and Shatila, were was completed in 1982.

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6 October 1973: In a surprise attack, that there would be “no peace, no recog- did not fully exist until 1962. Like many Egypt retook the Suez Canal and a narrow nition and no negotiation with Israel.” other small-scale guerilla movements that zone on the other side, and Syria retook appeared around that time, Fatah was 5-10 June 1967: Israel launched what it the Golan Heights. Following massive US considered subversive by Arab govern- described as a pre-emptive strike against re-supply, Israeli forces pushed back the ments, and had to operate clandestinely. the Egyptian Air Force in the belief that Syrian army on the Golan Heights and Egypt and Syria were planning to invade. 30 October 1956: Because of vetoes regained the Sinai. Israel eventually made Israel defeated the combined forces of from France and the UK, the Security gains beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines. Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and captured Council failed to act on the Suez crisis. Saudi Arabia led a petroleum embargo the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip The matter was referred to the General against states that supported Israel. from Egypt, East Jerusalem and the Assembly which met in emergency spe- 6 September 1970: The Popular Front West Bank from Jordan and the Golan cial session from 1 to 10 November. The for the Liberation of Palestine, the sec- Heights from Syria. Assembly called for a ceasefire and the ond largest of the groups forming the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 16 May 1967: Egypt instructed UNEF to PLO, hijacked Swissair, British Overseas occupied territories. It also established withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and Airways Corporation, PanAm and Trans the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) amassed troops on the border, closed World Airlines flights and diverted them to secure and supervise the cessation of the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying to Jordan. Three hundred and ten pas- hostilities. Britain and France withdrew Israeli flags, and called for unified Arab sengers were held hostage and freed from Egypt within a week, replaced by action against Israel. after governments agreed to release UNEF peacekeepers, and the Israelis Palestinian prisoners. 1966: An escalating spiral of raids and left the Sinai in March 1957. retaliations contributed to heightened September 1970: The PLO, largely 29 October 1956: Israel invaded the tensions in the region. Israel’s border based in Jordan, was increasingly seen Sinai Peninsula while British and French with Syria and with Jordan was the scene as a threat to internal security. Military forces attacked Egypt. of many military exchanges. In Novem- action was taken against the PLO by ber, Egypt entered in a mutual defense 23 September 1956: France and the King Hussein. This resulted in the PLO agreement with Syria. Israel invaded the UK referred the Suez dispute to the re-establishing its headquarters in Leba- West Bank, which was condemned by Security Council. non and the spawning of other more the Security Council in resolution 228 of radical terrorist groups. 26 July 1956: Egyptian President 25 November. Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the 3 February 1969: After Fatah gained 2 June 1964: Following the first Arab UK-controlled Suez Canal Company control of the executive bodies of the Summit in Cairo in January, attended by despite British opposition. The UK and PLO, Yasser Arafat was appointed PLO 13 Arab states, the PLO was founded the US had previously withdrawn their chairman. The organisation’s ideology with encouragement from Arab states, pledge to support the construction of the was also refined, particularly in the July concerned about coordinating Palestin- Aswan Dam following to Egyptian over- 1968 revised National Charter. ian guerilla groups and managing the tures to the Soviet Union. The Egyptian 1969-1970: Egyptian President Nasser risk of being drawn prematurely into president intended to finance the dam declared that he was no longer bound another war with Israel. Ahmad Shuqeiri, project using revenue from the Canal. by the terms of the 1949 armistice. Israel the Palestine representative to the Arab He also closed this vital international also began the policy of establishing League became its first leader and was waterway to all Israeli shipping. settlements in occupied territories. mandated to come up with a plan for a 8 December 1949: The UN Relief and Palestinian entity. 22 November 1967: The Council Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in passed resolution 242 calling for Israeli Around 1959: Yasser Arafat, Khalil al- the Near East (UNWRA), was established withdrawal and establishing the land for Wazir and others founded the Palestine by General Assembly resolution 302 (IV). peace principle. Liberation Movement, soon renamed In the absence of a solution to the refu- “Fatah” (Conquest). The movement gee problem, the General Assembly, August-September 1967: In an Arab began to take shape at a meeting in repeatedly renewed UNRWA’s mandate. summit in Khartoum, Arab leaders resolved Kuwait in October 1957 but apparently

30 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 3 April 1949: Israel and Arab states 11 June 1948: The first truce began, 1 September 1947: UN Special Com- signed an armistice in separate agree- lasting until 8 July. mittee on Palestine (UNSCOP) issued its ments. Israel gained about 50 percent report. The majority of the members rec- June 1948: The first group of military more territory than was originally allotted ommended that Palestine be partitioned observers, known as the UN Truce to it by the UN Partition Plan. The territory into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with Supervision Organization (UNTSO), of the British Mandate of Palestine was a special international status for the city of arrived in the region. divided between Israel, Jordan (which Jerusalem under UN administrative annexed East Jerusalem and the West 20 May 1948: Count Folke Bernadotte authority. The three entities were to be Bank) and Egypt (which took control of of Sweden was appointed UN mediator linked in an economic union. The minor- the Gaza Strip). Jerusalem was divided. in Palestine. ity plan called for an independent federal structure comprising an Arab state and a 11 December 1948: The UN General 15 May 1948: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Leba- Jewish state, with Jerusalem as the capi- Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/194 non, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia tal of the federation. No members (III) calling for the cessation of hostilities declared war against Israel. endorsed the unitary Arab state recom- and establishing the right of return for mended by the Arab Higher Committee. the Palestinian refugees (650,000 to 14 May 1948: The state of Israel declar- The Arab Higher Committee rejected the 750,000 at that time) and resolving that ed its independence as the British majority proposal; their counterparts in compensation should be paid to those Mandate expired. the Jewish Agency accepted it. choosing not to return and for loss of or 23 April 1948: The Security Council damage to property. established a truce commission in reso- June–August 1947: UNSCOP, com- prised of representatives of 11 nations 17 September 1948: Count Folke Ber- lution 48, to supervise the cessation of (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, nadotte was assassinated by members hostilities between Arabs and Jews Guatemala, India, Iran the Netherlands, of the Zionist terrorist group, the Stern in Palestine. Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugosla- Gang. He was replaced by the American 1948: During the war, about 750,000 via), visited Palestine. Palestinian mediator Ralph Bunche. Palestinians, over half the indigenous representatives, known as the Arab 16 September 1948: Count Folke Ber- population (UN estimates), fled or were Higher Committee, decided not to par- nadotte submitted a proposal peace expelled. This gave birth to the Palestine ticipate, on the grounds that the UN had plan for Palestine on the basis of the refugee problem. refused to address the question of independence and had failed to separate the partition formula, redrawing the bound- 30 November 1947: War broke out in aries and attaching Arab Palestine to Palestine, with many Arab attacks on issue of Jewish refugees from Europe Transjordan. He stated that the creation Jews and sieges of Jewish neighbor- from the question of Palestine. of an independent Palestinian state was hoods in Jerusalem. There were also 15 May 1947: At its first special ses- now unrealistic. The union of Transjor- anti-Jewish riots in a number of Arab cit- sion, the General Assembly adopted dan and Palestine was opposed by the ies outside Palestine. While the UK was resolution A/RES/106 (S-1) establish- Arabs, in addition to continued Arab preparing to withdraw, the Palestinians ing UNSCOP to investigate the cause rejection of any recognition of the Jew- raised a guerilla army with volunteers of the conflict in Palestine and devise ish state, and the Zionists rejected the from Arab neighbouring countries—the a solution. plan on the basis that it threatened the Arab Liberation Army—to resist imple- security of Israel. The plan was then mentation of the partition resolution. February 1947: Facing increasing vio- rejected by the UN. lence in Palestine, the UK decided to 29 November 1947: By resolution 181 bring the question of Palestine before 19 July 1948: The second truce in Pales- (II), the General Assembly adopted the the UN and asked for a special session tine started and lasted until 15 October. plan to partition the British Mandate of of the General Assembly. 15 July 1948: The Council adopted reso- Palestine into two states, one Arab and 1945-1946: After World War II and the lution 54 under Chapter VII of the UN one Jewish, with Jerusalem placed discovery of the Holocaust, Zionists Charter, declaring the situation to be a under a special international regime. pressed their cause to the international threat to international peace and security. Arab countries and the Palestinians rejected the plan. community. The UK agreed to issue

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thousands of immigration certificates for and Syria remain united in a single state, May 1916: The secret Sykes-Picot the survivors of the genocide. Increased with Emir Faysal at its head, under the Agreement was signed between the UK terrorism on the part of the Israeli Irgun mandatory authority of a foreign power and France, establishing zones of influ- and the Stern Group, especially directed for a limited time, the US preferably, if ence over much of the Arab Middle East at the British, played a role in the height- not, the UK, but not France. It finally after the war. ened tensions. noted that the Zionist programme could July 1915: In a correspondence between not be implemented without prejudice to 1936-1939: Disorder in Palestine and Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, and the rights of the non-Jews of Palestine the Arab revolt led to the creation of a Sir Henry McMahon, Britain promised to and recommended restrictions on Jew- British Commission of Inquiry—the Peel support Arab independence if the Arabs ish immigration. Commission—which concluded in 1937 would become their allies in World War I. that the underlying causes of the distur- 18 January 1919: The Paris Peace con- 1897: The first Zionist Congress was bances were the Arabs’ desire for ference, organised by the victors of held in Basel, Switzerland. The Con- national independence. It also recom- World War I to negotiate peace treaties, gress issued the Basel Programme to mended a partition of the territory of opened. Emir Faysal condemned the establish a “home for the Jewish people Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas. Sykes-Picot Agreement, demanded in Palestine secured by public law”. The Arab independence and proposed a Beginning in the 1920s: Unrest and WZO was created toward that end. commission of inquiry to determine the discontent grew among local Arab dwell- wishes of the local population regarding 1896: Theodor Herzl, a Jewish journalist ers in Palestine as the flow of Jewish the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. and writer in Vienna published a book immigrants and the purchase of land This plan was approved and a commis- “Der Judenstaat” setting out the idea continued to increase. Resistance to sion was established, headed by Henry that Jews should have their own state, British administration increased and was King and Charles Crane. primarily as a response to European fueled by the sense that the promise of anti-Semitism. He became the founder an eventual Arab state was receding. 2 November 1917: In a letter to Lord of modern political Zionism. Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish From around 1882 to 1939: Initially as community, the British Foreign Secretary 1880-1890: Beginning of the Arab a result of pogroms against Jews in Arthur James Balfour stated that the Brit- movement for independence from the Eastern Europe, then following the cre- ish government supported Zionist plans Ottoman Empire. ation of the World Zionist Organisation, for a Jewish national home in Palestine, Jewish immigration increased dramati- with the condition that nothing should be Other Useful Sources cally. It occurred in successive waves (or done which might prejudice the rights of n A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Con- aliyahs), which intensified between 1929 existing communities there. This became flict, Mark Tessler, Indiana University and 1939, due to the rise of Nazism in known as the Balfour Declaration. The Press, 1994 Germany. In 1922, a British census Arabs were disturbed by this declara- n Le Proche-Orient Eclaté 1956-2000, showed the Jewish population had risen tion, and all the more so when the George Corm, Gallimard, 1999 to about 11 percent of Palestine’s Sykes-Picot Agreement became public n The Question of Palestine at 750,000 inhabitants. In 1940, the Jewish the following month, but British reassur- http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpal/ population reached 450,000. ances were sufficient for the Arabs to n BBC Middle East Timeline http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/ 25 April 1920: Britain was assigned as finally join the Allies in World War I. hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/ the mandatory power in Palestine by the June 1916-1918: The Arab revolt was html/default.stm League of Nations, and France was initiated by the Sherif Hussein ibn Ali with n Mideastweb’s timeline of Palestinian/ assigned Syria and Lebanon. the aim of securing independence from Israeli History and the Israel-Arab August 1919: After touring Syria and the Ottoman Empire, and creating a sin- Conflict http://www.mideastweb.org/ Palestine in June and July, the King- gle unified Arab state spanning from timeline.htm Crane Commission submitted a report Syria to Yemen. recommending that Palestine, Lebanon

32 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Annex 2: Council Action on Israel/Palestine 2000 – 2007 30 May 2007 A Council press statement expressed grave concern at the breakdown of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the resulting increase in violence (SC/9028) 3 February 2006 The Council adopted a presidential statement that congratulated the Palestinian people on free and fair elections (S/PRST/2006/6) 30 November 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed the Agreement on Movement and Access for the Rafah crossing (S/PRST/2005/57) 6 December 2006 A Council press statement welcomed the agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to establish a mutual ceasefire in Gaza (SC/8889) 3 February 2006 The Council adopted a presidential statement that congratulated the Palestinian people on free and fair elections (S/PRST/2006/6) 30 November 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed the Agreement on Movement and Access for the Rafah Crossing (S/PRST/2005/57) 23 September 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that supported the 20 September Quartet statement (S/PRST/2005/44) 9 March 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed the conclusions of a meeting in London on the strengthening of Palestinian institutions (S/PRST/2005/12) 16 February 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed the Sharm el Sheikh summit and the resumption of direct talks between Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian President Abbas (S/PRST/2005/6) 13 January 2005 The Council adopted a presidential statement that welcomed the Palestinian presidential election (S/PRST/2005/2) 10 January 2005 A Council press statement welcomed the presidential elections of the Palestinian Authority (SC/8285) 16 December 2004 A Council press statement encouraged the Palestinian presidential elections and agreed that the moment was propitious for implementing the Road Map (SC/8271) 31 August 2004 A Council press statement denounced the escalation of viole nce in the Middle East and called on all the parties for the continuation of the peace process (SC/8177) 19 May 2004 The Council passed a resolution that called on Israel not to demolish homes in the Rafah refugee camp and expressed grave concern over the humanitarian situation in the Rafah area (S/RES/1544) 19 November 2003 The Council passed a resolution which endorsed the Quartet Road Map (S/RES/1515) 12 September 2003 A Council press statement expressed the view that Israel’s removal of Palestinian President Arafat should not be implemented (SC/7871) 13 June 2003 A Council press statement called on the parties to fulfill their Road Map obligations and reconfirmed the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East including the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli- Lebanese tracks (SC/7793) 30 September 2002 A Council press statement called for the full implementation of resolution 1435 (SC/7516) 24 September 2002 The Council passed a resolution that demanded Israel to cease the measures in Ramallah including the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and an expeditious withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from Palestinian cities (S/RES/1435) 18 July 2002 The Council adopted a presidential statement that supported the 16 July joint statement by the Quartet (S/PRST/2002/20) 28 April 2002 A Council press statement called for implementation of resolution 1405 and expressed concern at the continued delay in the arrival of the fact-finding team in Jenin (SC/7382) 26 April 2002 The Council adopted a press statement that expressed the hope for a non-violent resolution to the situation around Palestinian President Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah and the arrival of the UN fact-finding team in Jenin (SC/7378) >continued next page

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Annex 2: Council Action on Israel/Palestine 2000 – 2007 (continued) 23 April 2002 A Council press statement expressed serious concern for the safety of Palestininan President Arafat and emphasised that the siege must be lifted (SC/7374) 19 April 2002 The Council passed a resolution that welcomed the Secretary-General’s initiative to send a fact-finding team to the Jenin refugee camp (S/RES/1405) 10 April 2002 The Council adopted a presidential statement that supported the 10 April joint statement by the Quartet (S/PRST/2002/9) 7 April 2002 A Council press statement was released on the implementation of resolutions 1397, 1402 and 1403 (SC/7357) 4 April 2002 The Council passed a resolution that demanded implementation of resolution 1402 (S/RES/1403) 1 April 2002 A Council press statement was released on the implementation of resolutions 1397 and 1402 (SC/7351) 30 March 2002 The Council passed a resolution that called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian cities and the implementation of the Mitchell recommendations (S/RES/1402) 12 March 2002 The Council passed a resolution that affirmed a two-state vision and demanded immediate cessation of all acts of violence and the resumption of negotiations on a political settlement (S/RES/1397) 14 February 2002 A Council press statement expressed concern at the continuing violence in the region (SC/7302) 30 January 2002 A Council press statement expressed concern at the worsening situation in the Middle East and called on both parties to resume negotiations (SC/7287) 25 October 2001 A Council press statement expressed concern at the escalation of violence and supported the diplomatic initiative (SC/7188) 7 October 2000 The Council passed a resolution deploring the Al-Haram Al-Sharif provocation in September and condemning violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians (S/RES/1322)

Annex 3: List of Peace Duration Evolution of Troop Strength Operations in the November 1956 – June 1967 • Maximum strength reached in Middle East 1947–2007 Mandate February 1957: 6,073 military personnel This annex does not include the observer Established by resolution 1000 (ES-I) • Strength at time of withdrawal: missions in Lebanon (UNOGIL), in of 5 November 1956 of the first emer- 3,378 military personnel Yemen (UNYOM), in Iran/Iraq (UNIMOG) gency special session of the General and in Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM). Assembly with the aim to: Troop Contributors • secure and supervise the cessation Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, of hostilities, including the with- Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Past Operations drawal of the armed forces of Sweden and Yugoslavia First United Nations France, Israel and the United King- Latest Force Commander (January Emergency Force (UNEF I) dom from Egyptian territory; and 1966 – June 1967) Location • after the withdrawal, to serve as a Major-General Indar J. Rikhye (India) First the Suez Canal sector and the buffer between the Egyptian and Total Cost Sinai peninsula, later along the Armi- Israeli forces and to provide impar- $214.2 million (The financial cost was stice Demarcation Line in the Gaza tial supervision of the ceasefire. considerably reduced by the absorp- area and the international frontier on tion by the countries providing the Egyptian side of the Sinai penin- UNEF was withdrawn at Egypt’s contingents of varying amounts of the sula (headquarters: Gaza) request. expenses involved)

34 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Second United Nations Current Operations Mandate Emergency Force (UNEF II) United Nations Disengagement According to resolutions 425 and 426 Location Observer Force (UNDOF) of 19 March 1978: Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai Location • confirm the withdrawal of Israeli peninsula (headquarters in Cairo from forces from southern Lebanon; Syrian Golan Heights (headquarters: October 1973 to August 1974, and • restore international peace and Camp Faouar) then in Ismailia from August 1974 to security; and Duration July 1979) • assist the Government of Lebanon May 1974 – present Duration in ensuring the return of its effective Mandate authority in the area. October 1973 – July 1979 According to resolution 350 of Mandate In addition, according to resolution 31 May 1974: According to resolution 340 of 25 1701of 11 August 2006: • maintain the ceasefire between October 1973: • monitor the cessation of hostilities; Israel and Syria; • supervise the ceasefire between • accompany and support the Leba- • supervise the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces and nese armed forces as they deploy Israeli and Syrian forces; and observe that the parties return to throughout the south, including • supervise the areas of separation the positions they had occupied at along the Blue Line, as Israel with- and limitation, as provided in the 16:50 hours GMT on 22 October draws its armed forces from Agreement on Disengagement. 1973; Lebanon; Evolution of Troop Strength • prevent a recurrence of the fight- • coordinate its activities referred to ing, with the cooperation of UNTSO • 31 October 2007: 1,043 military above with the Government of Leb- military observers; and personnel, assisted by 57 military anon and the Government of Israel; • cooperate with the International observers of UNTSO’s Observer • extend its assistance to help Committee of the Red Cross in its Group Golan ensure humanitarian access to humanitarian endeavours in the • 26 November 1974: 1,224 military civilian populations and the volun- area. personnel tary and safe return of displaced persons; Evolution of Troop Strength Troop Contributors • assist the Lebanese armed forces • Maximum strength reached in • Current: Austria, Canada, India, in taking steps towards the estab- February 1974: 6,973 military Japan, Poland and Slovakia lishment of an area, between the personnel • Past: Finland (1979-93), Iran Blue Line and the Litani River, free • Strength at time of withdrawal: (1975-79), and Peru (1974-75) of any armed personnel, assets 4,031 military personnel Current Force Commander and weapons other than those of Troop Contributors Major-General Wolfgang Jilke the Government of Lebanon and of Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, (Austria) UNIFIL deployed in this area; and Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Latest Cost • assist the Government of Lebanon, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and 1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008: $41.59 at its request, in securing its bor- Sweden million (A/C.5/61/23) ders and other entry points to Latest Force Commander (December prevent the entry in Lebanon, 1976–September 1979) without its consent, of arms or United Nations Interim Force Major-General Rais Abin (Indonesia) in Lebanon (UNIFIL) related material. Total Cost Location Evolution of Troop Strength $446.5 million Southern Lebanon (headquarters: • 31 October 2007: 13,264 military Naqoura) personnel (authorized strength: 15,000) Duration • June 1978: 6,000 military personnel March 1978 (resolutions 425 and 426) – present

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Troop Contributors • supervision of the General Armi- military operations in Gaza. • Current: Belgium, China, Croatia, stice Agreements of 1949 between • S/PV.5313 (30 November 2005) Cyprus, Finland, France, FYR of Israel and its neighbours; was a Council meeting discussing Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, • observation of the ceasefire in the the Rafah Crossing. Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Suez Canal area and the Golan • S/PV.5312 (30 November 2005) India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Heights following the Arab-Israeli was a Council meeting on the Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, war of June 1967; Middle East situation. Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, • assist and cooperate with UNDOF • S/2004/783 (5 October 2004) was a Qatar, Republic of Korea, Spain, and UNIFIL; and vetoed Algerian, Pakistani and Tanzania and Turkey • UNTSO is also present in the Tunisian draft resolution calling • In 1978: Fiji, France, Iran, Ireland, Egypt-Israel sector in the Sinai. on Israel to halt military operations Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, Troop Strength in Gaza. • S/RES/1544 (19 May 2004) called Canada • 31 October 2007: 150 military on states to dismantle terrorism- Current Force Commander observers related infrastructure. Major-General Claudio Graziano Troop Contributors • S/2004/240 (24 March 2004) was (Italy) Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, a vetoed Algerian and Libyan draft Latest Cost Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, resolution condemning Israel’s 1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: $748.20 Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, killing of Hamas leader Sheik million Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Ahmed Yassin and six civilians. Norway, Russian Federation, Slova- • S/RES/1515 (19 November 2003) United Nations Truce Supervi- kia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland stated the necessity for a two state sion Organization (UNTSO) and the United States solution and unanimously Location Current Force Commander endorsed the Quartet’s Road Map. Middle East (headquarters: Jerusa- Major-General Ian Campbell Gordon • S/2003/980 (14 October 2003) was lem, and offices in Beirut and (Australia) a vetoed Guinean, Malaysian, Pakistani and Syrian resolution Damascus) Latest Cost claiming the construction of the Duration 2006-2007: $62.27 million Israeli security wall is illegal. May 1948 – present • S/2003/891 (16 September 2003) Mandate was a vetoed Pakistani, South According to resolution 50 of 29 May African, Sudanese and Syrian Annex 4: draft resolution condemning Israeli 1948: Selected UN Documents • assist the United Nations Mediator treatment of Palestinian President and the truce commission in super- ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT POST-1973 Arafat. vising the observance of the truce • S/2002/1385 (19 December 2002) Selected Security Council in Palestine. Resolutions and Formal Meetings was a vetoed Syrian draft resolution expressing deep concern at • S/2006/878 (10 November 2006) Following the wars of 1956, 1967 and the “deliberate destruction” by was a draft Qatari resolution, 1973 the functions of the observers Israel of a World Food Programme vetoed by the US, calling on Israel changed but they remained in the warehouse. to remove forces from the Gaza area, acting as go-betweens for the • S/RES/1450 (13 December 2002) Strip. hostile parties and as the means by condemned the 28 November • S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) which isolated incidents could be terrorist attacks in Kenya. expanded UNIFIL’s mandate and contained and prevented from esca- • S/RES/1435 (24 September 2002) capacity. lating into major conflicts. UNTSO has demanded an end to Israeli attacks • S/2006/508 (12 July 2006) was a also performed tasks such as: in Ramallah and urged the draft Qatari resolution, vetoed by the US, calling on Israel to halt

36 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Palestinian Authority to bring to deplored Israeli resumption of of three Palestinian leaders from justice all those responsible for deportation of Palestinians. Hebron and Halhoul. terrorist attacks against civilians. • S/RES/673 (24 October 1990) was • S/13911 (28 April 1980) was a draft • S/RES/1405 (19 April 2002) wel- a Council denouncement of Israel’s Tunisian resolution, vetoed by the comed the Secretary-General’s refusal to allow a visit by the Secre- US, deploring Israel’s continued initiative to establish a fact-finding tary-General’s mission to the occupation of Palestinian territory. team for the Jenin refugee camp. occupied territories (requested in • S/RES/452 (20 July 1979) the • S/RES/1403 (4 April 2002) resolution 672). Council accepted the recommen- demanded implementation of • S/RES/672 (12 October 1990) dations in a report (S/13450) resolution 1397. requested the Secretary-General submitted by a commission it set • S/RES/1402 (30 March 2002) to send a mission to the occupied up to look into the Israeli settle- expressed concern at the worsen- territories. ments. ing conflict between Israel and the • S/RES/608 (14 January 1988) • S/RES/446 (22 March 1979) Palestinians. called on Israel to stop deporting declared that settlements in occu- • S/RES/1397 (12 March 2002) Palestinians. pied territories have no legal demanded an immediate end to all • S/RES/607 (5 January 1988) called validity and the legal status of Jeru- acts of violence and called on both again on Israel to abide by interna- salem cannot be validly altered sides to resume negotiations. tional humanitarian law. unilaterally. • S/PV.4474 (21 February 2002) • S/RES/605 (22 December 1987) • S/RES/438 (23 October 1978) stated that the Council should deplored Israeli actions in the renewed UNEF’s mandate. receive periodic private briefings in occupied territories and called • S/RES/427 (3 May 1978) approved informal consultations from the upon the government again to the Secretary-General’s request to Secretariat on the Middle East. abide by the Geneva Conventions. increase the strength of UNIFIL. • S/RES/1390 (16 January 2002) • S/16732 (6 September 1984) was a • S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) estab- decided that all states should take draft Lebanese resolution, vetoed lished UNIFIL. counter-terrorism measures by the US, demanding Israel lift • S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. restrictions in occupied areas. upon Israel to cease military action • S/2001/1199 (14 December 2001) • S/RES/509 (6 June 1982) against Lebanese territorial integrity. was a vetoed draft Egyptian and demanded that Israel immediately Selected Presidential Statements Tunisian resolution demanding withdraw all military forces from • S/PRST/2007/20 (20 June 2007) Israel withdraw forces back to Lebanon. was the latest annual restatement of pre-September 2000 positions. • S/RES/484 (19 December 1980) the need for a comprehensive set- • S/2001/270 (26 March 2001) was a reaffirmed the applicability of the tlement of the Middle East problem. vetoed draft Bangladeshi, Colom- Geneva Conventions to Israeli • S/PRST/2006/34 (27 July 2006) bian, Jamaican, Malian, treatment of civilians in the Pales- called on Israel to conduct an Mauritanian, Singaporean and tinian territories. inquiry into its attack on a UNIFIL Tunisian resolution calling for full • S/RES/478 (20 August 1980) outpost, which killed four UN implementation of the Sharm el censured Israeli enactment of the observers. Sheikh undertakings. “basic law” on Jerusalem. • S/PRST/2006/6 (3 February 2006) • S/RES/1322 (7 October 2000) con- • S/RES/476 (30 June 1980) recon- expressed concern over Palestin- demned Israeli violence in firmed the illegality of Israeli actions ian Authority commitment to Jerusalem. to change the character and status nonviolence, settler expansion • S/PV.2970 (Part II) (20 December of Jerusalem. and the route of the Israeli barrier. 1990) was a Council meeting • S/RES/469 (20 May 1980) deplored • S/PRST/2005/57 (30 November supporting an active negotiating Israel’s failure to implement resolu- 2005) welcomed agreement on process to help resolve the Middle tion 468. use of the Rafah Crossing and East conflict. • S/RES/468 (8 May 1980) called called for renewed action on the • S/RES/681 (20 December 1990) upon Israel to rescind the expulsion Road Map.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 37 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT

• S/PRST/2005/44 (23 September • S/13450 (12 July 1979) was the Mitchell Report) (30 April 2001) 2005) gave support to the Quartet’s report of the Council commission recommended specific steps for 20 September statement. established under resolution 446. ending the violence, rebuilding • S/PRST/2005/12 (9 March 2005) Selected Secretary-General’s Reports confidence and resuming called on Israel and the Palestinian and Letters negotiations. Authority to respect the under- • S/2007/507 (22 August 2007) was • Protocol relating to the establish- standings reached at the Sharm el the Secretary-General’s letter to the ment and maintenance of a Sheikh summit, especially halting Council delineating the mandate of Multinational Force and Observers violence. the Quartet’s representative, Tony (3 August 1981) was a protocol to • S/PRST/2005/6 (16 February 2005) Blair. the March 1979 peace treaty was a statement on the Sharm el • S/2007/262 (7 May 2007) was a between Israel and Egypt, Sheikh summit. report on implementation of resolu- establishing an independent, • S/PRST/2005/2 (13 January 2005) tion 1559, which alluded to a non-UN force. welcomed the Palestinian presi- re-arming of militias in Lebanon. • Treaty of Peace Between the State dential election of 9 January and • S/2006/956 (11 December 2006) of Israel and the Arab Republic of called for full implementation of the was a review of the situation in the Egypt (26 March 1979) officially Quartet’s Road Map. Middle East by the Secretary- ended war between the states, • S/PRST/2002/20 (18 July 2002) General. established friendly relations, and supported a joint statement by the returned the Sinai to Egypt. Selected General Assembly Quartet. Resolutions • The Framework for Peace in the • S/PRST/2002/9 (10 April 2002) sup- Middle East (Camp David Accords) • A/RES/46/86 (16 December 1991) ported a joint Quartet statement. (17 September 1978) was the basis revoked the resolution which • S/PRST/2000/21 (18 June 2000) for peace between Israel and Egypt described Zionism as racism (A/ endorsed the Secretary-General’s and stated their intention to nor- RES/3379). conclusion that Israel had with- malise relations. • A/RES/3379 (10 November 1975) drawn its forces from Lebanon. decided that Zionism is a form of • S/22027 (31 December 1990) reaf- THE YOM KIPPUR WAR (1973), racism and racial discrimination. firmed Council commitment to an UNEF AND UNDOF • A/RES/3237 (22 November 1974) active negotiating process by call- Selected Security Council granted the PLO observer status at ing for an international conference, Resolutions the General Assembly. but members could not agree on • S/RES/350 (31 May 1974) estab- • A/RES/3236 (22 November 1974) when this would be appropriate. lished the UN Disengagement recognised the Palestinian’s right Force (UNDOF) to monitor imple- Selected Other Council Documents to sovereignty. mentation of the Agreement of • SC/9184 (30 November 2007) was Selected Other Documents Disengagement between Israeli a press release hailing the under- • A Performance-Based Roadmap to and Syrian Forces. standing resulting from the a Permanent Two-State Solution to • S/RES/346 (8 April 1974) extended November Annapolis conference the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the UNEF’s mandate. as “the most significant break- Middle East Road Map) (30 April • S/RES/344 (15 December 1973) through” for several years. 2003) called for a three phase tran- declared Council support for • S/2007/309 (24 May 2007) was an sition to a permanent settlement. convening a peace conference. Organisation of the Islamic Confer- • Palestinian-Israeli Security Imple- • S/RES/340 (25 October 1973) ence request for an observer mentation Work Plan (Tenet demanded a ceasefire and gave mission in the Occupied Palestin- ceasefire plan) (13 June 2001) laid the observer (resolution 339) the ian Territory. out specific, concrete steps to status of a UN mission (UNEF II). • S/2007/146 (13 March 2007) was a re-establish security cooperation. • S/RES/339 (23 October 1973) Non-Aligned Movement request for • Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh requested the Secretary-General to a UN observer mission comprising Fact-Finding Committee (the immediately dispatch observers to Council members.

38 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 9429 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org supervise the ceasefire. • S/RES/237 (14 June 1967) called • A/RES/997 (ES-I) (2 November • S/RES/338 (22 October 1973) on Israel to observe international 1956) called for a ceasefire. called for a ceasefire and the humanitarian principles in treat- comprehensive implementation ment of prisoners of war and THE CREATION OF ISRAEL AND THE of resolution 242. civilians in occupied areas. 1948 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR Selected Secretary-General’s Report • S/RES/236 (11 June 1967) Selected Security Council reaffirmed the Council’s demand Resolutions • S/11302/Add.1, Annex A (30 May for a ceasefire. • S/RES/69 (4 March 1949) was the 1974) contained the Agreement on • S/RES/235 (9 June 1967) con- recommendation to the Assembly Disengagement between Israeli firmed demand for a ceasefire. that Israel be admitted as a mem- and Syrian Forces concerning the • S/RES/234 (7 June 1967) ber of the UN. Golan Heights. demanded a ceasefire. • S/RES/62 (16 November 1948) Selected Other Document • S/RES/233 (6 June 1967) called for called for an armistice between • Separation of Forces Between a ceasefire. Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel and Syria (31 May 1974) was Selected General Assembly Syria. the disengagement agreement that Resolution • S/RES/61 (4 November 1948) officially ended hostilities during • A/RES/2256 (ES-V) (21 July 1967) established a committee to advise the Yom Kippur War. the Assembly called on the Council on taking Chapter VII action if the to swiftly return to considering the parties failed to comply with troop THE SIX DAY WAR (1967) tense situation in the Middle East. withdrawals and truce lines. Selected Security Council • S/RES/57 (18 September 1948) Resolutions THE SUEZ CRISIS (1956) condemned the murder of the UN Mediator in Palestine, Count Folke • S/RES/242 (22 November 1967) Selected Security Council was a British sponsored compro- Resolutions Bernadotte. • S/RES/54 (15 July 1948) declared mise between the three-power and • S/RES/119 (31 October 1956) the situation in Palestine to be a US drafts, calling on all parties to called for an emergency special threat to international peace and end territorial claims, respect sov- session of the General Assembly to security and threatened to take ereignty, and for Israel to withdraw make recommendations on the Chapter VII action. from occupied territories. Suez issue, due to French and Brit- • S/RES/50 (29 May 1948) threat- • S/8229 (7 November 1967) was a ish veto of the previous day’s draft ened further actions against the draft resolution by the US affirming Council resolutions. the necessity for mutual recogni- parties and established UNTSO. • S/3713/Rev.1 (30 October 1956) • S/794/Rev. 1 (27 May 1948) and tion and territorial integrity among was a draft Russian resolution, Rev. 2 (29 May 1948) were Soviet the belligerents, withdrawal from vetoed by France and the UK, Union draft resolutions demanding occupied territories, security guar- calling on all parties to immediately a ceasefire. antees, and requested the cease fire. Secretary-General to designate a • S/773 (22 May 1948) was a US • S/3710 (30 October 1956) was an draft resolution demanding an Special Representative to mediate earlier draft Russian resolution immediate ceasefire. between the belligerents. vetoed by France and the UK. • S/8227 (7 November 1967) was a • S/RES/48 (23 April 1948) estab- Selected General Assembly draft resolution by India, Mali and lished a truce commission for Resolutions Nigeria calling on Israel to withdraw Palestine. • A/RES/1002 (ES-I) (7 November from occupied territories and call- • S/RES/44 (1 April 1948) requested 1956) called for the withdrawal of ing on all states to respect other the Secretary-General to convoke a all foreign forces. states’ sovereignty and right to special session of the Assembly to • A/RES/998 (ES-I) (4 November security. consider the question of the future 1956) requested the Secretary- • S/RES/240 (25 October 1967) government of Palestine. General to submit a report on reaffirmed the ceasefire. • S/RES/43 (1 April 1948) was a call setting up UNEF I.

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for a truce between Palestinian and fight against international terrorism. • S/10785 (10 September 1972) was Jewish combatant groups. • S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004) a draft US resolution, vetoed by the Selected General Assembly insisted states refrain from aiding USSR and China, condemning the Resolutions terrorist groups in acquiring WMDs. 5 September Munich Olympics ter- • A/RES/377(V) (3 November 1950) • S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) rorist attack and calling on states to established the Assembly’s Uniting obliged states to criminalise sup- cease encouragement for terrorism. for Peace procedures. port to terrorists and to share • S/RES/286 (9 September 1970) • A/RES/194(III) (11 December 1948) information about terrorist groups. appealed for an end to hijacking of was a resolution calling for a right • S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001) commercial aircraft and for release of return for Palestinian refugees. condemned the 9/11 attacks and of passengers and crew currently • A/RES/181(II) (29 November 1947) affirmed the right of individual held. contained the General Assembly and collective self-defence Selected Presidential Statements against terrorism. Partition Plan for the British Man- • S/PRST/2006/29 (29 June 2006) • S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000) date of Palestine. condemned the murder of Russian added an arms embargo to exist- INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM diplomats in Iraq. ing sanctions on the Taliban • S/PRST/2005/55 (10 November Selected Security Council government of Afghanistan. Resolutions 2005) condemned the terrorist • S/RES/1276 (24 November 1999) attacks in Amman, Jordan on 9 • S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) placed sanctions and aircraft November. called on states to take further restrictions on the Taliban. measures to combat terrorism. • S/RES/1070 (16 August 1996) Selected Security Council Press Statement • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) estab- placed further sanctions on Sudan. lished UNIIIC to investigate the 14 • S/RES/1054 (26 April 1996) placed • SC/9029 (30 May 2007) was a February 2005 assassination of sanctions on Sudan. statement on authorising the estab- former Lebanese Prime Minister • S/RES/579 (18 December 1985) lishment of an international tribunal Rafiq Hariri. condemned acts of hostage-taking to try suspects in the assassination • S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004) and abduction. of Rafiq Hariri. called on states to cooperate in the

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