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Occupying Iraq Removing Saddam Tracing the Invasion, 'Regime

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Occupying Iraq Removing Saddam Tracing the Invasion, 'Regime SJMN Operator: NN / Job name: XXXX0109-0004 / Description: Zone:MO Edition: Revised, date and time: 08/24/76, 05:38 Typeset, date and time: 03/18/04, 21:14 031904MOAAAA004 / Typesetter: IIIOUT / TCP: #2 / Queue entry: #0523 CYAN MAGENTA YELLOW BLACK 3/19/2004 MO AA 4 CYAN MAGENTA YELLOW BLACK 3/19/2004 MO AA 5 4AA WWW.MERCURYNEWS.COM SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS FRIDAY, MARCH 19, 2004 WORLD March 20, 2003 March 18, 2004 President Bush Nearly one year after initiated the air the war, resistance raid on Baghdad. forces exploded a car bomb near the Mount A divisive war, an elusive peace Lebanon Hotel. One year ago, accusing Saddam Hussein of possessing banned weapons of mass destruction, President Bush ordered an One year after the invasion, Iraq remains in a state of siege from attacks on coalition forces and bombings of invasion of Iraq to overthrow him. The 42-day war, immensely unpopular in much of Europe and elsewhere, ended Saddam’s both military and civilian targets. As security forces struggle to maintain order, a political process aims to dictatorship and inaugurated a new era of both hope and uncertainty for Iraq. The banned weapons were never found. return the country to Iraqi sovereignty by June 30, with an elected government in place by the end of 2005. PrewarKey figures power Removing Saddam Occupying Iraq Postwar power The U.S.-led coalition that invaded Iraq defeated the opposition with overwhelming air power, precision munitions, Coalition authorities have divided Iraq into six sectors controlled by different military units. In the four U.S. Creating Iraqi rule Key players Key players Centralizing control unpredictable strategies and surprising speed. While many expected the war to open with prolonged bombing, zones, those units will change as part of a major troop rotation to be completed in May. The rotation will reduce Grand Ayatollah Saddam Hussein On March 8, the Iraqi Governing Ali Sistani Saddam Hussein maintained power by making commanders launched a ground attack the first day and bypassed several cities in a race for the capital. Five days the number of U.S. soldiers in Iraq to 110,000, from about 120,000 currently serving. Council signed an interim One of the longest- himself president, prime minister, chairman after reaching Baghdad, U.S. troops controlled the capital and Saddam’s regime was finished. constitution providing for the Iranian-born Shiite ruling dictators of Interim cleric has emerged as of the only legal political party and head of return of power to the Iraqi constitution modern times, the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. people. the most powerful Saddam effectively figure in Iraq, a controlled Iraq since behind-the-scenes 1968 and held TURKEY On June 30, 2004, kingmaker who makes absolute power from President, head Saddam Hussein Chairman of the occupying forces return no public appearances 1979 to 2003. of state and Prime minister Revolutionary TURKEY and will not meet with supreme army and head of Command Council, Captured airfield sovereignty to Iraqis. commander Iraq’s most U.S. officials. Qusay Hussein government powerful body Kurdish- 1st Marine Assembly Expeditionary Force elections Saddam’s younger son Deputy RCC controlled By Jan. 31, 2005, Iraqis Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and heir apparent; in Prime area elect a 275-member Leader of the Supreme charge of Iraq’s Minister March 30 3rd Infantry Tariq Aziz Kurdish fighters and U.S. special National Assembly. Council for Islamic powerful security and Mosul 4 Division, 101st 24,000 Iraqi Revolution in Iraq, the intelligence agencies forces advance as Iraqi troops Irbil Airborne security forces National Vice chair retreat toward Kirkuk. NORTH Assembly most powerful of the and commander of the of the RCC Mosul The assembly Shiite clerical groups, Republican Guard. British forces Irbil chooses a Deputy vice prime April 10 and an ally of Sistani. ministers 8 president and U.S.-backed Kurdish forces enter Kirkuk, as the Sulaimaniya 101st U.S. special forces Airborne two deputies. President Baath Party Iraqi government and army abandon Mosul, the and Kurdish guerillas Sulaimaniya and Uday Hussein other key northern target. Tigris Division Kirkuk deputies Chairman of Kirkuk Saddam’s older son, Halabjah 82nd Airborne Being replaced by the Baath The three choose a Ahmed Chalabi infamous for his Party SYRIA Stryker Brigade Halabjah impulsive behavior Minister Ministers 16,000 Iraqi prime Longtime leader of of defense minister. Prime exiled Iraqis as and cruelty; head of April 14: U.S. forces 9 SYRIA security forces minister Iraqi Olympic Euph president of the Iraqi capture Tikrit, ra Tikrit NORTH CENTRAL The new government will National Congress; a committee; known for Regional Saddam’s power base, te Army Government s Eu write a permanent favorite of U.S. torturing athletes in the last major March 20 phr Tikrit who lost soccer After March 17 deadline passes, U.S. at constitution. Permanent officials but unpopular combat engagement IRAQ IRAN es 4th constitution in Iraqi polls. matches. of the war. bombs Baghdad site in attempt to kill Saddam and other leaders. Infantry Abid Hamid April 6-9 WEST Division 1 By Oct. 15, 2005, a Mahmud al-Tikriti Army Air force An armored column drives into central Baghdad as Al-Fallujah 7 “Sunni Being replaced by 1st referendum is held on a Saddam’s cousin and Army and Marines consolidate positions surrounding Triangle” Infantry Division and permanent constitution. L. Paul Bremer Baghdad Constitutional closest aide; overseer the city. Two days after, the capital falls. Ar-Ramadi 6 BAGHDAD ZONE 30th Infantry Brigade referendum The top U.S. civilian 1st with Qusay of the Republican April 4 Ar-Ramadi administrator in Iraq, security services; Airborne Division Guard Ar-Rutbah Army seizes Saddam Al-Fallujah Baghdad a career diplomat; fourth on U.S. most- Regional governors Regional Baath By Dec. 31, 2005, newly elected overseeing Intelligence International Airport. An-Numaniyah wanted list after the Party chairs Being replaced by 14,000 Iraqi government takes office. reconstruction and April 1-2 Karbala Tigris above three. 5 Al-Kut 1st Cavalry Division security forces transition to Iraqi 3rd advances on Baghdad IRAQ rule. from Karbala as Marines Karbala Al-Kut close in from Al-Kut. 3 Ad-Diwaniyah JORDAN 7,000 Iraqi March 24 Al-Amarah security 3rd Infantry Division is An-Najaf forces CENTRAL SOUTH 209,000 north of An-Najaf, within 82nd An-Najaf Ad-Diwaniyah Peacekeeping tactics U.S. soldiers 50 miles of Baghdad. Airborne With the end of major combat, coalition forces faced serious new challenges: Offensive tactics Division Marines enter An-Nasiriyah. As-Samawah Al-Amarah trying to keep order in a chaotic environment and guarding against suicide During the invasion, the main objectives of the coalition Troop levels Severe sandstorm stalls the Being replaced by bombings and resistance attacks. advance. An-Nasiriyah 1st Marine were the swift elimination of troops loyal to Saddam and on eve of war Less experienced units are taking capture of principal cities. Key points of the strategy: Expeditionary Force 22,000 Iraqi Helicopters have become key Each figure represents 1,000 soldiers security forces IRAN charge of foot patrols in urban areas. After June, 40% of the force tactical and transportation Seasoned combat units Basra Troop levels today will be drawn from the National elements, though they are led the advance, often Guard and reserves. highly vulnerable to attack. Extensive use of air Polish-led An-Nasiriyah Eleven helicopters have been support, with fighter jets guided by elite special- operations troops. Umm Qasr multinational SOUTHEAST Basra downed since October. first destroying Iraqi air 89,500 120,000 U.S. soldiers* forces defenses and then bombing U.S. soldiers 430,000 400,000 2 enemy positions. en route Iraqi army Iraqi paramilitary March 21 British and U.S. Umm Qasr and security personnel 17,000 Iraqi forces cross border KUWAIT United from Kuwait. security forces 60,000 Iraqi Kingdom Recruiting Division Kuwait City soldiers and police and training KUWAIT Iraqi security SAUDI ARABIA 26,500 Multinational forces units is an 26,000 11,000 United Kingdom Kuwait City urgent 2,700 Italy priority. United Kingdom 2,000 Ukraine 1,300 Spain * An estimate; the figure changes daily because of SAUDI ARABIA 100 1,300 Poland 100 0 1,100 Netherlands troop rotations 0 Ground troops advanced in armored columns, with Miles 1,000 Australia Miles M-1A/2 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles and 27 other countries leading the way and guarding supply lines. Patrols in lighter vehicles such as the Humvee Before the war After the war substitute for tank raids. Gen. Tommy Franks Gen. John Abizaid As head of U.S. Central Command Daily crude oil production 2.2 million to 3 million barrels Daily crude oil production 2.3 million barrels Became head of U.S. Central from 2000 to July 2003, Franks was Command in July 2003. commander of the wars in Electricity available nationwide 4,400 megawatts Electricity available nationwide 4,088 megawatts (50% of demand) A grandson of Lebanese Afghanistan and Iraq. In the Army immigrants from Coleville, Calif., since 1967, he was wounded three Potable water available 12.9 million liters Potable water available 21.3 million liters (November 2003) Abizaid graduated from the U.S. times in Vietnam. Franks asked to Internet connections 4,500 Internet connections 50,000 Military Academy in 1973 and retire just after major combat in has served in conflicts in Iraq ended. Daily commercial aircraft departures nationwide 2 Daily commercial aircraft departures nationwide 40 Grenada, Bosnia and Kosovo. Tracing the invasion, ‘regime change’ and retribution The Marines go in Saddam statue toppled Bremer takes charge Qusay Hussein killed Thanksgiving with the troops Saddam in custody Signing the constitution Baghdad hotel bombed March 20: U.S.
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