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Saddam Hussein.This EC Establishes the Subfile Systemfor Capturinginformation Regardinghussein

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Saddam Hussein.This EC Establishes the Subfile Systemfor Capturinginformation Regardinghussein Rev.O1-31-2003! SW FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Precedence: ROUTINE Date: O2/17/2004 T0: RecordsManagement Recorif4AtmnA/UC Centeri t. Unit Frmm CounterterrorismIraq/Syria &#39;Uni om 4383 Contact:SSA -1 Approved By: Drafted By: asjr CaseID #: S! l5EHQl448534 S! 3l5EHQ-l448534lA S3l5EHQ-l4485341B315E-HQ1448534-302 315E-HQl448534BC 315E-HQl448534CE be mt 315EHQ-l448534ELADEELASSIFIED BY ugghaw 55334 DE 1.1 5-05-3959 3l5E~HQl448534ELl 3l5EHQl448534EL1A 3l5EHQ-1448534-ELlB 3l5EHQl448534LAB 3l5EHQl448534NC Title: }:s DESERT SPIDER IT - IRAQ Swumsis:Opening ZEQ subfiles of captionedfor matter.AD authority to restrict subfile 302. ::Isq1:: Clas&#39; &#39; By: 11109, 110 /c1e~e Reason " . c assify On: X1 ~i_9292 E95 To: Records Management From:Counterterrorism Re: B{ 315EHQ-1448534, O2/17/2004 Dennlsz 1B{:The captionedinvestigation wasopened tocapture intelligence andevidence itas relates to thenational security investigation targetingSaddam Hussein.This EC establishes the subfile systemfor capturinginformation regardingHussein. The following subfiles will be established: lA Will be a repository for all contemporaneous notes and itemswhich will need tobe retainedthat are not evidentiary in nature. lB will document FDl92bulky recordsand will be a repository for evidentiary material. 302- will be arepository for FD302s,inserts and classified LHM&#39;swhich document interviews conductedof captioned subject andadditional High Value Detainees. BC will be a repository for background informationon captioned subjectand hisclosest associates. CE will be used maintain all records regarding expenditures ofcase fundsin captioned matter. ELA- will beused to maintain alldocuments regarding the administration of electronicsurveillance incaptioned matter. ELl - will documentall original elsur logs developed or maintained in captioned matter. LAB will be a repository for all laboratory requests, reports and findings in captioned matter. clippingsNC deemed willof be significant a repositoryvalue for allthat theypertinent will addnewpaper tothe overall progression of the investigation. This EC also documentsthe fact that due to the sensitive natureof theinterviews ofcaptioned subject,and the request ofthe Departmentof Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General[noted in immediate EC fromCounterterrorism to General Counsel,dated O2/O6/2004]the 302 subfile will be restricted in the AutomatedCase ManagementSystem ACS!.Access will be granted to the following individuals: w% | II ll wlk Records Management From: Counterterrorism j§¢: 315E-HQ1448534,O2/17/2004 UC UC SSA George Piro SSA SSA SSA IA IA IA || ll | Bwi To: e ords Management From: Counterterrorism Re: ! 315E-HQ1448534, O2/17/2004 LEAD s!: Set Lead 1: Action! RECORDS MANAGEMENT AT WASHINGTON, DC EK RMDwill ensure the aforementionedsubfiles will be openedand thataccess to sub 302 will remain restrictedto the above mentioned personnel. Q0 MK I II |1 U.S. Department of Justice .": ll Federal Bureauof InvesngatlonI I In RWW*°° Baghdad Operations Center HN February 7, 2004 Interview Session Number: l b6 Interview Conducted by: SSA b / . Arabic/English Translation: ISSA >¥§ SaddamHussein HighValue Detainee#1! was interviewed on February 7, 2004 at a military detention facility at BaghdadInternational Airport BIAP!, Baghdad,Iraq. Hussein provided the following information: >¬Q Husseinstated he has servedthe Iraqi people for a very long time. He considers his greatest accomplishmentsto be the social programs forthe citizens of Iraq and improvementsin other sectors of the economy includingenhancements toeducation, the health care system, industry, agriculture, and other areas that generally enhanced theway of life for Iraqis. :?§i In 1968, Iraqipeople "barelyhad anything." Food was scarce, both in rural villages as well as in cities. Farmland wasneglected and agricultural methods were primitive. The Iraqi economy depended entirely on oil production, with most being exportedfrom Iraqby foreigncompanies andnot controlled by the government. Asthe countryof Iraq manufactured veryfew products, mostgoods hadto be imported. The health care system was "primitive" and the mortality rate was very high, particularly among the poor. The infant mortality rate was very high, estimated at 40-50 percent, with many deathsoccurring during pregnancyor delivery. The literacy rate was around twentyseven percent, with those classified as "literate" often not capable of true proficiency in either skill. Roads were almost nonexistent in rural areas and "very bad" in the cities of Iraq. Limited educational opportunities existed at the university level, even in Baghdad. Many cities had no college whatsoever. Generally, only wealthy individuals could afford to send their children to a university. ! llerive : -3 DEELASSIFIED BYucjhaw 50324 Dec &#39; y Qn on 05-05-znns n/ii This documentcontains, neignerrecommendations conclusions nor ofthe FBI. It is the propertyof the BB1 andis loanedto your agency; 2.:and its contents arenot to be distributedoutside youragency. II ll | ZZ@ Baghdad OperationsCenter !%§ Husseinimproved allof the areas previously discussed. Heconsiders thishis greatestaccomplishment and "service" to the Iraqi people. :PS§ In response to a question I" egarding Hussein&#39;s own mistakes, Hussein agreed that all humansmake mistakes, and only God is free of error. He noted that the interviewer was "smart" Hussein&#39;s previous and it appeared he had read reports from conversation between two interviews.such educated Husseinpeople stated, willnot be "Perhaps, useful aor successful." If one sayshe is perfect, he is saying he is like God. Husseinadded that not all of his efforts were viewedas successful in some people&#39;sHussein eyes. comparedthis evaluation of himselfby others and the existenceof differing viewpointsto his own views about theAmerican systemof government, of whichhe is "not convinced."He pointed out that approximately 30 millionpeople live in poverty inAmerica, butUS residentsdo notconsider this a "crime." Hussein statedhe wouldnever accept that for Iraq. When promptedby the interviewer a second time regarding Hussein&#39;smistakes, own he asked, "Do youthink I would tellmy enemy ifI madea mistake?" Hussein said that he would not identify mistakeshe had made to an enemy, likeAmerica. He pointed outthat he does not considerthe intervieweran enemy, nor the American people,but the Americansystem of government. }S3 Husseinstated it is not only importantwhat people sayor think about him nowbut whatthey think in the future, 500 or 1000 yearsfrom now. The mostimportant thing,however, is what Godthinks. If God believessomething, willHe convincethe people to believe. If God doesnot agree,it does not matter what thepeople think.Hussein added that a "traitor" provided information which led to his capture. As a "guest" at the location and as an Iraqi, he should not have been given up to US forces. The grandchildren of this "traitor" will hold him accountable and tell this to future generations. >§! In the future, Hussein believeshe will be known for fairness andas having "faced oppression."Ultimately, what the Iraqisthink will be upto them.Hussein statedIraqis would not compareleaders ofthe preIslamic era to the Islamic era. :tS{:Hussein believesIraqi citizens were able to exercise their rights to selfgovern asguaranteed bythe interim I§§eRE;r7=s<+l m@ Baghdad Operations Center Constitution in 1990. This occurred because the people had a leader and a government to lead them. >§d Hussein believes Iraq "will not die." Iraq is a great nation now, as it has been at times throughout history. Nations generally "go to the top" only once. Iraq, however, has been there many times, before and after Islam. Iraq is the only nation like this in the history of the world. This "gift" was given to the Iraqi people by God. When Iraqi people fall, they rise again. Hussein believes the Iraqi people will take matters into their own hands," rule themselves, and, with God, decide what is right. Hussein hopes that Iraq will advance in all areas, financial, religious, etc. He added that, as a humanitarian, he hoped the same for the American people. :}Si Hussein was quoted a passage from the book "Zabibah and the King, commonly attributed as his writing, where the deputies shout, "Long live Zabibah. Long live the people. Long live the army." The deputies do not, however, shout "Long live the king." Hussein was asked whether the Iraqi people will forget or fail to shout for him, to which he replied no. He said, "It&#39;s in God&#39;s hands." Hussein emphasized the king is not the main subject of the book, rather the people. He stated God comes first, then the people. Hussein added Jesus Christ was considered "from the people" as Mary was of the people and Christ lived among the people. Being faithful is a cherished thing in life, being a traitor is the worst thing. Hussein stated, "God wanted to tell us don&#39;t be surprised when people are traitors to you." Hussein ended this portion of the discussion by saying "a prisoner can not do anything for the people." He said he still has to have faith in God and repeated "It&#39;s in God&#39;s hands." :}§I Hussein stated the National Progressive Front, a political party, first existed as the National Front from 1970- 1974. The National Front consisted of the Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP!, the Communist Party, and the Baath Party. Political parties express differences in Iraq as occurs in other countries. Some groups, including the Kurds, did not believe in socialism along the same
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