Dictators, Ministerial Cronyism, and International Conflict

DICTATORS, MINISTERIAL CRONYISM, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT A Dissertation by MITCHELL THOMAS RADTKE Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Ahmer S. Tarar Committee Members, Matthew C. Fuhrmann Michael T. Koch Valerie M. Hudson Head of Department, William R. Clark August 2017 Major Subject: Political Science Copyright 2017 Mitchell Thomas Radtke ABSTRACT My dissertation examines an underexplored actor on the world stage: the personalist dictator. Personalist dictators are leaders that have consolidated all domestic power for themselves. Idi Amin, Joseph Stalin, Saddam Hussein, Pol Pot, and Benito Mussolini are all examples of these heads of states. Their names often live in infamy, etched in the history books with the blood they spilt. Although these regimes are usually remembered for the violence they exhibited within their own regimes, recent studies have found that these leaders also show a proclivity for conflict at the international level. In this dissertation, I ask, “Why are personalist dictators so conflict-prone?" To an- swer this question, I show how domestic institutions vary across autocracies in response to leaders’ incentives and how this variation can be used to explain the propensity of international conflict. In particular, I investigate the role that advisers play in conflict occurrence and outcomes. Often, leaders rely on individuals, such as defense ministers, to give them assessments on the potential outcomes of conflicts. Little attention has been paid to the effects these ministers have. However, if we believe that war may be the product of mis- calculation of capabilities or resolve, then we might expect that states with less capable advisers are more likely to experience international conflict. Using this logic, I argue that personalist dictators are more likely to experience conflict, because they are more prone to employ incompetent advisers and ministers. My theoretical argument starts with the assumption that personalist dictators live in constant fear of being overthrown. In comparison to other leaders, the despot can expect that his removal will more likely end in a negative post-tenure fate: exile, imprisonment, or death. The reason for this propensity is that a personalist leader’s legitimacy is uniquely tied to personal traits. So long as the despot is living, he poses a threat to his successors. ii The extreme costs for removal and the proximity of the likely culprits result in the dictator’s regime being characterized by paranoia and mistrust. In order to protect himself, the personalist dictator surrounds himself with small, exclusive circles of crony advisers whose loyalty is ensured through bloodlines or long-standing friendships. In utilizing this lever, the dictator trades bureaucratic independence and competence for loyalty and sur- vival. This loyalty-competency tradeoff results in a personalist leader’s inability to get accurate and honest assessments of his opponents from these advisers, making him more likely to underestimate his opponents, experience war (particularly ones in which his state is the weaker party), and incur worse conflict outcomes. After constructing an original cross-national dataset of over 1500 defense ministers from 1945 to 2005, and performing in-depth examinations of the Gamal Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein regimes, I provide evidence that personalist leaders are more likely to place cronies in advisory positions, and these advisers undermine the ability for personalist leaders to form accurate war-time assessments, leading to bargaining breakdowns, and subsequently, war. iii DEDICATION To my wife and family. Without them, this dissertation would not have been possible. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This section is probably going to read like an Oscar acceptance speech. In that, I will likely go on far too long, I will forget to thank numerous people who deserve my gratitude, and for large stretches, I will be incoherent. For those that I forget to thank, know that I do appreciate all that you have done for me. The idea for this dissertation first emerged in Matthew Fuhrmann’s International Con- flict seminar. Over the years, I have received feedback and support on the project from a variety of people. I would like to give credit to those individuals. First, I would like to thank Matthew Fuhrmann for helping to encourage this idea in its formative stages and pushing me to clarify my arguments and provide a clear framework for the project. Second, I would like to thank those that provided comments and critiques at conferences (Peace Science, Midwest, and Texas Triangle) where the dissertation’s chapters were pre- sented in their early forms. I thank Idean Salehyan, T. Clifton Morgan, Scott Wolford, Quan Li, Nehemia Geva, and Elizabeth Stein for providing these helpful comments. I also want to acknowledge Benjamin Fordham, Christopher Gelpi, Katja Kleinberg, and David Lektzian. Although these individuals did not give feedback on this particular project, their advice on other works was incorporated into the dissertation. I particularly would like to thank Jessica L. Weeks for providing me an early version of her book Dictators at War and Peace to help me find this project’s place in the literature and her overall encouragement. A special thank you goes to my adviser, Ahmer Tarar. This project would not be possible without your guidance and support. The list of things that you did for me while at Texas A&M is too numerous to fit into this section. I appreciate your patience with me whenever the production of chapters was slow. Moreover, you were incredibly generous v with your time when it came to leading direct studies, providing comments, writing letters, filling out forms, helping me work through formal models, and teaching me a majority of what I know. I also want to thank you for being a great mentor and friend. Our philosoph- ical discussions, although probably not pertinent to this study, are some of my fondest memories at Texas A&M. I also appreciate the support that I received from other members of my dissertation committee: Michael T. Koch, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Valerie Hudson. Mike, you were always kind and helpful. I learned a lot from you about the discipline, and in particular, how to be a good instructor and colleague. You were always there for me whenever I had a question, and you were always encouraging when I made mistakes. I truly appreciate all you have done for me. Most of all, thank you for being a friend. Matt, you provided incredible feedback on my projects, and you were always a strong advocate for me within the department and on the job market. Thank you for your honesty and your willingness to push me to reach my full potential. Valerie, thank you for your thorough and enlightening comments on the project. Your feedback was always insightful and thought-provoking. I also appreciated your enthusiasm for the project, which gave me energy to push through when things got difficult. There was a host of instructors and colleagues at Texas A&M that were invaluable in my training and education. I want to thank Quan Li, Kim Q. Hill, Evan Parker Stephen, B. Dan Wood, Guy Whitten, Ahmer Tarar, Michael Koch, and Shuhei Kurizaki for teaching wonderful seminars that provided me with theoretical and analytical skills that I will have for a lifetime. A special thank you in this regard goes to Paul Kellstedt, who likes to say that I minored in “Paul," whose seminars have developed my ideas of domestic politics, many of which can be found in this dissertation and other works. I also will like to thank Paul for being on my dissertation committee in its earliest stages, and for providing feed- vi back and support, particularly with regards to the job market. I would also like to extend my gratitude to those who provided me instruction at the Inter-consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan as well as the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Institute (EITM Houston). Thank you to Jim Morrow, Amy Pond, Ariel Tang, and Mark Manning for the knowledge they imparted. In particular, I would like to thank all those who provided comments on my presentation at EITM Houston (Chap- ter 3 in its earliest stages), including Jim Granato, Douglas Dion, Anup Phayal, Andrew Philips, and Mallory Compton. I would like to give special mention to three professors here at Texas A&M who made significant contributions to my development as a scholar and instructor: Elena McLean, Hyeran Jo, and Erica Owen. My first research assistantship was with Elena, and I cannot think of a better match for me. Our similar senses of humor made every project a delight. Elena, you are truly a great scholar, and I consider you a mentor. Most of what I know about research design and how to produce publishable work I learned from you. I am not sure how to repay you. Hyeran, I thoroughly enjoyed our three years researching together. I have learned a lot from you. You were a great co-author, and I was always impressed by your insightfulness and intelligence. Erica, my teaching assistantship with you was a pleasure. You taught me a lot about being an instructor. I also appreciate how strong of an advocate you were for me. Time and time again, you went beyond the call of duty to help me out. In particular, you were instrumental with regards to teaching awards and the job market. I would also like to thank Joe Ura, John Robertson, Michael Koch, Nick Conway, and Dwight Robyler for their advice and support with teaching. A well-deserved thank you goes to William Clark for his support and encouragement as department head.

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