Saddam Hussein Part 1 of 2
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
FD-517 Rev. 2-17-97! r,.-.," :5: pr4 Q Q1? __| i *5 41+ii 0 0! I ¢* 4 A: in--".00 Federal Bureauof Investigation Prosecutive Reportof Investigation Concerning SADDAM HUSSEIN IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL Article 11 GENOCIDE Article l2 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY Article 13 - WAR CRIMES ALL II92IF|:!F1I'L!lTI-IIIJ CU}-ITJLII-TED HEREII-I I 1'5UIJC Li-L5 IFIEII DATE I35-ll2D]9 BY 1.10,-"}::aI~.T Copy to: Regime Crimes Liaison Office FD-518 Rev. 12-1-95! Report of: SADDAM HUSSE IN Ofce: FB IHQ mm; March 10, 2005 cm H! # 163IHQ1462938 Narrativeof Offense: BACKGROUND Introduction From 1980 to 1988, Iraq was involved in a fullscale war with its neighbor, Iran. The IraqIran war was fought isI ,,/92 ./;§m"92.._,,=1~._?<>s;£~z:"» 92.-' W»I on several fronts, including /""zr" -"°[-mm , / I .92_ / ~ 92~~~--" _./woamum ./ 4./K _/ may § :it " ->'~v = @W"'"1°"°~ the Northern Region of Iraq uuaqqan .1-I A|Maws1T/mm/" 1"? . which borders Iran. This .~z92kl._92.92'A RAB '-92:{>,|»wrq. m,,|mr-M-»|92/ KRBHL; ;_92v N;1N,929292 "M" .92 5,? 1 I i: region, sometimes called Rl§PlBL| ' / 1A|o.vvv.:.1n°,,',_,,,,,,,c,§fj_"'f'_-,v.l~' Kn r -. " 92__.____ 92 T DuyraxZam° V. Alkklcfn '= ;/ Q _ 4 Kurdistan or the Autonomous v 1 | ~'"3 ' ~92T Wirkk # 5 '5 '4 mgwAsh la ¢5*"°"°°4. / 92 Mbr,92m1u T;V1,, 1;; V "" Region, was home to the ~ _, > v x / "15,-~ /L, lsl..»92M|<kn-l m.| 'or Kurds. Two major parties »>92 ._ : , B 4 _ W,1,~ Hnmgdln> I I IR 92 92, .'/_/numb/' I__,, >ALA_1-lAD I I/rag Sm . T represented the Kurdish ./ __/°Ak.u.h.i1' _/~Q, 3,m "v n ' O I "<%s,,,,,,,,,;, mm?' '"~.<.m...m ..-sh wan: '0Hdlhn 92 x 4. rmX1 A .7 '3 population: the Kurdistan 1 A1rw,_;.u " 92 , -0. * Hm .,._,/R;92._ 7 1 a6a'qba|:192._92 Democratic Party KDP! - 4| Rulliah LA Avnemaq@;Q 92 ggraghdad! °k1m Kfvllai C 92__°n=w > I 92j__,sauun D ,7 umun headed by MASUD ALBARZANI, XNHAR I~"92*' 1 - ., _,_____é 53 K H > Doliorn the son Of MULLAH MUSTAFA /KgraiégB.-KB!-11 V'7 smw-;a_-a ° T =. s 92I92_-U43-92L @A|Hi|sAn.5 ° v 92,._, * BARZANI hereinafter MULLAH 1 ~9292. K i~.f""' V °'m=|a».92m&m| . "92_ 92. 92 /1 H,» x Monnyyk 5 - . 92~. mmq/5°~ A|92,w}92j.;|g*>AgPMn1vaI1, _ - .-9- ' 921*92'>,}-?A92. mn h -1 Q- _~. BARZANI!, and the Patriotic 92-. ~41!-al*"Y'd92L5 ?_W§|.-ML!, u.392msi92,u-1O . , 7, 192 M 92! , .92 - 92 Union of Kurdistan PUK! 92._ / . _- t K.-*~ .,'. Hi. 92 I- °,:a||J'-sshvi ,~ -. o<myym~Ar=1a-.92 Car'yata|GIu|.X?<3I ,1 92 A _ [ Anus; headed by JALAL TALABANI Afar '92-~ wmm " If ' U 9292 P gr AnNésiyeh Aromkmo. 9 __: 92., hereinafter TALABANI!. The 92 /es 92_ __. !:v 4 92 ¢";'*"' M'ET"A|sasi5iP'§§92 Kurds had been seeking 92 I >4 .92ll'TI|.92N9292 '*1E*>R»92" *>< S492l'l!l .-92R.=92II I A - 92 .» ., = f-'J"Q,~v?§y,,» '92/ MnkhialB92$y'VJh al governmental autonomy for L1 r~mm.z|CJMQI mm" 92 j ,1 I ";;AiE¢:~ years. O C114:-vmv:|Ii-:@p|m| 92. 0 TIJW92 imp 92. I Aupu 92 ,_. ,_.,_I 111,__"",j"1;,'§,, ---- |ulovn.1n-um!b:»und.>1 ,1 ~- Gwamuuatarm. m '92. On or about Z 5 p|-mm, . mu Dmamlaam92 , v_..__..- u|.1.|» -M1 approximately February 12, Sn:->nda|v ma-1 1987, the Iranian Armed mama 5- 90 vi-J 150200 1&0mm v'MPumm'I!921'-92>-..,. win.¢..,».- »< rt ,1l_4___|_._|_14i4 »...;~».q»..-~1>.-=...4~..»..-.¢wavy; 4. awn ~.-.1;- 1 a aw 1-:<- 150 zoo m 1 163IHQl462938 Forces IAF! initiated a series of military offensives in Northern Iraq against the Iraqi government. On March4, 1987, the IAF, with the assistance of Kurdish guerrilla fighters known as Peshmergasfrom bothPUK andKDP, launchedits most alarming offensive of the series. Code namedKarbala 7, the IAF penetrated eight miles into Iraqi territory east of Rawanduz. Indeed, SADDAMHUSSEIN andhis officers in the Iraqi regime regularly referred to MULLAH BARZANI,his sons, and the KDP as the "offsprings of treason," and to TALABANI andthe PUK as Iranian agents. During OperationIraqi Freedom OIF!, hundredsof Iraqi documents detailing HUSSEIN andhis regime'soffensive and retaliatory actions against the Kurds wererecovered, and relevant documentsare summarizedin this report. This report also relies upon Iraqi documents KurdishRebel Parties had seized from variousIraqi governmentoffices during the 1991Uprising had givento the Human RightsWatch HRW!.HRW has published those documentsin their reports, mostnotably in Bureaucracy of Repression, theIraq Governmentin its Own Words,February 1994. The charging proposal detailed in this report also relies upon relevant statementsand admissionsmade byvarious highlevel Iraqi government officials, including SADDAMHUSSEIN. These statementswere madeto United States investigators while in United States custodyin Iraq. All interviews were voluntary in compliance with Geneva Conventions. Iraq's Governmental Structure , According to the Iraqi Constitution in effect prior to HUSSEIN assumingthe Presidency in 1979, the Revolutionary Command Council RCC! wasthe supremelawmaking bodyin Iraq and was Iraq'shighest authoritative body and was superior to the Cabinet. RCC decrees held the full force and effect of national law. Prior to OIF,the RCCwas comprisedof the following high level Baath Party officials: SADDAMHUSSEIN, Chairman;IZZAT IBRAHIM ALDURI hereinafter AL-DURI!,ViceChairman; TARIQAZIZ hereinafter AZIZ!;TAHA YASINRAMADAN hereinafterRAMADAN!; ALI HASAN AL~MAJID hereinafter ALMAJID!; TAHA MUHYIAL-DIN MARUF hereinafter MARUF!;and MIZBANKHADR HADI hereinafter HADI!. Immediately uponhis assumption of the Presidency, HUSSEIN successfullyeliminated the RCC's andpower consolidated 2 l63IHQl462938 it into his own hands. AZIZ stated that between 1979and 1981, HUSSEIN took other, less dramatic steps to consolidate governmental powerinto his own hands. For exampole,until 1979, the RCC held regular meetings and recorded the minutes of those meetings. However,after HUSSEINbecame President,meetings were less frequent and were not formally recorded. HUSSEIN told the RCC there would be times when he would not be able to consult with them and therefore, the RCChad to give him power to make unilateral decisions, which it did. [TARIQ AZIZ January30, 2004 interview]. HAMED YOUSEFALHUMMADI hereinafter ALHUMMADI!, HUSSEIN's PresidentialSecretary, stated that he was responsible for assemblingand presentingall reports and letters to HUSSEIN, and for preparing and disseminating all reports, letters and orders drafted by HUSSEIN. ALHUMMADI'sas role Presidential Secretary was purely administrative and ALHUMMADIheld no authority whatsoever. Similarly, the Presidential Diwan performed the same role for the RCC Secretary; that is, the Presidential Diwan facilitated correspondenceto and from theRCC andwas purely administrative in role and was without authority. [ALHUMMADI interview June 2, 2004] AHMED HUSSEINKHUDAIYER hereinafter KHUDAIYER!, the Presidential Diwan, stated that as the Secretary of the RCC,the Diwan issuedall finalized RCC decisions. KHUDAIYER statedthat most Iraqis who readthe RCCdecisions assumedthat they were promulgated after debate andconsultation which simply was not true. The RCC rarelymet asa governingbody. Rather, HUSSEIN, the Headof State and thereforethe Headof the RCC, assignedall decisions as a function of his own determination; that is, HUSSEIN madenearly all RCC decisionsunilaterally without RCC input or debate. If meetings occurredat all, only HUSSEIN's closest two or three advisors would have been involved. KHUDAIYER generally learned of the RCC's"decisions" via a telephone from SADDAM HUSSEINor from Presidential Secretary ABID HAMIDMAHMUD ALTIKRITI. KHUDAIYER forwardedHUSSEIN/RCC's instructionsto his legal section which preparedthe ordered document. KHUDAIYER reviewed the document, inspecting it for typographical errors and formatting, andediting as needed. [KHUDAIYERinterview, June12, 2004] In early 1987, MOHAMMADHAMZA ALZUBAYDI hereinafter 3 1631-HQl462938 ALZUBAYDI! wasthe senior Ba'ath Partyofficial in the Northen Region. ALZUBAYDI admitted during an interview that he failed to control the ongoing Kurdish activity within his jurisdiction. In approximately March, 1987, HUSSEIN relievedALZUBAYDI ofhis position in the Northen Region and ordered AL ZUBAYDI backto Baghdad. On March29, 1987, HUSSEIN, throughRCC Decree160, appointed ALMAJIDas the RCC andthe Ba'athParty Regional Command representativewho was empowered toimplement their policies in the Northern Region which included the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. This decree gave ALMAJID control of the state's civil,military, and security apparatuses in the Northern Region, including the AutonomousRegion. ALMAJID'sauthority and special power far exceeded AL~ZUBAYDI's.AZIZ, a longtime RCC member,stated that HUSSEIN unilaterally chose ALMAJIDand defined the scope of the authority RCC Decree160 grantedAL MAJID. AZIZ stated that HUSSEIN successfully seized the RCCs authority and decision-making ability from its members in the early 1980s. The RCCdid not discuss or vote on the appointment of ALMAJID. [AZIZ interview, February 2, 2004][RCC Decree160 attached as document XX]. KHUDAIYER examineda photocopy of RCC Decree 160 and recognized it as the copy of an authentic RCC documentin format and substance.KHUDAIYER not did remember attending anymeeting at which the contents of RCCDecree 160was discussed.Rather, he recalled receiving the information via handwritten instructions as usual. He vaguely recalled making a nonsubstantive correction on the original draft that his legal section had prepared. KHUDAIYER stated the difference between ALMAJID's appointment and ALZUBAYDI'sthat was ALZUBAYDI received his position based on his Ba'ath partystatus, not a Decree issued through the Presidential Diwan'soffice.