The Arauco War

Estudios Internacionales 188 (2017) - ISSN 0716-0240 • 97-119 Instituto de Estudios Internacionales - Universidad de Chile Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War Explicando los resultados de los conflictos asimétricos: La Guerra de Arauco Rodolfo Disi Pavlic* Abstract This article evaluates two theories that seek to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. It uses evidence from a case study of the Arauco War (1536-1883). The war resulted, unlike most other instances of European colonization, in the victory of the weaker side. The first theory argues that in asymmetrical warfare, opponents choose between direct (conventional) and indirect (guerrilla) approaches; the stronger side is more likely to win same-approach interactions, while the weaker side is more likely to prevail in different-approach interactions. The second theory advances the claim that when armies become mechanized, they gather less intelligence from the ground, and are therefore less likely to solve the information problem - te- lling combatants apart from noncombatants. The analysis of the Arauco War shows the limitations of the first theory: the stronger side can easily win some different-approach (indirect- direct) interactions, while the weaker can win same-approach (indirect-indirect) ones. The study lends support to the second theory, especially once it is generalized to include cultural differences as factors that exacerbate the identification problem. * Profesor asistente en el Departamento de Sociología y Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Católica de Temuco. Ph.D. en Gobierno de la Universidad de Texas. Especialización en política comparada y relaciones internacionales. Correo: [email protected]. Recibido: 5 de octubre de 2016. Aceptado: 7 de marzo de 2017. 97 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile Keywords: Asymmetrical warfare – Guerrilla – Arauco War – Identification Problem – Conquest of the Americas. Resumen Este artículo evalúa dos teorías que buscan explicar los resultados de conflictos asimétricos. Usa evidencia de un estudio de caso de la Guerra de Arauco (1536-1883). La guerra resultó, a diferencia de la mayoría de las instancias de colonización europea, en la victoria del lado más débil. La primera teoría argumenta que, en las guerras asimétricas, los oponentes eligen entre tipos directos (convencionales) e indirectos (guerrillas) de aproximación; el lado más fuerte tiene más probabilidades de ganar en interacciones del mismo tipo, mientras que es más probable que el más débil prevalezca en interacciones de distin- to tipo. La segunda teoría argumenta que cuando los ejércitos se mecanizan, recogen menos inteligencia del entorno y son, por lo tanto, menos capaces de resolver el problema de identi- ficación (distinguir a los combatientes de los no combatientes). El análisis de la Guerra de Arauco demuestra las limitaciones de la primera teoría: el lado más fuerte puede ganar fácilmente algunas interacciones de distinto tipo (indirecto-directo), mientras que el lado más débil puede vencer interacciones del mismo tipo (indirecto-indirecto). El estudio apoya a la segunda teoría, especialmente cuando es generalizada, incluyendo diferencias culturales que exacerban el problema de interacción. Palabras Clave: Guerra asimétrica – Guerrillas – Guerra de Arauco – Problema de identificación – Conquista de América. 98 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War To declare the truth of the (…) The Indians, seeing that war in Chile, it is convenient to they were invited by such timely tell the origin of the unhappy occasion to such a famous deed death of Governor Martín Gar- (to which they could only aspire cía de Loyola, because it was because there was no single the beginning of all subsequent sentinel on guard duty), and events in that kingdom. having had a council on whether to charge against those asleep, resolved to do it, and easily (…) Having his government scattered throughout the tents, in the span of five years reduced went into them at the same time most of that kingdom to the in a sudden assault, and with- false peace its natives were ac- out much resistance took their customed to, for which he was lives; and since among the tents equally content and deceived, the Governor’s was the biggest, it happened that on the way to he met his cruel executioners Angol, accompanied by more when they finally entered, and than forty captains, he reached they took his life with a thou- a valley called Curabala during sand wounds. They found him the night, where they assembled standing and with his chain their tents and released their mail in his hands because he horses, and went all to sleep, must have awakened hearing without the distrust they should some noise. have had of enemies or even of friends; because our friends are no less suspicious in that land (…) From the Governor’s than our sworn enemies; and death, which happened in De- going through that valley by cember of the year fifteen ninety- chance were about one hundred eight, a general uprising resulted, and fifty Indians from the province which was the beginning of the of Purén, who were on that road biggest losses the Spanish have to steal from some convoys of had in Chile; for all the Indians supplies that used to go from rebelled, and they devastated the Concepción to Imperial. They cities of Valdivia, Imperial, Villa saw the horses grassing, and Rica, Osorno, and Infantes de then found out that the Gover- Angol, and the fierce barbarians nor was sleeping there. committed great amounts of cruelty, ravage and bloodshed like it was never seen in any at- tack or assault by the angriest 99 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile and most offended of enemies set up on the Bío-Bío River between of the world: for they did not the Spanish colony of Chile in the spare any gender, age, religion north and the Mapuche-controlled or sacred thing (González de territory in the south. The Mapuche Nájera, 1614a)1. were independent until 1883, when the Chilean and Argentine armies This was the second time the conquered their territory (Navarro, “Indians” known as Mapuche2 1909). killed the highest Spanish author- Why where the Mapuche able to ity in Chile, and the destruction of fend off Spain? There is a general the abovementioned cities meant consensus among historians that that Spain had lost more than half when the first Spanish explorers of its Chilean colony’s settlements. arrived in Chile, the Mapuche were The “Disaster of Curalaba” and the a seminomadic hunter-gatherer “Destruction of the Seven Cities,” society3. How were the Mapuche as the events came to be known, successful in resisting conquest amounted to the near loss of a col- when larger, more complex so- ony due to indigenous warfare – an cieties like the Incas and Aztecs unparalleled occurrence in the his- quickly succumbed?4 Was it some- tory of the Spanish colonies in the thing specific to the Mapuche as a Americas (Goicovich, 2006; Villalo- society or military opponent, that bos, 1995). These events were a wa- made them prevail over a more tershed in the conflict known as the powerful, better-equipped enemy? Arauco War (1536-1883) between This article argues that the Spanish colonizers and Mapuche Arauco War can be reasonably un- warriors. Eventually, a frontier was derstood as an asymmetric war, this is, a war in which one of the sides 1 Alonso González de Nájera, a Spanish (Spain) is substantially stronger than soldier who arrived in Chile three the other (the Mapuche). It evaluates years after the events, wrote the above two theories from Political Science account in 1614. His work was never published during his lifetime but be- that seek to explain outcomes in came available when it was edited in Spain in 1866 and in Chile in 1899. 3 For an opposite yet contested view 2 I use this term even though it is some- that argues that the Mapuche were a what anachronistic. As Boccara ar- prosperous sedentary people before gues, the indigenous people called the arrival of the Spanish see Bengoa «Araucanians» by the Spanish are (2008). nowadays called Mapuche («People 4 For a description of the fall of the of the Land» in Mapundungun, their Incas see for example Rowe (2006), language) but used to call themselves and for an explanation of the fall of «Reche» («True People») in Pre- Co- the Aztec Empire see Raudzens lumbian times. See Boccara (2007). (1995). 100 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War asymmetric warfare in the light a conflict have become more likely of historical and anthropological to win wars over time (Arreguín- evidence from the Arauco War. The Toft, 2001; Lyall & Wilson, 2009), article divides the war roughly into answering the question presented in two periods –the initial one, where this paper had never been so pressing the Spanish easily prevailed, and as it is today. the later one, where the Mapuche triumphed– and uses the method of The Arauco War comparative historical analysis to as an Asymmetric tease out the factors that affected and Counterinsurgency the outcome of the war in each pe- Conflict riod5. It concludes that the Mapuche prevailed because they were able The Arauco War was a series to change their initial, frontal war of conflicts between the Spanish tactic to something akin to guerrilla Empire and the Mapuche of cen- warfare, and that the Spanish could tral-southern Chile. Even though not solve the information problem it occurred hundreds of years ago, needed to triumph due to cultural the conflict has been well described differences between the two factions. by historians (Armond, 1954; Ben- This question does not only goa, 2008; Ferrando Keun, 1986; concern a specific ethnic group Gascón, 2007; Villalobos, 1995; from a distant corner of South Villalobos, Aldunate, Zapatero, America three hundred years ago: Méndez Beltrán, & Bascuñán, answering how the Mapuche pre- 1982), ethnohistorians (Faron, vailed over the Spanish refers to a 1960; Jones, 1994)6, and anthro- broader debate on what determines pologists (Brand, n.d.; Goicovich, outcomes in asymmetric conflicts.

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