Estudios Internacionales 188 (2017) - ISSN 0716-0240 • 97-119 Instituto de Estudios Internacionales - Universidad de Chile

Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

Explicando los resultados de los conflictos asimétricos: La Guerra de Arauco

Rodolfo Disi Pavlic*

Abstract

This article evaluates two theories that seek to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflicts. It uses evidence from a case study of the Arauco War (1536-1883). The war resulted, unlike most other instances of European colonization, in the victory of the weaker side. The first theory argues that in asymmetrical warfare, opponents choose between direct (conventional) and indirect (guerrilla) approaches; the stronger side is more likely to win same-approach interactions, while the weaker side is more likely to prevail in different-approach interactions. The second theory advances the claim that when armies become mechanized, they gather less intelligence from the ground, and are therefore less likely to solve the information problem - te- lling combatants apart from noncombatants. The analysis of the Arauco War shows the limitations of the first theory: the stronger side can easily win some different-approach (indirect- direct) interactions, while the weaker can win same-approach (indirect-indirect) ones. The study lends support to the second theory, especially once it is generalized to include cultural diffe- rences as factors that exacerbate the identification problem.

* Profesor asistente en el Departamento de Sociología y Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Católica de Temuco. Ph.D. en Gobierno de la Universidad de Texas. Especialización en política comparada y relaciones internacionales. Correo: [email protected]. Recibido: 5 de octubre de 2016. Aceptado: 7 de marzo de 2017.

97 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile

Keywords: Asymmetrical warfare – Guerrilla – Arauco War – Identification Problem – Conquest of the Americas.

Resumen

Este artículo evalúa dos teorías que buscan explicar los resul- tados de conflictos asimétricos. Usa evidencia de un estudio de caso de la Guerra de Arauco (1536-1883). La guerra resultó, a diferencia de la mayoría de las instancias de colonización europea, en la victoria del lado más débil. La primera teoría argumenta que, en las guerras asimétricas, los oponentes eligen entre tipos directos (convencionales) e indirectos (guerrillas) de aproximación; el lado más fuerte tiene más probabilidades de ganar en interacciones del mismo tipo, mientras que es más probable que el más débil prevalezca en interacciones de distin- to tipo. La segunda teoría argumenta que cuando los ejércitos se mecanizan, recogen menos inteligencia del entorno y son, por lo tanto, menos capaces de resolver el problema de identi- ficación (distinguir a los combatientes de los no combatientes). El análisis de la Guerra de Arauco demuestra las limitaciones de la primera teoría: el lado más fuerte puede ganar fácilmente algunas interacciones de distinto tipo (indirecto-directo), mien- tras que el lado más débil puede vencer interacciones del mismo tipo (indirecto-indirecto). El estudio apoya a la segunda teoría, especialmente cuando es generalizada, incluyendo diferencias culturales que exacerban el problema de interacción.

Palabras Clave: Guerra asimétrica – Guerrillas – Guerra de Arauco – Problema de identificación – Conquista de América.

98 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

To declare the truth of the (…) The Indians, seeing that war in Chile, it is convenient to they were invited by such timely tell the origin of the unhappy occasion to such a famous deed death of Governor Martín Gar- (to which they could only aspire cía de Loyola, because it was because there was no single the beginning of all subsequent sentinel on guard duty), and events in that kingdom. having had a council on whether to charge against those asleep, resolved to do it, and easily (…) Having his government scattered throughout the tents, in the span of five years reduced went into them at the same time most of that kingdom to the in a sudden assault, and with- false peace its natives were ac- out much resistance took their customed to, for which he was lives; and since among the tents equally content and deceived, the Governor’s was the biggest, it happened that on the way to he met his cruel executioners Angol, accompanied by more when they finally entered, and than forty captains, he reached they took his life with a thou- a valley called Curabala during sand wounds. They found him the night, where they assembled standing and with his chain their tents and released their mail in his hands because he horses, and went all to sleep, must have awakened hearing without the distrust they should some noise. have had of enemies or even of friends; because our friends are no less suspicious in that land (…) From the Governor’s than our sworn enemies; and death, which happened in De- going through that valley by cember of the year fifteen ninety- chance were about one hundred eight, a general uprising resulted, and fifty Indians from the province which was the beginning of the of Purén, who were on that road biggest losses the Spanish have to steal from some convoys of had in Chile; for all the Indians supplies that used to go from rebelled, and they devastated the Concepción to Imperial. They cities of Valdivia, Imperial, Villa saw the horses grassing, and Rica, Osorno, and Infantes de then found out that the Gover- Angol, and the fierce barbarians nor was sleeping there. committed great amounts of cruelty, ravage and bloodshed like it was never seen in any at- tack or assault by the angriest

99 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile

and most offended of enemies set up on the Bío-Bío River between of the world: for they did not the Spanish colony of Chile in the spare any gender, age, religion north and the Mapuche-controlled or sacred thing (González de territory in the south. The Mapuche Nájera, 1614a)1. were independent until 1883, when the Chilean and Argentine armies This was the second time the conquered their territory (Navarro, “Indians” known as Mapuche2 1909). killed the highest Spanish author- Why where the Mapuche able to ity in Chile, and the destruction of fend off Spain? There is a general the abovementioned cities meant consensus among historians that that Spain had lost more than half when the first Spanish explorers of its Chilean colony’s settlements. arrived in Chile, the Mapuche were The “Disaster of Curalaba” and the a seminomadic hunter-gatherer “Destruction of the Seven Cities,” society3. How were the Mapuche as the events came to be known, successful in resisting conquest amounted to the near loss of a col- when larger, more complex so- ony due to indigenous warfare – an cieties like the Incas and Aztecs unparalleled occurrence in the his- quickly succumbed?4 Was it some- tory of the Spanish colonies in the thing specific to the Mapuche as a Americas (Goicovich, 2006; Villalo- society or military opponent, that bos, 1995). These events were a wa- made them prevail over a more tershed in the conflict known as the powerful, better-equipped enemy? Arauco War (1536-1883) between This article argues that the Spanish colonizers and Mapuche Arauco War can be reasonably un- warriors. Eventually, a frontier was derstood as an asymmetric war, this is, a war in which one of the sides 1 Alonso González de Nájera, a Spanish (Spain) is substantially stronger than soldier who arrived in Chile three the other (the Mapuche). It evaluates years after the events, wrote the above two theories from Political Science account in 1614. His work was never published during his lifetime but be- that seek to explain outcomes in came available when it was edited in Spain in 1866 and in Chile in 1899. 3 For an opposite yet contested view 2 I use this term even though it is some- that argues that the Mapuche were a what anachronistic. As Boccara ar- prosperous sedentary people before gues, the indigenous people called the arrival of the Spanish see Bengoa «Araucanians» by the Spanish are (2008). nowadays called Mapuche («People 4 For a description of the fall of the of the Land» in Mapundungun, their Incas see for example Rowe (2006), language) but used to call themselves and for an explanation of the fall of «Reche» («True People») in Pre- Co- the Aztec Empire see Raudzens lumbian times. See Boccara (2007). (1995).

100 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War asymmetric warfare in the light a conflict have become more likely of historical and anthropological to win wars over time (Arreguín- evidence from the Arauco War. The Toft, 2001; Lyall & Wilson, 2009), article divides the war roughly into answering the question presented in two periods –the initial one, where this paper had never been so pressing the Spanish easily prevailed, and as it is today. the later one, where the Mapuche triumphed– and uses the method of The Arauco War comparative historical analysis to as an Asymmetric tease out the factors that affected and Counterinsurgency the outcome of the war in each pe- Conflict riod5. It concludes that the Mapuche prevailed because they were able The Arauco War was a series to change their initial, frontal war of conflicts between the Spanish tactic to something akin to guerrilla Empire and the Mapuche of cen- warfare, and that the Spanish could tral-southern Chile. Even though not solve the information problem it occurred hundreds of years ago, needed to triumph due to cultural the conflict has been well described differences between the two factions. by historians (Armond, 1954; Ben- This question does not only goa, 2008; Ferrando Keun, 1986; concern a specific ethnic group Gascón, 2007; Villalobos, 1995; from a distant corner of South Villalobos, Aldunate, Zapatero, America three hundred years ago: Méndez Beltrán, & Bascuñán, answering how the Mapuche pre- 1982), ethnohistorians (Faron, vailed over the Spanish refers to a 1960; Jones, 1994)6, and anthro- broader debate on what determines pologists (Brand, n.d.; Goicovich, outcomes in asymmetric conflicts. 2007; León, 1983; Padden, 1957; Indeed, analyzing the Arauco War Zavala, 2008). Moreover, there are as an asymmetric conflict does only plenty of primary sources written shed light on why the Mapuche from the Spanish side that have won. More importantly, applying survived to this day (Boccara, 2007, theories of asymmetric warfare to pp. 416–418). the colonization of the Americas The war is conventionally explains how the Spanish were able thought to have started quickly to quickly conquer millions of peo- ple with a handful of soldiers but 6 Ethnohistory refers to the study of failed to do so in particular cases. people without historical records of As insurgents on the weaker side of their own, by means of indirect his- torical accounts and anthropological 5 For an overview of this methodology, and archaeological evidence, among see Mahoney & Rueschemeyer (2003) other sources.

101 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile after the Spanish entered what is sometimes thousands of yanaconas now known as Chile in 1536 with or indios amigos (“friendly indians”) the battle of Reynogüelén, and to soldiers and auxiliaries accompa- have ended in 1883 when Chile and nied the Spanish to war (Villalobos, Argentina conquered the Mapuche 1995, p. 47). These native allies were territory. Was the war actually so initially brought from Peru and later impossibly long? In recent decades, on from the Spanish-controlled area historians and ethnologists have ar- of Chile8. The Mapuche also suf- gued against the traditional dates of fered a demographic catastrophe the war (Villalobos, 1995). Villalo- that weakened them as soon as they bos claims that the conflict had encountered the Spanish: like all a warring stage (1536-1655) other Native Americans peoples, the and a peaceful stage (1655-1883) Mapuche had no immune protec- (Villalobos et al., 1982, p. 12). Boc- tion against the diseases brought by cara, on the other hand, argues that conquistadors; it is estimated that the Spanish were never peaceful to- epidemics killed up to eighty percent wards the Mapuche but interacted of their population (Villalobos, 1995, with them in two different ways: p. 46) or that it went from one mil- by imposing their sovereignty over lion people to less than 150,000 due them (1545-1641), and by trying to to diseases (Bengoa, 2008, p. 287). civilize them through conversion to Although the Spanish were initially Catholicism (1641-1810) (Boccara, victorious in their conquest (Ben- 2007; Foerster, 1996). At any rate, goa, 2008, pp. 245–287; Ferrando there is a general consensus that the Keun, 1986; Villalobos, 1995, p. so-called Arauco War was a long, 47), the abovementioned Disaster violent conflict at least in its initial phase (mid-1500s to mid-1600s). some of their technologies, like steel The Arauco War was a clash armor and gunpowder, in the hot and between unequal opponents. Al- humid jungles of Central and South though Spanish soldiers were always America and even adopted an Aztec padded cotton armor, which was less numerous than their Mapuche more mobile and breathable than counterparts, the Europeans had their metal or leather counterparts. a decisive technological advantage However, metal in the forms of given by the use of horses, metal, and swords and shields wreaked havoc gunpowder, which were unheard of among Native Americans, whose main weapon was the bow and arrow. in the Americas prior to their arrival The horse, unknown in the Americas (Salas, 1950)7. Also, hundreds and at the time, greatly reduced Native warriors’ morale when they first en- 7 Salas notes though, that their useful- countered them. ness depended greatly on the territory. 8 I thank Francis Goicovich for pointing For example, the Spanish discarded this out to me.

102 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War of Curalaba was the tipping point of Guillaume Boccara (Boccara, 1999, the war (Villalobos, 1995, p. 43). It 2007) argues that Mapuche society is widely accepted that the Mapuche was inherently open to external in- adopted insurgency tactics as the fluences and was able to assimilate war progressed, (Bengoa, 2008, pp. and change to meet the demands 249–251; Ferrando Keun, 1986; of war against Spain (Boccara, Gascón, 2007, pp. 45–53; Villalo- 2007, pp. 191–193)9. Similarly, to bos, 1995, p. 47) and ultimately Boccara, the explanation offered came out victorious out of this by Agustín Cruz emphasizes Ma- century-long conflict. puche capacity to innovate in the The Arauco War was both an battlefield (Cruz, 2010)10. Goico- asymmetric and counterinsurgency vich (2006, 2007) argues that the conflict. The Mapuche were rela- Mapuche were successful against tively numerous but faced a stron- the Spanish for two main reasons: ger opponent aided by technology first, because they were able to cre- and Native American allies. It was ate several peaceful alliances among also a long-lasting conflict that ulti- themselves and with the Spaniards mately resulted in Mapuche victory in Parlamentos (parleys) to ensure thanks to the guerrilla tactics they peace; second, because the Mapuche adopted. set up a network of military alliances called Vutanmapus to defend them- Competing explanations selves against Spanish attacks –an

How can the outcome of the 9 He makes the valid claim that Mapu- Arauco war be explained? Histo- che resistance to Spanish conquest was not surprising at all: «If the rians and anthropologists have al- central reche [Mapuche] groups ready begun to tackle this question. showed a great capacity to resist or, Overall, the classical argument is in other words, if [Mapuche] society that complex societies, being more was characterized by great sociocul- hierarchical, are easier to conquer tural flexibility, it is because war, a central social fact in the material and once their rulers and elites are elimi- symbolic production and reproduc- nated, coopted or absorbed (Cruz, tion of society obeyed a logic to ab- 2010; Villalobos, 1995, p.47). This sorb difference» (author’s, transla- explanation is nevertheless insuf- tion). However, resistance does not necessarily mean victory, which is ficient to explain why most tribal why it is important how both sides of societies did not resist Spanish con- the conflict approach war. quest but the Mapuche did. 10 Unfortunately, Cruz never offers a Several non-mutually exclusive definition of what he means by in- novation and, therefore, he does not explanations have been presented connect his argument to the literature for the Mapuche case. For example, on military innovations.

103 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile almost unparalleled development in Lyall & Wilson, 2009; Singh, 1971). the continent and only comparable Two of the most compelling theo- to what the Comanche did in North ries that explain the outcomes of America (Hämäläinen, 2008). Salas asymmetric conflicts are those pro- (1950) argues that the Spanish posed by Ivan Arreguín-Toft, and were able to conquer most Native Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson. The American societies because their former argues that the outcome of weapons, especially the sword and asymmetric conflict is determined horse, prevailed over Native Ameri- by the interaction of strategies that can clubs, bows and arrows. More each side uses; the later argue that specifically, Sauer (2014) argues the more mechanized the stronger that Mapuche culture was both side’s military is, the lower are its resilient enough to keep certain chances to win a counterinsurgency core aspects of its culture and suf- war. Although their explanations ficiently flexible to adapt to Spanish may, to a certain extent, overlap invasion and colonization. All these these theories, they can potentially answers are highly idiosyncratic offer contradicting predictions and descriptive, and see the reason of the outcome of an asymmetric for Mapuche’s success almost solely conflict. The Arauco War, an appro- from the Native American side of priate case to test these two theories, the problem instead of analyzing it offers two main insights. First, it as the outcome of the interaction shows how the strategic interaction between two opposing sides. Can argument does not explain well the we learn broader lessons from the outcomes of unequal wars when Mapuche success story? both sides use indirect strategies. Current theories of asymmetric Second, the mechanization argu- and counterinsurgency warfare can ment can explain the outcome of shed light on this issue. Insurgen- the Arauco War – but only after it cies have fought against stronger has been sufficiently generalized. enemies for millennia, but they have not been thoroughly analyzed The Strategic Interaction before the XVII century (Beck- Thesis and the Arauco ett, 2001a, 2001b; Bryant, 2004; War: A Poor Fit Record, 2007). The Arauco War presents an interesting, understudied Arreguín-Toft’s theory of stra- case of a weak defender winning a tegic interaction claims that weak war against a dominant power, well actors are more likely to defeat before it has been shown that weak stronger opponents when the two and insurgent actors began winning of them use different strategies. more wars (Arreguín-Toft, 2001; He argues against Mack, who says

104 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War that the more powerful a state is, defense, or “the use of armed forces the less it is interested in winning to thwart an adversary’s attempt to a war (because survival is not at capture or destroy values such as stake) in relation to its opponent territory, population, and strategic (Mack, 1975); this makes leaders resources” (p. 103). Its indirect more vulnerable to pressures by strategy is guerrilla warfare, defined publics or other elites, who try to as “the organization of a portion of convince them to get out of a war, society for the purpose of imposing which in turn makes them more costs on an adversary using armed likely to forfeit against a small, yet forces trained to avoid direct con- resolved enemy. In Arreguín-Toft’s frontation” (p. 103). argument, the main cause of victory There are therefore four strategy or defeat is not relative power but combinations. Strategic interac- the interaction of the strategies11 the tion theory argues that strong two sides use, which can be direct opponents are more likely to win or indirect. Direct strategies are same-approach interactions (direct aimed at eliminating the adversary’s attack versus direct defense, barba- capacity to fight, whereas indirect rism versus guerrilla warfare), while strategies undermine the opponent’s weak actors have better chances will and capacity to combat. of winning different- approach Direct and indirect strategies are interactions (direct attack versus different for strong and weak actors. guerrilla warfare, barbarism versus For strong actors, direct strategy direct defense). means direct attack, or “the use of The underlying logic is that in military to capture or eliminate an same-approach interactions, there adversary’s armed forces, thereby is no mediating factor between gaining control of that opponent’s unequal powers, so wars should values” (Arreguín-Toft, 2001, p. end quickly in favor of the stron- 100). He calls strong actor’s indirect gest actor; in different-approach strategy barbarism, which consists interactions conflicts linger, favor- of “the systematic violation of laws ing weaker actors, which is where of war in the pursuit of a military Mack’s theory has more explana- or political objective…its most tory power. important element is depredations Does strategic interaction theory against noncombatants (viz., rape, explain the outcome of the Arauco murder, and torture)” (p. 101). The War? At first glance it seems like it weak actor’s direct strategy is direct does: the conflict lasted for decades, and it is well known that the Ma- 11 He defines strategy as «an actor’s plan puche were victorious when they for using armed forces to achieve military of political objectives» (99). applied a guerrilla warfare strategy

105 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile against the Spanish. However, in Did the Spanish use an indirect order to test the theory, it is neces- approach? The Spanish engaged sary to analyze the strategies both in several direct military engage- sides used, and how that changed ments with the Mapuche, some of their odds of victory. which they won (Bengoa, 2008; Ferrando Keun, 1986). However, The Arauco War before the Spanish military and political the Disaster of Curalaba strategy was defined by what Ar- reguín-Toft would call barbarism. In terms of strategies, it is Take, for example, Bengoa’s ac- possible to identify an initial count of the treatment given by the period in the Arauco War when Spanish to the Mapuche population the Spanish obtained resounding that inhabited the Penco region, victories over the Mapuche, which lasted roughly from the beginning The consequence of what we of the conflict until the abovemen- could call the “surprise or defeat tioned Disaster of Curalaba in of Andalién and Penco” was 1598. As Villalobos depicts (Villalo- very clear. [Spanish conquista- bos, 1995, pp. 37–38), the level of dor] Valdivia searched the whole hostilities among and Spanish and land and brought before him Mapuche between 1536 and 1700 the caciques to whom he spoke varied over time. However, it also about labor and the goldmines. shows that the last year of “gen- A few months later, he had put eral offensives,” this is, large scales twenty thousand people to work battles between the two sides, was in the Quilacoya goldmines, not 1601, and that afterwards the Arau- too far from Concepción on the co War became something akin to rivers that bears that name and a low-intensity conflict (Thompson, that flow into the Bío-Bío River. 1989). It was in the period prior There are numerous testimonies to the Disaster of Curalaba that that coincide on the number of the Spanish settled and began to workers of that famous deposit. colonize Mapuche territory, which The revenues recorded from the they subsequently lost. The interac- gold mines are considerable, tion approach, in this first period of and coherent with these num- the Arauco War, does not support bers. We can calculate that the strategic interaction theory because penco population under Spanish the Spanish, who used an indirect domination was of about one approach, defeated the Mapuche, hundred thousand people, so who applied a direct strategy. there was a sizeable potential workforce. The impact of the

106 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

mining labor was disastrous. puche capacity and willingness to The Mapuche population on the resist conquest12. northern shore of the Bío River The Mapuche were on the losing never recovered. After a few side against the “barbaric” Spaniards years they were decimated. The even though they used a direct ones on the northern shore, from strategy against them. From the [rivers] Itata and from Laja, had beginning, the Spanish considered come in massive numbers to the Mapuche living in the south the ceremonial battle, and they of the Itata River, one of the most found an enemy that did not aggressive and belligerent peoples respect the rules of the game they encountered in the Americas known to them. The newcomers (Boccara, 2007, pp. 118, 191)13. had come to imprison the chiefs Indeed, Bengoa argues that the and seize workforce. This was presence of clearly limited frontiers a submission war. It was com- and military leaders made possible pletely incomprehensible for the the “massive ritual reaction that natives (Bengoa, 2008, p. 248. existed when the war against con- Author’s translation) quest first began. In other places, other societies without a state and Even though it might have not without a modicum of stability and been understood in these terms 12 then, the Spanish were waging “Besides combatting the Araucanian armies, the troops engaged in a war an extermination war, in which of devastation; wherever they went the murder and enslavement of they left a trail of the corpses of the noncombatants and the destruc- elderly, women and children, burned- tion of nonmilitary values were down rucas [houses], destroyed tools widespread. Similarly, in a treatise and devastated crop fields. Young men were killed or were horribly muti- he wrote in 1607 to explain to his lated to teach them a lesson. They countrymen why the Mapuche were also taken prisoner, and along rebelled (Calderón, 1607), Span- women and children were sold to ish Melchor Calderón explained miners and estate owners from Con- cepción or Santiago…” (Villalobos, that the Spanish “disposed of them 1995, p. 42. Author’s translation). without discretion and seized their 13 It is important to note that north of women and children” (Calderón, that river and as north as the Choapa 1607, p. 15. Author’s translation) River the inhabitants of Chile also spoke Mapudungun. However, this that the “cruelties they have used people, called Picunche (“People of against them are unbelievable” the North”) by the Mapuche, had a (p.18). They tried to eliminate Ma- more sedentary lifestyle and had been subjected to Inca rule, and were thus arguably easier to conquer than their southern cousins.

107 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile social order simply dispersed, hid The Arauco War after in the jungles, or just disappeared the Disaster of Curalaba under the vigor of conquest” (Ben- goa, 2008, p. 243. Author’s transla- tion). However, this does not mean The Battle of Andalién, in which that they knew the enemy they the Mapuche lost three thousand were facing – and how to defeat men, was one of the last in which it. Mapuche warfare, like all Na- they directly faced their enemy in tive American warfare, had a very accordance with their traditions. As strong ritual component (Bengoa, Ferrando Keun states, “the Mapu- 2008; Boccara, 2007; Isaac, 1983; che from then on will never face the Smith, 1995), which emphasized Spanish like they did in Concepción one-on-one fighting, wearing eye- (Penco) or in Andalién with five, catching yet impractical attires, ten, fifteen or twenty thousand and displays of recklessness, bold- men fighting all at once” (Ferrando ness and bravery, such as the ones Keun, 1986, p. 25. Author’s trans- described by Alonso de Ercilla y lation). Mapuche warriors learned Zúñiga in his epic poem La Arau- from earlier generations’ mistakes in cana (Boccara, 2007, p. 130). The the battlefield and from continuous Mapuche reacted to Spanish ag- interaction with the Spanish14.They gression by attempting to destroy did not only assimilate Spanish their enemy’s capacity to fight. practices and technologies, like the They used a primarily direct defense use of cavalry and the construction strategy in accordance with their of forts but, more importantly, they traditions. However, their strategy changed their strategy from direct failed against a stronger enemy that defense to guerrilla warfare (Ben- not only defeated them in the battle- goa, 2008; Ferrando Keun, 1986). field frequently but also –and more This process, defined as the “secu- importantly– tried to destroy them larization of war” meant that war as a society. As Bengoa puts it: “the was less and less associated with enormity of the Mapuche popula- religion, and its main goal became tion, its religious discipline, its defeating the enemy at any cost – absolute capacity to self-sacrifice, not fulfilling a ritual (Bengoa, 2008, surprised the first Europeans that p. 216). By the time they ambushed observed them. It was not militarily Governor Mendoza in Curalaba, useful, and victory was for the King’s The Araucanos and Tucapelinos, regiments” (Bengoa, 2008, p. 215). this is, the Mapuches from Arauco

14 The reasons that explain Mapuche capacity to adapt and incorporate are well covered in Boccara (2007).

108 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War and Tucapel, would quickly learn fortify the boundary between the the art of war from their enemies. colony of Chile and the territory They would break the system of lost after the Destruction of the large concentrations of warriors in Seven Cities15. In fact, Mapuche processions and would begin to use tactics became so successful that more efficient groups, successive, they expanded to the East across small squadrons, similar to a relay the Andes, imposing their language system. They would incorporate and culture on other indigenous the horse more and more in their peoples, creating vast trade net- attacks. They would use stratagems works, and threatening Spanish similar to surprise attacks and settlements as far as Córdoba and guerrillas, like ambushes, laying Buenos Aires, in nowadays Argen- siege on forts, entering them in tina (Boccara, 2007; Gascón, 2007, disguise or camouflaged under large pp. 71–95; Zavala, 2008). The haystacks, and finally, they would Mapuche had clearly gone from a build their own fortifications. The direct to an indirect strategy – and secularization process would last from a defensive to an expansive for the rest of the century and, by position. The Spanish also changed the end of the sixteenth century, it their primary strategy by the end of was already completed (Bengoa, this period. Unable to face their en- 2008, p. 251). emies directly (direct military con- Closer to Spanish settlements, frontations) or indirectly (attacking the change was not only strategic, civilian and nonmilitary targets), they but it also affected society as a began to build forts on the Bío Bío whole. With the introduction of the River to prevent Mapuche incur- horse, the Mapuche became more sions to the north. Even though mobile and they hid in forests and they signed several peace treaties mountain ranges when the Spanish and even recognized the Mapuche attacked. They even adapted to the as an independent state, the Spanish Spanish “scorched earth” strategy still tried to impose their dominance of destroying their crops (Foerster, through religious conversion car- 1996, p. 174) by planting fields in ried out by missionaries (and the oc- small patches, moving them to remote casional skirmish). However, their mountain valleys, focusing more on cattle ranching, and replacing indige- 15 As the conflict waned, however, the nous corn with newly-arrived wheat, Spanish were able to rebuild Valdivia which could be harvested faster on the coast in 1684 (motivated by a (Bengoa, 2008; Villalobos, 1995). Dutch attempt to establish a colony Malones, as the Spanish called the there) and Osorno in 1796. Both cit- ies were far from the Mapuche heart- Mapuche’s razzias, forced Spain to land.

109 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile position became more defensive tling in their territory. The Spanish, than offensive (Foerster, 1996, pp. contrary to the theory’s expecta- 131–140), and by the mid-1600s, tions, won this different-approach the boundary between the two interaction. Why did this happen? societies, however permeable, was Wars where the weak fights directly already established. and the strong indirectly are very The development and outcome infrequent in modern times, so an of the Arauco War brings to light analysis that merges both types of several issues in strategic interac- different-approach interactions into tion theory. First, it is problematic the same category would not pick to assign one kind of strategy to up the difference between direct- each actor when the two use both indirect and indirect-direct inter- kinds of strategies simultaneously. actions. Indeed, its results may be For example, from the beginning, driven by the more common direct both the Spanish and Mapuche attack-guerrilla warfare interaction. used direct strategies against each Arreguín-Toft suggests that in order other and subsequently, when the to use barbarism against a weak Mapuche turned to guerrilla war- opponent, a strong actor must pay fare they also adopted from the political costs, both domestically Spanish the construction of forts. and internationally (2001, p. 114, While it may be possible to assign f.n. 68). This assumes that con- each actor in the Arauco war a flict visibility, a democratic weak primary strategy, this may not be contender, and the presence of an as easy in other conflicts without international community may in- risking oversimplification. fluence how much a strong state is Second, and more important, the willing to use barbarism, and make outcome of the different interac- it fall short from annihilating the tions in the Arauco War is not con- weak actor. In the sixteenth century, sistent with the theory’s hypotheses Spain – as most states throughout which states that, same-approach history – did not have to deal with interactions tend to be won by the these cost-inducing factors. stronger side and that different- When the Mapuche adopted approach ones favor the weaker an indirect strategy (guerrilla war- actor. Initially, the Mapuche used fare) to counter Spain’s barbarism, a direct strategy (direct defense) they prevailed and secured their against the Spanish, sending army independence. In the case of the after army to the battlefield. The Arauco War, it is not supported Spanish primary strategy was in- the hypothesis that in general direct (barbarism), and they were same-approach interactions (and able to defeat the Mapuche, set- specifically indirect-indirect ones),

110 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War strong states win. Again, this kind cara, 1999, 2007; Sauer, 2014)16. of interactions may be rare. The Mapuche insurgents earned the results of a large-n analysis that full support of their communities combined rare barbarism-guerrilla because the warriors’ success was warfare and common direct attack- inextricably linked to their survival direct defense interactions into the as a people in the face of Spanish same analytical category would, extermination. therefore, be driven more by the outcome of the former than the The Mechanization Thesis latter. and Early Colonial In terms of power asymmetry, it Warfare: A Common is unsurprising that the Mapuche Ground? resorted to guerrilla warfare to counter the Spanish: “it turns out Lyall & Wilson (2009) offer an that adversaries do not give up the alternative explanation for the out- armed struggle under these condi- comes in counterinsurgency wars. tions; rather, any smart enemy goes They show that incumbents (gov- unconventional” (Kilcullen, 2009, ernments in power) have been de- p. 23). However, strategic interac- creasingly able to defeat insurgents tion theory fails to explain why the Mapuche prevailed in a same- 16 Bengoa (2008, p. 217) depicts the situation vividly, «The natives re- approach interaction. What was moved their dwellings from the river special about the Mapuche change shores, they have abandoned the in strategy that allowed them to crops, they do not sow the slopes and prevail? Why did the Mapuche hills like they used to do, and they take win this interaction? The answer is refuge in their cattle, which is easy to transport. The native society that re- related to the extent to which they sults from the massacre is totally dif- adapted to guerrilla warfare not ferent from the original one, that only as a military strategy but also peaceful society of the tree-lined paths, as a way to organize their society. were they gathered to drink, to play chueca, to solve their justice affairs, to Boccara claims that the clash with fall in love, and celebrate. The beauti- the Spanish was so significant that ful drinking fountains and the farms it amounted to an “ethnogenesis,” to live in peace are gone. Nothing this is, an entire cultural identity remained from the old times. Women shift, causing the old Reche or Che do not wear gold earrings anymore, fearing Spanish greed. They stopped (“True People” or “People”) to wearing the colorful beads that caught become the Mapuche (“People of the attention of the first visitors. The the Land”) (Bengoa, 2008; Boc- blue used to paint faces, to dye the sky-blue ponchos is gone. The women hid in their black shawls, and sank in their sad, rhythmic music».

111 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile since the nineteenth century (Lyall militaries find hard to overcome the & Wilson, 2009, p. 69), which they urge to mechanize to appropriately argue has been caused by some engage with insurgent opponents change in the nature of incumbent (Lyall & Wilson, 2009, p. 80). armies. These armies have gone This brief overview of the from “foraging” to “mechaniza- mechanization thesis would sug- tion.” The former implied “monetary gest that it is not applicable to the payments, forced requisition, and Arauco war – the mere fact that simple looting to acquire provisions the Spanish armies were a premod- from populations located in or near ern force makes them an unlikely the conflict zone rather than from candidate for an analysis that the national homeland” (p. 73); in emphasizes technology. Indeed, the latter, “conflict zones could pro- the Spanish forces neatly fit into vide neither increasingly specialized the category of “foraging” armies, supplies, such as fuel and parts, nor which are “often quite rudimen- the sheer quantities required to sus- tary in their level of technological tain large modern armies” (p. 75). sophistication” (Lyall & Wilson, Why has mechanization made 2009, p. 73). incumbents more likely to lose However, a case can be made for counterinsurgency wars? Unlike the technological divide between foraging armies, who perforce have Spanish and Mapuche. Initially, the to know and interact with locals to Spanish, just like modern mecha- obtain supplies, mechanized armies nized armies, used “high-tech” get resources through supply lines, supplies (horses, gunpowder, steel, which isolates them from their en- leather) brought from Peru and vironment. Therefore, it is harder Spain to fight the locals (Bruhn de for them to solve the “identifica- Hoffmeyer, 1986, p. 11). Although tion problem,” this is, the common on a day-to-day basis it was more issue in counterinsurgency wars common for conquistadors to rely that arises because “[i]rregular com- on spears and sabers (Bruhn de batants and the spies of either side Hoffmeyer, 1986, pp. 10, 41), these hide among the civilian population” resources could not be foraged out- (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 89). Mechanized side Mapuche territory. Paraphras- armies’ diminished capacity to tell ing Lyall and Wilson, the conflict combatants from noncombatants zone in southern Chile “could pro- and to gather intelligence from vide neither…specialized supplies… locals, results in a “counterinsur- nor the sheer quantities required to gency that fuels, rather than de- sustain large [pre]modern armies” ters, insurgent recruitment” (Lyall (Lyall & Wilson, 2009, p. 75). & Wilson, 2009, p. 79). Modern

112 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

As the conflict dragged on, and maintain the soldiers guarding the akin mechanized armies, the Span- border. This made the Bío-Bío the ish army in southern Chile did not de facto and eventually the de jure engage in foraging in contested ter- border between the Spanish Cap- ritory for two main reasons. First, taincy General of Chile and the because of the development of the Mapuche territory. encomienda17 system in central However, the core of Lyall Chile, which ensured the supply of and Wilson’s argument is not that materiel outside the conflict zone. mechanization makes winning a Secondly, the establishment of the counterinsurgency war harder per Real Situado created a line of sup- se, but that it makes solving the plies away from the frontlines. identification problem more diffi- cult. Mechanization can be seen as In 1600, the court decided to one of many impediments for effec- give 82,500 pesos annually for tive intelligence gathering in asym- three years, under the assump- metric conflicts. They suggest that tion that this sum would help cultural differences may also make to restore the dominance of the the identification problem worse: [Spanish] Christian army. The “Acquiring this information in conflict did not recede, and the turn requires a high rate of inter- amount had to be increased and action between counterinsurgent the deadline extended, until in and population so that the requi- 1606 was fixed in 293,000 pe- site skills–including language and sos, which was maintained until cultural awareness – are obtained the end of the century. At the and connections forged” (Lyall & beginning of the next century, Wilson, 2009, p. 75, emphasis add- the conflict disappeared and the ed). Therefore, similarly to mecha- situado was reduced to 100,000 nization, cultural differences pesos (Villalobos, 1995, p. 107) can “inhibit the collection and vetting of the context-specific The Real Situado made it pos- information required to wield sible in Chile to have the only power discriminately” (Lyall & permanent army in the Spanish Wilson, 2009, p. 76). Americas and, therefore, reduced The Spanish tackled the identifi- the need to forage and pillage to cation problem in two ways simul- 17 Encomiendas were large estates in taneously. First as, mentioned above, which a Spanish patron, the encomen- they used indios amigos (“friendly dero, used native labor to cultivate his Indians”), who not only served as lands in exchange for the nominal auxiliary and scouting troops but education and evangelization of the native labor. also provided the conquistadors

113 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile with valuable information about Americans were abysmal – for a the terrain, and the numbers and long time even Spanish theologians movements of the enemy. Their argued whether Indians were hu- importance decreased, however, as man beings and could therefore the Mapuche resorted to guerrilla be baptized and converted. The warfare, and during the Destruc- differences were even more insur- tion of the Seven Cities most col- mountable in the case of less hier- lectivities and individuals who archical societies like the Mapuche had converted to Catholicism and polity. In fact, when the Spanish cooperated with the Spanish de- conquered the Incas and Aztecs they serted or were killed by their fellow intermarried with the elites – Óñez countrymen (Bengoa, 2008). On de Loyola, the Governor killed in the other hand, later in the conflict, Curalaba, was married to Clara the Spanish traded with natives, Coya, the niece of the last Inca em- north and south of their area of peror. The situation in southern Chile control. This increased their ability was different, where the Spanish to gather reliable information from encountered people “who refused merchants who traded Mapuche to be human from their cultural cattle, horses and goods stolen in point of view, to recognize a king, Argentina for Spanish liquor and to serve” (Bengoa, 2008, p. 247). manufactured goods. At that stage The Spanish, therefore, had few of the conflict, however, after the qualms about enslaving, killing, and destruction of all Spanish settle- subjugating the Mapuche, treating ments between Bío-Bío River and warriors and noncombatants alike. Chiloé Island, this information was It is hence unsurprising that the used to defend their fortifications Mapuche refused to negotiate while and settlements from malones or the Spanish practiced barbarism, as making short retaliatory incursions a 1569 letter from governor Bravo into Mapuche territory to capture de Saravia to the King of Spain and enslave prisoners (called ma- attests: locas, see Carrasco, 2005), rather than to make any serious attempt We sent clerics and other at reconquering them. people and some of their own Second, and perhaps more criti- to talk to them and forgive in cally, the Spanish dealt with the the name of His Majesty the identification problem by ignoring crimes that they have commit- it altogether. As mentioned above, ted here, and to offer them good the Spanish initially adopted bar- treatment hereon after, and they barism. The cultural differences not only do not want peace but between conquistadors and Native also say that they shall eat us

114 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

or banish us from the land and as an organization, as Nagl argues many other blasphemies (quoted in the case of the Vietnam War18. in Bengoa 2008, p. 246). It is possible that the outcome of the Arauco War would have When the Mapuche society, as a been different if the Spanish had whole, turned to insurgency to re- discriminated between warriors sist conquest, it became impossible and noncombatants. Paraphrasing for the Spanish to directly address Kilcullen, “assuring [the Mapuche] the information problem – they had that [Spain] will exercise its power turned virtually the entire polity responsibly, sparingly, virtuously, against them. John Nagl’s quote of and in accordance with interna- Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff tional norms is therefore not an of the U.S. Army during the Viet- optional luxury or a sign of moral nam War, has several parallels with flaccidity” (Kilcullen, 2009, p. 24). what the Spanish experienced in the In sum, the theory presented by Ly- forests of Chile four hundred years all and Wilson accurately explains earlier, underscoring the pervasive- the outcome of the Arauco War but ness of the identification problem, only when it has been generalized to include variables that exacerbate We were indiscriminate in the identification problem beyond our application of firepower, mechanization. in the true sense of being dis- criminating, because too much Conclusion of it went out on a relatively random basis. If we were really Analyzing the Arauco War oriented after people we should through the lens of two compet- have been discriminating against ing theories of asymmetric war- those people that we were after fare offers several insights. First, and not against all people. I regarding strategic interaction think we devastated the coun- theory, the Arauco War shows that tryside. Now I don’t know what hypotheses derived from collapsing the alternative is (Nagl, 2002, both types of same-approach and p. 175) different-approach interactions can be misguided. The stronger Spanish The Spanish defeat in the Arauco defeated the Mapuche, a relatively War could be understood in terms of the Spanish army incapacity to learn 18 Understanding organizational culture of the Spanish military in the early modern era is nevertheless beyond the scope of this essay and is the subject of future research.

115 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile weaker actor, when the two factions barbarism in particular, may also used different strategies, but lost influence the outcome of wars. As when the Mapuche secularized their Villalobos puts it, Spanish failure warfare and used the same type of to solve the identification problem strategy that their enemies used. meant that “there was no one to Arreguín-Toft proves that strong trust or negotiate with and the war states are more likely to win same- became an evasive ghost without approach interactions and that the existence of a body to strike” weak states have a better chance at (1995, p. 46). winning different-approach ones. Armies that have serious dif- However, as this analysis shows, ficulties to solve the information it does not necessarily follow from problem are less likely to defeat his evidence that strong states have insurgencies. However, this is not the same probability of winning enough to explain why the Ma- both kinds of same-approach in- puche prevailed over the Spanish teractions, or that weak states will south of the Bío-Bío River while have similar favorable odds at both other similar and more advanced types of different-approach interac- cultures did not. Drawing from tions. As Lyall & Wilson (2009, p. both theories of asymmetric war- 71) argue, “treating these types of fare, it can be concluded that the wars as functionally equivalent is Mapuche won the Arauco War problematic if the determinants of because they were able to change a outcomes vary systematically by counterproductive direct strategy conflict type and time period”. (face-to- face confrontation) for The mechanization thesis, which a more appropriate indirect one argues that mechanized armies have (guerrilla warfare). This change in problems telling civilians apart strategy, combined with Spanish from insurgents, offers a valuable incapacity to surmount the iden- explanation for the outcome of tification problem, lengthened the counterinsurgency wars. However, conflict and made it so costly for its focus on mechanization – a prod- the Spanish that they were forced to uct of the time period that inspired respect Mapuche independence at the mechanization thesis – as the the south of their fortified frontier. sole obstacle to solve the identi- Further research on other cases fication problem leaves out other of resistance to Spanish conquest, factors that also aggravate the iden- as well as resistance to other colo- tification problem. Analyzing the nial powers in other periods and Arauco war as a counterinsurgency continents, presented that Jíbaros, conflict shows that cultural differ- Chichimeca, Yaqui, Guajiro, Ju- ences in general, and the Spanish mano, Apache, Comanche, Pueblo

116 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War and other American indigenous Pueblo settlement patterns in the peoples (Barrett, 2002; Boccara, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. UNM Press. 2007, p. 119, f.n. 254; Hämäläin- Beckett, I. F. W. (2001a). Encyclopedia of en, 2008; Liebmann & Murphy, guerrilla warfare. New York: Check- 2011), can benefit from applying mark Books. the framework used in this paper. Beckett, I. F. W. (2001b). Modern insur- Current counterinsurgency efforts gencies and counter-insurgencies: guerrillas and their opponents since may also learn from the Mapuche 1750. London; New York: Routledge. experience: strong actors should Bengoa, J. (2008). Historia de los antig- never underestimate the capacity uos mapuches del sur: desde antes de of weak actors to innovate and la llegada de los españoles hasta las Paces de Quilín, siglos XVI y XVII. mobilize entire societies – espe- Santiago de Chile: Catalonia. cially in the case of less hierarchical Boccara, G. (2007). Los vencedores: polities. No matter how strong an historia del pueblo mapuche en la army is, it should always consider época colonial. (D. Milos, Trans.). building rapports with the local [San Pedro de Atacama, Chile]: Línea Editorial IIAM. populations to overcome factors Boccara, G. (1999). Etnogénesis Mapu- that make the information problem che: Resistencia y Restructuración insurmountable, either high degree Entre Los Indígenas del Centro-Sur of mechanization or major cultural de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII). The Hispanic American Historical Re- differences. The Arauco war also view, 79(3), pp. 425-461. http://doi. shows that unleashed barbarism, org/10.2307/2518286 whether it is against a conventional Brand, D. (n. d.). A Brief History of Ar- army or a guerrilla, makes the dis- aucanian Studies. Bruhn de Hoffmeyer, A. (1986). Las tinction between combatants and Armas de los Conquistadores. Las noncombatants blurry, and can Armas de los Aztecas. Gladius, 17, therefore lead to defeat, no matter pp. 5-56. how strong the “barbaric” side is. Bryant, G. J. (2004). Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth- Century India. The Journal of Military Bibliography History, 68(2), pp. 431-469. http:// doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2004.0019 Armond, L. D. (1954). Frontier Warfare Calderón, M. (1607). Tratado de la in Colonial Chile. Pacific Historical importancia y utilidad que ay en Review, 23(2), pp. 125-132. http:// dar por esclavos a los indios rebe- doi.org/10.2307/3634288 lados de Chile. Madrid. Memoria Arreguín-Toft, I. (2001). How the Weak Chilena. Recuperado de: http://www. Win Wars: A Theory of Asym- memoriachilena.cl/archivos2/pdfs/ metric Conflict.International Se- MC0008854.pdf curity, 26(1), 93-128. http://doi. Carrasco, M. X. U. (2005). La frontera org/10.1162/016228801753212868 “de arriba” chilena y el camino de Barrett, E. M. (2002). Conquest and Chiloé a Valdivia, 1786-1788. Temas catastrophe: Changing Rio Grande Americanistas, (18), pp. 70-92.

117 Estudios Internacionales 189 (2018) • Universidad de Chile

Cruz, E. A. (2010). The grand Araucanian Hämäläinen, P. (2008). The Comanche wars (1541-1883) in the kindgom of empire. New Haven: Yale University Chile. S. l.: Xlibris. Press. Isaac, B. L. (1983). The Aztec Faron, L. C. (1960). Effects of Con- “Flowery War”: A Geopolitical Ex- quest on the Araucanian Picunche planation. Journal of Anthropological during the Spanish Colonization Research, 39(4), pp. 415-432. http:// of Chile: 1536-1635. Ethnohis- doi.org/10.2307/3629865 tory, 7(3), pp. 239-307. http://doi. Jones, K. L. (1994). Comparative Eth- org/10.2307/480824 nohistory and the Southern Cone. Ferrando Keun, R. (1986). Y Así Nació Latin American Research Review, la Frontera… Conquista, Guerra, 29(1), pp. 107-118. http://doi. Ocupación, Pacificación. 1550-1900. org/10.2307/2503646 Santiago de Chile: Editorial Antártica. Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The logic of vio- Foerster, R. (1996). Jesuitas y mapuches, lence in civil war. Cambridge; New 1593-1767. Santiago de Chile: Edito- York: Cambridge University Press. rial Universitaria. Kilcullen, D. (2009). The accidental guer- Gascón, M. (2007). Naturaleza e impe- rilla: fighting small wars in the midst rio: Araucanía, Patagonia, Pampas, of a big one. 1598-1740. Buenos Aires: Editorial Oxford; New York: Oxford University Dunken. Press. Goicovich, F. (2007). Entre la Conquista León, L. (1983). Expansión inca y resis- y la Consolidación Fronteriza: Dis- tencia indígena en Chile, 1470-1536. positivos de Poder Hispánico en los Chungara: Revista de Antropología Bosques Meridionales del Reino de Chilena, (10), pp. 95-115. http://doi. Chile Durante la Etapa de Transición org/10.2307/27801769 (1598-1683). Historia (Santiago), 40, Liebmann, M. & Murphy, M. S. (eds.). pp. 311-332. (2011). Enduring conquests: rethink- Goicovich, F. (2006). Alianza Geoétnicas ing the archaeology of resistance to en la Segunda Rebelión General: Gé- Spanish colonialism in the Americas nesis y Dinámica de los Vutanmapus (1st ed.). Santa Fe, N. M.: School for en el Alzamiento de 1598. Historia Advanced Research Press. (Santiago), 39, pp. 93-154. Lyall, J. & Wilson, I. (2009). Rage González de Nájera, A. (1614a). Desen- Against the Machines: Explaining gaño y Reparo de la Guerra del Reino Outcomes in Counterinsurgency de Chile. En Miraflores, M. y Salva, Wars. International Organization, M. (eds.), Colección de Documento 63(01), 67. http://doi.org/10.1017/ Inéditos para la Historia de España S0020818309090031 (Vol. XLVIII). Madrid: Imprenta de Mack, A. (1975). Why Big Nations la Viuda de Calero. Lose Small Wars: The Politics of González de Nájera, A. (1614b). Desenga- Asymmetric Conflict.World Poli- ño y Reparo de la Guerra del Reino de tics, 27(2), pp. 175-200. http://doi. Chile. (J. Toribio Medina, Ed.) (Vol. org/10.2307/2009880 XLVIII). Santiago de Chile: Impre- Mahoney, J. & Rueschemeyer, D. (eds.). siones Ercilla. Recuperado de: http:// (2003). Comparative historical analy- www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/ sis in the social sciences. Cambridge, desengano-y-reparo-de-la-guerra-del- U.K.; New York: Cambridge Univer- reino- de-chile-donde-se-manifiestan- sity Press. las-principales-ventajas-q-0/ Nagl, J. A. (2002). Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam:

118 Rodolfo Disi Pavlic Explaining outcomes of asymmetric conflicts revisited: The Arauco War

learning to eat soup with a knife. C. (1982). Relaciones Fronterizas Westport, Conn: Praeger. en la Araucanía. Santiago de Chile: Navarro, L. (1909). Crónica militar de Universidad Católica de Chile la conquista y pacificación de la Ar- Zavala, J. M. (2008). Los mapuches del aucanía desde el año 1859 hasta su siglo XVIII: dinámica interétnica y completa incorporación al territorio estrategias de resistencia. Santiago, nacional (1º ed.). Santiago de Chile: Chile: Editorial Universidad Boli- Pehuén. variana. Padden, R. C. (1957). Cultural Change and Military Resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550-1730. Southwestern Jour- nal of Anthropology, 13(1), pp. 103- 121. http://doi.org/10.2307/3629161 Raudzens, G. (1995). So Why Were the Aztecs Conquered, and What Were the Wider Implications? Testing Military Superiority as a Cause of Europe’s Pre- industrial Colonial Conquests. War in History, 2(1), pp. 87-104. http://doi. org/10.1177/096834459500200105 Record, J. (2007). Beating Goliath: why insurgencies win. Potomac Books, Inc. Rowe, J. H. (2006). The Inca civil war and the establishment of Spanish power in Peru. Ñawpa Pacha: Journal of Andean Archaeology, (28), pp. 1-9. http://doi.org/10.2307/27977824 Salas, A. M. (1950). Las Armas de La Conquista. Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores. Sauer, J. (2014). The archaeology and ethnohistory of Araucanian resilience. New York: Springer. Singh, B. (1971). Theory and practice of modern guerrilla warfare. New York: Asia Pub. House. Smith, A. (1995). Alliance Formation and War. International Studies Quar- terly, 39(4), pp. 405-425. http://doi. org/10.2307/2600800 Thompson, L. B. (1989). Low-intensity conflict: the pattern of warfare in the modern world. Free Press. Villalobos, S. (1995). Vida Fronteriza en la Araucanía: El mito de la Guerra de Arauco. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello. Villalobos, S., Aldunate, C., Zapatero, H., Méndez Beltrán, L. M. & Bascuñán,

119