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’S PERIPHERY: FRONT PERMANENT WAR ON PERU IER IDENTITY AND THE
POLITICS OF CONFLICT IN 17TH CENTURY CHILE.
By
Eugene Clark Berger
Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
History
August, 2006
Nashville, Tennessee
Approved: Date:
Jane Landers August, 2006
Marshall Eakin August, 2006
Daniel Usner August, 2006 íos Eddie Wright-R August, 2006 áuregui Carlos J August, 2006 id2725625 pdfMachine by Broadgun Software - a great PDF writer! - a great PDF creator! - http://www.pdfmachine.com http://www.broadgun.com
HISTORY ’ PERMANENT WAR ON PERU S PERIPHERY: FRONTIER IDENTITY AND
THE
POLITICS OF CONFLICT IN 17TH-CENTURY CHILE
EUGENE CLARK BERGER
Dissertation under the direction of Professor Jane Landers
This dissertation argues that rather than making a concerted effort to stabilize the
Spanish-indigenous frontier in the south of the colony, colonists and indigenous residents
of 17th century Chile purposefully perpetuated the conflict to benefit personally from the
spoils of war and use to their advantage the resources sent by viceregal authorities to
fight it.
Using original documents I gathered in research trips to Chile and Spain, I am able to
reconstruct the debates that went on both sides of the Atlantic over funds, protection from
’ th pirates, and indigenous slavery that so defined Chile s formative 17 century. While my
conclusions are unique, frontier residents from Paraguay to northern New Spain were
also dealing with volatile indigenous alliances, threats from European enemies, and
questions about how their tiny settlements could get and keep the attention of the crown.
I also hope to shed new light on what the residents of the frontiers themselves were
saying about their world, rather than relying on the important but somewhat muddled
impressions of historians and statesman who have national legacies in mind.
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To Caroll and Matthew. For their love, patience and for allowing me to pursue a
profession I am passionate about.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project could not have been undertaken without funds from the Program for ’s Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports and Cultural Cooperation between Spain
United States Universities, the Herbert and Blanche Henry Weaver Fellowship, the
William Campbell Binkley Graduate Education Fund, a Vanderbilt University Travel
Grant, a Vanderbilt University Graduate Fellowship and Teaching Assistantship, and the ón Helguera Dissertation Fellowship. J. Le I am especially indebted to Patrick McMullen ’s generous gift III who established the Helguera Fellowship. Mr. McMullen serves as a ’s decades of commitment to Vanderbilt University and more testament to Dr. Helguera
importantly, to each and every one of his students.
I am very grateful to my advisor, Dr. Jane Landers for her patience and guidance over ’s genuine interest in my project was a great the course of my entire graduate career. Jane
motivator and she maintained her commitment to my work even through the very ’s passing difficult loss of her friend and colleague, Dr. Simon Collier. Dr. Collier was a
shock to all who knew him, and I am blessed to have been mentored by such a brilliant ’s history and culture. I scholar, who helped cultivate my love and respect for Chile
would also like to thank the members of my committee, professors Marshall Eakin, áuregui, Daniel Usner and Edward Wright íos. Carlos J -R
I would like to thank my parents for taking in and supporting three weary travelers
with the only condition being that I do the same for my children. I thank my son
Matthew for his laugh, his wonderful personality, and for interrupting me when I really ’t). Finally, I thank my wife needed a break from writing (and sometimes when I didn
iv Caroll for her faith. She never hesitated when I asked her to leave her friends and family in Chile, postpone her career, and follow me to Nashville.
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Extent of the Inca Empire ...... 10
2. Cities and forts founded in 16th-century Chile...... 12
’s route 3. Almagro ...... 32
’s 16th 4. Approximate Distribution of Chile -Century Indigenous Population...... 34
ía 5. The Araucan ...... 82
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEDICATION...... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iv
LIST OF FIGURES ...... vi
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 8 “ ” THE II. TRABAJOS DE LA GUERRA Y TRABAJOS DEL HAMBRE. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONTIER IN 16TH-CENTURY CHILE ...... 29
“The Araucanía” and Araucanians ...... 33 Indios de Guerra...... 37
’S III. LABOR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. CHILE FRONTIER ECONOMY RESISTS VICEREGAL NEEDS ...... 65
ñez de Loyola Disrupts the Colonial Pact O ...... 95
IV. FRONTIER EXPERIMENTS: JESUITS, MYTHS AND SLAVERY IN POST-CURALABA CHILE...... 101
V. PROFITEERING ON THE FRONTIER: THE POVERTY OF THE VIDA FRONTERIZA MEANS WEALTH FOR AN UNSCRUPULOUS FEW ...... 137
VI. CONCLUSION: AN EARTHQUAKE RATTLES PERU AND SENDS ’S FRONTIER ECONOMY RIPPLES THROUGH CHILE ...... 177
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 193
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For more than three hundred years, the Araucanian indigenous group in southern
Chile remained unconquered by both Spanish and later Chilean authorities.1
Araucanian resistance began almost immediately after the Spanish arrived in the
region in the 1540s and did not end until the 1880s when Chilean soldiers returned
from the War of the Pacific to put down the last major Araucanian offensive. “War of Arauco” as it would come to be called took its name from the region This
where most of the conflict would center.2 Not satisfied with decreasing spoils from
the conquest of Peru, a number of Spaniards and their indigenous auxiliaries marched
through the forbidding Atacama Desert and founded Santiago de Chile in 1541. After
finding gold in rivers near Santiago, a smaller group of Spaniards moved steadily
south in search of more placer mining possibilities, erecting first a fort then the town ón near the mouth of the Bío ío River in 1550. It was at the Bío ío of Concepci -B -B
1 “Mapuche,” and now refer to themselves as such. Mapuche The Araucanians are also known as “people of the earth” in Mapudungun, but the term only sporadically appears in 16th and 17th means century sources. The Spanish had various terms to refer to these Indians, usually based on the region “Araucano” or from whence they sent representatives in peace talks, but the most universal term was “Auca.” In a recent article Guillaume Boccara correctly pointed out that both “Mapuche” and “ ” are flawed, and instead uses the term “true people” to refer to the Araucano reche meaning “Etnogénesis Mapuche: Resistencia y Restructuración inhabitants of this area. Guillaume Boccara, ígenas del Centro ” Entre los Ind -Sur de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII), Hispanic American Historical Review 79:3 (August 1999). Reche was used and understood by the Spanish, but it too is imperfect as ’s political or religious leaders. it refers to the masses or individuals and does not include this region ás Guevara, ón de Araucanía, Tomo I ía Araucana Tom Historia de la civilizaci , Antroploj (Santiago: “Reche” is becoming more widely used among Chilean historians, Imprenta Cervantes, 1900), 186. “Araucanian” remains more universal. but 2 The colonial Province of Arauco was bordered by the Pacific and the Andes to its west and east, and én and Maule Rivers on the north and south. I will also use the more loosely defined by the Tolt “Araucanía” in this study.
8 River where this steady movement southward would stall, and the Spanish war of conquest would become one of Araucanian resistance.3
Two main factors prompted this development. First, no significant deposit of precious metals was discovered in Chile, immediately relegating the new colony to ’s economic periphery. The aforementioned placer mines were the Spanish Empire quickly exhausted, and no major gold vein was ever discovered. In the meantime, the “silver mountain” of Potosí in 1545 soon would help t discovery of the riple the amount of silver arriving in Seville.4 This meant that although the crown had no ’s silver intention of abandoning Chile (it had potential as a breadbasket for Peru mines), it would see only modest settlement and few resources. By 1549, there were only 500 colonists in all of Chile.5 Second, Araucanian resistance had stopped the ío ío and a century later the river and the advance of the Inca Empire at the B -B residents to its south thwarted another empire. (See map below.) However, lacking large scale political institutions, the scattered Araucanians had no territorial ío ío. Therefore, with neither the Spanish nor Araucanians aspirations north of the B -B ío ío, something of a permanent frontier began enthusiastic about penetrating the B -B
3 “spiritual conquest” also slowed at the Bío ío. There w The Spanish -B ere members of a number of regular orders in Chile by the 1550s, but their work was concentrated near Santiago. The founding of é (Chillán) (1590) produced few results. In the the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and San Bartolom 1590s, the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role. In 1595 two Jesuits set out for ía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who believed the Jesuits could aid in the the Araucan “pacification” of the region. Rolf G. Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 1593-1767 (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1996), 48-50. 4 Lyle N. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World: 1492-1700 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 229. 5 Tracing population numbers for the rest of the century becomes a difficult task with miscegenation and the abandonment of Spanish settlements. The most reliable numbers are those of Spanish arrivals, but it becomes more difficult to track their movements and offspring once they set foot in Chile. Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile: Tomo I (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 263.
9
Figure 1. Extent of the Inca Empire6
to straddle the river. Soon, what began as a skirmish line had become a region of frontier negotiation where trade flourished. Strawberries, lima beans, corn, potatoes, blankets, feathers, and metal trinkets had begun to change hands in regular Spanish-
Araucanian trade fairs as early as the 1550s.7 Miscegenation also brought the Spanish and Araucanians closer, as Spanish women were scarce.8 This contact was facilitated by the presence of Spanish towns in Araucanian territory and by the forced settlement
“pueblos de indios” or “reducciones” near Spanish towns or forts.9 of Araucanians in
6 Adapted from:
10 In the first decades of Spanish settlement, surviving on the frontier was the priority “enemy.” By 1565 for these small towns even if it meant trading with the indigenous
Chile had seen the arrival of only 1,500 Spaniards, who dotted settlements over the
ón.10 1,000 kilometers between Coquimbo and Concepci (See map below). ía likely Without frontier exchange, this scattered colonization of the Araucan ús and Rey Don Felipe. These two would not have escaped the fate of Nombre de Jes settlements in the Strait of Magellan were never re-supplied and disappeared soon after their 1584 founding.11 With colonists recognizing their weakness, modest ía began to bear fruit. It even efforts to forge a frontier economy in the Araucan appeared that the consistently frustrated attempts of the Catholic Church to evangelize the Araucanians were having some success.12
However, all belief that the frontier would evaporate a generation after the conquest was dashed by massive Araucanian rebellions in 1598 and again in 1655 which returned an air of instability to the region. It is my goal to address the connection between these rebellions and the fact that both the Spanish and
Araucanians cultivated and benefited from the simmering war of resistance on the frontier. ’s southern settlements had existed only a generation when they Most of Chile were attacked by the Araucanians in 1598 and subsequently abandoned. While there
10 ás Thayer Ojeda ón de la sociedad chilena y censo de la población de Chile en los Tom , Formaci ños de 1540 a 1565 a (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1939), 320. 11 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 44. 12 é (Chillán) (1590) produced The founding of the Dioceses of La Imperial (1560) and San Bartolom few results, but the newly-arrived Jesuit order began to seek a more active role in the 1590s. In 1595 ía under the government of Martín de Loyola, who two Jesuits set out for the Araucan believed the “pacification” of the region. Jesuits could aid in the Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 48-50.
11
Figure 2. Cities and forts founded in 16th-century Chile. (Cities are represented by circles, forts by triangles.)13
13 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 45.
12 were many peripheral, or frontier areas throughout the Spanish Empire, only in ’s case did the crown feel it ne Chile cessary to send (and fund) a permanent army. On other frontiers, vecinos were expected to form militias and provide for their own defense. The crown called for a professional army in Chile after the colony was shaken by the Araucanian assault of 1598 and a subsequent attack by Dutch é in 1600. privateers on the island of Chilo While many historians have argued that frontiers are usually transitory,14 the presence of the permanent army would make
Chile a notable exception. While the 16th century was one of surviving the frontier, and developing patterns of interaction, the arrival of a permanent army in the 17th ía. The century brought major investment and significant settlement to the Araucan
“Army of Arauco” as it became known, was established in the firs th t decade of the 17 ío ío River. The army century and established forts at different points along the B -B ’s tenuous frontier estancias and missions had two primary functions, to protect Chile from any Araucanian advance and to drive away pirates interested in the Peruvian ’s entire American colonial silver that funded the army and for that matter, Spain venture. On three occasions in the 16th century, European pirates, including Francis
Drake, had slipped through the Strait of Magellan and threatened Chile. These three breaches of the Pacific did more psychological than real damage to the viceroyalty, as the pirate activity was brief but served to confirm that the southern door to Peruvian silver could indeed be forced open. The 1600 Dutch attack was more worrisome however, as it raised the prospect that European enemies would ally with the
Araucanians and establish a stronghold in Chile.
14 öter, “La frontera en hispanoamérica colonial: un estudio historiográfico comparativo ” Bernd Schr , Colonial Latin American Historical Review (2001:Summer), 367.
13 While the Army of Arauco was designed to drive off pirates and finish the conquest, its real contribution to the colony had less to do with its professional duties and more to do with the role of these soldiers as residents on a developing frontier.
The crown created the army as a temporary force that would finish off the Araucanian threat. However, for a number of reasons the Army of Arauco never mounted a significant campaign, instead focusing on smaller raids and contributing to the climate of negotiated violence that characterized the permanent frontier. As the seventeenth century moved along, an end to the conquest seemed farther and farther afield and residents of the frontier and the colony in general continued to take advantage of this increasingly permanent frontier. By cultivating a fear of pirates and to some extent of indigenous rebellion, residents of the frontier could count on more funds from the viceroy even as they embezzled them and used them to conduct illegal slave taking campaigns. ’s lack of an David Weber has recently reminded us that the Hapsburg crown overall strategy for its American frontiers meant that it was up to residents of far- flung outposts like Chile to craft their own political and cultural systems.15 Through my research I have found that ultimately, both Spanish and Araucanian residents on the frontier, as well as officials in Santiago and Lima did not want to see an end to the
War of Arauco. The war and the frontier life that it had created benefited them too much.
Frontier interaction began as a war of conquest where both parties had tried to eliminate one another. However, once a balance of power was established, both sides
15 árbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment David J. Weber, B (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 8.
14 in the War of Arauco purposefully kept the conflict simmering for most of the 17th century and helped make the War of Arauco a permanent one. For the Spanish, the most effective way to make the frontier disappear would have been through settlement, yet there was neither the will nor the resources for a major colonization ío ío. Neither was there a significant advance of a line of Catholic south of the B -B
ío ío until the late 18th missions south of the B -B century. There were Jesuits and
Franciscans in the region during the 17th century, but their activity was limited to periodic excursions from larger Spanish settlements. The Araucanians on the other hand also benefited from the ebb and flow that was frontier exchange. The presence of the Spanish helped them financially through trade, raids and gifts, and helped their leaders gain power by proving that through their interaction with Spanish officials that they were on an equal level with their supposed conquerors. After the 1560s then, neither side made a real and lasting commitment to victory, as the War of
Arauco provided resources that would have been lacking without the attention the conflict brought.
Since this frontier negotiation was not limited to Chile, studying other 16th and
17th century frontiers has helped structure my research. New Mexico was one of these “vacant” during frontier areas that historians of the United States had disregarded as its colonial period. Fortunately the work of Bolton and more recently David Weber,
James Brooks, Dan Usner and others has revealed that there was in fact a vibrant exchange economy in the region. While many have cited the Pueblo Revolt of 1680 as evidence of a lack of Spanish hegemony in the region, only recently have scholars “this antithesis between the moved past that dramatic moment to truly reveal how
15 … has been greatly overworked.”16 Spanish pick and the English hoe ’s multiple award winning James Brook Captives and Cousins traces several centuries of development in the southwest borderlands and argues among other things that the mountains of the region were not a barrier to societal development. Instead “Sierras de Sangre de Cristo, Jémez, Sandía, and Magdalena (linked) landscapes the ” in the sout and societies hwest, much like the cordillera between Chile and Argentina
17 ’ description of how frequently and how did. Also important for my work is Brooks “just war” to turn indigenous slavery into a legitimate and formally the Spanish used lucrative staple of the frontier economy. In Chile and in New Mexico alike, the fact that Spanish and indigenous residents of the frontier received little direct economic assistance from the crown did not preclude them from thriving as a multi-ethnic society, even if they had to use extra-legal means to do so. In fact, the very lack of direct contact with royal authorities was what emboldened these frontier residents to develop permanent patterns of indigenous slave taking and trading.
Perhaps the most well known American frontier existed in northern New Spain. “silver arc,” a network of presidios established to There the Spanish set up their “savage” Chichimec peoples. While it is protect the silver mining economy from the understandable that the torture and mutilation of Spanish prisoners at the hands of the ’s colonial history, the silver arc Chichimec are the most dominant images of this area remains one of the earliest examples of how creole societies survived and self-
16 “Defensive Spanish Expansion and the Signifi ” in Herbert Bolton, cance of the Borderlands, The Idea of Spanish Borderlands, ed. David J. Weber (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1991), 2. 17 James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship and Commmunity in the Southwest ón has written extensively on the Borderlands (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2002), 117. Margarita Gasc ón, Cordillera de los Andes as a bridge rather than a barrier. Margarita Gasc “Comerciantes y redes ú,” mercantiles del siglo XVII en la frontera sur del Virreinato del Per Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 57:2, (July/December, 2000): 413-448.
16 conceptualized when they were so far from the imperial spotlight. In both Chile and
New Spain it was frontier residents themselves who initiated dialogue with the crown about and sought solutions for their unique legal, military and economic
18 ’s programs of ón circumstances. Much as was the case in Chile reducci and “defensive war,” “the mestizo warrior -diplomat (in New Spain) fashioned an
”19 enduring and humane peace in a unique frontier setting. “Guaraní frontier” which developed in territory now split between The so-called
Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, also held many similarities to the Chilean case.
Jesuits in both Chile and the River Plate area first unwittingly exposed to, then tried í from slave raiders. Aborigines in both areas were to protect Araucanians and Guaran concentrated into Jesuit designed reducciones which made them both easier to catechize and unfortunately to kidnap.20 A general lack of Spanish settlement also í frontier, producing “an intense process of characterized both Chile and the Guaran
” and in the latter case, “ado ”21 miscegenation ption of the native language.
18 ’ work on Spanish Florida. It was at Fort Mosé near St. Augustine, where a Also see Jane Landers group of runaway African slaves took full advantage of their liminal existence by contributing to a frontier militia and creating a permanent community. The uncertainty and permissiveness of living between two empires, near volatile Indians, and during the height of Caribbean piracy allowed free blacks in the area to thwart preconceptions, and become entrepreneurs and soldiers. Jane Landers, Black Society Spanish Florida (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 35, 204. See “Jonathan Bryan’s Plantation Empire: Land, Politics, and the Formation of a Ruling Class Alan Gallay, ” rd in Colonial Georgia, The William and Mary Quarterly, 3 Ser., Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1988) for similar economic opportunities on the neighboring Georgia frontier. 19 Philip Wayne Powell argues that the leadership of a handful of first generation Americans was essential to Spanish survival in the region. He writes extensively of Miguel Caldera, who used his local knowledge to author a fragile peace with the Chichimec as the 16th century came to a close. ’s plan involved “protection and defense of the pacified people ” Caldera s, provisioning and gift-giving, “religious agricultural help to the Chichimec in an attempt to reform their nomadic existence, and ” Philip Wayne Powell, ’s Miguel Caldera: The Taming of America’s First conversion. Mexico Frontier, 1548-1597 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1977), 22, 205. 20 í Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata Barbara Ganson, The Guaran (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 45. 21 Ibid., 29. Tens of thousands of Chileans still count Spanish as their second language, but ún í. mapudung (the language of the Araucanians) was never used as widely as Guaran
17 Looking at comparative cases is however most helpful in terms of reminding us of ’s uniqueness. First of all, Chile did not have the pressures of the Chilean frontier territorial competition that we saw in Louisiana or Spanish Florida. While it is true that the Dutch and English occasionally appeared in Pacific waters, the Spanish-
Araucanian interaction had a longer incubation period than did that of the Spanish and Seminole or French and Choctaw. Second, while the New Spanish silver arc í frontier unstable, the moved north and paulistas (slave raiders) made the Guaran story of frontier life in Chile was one of permanence. Spanish settlement did not progress further south, nor did the Araucanians drive the Spanish back toward
Santiago. Patterns of war making, slave taking and trade, rather than disappearing over time became more frequent and more widespread. Soon the frontier economy ’s all was not simply one of subsistence, but became integrated into the viceroyalty - important silver extraction. As Chile moved toward the 18th century, Araucanians and Spanish creoles defined success not as assimilation or conquest, but as a negation or frontier pact which bridged the physical and cultural territory between two societies.22
Chile also is unique in that during the national period, the legacy of the frontier was not regarded as a threat. In Argentina for example, it was not long after 19th- century ethnographers like Lucio Mansilla reported back about little-known frontier groups like the Ranqueles, than these same groups were attacked in future president
22 ón dedicates chapters to a handful of increasingly powerful 18th Leonardo Le century frontier toquis ón, ñores de las cordilleras y la (chieftains) in, Leonardo Le Los se s pampas: Los Pehuenches de Malalhue, 1770-1800 (Mendoza, Argentina: Universidad de Congreso, 2001). Also see Leonardo ón, th Le Maloqueros y conchavadores. Kristine Jones has also written a number of articles on 18 “Comparative Frontier century frontier raiding economies in Chile and Argentina. See, Kristine Jones, ” in Raiding Economies, North and South, Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire, Ed. by Donna J. Guy and Thomas E. Sheridan (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1998).
18 ’s extermination campaign.23 Julio Roca In Chile on the other hand, the frontier south had become quite powerful politically even before the wars of independence began. ’s liberator, Bernardo O’Higgins was from the southern frontier town of Chillán, Chile ’s leaders had earned their stripes as officers on the and many of the new republic
Araucanian frontier. The Araucanian frontier was not only a source of leadership experience, but for some statesmen their indigenous enemy provided an example of “only the standard of Aruacanía democracy that Chile could follow. After all,
”24 opposed the banners of the House of Austria. Trying to be consistent with this ’Higgins rhetoric, O made overtures to the Araucanians, reminding them of their shared creole heritage and claiming that the Spanish were a common enemy. He and “reformed and other statesmen held optimism for the future in attempting to create a
” where whites and 25 ideal state Indians could build on this common heritage. This “common heritage” would not have existed without Chile’s long frontier sense of experience.
While historians have been looking at frontier development for centuries, “frontier studies” as a sub -discipline has its roots in the writings and politics of
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and Frederick Jackson Turner. In simplest terms, for
Sarmiento the frontier was a threat to the Republic of Argentina, while for Turner it was an opportunity for the United States.
During his 1840s exile in Chile, the Argentine author and future president ’s celebration of frontiersmen Sarmiento wrote a scathing critique of his new nation
23 ón a los indios Lucio Mansilla, Una excursi Ranqueles (Buenos Aires : Editorial Universitaria, 1966). 24 Simon Collier, Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence:1808-1833 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 213-14. 25 Ibid., 215-16.
19 “American Bedouins” on the outskirts of Buenos Aires were and argued that these stifling progress. Sarmiento added that all civilizations, whether native, Spanish or ” and worried that Argentina was losing European, were centered in the cities intellectual and social ground to non-urban denizens. The statesman lamented that “fusion” of the S “families” had produced “a the panish, indigenous and African ” characterized by a “love of idleness and incapacity for industry.” homogenous whole “education and the exigencies of social For Sarmiento, only the growth of the city and ” could “succeed i position n spurring (the homogenous whole) out of its customary
” and rescue Argentina from the clutches of the árbaro 26 pace b . ’s ’s North American frontier Like Sarmiento pampa, Frederick Jackson Turner was a mostly vacant area defined by its low population density. Both authors gave ’s “settled area.” Turner did little agency to the residents who lived outside of Turner “Americanization,” where concede that the frontier had some merit as a laboratory for the wilderness changed settlers of European stock through its opportunities for problem solving.27 In other words, neither author celebrated frontier culture, but
Turner the historian differed from Sarmiento the statesman in his belief that the ’s political and social legacies were too important to try and e frontier rase with a “civilization” campaign.
We also have to remember that nineteenth century writers were often influenced by scientific racism and often engaged in stereotyping of indigenous actors on the
26 “Civilization or Barbarism?,” trans. by Mrs. Horace Mann in Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, The Argentina Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. by Gabriela Nuzeilles and Graciela Montaldo árbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 85-87. See Weber, B the Age of Enlightenment, for a discussion of the larger implications of this term. 27 “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” in Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), 2-4.
20 frontier. Only recently have historians begun to refute the idea that residents of the frontier were stereotypes and that American residents had little to say about the frontier until the national period. In fact, there are a number of other examples of “the fringes” in the minds of statesmen and histori where ans had actually been centers of economic and even intellectual activity from the early years of the Spanish Empire.
Prominent frontier figures on both sides of the line like Miguel Caldera in Mexico úñez de Pineda in Chile we and Pelantaro and Francisco N re the foot soldiers of national consciousness that liberal reformers and historians of the 19th century did not recognize or might not even have known about.
Fortunately, more recent scholarship from multiple disciplines has reminded us of the cultural give and take of frontier life and how this played a central role in the development of national and regional identities.28 Herbert Bolton deserves most of the credit for developing the study of comparative frontiers. He was the first to argue that historians of the United States and historians of Latin America had much to learn from sharing information about their similar colonial frontiers.29
Study of the Chilean frontier of course began in the colonial period, and more recent work by anthropologists and historians has continued to probe the illusive question of why the Araucanians resisted conquest for centuries. In the 19th century é Toribio de Medina published dozens of primary source volumes on the polymath Jos
28 One interesting sub theme is how this rejection or acceptance of the other is manifested through í á and in turn Americans “ingested” cannibalism. Oswald de Andrade celebrated how the Tup -Namb “Anthr ” the other in his opophagite Manifesto. http://www.coleccioncisneros.org/st_writ.asp?ID=17&Type=2 More recently, Guillaume Boccara has made some fascinating observations about Araucanian cannibalism, its meanings and ramifications for énesis Mapuche,” 425 the vida fronteriza. Boccara, “Etnog -461. 29 Herbert Eugene Bolton, Wider horizons of American History (New York: Appleton-Century co., “The Mission as a Frontier Institution in t ” 1939)., Bolton, he Spanish-American Colonies, The American Historical Review, 23 (Oct. 1917): 42-61.
21 ’s colonial past, and had thousa Chile nds more documents transcribed into the archive that now bears his name. The French scholar Claudio Gay made similar documentary ás Guevara opened a flurry contributions during the post-independence period. Tom of 20th-century writings on the frontier with his multivolume synthesis of Araucanian ón de Araucanía history, politics and culture, Historia de la civilizaci . The historian and literary scholar Ricardo Latcham led the next generation, reviving interest in the
Spanish-Araucanian epic La Araucana, and taking a closer look at the diversity of
’s indigenous groups at first contact.30 Chile
Some of the earliest work on the Chilean frontier in English came from Alfred ’s Tapson, Eugene Korth and through the translation of Natan Wachtel The Vision of
31 ’s first the Vanquished. The work of these scholars paralleled that of Chile óngora, and Guillermo indigenista generation, which included Alvaro Jara, Mario G ’s most eminent historian, Sergio Villalobos recently lent his Furlong. Chile ’s considerable prestige to the study of Chile vida fronteriza (frontier life), and to the ón, Guillamme Boccarra, Margarita work of younger scholars like Leonardo Le
ón, Jorge Pinto, and Mario Orellana.32 Gasc U.S. scholars Kristine Jones and the
30 “Los indios de la Cordillera y la Pampa en el siglo XVI,” Ricardo Latcham, Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografia (1929). 31 ” Alfred J. Tapson, “Indian warfare on the Pampa during the Colonial period, Hispanic American Historical Review 42:1 (Feb. 1962) pp. 1-28. Nathan Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished, The ân Reynolds (Hassocks, Sussex: Spanish Conquest of Peru Through Indian Eyes, trans. by, Ben and Si The Harvester Press Limited, 1977). 32 íguez. ía, 1600 á: Consejo See Jorge Pinto Rodr Misioneros en la Araucan -1900: Vol. I (Bogot ón de la Episcopal Latinoamericano, 1990). Alvaro Jara, Guerra y sociedad en Chile: La transformaci Guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1971). Leonardo ón Solís, ía y las Pampas, 1700 Le Maloqueros y Conchavadores en Araucan -1800 (Temuco: óngora, Ediciones Universidad de la Frontera, 1990). Mario G Encomenderos y estancieros: Estudios ón social aristocrática de Chile despues de la Conquista, 1580 acerca de la constituci -1660 (Santiago: íguez, ía de la isla de La Editorial Universitaria, 1971). Mario Orellana Rodr Historia y antropolog ón “Comerciantes y redes mercantiles Laja (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1992). Margarita Gasc , ú,” del siglo XVII en la frontera sur del Virreinato del Per Anuario de . Estudios Americanos, 57:2 (July/ December 2000): 413-448.
22 ’s indigenous anthropologist Tom Dillehay are also doing important work on Chile past.33
It is impossible to generalize the findings of more than a century of scholarship, but for our purposes I will focus on one common argument about Araucanian resistance that helps frame my own. Many of the aforementioned scholars have embraced the idea that Araucanian society went through fundamental changes in the
16th century, allowing them to reject the Spanish advance both militarily (Wachtel) and culturally (Boccarra).34 I fully agree with this finding, but there is an underlying assumption in most scholarship that the Spanish were actively pursuing a military ón, Jones and others have victory in their conflict with the Araucanians. However, Le “War of Arauco” was in fact composed of revealed that the more trade and negotiation than actual battles. My research has allowed me to take this argument a step further and claim that both the Spanish and Araucanians purposefully extended the conflict to establish a permanent frontier. In my sources I came across repeated occasions where the both the Spanish and Araucanians argued in favor of maintaining a simmering military conflict. Without the threat of the War of Arauco, the Spanish would have lost monetary support from the viceroy and the Araucanians would have been cut off from the gifting and trade cycle that was so important to their politics and economy.35
33 “Comparative Ethnohistory and the Southern Cone,” Kristine Jones, Latin American Research ía: presente y pasado és Bello: Review 29:1 (1994): 107-118. Tom Dillehay, Araucan (Editorial Andr Santiago, 1990). 34 “Etnogénesis Mapuche.” Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished. Boccara, 35 “Spanish” and “Araucanians” we When we refer to the really mean the officials that drive policy for both groups. We must not ignore the fact that as the war drew on, life for subalterns on both sides of ío ío often improved very little and in some cases got worse. It was the slaves, captives, the B -B women, children, farmers and foot soldiers in this region who bore the brunt of the conflict, while ’s share of the benefits. captains, governors and lonkos saw the lion
23 ’s conqueror, Pedro Chapter one of this dissertation is a discussion of how Chile de Valdivia, ironically laid the framework for the permanent frontier. Realizing that
Chile would not yield the quantities of precious metals that would Peru, Valdivia figuratively beat swords into plowshares by turning his conquerors into farmers and ’s hope was that Chile’s rich soil and access to pl ranchers. Valdivia entiful indigenous labor would attract a new generation of Spanish settlers and ensure its economic ’s Araucanian opponent led a stunning assault against the survival. Lautaro, Valdivia
Spanish, but neither he nor his allies sought to press their advantage and take territory ío ío. north of the B -B ’s frontier economy. Chapter two traces the formation of Chile Encomenderos rejected a less lucrative but more stable wheat economy and instead used their Indians in gold mining and cattle raising. Over time both Araucanians and colonists realized that the War of Arauco actually brought economic benefits and both set about establishing patterns of war and peacemaking. In general a permanent frontier was established by the turn of the century where the Araucanians and neighboring groups were neither to be incorporated, nor left to their own devices. The cultural and economic exchange on the frontier had developed its own momentum and own rules “outsiders.” that confounded the viceroy and other
Chapter three describes a number of experiments the crown and viceroy formulated to address the frustrating stalemate along the Chilean frontier. The crown legalized, then abolished, then legalized again the enslavement of rebel Araucanians. ío ío. Spain also It created a 2,000 man strong professional army along the B -B “Defensive Wa ” organized by Jesuits supported a r . Finally, it sponsored expeditions
24 to the mythical city of Caesars to find and conquer an imaginary indigenous group that was providing aid to the Araucanians. These experiments demonstrated that
Spain had recognized and was willing to address the problem of the Araucanian frontier, but all that these changes accomplished was to reveal how entrenched the colonial pact had become and how difficult the economic, military and cultural patterns along the frontier would be to break.
Chapter four describes how in the mid-17th century the frontier actually became an economic boon to powerful and unscrupulous officials who were willing to violate ’s “colonial pact.” Both the Spanish and their indigenous informants the frontier exaggerated the presence of European enemies in Chile and the extent of their alliances with the Araucanians. Sightings of Dutch or English privateers, real or imagined, had to at least be investigated by the viceroy. The arrival of a search party meant at the very least supplies and reinforcements for the Spanish and gifts for information and cooperation for the Araucanians. Under the exaggerated threat of
European pirates, the viceroy turned a blind eye to Chilean mis- and malfeasance.
Governors and army officials loafed, embezzled and or misused funds, and conducted illegal slave raids knowing that the viceroy could not risk cutting off aid to Chile.
The avarice of one Chilean governor in particular prompted a disastrous rebellion by indios amigos in 1655. This attack revealed how newly arrived Spanish officials and indios rebeldes alike could affect the carefully crafted colonial pact that existed between creole Spaniards and most Araucanians. ’s This study ends in the 1680s, when a major earthquake in Peru changed Chile economic role in the viceroyalty and in turn marked the beginning of a new period of
25 sedentary agriculture which brought fewer raids along the frontier. However, I will explore in my conclusion how the legacy of the frontier persists even in modern
Chile. As a Latin Americanist in the United States I have explored the relationship í silver mines without worrying about that the Chilean frontier had to the Potos national rivalries that still exist among historians in Peru and Chile. At the same time, I will argue that I am making an important contribution to the colonial historiography of both nations. My interest has not been declaring a winner of the
War of Arauco, but instead in chronicling how, and explaining why both sides wanted to keep it alive.
Beyond statements affirming Spanish and Araucanian desire to maintain a permanent frontier, the actions of both parties also serve as evidence of their desire to keep the war alive. When Spanish settlements penetrated Araucanian territory, the
Araucanians attacked but fell back. In response, the Spanish were understandably timid; their offensives rarely were more than summer raids and they failed to repopulate many abandoned settlements until the republican period. Times of peace allowed both sides to gain strength for future campaigns, while without occasional military victories over worthy adversaries both sides would have been hard-pressed to gain the support of their peers and of their superiors alike.
Finally, we must recognize that part of the importance of the vida fronteriza came in the fact that its residents found it difficult to gain credibility or notoriety outside of ía. Colonists in Chile fou the Araucan nd themselves at a double disadvantage; having “barbarous” and culturally backward Americas and the stigma of living both in the “savage” Araucanians. among the
26 úñez ñán, the most No one knew this better than Francisco N de Pineda y Bascu
’s 17th íz. úñez de prominent creole of Chile century and author of Cautiverio fel N án to a prominent Spanish officer and was captured by the Pineda was born in Chill úñez de Pineda was the Araucanians in 1629, early in his own military career. N án for a nu captive of Maulic mber of months where he participated in all facets of
Araucanian life. Decades later he published his account of his captivity in an attempt to defend his legacy after the story had become lampooned in a Lima theatrical úñez de Pineda was well production. As a former captive and as a creole, N “...whose positioned to combat a growing Spanish disillusion with American reality,
”36 colonial societies seemed to bear little resemblance to the European utopias. “colonists had There was an increasing feeling in Europe and America that the
”37 “transculturation.” The become colonials and were experiencing an unfortunate ún in New Spain mentioned that Spanish individuals Franciscan Bernardino de Sahag in the colonies were beginning to act like Indians, a trend which was even truer for
38 “wild man” of creoles. The Spanish feared losing their battle for America to the
European Medieval legend, an uncultured rural dweller who was known to carry away women and children. The wild man mostly reflected the Spanish view of “sa ” but i vage Indians, ncreasingly the Spanish were beginning to fear this character
“nemesis” but also as “a possible destiny.”39 not only was a íz Much of Cautiverio fel then was dedicated to refuting predictions of colonial ’s impending doom. Núñez ’s text also had to combat the society de Pineda
36 “Imperial History, Captivity, and Creole Identity in Francisco Núñez de Pine Ralph Bauer, da y ñán’s íz ” Bascu Cautiverio fel , Colonial Latin American Review 7:1 (1998), 62. 37 Ibid., 66. 38 Ibid., 62-63. 39 Ibid., 68.
27 predominating European literary tradition that portrayed two American worlds, with
“geo ”40 úñez de Pineda exaggerated aspects of both Europe as the -cultural center. N indigenous and Spanish societies to distance creoles from the extremes and, expand
“space in between.”41 the The author not only disassociated himself from peninsulares and their abuses and mismanagement, but also kept indigenous society ’s length. He described his rejection of indigenous women as at arm love interests and his disdain for the indigenous clothes he was forced to wear during his captivity, as evidence against the idea that Chilean culture was just a form of mestizaje. He was “naked, Indianize ” and “white motivated by the fear that creoles would become d,
”42 savages. Rejection of both cultures and the establishment of a third was his aim and the aim of many of his creole contemporaries.
40 Ibid., 69. 41 Ibid., 72. 42 Ibid., 72-74.
28
CHAPTER II
“TRABAJOS DE ” LA GUERRA Y TRABAJOS DEL HAMBRE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRONTIER IN 16TH-CENTURY CHILE
“All this was done so that messengers could be sent to His Majesty who would bring news of me and of this land, and to Peru so that more help would be sent to enter and populate it (Chile); because without gold, it has been impossible ”43 to bring (settlers), and even with them there has been no shortage of work here.
án The Spanish founded Santiago de Chile in 1541, a full twenty years after Hern és conquered the Aztec Empire. Most of Chile’s conquerors had taken part in the Cort dismantling of the grand Inca Empire in Peru. Based on this background, Chile was a bit of a disappointment to its first Spanish residents. Chile had a significant indigenous population, but there was no empire, and little gold.44 Much of its territory was covered by dense forest or dry desert and a frigid and unknown ocean bordered all of it. This was compounded by the fact that the Aconcagua chief and former Spanish prisoner Michimalongo led an attack on Santiago only a few months
45 ’s first Spaniards after its founding and left the settlement a smoldering ruin. Chile would not have an easy time making the new colony as attractive as New Spain or
Peru to the crown and future settlers. However, its Spanish conquerors, led by Pedro de Valdivia decided to cast their lot with the new colony.
43 ón, 15 October 1550, Pedro de Valdivia, Letter to Emperador Carlos V, Concepci
29 Things quickly became even more difficult for the men who had given up healthy rewards in Peru for the unknown territory to the south. When the Spanish push southward ran into indigenous resistance and disappointing mineral yields, Valdivia and his successors knew that they would have to adapt their tactics to maintain the interest of both the crown and the colonists in this far-flung territory. By 1560, ’s south had turned the stalled conquest from a residents of Chile weakness to a trump card to play against more productive colonies in Peru, New Spain and the Caribbean.
On the ground, the frontier where the conquest stalled became a shared means of ’s colonists and indigenous inhabitants. In subsistence between Chile histories and official correspondence the precarious frontier kept Chile present in the minds of an ’s place insecure crown and scrambling viceroys. This frontier life would define Chile in the Spanish Empire, in the Viceroyalty of Peru and in the minds of its own residents for more than a century.
The success of Spanish conquerors in the north of Chile gave Valdivia no indication that his enterprise would soon experience major setbacks. With the help of ’s brother, Die Prince Paullu, the Inca Manco Capac go de Almagro led the first
Spanish exploration of Chile from Peru in 1535 and conquered the Andean provinces known to the Inca as Purumauca, Antalli, Pincu, Cauqui and Araucu.46 The Spanish also borrowed strategies from the Inca to quickly subdue the Atacama, Diaguita,
Huarpe and Picunche Indians.47 (See figure 4) However, Almagro soon fell out of favor in the former Inca districts by bringing violence and forced labor in the newly
46 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Historia general del Peru: Segunda parte de los Comentarios Reales, Tomo I (Lima: Editorial Universo S.A, 1970), 175. 47 “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 24. Horacio úsqueda de la paz en la Villalobos, Zapater, La b és Bello, 1992), 73. Guerra de Arauco: Padre Luis de Valdivia (Santiago: Editorial Andr
30 discovered territory. Almagro responded to the murder of three of his men by “arbitrarily (putting) to death several leading inhabitants of the district of Coquimbo” and enslaving others.48
At the eastern entrance to the Aconcagua valley, which would become the ’s capital, Almagro decided to turn back to Peru gateway to Chile but not before hearing from his scouting expeditions. One of these expeditions reached, and named
ómez de Alvarado went southward.49 the port of Valparaiso, while another led by G
De Alvarado reported that the further he traveled, the worse the terrain became. Chile ’s was increasingly cold, barren, and full of large and muddy rivers. De Alvarado ’s indigenous inhabitants. He pessimism carried over into his description of the region said of one group, (probably the Huarpes) that they dressed in nothing but pelts and ate only roots. Unwittingly building a case for their enslavement, he also likened them to the Arab nomads of the Moorish occupation of Iberia.50 ’s opinion of Chile’s indigenous inhabitants was undoubtedly worsened Alvarado when his group met armed resistance as they moved further south in 1536. The “skirmish” Spanish fought off an attack at the Maule River and were engaged in the én at the junction of the Ñuble and Itata rivers. This battle represented of Reinoguel the first Spanish contact with the indigenous group that would come to be known as
“Araucanians.”51 én resulted in the deaths the Araucanos or The events at Reinoguel of two Spaniards and the capture of scores of Araucanians.52
48 Eugene Korth, Spanish Policy in Colonial Chile: The Search for Social Justice, 1535-1700 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 23. 49 Pocock, The Conquest of Chile, 31. 50 ández de Oviedo y Valdés, Fern Historia General y Natural de las Indias, 143. This collective and quite negative view of nomads persists to some extent today, and would have an important presence in the Spanish accounts of groups like the Huarpe and Pehuenche who lived in the southern Andes. 51 “Arauco” is derived from “ragco,” meaning “muddy water,” in Mapudungun (the language of the
31
’s route53 Figure 3. Almagro
“Auca,” from the Quechua term “purun aukas,” meaning “enemy, rebel or wild.” Araucanians) and ón de Araucanía, Tomo I Guevara, Historia de la civilizaci , 9-10. Carlos Aldunate del Solar, Cultura “Arauco” Mapuche (Santiago: Editorial Gabriela Mistral, 1978), 13. Ragco became the region of where Pedro de Valdivia established a fort in 1553 near the Carampangue River. (The Carampangue “Bahía de Arauco” or Bay of Arauco.) River feeds into the 52 ómez de Alvarado left The Araucanians would soon be well known across the Spanish Empire, but G “there was only one Peru.” Chile still thirsting for more adventure and lamenting, Pocock, The Conquest of Chile, 33. 53 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 33.
32 “The Araucanía” and Ara ucanians
Less than a decade after the founding of Santiago, Pedro de Valdivia and his ío ío River they found a region that lieutenants continued south where near the B -B was more heavily populated but less politically organized than the Almagro- conquered north. The high population density in the south was made possible by an abundant food supply which included fish, guanacos, pine nuts (in mountainous areas) seals, corn, beans and cochayuyo, an ocean plant.54 Chroniclers encountered
Indians who feasted on shellfish, calling them savages and comilones (gluttons) because they ate without restraint. Accustomed to eating pickled cod, the Spanish had apparently forgotten the flavor of fresh shellfish and the fact that it had to be eaten immediately after it was caught.55 ’s marked geographical The Spanish also began to understand that the region features had produced a diverse array of ethnic and linguistic groups. Although they were in constant contact with one another, mountain peoples such as the Pehuenche, án, and Puelche were racially, culturally and linguistically distinct from both Chiquill the neighboring Araucanians of the plains and the Patagonians to the south.56
54 Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche, 15. 55 Ibid., 25. 56 ígenas de la Argentina: Su origen Salvador Canals Frau, Las poblaciones ind - su pasado - su presente (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1953), 357. Raul Molina, Territorio y Comunidades ío ío ón Nacional de Desarrollo Indígena, 1996), Pehuenches del Alto B -B (Santiago, Chile: Corporaci 11. The plains peoples include: the Araucanians, the Huilliche, and the Picunche. Territorio y ío ío Comunidades Pehuenches del Alto B -B , 11.
33
“Approximate Distribution of Chile’s 16th Figure 4. -Century Indigenous ”57 Population
Despite their ethnic differences, the geographical propinquity and mobility of these groups would have made it difficult for the casual observer to tell them apart. ía is no more than half the size of California making it very possible for The Araucan the Spanish to encounter members of various groups in the same day. Most Indians ’s south were divided into small, kin in Chile -based settlements, scattered seemingly
57 Silva Galdames, Atlas de Historia de Chile, 31.
34 ’s green hills, making it difficult for the Spanish to haphazardly about the region
58 ’s south define them politically or geographically. The indigenous people of Chile also had a well-developed trade network, meaning that mobility and inter-group contact were well established in pre-Colombian times. Contact and mobility were further increased almost immediately by the arrival of Spanish horses, making the task of identifying, let alone controlling these groups a difficult one.59 ía, they were the While the Araucanians were not the only denizens of the Araucan ’s region most populous and most well known group. The abundance of food and relative lack of precious stones and metals meant that competition for resources was scarce and led to the existence of a fairly egalitarian Araucanian society. Also, the large-scale, empire-supporting farming that existed in the north was not necessary and ía. The population of the plains would have been difficult to maintain in the Araucan was too dense to support large tracts of land dedicated to agriculture, and the “slash and burn” ( Araucanians practiced tala y roce) farming which required large plots to lie fallow for significant periods. In slash and burn farming a mixture of small plots is required, with one always in the production stage, providing enough food to maintain an individual family unit. Slash and burn economies cannot support the concentrated populations that sedentary agricultural can, but conceivably could be incorporated into a larger community with a diversified commerce or transit
58 Dillehay, Araucania: Presente y Pasado. 59 The conquistadors would come to regret using Araucanians to care for their horses; the Indians quickly overcame their fear of these strange beasts, and developed a ring-like stirrup that gave these barefoot riders better maneuverability than Spanish horsemen in their battles between the two groups. “Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile” in Weber and Rausch, eds. Louis de Armond, Where Cultures ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile Meet. Alonso Gonz Desenga (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26-28.
35 economy. There was certainly inter-regional trade in pre-Colombian Chile, but never a large enough population to make it a primary means of survival.60
Each Araucanian family generally maintained its own farmland, without a need for large group labor or town-like settlements. The need of each family for a large amount of land meant neighboring dwellings (rukas) were within sight, but never next to one another.61 The maintenance of space between individual rukas and ruka communities was reinforced by the belief that curses or poisoning would befall the families who kept their dwellings and fields too close together.62
This settlement pattern had an important effect on Araucanian political hierarchy.
The absence of a central village meant the absence of a central authority. A lonko, usually an elder or descendent of a previous leader served as the head of a familial unit, but his power was limited.63 A machi or shaman was important in Araucanian ceremonies, but had little day-to-day influence. In times of war, a toqui or warrior chief was named to make strategic decisions, but in times of peace he had little power.64 Although war often brought a toqui to power, it ultimately limited
Araucanian hierarchy as conflicts over land made political organization more difficult.65 Lineage-based clans came together and made decisions at bi or tri-annual meetings called reguas or cahuines. While some political discussion went on at these gatherings, their central feature was a reciprocity ceremony. More infrequent were
60 Araucania: Presente y Pasado, 42-43 61 Ibid. 62 Dillehay, Araucania: Presente y Pasado, 206. 63 Ibid., 41. 64 Carlos Aldunate del Solar, Mapuche, Seeds of the Chilean Soul: An exhibit at the Port of History Museum at Penn's Landing, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, March 27-June 30, 1992, trans. by Richard C. Baker, Peter W. Kendall (Santiago: Museo Chileno de Arte Precolombiano, 1992), 43. 65 Araucania: Presente y Pasado, 44.
36 larger gatherings of several cahuines.66 In these levos, clans traded, contracted marriage, performed religious ceremonies and made or organized wars.67
The scattered settlement pattern kept the Araucanians out of the Inca Empire and would make their conquest by the Spanish equally difficult.68 The Spanish had found that the centralization of power and of settlement in indigenous empires made them vulnerable to political collapse over questions of succession and to demographic collapse due to European diseases. In Peru for example, power was so concentrated in the Inca himself that the power struggle between Huascar and Atahualpa and ’s subsequent murder sent the empire crashing down. Empires were also Atahualpa usually surrounded by jealous and angry neighbors who the Spanish enlisted as their allies. In Mexico the Tlaxcalans were instrumental to the fall of the Aztecs. The lack ’s south assured that regional indigenous rivalries of a central seat of power in Chile
(of which there were many) did not have larger implications.69
Indios de Guerra ía, his While Valdivia was able to found a handful of towns in the Araucan progress was slowed by Araucanian resistance. By the 1550s much Spanish- “War of Arauco,” a seemingly eternal Araucanian conflict was evolving into the
66 “juntas” or “reuniónes” A number of Spanish cronistas referred to reguas and cahuines as (meetings). The terms could refer to both the meeting itself or the place where it took place. For the Spanish the cahuin was more of a space but the Araucanians understood it as an action, or a ceremony. úsqued Zapater, La B a de paz en la Guerra de Arauco, 89-90. 67 Ibid. 68 “the very absence in other parts of mainland America of the conditions J.H. Elliot explains that ” had much to do with the slo prevailing in the civilizations of the Andes and central Mexico wing of án and the Araucanía. J.H. Elliot, “The Spanish Conquest conquest in peripheral areas like the Yucat ” in and Settlement of America, The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol I, ed. by Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 186-87. 69 é Bengoa, Jos Historia del pueblo Mapuche. (Santiago: Ediciones Sur, 1985), 24.
37 struggle between the two sides that lent itself to dramatic stories (factual and “Golden Age” of Spanish fictitious) of combat and adventure on the eve of the ’s contemporaries even admitted their admiration of literature. Many of Valdivia
Araucanian battlefield tactics, one commenting that they were so organized in combat that it was almost as if they had prepared against the Romans.70 Accustomed to quick conquests, struggles against the Araucanians became an important conundrum for
Spanish governors, writers and soldiers alike. ’s expedition had reported, the Araucanians had As members of Diego de Almagro developed a reputation as bellicose long before the Spanish had contact with them.
“enemy, rebel or wild.”71 The Inca called the Araucanians purun aukas, meaning The ’s Spanish were probably not surprised then when the Araucanians resisted Valdivia ío ío River. But neither were they worried first attempts to push south of the B -B initially. After all, there was no indication that the fate of the Araucanians would be ños and Picunches who all any different from that of the Diaguitas, Atamace unsuccessfully took up arms against the Spanish during the initial conquest. It soon became apparent however that the Araucanians had a number of circumstances in their favor that their northern neighbors did not. The longer the Spanish took to advance, the more the Araucanians pressed these advantages.72
70 ónimo de Vivar, ónica de los Reinos de Chile Jer Cr (Madrid: Dastin, S.L., 2001), 250. 71 Carlos Aldunate del Solar, Cultura Mapuche (Santiago: Editoria Gabriela Mistral, 1978), 13. Although the Araucanians were not incorporated into the Inca Empire, the Chilean aborigines were not ín necessarily culturally dissimilar to those in Peru. See for example comparisons between Chav - Huantar and Araucanian iconography and ceremonial space in Dillehay, Araucania: Presente y Pasado. 72 “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 26 “ Villalobos, -27. See my M.A. thesis, People of the Pine: The ” (Vanderbilt Course of the War of Arauco and its Effects on Spanish views of the Pehuenche University, 2001) for a discussion of the Araucanians and the noble savage myth. We should note that ños, Picunches and Araucanians allied with the Spanish. Hundreds of there were Diaguitas, Atamace ía and at least one Picunches served as auxiliaries in the earliest Spanish campaigns into the Araucan
38 The fact that the Araucanians were mainly hunter-gatherers meant that unlike groups in the north, they were not dependent on crops from irrigated valleys ’s rainy climate and multiple river vulnerable to Spanish takeover. The south crossings often rendered Spanish arms useless, rotting their gunpowder and dampening their fuses. In the desert north there were never such problems with ammunition neither were there forests to hide in when the Spanish approached.
’s south was full of forests.73 Chile For the first years of contact, the Araucanians even avoided the catastrophic plagues that had already begun to wipe out their northern neighbors.74
Although Spanish disease would eventually weaken Araucanian war making capacity, the arrival of the horse gave them a window of opportunity before disease caused them to retreat. The first great Araucanian victory over the Spanish in 1553 ’s ’s was led by Lautaro, Pedro de Valdivia former groom who understood the horse strategic potential. Through theft and natural population increase the Araucanians soon had hundreds of their own horses. They quickly became superb riders and developed saddles made of small pieces of wood and wool cushions, which were ’t tire as lighter than those of the Spanish. This meant that Araucanian horses didn fast, and that the Araucanian cavalry could outrun the Spanish almost without fail.
’t until the significant Araucanian general was an ally of the Spanish. Despite these nuances, it wasn turn of the 17th century that the Spanish started to divide the Araucanians into indios rebeldes or indios de guerra and pacified indios amigos. As we will see in future chapters, this was done more to legitimize the enslavement of indios rebeldes than it was to protect the allied indios amigos. 73 “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 25 Villalobos, -26. 74 It was actually an Araucanian assault northward into Spanish territory in the 1550s that led to a typhoid plague among the aborigines. The typhoid epidemic of the 1560s killed 100,000 people, but ío ío. Bengoa, most of the deaths occurred to the north of the B -B Historia del pueblo Mapuche, 30. It is hard to say whether the scattered settlement pattern of the south prevented disease from spreading, or prevented accurate data about its devastation to be collected. In any event, the Araucanians were affected much less than the Pichunche.
39 ’s burden was also lighter because the riders used l The Araucanian horse ittle metal in their weapons or riding implements.75 Ironically, with Spanish estancias and ía to control the Indians, indigenous missions moving further into the Araucan communities were becoming more mobile and more evasive on horseback.
The war with the Spanish not only created a warrior class and changed the organization of Araucanian society. More warriors were available with the “Indian mercenary” who worked for a pre appearance of a type of -arranged payment.76 Warriors began to ascend through the ranks of Araucanian society, something unseen in peacetime when social status was largely hereditary. An ulmen could become a toqui through his war deeds. After the arrival of the Spanish a toqui “possessor of the stone hat could become a gentoqui, or chet, a symbol of his
”77 function. Toqui also referred to a stone hatchet. Thus, through the ritual murder of a Spaniard with toqui, a gentoqui retained a constant reminder of the source of his power and his title. According to Guillaume Boccara, the hatchet could be
“considered as an ancestor or as a part o ”78 f a petrified mythical ancestor. (The Inca used similar sacred objects (huacas) to expand their power.) The Araucanians revered their ancestors, and the fact that they were present in ritual murder, integrated violent conflict even more into Araucanian society. The hatchet was a tremendously
75 “Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile” in David J. Weber and Jane M. Rausch, eds. Louis de Armond, Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History (2nd ed.; Wilmington, DE: Jaguar Books, ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile 1994); Alonso Gonz Desenga (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26-28. 76 “Cultural Adaptation and Militant Autonomy among the Araucanians of Robert Charles Padden, ” in Chile The Indian in Latin American History: Resistance, Resilience and Acculturation, John E. Kicza, ed. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1993), 78. 77 “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 435. Boccara, 78 Ibid., 435.
40 powerful symbol of leadership that helped re-organize Araucanian society around these new war chiefs.
For many indigenous cultures, acculturation meant a break with the past. The “...linked the old and the new in a movement one may describe Araucanians however, ” In fact, “...an as a dialectic, in which the past was both preserved and restructured. entire society was restructured and a new equilibrium created, although this was
”79 accompanied by constant war against the Spanish. Resistance to the Spanish became an integral part of this changing Araucanian culture. Horses gained a religious significance for their value in combat. The scattered tribal existence was abandoned in order to be able to muster more quickly.80 The Araucanians also began to grow wheat instead of corn, for both practical and symbolic reasons. It was part of the cultural incorporation process, and could be harvested before Spanish summer raids.81 It has also been suggested that they turned to cannibalism as a rejection of
Christianity.82 The Araucanian use of guns and tactical adaptation was similar to that of the plains Indians in the United States, who like the Araucanians were not conquered until the nineteenth century.83 Youths learned war strategy through
79 Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished, 197-199. 80 án had a similar reaction to Spanish inva The Maya of the Yucat sion. The scattered existence of Maya populations made conquest slow going for the Spanish, but they did form larger alliances when it was to their advantage, namely in the Maya Revolt of 1546 when the Spanish were driven out of érida by thousands of May M a gathered from all over the peninsula. The similarities to the Chilean “allied” groups of Maya and conquest did not end there. The Spanish were forced to re-conquer ’s lack of Araucanians when the indigenous groups broke their oaths of allegiance. The Maya region natural resources also made it difficult to sustain both Spanish campaigns and settlements there, a well- ’s relatively sparse inhabitants. Inga Clendinnen, known problem to Chile Ambivalent Conquests: án, 1517 Maya and Spaniard in Yucat -1570 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 25, 31, 42. 81 Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished, 196. 82 “Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile,” 119. Tapson, 83 John H Parry and Robert G. Keith, eds. New Iberian World: A Documentary History of the Discovery and Settlement of Latin America to the Early 17th century (New York: Times Books, 1984), Vol. 5, 372. New Iberian World, 372.
41 games.84 A restructuring in almost all levels of society is uncommon among indigenous societies in the Spanish sphere of influence, and enabled the Araucanians to hold off the Spanish.85 ía had led to some conflict among The relatively dense population of the Araucan indigenous groups before the Spanish arrived.86 The lack of a formal justice system “vendettas” that were later used meant that conflicts were often solved by the same against the Spanish. However, within Araucanian culture a system of exogamy and “double ” or “double descent” ón “assured the persistence of parentage (doble filiaci )
” by containing disputes within families.87 peace
The Araucanians also managed to keep their alliances with other indigenous groups from being counter-productive, an achievement aided by a common antipathy for the Spanish. Initially, the Pehuenche entered into multiple and fleeting alliances with Hispanic-Creole settlers, but the strain of war with the Spanish ultimately brought the Araucanians and Pehuenche closer. 88 Later, the Spanish would seek to “flattery,” but the tactic would backfire. make peace with the Araucanians through
Instead of bettering the Spanish relationship with the Araucanians, these Spanish gifts entered the Pehuenche-Araucanian trade cycle and strengthened economic ties between the two indigenous groups when a spirit of cooperation was not enough.89
Under the pressure of Spanish arms, indigenous groups responded by expanding an efficient and rather covert system for constructing military alliances. Many
84 Ibid., 436. 85 Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished, 199. 86 “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 24. Villalobos, 87 “Guerra y trueque ” Osvaldo Silva Galdames, como factores de cambio en la estructura social, in (FRQRPt $Pp a y comercio en rica Hispana, Guillermo Bravo Acevedo, ed. (Santiago: Departamento +LVWy )LORVRIt de Ciencias rica, Facultad de a y Humanidades, Universidad de Chile, 1990), 84. 88 ía de la Isla de la Laja, Orellana, Historia y antropolog 36. 89 “Guerra y trueque,” 93. Silva Galdames,
42 Spanish colonists also mentioned the passing of an arrow among Araucanian and “(the Araucanians) receive other allied groups as a call to arms, a challenge that without wasting time or pondering reasons against it, move to make cruel war against
’s enemies.”90 their land Through this challenge the news that war was on was quickly spread to thousands of Araucanians.
Undoubtedly Pedro de Valdivia did not entirely appreciate the depth of these changes in Araucanian society, but he did recognize that adjustments would have to ío ío if the Spanish were to survive growing resistance. be made on his side of the B -B
The fact that Valdivia had willingly accepted the challenge that Chile presented perhaps made him ideally suited to respond to it. Valdivia had served the crown in
Flanders and Italy, and turned down offers of spoils from the victory against the Inca
91 ’s contemporaries and mo to seek further conquests in Chile. Valdivia dern historians alike were at a loss to understand why Valdivia would do so, but a closer look will reveal that this decision made sense on multiple levels. First of all, Valdivia “Kingdom and the members of his expedition instantly became royalty in the of
”92 Chile. Valdivia rewarded almost all of the members of his 150-man expedition ’s reputation as a poor and with encomiendas and began attempts to erase Chile
93 “disappointing” and indeed they desolate land. J.H. Elliot considers these rewards were according to Peruvian antecedents.94 However, as was common in other
90 én Indomito Diego Arias de Saavedra, Pur (Leipzig: A. Franck, 1862), 211. 91 “Prologo” in ón de la Conquista de Chile Mario Ferreccio Podesta, Cartas de Relaci (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 12. 92 “The Kingdom of Chile” almost universally by The colony was referred to as El Reino de Chile or the 17th century. 93 ás Thayer Ojeda and Carlos Larraín de Castro, ñeros See Tom Valdivia y sus compa (Santiago: 1950), for brief biographies of the 150. 94 “The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America,” 186. J.H. Elliot,
43 ’s elite for Spanish colonies, these encomenderos would be the source of Chile centuries to come.
Secondly, as a conqueror, Valdivia needed a challenge.95 After participating in such dramatic European campaigns as the Battle of Pavia, Valdivia had missed out on the initial conquest of Peru and was rewarded more for his loyalty in the subsequent civil war than his skill as a soldier. Therefore, Valdivia gave up his encomienda and his silver mine in Peru in exchange for the title of Lieutenant Governor in the stalled “auxiliaries,” 150 Spanish soldiers and three conquest of Chile. With 1,000 Indian
’s central valley in 1541.96 Christian missionaries in tow, Valdivia arrived in Chile
Valdivia thus became the first Spanish governor of Chile to seek glory in a desolate “noble savage” Arauacanians. In fact, Valdivia himself would have a land against the hand in crafting both the vision of Chile and of its indigenous inhabitants that would become dominant throughout the colonial period and beyond. ’s economic needs Valdivia was also very aware of the crown . The fact that the conqueror had rejected his Peruvian encomienda did not prevent him from rewarding the members of his Chilean expedition with indigenous labor and access to metals.
Valdivia forced the Aconcagua chief Michimalongo to provide 1,200 Indians to work
95 “Che” Guevara was just one of many who have tried to explain what made conquerors like Ernesto “belonged to that special class of men…in whom a Valdivia tick. Guevara posited that Valdivia ” He added that craving for limitless power is so extreme that any suffering to achieve it seems natural. “symbolize(d) man’s indefatigable thirst to take control of a place where he his decision to leave Peru can exercise total authority. That phrase, attributed to Caesar, proclaiming he would rather be first-in- command in some humble Alpine village than second-in-command in Rome, is repeated less ” Ernesto “Che” pompously, but no less effectively, in the epic campaign that is the conquest of Chile. Guevara, The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes on a Latin American Journey, trans. and ed. Alexandra Keeble (New York: Ocean Press, 2003), 85. 96 “Pedro de Valdivia” [online encyclopedia]; available from Icarito. http://www.icarito.cl//medio/articulo/0,0,38035857_172985985_182699539_1,00.html. Thayer Ojeda, ón de la sociedad chilena Formaci , 320.
44 ’s first significant placer mine at Marga 97 the new colony -Marga. Once released from
Spanish custody however, Michimalongo continued to torment the Spanish, leading the aforementioned 1541 assault of Santiago.98 This event set in motion a long pattern in Chile of Indian rebellion against forced labor.
The extraction of enormous mineral wealth on the backs of the indigenous was of course not unique to Chile and was quickly becoming a trend across the Americas, aided by loopholes in measures designed to protect aborigines. Long before they set foot in Chile, or in the Americas for that matter, the Spanish had developed guidelines for the categorization and treatment of indigenous peoples. These guidelines began to be developed centuries before in the cross-cultural encounter that was the Crusades.
To the Spanish, captive Muslims had attacked Christendom and ipso facto “just war.” Christianity itself, and were to be treated as slaves in the context of this
But how should the Iberians treat the West Africans encountered by the Portuguese in the 13th century who had no exposure to Christianity? This conundrum was addressed by the writings of Cardinal Henry of Susa (Hostiensis). Hostiensis “when Christ came into the world, temporal as well as spiritual lordship postulated ” According to his argument, those over all its peoples passed immediately to Him. “recalcitrant” persons against whom a just war that did not accept Christianity were could be waged.99
97 Pocock, The Conquest of Chile, 84-85. 98 Ibid., 94. 99 “just war” saw a McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 52. Once it was rationalized, rather seamless transition to the Americas largely because of its long tradition in Europe. There are several examples of how concepts, strategies and traditions were transferred piecemeal from the Crusades to the Conquest. In an example relevant to our South American case, the Spanish referred to íe Indians of Juyjuy as “alárabes” (or “A la Arabe”) believing that the members of this semi the Jur - ández de Oviedo y Valdés, nomadic Andean group resembled Arabs. Gonzalo Fern Historia General
45 Queen Isabella and her successors chose a more forgiving tone when it came to the inhabitants the Americas. She argued that the indigenous inhabitants of the “become vassals ” and even had Americas had of the Crown and as such were free,
Columbus free the Indians he brought back to Spain with him. However, there were “just two important exceptions to this freedom. Indians could be legally enslaved in a ” where they had attacked or rej war ected Spanish authority and could remain slaves if they were already in the service of other Indians.100
Those Indians who were not immediately enslaved did not fare much better. “pagans” were funneled into the These repartimiento system where they were distributed to Spanish conquerors to be cared for, put to work and instructed in the
Christian faith.101 In many areas the repartimiento and encomienda co-existed and in others the latter replaced the former. What links them in all areas however is the fact that neither ever became a means of protecting Indians. Instead, encomenderos often abused the Indians under their care. Many denounced the mistreatment, but there was little action taken in the Americas to stop it.102
The crown and the church did at least acknowledge the problem of forced labor.
The bull Sublimus Deus was issued in 1537 as a response to reports of Spanish cruelty in the Americas, but it had little immediate effect in Chile or anywhere else in the Indies. The bull would however influence future debate by declaring that the
“true men” and were not to be enslaved.103 Indians were
ñoles, Vol. 121 y Natural de las Indias, Biblioteca de Autores Espa (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1959), 133. 100 McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 155-56. 101 “allotment” of Indians. Ibid., 81. McAlister defines repartimiento as an 102 Ibid., 19. 103 Pope Paul III, Sublimis Deus, June, 1537, Trans. by Stafford Poole in ibid., xxvii-xxviii.
46 Seeing that their contemporaries in the Caribbean and New Spain had essentially ’s Indians, the Spanish conquerors of been given carte blanche to abuse the region
Peru employed great cruelty in their destruction of the Inca Empire. They
“inferior and impure heretics.”104 demonstrated that they too saw the Indians as The
Spanish did not wantonly destroy everything Inca however, recognizing that they ’s administrative techniques. In Peru, the could usurp some of the fallen empire
Spanish pattern of employing conquered Indians in manual labor projects worked relatively seamlessly, as encomenderos became the new beneficiaries of the Inca mita system of labor obligations, organized into local ayllus (family groups).105
It soon became apparent that encomenderos were doing a miserable job fulfilling their obligation to protect and instruct the Indians entrusted to their care, unable even to keep them alive. As thousands of Indians in Peru begun to succumb to over-work and disease, the encomiendas could no longer be evenly distributed along ayllu lines.
The encomenderos were forced to violate a number of encomienda regulations in order to keep up with labor demands, principally among them the prohibition on moving Indians from one place to another in their attempt to create larger concentrations of mineworkers.106 This trend worried the crown and prompted additional yet equally unsuccessful attempts to control the encomienda institution. In the meantime, it was clear that even with the shell of a tribute collecting empire in place the Spanish could not or would not adhere to encomienda guidelines. In the imperfect situation that was the conquest of far-flung Chile, encomenderos had even freer reign and regulations were blatantly ignored.
104 Christine Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 42. 105 “The Spanish ” 183. J.H. Elliot, Conquest and Settlement of America, 106 Korth, Spanish Policy, 27.
47 The crown had anticipated an attempt by encomenderos to resist all control to
“transform themselves into a European ”107 their authority -style hereditary nobility. In an attempt to avoid class divisions among the conquistadors, the crown made nobles out of very few of them. The crown also took steps to keep encomiendas non- hereditary, reinforcing the idea of service and reward. He who most served the crown would be rewarded, in this case with an encomienda.108 Competition for encomiendas curbed feudalism, but still hurt crown authority in that it led to political infighting and in some cases civil war.
Responding to Sublimus Deus and further reports of Spanish abuses in the Indies, “New Laws” in 1542, which reinforced the royal ban on Charles V issued the indigenous slavery109 and dictated that encomiendas would revert to the crown upon the death of their holder.110 While the New Laws did slow enslavement of Indians to
111 ’s some degree, the latter provision infuriated encomenderos. Peru encomenderos openly defied the crown when the New Laws arrived in the Americas. The Pizarro ’s first brothers and their contemporaries rebelled against and eventually killed Peru
107 “The Spanish Conquest,” 194. Elliot, 108 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 43-47 109 Henry Stevens, ed. The New Laws of the Indies (London: The Chiswick Press, 1893). 110 “The Spanish Co ” 194. Elliot, nquest, 111 Indigenous slavery persisted even into the 18th century in a handful of regions, especially in frontier areas like the south of Chile where African slaves were hard to come by and where imperial authority was weak. One of the causes of the Acaxee rebellion of 1601 in Nueva Vizcaya was Acaxee “Indigenous Rebellions on the Northern frustration over Spanish slave-taking raids. Susan M. Deeds, ” in Mexican Mission Frontier: From First-Generation to Later Colonial Responses, Contested Ground, 36-37. In the early years of the 18th century, the Choctaws and Chicksaws sought an alliance with the French at Mobile to strengthen their defenses against British slave dealers from Carolina and the new Spanish presence at Pensacola. Daniel Usner, Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 17-19. While the French may have protected the Choctaw, they were soon involved in the indigenous slave trade, buying Apache women and children from the Pawnee. Brooks, Captives “just war” against the and Cousins, 61. Even as late as the 1780s, the Spanish sought to end their “ Apaches by shipping captives as slaves to Havana. Richard Slatta, Spanish Colonial Military Strategy ” in and Ideology, Contested Ground, 90-91.
48 úñez Vela whose unenvia ’ Viceroy Blasco N ble task was trying to rein in the siblings power.112
The revolt in Peru kept the crown from paying much attention to some of the same encomendero defiance in Chile. As in the rest of the Americas, demand for indigenous labor in Chile stemmed from the Spanish distaste for manual labor, the small Spanish population, a shortage of African slaves, and a lack of beasts of burden.113 It was not impossible to get African slaves in Chile but there was much higher demand and more capital to purchase them in the ports of Lima and later
Buenos Aires. 114 Interruptions in the trans-Atlantic trade and local plagues kept demand up in Buenos Aires while many of the slaves that made it across the Andes into Chile often ended up in Lima. 115 At one point, the Governor of Chile even declared that anyone taking an African slave from Chile to Lima would be fined 500 pesos.116
112 Hunefeldt, A Brief History of Peru, 49. 113 Diego Barros Arana estimated that Chile had no more than 500 Spanish residents in 1550. Tracing population numbers for the rest of the century becomes a difficult task with miscegenation and the abandonment of Spanish settlements. Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile: Tomo I (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 263. The next significant arrival of Europeans did not come until 1605 when 1,000 reinforcements arrived for the Army of Arauco. (See chapter three.) Archivo “A.G.I.”) General de Indias, (Hereafter Chile,4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Letter from junta, Madrid, 4 October, 1606. 114 Africans were instrumental in the armies of conquest in Peru, and their importation to this colony had begun even before the Spanish discovered Chile. Juan Valiente, a well-known figure in early “discoverer colonial Chile, was a free black member of the expeditions of both Diego de Almagro, the ” and Pedro de Valdivia, Chile’s “conqueror.” Free blacks, slaves and mulattos even had of Chile ón de la esclavitud negra en important roles in the War of Arauco. Rolando Mellafe, La introducci áfico y rutas Chile, tr (2d ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 45-49. 115 Africans trickled into Chile at a steady rate, meaning by the 1630s there were a number of African confraternities that participated in Santiago processions. Alonso de Ovalle, Historica relacion del Reino de Chile, Escritores Coloniales de Chile (4th ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1974), 85- 86. Della M. Flusche and Eugene H. Korth, Forgotten Females: Women of African and Indian Descent in Colonial Chile, 1535-1800 (Detroit: Blaine Ethridge Books, 1983), 6. 116 “Comercio negrero en el Río de la Plata durante el siglo XVII. Comerciantes y rutas Liliana Crespi, ón hacia las provincias internas, Chile y Perú.” Presented at “Reunión: La ruta del esclavo de dsitribuci é, en hispanoamerica, San Jos Costa Rica, 24-26 febrero, 1999.
49 ’s The crown did try and reduce a need for African slaves by protecting Chile indigenous population, stipulating that aborigines were not to be forced to work in ’s Indians decided voluntarily to work in the mines the crown placer mines. If Chile mandated that they were to be paid a percentage of the gold they extracted. However, little was or could be done from Spain to see that this royal order was enforced. In fact, the same order began with a statement on how important gold mining was to the royal treasury and a promise of royal help in aiding the extraction of the metal.117
Therefore comes as no surprise that Chilean encomenderos treated Indians as de facto slaves, helping them make a fortune in placer mining.118 Since this type of mining involved being partially immersed in water most of the day even in the winter months, it was not long before local workers began succumbing to these terrible conditions.119 A seventeenth century Augustinian and Indian advocate claimed there had been as many as 300,000 Indians between La Imperial and Valdivia providing “plague, continued wars and gold to the crown, most of whom disappeared due to
”120 calamities. To replace these workers, encomenderos repeated the actions of their contemporaries in Peru and began to openly violate prohibitions against moving encomienda Indians, forcing them hundreds of miles from their homes to work on
117 édula conunicada al adelandado don Jerónimo Alderete, gobernador de Chile, sober Real c ón de documentos inéditos beneficiar las minas de aquella provincia, 4 September, 1555, in Colecci para la historia de Chile desde el viaje de Magallanes hasta la Batalla de Maipo: 1518-1818: Tomo XXVIII, ed. J.T. Medina (Santiago: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1901), 24. 118 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 28-29. 119 “Importación de trabajadores indígenas en el siglo XVII,” Alvaro Jara, Revista Chilena de Historia ía y Geograf , 124 (1956): 179. 120 ón de Valdivia: Motivos y medios para aquella fundación, defensas del Miguel de Aguirre, Poblaci ú para resistir las invasions enemigas en mar y tierra, paces pedidas por los indios Reino del Per rebeldes de Chile, acetadas y capituladas por el gobernador; y estado que tienen hasta nueve de Abril ño de 1647 ón de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional: del a , in Colecci ía (Santiago: Imprenta tomo xlv, los Holandeses en Chile , ed. Sociedad Chilena de Historia y Geograf Universitaria, 1923), 75.
50 their estancias and in their mines. 121 In one case, encomienda Indians from the trans-
Andean province of Cuyo would make a seasonal trek over the hundreds of kilometers between Santiago and La Serena.122
Much of this permissiveness can be explained by the actions of Pedro de Valdivia.
Circumstances dictated that Valdivia keep his encomenderos on the longest of leashes. For example to avoid rebellion after the viceroy failed to re-supply Chile for years, Valdivia freed all the members of his expedition of their debts, dramatically tearing up the sheets upon which the debts were recorded.123 For a time, Valdivia even left Chile, traveling to Peru in 1548 to join the side of the Viceroy against rebellious encomenderos.124 Upon his return to Chile, Valdivia continued to design ’s his legacy and Chile around the strength of encomenderos and access to indigenous labor. Valdivia saw enough gold extracted to keep the interest of royal authorities and attract reinforcements, but knew that enough had not been discovered (nor would it be) to compete with Peruvian precious metals.
Although Valdivia was able carve out a uniquely Chilean legacy, no one in the
th í’s silver Spanish Americas of the 16 century could escape the long shadow of Potos ’s economic mountain and it did not take long for the great irony that was Chile ’s silver relationship with Peru to present itself. Chile owed its existence to Peru mines, but the colony constantly was pitted against the viceregal capital for resources í’s “mountain of silve ” consumed “mules and control of its future. First of all, Potos r
121 Ibid., 28-31. The removal of Indians from their homes, with or without their consent had been banned by the Ordinances of Toledo in 1528 and reinforced in 1541. Ibid., 23, 27. 122 óngora claims that this practice helped create a class of itinerant workers in The historian Mario G Chile known as the roto or huaso that had a major presence in the republican period and that even óngora, “Vagabundaje y Socied exists in some form to this day. Mario G ad Fronteriza en Chile (Siglos ” ómicos XVII a XIX) Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Socioecon 2 (1966), 5. 123 ónica de los Reinos de Chile Vivar, Cr , 160. 124 Pocock, The Conquest of Chile, 145.
51 órdoba, coca from Cuzco” and would soon attract “Indian slaves from from C
”125 Southern Chile. While Peru provided a potential market for Chilean tallow (for candle making), and to a lesser extent wine, corn and wheat, 126 it also competed with
Chile for laborers and had its own supply of wheat that drove Chilean prices down.127 ’s relationship to Peru í There were also security considerations in Chile . Potos silver was loaded onto ships at the Peruvian port of Arica, just north of Chile, making that port vulnerable to pirates. Even as the Araucanians presented more and more problems, the crown could not abandon Chile and ignore the need to protect its precious metal and the territory from which it was extracted. ’s gift to With these developments in mind, Valdivia decided that his, and Chile the crown would not be riches, but suffering and sacrifice. Valdivia could not follow the path of the Pizarros whose exploits brought much prestige to the crown, but eventually hubris caused them to rebel. Instead, Valdivia and his encomenderos would make the crown proud by beating their swords into plowshares and establishing an indelible settlement in Chile through their hard work. Valdivia began ’s soil and hoped this ne to laud the fertility of Chile w encomendero class would use the huge tracts of land he had granted them to develop into productive ranchers and farmers. Valdivia saw the earth and the people as fertile and exploitable. His language reflected a need for settlement, and not the epic descriptions of military glory employed by most conquerors.
125 í: An Unwritten Chapte Lewis Hanke, The Imperial City of Potos r in the History of Spanish America (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 29. 126 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo I, 131. 127 “Importación de trabajadores indígenas,” 183. Demetrio Ramos, Jara, Trigo Chileno, navieros del ños entre ícola del siglo xvii y la commercial de la primera Callao y hacendados Lime la crisis agr “Gonzalos Fernández de Oviedo,” 1967), 9. mitad del xviii (Madrid: Instituto
52 “I saw to it that the yanaconillas and Indian servants that we brought to Peru were put to work in the mines, and they did help us with good disposition. We carted them food from the city twelve leagues away, sharing what we had for our own sustenance and that of our children; the food we had sown and ”128 harvested with our own hands and work.
Valdivia was quick to realize that Chile was the end of his travels, (his wife was on her way to join him from Spain when he died)129 and his success there depended
130 “an extremely on getting others to settle around him. His letters as a result, painted
”131 idealistic portrait of Chile.
Valdivia placed so much emphasis on attracting settlers because he and many members of his expedition felt that this propaganda was essential to their very ’s soldiers, wrote that after four years survival. Geronimo de Vivar, one of Valdivia ’ clothing was in tatters and most had begun to wear with no re-supply, the colonists beaver and sea lion pelts. Vivar added that no mass had been held for five months as “the main the Spanish had run out of wine. The lack of re-supply also meant that focus of (colonists) was planting and growing to be able to maintain and perpetuate
”132 this land for His Majesty, which left little time for exploits on the battlefield.
Therefore, the exploits that colonists in Chile would relate to the crown had little to do with glory, and everything to do with survival. Valdivia and Vivar expressed the “labors of hunger” ( “labors value of their trabajos del hambre) rather than the usual ” ( of war trabajos de la guerra). Trabajos de hambre were carried out with much sacrifice and little glory. As such, sacrifice replaced glory as a means of gaining
128
53 favor with and gifts from the crown.133
While the Spanish did scramble to grow their own food, a lack of re-supply from the viceroy meant that their survival in Chile depended on economic and cultural exchange on the frontier that would permanently link the Spanish and Araucanians.
The indios de servicio in the central valley had already demonstrated that without “great calamities…” as they were devoid of their help, the Spanish suffered “commerce with other kingdoms.” These calamities occurred after Michimalongo’ s revolt inspired indios de servicio to literally run for the hills, where they would be out of the reach of encomenderos.134 While resistance in the central valley was fleeting, ío ío meant that the Spanish would have to more constant resistance near the B -B be sustained by a mixture of indios de servicio and resources from Indians and areas that were not under their hegemony. This exchange of resources was not always cordial but brought the Spanish and Araucanians together nonetheless. For example, the fact that the Araucanians had taken dozens of Spanish captives meant that not only were the Spanish duty bound to try and rescue the captives, but that miscegenation on both ío ío was creating a generation of mestizo children. These children sides of the B -B would come to define the legacy of the frontier long after Lautaro and Valdivia were gone.135
In addition to cultural developments, raids from both sides created a kind of frontier economic codependence. While the Spanish failed to subjugate the
133 ía Invernizzi Santa Cruz, “‘Los trabajos de la g ’ y ‘Los trabajos del hambre’: Dos ejes del Luc uerra óngora Marmolejo),” discurso narrativo de la Conquista de Chile (Valdivia, Vivar, G Revista Chilena de Literatura 36 (1990): 7-9. 134 ño de Lobera, ónica del Reino de Chile Pedro Mari Cr (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1970), 26. 135 As a means of demonstrating their commitment to the aforementioned rejection through “naked below the incorporation, the Araucanians would occasionally return female Spanish captives ” Stephen E. Lewis, “Myth a ’s Araucanians,” waist and pregnant. nd the History of Chile Radical History Review, 58 (Winter 1994), 119.
54 Araucanians as a whole, they did take a number of Indian captives who were to replace declining numbers of Picunche and Huarpe laborers.136 On the other hand, the Araucanians would often look forward to Spanish summer raids when they could seize swords, armor and gunpowder. In desperate times, the Spanish were even known to trade gunpowder to the Indians for food.137 Although war was understandably the focus of most Spanish sources, in daily life on the frontier there were infinitely more moments of Araucanian and Pehuenche traders traveling down from the mountains, or Spanish ranchers searching for lost livestock in the foothills, than there were moments of epic battle. The paths of the Araucanians and Spanish crossed quite often, and although they did not always get along, their relationship based on mutual benefit kept them coexisting for the greater part of a century.
We should not give the impression that the Spanish stayed the course in Chile only because they were obligated. Despite diminishing returns, the Spanish had not given up on the prospect of future gold extraction. Even without gold, there was “in the form of the growing Peruvian market for agricultural economic growth ” leading to the existence of “modestly prosperous farming communities in produce
ío ío.”138 the fertile valleys north of the river B -B ’s future. In 1552 and 1553 Valdivia Myth also maintained optimism about Chile ónimo de Alderete, Francisco de Villagra and Pedro de Villagra on separate sent Ger “Lost City of Caes ” and the “North Sea,” expeditions to find the ars or the Atlantic
139 én, Ocean. The Villagra cousins explored a good deal of the mountains of Neuqu
136 Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished, 194. 137 “Frontier Warfare in Colonial Chile,” 120. Tapson, 138 “The Spanish Conquest,” 186 Elliot, -87. 139 én, su histo ía, su toponimia Alvarez, Neuqu ria, su geograf 27-28.
55 the region lying directly to the south of Cuyo, before they were interrupted by ’s death and had to return to Chile. The Spani Valdivia sh had long heard of and imagined a large and rich empire in the Andes, but it took them over thirty years to ’t the same thing happen in Chile? reach Cuzco. Couldn
Chilean settlers also felt that there still was plenty of indigenous labor to be had for both metal extraction and farming.140 Chilean colonists continued to look for labor on the eastern slope of the Andes141 and still held out hope that the Araucanians could be converted into laborers on a wider scale. Although their settlements were scattered they could be organized under Spanish control as Pedro de Valdivia demonstrated when he divided encomiendas of conquered Araucanians according to their own levos. Araucanian labor would now be even easier to divide, as the Indians had developed larger and more organized territorial divisions to defend themselves against the Spanish.142 The Spanish had also observed that the Araucanians even had at least a rudimentary labor tribute system. Ruka construction was performed by teams of laborers or cullas who received a feast or mingaco as payment when the dwelling was completed.143 ’t necessarily Finally, Chilean colonists realized that a frontier existence didn equate to failure or a lack of opportunity. Often, just the opposite is the case. While in Europe and American urban areas the frontier was the domain of the “wilde man,” frontier residents in Chile and all over the Americas aforementioned
140 “Tres siglos de vida fronteriza,” 19. Villalobos, 141 David Rock, Argentina 1516-1987 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 12. 142 úsqueda de la paz Zapater, La b , 89-90. 143 Dillehay, Araucania: Presente y Pasado. Mingaco labor was instrumental in many Spanish and Chilean public works projects until 1821, especially in the construction of churches. Mingaco still exists in some outlying areas. Diego de Rosales, Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes és Bello, 1989), 145. Indiano, Tomo I (2nd ed., Santiago: Editorial Andr
56 144 ’s massive saw it differently. Whether it was elite families operating in Brazil captaincy grants, venture capitalists in colonial Georgia, or Valdivia in Chile, frontier denizens realized and at least tried to convince colonial authorities and European monarchs that the frontier could be a source of wealth and prestige and that these far- flung territories were worth keeping.145 In some cases colonists were able to use legal channels to expand their influence, but in Chile frontier residents profited from the frontier by often unscrupulously expanding the campaign against the Araucanians.
The expansion of military operations would allow officials to skim from soldier salaries and supplies and to engage in illegal slave taking raids.
Ultimately though, it was a military balance of power which made this frontier exchange both necessary and possible. This balance of power was most dramatically illustrated in 1553 when Pedro de Valdivia was killed by a group of Araucanians led by Lautaro. Armed with the euphoria of the victory over Valdivia and the knowledge that the Spanish would return to the south if not driven out of Chile, Lautaro led an
Araucanian offensive in 1557. After months of northward marching, Lautaro was nearing Santiago when he was headed off by the Spanish and killed in a battle with the new governor, Francisco de Villagra.146 Lautaro had brought organization and confidence to his army, revamping battle tactics to focus on long campaigns rather than brief and regional skirmishes, and convincing his troops that the Spanish and their horses were separate beasts.
144 “Imperial History, Captivity and Creole Identity.” Bauer, 145 “Family, frontiers, and a Brazilian community” in Weber & Rausch, eds. Alida C. Metcalf, Where “ ’s Plantation Empire.” Cultures Meet. Gallay, Jonathan Bryan 146 é León Echaiz, Ren El Toqui Lautaro (Santiago: Talleres de Ricardo Neupert, 1971), 40
57 While Lautaro indeed failed to drive the Spanish out of Chile, indios rebeldes for generations performed ceremonies rejecting Spanish authority much like the one surrounding the death of Valdivia. Diego de Rosales, a 17th-century Jesuit missionary and historian collected accounts of the killing from Araucanians and Spaniards and wrote the most extensive and most accepted account of the killing.
Hearing that Valdivia had been ambushed, fourteen cavalrymen were sent to assist him. Seven were killed, their heads cut off and shown to the captured Valdivia. “ An infinite multitude had congregated...women, children and elders along with the troops of soldiers, that there were, they made a ring, and planted in the middle of the Toques, the lances, and arrows, making a great circle, the chiefs and ancients from all around, they called to bring out Valdivia, and in ” the middle of the wheel, they would take his life.
Valdivia was felled by a blow to the head with a club. With that, his captors “...raised their voices, and their lances over dead body, stomping the earth with their feet, and making it shake, to make it understood that the earth trembled with their bravery. Upon this one arrived, and ripping him open from the throat to the chest with a knife, he reached his hand into him, and removed the heart by ripping it out, and while beating, and squirting blood, he showed it to everyone, and smearing the toquis and the arrows with blood, he cut it into small pieces, that all the chiefs ate, and the rest licked up the blood, and all of those in the group that touch a part of the body, are sworn to unite their arms, and to have their hearts against the Spanish. They cut off his head soon after and made flutes from his thighbones and (his head) put on a stake, they sang a victory song around it, and had a long celebration with toasts and ” Later, “..they left the body for the acts of joy, at seeing their nation liberated. birds and wild animals, and took the head and nailed it to the door of the án, principal author of this tr house of the great Caupolic ophy, and around it put the heads of some Spaniards, distributing others among different provinces, to bring devotion to them. They even used the heads of the horses as trophies. Finally, they cooked the head of Valdivia, and while all were án took out the head, and drank intoxicated yet solemn, Caupolic chicha from the skull, offering a toast to all of the chiefs greater than him. This head kept watch outside of his house, as if it were a link to an ancestor, and they pass it ” ( down to his descendants. Even in times of peace the Araucanians would not
58 “When give this skull back to the Spanish, no matter what the offered price.) ”147 there is to be an uprising, they take it out to provoke rebellion.
The Araucanians understood that there were two levels of Spanish power, that of leaders and that of the collective society that supported them. The Araucanians took “kill” Spanish society. care of the leaders through ritual murder, but could not
Instead, they tried to dominate it. They did this in a variety of ways. First of all, when warriors returned from an expedition against the Spanish, they would often “...During combat the warriors did everything possible in order dress like the enemy.
”148 to capture an object that would symbolize the other. The Araucanians also began to use iron, let their beards grow, and incorporate horses into their warfare and “assimilate the qualities” of the ceremonies. This way, the Araucanians could
Spanish and in turn be less culturally dominated by them. Another step in this plan was to fully integrate lower-ranking Spanish captives into Araucanian society. They were not allowed to speak Spanish, wore Araucanian clothes, were shaved and put to work. Female captives were given to Araucanian men, and mestizo children were fully integrated into indigenous society.149 This integration was even more effective when we take into account the Spanish fear that American born colonists were descending into savagery.150 By integrating Spanish symbols into their culture, the
Araucanians robbed them of their power. This was one half of the process of rejection through incorporation. The other was exocannibalism.151
147 Rosales, Historia General del Reino del Chile, Flandes Indiano, 437-438. 148 “Etnogénesis Mapuche Boccara, , 437. 149 Ibid., 439. 150 “Imperial History, Captivity, and Creole Identity ” Bauer, . 151 “Ethnogénisis Mapuche,” 439. Boccara,
59 According to Clifford Geertz, when a ritual incorporates a feast of some kind,
“sensuous symbols”152 these of food and drink make the ritual easier to remember and ’s ritual murder was effective understand. Catherine Bell might add that Valdivia
“communicated on multiple sensory levels.”153 because it There was shouting, stomping of the feet, the gruesome murder itself and the feasting. Most importantly, all of the community was involved.
The eating of the heart was not just a sensory experience, but a spiritual one as “...was considered the place of decision, well. For the Araucanians, the heart or Piuke ” This “assimilate will... and feelings. means that the best way for the Araucanians to ” was to literally “digest” him. The consumer achieved a the qualities of the enemy “symbolic gaining of the life substance of the captive’s body.” The making of flutes
’s leg bones out of Valdivia also begins to make sense in the context of this incorporation of qualities. Mapudungun is the Araucanian language. The verb dungun means to both talk and to play music. By playing the bone flutes, the soul of “sing or ” providing the Araucanians with Valdivia would have been made to speak, more Spanish knowledge and power. Contacting their dead through music was an important Araucanian practice. Perhaps the contacting of the Spanish dead would have lead to greater assimilation. “symbol of the Decapitation also was involved in assimilation. The head was a ’s bravery... and the source of his prestige.” The person in possession of a enemy severed head absorbed some of its qualities, as thought and perception were believed to reside there. As mentioned, the skull was incorporated into traditional Araucanian
152 Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre and State in Nineteenth Century Bali (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 103. 153 Catherine Bell, Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford University Press, 1992), 160.
60 rites as a drinking vessel. The Araucanians would also often make a hat from the jawbone of a Spanish victim. This procedure evolved from the tradition of wearing the jaw of and absorbing the traits of a ferocious animal. This cap displayed a
’s bravery and ferocity.154 warrior There is also the possibility that this decapitation ’s 1541 attack on Santiago was was a response to a Spanish act. Michimalongo é árez, ’s mistress stopped only by the legendary actions of In s de Su Pedro de Valdivia árez demoralized the attackers and the first European woman in Chile. Su by decapitating several of their captive chiefs, and throwing their bodies toward the attackers.155
This throwing of the body resembles a deeply symbolic Araucanian gesture.
When the Araucanians were through with the heart, head, and bones of a sacrificial “flung with disdain toward his territory of victim, what remained of the body was
”156 origin. Once the Araucanians had incorporated all the spiritually significant parts of the body into their society, they had achieved what David Kertzer calls “condensation,” whereby one symbol “can represent and unify a rich diversity of
”157 meanings. The throwing of the body was the last and most important meaning to be extracted from this singular symbol. By throwing it, the Araucanian made it known that this ceremony was ultimately a rejection of Spanish power. The fact that the body was thrown from whence it came suggests that this ceremony developed after the Spanish had arrived. All Araucanians, despite any political rivalries, came from the same place. The Araucanians would not need to incorporate uniquely
154 “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 438. Boccara, 155 é Luis Schroeder Gutiérrez, Osvaldo Silva Galdames and Jos Historia de Chile Ilustrada (Santiago: La Tercera, 1998), 78. 156 “Etnogénesis Mapuche,” 438. Boccara, 157 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 11.
61 Araucanian qualities from the heart or skull of one of their own. This ritual “other” that came from “over there.” developed its meaning in its response to the
As a successful rite of rebellion must do, the value of Araucanian ritual killing went beyond the ceremony itself. The ritual killing was part of the larger creation of án, the Araucanian a warrior class. As mentioned, the rite was a sacrifice to Pill án took creator god who was said to have a great respect for warriors. Pill ulmenes
(family heads) who died fighting the Spanish to heaven, and sent the souls of these dead warriors to lead the living chiefs. The pink color of the sky during sunsets was
158 “cult of said to be the blood of warriors mixed with the sun. It appears that the án” became stronger as the war continued. Pill
Another part of ritual murder that unified the warrior cult was the gift. As in ’ example of Pacific island cultures, “...gifts are rendered, received and Marcel Mauss ’s own interest, in magnanimity, for repayments of repaid both obligatorily and in one
”159 services, or as challenges or pledges. In Araucanian warrior culture a gift usually functioned as a challenge. The giving and returning of heads, bodies, captives, etc., created a competition among warriors of various family units. The debt cycle could only be closed when a gift was returned, i.e. when another Spaniard was killed. ’s death However, Lautaro demonstrated how the power of a toqui was also restricted by these very factors. If a toqui were killed, there was usually no ’s immediate successor, explaining why the Araucanian uprising stalled with Lautaro ’s power came directly from Valdivia’s blood on his demise. Lautaro toqui (hatchet)
158 Rolf. G. Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches 1593-1767 (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, S.A., 1996), 91. 159 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions in Archaic Societies, trans. by Ian Cunnison (London: Cohen & West Ltd., 1954), 27. Also see Brooks, Captives and Cousins and Natalie Zemon Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth Century France (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000).
62 and none of his lieutenants would have had such a direct connection to killing and the ’s powers. subsequent usurpation of the enemy Toquis were also regional, meaning that the complicated alliances that were forged in general uprisings just as easily could fall apart as Araucanian troops advanced through and especially out of the ía. Part of Lautaro’s defeat must also be attributed to disease. A typhoid Araucan outbreak around this time killed as much as one third of the Araucanian population.
Its effect on the battlefield was the most dramatic and the most damaging as Spanish soldiers witnessed Araucanians succumbing to vomiting spells as they prepared for battle.160
By 1560 then, both the Spanish and Araucanians knew that they had reached a balance of power on the frontier and that neither would be able to emerge as a clear victor in the War of Arauco.161 Two important reactions to this stalemate would come to define the frontier for decades to come. First of all, both sides would accept “other.” The that they would be defined by their relationship to the frontier
Araucanians were divided between indios de guerra and indios de paz, but the former were defined by their rejection of, and the latter by their negotiation within Spanish culture. The Spanish recognized that without trade with the Araucanians and without access to their labor, they could not survive economically. Secondly, neither side was willing to let the viceroy or the crown in on their little secret; that the war would not be won by either side. Colonists exhorted the crown to keep sending resources dedicated to ending the War of Arauco, knowing full well that the crown could not
160 í nació la frontera: conquista, guerra, ocupación, pacificación. Ricardo Ferrando Keun, Y as 1550- 1900 (Santiago: Editorial Antartica, S.A., 1986), 74. Pocock, The Conquest of Chile, 228. 161 “absence of decisive force” in late Hal Langfur describes how a similar -colonial Brazil let to a “Moved by Terror: Frontier Violence as stalemate but actually prompted more violence. Hal Langfur, ” Cultural Exchange in Late-Colonial Brazil, Ethnohistory 52:2 (Spring 2005): 259.
63 send a massive army to a faraway land with little economic potential. At the same time they knew that the crown did not want to lose Chile and that they could count on at least some clothing, settlers and weapons. Indios de guerra needed fresh Spanish victims in their gifting cycle and also benefited from their own raids of the very
Spanish supplies that were meant to defeat them. On the other hand, both indios de paz and repentant indios rebeldes could expect gifts every time a new Spanish governor arrived. By 1560 colonists had come to realize that they needed both the ’s frontier and the war to have a significant role in the viceroyalty economic and strategic concerns.
64 CHAPTER III
’S LABOR AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. CHILE FRONTIER ECONOMY RESISTS VICEREGAL NEEDS
“This province is where great generals are confirmed and where great captains are ”162 born.
As we saw in the previous chapter, scholars of the Spanish conquest of the
Americas have quite successfully explained what on the surface seemed to be one of the great incongruities of the era. Why did the seemingly powerful Aztec and Inca empires fall so readily to a handful of Spanish conquerors, while groups like the “weaker” economically, politically and Araucanians and Chichimecs who numerically resist conquest for centuries?163
By 1560, Spanish residents of Chile had come to the realization (although modern historians may express it differently) that it was not only easier to conquer concentrated empires, but the transition to a post-conquest society was easier if some
164 “there is only one of the edifices of empire were left in place. Again the phrase, ” came to mind for Chilean colonists. T Peru his time the admonition reminded them
162 “BN”), Tomo 109, Pieza 1784 Biblioteca Nacional de Chile (Hereafter . Letter from the Governor ía Ramón a S.M. el Rey, Río de la Laja, 11 January 1607. of Chile Alonso Garc 163 ’s multitude of works on this subject including: See James Lockhart The Men of Cajamarca: A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conquerors of Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972) and (ed.) We People Here: Nahuatl Accounts of the Conquest of Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 164 ’s Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga Steve J. Stern, Peru to 1640 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), 28-33.
65 that they would have to build their political and cultural authority from the ground up and would experience resistance every step of the way. ’s conquest had in effect ended with the death of Many acknowledged that Chile ío ío adjustments were made to deal with its conqueror, and on both sides of the B -B
th “War of this new reality. For many, the story of the 16 century is that of the
” a failed conquest and a tale of barbarous deeds from both sides. The 16th Arauco; century was also regarded as one of economic failure by encomenderos in Peru who wanted Chile to provide food so that their Indians could be freed up to work in mines.
For them, every year the War of Arauco persisted was a year of decreased profits for
Peru.
Indeed, there was fighting, and there was abuse, but as Richard White reminds us, “war” the perio within a ds of actual armed conflict are very brief and can blur our ío ío frontier or in White’s attempts to understand frontier exchange. On the B -B “middle ground” even episodes of violence are not always acts of war. Violence was
“inextricably bound up wi ” in that it was an “option both for often th commerce
”165 acquiring goods and for protecting them. What really took place then during the first decades of the War of Arauco was frontier acculturation through negotiation.
This stalemate was a sobering situation, but one that Valdivia had prepared the colony for and one which became quite successful in defining its own rules and procedures during the latter half of the 16th century. The events of the late 16th century would lay the groundwork for a society and an economy that would grow “colonial pact” and would resist the quite accustomed to frontier negotiation or the
165 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 75.
66 needs of the viceregal center. The lessons of the 16th century would allow many in the
17th to purposefully perpetuate frontier warfare to benefit from it. ía deserve a good deal of While Lautaro and other indios rebeldes of the Araucan credit for holding off the Spanish, the region offered challenges apart from indigenous resistance. First of all, the region was hard to get to.166 One option for arriving at the front began with a walk of more than a week from Santiago to the port ón. The voyage to of Valparaiso, where soldiers would board a ship for Concepci ón was not usually a long one, but could be plagued with bad weather and Concepci ón, the soldiers had another several unfavorable winds. Once in Concepci -day trek to the front. This process of course required ships, which were not plentiful in the sixteenth century. Another option was to walk south for months from Santiago. A shortage of horses and indigenous porters meant that the soldiers were usually tired before they reached the front, some of them even drowning while trying to ford one
’ many turbid rivers.167 th of the regions For a while in the 16 century there was even talk of moving the capital south from Santiago to be closer to the War.
Many of the initial adventure seekers who arrived with Valdivia had settled down or been killed, and it was soon up to a few hundred new and mostly unhappy arrivals to pursue the war. Being at the tip of the Spanish empire meant that their pay, provisions and food were all insufficient. Some soldiers had actually been banished to Chile. When soldiers wintered in Santiago, instead of gaining strength, many
166 It took Pedro de Valdivia more than a year to communicate his founding of Santiago and discovery of gold to Peru, as the ship that he was having built to deliver the news was destroyed by coastal Indians. 167 ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile Desenga , 50.
67 succumbed to disease, while others deserted.168 Those soldiers not conscripted were often aspiring bureaucrats who recognized that volunteering for the War of Arauco ’s favor. These volunteers usually were leaving was the best way to gain the governor behind lands and families, reducing their willingness to stay for a long campaign.169 “soldiers” were in fact Many encomenderos from haciendas near Santiago who took their own indios de servicio to the front. When they returned to Santiago in the winter, the Indians often fled or stayed in the south.
Despite these difficulties, or perhaps because of them, residents of the frontier had scratched out a means of survival by the 1560s. Life on the frontier represented a delicate balancing act that only the residents understood, and that was easily interrupted by newly arrived governors. Father Juan de Torralba wrote from Santiago ’s attack, Governor García Hurtado de in 1569 that in the aftermath of Lautaro
Mendoza had returned stability to the colony and had earned the respect of the indios de guerra through his success against them on the battlefield. For Torralba, the greatest threat to frontier stability was the revolving door that was the governorship.
No sooner did experienced administrators and commanders like Hurtado de Mendoza gain the respect of colonists and Indians, than they submitted details of their exploits ’s success in Chile to the crown and were sailing north. In fact, Hurtado de Mendoza later helped him become the Viceroy of Peru. Torralba argued that Hurtado de ’s successors f Mendoza ailed to live up to his legacy and did little to protect indios amigos or gain the respect of indios de guerra. According to Torralba, one of these incompetent replacements ignored the military advice of colonists and instead placed
168 “Frontier Warfare in Colo ” 119. Tapson, nial Chile, 169 ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile Desenga , 53.
68 “pacification of the Indians.” According his inexperienced associates in charge of the “order or consultation” to Torralba, in 1568 these inexperienced soldiers went without to retake a fort and instead provoked a counterattack.
This pattern was one that would persist for more than a century in Chile.
Experienced governors who understood the vida fronteriza would leave, only to be replaced by green administrators who in their desire to pad their hoja de servicio
(service record) would upset the balance of the frontier. During the rest of the 16th century and for most of the 17th then there was a constant tension between new arrivals or peninsulares who wished to make a name for themselves on the frontier, and creoles, mestizos, and indios amigos who knew and lived on the frontier and bore the brunt of the cavalier attitude of many of these new governors. As Father Torralba “poor men put it, incompetent governors and judges were making life impossible for and officials who have nothing more than their jobs, disturbing their wives, homes
”170 and children and taking goods from merchants without paying for them.
This is not to say that creole encomenderos did not have a role in angering “ ” Araucanians by perpetuating personal service. By the 1560s placer mining was yielding diminishing returns, and indigenous labor was becoming scarce.171 Despite this decline in available labor however, encomenderos resisted making changes that would reverse it. Albeit for disparate reasons, officials in both Peru and Chile wanted to limit personal service which saw Indians paying tribute to the crown through their
170 … al Rey indicando las causas que han influído en el alzamiento Juan de Torrabla, Carta de fray ón de Documentos Inéditos para La Historia de C general de los indios, 13 June, 1569, Colecci hile. é Toribio Medina órico y Segunda Serie. Tomo I. 1558-1572, ed. Jos (Santiago: Fondo Hist áfico J.T. Medina, 1956), 230 Bibliogr -31. 171 “The Spanish Conquest,” 186 Elliot, -87.
69 labor, rather than in specie or goods. This practice had been banned on several occasions as it equated to de facto slavery.
Officials in Peru rallied against it since it delayed the advent of Chile as a provider of foodstuffs. Under personal service the profit margin in mining was exponentially higher than it would have been in agriculture or ranching. As long as encomenderos were not obligated to pay their workers in gold, as they were legally bound to do, they would ignore less profitable but more stable industries. Fewer
Indians dedicated to agriculture in Chile meant fewer exports to Peru. The crown of course did not discourage gold extraction in Chile, but this was a minor industry í was producing. As far as the viceroy was concerned, the compared to what Potos “ ” and the role of other carrera (Spanish merchant fleet) lived and died by silver
í through “inshore” trade.172 colonies was to support Potos the Pacific The viceroy could not help that some silver disappeared through internal transactions and smuggling, but he was perturbed when colonies like Chile made its extraction more difficult.
Viceregal regulation of encomiendas had begun disastrously with the murder of úñez de V N ela, but by the 1550s new viceroys were bold enough and the situation was desperate enough for them to make another attempt at curbing abuse. Chilean and
Peruvian officials alike had observed that personal service was largely responsible for the decline of Indian labor whether through death and disease or rebellion. Thus, in
1557 the viceroy appointed a member of the Audiencia de Lima, Hernando de án y Figueroa to observe and improve the treatment that Indians in Chile Santill
172 “Spain and America: the Atlantic trade 1492 ” in Murdo J. MacLeod, -1720, The Cambridge History of Latin America: Vol I, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 368.
70 án first trav received. Santill eled to La Serena where local and imported Indian án quickly workers were dying from the harsh conditions of nearby mines. Santill sought to remedy this situation by declaring that Indians could not be used as beasts of burden, that no more than a fifth of Indians from a given encomienda could be used in gold washing, and that workers would get a weekly salary in the form of “one ” Santillán also pronounced that Indians were to -sixth of the ore they extracted. be fed and clothed properly, that no additional tribute was to be exacted, and that they án “set free all the were to attend mass. As he left La Serena, Santill yanaconas attached to encomiendas, noting that if they voluntarily consented to work in the mines, their Spanish employers would have to provide them with food, implements,
”173 and a salary amounting to one-fourth of the product of their labor. án found conditions to be even worse than As he moved south to Santiago, Santill those in La Serena. There the oidor observed the treatment of Indians and the local political climate for months and developed a set of regulations collectively called the án that he believed would be acceptable to both the crown and Chile’s Tasa de Santill encomenderos. The tasa began to phase out Indian porters, and arranged for domestication of draft animals. It limited the number of months per year Indians could work in mines and set punishment guidelines for non-conforming án also traveled to Concepción, Valdivia, Osorno and encomenderos. In 1558 Santill
Villarrica where he established similar ordinances dealing with Araucanian laborers.174
173 A yanacona in this case referred to a war captive, but at times the term was used universally to describe an Indian laborer. Ibid., 31-32. 174 Korth, Spanish Policy, 35.
71 án were effective. In one gold mine for Some portions of the Tasa of Santill example, better working conditions under the tasa increased production dramatically. ’s rela However, Chile tive lack of mining, large scale agriculture, pastoral, and handicrafts economies continued to make it difficult for Indians to pay tribute with anything but personal service. The tasa was designed to obligate encomenderos to produce wheat, corn and barley. Ideally, this increased farm production would reduce ’s the portions of tribute paid by personal service and would help address the colony poverty which had deepened through its dedication to volatile placer mining.175 án and future ordinances made provisions for Ultimately, whilte the Tasa de Santill
Indians to pay their tribute in specie or farm products, they never completely eliminated personal service on paper or in practice.176
Chilean encomenderos would eventually abandon placer mining as deposits were depleted, but they continued to resist dedicating their efforts to agriculture. Colonists ’s modest argued that for one, wheat production was not profitable. With Chile population, there was little domestic demand for grains. Also, Peru continued to have ’s need to have Chile pull its own abundant and cheap supply, sabotaging the capital its weight. Encomenderos also rejected farming because their militia obligations kept them away from their lands for months every year. The great irony and source of frustration for the colonists was that the crown wanted them to be in two places at once. The same colonists that were serving on the frontier were those who were supposed to be providing supplies for the campaigns. The absence of these landowners not only decreased production, but made their haciendas vulnerable to
175 Ramos, Trigo Chileno, 5-6. 176 “Tasa ” replaced the Tasa de Santillán in 1580 but was no more successful than its The de Gamboa predecessor at limiting abuse of Indians.
72 attack, especially for those closest to the frontier. The most vulnerable haciendas were of course the most important to the war effort because of the relative fertility of the soil and proximity to the frontier. All of these factors made it unprofitable for
Chile to maintain a surplus of grains, leaving the colony constantly on the verge of shortages. Chile was even obligated to import wheat on a number of occasions, an embarrassing and very telling development for a colony with optimal farming conditions.177
With gold mining fast becoming a thing of the past, and agriculture proving unappealing, encomenderos turned to ranching for their livelihood. Despite the prospect of cattle theft, ranching was better suited to the volatile frontier. Ranching provided quicker returns when peace broke out, and only saw a slight decline in times of war as the industry provided food and transport for soldiers.178 Ranching would also eventually provide profitable exports in the form of tallow and jerked beef for the í mines. Potos
The fact that ranching is not labor intensive did not mean that encomenderos released Indians from their tribute obligations. By the 1560s encomienda Indians performed almost all manual tasks in Chile, working on construction projects, and carrying all manner of things within and between cities. Female Indians in particular often worked as domestics.179 The encomienda system was designed to protect and instruct Indians under Spanish care, but as we saw in chapter one, it rarely worked out that way as encomenderos openly violated its provisions to turn a greater profit.
Indian porters and mineworkers especially suffered when their encomenderos
177 Ramos, Trigo Chileno, 8-10. 178 Ibid., 11-12. 179 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 101.
73 overworked them by greatly exceeding limits on weight of loads, hours worked, distance traveled, and minimum age.180
Pedro de Valdivia and Peruvian officials shared the very unlikely notion that
Chilean hidalgos would turn into farmers.181 The same seigniorial attitude that kept the colonists from farming also meant that they remained steadfast in their defense of personal service. Those who had suffered through the above mentioned difficulties were even less willing to give up tribute through indigenous labor that was their only real reward. Over time, encomenderos realized that they could have their cake and eat it too by playing up this sacrifice without giving up the benefits of personal service Encomenderos eventually began to accept that Valdivia and the Araucanians had begun to turn these would be conquerors into settlers. They would continue to support the aforementioned sense that economic hardship would make sacrifice their gift to the crown.
This economic suffering and sense of sacrifice was not just a way of life for encomenderos, but became important in defining their role in the viceroyalty. By the
1560s, letters from Chile constantly referred to shortages and violence due increasingly to the War of Arauco. This tone of suffering and sacrifice was further “first American epic,” Alonso de Ercilla’s solidified after the publication of the La
Araucana.
180 Korth, Spanish Policy, 23-27. 181 Peru never really gave up their idea that they should be importing their wheat, as price fluctuations and population growth decreased supply and increased demand. For periods of the 17th century Peru ’s imported wheat from Jamaica. Ironically, it took a devastating 1687 earthquake which crippled Peru internal production for the capital to finally see the much anticipated import of Chilean wheat. Ibid., 24.
74 ’s page, Ercilla had traveled a good deal as a young man. He had As Prince Philip accompanied the future monarch to England for his wedding with Mary Tudor, and in his early twenties set out for Chile. Ercilla arrived in Chile in 1558 where he stayed for seventeen months.182
Ercilla was sent to the front and engaged in combat with the Araucanians.
However, his closest brush with death came not in combat, but in a Spanish ceremony. In a moment of confusion during a ceremony celebrating the coronation of the same Prince Philip, Ercilla touched his sword in the presence of Governor
ía Hurtado de Mendoza.183 Garc Ercilla and another soldier were immediately sentenced to death by the governor for this gross breach of etiquette. Fortunately for
Ercilla, the sentence was commuted to a short prison term at the last minute. Ercilla “been next in line, turned over to the sharp knife wrote in La Araucana that he had
”184 against his throat... As a result of this incident, Governor Mendoza was left out of
La Araucana entirely.
After his run-in with the governor, it was clear to Ercilla that any further advancement in Chile was impossible and he returned to Spain. It was there where
Ercilla wrote most of La Araucana and where the epic was first published in 1569. 185
Ercilla the soldier saw few victories for the Spanish during his brief stay in Chile, his epic reflecting the voice of a frustrated adventurer. La Araucana also typified the ’s vanquished contemporaries, and contributed to a myth of the sentiments of Ercilla
182 Roque Esteban Scarpa, Prologo Breve, in La Araucana, by Alonso de Ercilla (Santiago: Editorial és Bello, 1983), 7 Andr -8. 183 ón del Reino Philip II was crowned in 1555, but the news did not reach Chile until 1558. La Invenci de Chile, 162. 184 Quoted from La Araucana in Prologo Breve, 7. 185 Collier, Ideas and Politics, 27.
75 “noble or barbaric savage.” Losing commanders had to elevate the status of their victorious foes in order to somehow explain the failure.186 “Never has a king subjected
Such fierce people proud of freedom, Nor has alien nation boasted ’er of having trod their borders; E ’r has dared a neighboring country Ne Raise the sword and move against them; Always were they feared, unshackled, ”187 Free of laws, with necks unbending.
’s experiences and impressions not only influenced his style, but also the Ercilla ’s content of his epic. La Araucana favorable treatment of Araucanian leaders may ’s conflicts with his own superiors. He anticipated also have had to do with Ercilla “... to some people it would seem that I am criticism in his prologue saying, somewhat inclined toward the Araucanians, relating their ... bravery more extensively ” Ercilla explained his admiration by than necessary when it comes to barbarians. “...with pure valor and perseverance they have maintained their arguing that ” despite their limited weaponry and lack of large scale political freedom... organization.188
On the other hand, Ercilla did not do injustice to the Spaniards in his account. “have defended Much of his deference for the Araucanians lay in the fact that they
”189 their land against such fierce enemies as the Spanish. In addition, his original intent was not to make heroes out of his enemies, but to make sure that the
186 “Myth and the History of Chile’s Araucanians,” Stephen E. Lewis, Radical History Review, 58 (Winter 1994): 114. 187 Charles M. Lancaster and Paul T. Manchester, translators, The Araucaniad: A Version in English úñiga’s Poetry of Alonso de Ercilla Z La Araucanca, in John H Parry and Robert G. Keith, eds. New Iberian World: A Documentary History of the Discovery and Settlement of Latin America to the Early 17th Century (New York: Times Books, 1984), Vol. 5, 377. 188 Prologo Breve, 6. 189 Ibid., 6.
76 “perpetual silence.”190 achievements of his fellow Spaniards did not become lost in
The War of Arauco seemed to provide all the elements Ercilla needed to create a popular epic; a bloody conflict in a faraway land between two very different but equally matched armies, with plenty of tales of chivalry and tragedy. Ercilla drew together actual events, classical literary influences and glorified language to create an epic that holds a permanent and important place in world literature.
As did Valdivia before him, Ercilla understood that Spain was at the height of its arrogance and that the actions of a handful of soldiers against savages half a world “mixing the war away would gain little attention. Thus he needed to cast a wider net,
ín.”191 of Arauco with the brilliant actions of Lepanto and Saint Quint Thus, La ’s observations and examples of sixteenth Araucana became a mixture of Ercilla ’s century literature, adopted and falsified as autobiographical by the author. Ercilla sense of poetic license prompted him to quote Araucanians who he probably never met in the context of events that happened before he arrived in Chile. The liberties ’s that Ercilla took sparked still-unresolved debates about La Araucana usefulness as a historical document.192
More important to our discussion is how Ercilla was able to bring the War of
Arauco to life through text. The descriptions of Araucanian bravery and military ability expanded Spanish interest in the Americas, while their success at stalling the
190 Ibid., 5. 191 Eduardo Solar Correa, Semblanzas Literarias de la Colonia (Santiago: Editorial Difusion Chilena S.A., 1945), 27. 192 án carried a Giorgio Antei refers to the legendary and possibly fictional contest in which Caupolic tree trunk on his shoulders for days to become the next toqui. Ercilla reconstructed conversations that took place among Araucanians during this contest, despite the fact that another chronicler (Pedro ño de Lovera) had written about this event in 1551, two y Mari ears before Ercilla arrived in Chile. La ón del Reino de Chile Invenci , 177.
77 Spanish advance worried the crown.193 Ercilla gave future chroniclers, adventurers and officials a wonderful template through which to maintain the interest of royal ’s direction aimed at officials in Spain and Peru, and keep resources headed in Chile ending this epic struggle.
While Valdivia used sacrifice and Ercilla heroism as their principal themes, both constantly referred to the desolation and desperation on the Chilean frontier. Whether focusing on trabajos de la guerra or del hambre future authors would always stress the pressing need for more resources, especially if their future was tied to the far- flung colony. án’s efforts, labor conditions continued to With the mixed success of Santill
’s indigenous population continued its decline. One late 16th deteriorate and Chile century observer noted that the indigenous population of Santiago had dwindled to
4,000 from its peak of 60,000. Both the Council of Indies and officials within Chile suggested the large-scale import of African slaves to avert a crisis, but this solution never got beyond the planning stages.194 Gold was no longer being extracted because ’t eat it. The remaining even though the Spanish were obsessed with it, they couldn encomienda Indians had to be employed in food cultivation. There were so few “auxiliaries” available to the a Indian rmy that the only goal of raids against the
Araucanians became securing enough porters to conduct the next campaign. There
193 ñol de los siglos XVI y XVII See Daisy Tipodas Ardanaz, ed. Lo indiano en el teatro menor espa , in ñoles desde la formación del lenguaje hasta nuestros ías Biblioteca de autores espa d (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1991) for a discussion of how traveling theatre companies in 17th century Spain ’s inspired a popular fascination with everything Araucanian. Inspired by a desire to remedy Chile ’s desc difficulties and fascinated by Ercilla ription of the colony, in 1599 Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, a Spanish captain and veteran of several European wars unsuccessfully petitioned the king for the governorship of Chile. Barros Arana, Historia general:Tomo III, 252-53. His case was not an atypical ’ heyday. one in Cervantes 194 Korth, Spanish Policy, 36-38.
78 could be no long-term strategy of conquest without a significant pool of auxiliaries.
This scarcity existed despite the fact that indios de servicio preferred accompanying the army to serving more intense and longer periods of labor in placer mines or in agriculture. Some observers even claimed that indios de servicio were interested in prolonging and even expanding the war to keep the freedom that working with the
Spanish army offered.195 Observers also noted that those Indians who had not yet “tried to maintain the war and preferred death in battle to becoming been reduced also subjects of a people who had committed so many wrongs against them without justice
”196 or reason.
Nonetheless, the Spanish continued to advance eastward and southward from án and Mendoza close to groups of Santiago, founding frontier cities like Chill unconquered peoples who could be enslaved, evangelized or both. With the decline ’s south, and further Spanish encroachment, more and more of placer mining in Chile
Araucanians were being shipped northward. There were already yanaconas serving encomenderos in La Serena by the 1550s and in the 1570s a number of Araucanians ’s south, to Coquimbo and Peru. By 1573 this were shipped from the front in Chile practice was so common and so many Indians from Chile were dying in transit to
Peru, that the king felt it necessary to remind viceregal officials that such transport
197 ’s message may have been heard at least temporarily in was illegal. While the king
Peru, the illegal movement of Araucanians continued within Chile. In 1578 dozens of “principal ” of Arauco were expelled to La Serena where Indians and six caciques
195 In chapter four we discuss how in the 17th century Spanish soldiers were angered that indios amigos were both profiting from the sale of Indian prisoners and collecting a salary. 196 … al Rey, 13 June, 1569, Torrabla, Carta de fray 230. 197 Alvaro Jara, Guerra y sociedad en Chile y otros temas (3rd ed.: Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 152.
79 they were put to work in mining and agriculture.198 With the Spanish moving closer word soon spread among unincorporated Indians of the poor treatment that Indian án observed that the prospect of personal workers received. Hernando de Santill “nati service meant that ve women preferred to let their offspring die (fighting the
Spanish) rather than see them seized later for service in the mines.199 Ironically then, ón increasing Indian resistance to reducci efforts increased the likelihood that if captured they would not only be subject to personal service but might be enslaved as “just war.” prisoners in a
Despite these risks, many indios de servicio believed that there most attractive ío ío, the presence of Araucanian option was rebellion. Especially near the B -B indios de guerra often inspired revolts by Indian laborers. Especially worrisome for Spanish encomenderos were nomadic mountain groups like the Pehuenche. These mounted aborigines would conduct occasional raids on Spanish estancias and spirit away a handful of colonists or indios de servicio to the safety of rugged mountain passes.
Often the Pehuenche were involved in larger attacks led by indios de servicio or
Araucanians, as was the case in a 1579 attack. In response to this joint attack, the ín Ruíz de Gamboa founded the city of Chillán as a future Governor of Chile Mart
“bulwark against the plains and mountain Indians.”200
Because of their relative autonomy as mountain dwellers, the Pehuenche also demonstrated to other aborigines that they could maintain some economy even in a
Spanish controlled economy. The Pehuenche controlled access to salt deposits in the cordillera and as a result, had a great deal to say in terms of how much or how little
198 Ibid., 154. 199 Korth, Spanish Policy, 32. 200 ía de la Isla de la Orellana. Historia y antropolog Laja, 36.
80 jerked beef Chile exported to Peru. Pehuenche control of mountain passes also increased their autonomy as the Spanish searched for Caesars and tried to improve ties with Buenos Aires.201 As time progressed some Araucanians produced ponchos for export while others maintained a pre-colonial subsistence economy. Despite drastic economic changes, the vida fronteriza did provide some alternatives for indios de guerra and indios rebeldes.
201 Sergio R. Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza ( Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Universidad ólica de Chile, 1989), 29. Orellana. ía de Cat Historia y antropolog la Isla de la Laja, 29.
81
ía Figure 5. The Araucan (The dotted lines represent the boundaries of Pinto íguez’s frontier “commercial circuit.”)202 Rodr
202 íguez, “Prod ón e intercambio en un espacio fronterizo. Map adapted from: Jorge Pinto Rodr ucci ía y Pampas en el siglo XVIII” in Araucan Jorge Silva Riquer & Antonio Escovar Ohmstede, eds., ígenas en México, Chile y Argentina áfico Editorial: Mexico City, 2000), Mercados ind (Desarrollo Gr 158.
82 Old Enemies in a New Land ’s greatest enemy dropped anchor in the Chilean port of Valparaiso. In 1578 Spain
However, Sir Francis Drake had not yet earned his fame as the scourge of the Spanish
Empire and Valparaiso was so isolated that the unsuspecting crew of the lone Spanish ’s launch. Drake eventually pillaged the ship in the harbor dropped a line to Drake port and his haul was significant for such a small settlement, but the wide and lasting impact of his arrival had little to do with what he took. 203 The Spanish were more concerned that a European enemy had penetrated the Magellan Strait, the Spanish ’s primary Pacific bulwark, exacerbating whatever ill might have been Empire ’s Pacific colonies. plaguing each of Spain ’s arrival made pleas for more In Chile the ill was the War of Arauco, and Drake troops, more resources and the legalization of indigenous slavery all the more urgent. ’s landing especially resonated with the viceroy, who was charged with raising Drake many of the troops and money sent to Chile. An Indian war in Chile seemed, and indeed was quite distant from goings on in Lima. However, the viceroy soon took greater interest in Chile when he realized that if and when the War of Arauco were “outer wall” in the Pacific, slowing won, the colony could be an European enemies as
’s silver.204 they followed the scent of the king
While the War of Arauco continued however, the appearance of English enemies in Chile raised the prospect of a European-indigenous alliance against the Spanish.
203 ’s Drake loot consisted of 2,000 jugs of wine, 60,000 gold pesos; a silver chalice, two cruets, and ’s chapel, and oregano, licorice and walnuts. ín Vicuña one altar cloth from the port Benjam íso: Tomo I Mackenna, Historia de Valpara , in Obras Completas, Volumen Tercero ed. by La ón General de Prisiones, 1936), 68. Universidad de Chile (Santiago: Direcci Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation. Volume XI. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 113. 204 íguez, “Producción e intercambio en un espacio fronterizo,” 150. Pinto Rodr
83 Authorities in Chile were already starting to worry about increasing pan-indigenous movements against them after the Pehuenche and Araucanians indios rebeldes joined forces in the aforementioned 1579 attack.
For the first forty years of Spanish colonies on the Pacific, Patagonian winds had been sufficient protection. Drake proved that this was no longer the case and raised the possibility of Spanish settlement in the Patagonia and the Strait of Magellan. The crown had believed settlement of the territory would actually attract pirates, but soon made an about face when it became apparent that fortifications could provide an early line of defense against anything from a trickle to a steady stream of pirates seeking
Peruvian silver. In the 1530s and 40s there had been a number of expeditions to the strait and Patagonia, but attempts to settle the strait were few and had for all intents and purposes been suspended since 1563 when the crown declared that entradas would need royal approval. Chilean colonists also supported a renewal of settlement ’s tip. Such settlements would protect the Chilean coast and activities on the continent would provide a base from which to conquer the mythical Indians of Caesars.205
The first steps toward settlement came when Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa led an expedition to Tierra del Fuego from Callao in 1579. Sarmiento de Gamboa explored several possible fort sites, and crossed the Atlantic to report his findings to Spain.
Meanwhile, the 1580 re-founding of Buenos Aires prompted a renewed interest in the
Caesars and a westward expedition led by Juan de Garay.206 As the 1580s arrived then, Chile was faced with growing military threats, a labor shortage and no real ’s Governor solution to deal with either one. In 1581 Chile -elect Alonso de
205 Álvarez, én, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia Neuqu , 23. 206 Shields, The Legend of the Caesars, 23.
84 ’s predicament even before he had set foot Sotomayor would begin to appreciate Chile ’s landing fresh in his mind, Philip II ordered the outfitting in the colony. With Drake of a twenty-one-ship fleet in Seville by July of 1581. The plan was for the fleet to sail to through the Magellan Strait and establish a settlement there. The remainder of ’s new governor would the expedition would continue on to Chile where the colony disembark with reinforcements for the War of Arauco. The expedition was immediately beset with difficulties however, and by the time it began its Atlantic crossing five months late, it had already lost eighty men and four ships. Further problems were to follow, prompting its leaders to abandon the Magellan Strait route and land at the newly re-founded port of Buenos Aires. Sotomayor led the reinforcements overland to Mendoza where he they had to wait until the spring thaw to enter Santiago. Sotomayor and the remaining 400 soldiers finally arrived in
Santiago in September of 1583. The crossing took well over two years and brought two hundred casualties long before the arrivals had seen any combat.207
Sotomayor was unimpressed with the state in which he found the colony. ños Desertion was rampant, especially among Lime who tired of the discipline in such a faraway place. (In Lima in 1570 the viceroy had solicited soldiers for the Chilean “other necessities for the front, promising them silver, arms, clothes, victuals and
” He got one volunteer.)208 campaign. Some even switched sides, attracted by the “freed ” of Araucanía and taking advantage of the frequent contact between groups om on the frontier.209
207 Barros Arana, Historia general:Tomo III, 21-27. 208 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 100. 209 óngora, “Vagabundaje y Sociedad Fronteriza en Chile,” 38(n). G
85 Sotomayor said that the soldiers who managed to stay at their posts were spoiled, “free and licentious ” E “naked . ven though his reinforcements were bedraggled, and ” the incumbent soldiers expected that his arrival meant their “relief and lost ” While the soldiers were getting what they wanted, fulfillment of their pretensions. ’t come close to covering the salaries of royal the royal coffers were bare and didn ’s). S officials (including Sotomayor upplies were thin, and the vecinos were “consumed.” In light of such scarcity, Sotomayor’s first act was to send a captain to
édula Lima armed with a royal c authorizing more reinforcements, arms, clothing, and
“b ”210 money to egin as soon as possible a new campaign against the Araucanians.
Sotomayor also found that the Chilean encomenderos and Church officials had
211 “rain of long ago taken sides in a power struggle with the governor at its center. A ” had been leve ’s predecessor, Martín Ruíz de accusations led against Sotomayor íz Gamboa after he had tried to restrict encomendero power through his own tasa. Ru ’a last year had been an ineffective one as he spent de Gamboa most of it imprisoned or on trial in Santiago defending himself against his political enemies who welcomed
Sotomayor with open arms. The incoming governor soon found himself caught up in the battle between opposing encomenderos, taking back a number of repartimientos
íz de Gamboa had given, and repealing the T 212 Ru asa de Gamboa.
If the Sotomayor reinforcements were insufficient, there was still hope that a fortification of the Strait of Magellan would cover up the Chilean chink in the viceregal armor. Sarmiento de Gamboa returned to South America in 1584, creating
210 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 28. 211 The secular clergy were generally in favor of personal service restrictions, but the Dominicans in Santiago sent a representative to Lima to defend the encomenderos affected by the tasa de Gamboa. Ibid., 31. 212 Ibid., 29-31.
86 ús and Rei don Felipe 213 two settlements on the Strait of Magellan, Nombre de Jes . A total of 277 people were left to settle Nombre de Jesus; 251 men, 13 married women, and 11 children. Geographically, cutting off access to the Strait made good sense, but weather doomed the experiment. Along with the cold came the famous Tierra del
Fuego wind, making navigation and re-supply in particular extremely difficult. ’s first support exped ús On Sarmiento ition to Nombre de Jes a sudden storm obligated the crew of his ship to cast off and leave their anchor behind. Sarmiento was forced to sail on to Brazil, leaving several families who planned to be relocated ús. standing on the beach. This was the last time Sarmiento would see Nombre de Jes ía, surviving Once in Brazil Sarmiento tried to return, but was shipwrecked off of Bah only by holding onto a floating board with his African slave and a priest. After this failure, Sarmiento set off to Spain to appeal for help for the colonists in person, and to ask why none of his written petitions had been answered. On this voyage however,
Sarmiento was captured by the English. The ransom for his return to Spain was not paid until 1589. He died in Spain three years later. Meanwhile, the hundreds of settlers in Tierra del Fuego were completely abandoned. Only fifteen men and three women eventually survived the harsh Antarctic winters. 214
This disaster revealed that while the viceroy may have been understandably concerned about pirates, the real threat to colonists in Chile was not European ’s newly founded enemies, but starvation. We remember for example that Valdivia ’s 1541 revolt left the Spanish Santiago was almost abandoned after Michimalongo
213 Rei don Felipe was provided with six canons at its founding, showing us that the fortification strategy was to begin immediately. Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 78. 214 é A. del Busto Duthurburu. Jos Siglo XVI - Historia Externa, Tomo III, Vol. 2., in Historia Maritima del Peru. (Lima: Editorial Ausonia, 1975), 584-89.
87 without Indian allies. Also, it was not uncommon for Spanish frontier soldiers to trade gunpowder to the Araucanians for food. In general, when the Spanish were without Indian help, they fared as badly as the residents of Nombre de Jesus who saw ’s sparse and scattered native population. little help from the strait The irony here is that while thousands were killed on both sides of the War of Arauco, without the economic and cultural exchange of the vida fronteriza the Spanish may have disappeared from Chile anyway.
In the meantime, colonists further north may also have been feeling figuratively abandoned if not literally. Governor Sotomayor pleaded with the crown to remedy the fact that the army was in rags and lacked powder, which threatened his ability to mount even a brief summer campaign. (They did manage one, but with little to show ’s economy brought in for it.) There was more bad news with the revelation that Chile no more than 22,000 pesos yearly and that the treasury was in debt for more than
300,000.215 In the same year a plot by a number of destitute soldiers was uncovered ío, Chillán and even in which they had planned to take over forts at Angol, Bio B
Santiago, collecting all the discontented soldiers along the way and marching over
Andes to return to Spain. The conspirators were executed.216
Without outside support, colonists turned to myth to improve their situation.217 In án, Juan Ramírez de Velasco proposed a small 1586 the Governor of Tucum “dazzling” city called “Linlín” investigation to determine whether there was in fact a “powerful Inca” with 200,000 Indian led by a s and 30,000 Spaniards as his
215 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 33. 216 Ibid., 39. 217 íbola and the Fountain of Youth kept Spanish hopes flickering in Myths of the seven cities of C equally desolate regions of New Spain and Florida.
88 218 írez de Velasco believed that if Linlín could be found, its residents subjects. Ram would end their support of the Araucanians and could provide Spanish settlers with provisions, curing the ills of both Sotomayor and Sarmiento de Gamboa.219
By the time another Englishman Thomas Cavendish, who had been with Drake on his expedition, landed near Valparaiso in 1587 Chile had made little progress against its indigenous enemies and was still ill-prepared to meet this sea borne threat.220
Again, the viceroy sent troops to respond to the pirate landing, and again Governor
Sotomayor regarded the reinforcements as insufficient. It was perhaps very fitting then that the captains of the ships carrying the pirate-hunting troops were instructed to ’t outfitted for avoid all contact with enemy ships, as the transport vessels weren combat.221
As a next step, Sotomayor sent his brother Luis to Spain, hoping that a first-hand account could express the urgency of the need to end the War of Arauco and that his brother would bring the resources that would make it possible. However, in 1587
Spanish ships were hard to come by as most of them preparing to invade England.
Luis de Sotomayor would have to wait at least a year for the stunning events of 1588 to play out before his petition would be heard.
Interestingly enough, the rout of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel did ’s ability to support its not cripple the crown American colonies. Fearing that the
English would press their advantage and try to take Spanish possessions in the
218 Álvarez, én, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia Neuqu , 33. 219 ónimo Luis Robert Hale Shields, The Legend of the Caesars and the Patagonaian Expedidion of Ger de Cabrera, 1620-1621, Unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, [1940?], 49. 220 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 91. 221 Ibid., 80-81.
89 Americas, the Spanish scrambled to ready ships for the Indies. In June of 1589 Luis de Sotomayor arrived in Panama with seven hundred men that were destined for the
Chilean front. Here the story took a surprising twist. Accompanying Sotomayor was ía Hurtado de Mendoza the former Governor of Chile who had none other than Garc ñete. Surely if anyone would just been named Viceroy of Peru and Marquis of Ca assure that these troops made it to the front, it would be a former Governor of Chile and someone who had faced the Araucanians personally. Instead, the marquis had the “auxiliaries” turn right around and accompany the millions of pesos of seven hundred silver that were being readied for shipment to Spain. Instead of 700 soldiers, among them veterans of European campaigns, Chile would get two hundred conscripts from in and around Panama. The marquis explained to the cabildo of Santiago that he ’s situation and as such had sent two hundred “select” and understood Chile well “be more than equipped soldiers who when joining those already on the front would
” to conquer and populate the Araucanía.222 enough
There are a number of reasons why the marquis might have shorted Chile five hundred soldiers. First of all, the crown could ill afford another economic disaster like the defeat of the armada and as such all hands were needed to protect the 1589 silver fleet. Secondly, the marquis had been in close quarters with many Chilean officials and perhaps believed that like Alonso de Ercilla, they were exaggerating the “thought he knew merits of the Araucanians. According to one historian, the marquis ” and believed that the colony needed much less than its Chile better than anyone officials were asking for.223 Thirdly, the marquis had proposed that the Indians on
222 Ibid., 83-86. 223 Ibid., 148.
90 ’s coastal islands be removed and sent to work in Santiago and La Serena.224 Chile ’s labor shortage and pirate threat, and the viceroy This plan would address both Chile wanted to give it time to work. Finally, the marquis may have been protecting his ía Hurtado de Mendoza was left out of legacy. Governor Garc La Araucana because of the punishment he had levied on Ercilla. Hurtado de Mendoza had responded to this omission by commissioning his own version of the conquest, a stilted account called Arauco Domado (Araucania tamed) in which he was the hero and conqueror of the Araucanians.225 Whatever his motives, the marquis had showed little urgency in ’s needs and reinforced the colony’s low rank on the viceregal l meeting Chile ist of ’s plight priorities. Future viceroys would show even more indifference to Chile , prompting authorities in Chile to respond with even more exaggerated claims about the threats they faced from their enemies and royal neglect.
Disappointing as it was, Chilean colonists were not shocked by the indifference of the viceroy and as the last decade of the century arrived they settled even deeper into “colonial the relative stability of the vida fronteriza or what other authors call the ” Both Spanish c pact. olonists and indios rebeldes had acknowledged that a clear victory was impossible in the short term, and the Spanish even began to talk peace rather than conquest.226 Spanish missionaries were also able to establish themselves in the region by the 1590s, a development that would have been impossible in
224 Ibid., 104-105. 225 “Myth and th ’s Araucanians,” 118. Lewis, e History of Chile 226 íguez, “Producción e intercambio ” 154. “pacto colonial” usually appears in Pinto Rodr , The term references to the 18th century when parleys were more frequent and more formal. However, this relationship undoubtedly had its roots in the devlopments of the 17th century.
91 wartime. By 1590 the Dominicans, Mercedarians, and Franciscans had at least two-
ía.227 dozen missionaries divided among the principal settlements in the Araucan
The Araucanians had even made admirers out of two Jesuit missionaries who had set out to evangelize the Indians in 1595. Fathers Aguilera and Vega wrote that the
Indians spoke of their conditions and Spanish abuses clearly and reasonably. The
Jesuits for their part were able to communicate to the Araucanians that they came “neither gold nor silver” and were instead interested in furthering the seeking evangelization of the Indians by limiting Spanish abuses.228 The colonial government recognized the confidence that the Jesuits had among the Araucanians, and began to use the priests as mediators.
Despite the relative tranquility that existed in the region, illegal slave taking and ín indigenous abuse in general were still proving a disruptive force. Governor Mart ía Oñez de Loyola gave orders that pe Garc aceful Indians were not to be abused and “bad even enlisted the help of the above-mentioned Jesuits to smooth over this
”229 treatment. But by the 1590s the illegal transport of Indian slaves had been ’s indigenous population disrupting the region for twenty years. Eugene Korth called
ía of the late 16th “a clearinghouse for the deportation of slaves to the Araucan century the mines and encomiendas of Santiago, La Serena, and Peru. By the 1590s “reduced” Indians were being “crowded into hulls in a fashion tha t resembled Negro
” in Valdivia and sent to Valparaiso and points north.230 slavers Making matters worse was the fact that more domestic labor was soon needed when the Audiencia of Lima
227 Ibid. 228 Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 54. 229 Ibid. 230 Korth, Spanish Policy, 75.
92 ’s most important farm products like wh eliminated import tariffs on Chile eat, flour, fruits, and bacon.231
The new threat of European pirates did little to slow slave-taking trends. When the viceroy sent a ship to Arauco to watch for European enemies in 1592 the sailors offered to help should any skirmishes with the Indians arise. Sure enough the sailors were soon off to join a Spanish raid in which a number of Indian prisoners were taken. There is no direct evidence that the captives were taken to Peru, but previous trends would suggest that they were likely sold into slavery there.232 The implicit ’t take pirate threats seriously (the ship message to the viceroy was that if Lima didn ’s arrival was a response to Cavendish five years earlier), neither would Chilean colonists. They would instead use the late and insufficient reinforcements to take more indigenous slaves. ñez de Loyola took his post in 1593 and brought an impressive Governor O ésumé. He was the nephew of Saint Ignatius, was married to an Inca princess, and r had defeated and executed the leader of a major indigenous rebellion in Peru. It stood ñez de Loyola was one of the few to reason then, that he had big plans for Chile. O governors of Chile to strongly speak out against the practice of enslaving Indian prisoners of war. The governor denounced growing slave export, arguing that the shipment of Indian slaves from Valdivia was becoming quite regular.233 Many of these slaves had even come to the Spanish as allies and instead were placed in
231 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 31,35. 232 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 156. 233 Ibid., 178.
93 234 ñez de Loyola also criticized his eventual successor for branding irons. O indios de guerra on the face and sending some of them to Arica where his brother had a
235 ñez de Loyola also commissioned a report on the mutilation of vineyard. O indigenous slaves to prevent their escape. The Spanish would regularly cut off the ’s foot and or cut a nerve that connected the foot to the leg, meaning front of a slave that the affected person could only walk by dragging his foot.236 ñez de Loyola also heard complaints about how miscegenation through the O capture of Araucanian women continued to be a source of ire along the frontier. Fray ín de Cisneros, the Bishop of La Imperial wrote to Oñez de Loyola that “many Agust
”237 soldiers, carry off female Indians for immoral purposes. Prostitution and concubinage often accompany armies, and with the number of young female Indians captured by the Spanish there is no reason to expect that things were any different along the Chilean frontier.238 In all fairness to the Spanish however, we must remember the scores of Spanish women who had been and continued to be captured by the Araucanians and Pehuenches.239
234 The Spanish soldier Diego Serrano and Pehuenche chief Juan Millanchingue had agreed to attack a rebel tribe together. When Millanchingue arrived with his people to carry out the attack, Serrano had all of them imprisoned. Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza, 30. The soldier-poet Diego én Indomito “Llegado a él, a los demás Arias de Saavedra referred to the incident in his Pur . ándolos a quien más por ellos dieron, que creo que vendieron como a esclavos herrados de Guinea, d á quién esto crea; cual ésta otra élfico rodea, ni no habr maldad gentes no vieron en todo cuanto el d ” Arias de Saavedra, én codicia tan grande que hiciese que por esclavo el libre se vendiese. Pur Indomito, 527. 235 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 162. 236 Ibid., 251(n). 237 Korth, Spanish Policy, 75. 238 ón, “Frontier Socieities: A View from the Southern Frontier of the Indies” Margarita Gasc International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1800. Harvard University, Working Paper No. 02-04., 21. (Used with permission of the author). 239 “Spanish Captives in Indian Society: Cultural Contact along the See Susan Migden Socolow, ” Argentine Frontier, 1600-1835, Hispanic American Historical Review, 72:1 (February 1992): 73-99. ’s article is a fascinating study of captive taking on the ot Socolow her side of the Andes where Spanish women were still being kidnapped to bolster indigenous populations in the pampa well into the republican era.
94 ñez de Loyola even tried to reduce the power of the seemingly untouchable O encomenderos, denouncing a petition made by a number of Santiago vecinos to attach encomienda Indians to an hacienda and to make the encomienda hereditary. The petition even asked that this perpetuity be transferable from one encomendero to ñez de Loyola, this would “open the door” for the another. According to O “depopulation” of Chile’s southern cities since new Indian laborers would be m uch more valuable.240 ñez de Loyola helped reveal that while slave taking raids were supposed to O secure southern cities against attack by Indians, they were instead making them more vulnerable. As Santiago and other cities in the north demanded more labor, southern interests began to ship out the same Indians who had fed and supported the army on their campaigns. While their food and supplies diminished, the Army of Arauco was called upon to conduct additional raids, leaving them ill prepared to deal with any
Indian attacks.
ñez de Loyola Disrupts the Colonial Pact O ñez de Loyola also proved determined to get the viceroy’s help against English O pirates. After learning that Richard Hawkins had anchored his Dainty in Valparaiso ñez de Loyo harbor in 1594, O la sent an emissary to the Audiencia of Lima rather than the stingy Hurtado de Mendoza to ask for help. The audiencia eventually sent 300 more conscripts from Tierra Firme and Panama along with 40,000 pesos, but not without a new mandate from the viceroy stating that the Governor of Chile could not
240 Ibid., 178-79.
95 ’s 241 recruit the colony vecinos and moradores for the war effort. This measure effectively nullified any help the reinforcements brought, as Chile depended on the temporary manpower and extra financial contributions from vecinos to keep the front supplied during frequent difficult periods. From the perspective of officials in Chile, the viceroy had tied them up in knots by not providing them with the resources they needed or even allowing them to gather them on their own. Without excusing illegal slave-taking raids, we see that Chilean colonists were increasingly limited in their ability to keep the War of Arauco economically and strategically viable through legal means. ñez de Loyola sent another em Undeterred, O issary to Spain in 1595. The dying
Philip II could not attend to his affairs and the Council of Indies could offer little
“a promise” of future assistance.242 ’s more than a plan and Hurtado de Mendoza successor Luis de Velasco proved no more willing to fortify Chile against pirate threats. He maintained that the best way to deal with pirate landings was with local militias that could be quickly gathered to drive them off, even though Hawkins had already proved this strategy to be obsolete.243 Like his predecessors, Velasco continued to argue that the difficult Magellan run combined with the problems of re- supplying on a desolate Chilean coast would provide sufficient natural protection for
Chile and Peru against European enemies.244
241 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 149. 242 Ibid., 161. 243 Hawkins knew that the Spanish could only defend themselves on land, and as such did not disembark in Valparaiso when he anchored the Dainty there in 1594. Instead, he captured the Spanish ships that were in the harbor, holding their cargoes for ransom. Del Busto Duthurburu. Siglo XVI - Historia Externa, Tomo III, Vol. 2., 609. 244 Peter T. Bradley, The Lure of Peru: Maritime Intrusion into the South Sea, 1598-1701 (New York, ’s Press, 1989), 26. St. Martin
96 ñez de Loyola was Despite being turned away by the crown and viceroy, O determined to bring more stability to Chile. He wanted to make strides against indios rebeldes, improve the treatment of indios reducidos as we have seen, and release a number of illegally taken indigenous slaves. While the second of these measures ía made the reduced tensions to some degree, further encroachment into the Araucan indios rebeldes nervous and the release of captives was regarded as a sign of “colonial pact” was kept stable by an equ weakness. The al power relationship between the Spanish and indios rebeldes, so in 1598 when the Araucanian lonko ñez de Loyola had overextended Spanish Pelantaro correctly observed that the O forces he attacked.245 ñez de Loyola himself had taken the point in t Governor O he Spanish push into the ía and he and his men ventured into the Valley of Curalaba in 1598. Some Araucan authors say he was ambushed, some say his attackers only happened upon him, but all agree that he was killed by a small group of Araucanians who left only one Spaniard ñez de Loyola was decapitated, his head becoming the alive. Most also concur that O inspiration for the subsequent assault.246
Although this was a most brutal act, its effectiveness in rallying the Araucanians was undeniable. As we saw in chapter one, the Araucanians would absorb the traits of “symbol of the enemy’s bravery... an the enemy and the head was a d the source of his
245 Silva Galdames, Atlas de historia de Chile, 48. 246 ón de Araucanía Guevara, Historia de la civilizaci . Ovalle, Historica relacion del Reino de Chile. ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile. Gonz Desenga These are just four of the many sources that discuss the assassination of the governor in detail.
97 ” 247 ’s assassin, Pelantaro, became the recognized prestige. As a result, the governor leader of the assault.248
The soldier-poet Diego Arias de Saavedra was one of the Spanish defenders of án during the Pelantaro én Indómito Chill -led attack and described it in his poem, Pur
én Untamed) 249 (Pur . “The din, the rumble the horrific scream,
the mob, bedlam, the clamors the barbarous shouting, without end the fears increase: no one defends their miserable house against the perfidious traitors,250 they flee unarmed and naked, ”251 of fright and fear deaf and dumb.
After the assault, Arias de Saavedra and a few fellow soldiers set out in pursuit of the attackers, eventually finding them waiting in ambush with stones and arrows ready. “Twas so terrible and vigorous the stoning that, not being of such great strength nor of such fine refuge the helmet, my head was cut to pieces; it was my cursed luck to be senseless for a good hour, without being able to walk ”252 straight, nor be useful for more than an hour.
As mentioned in chapter one, the Spanish presence had led to the development of the lonko system by which a temporary alliance among scattered Araucanian and é’s aborigines) groups was rapidly formed. In both even Pehuenche and Conco (Chilo this case and in that of the Pueblo Revolt in New Mexico, the Spanish overlooked the
247 “Etnogé ” 437 Boccara, nesis Mapuche, -438. 248 Silva Galdames, Atlas de historia de Chile, 48. 249 én is a region of Araucanía. The term is also often used to describe its inhabitants. “Purén” and Pur “Araucania” are often interchangeable.
250 These traitors were a handful of Christianized Indians who gave strategic help to the Pehuenche before their assault. Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza, 30. 251 én Indómito Arias de Saavedra. Pur , 301. 252 Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza, 32.
98 potential of scattered groups to ally. In Chile, the lonko system and smoldering resentment of the Spaniards253 were able to turn hundreds of small kin groups into a
6,000-man army that between 1598 and 1602 forced the Spanish to abandon not only
án, but Osorno, Valdivia, Villarrica, La Imperial, Sa 254 Chill nta Cruz, and Arauco. “Disaster of Curalaba” meant the deaths of According to one author, this so-called more than three thousand Spaniards and the capture of more than five hundred women and scores of children and priests.255
The Disaster of Curalaba revealed two important lessons. One, that the colonial pact had become instrumental in governing the conduct of colonists and Araucanians alike. Two, that if the norms of the pact were broken there would be violent consequences. The Araucanians knew there was little they could do about their declining population, and legal status, but after 1598 they were confident that they could fend off territorial incursions that violated the colonial pact.
By 1598 Spanish governors and missionaries had learned that reputation went a long way among the Araucanians, and that any incursions outside of Spanish settlements had to be made very delicately. Governor Loyola and Spanish Jesuits ía in the 1590s with the great fervor of reformers and ti alike entered the Araucan pped the balance of power that was the colonial pact. Both had good intentions, but the
253 án Leading the assault on Chill were the Pehuenche who sought revenge for their betrayal by Diego ’s women captive. én Indómito Serrano and took half of the settlement Arias de Saavedra, Pur , 304. 254 ña, ón del viaje a Chile, año de 1600, contenida en la crónica intitulad “A Diego de Oca Relaci a és de la América del Sur” (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1995), 42. trav This 6,000 soldier figure ña’s own estimate, but based on the observations of other chroniclers and on the is Father Oca destruction caused we can say almost without a doubt that the invading army was composed of thousands of soldiers. Villarrica and Arauco held out during the initial assault, but were abandoned a few years later. Villarrica would not be refounded until the 19th century. 255 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile, é Alonso Gonz Desenga in Marqu s de ón de documentos inéditos para la historia de España Miraflores & D. Miguel Salva, eds. Colecci : Tomo XLVIII, (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1866), 124.
99 Jesuits had already made the Araucanians feel invaded when Loyola wandered into the Valley of Curalaba and provided Pelantaro with the perfect opportunity to make a “restore the fatherland” as he put it. Pelantaro later would boast name for himself and “driven all Spaniards out of Chile” or had Spanish that he would not stop until he had “making chicha and dressing in blankets.” He knew full well however that women the Spanish would not disappear and that he in fact needed them to bolster his power.
His murder of Loyola had turned him into a gentoqui and converted his rivals like ón into his lieutenants. This is best revealed by the fact that a decade later Aganam “Defensive War” he would make peace with the Spanish. In chapter three during the we will see that during the Defensive War, the best way to gain recognition on the frontier was by to bring hundreds of Araucanians to be catechized. Pelantaro recognized this and took advantage of the opportunity, just as he had done in 1598.256
256 Diego de Rosales, Historia General del Reino de Chile, Flandes Indiano, Tomo II (2nd ed., és Bello, 1989), 688, 958. Santiago: Editorial Andr
100 CHAPTER IV
FRONTIER EXPERIMENTS: JESUITS, MYTHS AND SLAVERY IN POST- CURALABA CHILE
“The Spanish never put their (shoulder) into the ón reducci nor conversion … with as much endeavor as they had in getting the enslaved Indians to work, our entire attention (was) upon capturing slaves and selling them while we informed his Majesty that we had achieved a great deal in his Royal Service, ‘virtues’ and greed ‘piety’ and procuring that all the provinces calling vices ”257 (in Chile) were angry and in revolt.
While the Pelantaro-led assault of 1598 was catastrophic for Chile, news of the event caused barely a ripple in Peru where the murdered Governor Loyola had been nothing short of a hero. One of the most dramatic reactions came not from the ’s prominent women. They showed concern government, but from a group of Lima for the plight of the hundreds of Chilean women taken captive during the assault,
258 ñas some of whom may have been relatives or acquaintances. These Lime collected “forgotten and helpless captives” who they hoped would be alms to clothe any of the freed.259 The new viceroy Luis de Velasco quickly promised three hundred men, but ’s replacement left it up to Loyola to find them and take them to Chile. The new
257 ército de Chile y su situado. 1680 A.G.I. Chile,129. Expediente relativo al Ej -1699. No. 12 in in Memoria de los ynstrumentos que el lcdo D. Pablo Vazquez de Velasco Cavo del orden de Santio y fiscal de la R. Auda de Chile remite a su Magd. en comprobazion de lo que en carta de 25 de Septte de 1690 escribe en orden a lo obrado en la distibuzion del situado del exto de chile y de los fraudes y malas administraziones que reconosco y experimento en el dispendio del caudal de dho situado y lo dmas que en dha carta se contiene. Maestre de Campo Geronimo de Quiroga. Letter to Licenciado ón, 28 February, Don Pablo Vazquez de Velasco...Fiscal de la Real Audiencia ... de Chile. Concepci 1690 258 ájera says 500 Spanish women were taken captive. Ibid., 124. Gonzalez de N 259 Ibid., 128.
101 ñones governor Francisco de Qui only managed to scare up 130 volunteers despite promises that they would be paid and allowed to return to Peru whenever they ñones would wished. Like Pedro de Valdivia and other governors before him, Qui remind the crown of how he had sacrificed by spending money out of his own pocket to get the troops to Chile.260
The crown finally managed to send 500 reinforcements through Buenos Aires in
1601, but they reached Mendoza in such poor shape that they had to be outfitted with proper clothing while before they could cross into Chile in the spring.261 ’s colonists were still trying to put down the Araucanian assault of the Chile previous year when the captain of the Dutch ship Fidelity, Baltasar Cordes, led the é’s principal remnants of a larger Dutch expedition in an attack on Castro, Chilo port.262 é “reduced,” but just before the Dutch arrived Most of the Indians of Chilo were they joined the general uprising. According to the account of Diego de Rosales, it é Indians who solicited Dutch assistance with their was the Chilo own plan to attack
Castro. As Cordes and thirty musketeers approached Castro they revealed the ’ plan to Spanish officials in the hope that the colonists would r Indians e-supply them in exchange for the information. The Spanish accepted the deal and provided the
Dutch with gunpowder and ammunition. However, when the Spanish sent envoys to plan an attack on the Indians, Cordes sprung a trap and had them killed. Cordes and
260 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 195. 261 Ibid., 274. 262 Kris Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 75.
102 his men then advanced on Castro, sacked it, killed Spanish men who had found
“ ”263 refuge in a church, killed the local priest, usando de humanidad con las mujeres.
Spanish reinforcements from Osorno eventually drove the Dutch out of Castro and killed thirty of the Indian leaders who had assisted them. Captured or deserting
Dutch sailors were interviewed ad nauseum about the plans for their voyage, which meant that officials in Chile and Peru were well aware of Dutch motives. This Dutch ’s motivation for threat from the south is quite ironic when we consider that Magellan finding the strait that bears his name was an alternate route to the East Indies. This
Spanish sponsored expedition had only paved the way for a century of Dutch and
English navigation of the route when Spanish attention shifted to American gold and silver.264
While the attack on Castro was a blow to the entire viceroyalty, there were signs that it would not be easy for the Dutch to gain a toehold or even establish trading é was essentially an afterthought relationships in Chile. First of all, the attack on Chilo and an act of desperation. While the goal of the five-vessel expedition of “contrabandists” under Jacob Mahu was to explore and trade in the “South Sea,” they did not come close to reaching the Pacific intact. Mahu himself died off the coast of
Africa, and the expedition only went downhill from there. The ships became separated, and a number of them were lost or had turned back by the time Cordes
é.265 landed in Chilo Secondly, there was no guarantee that the Indians of Chile would ally with the Dutch or even give them free passage for that matter. Three- dozen ’s scattered expedition landed in Arauco six months before the members of Mahu
263 Rosales, Historia general: II, 721-73 264 ’s Publishers, 1926), 39. W.S. Barclay, The Land of Magellan (New York: Brentano 265 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 74-75.
103 Castro attack. After what seemed as a welcome banquet, the inebriated Dutch were slaughtered by their Araucanian hosts.266 In fact, the Dutch did not necessarily have major territorial aspirations in Chile. The Dutch saw Chile and the islands off its coast mostly as a stopping-off point on their way to Callao or the Moluccas, or a base
“southern continent.”267 from which to search for the mythical other
However, the lack of major Dutch territorial aspirations did not stop skittish
Chilean officials from ruminating about a Dutch takeover of the entire continent, which would begin when they were able to dislodge the Spanish from Chile. For
Chilean colonists the fact remained that their European and domestic enemies had, however temporarily, formed an alliance. Although little thought was ever given to é in the rest of the colony, this example of a potential alliance would remain in Chilo the minds and in the missives of Chilean officials for most of the century and would govern much of the colonial-viceregal-imperial relationship and discussion of resources, which was just as Chile wanted it.268 The viceroys of Peru consistently showed a lukewarm commitment to the War of Arauco, (especially after 1598) but this time their silver lifeblood could be threatened by a Dutch outpost in the ía, and they Araucan had to act. For the viceroys, the failure to win War of Arauco “outer wall of the Pacific” meant a failure to establish Chile as the aforementioned against pirates.269
266 Rosales, Historia general: II, 720. 267 ’s Island: A History of the Juan Fernández Islands Ralph Lee Woodward, Robinson Crusoe (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1969), 18-21. 268 This was not the first time concerns over pirates and aborigines coincided. Pedro de Valdivia “ ’s banner” in the Strait of Magellan and settle the area to showed a great desire to plant His Majesty keep non-Spaniards out. However, the expedition he sent to begin this project had to turn back when Valdivia was killed. Pedro de Valdivia. Carta al emperador Carlos V, Santiago, 26 de octubre de 1552.
104 Colonists were very aware of the fact that whereas the destruction of seven
Spanish settlements by the Araucanians warranted only 300 ragtag reinforcements, the appearance of a severely depleted Dutch fleet prompted Viceroy Velasco to gather eight armed vessels at Callao and send three of them south to search for more possible breaches of the Strait. Velasco then complained to the crown that these eight ships were not sufficient and would need more resources from Spain to defend Peru
“Dutch or other foreigners.”270 against the
The story of the early 17th century then became one of how to deal with the combined Dutch-Araucanian threat and what this meant for the vida fronteriza. It took the events of 1598-1600 (most importantly the appearance of the Dutch of course) for the crown to decide that instability on the Chilean frontier had lasted long enough and now posed a very real threat to Peruvian silver. The crown would now sponsor a series of experimental ways to end the War of Arauco including the “Defensive War” and the creation of a permanent army, the establishment of a legalization of indigenous slavery. While these experiments were important in revealing the commitment of the crown and viceroy to protecting their silver, to residents of Chile they were a lesson in how the War of Arauco and fear of pirates could become a permanent source of resources for a flagging frontier economy.
Ultimately the crown failed to realize how important the vida fronteriza had become to Chile. Therefore, attempts by Spanish officials to erase or move the frontier instead became a means by which colonists and aborigines could to solidify its importance through permanent war.
270 ú. 1600 A.G.I. Lima,34. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -1604. #28. Letter from V.R. Luis de Velasco. Dated Lima, 28 December, 1601.
105 While Viceroy Velasco initially reacted quickly to the Dutch attack, scaring up reinforcements and appealing to the crown for help, further action would have to wait for Philip III to get up to speed after the recent death of his father. When Phillip III did respond, very little was done to protect Chile from pirates. The crown suggested that the Callao to Valparaiso supply run be carried out in the winter months thinking that pirates would not brave the Strait in winter, but Chile was essentially back to square one, relying on the no longer impenetrable barrier of the Strait for its protection. There were simply no available ships in the Pacific fleet to provide permanent defense. Therefore, future Chilean colonists knew that they would never ’s European enemies ’t be adequately protected from Spain . However, this didn prevent them from squeezing future viceroys for fortifications and troops now that the ’s attention. English and Dutch had done them the favor of getting Lima
As the 17th century wore on, it became apparent that Chile would need to be able to frighten the crown to secure ever limited resources. The 1588 defeat of the Spanish
Armada and the 1598 death of Philip II were the most recognized but not the only indicators that the primacy of Hapsburg Spain was on the verge of a sharp decline. ’s grand imperial The bankruptcy of the royal treasury in 1596 signaled that Philip II ventures would at the very least have to be put on hold and that prospects for any
271 ’s weakness, further expansion looked bleak. Begrudgingly acknowledging Spain
Philip II had allowed Archduke Albert of the Netherlands to at least nominally rule the Low Countries, and had made peace with Charles IV.272 All of this meant that
th “closed in on toward the end of the 16 century, the Spanish American Empire
271 J.H. Elliot, Imperial Spain: 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 287. 272 Ibid., 290.
106 ”273 itself. It was no accident that the 17th century spawned the tale of Don Quixote, where what began as a glorious crusade ended in humiliation.274 “century of disillusionment,” not for mere Chile also sank rather deeply into this economic reasons, but also because of the strategic and psychological effects of the
Disaster of Curalaba. The assault of 1598 was a watershed event in the War of
Arauco. The Spanish had managed to extract some mineral wealth from the south, but their tenuous settlements were now gone. Previous images of glorious battles between two noble armies had yielded to those depicting a bloody stalemate between two tired forces. This significant defeat helped the Spanish crown and Chilean colonists alike reflect on why the conquest was failing.
Although La Araucana is set apart from other colonial accounts because of its epic style and rhyme scheme, Alonso de Ercilla was by no means the only author to poeticize the Araucanian war. Some decades later, the soldier-poet Diego Arias de én Indomito. Saavedra used La Araucana as a model for his own epic entitled, Pur én Indomito Although the two epics contain many similarities, the tone of Pur reminds us that the scenes in La Araucana represent only a brief period in the long and painful war of Arauco. Much of what Arias de Saavedra writes reflects the disillusion ’s vision of an epic struggle between the following the 1598 assault. Ercilla
án 275 worshipers of God and Pill , turned into a divisive power struggle within a
273 Ibid., 291-92. 274 Ibid., 299. 275 án was the Mapuche creator who had great respect for warriors. Pill Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 91
107 “...losing sight of Christian virtue.” In Purén Indomito, Spanish society that was
“...war is wretched, cruel, terrifying; God’s punishment for the sins of the Spanish.276
The frustration with the stalemate was also expressed in the account of Alonso ález de Nájera. González de Nájera was a Spanish soldier who arrived in the Gonz aftermath of the 1598 rebellion, was wounded, and commissioned to write an account
277 ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile of what he observed. His Desenga includes tales of cannibalism and Araucanian bloodlust, images undoubtedly influenced by the fact that his own page was killed and eaten by the Araucanians. Referring to Araucanian ález ájera said, “...there is great joy in the victory, victory celebrations, Gonz de N especially if they take with them the severed heads of Spaniards or prisoners, that for
”278 them back on their land, and among their own, is more than a Roman triumph.
Although the translated title of his account is Disillusion and Remedy of the War
279 ález de Nájera saw no easy way to end this war. He said quite in Chile, Gonz frankly that the Spanish should give up the illusion of ending the conflict through “Because even though making peace ( dialogue, something that is incredibly difficult) is possible, given the means and the forces necessary to do it, it will never be that the ” González de Nájera Indians maintain it, nor that war will cease until the end of time. showed his frustration at the broken promises and trickery of the Araucanians, but also realized that the Spanish gave them two options; resistance enslavement. The
276 íguez Fernandez, “Estudio Preliminar,” in Diego Arias de Saavedra, én Indómito Mariano Rodr Pur ón: Universidad de Concepción, 1984), 99 (Concepci -102. 277 ález de Nájera’s descriptions of Chile’s difficulties ño y The inspiration for Alonso Gonz in Desenga reparo de la guerra del Reino de Chile, was a 1607 report he was sent to personally deliver to the Council of Indies by the Governor of Chile. Marques de Miraflores and Miguel Salva, introduction to ño y reparo de la guerra del Rein Desenga o de Chile, 8. I have used the 1970 edition of this text unless otherwise noted. 278 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de la Guerra de Chile Gonz Desenga , 24. 279 “Myth and the History of Chile’s Araucanians,” 117. Lewis,
108 “refuses to call them Spanish soldier mentioned that despite their brutal actions, he
” impressed with their deftness 280 barbarians, in negotiating truces to their favor.
After 1598 the more critical tone of Franciscan missionaries in Chile was beginning to take precedence over that of their Jesuits colleagues who had tried to point out the merits Araucanian culture and politics. The Franciscan Pedro de Sosa, in his Memorial del peligroso estado espiritual y temporal del Reino de Chile,
(Memoir of the perilous spiritual and temporal state of the Kingdom of Chile) talked of his frustration with the Araucanians and argued that their violence, and their habit of killing missionaries in particular, had much to with their struggles.
“The Araucanians are rebels, they flee the Spanish and make war on the Christian Indians, wasting the fruit of so many years of hard work. The rebel Indians have been offered peace and good treatment as given to friendly Indians, but as they are barbarians and live without government, republic or law, they do as they please. Being impossible to put them in reducciones, there remains no other solution than to make war on them. Saint Augustine would have approved it, and the gospel calls a mercenary the pastor that sees ”281 the wolf and leaves the sheep.
Father Sosa added that missionaries could not continue to allow these Araucanian “wolves” to continue t “reduced sheep” from hearing the word. o prevent the
Christian martyrs did not help the spread of the gospel. Father Sosa mentioned that
Saint Paul, upon hearing that many wanted him dead, asked to be given soldiers for his protection. Sosa believed that his contemporaries should have done the same.282
’s new Even the election of a decorated soldier and enthusiastic diplomat as Chile governor failed to bring Chile out of the post-Curalaba doldrums. New governor
280 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo de l Gonz Desenga a Guerra de Chile, 49. 281 íguez. ía Pinto Rodr Misioneros en la Araucan , 103. 282 Ibid., 103
109 Alonso de Ribera did all he could to get the colony back on its feet. He set up a mill near Santiago to provide blankets and other materials for surviving soldiers. He also ón and Santiago to make sure that these had cart making operations set up in Concepci new domestically generated supplies could get to the front.283
But Ribera was never able to enlist the help of Santiago merchants to turn the economy around. Tired of supporting a losing cause, the merchants had begun to ía and had were increasin move away from supplying soldiers in the Araucan gly
í.284 involved in export to Potos Ribera tried to get them re-involved, but a 1604
Santiago flood left vecinos both unwilling and now unable to help.285 Ribera also sought more help from the viceroy and crown, and even sent a recruiter to Lima to
’t deliver.286 round up the troops that the viceroy couldn
’s recruiter had a difficult task ahead, as the “Disaster of Curalaba” left Ribera
Chile in dire need of any and all resources for the front. According to one estimate the Spanish troops were outnumbered at least twenty to one, a ratio that was
287 ’t in increasing yearly as casualties outpaced reinforcements. Even when they weren battle Spanish soldiers suffered. In one extreme case, the starving inhabitants of a
Spanish fort were forced to use their dead as bait to attract dogs to kill and eat.288
This climate of pessimism within the colony and the kingdom combined with events in Chile prompted Philip III to take a step that would have been unthinkable a half-century earlier during the up swell of the conquest. In 1604 the crown decided
283 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 309. 284 ón, “Frontier Socieities: A View from the Southern Frontier of the Indies,” 11. Margarita Gasc 285 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 323. 286 Ibid., 309. 287 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo Gonz Desenga , 150. 288 Ibid., 124.
110 that Chile would have the only permanent and professional army in the Indies, funded ío yearly by the treasury of the Viceroyalty of Peru. This permanent army on the B - ío was the only exception to Spain’s military strategy in B its other American
“presidio ” model.289 territories which followed the -fuerte-milicia Chile had never solidified its frontier with a line of presidios or a series of advancing forts. Its tenuous settlements had already been abandoned on a number of occasions and the crown felt that a professional army needed to replace the frequently overrun vecino- é of course further convinced the crown to based militia. The Dutch attack on Chilo make this drastic decision. “Army of Arauco” would be a force of 2,000 This and would receive a yearly situado (salary or payment) of 212,000 ducats.290 Governor Ribera brought a portion of this new situado with him on his way to Chile and had more than 1,000 new troops from Spain and New Spain at his disposal the year he took office.291 ’s Not surprisingly, there were difficulties in raising enough troops to fill the army “the abandonment of this 2,000 spots. However, it was now abundantly clear that remote outpost of empire (Chile) seemed an impossible option, not least because of
”292 its strategic position controlling the straits of Magellan. While the Army of ’s principle task was securing Chile against the Arauco indios rebeldes, colonists were well aware that they had the Dutch to thank for the decision to establish the
289 öter, “La frontera en hispanoamérica colonial,” 380. Schr 290 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 363. 291 Philip III ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to send 400 troops to Chile. 154 arrived in 1605. Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 338-39. 292 Ibid., 366-67.
111 293 “a miniature war of Flanders permanent force. In the meantime was in the
” 294 making, a long and grueling European campaign of which Ribera was a veteran.
Ribera welcomed the reinforcements, but pointed out that he could not pay them.
He had only received a portion of the promised situado from Lima and Viceroy
Hurtado de Mendoza had prohibited colonists in Chile from covering the difference.295 Ribera might have been even more concerned about this salary shortage if he had thought he was getting professional soldiers. He called his new “poorly disciplined” and said that the ranks were marked by “confusion and troops
” and hardly resembled a Spanish military unit.296 ález de barbarism Alonso Gonz ájera, who had recently been a part of this “confusion and barbarism ” agreed. He N , argued that if the Spanish were to win the war, royal officials would have to stop
’s “miscreants” by sending them to serve on the Chilean frontier.297 punishing Lima
These complaints revealed some important truths about Chile and the future of the “a true Army of Arauco. As one historian put it, the establishment of the situado was
”298 recognition of the absence of real revenue in Chile. There was no real wage economy in Chile until the crown established the Army of Arauco, and even then much of the situado arrived not in specie but in supplies.299 In other words, if Chile could have paid for its own war, the crown would have obligated the colony to do so.
293 ón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú en el siglo XVII. Recursos, catastrophes Margarita Gasc ” (paper presented at the y estrategias imperiales Encuentro de historiadoes Argentinos y Peruanos, Lima, Sept. 2004), 4. 294 “The Spanish Conquest,” 187. Elliot, 295 Ibid. 296 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 131. 297 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo Gonz Desenga , 451. (1866 edition). 298 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 133. 299 Most specie in the 16th century was tied up in administration of the colony and very rarely passed from employer to employee. The Army of Arauco did change this somewhat, but it was not until a class of itinerant mestizo laborers developed in the 18th century and began to replace encomienda labor ía de that Chile had anything close to a wage economy. Sergio Villalobos, et al. Historia y geograf Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), 72.
112 Also, administrative snafus, embezzlement, and economic dry spells in Lima would make it unlikely that Chile would ever receive the soldiers and the resources it was supposed to in consecutive years.300 So at the beginning of the 17th century, Chile had few resources of its own, but would sporadically receive a large chunk of money and hundreds of soldiers from Peru or from Spain via Buenos Aires.301 These factors would prompt Chilean officials to exaggerate and even provoke threats to scare Lima into rushing the situado and reinforcements to them.
Poorly disciplined troops and a lack of resources began to turn the Army of
Arauco into something very different than what the crown had envisioned. While the permanent army was supposed to end the Araucanian threat, what it really did was to bring more unscrupulous entrepreneurs to Chile. There they could now count on a ía situado to skim from and could maintain a more permanent presence in the Araucan where they would be in constant contact with potential indigenous slaves. Among the thieves, rapists and murders that ended up in the ranks of the Army of Arauco was a
300 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 366-67. In 1606 the crown responded to complaints about low salaries. 212,000 ducats would be sent yearly from Peru, and a 2,000-man army was established. But as of 1609 not enough reinforcements had arrived from Peru to expand campaigns beyond those of ’s yearly contribution varied and was supposed to be previous years. Before the Army of Arauco, Lima “in moderation.” Jara, given Guerra y sociedad, 99. According to one viceroy, the 212,000 annual ’s spending. This seventeen pe ducats represented about seventeen percent of Lima rcent does not count money sent to bring reinforcements from Spain or for reinforcements against pirates. This spending was especially worrisome to the viceroy because he was sending only about a million ducats to the ón que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor king, but spending a million and a quarter. Relaci és de Guadalcázar sobre el estado en que deja las provincias del Peru. 1621, in ón de las Marqu Colecci ú acerca del estado en que dejaban memorias o relaciones que escribieron los Virreyes del Per las án y Rózpide. (Madrid: Imp. cosas generales del reino. Tomo I. Ed. by Ricardo Beltr Del Asilo de érfanos del S.C. de Jesús, 1921), 291 “The Costs of Empire Spendig Hu -93. Also see John Te Paske, ” Patterns and Priorities in Colonial Peru, 1581-1820, Colonial Latin American Historical Review 2: (Winter 1993), pp. 1-34. 301 Zacarias Moutokais argues that the arrival of navios de registro in Buenos Aires, (ships from Spain with special permission to land in Buenos Aires) transformed the Rio de la Plata economy. Most of the first navios were carrying troops or supplies for the Army of Arauco. So the Chilean frontier was not only an economic resource in its own colony, but also helped Buenos Aires grow after it was re- “ founded in 1580. Zacarias Moutokais, Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local ” Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires The Hispanic American Historical Review 68:4 (Nov., 1988): 771-801.
113 woman disguised as a man. After escaping a convent in the Spanish town of her birth and hiding for two years under the noses of her family and neighbors disguised as a úcar where she paid young man, Catalina de Erauso made her way to Sanl her way onto a ship bound for Panama.302 According to her manuscript, Erauso herself arrived in Chile with a questionable background, not as a suspected woman, but as a rabble- rouser who was prompted to join the army after killing a man in Peru.303 In about ón where she and her fellow 1603 Erauso made her way from Lima to Concepci
“…well received due to the lack of people that there were in Chile.”304 soldiers were
Erauso served for fifteen years in Indian wars in Peru and Chile.305 Some documents place Erauso in a battle for the port of Valdivia, a battle that the Spanish ultimately
érez.306 lost, but after which she gained the title of alf She led her company for six months after the death of her captain, but any possibilities for her own ascension to
“Captain of Indians.”307 captain were lost after she lynched a traitorous Later, she
én Valley 308 was injured in a mounted assault on the Pur .
302 érez, …, escrita por Angel Esteban, introduction in, Catalina de Erauso, Historia de la Monja Alf átedra, 2002), 93(n). ella misma (Madrid: Ediciones C 303 Ibid., 109. 304 Ibid., 111. 305 “Memorial de la Monja Alférez, Doña Catalina de Erauso ón de sus méritos y servicios con la relaci y pidiendo se le conceda un entretenimiento de 70 pesos de a 22 quilates al mes en la ciudad de ” in ña Catalina de Erauso: Dos Cartajena de Indias, Pedro Rubio Moreno ed., La Monja Alferez Do á éditos de su autobiografía conservados en el Arvhivo de la Santa manuscritos autobiogr ficos in Iglesia Catedral de Sevilla (Seville: Ediciones del Cabildo Metroplitano de la Catedral de Sevilla, 1995). 306 ña Catalina de Erauso: Dos manuscritos autobiográficos éditos, La Monja Alferez Do in 106. 307 Ibid., 107. 308 Ibid. Two soldiers who served with her gave sworn declarations that she in fact was wounded at én. Both gave the declarations in Lima after she had confessed that she was a woman and was Pur ón de érez de facing punishment for the murders she had committed. Certificaci Don Francisco P ón de Don Juan Cortés de Monroy. (1625), in Navarrete. (1624), and Certificaci La Monja Alferez ña Catalina de Erauso: Dos manuscritos autobiográficos. Do
114 ’s life, but was very The War of Arauco was not only an important part of Erauso useful to her picaresque narrative.309 The popularity of La Araucana meant that for “…only cruel adventurers who peninsular Spaniards, the Chilean frontier attracted
”310 fled dark pasts and knights abused by their bad fortune. Such cruel adventurers
“rugged world of the South Ameri ”311 were thrust into the can frontier where a
Spanish audience could imagine them engaged in frequent duels and other illicit “…we always had our activities. Erauso supported this notion when she stated,
”312 ’s weapons in hand, because of the great invasion of the Indians. Erauso ’s reputation had experience in Chile demonstrates how widespread the frontier become, and how this reputation could translate in reward to those who (even questionably) served or had served there.313
309 ’s autobiogr Some argue that Erauso aphy is actually an apocryphal text. (See discussion in Rima R. “ órica y ficción en érez” Vallbona, Realidad hist Vida y sucesos de la Monja Alf (PhD. diss., “La Monha Alférez Middlebury College, 1981), 5-20; and Diego Barros Arana, -Algunas íticas sobre su historia ” observaciones cr -Noticias desconocidas acerca de su muerte, Revista de Santiago I (1872), 219-20.) In the A.G.I. I searched the admittedly incomplete records of soldiers in ’s supposed tenure there, and none of th the Army of Arauco during Erauso e names matched any of her three aliases. However, if she did make up her participation in the War of Arauco, this simply means that the idea of the Chilean frontier was powerful enough in Spain to get someone a pension who had never been there. 310 érez, ónica de una vida que tuvo perfil de romance Raul Morales Alf La Monja Alferez: Cr (Santiago: Excelsior, 1938?), 40. La Araucana spawned a number of imitators that continued Spanish ’s fascination with the War of Arauco. Spanish Baroque playwrigh literature ts were so interested in the New World, that any mention of the Americas in a source caused it to be labeled as exclusively about the Americas. For example, the fact that La Araucana contained passages on Spanish victories in éctor Brioso Santos Europe was of little interest to playwrights of the time. In fact, H calls La “sources of the ” Indeed, the Araucana one of the principal lopesca works regarding the Americas. ’s namesake, Lope de Vega first had his lopesca genre Arauco Domado published in 1625. The play éctor Brioso Santos, érica en la prosa went through three more printings in the same decade. H Am ñola de los siglos XVI y XVII ón Provincial de Huelva, 1998), literaria espa , (Huelva, Spain: Diputaci 38-40, 97-98. There were no less than six Spanish plays written in the seventeenth century set in Arauco. Five of them were written within the first thirty years of the century, at the height of Catalina ’s fame. de Erauso 311 Jerome R. Adams, Notable Latin American Women: Twenty-Nine Leaders, Rebels, Poets, Battlers and Spies, 1500-1900 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1995), 49. 312 érez Historia de la Monja Alf , 113. 313 The crown eventually granted Erauso a pension, largely because of her service in the War of Arauco. She lived off of the pension in her final years as an anonymous mule herder in New Spain.
115 Beyond the questionable skill of the Spanish infantry, a change in Araucanian tactics also limited the effectiveness of the army. Improved Araucanian “fortified war” in favor of more mobile, horsemanship allowed them to abandon their more flexible, and smaller scale raids called malones or malocas.314 The Spanish responded with more raids of their own, partly because they did not have the resources for a sustained campaign and partly because concern shifted from capturing territory to taking prisoners. These factors would turn the Army of Arauco, designed “a slave ” which for a few sustained and decisive campaigns, into -hunting machine would eventually conduct hundreds of smaller raids.315
Before turning to slave-taking raids on a larger scale, Chilean residents had to address the fact that indigenous slavery was illegal in the Americas. For years colonists in Chile had pushed for the legalization of indigenous slavery, but after the attack of 1598 petitions became more frequent and more detailed. The Council of
Indies became an advocate for permitting the practice in Chile and outlined four important benefits that enslaving prisoners of war might bring to the colony. First, the soldiers in the War of Arauco would be certain of spoils. Second the new slaves
“personal service” burden of 316 would lessen the indios amigos. Third, the council
314 ón Solís, ún Le Maloqueros y conchavadores, 15. The Araucanian language (mapudung ) “maloca” th term was commonly used to describe a raid from either side well into the 18 century. 315 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 149. 316 The term indios amigos is a bit misleading as at least in the beginning, the aborigines did not help “friendship.” In the late 16th the Spanish out of century most indios amigos were in fact encomienda Indians aiding their encomendero perform his obligatory military service. By the 17th century, most indios amigos were no longer attached to encomiendas and had a good deal of autonomy as long as án de amigos they lived near a Spanish settlement or with a Spanish capit supervising them. Groups of ’s central valley and the Araucanía indios amigos were scattered throughout Chile , so mapping their settlements or counting them would be more than difficult. However, we do know that the indios amigos serving as soldiers on the Spanish side in the War of Arauco far outnumbered troops of European extraction. Some chroniclers added that indios amigos were essential for their quantity and quality, as with their local knowledge and zeal in battle, one indio amigo soldier was worth a dozen of íz his Spanish allies. Andrea Ru -Esquide Figueroa, Los indios amigos en la frontera Araucana
116 theorized that the freed indios amigos could return to farming where they would ’s food shortages. Finally alleviate Chile , captive Indians could be Christianized, a
“great spiritual good.”317 ’s After extensive debate and at the urging of Chile governors, in 1608 the king legalized indigenous slavery.318
Although the crown had now legalized enslavement of indigenous prisoners of war, and sent an army to the Chilean frontier, Philip III was still willing to listen to less violent and more cost effective proposals for ending the War of Arauco, like the one introduced by the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia. Father Valdivia began working to end personal service and enslavement in Chile in 1605. Part of his strategy involved building support of the viceroy against Chilean governors who permitted slave raids that interfered with his plans for peace with and with his evangelization of rebel
Araucanians.319 Since Valdivia had met several past Viceroys of New Spain in Lima he most likely knew the ins and outs of failed aggressive pacification efforts on the
Chichimec frontier, and wanted to try something different in Chile. Father Valdivia was also inspired by inroads being made without the help of an army by his Jesuit í. brethren in Paraguay among the Guaran Father Valdivia also recognized that slave raids had destabilized and defeated peace efforts on all three frontiers.320
(Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1993), 23. Indios rebeldes and indios de paz had not been reducidos (conquered) by the Spanish, but as the name suggests, indios de paz had no quarrel with the Spanish and helped them occasionally. 317 BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 113. Pieza 1946. Consulta llevada al consejo de Indias para que se tengan por esclavos los indios que se cautivaren, fecha en Madrid a 28 de Marzo de 1610. Consejo de Indias, Madrid 17 Nov., 1607. Fojas 252-53. 318 ón del 26 May, 1608 en que se dieron por esclavos los indios de Chile. A.G.I. Lima 40. Real provisi “officially promulgated in Chile.” Fojas 218-219. It was not until 1610 that the decree was Korth, Spanish Policy, 111. 319 Ibid., 118-19. 320 Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 133.
117 Undaunted by the order of 1608, Valdivia pushed a plan that became known as “Defensive War.” The Army of Arauco would remai the n in place, but all new campaigns would be suspended and resources would be dedicated to fortifying ío ío River. Maintaining the army in the region would existing forts north of the B -B keep the Spanish from looking weak and would prevent assaults from indios rebeldes, but the suspension of campaigns would allow for more missionary work and would build trust between the Jesuits and Araucanians. The king liked the plan because it required no significant spending or troop increases, and addressed the perennial problems of mistreatment of indios de paz and personal service. He decided in 1610
“defensive warfare ought to be tried for a period of three or four years.”321 that “ordered the cessation of offensive warfare,” and gave In 1612 the viceroy
Valdivia exceptional powers for an ecclesiastic and a religious one at that, naming “Visitor General of Chile ” him . The viceroy also informed the Governor of Chile and the audiencia that Father Valdivia was not subject to their authority. The viceroy ío ío River as the frontier and decreed that no Spanish infantryman was named the B -B to cross it under the penalty of death. The Defensive War also meant forbidding non- violent contact, particularly trade and romantic relationships between Spanish soldiers “slavery and Araucanian women. Finally, the viceroy suspended the polemical 1608
”322 decree. édula “Chiefs of The king armed Father Valdivia with another c addressed to the ía” in which he said, “ Araucan I have been informed that the occasion and causes that you have had for rebelling and continuing the war for so many years have been some
321 Ibid., 122-23. 322 Ibid., 130-31.
118 humiliations and poor treatments that you received from the Spanish during which ” The king added that such abuses were against his time you were living peacefully. “like will and that of his predecessors, who all had wished that the Indians be treated, ” The king assured free men, as you are no lesser than the rest of my Spanish vassals. the Indians they could trust Father Valdivia and go to him for what they needed.323 “revindicate” the Indian in Chile after the 1598 attack. Father Valdivia set out to
Like his Jesuit predecessors, Valdivia believed that the Araucanians were misunderstood and ready to be converted. He even excused the 1612 killing of two ón as an accident and claimed that there was no Jesuits by the Araucanian Anganam danger among the Araucanians. Valdivia believed that the kidnapping of Jesuits could “ actually help evangelization efforts, arguing as prisoners their work would bear fruit,
”324 making the Indians understand the will of the Crown. A fellow Jesuit supported ’s claims, adding that t Valdivia he abuses committed against the Araucanians were rarely discussed.325
Father Valdivia did not enter into this project blindly however and knew that there were chiefs he would have a hard time bringing into the fold. Valdivia believed that “most bellicose” and the key to the war was the Ilicura Regua, led by the elderly the chief Untablame. Aware of the enormity of his project Father Valdivia enlisted the “polit ” and took Governor Alonso de help of both ical and ecclesiastic authorities
Ribera with him on his 1612 Araucanian peacemaking journey, later dubbed the
323 “Real cédula para los caciques de la Araucania, en favor del P. Luis de Valdivia.” in Historia fisica y politica de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Primero. (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846) 261. 324 ón, Oct. 25, 1613, Letter signed by Alonso de Ribera, Governor of Chile, Concepci Historia Fisica y Politica de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Segundo (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846), 297. 325 íguez. ía, Pinto Rodr Misioneros en la Araucan 66.
119 “Parley of Paicaví.”326 ía and over several The parley ranged deep into the Araucan days the Spanish talked to and made peace with leaders from dozens of separate groups. During the parley there were prisoner exchanges and disarmament agreements.
The parley revealed the surprising civility that existed between these two groups who had committed such atrocities on one other. One particular Araucanian group sent a procession of over seventy men to the parley, dressed in an elaborate and traditional manner, with the front fifteen in the procession carrying canelo
327 í for Valdivia was branches. One of the defining moments of the Parley of Paicav seeing Untablame at the front of the procession of the seventy-three peace offering
328 ’s people “ chiefs. Father Valdivia added that while he was among Untablame no weapon had been touched, nor have we seen any of their sentinels, nor have we lost a ” Instead, “(the) Indians of the land of war came to trade and single horse.
”329 communicate with us, selling us strawberries, lima beans and potatoes. ’s Defensive War would last much longer than the three or four years the Valdivia king had imagined, but its success was limited largely by the same factors that made it necessary in the first place. Many colonists believed that a defensive war would ía expected provide very little defense. Residents of towns in or near the Araucan
326 Zapater, La busqueda de la paz, 30. 327 “Relación de lo que sucedio en la jornada que hicimos el Sr. presidente Father Luis de Valdivia. á Payca á conducir las paces de Ilicura Alonso de Ribera gobernador deste reyno y yo desde Arauco vi última regua de Tucapel y las de Puren y la Imperial, escrita por mi el Padre Luis de Valdivia al salir á Lebo.” in de Paycavi de vuelta Historia Fisica y Politica de Chile: Tomo Segundo, 285. 328 “ ón de lo que sucedío en la jornada que hizimos el señor Presidente Padre Luis de Valdivia, Relaci í, a concluir las pazes de Alonso de Ribera, Governador deste Reyno, y yo, desde Arauco a Paicav én, y la Imperial. Escrita por mi el Pad Elicura, ultima Regua de Tucapel, y las de Pur re Luis de í, de vuelta a Levo,” in Valdivia, al salir de Paicav Americana Series; photostat reproductions by the Massachusetts Historical Society: no. 223. [Lima?, 1613?] 329 Ibid., 289.
120 ío ío were concerned that a lack of campaigns threats, but denizens north of the B -B would allow indios rebeldes to gather strength and mount a major offensive. The town of Mendoza was not even threatened in the chaos after 1598, but residents became worried a decade later with rumors that groups on the eastern slope of the cordillera had allied with the Araucanians. 330 Even in Coquimbo, 1000 kilometers to
“nothing (was) talked about but the war.”331 the north of the front, One official added ’s contemporaries that the 1612 death of Valdivia was not as a misunderstanding, but
’s “dangerous state.”332 evidence of Chile
Any new projects dealing with the War of Arauco had to address labor needs and the excesses of personal service. The Defensive War was no exception. Before going on to design the Defensive War, Father Valdivia had lived near the town of Mendoza “most miserable where he proselytized among the Huarpe for years, calling them the
”333 and absent-minded people I have seen in my life. Long after Valdivia had left the region and set out to vindicate the Araucanians, the demographic catastrophe among the Huarpe continued and was even exacerbated when Spanish raids against the ’s plan. Araucanians were discontinued under Valdivia
In 1613 the cabildo of Mendoza asked for licencias for 1,000 African slaves in
“the few aborigines that remain.”334 order to relieve That same year the Viceroy of
330 Ibid. 331 ález de Nájera, ño y reparo Gonz Desenga , 26. 332 ón del reino de Chile. 1607 A.G.I. Patronato 229. R.28 Guerra, socorro y pacificaci -1622. 17 January 1613. Pedro Lipsberguer. (Procurador general en la Audiencia de Chile). Testimonios de las ça del Reyno de Chile hechos pa çia diligencias que la cuidad de Sant.o Cabe ra que la Real Audien diese aviso a Su Magd del estado peligrsoso de aquel Reyno y la respuesta que se dio. 16 January, 1613. Peticion del procurador del Reyno de Chile ante la audiencia ... sobre que diese aviso a su magd del estado del Reyno por estar tan peligroso. Foja 1. 333 Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 41. 334 B.N. M.M. Pieza 1980. Instrucciones del cabildo de la ciudad de Mendoza al Padre fray Pedro de Sosa, sobre lo que ha de pedir y suplicar en la corte de S.M. el Rey para la tranquilidad de la
121 “personal service” burden Peru supported the import of African slaves to reduce the
335 ández on Indians in Chile. Also in 1613, Juan Fern de Castillo and other residents of La Serena asked for both indigenous prisoners of war and African slaves claiming ’s population that war and disease had decimated the town . The petitioners argued the entire colony would benefit by removing these captives 150 leagues away from the front where they could work extracting gold and copper and actually recover some of the money lost on the war they had prosecuted. The petitioners did not stop there, asking that in addition to the indigenous captives 1,000 African slaves be imported through Buenos Aires to serve the vecinos and residents of La Serena.336
As we saw in chapter one however, simply asking for African slaves did not mean they would ever arrive in Chile, and the labor shortage continued.337 Unable to count on African slaves, colonists sought domestic sources of labor on both sides of the ío ío. So without African slaves and with the continuing disappearance of groups B -B ío ío, the only source for labor remained the Arau north of the B -B canians who were now off limits, and other groups like the Pehuenche and Puelche who were relatively secure in the cordillera.338
provincia. 2 May, 1613. Foja 49. 335 ú. 1611 és de Montesclaros. A.G.I. Lima 36.Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -1615. Marqu Letter to S.M. Callao. 17 April, 1613. Foja 57. 336 ández de Castillo. Instruccione B.N. M.M. Pieza 1981. Juan Fern s ... de La Serena al muy án de la casa y convento de San Francisco de la cuidad de Santiago, sobre las Reverendo..., guardi cosas que necesista el Reino de Chile. 1 Abril 1613. Fojas 52v.-53v. 337 African slave import for mining and hacienda work gradually grew, and by 1620 the black and “mestizo de color” population of Chile had reached 22,000. But even these numbers were not sufficient. In a 1626 declaration, the Cabildo de Santiago claimed that 4,000 African slaves were “compensate for the dim ” ón de la needed to inished number of Indian workers. Mellafe, La introducci esclavitud negra en Chile, 226. Della M. Flusche and Eugene H. Korth, Forgotten Females: Women of African and Indian Descent in Colonial Chile, 1535-1800 (Detroit: Blaine Ethridge Books, 1983), 6. 338 See my M.A. thesis for the changing Spanish relationship with these mountain groups.
122 ’s plan had Valdivia reduced spending burdens for the king and viceroy, but the
Defensive War was not an economic plan. Chile had become so dependent on personal service that the instead of stopping the practice, the Defensive War merely increased demand for indigenous labor and encouraged more raids. In only the first ío ío fourteen months of the Defensive War four slave-taking raids penetrated the B -B
339 ’s attempts to gain the trust of frontier. The fact that raids continued made Valdivia the Araucanians nearly impossible. ’s Another factor complicating the Defensive War was the reappearance of Spain
European rivals off the coast of Chile. The misfortunes of the Mahu expedition in
1600 and a truce between Spain and Dutch rebels had kept the South Sea fairly quiet.
This tranquility was ruptured in 1615 when the viceroy wrote that pirates had been spotted near Brazil. He also sent an expedition to the abandoned port of Valdivia to investigate a report that the Dutch had taken it. The expedition found nothing and the viceroy admitted that such accounts were often inaccurate, but the worst possible course of action was ignoring them.340 In the same letter however, the viceroy added that the only place he expected to encounter and confront pirates was off the coast of
Callao and that the length of the Pacific coast and a lack of resources meant that he “defenseless against (pirate) would have to leave everything south of Callao ” The viceroy admitted that even the port of Arica could not be protected, invasion. despite the fact that most silver destined for Callao was loaded there.341
339 Korth, Spanish Policy, 156. 340 ú. 1611 és de Montesclaros. A.G.I. Lima 36. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -1615. Marqu Num.20, lib. VII is letter from V. to Sm.S. dated Callao, 2 March, 1615. Fojas 129-129v. 341 Ibid.. foja 130v.
123 Appropriately, a new wave of Dutch ships was arriving in the Pacific as the ’s viceroy was writing of the threat they presented. Only a month after the viceroy ’s patrol had returned to Callao, Chile governor wrote that Spanish sailors had seen
’s coastal island of Santa María.342 five enemy ships anchored off Chile The sailors had indeed spotted the fleet of Joris von Speilbergen who raided up and down the
Pacific coast from 1614-17. Speilbergen stopped at the islands of Mocha and Santa ía before sacking a Valparaiso deserted in a Mar nticipation of the Dutch invasion.
Spielbergen then went north and in what seemed like an attempt to prove the ’s point viceroy , landed in Arica and encountered no resistance. Fortunately for the
Spanish, the silver fleet had recently left, but Spielbergen set off in hot pursuit of the metal bearing ships.343
Although he stopped only briefly in Chile, what Speilbergen did next did have important consequences for the colony. Nearing Callao, Speilbergen planned to “incoming viceroy” as he too was approaching the port from the capture the northeast.344 The attempt was foiled when the Spanish were alerted to the presence of the Dutch fleet, but after nearly being captured himself, the new viceroy would be ’s. much less apt to continue defensive experiments like Valdivia
Since his administration was almost ended by Dutch privateers before it began, ón the viceroy Francisco de Borja y Arag was understandably more active in addressing threats from European enemies in the South Sea.345 The viceroy fortified
342 ón, 30 May 1615. A.G.I. Lima 36, num. 33-B. Alonso de Ribera to Viceroy of Peru. Concepci Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 945. 343 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 80. 344 Ibid., 82. 345 The viceroy also entertained a proposal from the ubiquitous Governor of Buenos Aires Province, Hernandarias to settle the Strait of Magellan. His plan called for a string of inland settlements
124 Callao, renewed patrols from the Armada del Mar del Sur and even addressed the possibility of European and Indian alliances in Chile.346
To his credit, Borja did not abandon the Defensive War. He sent reinforcements ón above the Bío ío, when they could have gone to Valdivia or Arauco, to Concepci -B violating the frontier. He also continued the campaign against personal service. The viceroy sent a special envoy to help Governor Lope de Ulloa y Lemos combat forced ’s ’t like being stripped of labor and explained that although Chile vecinos wouldn personal service, they would eventually understand that his motives were the right ones.347 ’t nearly the supporter of At the same time, Borja wasn Father Valdivia that his predecessor had been. He argued that while the Defensive War had brought less ’t think it had changed the conduct or beliefs of Araucanians. armed conflict, he didn
Although the Dutch did not attempt to take any territory in Chile, their meeting with ón inspired him to again join with Pelantaro in an assault against the Anganam
Spanish.348 The attack killed a number of indios amigos and prompted many Spanish “they expected to live more comfortably” soldiers to defect, where among the enemy and hoped that eventually they could leave Chile by sea or by crossing the Andes. If these soldiers believed they would live more comfortably among the enemy, it comes
connected to outposts along the Strait, rather than the sea-based link that had failed so miserably when Sarmiento tried it. Hernandrias posited that with these new outposts in place, no European enemy would be able to navigate the Strait without being spotted and that the Indians of Chile would make “completely surrounded.” Shields, peace with the Spanish, after finding themselves The Legend of the Caesars, xxvii-xxx. 346 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 84. 347 ú. 1618 A.G.I. Lima 38. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -1619. (Francisco de Borja y ón, Arag Principe de Esquilache.) V. to S.M. 27 March, 1619, Lima. Foja 455v. 348 ón, Diego Rosales claimed that the Dutch were close enough to say to the residents of Concepci “What are you doing Spaniards? Don’t fall asleep, there are Moors on the coast.” Rosales , Historia general:Tomo II, 947-49.
125 as no surprise that governor Ribera complained to the king in same year a about lack of reinforcements. Defection and scarcity were compounded by a shipwreck off
Valparaiso in which much gunpowder was lost.349 The viceroy noted that the calm of ón time to gather gold and other gifts to give the Defensive war was giving Anganam to the Dutch in the event of their promised return.350
The viceroy also argued that the best way to put pressure on indios de guerra was through the establishment of new settlements.351 Many residents in Chile agreed, and were worried that the Dutch would take advantage of the lull during the Defensive ía. Colonists noted that although the Spielbergen War to populate the Araucan expedition was in Chile only briefly, the Dutch brought carpenters along.352
Carpenters were of course commonplace on any long voyage, but to skittish Chilean authorities their presence meant plans for settlement.
While Father Valdivia had differences of opinion with the viceroy, Borja did not directly interfere with his work. The same cannot be said for the governors of Chile who served during the Defensive War. No governor liked yielding so much authority to Valdivia, much less when the Jesuits drew 12,000 ducats from the Army of
’s 353 Arauco situado for their mission of peace. Valdivia especially butted heads with
Governor Ribera, who had accompanied the Jesuit to his early parleys. Ribera refused ’s ón to sign Valdivia relaci , claiming that the priest had made several agreements
349 Barros Arana, Historia general: III, 118. 350 A.G.I. Lima 38. V. to S.M. 27 March, 1619, Lima. Fojas 455v-56. 351 Ibid., foja 456v. 352 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 945. 353 ón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del ú,” 9. Gasc Per
126 ’t need) without his knowledge or consent (which he technically didn and later cited the governor as a witness to them.354 óngora Marmolejo, According to the declaration of Captain Luis G it was not only ’s tactics heavy governors who found Father Valdivia -handed. A former Spanish óngora captive had come to G in tears, claiming that Valdivia had become angry with óngora her for declaring the truth about her experience. G had also been told by a number of caciques that Valdivia had success in pacifying indios de guerra not with
“lance in hand.”355 ón his words but because he spoke them with Finally, Anganam claimed that his aforementioned murder of three Jesuits was revenge for the flight of a handful of Araucanian women to a Spanish fort and their subsequent baptism.356 “spiritual conquest” of the Defensive War This reveals that for some Araucanians, the was more disruptive and more intrusive than the sporadic military conquest of previous decades.
Even if Valdivia had not come off as intrusive, there is little evidence that he could have accounted for the individual will of all Araucanians leaders, especially with a limited Spanish presence in Araucanian territory. Although the toqui system allowed quick alliances to be formed and aid the parley process, each Araucanian regua still operated independently. Jealousy, rivalry and ambition had just as much impact in Araucanian culture as it did in Spanish. For example, Araucanian captives ón testified that much of his motivation loyal to Anganam for his attacks was not a
354 ón, Oct. 25, 1613. in Alonso de Ribera, Concepci Historia Fisica y Politica de Chile: Documentos. Tomo Segundo by Claudio Gay (Paris: Imprenta de Maulde Y Renou, 1846), 295. 355 ón del re A.G.I. Patronato 229. R. 45. Guerra, socorro y pacificaci ino de Chile. 1607- érpretes de los indios de Chile, sobre el 1622.Patronato, 229, R(amo). 45. Declaraciones de los int ís de Góngora estado de aquella guerra, enviadas a su Majestad y Consejo de Indias. Declaration of Lu Marlolejo, March 1614, Santiago. 356 úñez de Pineda y Bascuñan, ón individual de las guerras Francisco de N Cautiverio Feliz y raz dilatadas del Reino de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1973), 80-84.
127 ’s prominence. When Anganamón hatred of the Spanish, but jealousy of Pelantaro decided to conduct a raid and interrupt the peace of the Defensive War he was aware that most Araucanians wanted to maintain the truce. Therefore, there was no incorporation ceremony before or after the attack, and its leaders communicated in secret.357
This secrecy was necessary because the Spanish would frequently pay for information. We have seen that indigenous alliances were often fleeting, and one
Spanish official reported that he paid two Indians for informing him that indios de guerra on the other side of the cordillera had carried out two large juntas and were preparing an attack.358 All this meant that the same Jesuit attempts to gain the trust of some groups raised the ire of others. With colonists anxious to return to offensive war, and pockets of indios rebeldes still springing up, the odds were stacking against
Valdivia and his Jesuit contemporaries.
To be fair to the Jesuit, there was little hope that a defensive war could regulate all aspects of the well-entrenched vida fronteriza, especially when violence was such an expected part of this interaction. For years residents of the frontier had been “lance expecting and adjusting to the pillaging and captive taking that occurred with ” As James F. Brooks points out in the context of the American Southwest, in hand. “corrosive” effects of frontier violence “diffuses its major only focusing on the contributions to inter-cultural trade, alliances, and communities among groups often
… modernizing strategies.”359 antagonistic to Spanish This statement also applies to
357 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 965. 358 Juan Luis Espejo, La provincia de Cuyo del Reino de Chile: I (Santiago: Fondo historico y áfico José Toribio Medina, 1954), 57. bibliogr 359 Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 36.
128 Araucanian society where captive Spanish soldiers became integral to inter-group
“ethnogenisis.”360 relationships and The sons of Araucanian men and Spanish women made up much of the Araucanian hierarchy and were afforded a unique status by the
Spanish. Araucanians and mountain groups like the Pehuenche also benefited materially from their raids, taking Spanish horses and weapons.361 One author wrote of a case where a group of Araucanians had captured so many Spanish arms and horses that from a distance they looked like Spanish cavalry. In one case, a Spanish company had to abruptly retreat when they realized that the party they were approaching was not a stray Spanish unit, but a group of well-equipped
Araucanians.362
Spanish raids not only garnered slaves but also Araucanian crops that helped the
Spanish weather frequent shortages. These raids also brought more relationships between Spanish soldiers and Araucanian women, whether they were captives or free women who maintained relationships with Spanish soldiers from nearby forts or encampments. Both the Spanish and the Araucanians tried to avoid rampant miscegenation, usually to no avail. Dozens of Spanish raids were principally attempts to rescue Spanish women and girls, but after living among and often forming
Araucanian families, many refused to go with the Spanish. The Jesuit Alonso de “…seeing violated the living Ovalle referred to this situation when he lamented temples of God, and the blood of those old Spaniards and Christians, mixed with that … have had enough mestizo children that they of those gentile barbarians who,
360 “Etnogénesis For more on ethnogenesis and Spanish captives in indigenous societies see Boccara, ” “Spanish Captives in Indian Societies.” Mapuche and Socolow, 361 Villalobos, Los Pehuenches en la vida fronteriza. 362 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 805.
129 ” 363 already represent an entire generation. Despite these reactions to miscegenation, individuals could do little to stop its growth, set in motion by the fact that only a
’s early colonists were women.364 quarter of Chile ’s ío ío bor The Defensive War imposition of the B -B der also interrupted more án traditional trade, especially in towns like Chill that lay to the north of the river. We án saw in chapter two that authorities founded Chill to restrict indigenous alliances.
However, its location between Pehuenche and Araucanian territory also had made it a án to trade blankets and trading center. Every summer, groups would travel to Chill
365 úñez de shirts they had made in exchange for animal skins, and stones. Francisco N án. Pineda related his memories of trade fairs in his native Chill
“In the old days, (when I was) a 366 boy, these Puelches continued coming to our lands to attend their expositions of stones that they had brought, their pelts of striped tigers, pine nuts, hazel nuts, and other things. Some arrived from the state of Arauco, that old and grand place, where through free trade and negotiation the Araucanians bought everything. The Puelches also brought some poisonous arrows when they had wars with others and these they sold to our Indian friends ”367 to rub on their lances against their enemies.
363 ón del Reino de Chile Alonso de Ovalle, Historica relaci (Santiago: Instituto de Literatura Chilena, 1969), 284. 364 “Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,” 39. Villalobos, 365 érez, foja 269. The stones are referred to as Declaration given by Captain Pedro P piedras bezares, which were well known throughout Europe by the sixteenth century. These apparently are actually the kidney or gall stones of deer or goats. These animals were actually hunted for the stones which were “poisons and fainting.” The stones were sometimes ground into a powder. sold as a remedy against They were also associated by this author with mountain peoples, whether in India, the Middle East, or Greece. It is possible that this witness merely thought he saw the stones because the Pehuenche were mountain people, but this is less likely when we see that he is not the only chronicler to mention their use among the Pehuenche. Dr. Nicoloso de Monardes, Dos libros, el uno que trata de todas las cosas que traen de nuestras Indias Occidentales, que sirven al use de la Medicina, y el otro que trata de la ór...Medico de Sevilla Piedra bezaar, y de la Yerba Escuaerconera. Compuestos por el doct (Seville: íaz, 1569). órica relación del Reino de Chile Hernando D See also Ovalle, Hist . 366 úñez de Pineda did not distinguish Pehuenche and Puelche. Since Like most writers of his time, N úñez de Pineda spent hi án, these would have been Pehuenche. N s childhood in Chill 367 úñez de Pineda y Bascuñán. Francisco N Suma y epilogo de lo mas esencial que contiene el libro íz, y guerras dilatiadas del Reino de Chile. intitulado: Cautivero fel (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Catolica de Chile, 1984), 73-75.
130 Despite setbacks, Valdivia had outlasted his critics and was still moving forward in his campaign against indigenous slavery, gaining the release of hundreds of indigenous captives taken illegally during the Defensive War. Father Valdivia conducted mass baptisms of Araucanians during his peace parleys, and the relative calm allowed an expansion of the ranching economy and a resurgence of agriculture.368 However, a conflict with the Jesuit provincial in Paraguay caused
Valdivia to return to Spain rather abruptly in 1619. The Defensive War continued ’s absence, but his successors, although quite capable inherited a despite Valdivia
369 ’s project that began to decline with the departure of its architect. Valdivia departure did not change his legacy however. Valdivia had used the frontier as a source of tremendous authority and lasting fame, as did his predecessors and as would missionaries and soldiers yet to arrive. ’s absence In Valdivia , the imagination of colonists and the purse strings of the crown were somewhat freer. The crown would once again support expeditions to the mythical city of Caesars in the Patagonia, this time to investigate the claim that rebel
Araucanians were being secretly backed a runaway Inca community there. Little activity had come in the search for the city since 1604 when the future Buenos Aires
ás led an expedition that turned up little.370 governor Hernandri However, in 1620 his ónimo Luis de Cabrera, led a larger expedition from his own son-in-law, Jer
órdova in search of Caesars.371 encomienda near C
368 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 950. 369 Korth, Spanish Policy, 159-61. 370 Shields, The Legend of the Caesars, vi. 371 Álvarez, én, su historia, su geografía, su toponimia Neuqu , 23
131 ío Cuarto, a settlement south of Córdova with 160 soldiers, arms, Cabrera left R and supplies, carried by ox carts and on horseback.372 The expedition moved south across the pampa, eventually turning inland at the Negro river. Their progress was slowed by difficult terrain as they approached the eastern slope of the Andes, when
Cabrera left his carts and sent thirty men forward on horseback.373
A Chilean-born sergeant volunteered to lead this smaller party as his curiosity was piqued by the fact that even though no Spaniard had ever set foot on this eastern side of the cordillera, they had come across Indians who showed them Spanish lance
“the language of Chile.”374 wounds and spoke The party crossed the cordillera and came close to the abandoned Chilean cities of Osorno and Villarrica. From there the party returned to give word of their findings to the main expedition. Cabrera was “take the intrigued and began to consider that this route to Chile could be used to
”375 cities that the Indians had abandoned and finish the war. By this point however, ’s the expedition leaders decided to turn back, believing that they had become over- “not come to finish the Chilean extended and reminding themselves that they had
”376 war, but to discover the Caesars.
372 é órdova, 21 July, Declaration given by Captain Pedro P rez to Pedro de Torres, Royal Scribe, C 1625. B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 255. 373 énez, “Encomenderos arruinados, incas fugitivos, beliches y corsario holandeses” Juan Francisco Jim Anuario IEHS 13 (1998):182-184. 374 Shields, The Legend of the Caesars, l. The members of the Cabrera expedition commented on how ’ indigenous groups had with each other. First of all, there was little much contact the regions órdova using Pampa geographic distance between cultures. The expedition began to the south of C Indians as guides, and later had the help of Puelche to guide them through the mountains. Abandoned by the Puelche, they continued a few miles further and encountered the Huilliche. A few soldiers who had been sent off to find missing horses reported back that they had come across houses, which árques, Córdova, 23 July, probably belonged to the Araucanians. Declaration given by Antonio M 1625, B.N. Biblioteca Medina, Manuscript Volume 128, pieza 2309, foja 282. 375 érez de B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 129: Pieza 2317. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso P Salazar a S.M. el Rey, fecha en Lima en 24 de Junio de 1628, foja 42. 376 Ibid.
132 Although jealousy and lack of resources prevented Buenos Aires and Santiago from cooperating on the War of Arauco and Caesars, this expedition had an impact in both colonies.377 First of all, it raised the possibility that the War of Arauco could be ’s cause as the line prosecuted from the south and east. This hurt the Defensive War ío ío was now revealed to be less effective as both a point from of forts on the B -B which to launch offensives and a bulwark against indigenous movement. Instead of finding Caesars, this expedition raised more questions about where it might be and órdova, where the expedition provided an impetus for further exploration. In C “on the other side of the mountains” in Chilean originated, Caesars was thought to be territory,378 while in Chile, Caesars was envisioned as tucked away somewhere deep in Tierra del Fuego. This phenomenon seems to suggest colonists kept the mythical “permanent frontier” that would lead to further city as far away as possible, on a expeditions and more funds. The surprising closeness between the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans again raised the possibility that a string of settlements in the Patagonia could warn Lima of European enemies approaching by sea.379
On cue, a Spanish-Dutch truce ended in 1621 and the Dutch West India Company “chartered with belligerent commerce in mind.” was The modest aspirations of the
Dutch in the Pacific were now a thing of the past, and expeditions would be armed “were not prohibited from stealing the enemy’s most prized possessions in lieu of and
377 Cabrera claimed that Chileans tried to stop his expedition, hinting that thy may have been jealous that they were never able to breach the cordillera where his Sergeant had. Shields, The Legend of the Caesars lxviii. 378 érez de Salazar, 39. B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso P 379 News of the Spanish expedition first arrived in Chile not through official channels, but overland through a network of paid indigenous spies. Members of the Cabrera expedition also noted that the é had contact with and could understand the Indians of the Indians of the Pacific island of Chilo án. Both examples demonstrated the possibilities of east mountain valley of Cut -west communication. Shields, The Legend of the Caesars, xviii, lxvi, xxi.
133 ”380 a forced sale. Although the Dutch never came close to dislodging the Spanish from the Americas, pamphleteers in the Low Countries inspired sailors to try. Just as the truce was ending, the first Dutch translation of La Araucana was also published. ’s epic as the crown tired of the War of While in Spain interest waned in Ercilla
Arauco, the text and everything Araucanian was just beginning to capture the Dutch “the invincible …had obvious appeal to a imagination as spirit of the Chilean warriors
”381 patriotic Netherlander. Dutch authors warned that if the United Provinces were defeated by the Spanish, the Dutch would soon replace the Indians as laborers in the í. O mines of Potos thers contributed to renewed hostilities by arguing that a Dutch victory in the Americas would drive the Spanish out of the Low Countries.382 “the perception of the Indian Important for Chile was the fact that -as-ally still ” The backers of the so retained considerable currency within the Dutch imagination. - called Nassau Fleet that arrived in the Pacific in 1624 were counting on a Dutch- “oust the Indian alliance to ignite a full-scale revolt in the Americas that would ” The ten ship, Spanish decisively from the New World. 1,500 man fleet carried with
“letters of alliance” to co 383 it all sorts of nvince Indians to rebel. ’s coast, but did not stop in the colony nor was The Nassau fleet sailed along Chile it even observed before the Dutch attacked Callao.384 Even though the Dutch avoided ’s Chile, there would be repercussions for the colony. Chile governor said in a 1624
380 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 67. 381 Ibid., 205-06. After a printing in 1632, La Araucana went unpublished for 100 years. Collier, Ideas and Politics, 27. 382 Benjamin Schmidt, Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World, 1570-1670 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 192. 383 Ibid., 198. 384 Word circulated that the Dutch raised black sails as they passed Chile to avoid detection. There had ’s central coast. This information been some unconfirmed sightings of fifteen Dutch ships off Chile made it to the Viceroy of Peru who was able to prepare for and fend off the Dutch attack in May of 1624. Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 139-40.
134 “if (the Dutch) were to take Valdivia, it would mean the destruction letter to the king, of these coasts of Peru, Panama and Mexico. To prevent such a (takeover) this port
”385 must be populated. The viceroy reiterated this threat in a letter to the king, adding ’s European that Indians had taken over Valdivia, making it easier for the crown enemies to gain a foothold there and interrupt both inter-colonial and transatlantic commerce. The viceroy also opined that the fortification of the port was crucial but that the cost of such a project was prohibitive.386 ío ío, the Nassau fleet also Since the port of Valdivia lay well below the B -B ’s project. Even though it was clear the contributed to the demise of Father Valdivia
Defensive War was on its last legs, outgoing viceroy Borja warned his successor not to give into requests from Chile to return to offensive war. He was convinced that the
War of Arauco had lasted for seventy years largely because of mistreatment of indios de servicio, and that the offensive war would simply be an excuse to a return to “banditry.” Instead of taking territory, raids “robbed and took slaves” and made evangelization efforts impossible.387 ’ argument that th Governors of Chile responded with the Council of Indies e only way to motivate soldiers was with the spoils, namely Indian captives, of the “offensive war.” Governor Luis Fernández de Córdova claimed that since captive taking was suspended during the Defensive War, many soldiers who had constantly
385 B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo. 126. Pieza 2267. Carta de don Pedro Osores de Ulloa a S.M. el ón a 20 de Abril de 1624. Rey, fecha en la ciudad de Concepci Fojas 16-17. 386 A.G.I. Lima 40. N. 3, lib. IV. Letter from V. to S.M., Los Reyes, 30 April, 1624. Foja 212. 387 án y Rózpide, ed. Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al Señor Marqués de Ricardo Beltr ázar, 261 Guadalc -63.
135 put their lives in danger for the crown were granted tiny and unprofitable encomiendas and ended up penniless.388
On April 13, 1625 the incoming viceroy officially ended the Defensive War by “all Indians taken in the War (of Arauco) be declared and possessed a ordering, s
”389 slaves. The Defensive War had succeeded in pacifying some previously unincorporated groups, and lasted much longer than anticipated, but it failed largely because the permanence of the vida fronteriza caused the Araucanians and the
ío ío.390 Spanish to disregard the new restrictions on crossing the B -B The expedition to Caesars discovered new territory, but rather than defining the frontier, it opened more possibilities for frontier interaction. The Army of Arauco brought much needed resources to Chile, but it was inadequately supplied and insufficiently prepared for the exigencies of a fluid conflict. The reappearance of pirates also confirmed the importance of sending resources to the frontier, as the Dutch actively if ’s frontier unsuccessfully sought alliances with Araucanians. Therefore, the crown experiments of the early 17th century only served to reveal that a set of unwritten rules for the vida fronteriza had gotten in the way of their success. By the mid-seventeenth ’s job more century these rules became more formalized and actually made the viceroy difficult. Continued pirate threats meant that the viceroy had to continue sending resources to the frontier even if he knew they were being used inappropriately by soldiers and government officials alike.
388 ández de Córdoba, A.G.I. Chile,19,R.7,N.71. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fern ón Gobernador de Chile. 1 February, 1627. Concepci 389 A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Order from Viceroy of Peru, April 13, 1625. 390 As we have seen, Spanish raids sought captives to replace a decreasing indigenous population in “advantages of towns to the north. Soldiers became frustrated with the Defensive War as they lost the … that came with the Offensive War and raids.” the pillaging Rosales, Historia General: Tomo II, 909.
136
CHAPTER V
PROFITEERING ON THE FRONTIER: THE POVERTY OF THE VIDA FRONTERIZA MEANS WEALTH FOR AN UNSCRUPULOUS FEW
“We walked the nine or ten leagues to Conc ón and we all were on epci …there were more than two thousand five hundred of us foot, , all crying and having a difficult time, and there were many stillbirths on that road, the mothers ”391 forced to bury their children there as they could not carry them.
The momentum of the vida fronteriza had sunk the Defensive War, and with the era of experiments over, colonists and Araucanians alike became all the more dedicated to permanent war. The story here is of that of colonists taking advantage of ’s the vida fronteriza formalized econonomy, its cultural interaction, and its steady flow of resources from the viceroy. Colonists were confident that these resources would keep coming when the Dutch takeover of the port of Valdivia reminded the viceroy that he had to keep sending resources even if he was being bilked. With excessive profiteering in the mid-17th-century tension increased between frontier residents (creoles, missionaries and indios amigos) who wanted to hold the colonial “outsiders” peninsular Spaniards and pact together, and indios de guerra) who gained no advantage from holding the pact together. Both groups wanted to maintain the attention of and funding from the viceroy, but for disparate motives.
Chilean officials began to see their 17th century task as one of keeping the War of
Arauco alive despite predictions from viceroys that the Army of Arauco would finish
391 ía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Testimony of Juana de Sotomayor. Ciudad de los Reyes. 18 A.G.I. Escriban November, 1655. Foja 81.
137 off the indios rebeldes in less than a decade. These officials needed the War of
Arauco to take slaves and to skim from the situado and discovered the best way to hold the viceroy to his yearly commitments was by reporting on and playing up í silver. (Which threats to Potos after all was a threat to Chile as well since this is ’s colonists not only sent constant warnings where the situado came from.) Chile regarding threats from Araucanians, the city of Caesars and Europeans, but also looked for and played up any signs of what would be a disastrous alliance between any of these enemies.
The principal motive for keeping the War of Arauco alive was its access to
Araucanian prisoners of war. We saw that enslaving prisoners of war was temporarily banned during the Defensive War, but few bans ever really put a dent in this practice. Earlier in the century the viceroy had issued a less than effective ban on the practice in response to reports that indigenous slaves taken in Chile were living in
Callao, Los Reyes and other parts of Peru, some of them being branded on the face. ález de Nájera wrote that on his way But even two years after the ban, Alonso Gonz back to Spain he witnessed Araucanian prisoners of war being sold publicly in the viceregal capital of Los Reyes.392 On one occasion, the Governor of Chile, Alonso ía de Ramón boasted that when thirty Garc caciques reneged on a peace settlement, he “clean the viceroy’s had twenty of them killed, and sent the remaining ten to
”393 stables. One author of the period estimated that well over 1,000 slaves were taken
ía Ramón’s term 394 during Garc , most of which came after the ineffective ban.
392 Jara,Guerra y sociedad, 167, 181. 393Ibid., 177. 394 Ibid., 175-77.
138 With the temporary ban on indigenous slavery lifted in 1625, Governor Luis ández de Córdo Fern va wasted little time in organizing a number of raids. The governor claimed that a number of Indians offered peace when they heard that “reduced” Indians did not adhere t offensive war had returned. When the same o the conditions of peace, the governor led a rare wintertime attack on the offending ández de Córdova added that he was also able groups, eager to display his zeal. Fern to procure the return of a number of Spanish captives, some of whom were held for more than twenty-five years and who provided valuable intelligence about the enemy.
Despite his initial slave taking-enthusiasm, the governor also expressed reservations about offensive war, claiming that all this success had earned him more
395 ández de Córdova believed that with the wi enemies. Fern ll of God and His “infidels” but wondered whether he could continue to Majesty he would defeat these depend on resources from the crown as the war intensified. Much of this concern “weakened the hand of came from his mistrust of the viceroys who he said, the ” with their conflicting orders. governors here (in Chile) As evidence, the governor added that more than eighteen months had passed since the last reinforcements “some reinforcements of 800 to 1,000 well arrived and asked for -armed men, most of ” He also requested that the crown help him rebuild Chile’s whom would be married. “conclude this war because… almost from (Chile’s) destroyed settlements and discovery our enemies have proved to be equal or superior to European soldiers. If
395 ández de Córboba…1 A.G.I. Chile,19,R.7,N.72. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fern ón. February, 1627 Concepci
139 we are not especially vigilant, every day our forces are diminished as theirs grow and
”396 the prospect of building more towns and forts becomes all the more difficult.
Viceregal reluctance to aid Chile probably had to do with the fact that many viceroys benefited from the spoils of the War of Arauco. A lack of other resources in
Chile would make more colonists turn to indigenous slave export to Lima, and solve ’s (and the viceroy’s) labor problems. The Bishop of Santiago Francisco de Peru
Salcedo wrote that Indians from the War of Arauco were sent to the daughters of the
397 ’ successor argued that Viceroy Marques de Guadalcazar in Lima. The marquis
Chile would be more secure if indios rebeldes could be removed from the colony, where they could not escape and easily return to torment the Spanish. He added that “instructed and in Lima (quite conveniently for the viceroy) the slaves could be better
” and prepared for a possible return to Chile as 398 informed indios amigos.
While the viceroy and some encomenderos and soldiers in Chile continued to argue that the offensive war would make Chile safer, events put a damper on this ’s theory. With no reinforcements, Chile vecinos were obliged to perform the dual roles of soldier and head of household. With the vecinos away at war, city ’ infrastructure projects and the vecinos own families and family farms would be neglected, and war making ability and supply chains would be weakened. 399 ández de Córdova claimed that rumors about “European enemies” Governor Fern
396 Ibid., fojas 3v-4v. 397 ón. A.G.I. Chile,60. Cartas y expedientes de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepci 1564-1633. Bishop of Santiago, Francisco de Salcedo. Letter to S.M. Santiago, 20 January, 1630. 398 ú. Num. 7. El V. a S.M., inconvenientes A.G.I. Lima, 46. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per de que los indios que se cautivan en la guerra de Chile se saquen a vender fuera de aquella provincia. Lima. 24 November, 1635. 399 ández de Córdoba, A.G.I. Chile,19,R.7,N.71. Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Luis Fern ón. Gobernador de Chile. 1 February, 1627. Concepci
140 (later substantiated) were making unpaid soldiers even more restless and that he personally had to put down two potential mutinies.400
ández de Córdova’s fears that these raids would produce more enemies Fern án in 1628. proved justified when the toqui Lientur led a significant raid against Chill “behind the cordillera” and added The governor described the attack as coming from
“two Spanish Moors” and some 401 that the Indians captured indios amigos. A punitive ández de Córdova cal expedition was organized against the offenders who Fern led “Puelches,” adding that they came under the guise of being friendly. Not only had the
“Aucaes” (or Araucanians) during the raid, but they gav Puelches accompanied the e them food and supplies. The punitive expedition eventually caught up to these “rough terrain,” killing or capturing more than 140 of them. For entering Puelches in ández de Córdova said that the in this alliance with the rebel Araucanians, Fern “just as much our ” but did add Puelches were to be considered enemies as the others,
“reduced.”402 that their skill as archers could make them valuable indios amigos if
The return of offensive war also meant more ritual murders of Spanish soldiers. úñez de Pineda was captured in the raid on Chillán and believed Captain Francisco N
úñez de that as the son of a Maestro de Campo, his days were numbered. Instead, N
400 “A.N.”) Fondo Morla Vicuña, Vol. 19, N. 34. Carta de D. Archivo Nacional de Chile. (Hereafter ández de Cordova. Da noticia d Luis Fern e los Indios de la ortra banda de la cordillera. 1629. Foja 247. 401 ón de A toqui was something of an Araucanian field marshal. Guevara, Historia de la civilizaci ía, Tomo I Araucan , 186. The title of toqui was one of many Araucanian adaptations to the Spanish presence. The toqui led a number of smaller Araucanian sub-groups but the position was not permanent. Thus the Araucanians could quickly assemble large numbers led by a toqui, but just as quickly dissolve into their smaller familial groups making them hard to pursue and capture in large numbers. 402 ña, Vol. 19 N. 34. Carta de D. Luis Fernandez de Cordova: Da noticia de los A. N. Morla Vicu Indios de la ortra banda de la cordillera. 1629. Fojas 245-246.
141 Pineda was sold to a captor who spared his life, but was forced to witness the death of a fellow soldier. “Putapichun had commanded the unfortunate Spaniard to start gathering sticks from the ground. The captive had begun to gather sticks, and with each one “brave” Spaniard. The captive was new to the war and repeated the name of a thus was not aware of which Spaniards were known among the Mapuche. ’s father, Alvaro Thus Putapichun had prompted him, naming Pineda Maltincampo first. After the speech, when the captive had collected a number of sticks, Putapichun had him drop the sticks into a hole one by one, again repeating the names of brave Spaniards. When he had dropped all twelve of his sticks into the hole, they told him to cover it with dirt. While he was doing this, he was given a heavy blow to the head, that dashed his brains out with the hatchet or the studded club, that was used as the insignia that they call ” toqui.
Putapichun went on to explain the reasons behind the ritual.
“Our goal is none other than to exalt our names, and affix the toquis and ancient insignias of our dear nation with the blood of opinionated Spaniards, and solicit an effort to expel them from our lands. Today it seems that our án... is favorable and propitious, as good fortune has followed us in the Pill án for the great two raids we have made,...We (make this) sacrifice to our Pill ”403 successes he has brought us.
We see in this example that despite the brief period of peace under Father ’s watch, the Araucanians too had returned to offensive war. Through the Valdivia “reputational” burying of sticks we see in this ceremony a rejection of Spanish power.404 We have seen throughout how powerful the reputation of a militarily successful Spanish governor or commander could become. In this case the úñez de Pineda’s father as a way to reject Araucanians used the reputation of N
Spanish authority in the midst of increased Spanish raids. The Spanish captive had to
403 úñez de Pineda, íz N Cautiverio Fel , 38-39. This killing occurred at least a full generation after ’s death and hundreds of kilometers away. The common elements in the two Pedro de Valdivia ceremonies make it appear that despite these differences in distance in time, the ritual killing ceremony ía territory. described in chapter one had become well ingrained across the Araucan 404 Barry Barnes, The Nature of Power (University of Illinois Press, 1988), 9.
142 úñez de Pineda and other recognize the power of the now deceased Alvaro N
Araucanian antagonists and subsequently bury them in effigy. The Araucanians may “bury” these reputations. have believed that only a Spaniard could án was At the same time Chill being attacked, threats from outside the colony “well mounted Serranos (an Indian group with territory east continued. In 1628, 500 ” raided Buenos Aires armed with lances, bows and arrows, bolas of Buenos Aires), and slings.405 Also, the recent Dutch takeover of Bahia prompted the viceroy to “infesting” Peru and Chile. He added that with worry about the European enemies this growing threat, the situado needed to be sent on time.406 Again on cue, in 1628 érez de Salazar warned the king of rumors that s Alonso P even or eight ships were approaching the Magellan Strait.407 In 1629 the Governor of Buenos Aires warned of ’s interior by sailing up a number of its rivers in Dutch plans to invade South America forty flat-hulled ships that were being readied in Flanders.408
In general then, indigenous assaults and pirate threats continued to erode any ández progress made toward peaceful solutions to the War of Arauco. Governor Fern órdova realized that he would have to act decisively to keep the recently renewed de C offensive war from getting out of hand and assuring that only indios rebeldes were enslaved. Captain Domingo de Eraso had warned that while indios rebeldes could be
405 ón de Buenos Aires áficos Roberto H. Marfany, El indio en la colonizaci (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gr ía Nacional de Buenos Aires, 1940), 44. de la Penitenciar These two assaults may not have been a coordinated effort, but the fact that they came in the same year reveals how thorough indigenous equine superiority had become, and how vulnerable it made Spanish cities. 406 ández de Córdoba, Marques de Lima 40. Cartas y expedientes... 1624-26. (Diego Fern ázar.) V. to S.M. Acuerdo general que el Vrey hiço sobre la cantidad de situado que se enbio Gaudalc °33.Los Reyes, 8 Jan a Chile citado en la carta de Guerra . 1625. (Num. 5), foja 211. 407 érez de BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 129: Pieza 2317. Carta del Licenciado don Alonso P Salazar a S.M. el Rey, fecha en Lima en 24 de Junio de 1628, foja 37v. 408 éspedes, A.G.I. Charcas,28,R.3,N.34 Cartas de Gobernadores. Carta de Francisco de C Gobernador de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires, 23 October, 1629, foja 1.
143 controlled by war, the more difficult task was treating indios de paz with respect and eliminating their personal service obligations. Otherwise a war against the indios
“unreasonable and unjustified.”409 rebeldes would be Sure enough, in order to cover up the illegal sale of indios amigos, some soldiers had already begun to falsify documents and much worse, brand them. To try and end the branding of non-slaves, ández de Córdova ordered that any soldier participating in said practice would be Fern é for four years. He also mandated that all slaves banished to the island of Chilo legally caught in war were to be branded within three months of their captivity and their ages were to be recorded.410 However, another example demonstrates how rare it was for both personal service and illegal slave taking to be combated simultaneously. ández de Córdova appa Fern rently was able to restrict illegal slave taking only after winking at other forms of abuse. An official in Mendoza complained that with ández de Córdova’s permission, ’s 1622 Fern encomenderos were violating the crown order (and the 1542 New Laws) by moving Huarpes in collars and restraints across the cordillera from the province of Cuyo into Santiago.411 The Bishop of Santiago ’s Indians to the Israelites and wrote of the sad plight of a number of compared Chile
Huarpes who to escaped their encomenderos in Santiago only to freeze to death in mountain caves while trying to return to their families. According to the bishop, the encomenderos were also neglecting their obligation to catechize the Indians working for them and as a result many Huarpes did not even know how to make the sign of the
409 án... , in ón de Domingo de Eraso, Papel sobre la esclavitud de los indios de Chile. Del capit Colecci éditos para la historia de España: Tomo L. documentos in Marques de Miraflores y D. Miguel Salva, eds. (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1867), 228. (This document is undated, but Eraso died in Chile in 1637 and wrote of events in the early 17th century. It was most likely written between 1600 and 1615.) 410 Diego de Rosales, Flandes Indiano. Tomo II. 1018. 411 ón. A.G.I. Chile 60, Cartas y expedients de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepci Letter from Captain ánchez Chaparro, Mendoza, 27 February, 1627. Domingo S
144 cross. The bishop resolved that future violators of the 1622 order would be subject to a fine and excommunication.412
Discussions in Spain gave little hope that a peaceful solution to slave taking and the war in general was at hand. While twenty years earlier the Council of Indies had ’s War Council that rallied support for the Defensive War, it was now the king led a án, the discussion of what was to be done in Chile. In the wake of the attack on Chill council recommended that 300 soldiers for Chile be sent with the new Governor of
Buenos Aires.413 ’s safety were also increased by the viceroy’s response to Concerns about Chile ández de Cabrera gave perhaps one of threats. In a 1629 letter the Viceroy Luis Fern the most honest, but for Chile one of the most discouraging assessments of his ability to protect his Pacific coast. Instead of building settlements in the Strait of Magellan or even something as simple as a series of watchtowers along the coast of Chile, the viceroy proposed that more resources be dedicated to gathering intelligence on ships leaving European ports. He added that no matter what steps were taken, European enemies would still be very much able to reach Callao without being spotted and that “very small number of (enemies) from there was little he could do to prevent a sacking and burning Arica, Pisco, Paita and Guayaquil and every other coastal ” He added that these coastal cities were not on par with those in Europe settlement. “settlements of reed houses with a few built of but instead were no more than
412 ón. Letter from A.G.I. Chile 60, Cartas y expedients de los Obispos de Santiago y Concepci Francisco de Salcedo Obispo de Santiago to S.M., Dated Stgo., 16 May 1626. 413 Chile,4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Madrid, 20 August, 1630.
145 ” This meant that in the event of an invasion “the boards. vecinos could easily gather
”414 up their belongings and flee inland. ’s obvious problems and excesses, few favored pea Despite the offensive war ceful solutions when all signs indicated that more threats were to come and that the viceroy could not protect Chile. These threats merely became an excuse to conduct more raids and demand more resources from the crown. Rather than making Chile safer, the offensive war and a more consistent situado merely increased embezzlement and caused a major revolt of indios amigos.
When the Defensive War ended, slave taking went from being a nuisance to being a principal economic activity. Governors of Chile split their time between raids and peace parleys, but none of them harbored any illusions about ending the War of
Arauco quickly. With this in mind, the king and viceroy complained that the situado was being wasted, but could not eliminate it because of sporadic but very real pirate threats. In this era of political and military uncertainty, governors and officials took more risks, engaged in more abuse, and embezzled more money from the situado as ’t know when indigenous slavery would be outlawed agai they didn n or whether the ’s next year situado would even arrive at all. Despite a 1655 rebellion caused by gubernatorial excess, illegal slave raids and embezzlement continued because the ’t change. This pattern was only interrupt conditions that created them didn ed when ’s demand for Chilean slaves and instead an earthquake in Peru interrupted Lima created a demand for Chilean wheat cultivated by local, stable, and even paid laborers; not unlike the encomienda labor system that Pedro de Valdivia had
414 ú. 1629. (Luis Fernández de Cabrera, A.G.I. Lima 42. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per ón.) Conde de Chinch N. 26, V. a S.M. Lima, 31 October, 1629.
146 envisioned 150 years earlier. Since indigenous slave taking never really ceased, the
Spanish were ready to conduct large-scale raids only five years after they were ’s War Council boasted that the army under Gove legalized. The king rnor Francisco
Laso de Vega captured four hundred Indians in three separate raids between 1631 and
1633.415 The increased slave taking also meant that officials who lost ground against indios rebeldes were vilified. Governor Angel Peredo was accused of putting his ’s successors in a bind by returning Indian captives to their homes. Critics saw Peredo
“tolerance” as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to rebel.416 policy of Anger against Peredo grew when he did not deliver the compensation promised to the
417 édula owners of returned slaves. Meanwhile, a 1634 royal c reiterating the ban on personal service made indigenous war captives more valuable, as they could be forced to work without compensation.418 We see then that indigenous slavery had ’s attempts to become so important to Chile that Peredo restrict it were regarded as a threat not only to the security of the colony but to its economy as well.
While many continue to argue that offensive war would make Chile safer, all indications were that it was making the colony more volatile. For one, offensive war brought new indigenous alliances against the Spanish. It was precisely because of slave taking raids that groups like the Tehuelches later gave up their neutrality and allied with Araucanian indios rebeldes.419 While the threat of offensive war
415 A.G.I. Chile 4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Madrid, 20 September, 1633. Laso de Vega was so eager to conduct raids because he profited from the sale of indigenous slaves to the tune “Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,” 39. of 200,000 pesos. Villalobos, 416 A.G.I. Chile 55. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). ón, 23 Testimony from Maestre de Cmapo General Geronimo de Molina Vasconcelos, Concepci March, 1665. Fojas 2v.-3. 417 Ibid., fojas 4-20. 418 Barros Arana, Historia general, IV: 245. 419 ás Mascardi, S.J. y su carta ón. (1670) Guillermo Furlong, S.J. Nicol -relaci (Buenos Aires:
147 prompted some Indians to seek peace, others fought harder when they got wind of the treatment that captured indios rebeldes received. Also, practices like facial branding produced more mistrust among both the indios amigos and rebeldes and in some cases led to the branding of Spanish captives out of revenge.420 The viceroy suggested in 1633 that this practice be discontinued in favor of slightly less inhumane hand branding,421 but the practice dragged on as any decision on an outright ban was left to the king.422 Finally, removing indios rebeldes from Chile merely expanded the ía. On at least two occasions captive Indians took War of Arauco beyond the Araucan over the very ships that were to remove them from the colony, once in Valparaiso and once in Coquimbo.423 ía Ramón had warned decades earlier, soldiers and Just as Governor Alonso Garc officials on the Spanish side were doing more trading of indigenous slaves and less fighting and governing. Certain governors were contributing to this trend, attempting to boost soldier morale by eliminating the quinto on sales of enslaved war captives.424
According to one 1640 letter from a member of the Audiencia de Chile, there was
ía, 1963), 20 Ediciones Teor -21. 420 ña. Vol. 50. Pieza 26. Carta de Nicolás Blanco de Santillán a S. M., de 7 de mayo A.N. Morla Vicu de 1633, sobre la marca que se le pone en el rostro a los indios esclavos. Foja 206. 421 ú. 1633. Luis Fernández de Cabrera, A.G.I. Lima, 44. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per Viceroy of Peru. N. 4 lib. 4. Letter to S.M. In N. 4 lib. 4 is V. to S.M. Duda sobre si se han de herrer en el rostro los indios que se cautiven en la guerra de Chile. Lima, 6 de Abril, 1633. Foja 300v. The practice was banned by the viceroy in 1635. Slaves considered a flight risk could still be branded. ú. 1635 A.G.I. Lima, 47. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -36. N.1, lib III. Auto from Viceroy. Ciudad de los Reyes. 16 October, 1635. Foja 340v. 422 B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 133. Pieza 2413. Junta de Guerra del Consejo de Indias. Sobre que los indios, varones o hembras, que se tomen prisionersos en las guerras de Chile se tengan por esclavos. Madrid. 24 Abril, 1635. Fojas 47-51. 423 ú. El Gobernador de Chile A.G.I. Lima, 46. Num. 7-A. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per Don Francisco Lasso de la Vega contradice los inconvenientes que el fiscal alega para vender fuera de aquella provincia los indios cautivados en la guerra. 15 April, 1633. 424 Jara, Guerra y sociedad, 233. Quite ironically, the only other comparable incentive would have been permission to leave Chile or retire. Authorization to do so was even sold by some unscrupulous governors.
148 also a vibrant black market slave trade between the indios amigos who often captured “war ministers” and soldiers who bought them. While some of the slaves, and the these transactions were legal, very rarely were they reported or were required taxes paid. This oidor was also annoyed that in cash-strapped Chile, the indios amigos were both collecting a salary as soldiers and making money in this racket.425
While some indios amigos were making a profit in this trade, other indios amigos and indios de paz were being victimized by Spanish soldiers who were now less discriminating about whether they were raiding friend or foe.426 The Jesuit Diego de
Rosales worked frequently among the Puelche, and argued that they were often “were not warlike, and did not attacked by the Araucanians and Spanish alike, as they ” In typic have arms other than arrows. ally paternalistic tone he added that they were
“because they were more humble, and less courageous.”427 easier to capture
Finally, slave raiding was given even more impetus when the Portuguese revolution of 1640 interrupted the activities of Portuguese African slave traders and ’s indigenous slaves. Costs shot up from 250 pesos per slave to raised prices for Chile
600 and 700 pesos during this period.428
The prevalence of slave taking raids meant that for the first time since the conquest of Chile, there was little talk of a major offensive and quick end to the War
425 A.G.I. Chile 35. Cartas y expedientes de personas seculares. 1632-1660. Francisco de la Fuente ón. Villalobos. Letter to V.M. 4 de Abril, 1640, Concepci 426 A 1631 letter from the audiencia stated that soldiers were not only enslaving indios de paz but were stealing their horses, mules and oxen as well. A.G.I. Chile,10, R.3,N.10\3. Cartas de Audiencia. Santiago 6 April 1631, foja 4r. 427 Rosales, Historia general Tomo :II, 1293-94. 428 As late as 1686 there was no drop in prices to pre-1640 levels. A list of prices in: B. N., Archivo de “Una negra criolla, de 34 la Real Audiencia, Volumen 1805, pieza 1a, page 21, lists among others, ños, en 800 pesos, Un esclavo mulatto, de 16 años, en 650 pesos, Una zamba esclava, de 6 años, en a ” Quoted in Domingo Almunategui S “La trata de negros en Chile” 300 pesos. olar, Revista Chilena de ía Historia y Geograf 91: No. 46, (1922), 33-34.
149 of Arauco. Governor Francisco Laso de Vega (1629-39) was one of the last in his office to brag to the king that he could pacify the Araucanians by the end of his ópez de Zúñiga administration. Instead, all he left his successor Francisco L were exaggerated accounts of his campaigns. Another ex-governor explained that the Army ’s activities had become limited to disorganized raids, where they would of Arauco fall upon the first group of Indians they found, take prisoners and flee toward Spanish territory. Instead of increasing Spanish control of the region, these Spanish hit and run techniques emboldened the Indians and weakened the morale of Spanish
429 ópez de Zúñiga saw little hope for e soldiers. L nding this cycle, arguing that “more supplies, more troops, a larger without situado and settlement, it would be ” He believed that with Chile’s limited impossible to reduce the indios rebeldes.
“the armed subjection of Indians would absolutely i ”430 resources mpossible.
If the Araucanians could not be defeated militarily and had outlasted the
Defensive War, the only thing left to try was a mixture of dialogue and military campaigns. A series of rather anomalous parleys was initiated. These were peace missions, but the uncertainty of the vida fronteriza required that they be initiated by hundreds of well-armed troops. These troops were usually accompanied by the ía would Governor of Chile who upon reaching a strategic spot within the Araucan send out emissaries to spread the word that he wanted to negotiate.431
As their unorthodox composition would suggest, these parleys had mixed results.
Without fail, scores of Araucanian, Puelche and Pehuenche reguas would arrive
429 ú. N. 4, lib. II. Memorial y parecer que el A.G.I. Lima, 46. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per ón del Oidor Luis Merlo de la Fuente, gobernador de Chile, dio al V. sobre los medios para la pacificaci reino de Chile. Lima. 1 May, 1635. Foja 257. 430 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 262. 431 Ibid., 263-64.
150 peacefully to the Spanish camp, promise to come out of hiding and live near colonists, and leave with gifts in hand. Some of these promises were kept, but just as many were fleeting; broken by indios rebeldes seeking further gifts or greedy colonists seeking slaves.432 While some groups broke peace agreements made at these ’t even know that the parleys parleys, others never entered into them and many didn were being held.433
The parleys could also create more problems than they solved by muddling
Spanish understandings of friend and foe and interrupting indigenous daily life.434 In one example, to avoid confusion over neighboring indios amigos and indios rebeldes, “rebel” side of a local river could be the Spanish declared that anyone on the “friendly” side there enslaved. However, this border was an arbitrary one and on the was nothing to eat. Two indio amigo caciques complained that Spanish soldiers enslaved their people simply because they had crossed the river in search of food.
Diego de Rosales explained this to the governor, who to his credit nullified the border declaration.435 “peaceful” groups like was the fact that the only Another element working against arena for dialog with Spanish officials was through these peace parleys. Since the ostensible goal of these gatherings was to draw up Spanish-indio rebelde truces, attendance at a peace parley was bound to label indios amigos as rebeldes. In one
432 “buying peace” had already been tried with little success on the Chichimec front This ier in northern New Spain. 433 Espejo, La provincia de Cuyo del Reino de Chile: I, 146. 434 Ibid. 435 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 1295.
151 such example, the Puelches came to the parleys not to offer peace, which the Puelches
“acknowledge the king, as his vass ”436 had never broken, but to als.
The parleys were instituted because of Spanish weakness, and in many ways they reinforced Spanish limitations by revealing the extent of Araucanian autonomy. For example, while the Spanish believed that their incursions were forcing indios rebeldes to seek peace, historians argue that it was really the indigenous who were inviting the
Spanish to participate in their internal parleys.437 The Spanish believed that God had interceded in their favor by causing the 1640 eruption of Villarrica Volcano and ín in 1641. Dozens of frightening the rebeldes into seeking peace at the Parley of Quill “animists” rebelde groups did participate in the parley, but only because they were “pragmatists” and as such were moved both by the eruption and by their need for and food.438
While the Indians that attended these parleys were technically capitulating to the ’s authority, in reality they gave up very little. crown The Indians knew that governors came and went, and each one would have a parley of his own. A common ón tactic of indios amigos was to agree to live on a reducci near the Spanish long enough to organize a raid on them and flee to the mountains. The offending indios amigos knew the mountains could sustain them only as long as it took for a new governor to arrive, to whom they would make an offer of peace. The governor would
436 Ibid., 1338. 437 ón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú,” 14. Gasc 438 ón, “Frontier Socieities,” 28. Gasc
152 demand they come out of the mountains, and the process would begin all over again.439
Indios rebeldes gained power and material benefits through their participation in parleys. These meetings were occasions not only for discussions of peace, but also for trade. The Indians would not only receive gifts in exchange for their offers of peace,440 but would sometimes sell their desperately needed ponchos and blankets to “shoeless and Spanish soldiers who were constantly complaining that they were
”441 naked. This trend had mixed benefits for the Spanish. While this exchange motivated indios rebeldes to participate in the parleys, it also created wider indio rebelde alliances through the gifting cycle.442
ín de Mujíca A description of a 1646 parley called by incoming Governor Mart reveals a great deal about the mixed benefits of these meetings and how they merely served to reinforce the balance of power on the frontier. First of all, it was the
Spanish who approached the Araucanians about a peace deal, but it was the “principal chiefs” ( Araucanians who accepted Spanish terms. The caciques principales) who attended the parley agreed that their subjects would be catechized,
439 ército de Chile y su situado. 1680 A.G.I. Chile,129. Expediente relativo al Ej -1699. Memoria de los ynstrumentos que el lcdo D. Pablo Vazquez de Velasco Cavo del orden de Santiago y fiscal de la R. Audiencia de Chile remite a su Magd. en comprobazion de lo que en carta de 25 de Septte de 1690 escribe en orden a lo obrado en la distibuzion del situado del exercito de chile y de los fraudes y malas administraziones que reconosco y experimento en el dispendio del caudal de dicho situado y lo demas que en dha carta se contiene. N. 12 is a letter from Maestre de Campo Geronimo de Quiroga to ón, Licenciado Don Pablo Vazquez de Velasco...Fiscal de la Real Audiencia ... de Chile, Concepci February 28, 1690. 440 Several breakdowns of the situado list how much is to be dedicated to agasajos (gifts) for Indians ón del Gobernador de Chile. 1663 seeking peace. A.G.I. Chile 126, Expediente de la actuaci -1665. A.G.I. Chile, 4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra: 1602-1699. Letter from don Juan de Urrutia, ón, 15 July, Concepci 1690. 441 “ ” Silva Galdames, Guerra y trueque, 87. This purchase of peace was so common that agasajos or ’s gifts were part of the army situado. A.G.I. Chile,4. Consultas de la Junta de Guerra. 1602-1699. Letter from Don Juan de Urrutia dated Concepcion, 15 July, 1690. 442 “Guerra y trueque,” 93. Silva Galdames,
153 that the enemies of the Spanish would be their enemies, and that they would immediately notify the Spanish if another cacique tried to initiate a rebellion by “passing the arrow.” Not notifying the Spanish of such a call to arms would be punishable by death.
However, the principal chiefs were allowed celebrate the ceremony in their own manner, making sure of course that the process enhanced their power. First of all, the chiefs literally buried the hatchet, breaking a toqui in half, giving half to the governor and interring the other half. Next, the chiefs planted a canelo branch on top of the buried toqui.443 The chiefs had buried their war-making capability but had replaced it with a powerful symbol of peace. We see that although the Spanish may have declared victory when their conditions were accepted, for Araucanian leaders recognition by the Spanish whether through war or diplomacy was usually beneficial.
While some Araucanians and many colonists may have been content with this cycle of parleys, the viceroy spoke out against them as he recognized that they were a veiled protest against a lack of resources from Lima. He argued that while the
Spanish were involved in peace negotiations they should have been capturing territory and Indians and dividing them into encomiendas. The viceroy added that
Indians who had not been encomendados would always have peace on their own terms, and would be able to conserve their territory and some autonomy. He also explained that without Indian or African laborers and without gold or silver, Chile could not attract new colonists.444
443 ón de Valdivia Aguirre, Poblaci , 84-87. 444 A.G.I. Lima 50. N.8 Lib. II. V a S.M. informe sobre el tratado de paz con indios rebeldes de Chile, ún aviso el Marqués de Vaides. Callao, 8 J seg une 1641. Foja 131 v.
154 The Governor of Chile and the Viceroy of Peru had been at odds before, but this new impasse was more serious as Lima could refuse (at least until the crown heard ’s about it) to send Chile situado. Without the situado, the Chile of the 1630s and 40s would have still been in the post 1598 doldrums. The situado was supposed to be a temporary measure to help Chile end the War of Arauco, but instead had extended the war by supporting other commercial and illicit activities.445 The king thought about “the suspending the situado on a number of occasions as the war drew on but ” and the re incessant complaints of the Governors of Chile -appearance of pirates assured that it kept coming.446 ’s port of Va Despite Dutch past designs on Chile ldivia, and intelligence that indicated they were still interested in it, a lack of resources made Chilean Governor
Luis Merlo de la Fuente resist recontructing the town.447 Merlo de la Fuente was “a thousand good concerned about the Dutch threat, but pointed out that there were ” between Chiloé and Panama from which the Dutch could continue their East ports
Indies trade. He added that if they were to gain a foothold in the Pacific, they could attack anywhere from New Spain to Chile without warning.448
In 1640 the outgoing viceroy explained his reluctance to carry out the long overdue repopulation of Valdivia. The viceroy did argue that Valdivia could be an
445 ón, “La frontera sur del virreinato del Perú,” 16. Gasc 446 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 167. 447 íncipe de Esquilache wrote of the “grave damage” European enemies Ibid., 279-83. In 1621 the Pr would do if they were to fortify the abandoned port of Valvidia. He called for his successor to try and án y Rózpide, ed. Relación que el Príncipe de Esquilache hace al repopulate the port. Ricardo Beltr ñor Marqués de Guadalcázar, 264. Se Another 1635 letter from the viceroy mentioned that Father Bernardino de Morales y Alboroz, a Dominican who had been a Dutch prisoner, warned of the “designs (the Dutch) had to fortify the port of Valdivia.” A.G.I. Lima 46. N. 4, lib. II. V. a S.M. 26 May, 1635. Foja 242 448 “Memorial y parecer que el Oidor Luis Merlo de la Fuente, gobernador de Lima 46. N. 4, lib. II ón del reino de Chile. Dated Lima, 1 May, 1635. Chile, dio al V. sobre los medios para la pacificaci Foja 249.
155 important supply point in the War of Arauco, but added that if European enemies wanted a fortification in the South Sea, they would have attempted to establish one already. The viceroy theorized that European enemies would be more interested in ports like Buenos Aires (also under his jurisdiction) that would be easier for them to re-supply.449 Plans were even made to prevent a land invasion from Buenos Aires, and the Governor of Chile was warned to be on the lookout for the western prong of
í’s silver.450 the attack that would leave the Dutch in control of Potos In an embarrassing twist for the viceroy, at the very time he was dismissing European intentions to establish themselves in a Pacific port, the Dutch were planning their takeover and settlement of Valdivia.
The Dutch West India Company had expanded its influence in Brazil to conduct raids on Spanish ships and territory in the Caribbean, but occupation was expensive.
A takeover of Peruvian silver at its source would have been more cost effective.
Thus, a streamlined version of previous South Sea expeditions was sent to Chile in “the Dutch governor of Brazil, Prince Maurits, 1642. The viceroy was half-right, as hoped to establish a foothold (on the coast of Chile not in Buenos Aires) and launch
”451 attacks on the mineral-rich interior. The Dutch also hoped that allying with the
Araucanians could offset their lack of manpower. It was precisely the stiff “Chileans the best hope for an Araucanian resistance to Spanish rule that made the ” The leader of the Nassau fleet had also played up the possibility of a American ally.
449 ón del estado en que el Conde de Chinchón deja el Gobierno del P ú al Señor Virrey Relaci er és de Mancera, Los Reyes, 26 January, 1640, ón de las memorias o relaciones que Marqu Colecci ú acerca del estado en que dejaban las cosas generales del reino: escribieron los Virreyes del Per ñolas, 1930), 109. Tomo II, ed. by Angel de Altolaguirre (Madrid: Imprenta Mujeres Espa 450 A.G.I. Lima, 50. Num. 8, Lib. II. El V. a S.M., prevenciones para evitar la entrada de enemigos desde el Brasil por el puerto de Buenos Aires. Callao. 8 June, 1641. Fojas 169-171. 451 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 87-88.
156 Dutch-indigenous alliance, claiming that la Mocha residents were excited to see that
Dutch guns would be used against the Spanish. The Dutch went so far as to identify
Araucanians as fellow freedom fighters. The leader of the 1642 expedition, Hendrick “freedom Brouwer detailed that he wanted to ally with the -loving and Spanish-
” depicted in 452 loathing warriors La Araucana. ’s expedition took on supplies é Brouwer at Recife and landed just north of Chilo in May of 1643. There two hundred Dutch musketeers defeated Spanish resistance and took on some provisions, but lost their element of surprise.453 The desperate and outnumbered Spanish called local Indians to their aid, but the Dutch soon advanced on Castro, sacking it and partially destroying a Jesuit church. There they left a message in Latin that accused the Spanish of being cowards for fleeing and signed it,
“ ña.”454 Victor (olandii), cola Espa é, the governor scrambled to defend Concepción, After receiving word from Chilo
455 ón wa digging miles of trenches and erecting a small fort. Concepci s spared however, as the Dutch would only go as far north as Valdivia where they met no
Spanish resistance. Brouwer died of natural causes during the voyage, but the ’s new leader Elias Herckmans “landed expedition (in Valdivia) with two companies ‘an excellent harangue and oration’ to a crowd of about three of troops and delivered hundred Araucanians. Herckmans explained the Dutch purpose in the South Pacific, ‘Letters of Credentials’ from the Prince of Orange, and distributed gifts in presented his name. In another speech to an audience of 1,200 Herckmans reminded the
452 Schmidt, Innocence Abroad, 205-06. 453 Rosales, Historia general:II, 1163. Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 87-90. 454 Ibid., 1164. 455 Ibid., 1166.
157 Araucanians that the Dutch had also fought the Spanish for 80 years, and trade agreements were made.456 The Araucanian Manqueante in turn agreed to ally with the “his lands, people, arms, rich Europeans against the Spanish and offered the Dutch ” He even sent his son to live among the Dutch as proof of gold mines and women. his trustworthiness.457
The Dutch takeover of an abandoned port may not have seemed like much, but in the context of the state of the American colonies it was disastrous. The recent
Portuguese War of Independence had already weakened the Spanish position in
America, as the Spanish no longer had an ally in Brazil. The Viceroy of Peru expressed his concerns about Dutch power in the Americas to his contemporary, the
Viceroy of New Spain. The letter sent from Lima again raised the possibility that the
Dutch and Portuguese could push inward from the River Plate and the Dutch from
Chile. Of interest to the Viceroy of New Spain was the possibility that once the
Dutch became established in Valdivia or another port in Chile, Acapulco would be threatened, as it was an ideal port for a return voyage from China.458 ’s perspective. The possibil The situation was even graver from Chile ity of an alliance between indios rebeldes and European enemies had kept Chilean officials on ’s position was painted as edge for decades, and now that it had occurred, the colony all the more precarious and requiring additional resources. In a 1643 letter, the governor claimed that the presence of the Dutch was a watershed moment for Indians “ ” in the region, whether they were at peace or enemigos. The aucaes or indios
456 Schmidt, Innocence Abroad, 208-09. 457 Rosales, Historia general:II, 1168-69. 458 ña, Conde de Salvatierra, sobre la entrada de A.G.I. Lima 51. No. 12-B. El V. al V. de Nueva Espa holandeses en el Mar del Sur. 10 October, 1643.
158 “extremely bold” while those on “insolent” rebeldes had become reducciones were “content.” The governor added that without His Majesty’s and encomendados were help, things could get very dangerous in Chile. He argued that if the Dutch were only intent on using Chile as a stopover for their journey to the Philippines, they would not
é.459 é landing was more have pillaged Chilo The governor added that the Chilo
“infest” Chile and asked the king for 1,000 men.460 evidence that the Dutch wanted to
A little more than a week later, the governor sent another letter to the viceroy ’s “sea and land” enemies had formed an alliance. The detailing how quickly Spain én had all “befriended” Indians of Villarrica, Valdivia, Osorno, Mariquina and Tolt the Dutch who had announced that they would help them drive the Spanish out of
Chile. The Dutch were even winning over indios reducidos, making the governor fear that the Dutch were providing just the spark these groups needed to try and free
“Spanish oppression.”461 themselves of To prevent this alliance from spreading any further, the governor sent Spanish and Indian messengers to warn that the Dutch were there for gold, and that local Indians would soon be forced to work in Dutch mines.462
459 é The second Dutch attack on their island (the first was in 1600) had made residents of Chilo especially nervous, prompting them to ask the Viceroy to give them enough resources to defend themselves against such attacks or move them to Coquimbo. Rosales, Historia General:II, 1175. 460 “key” to Spain’s retaining power in all of the The governor went on to describe Chile as the ’s Americas. From Valdivia, the Dutch could begin to take over Spanish trade in the Pacific. Valdivia proximity to the Strait of Magellan would facilitate communication and cooperation with their forces ’s Atlantic trade as well. The mar in Brazil to cut off Spain quis claimed that with this increasing Dutch ’s distance from Spanish forces, its control, no American silver would reach Spain. Also, Valdivia fertile soil, and cooperative local Indians, made a permanent Dutch presence there seem all the more “had tried to say that (the loss of Chile) would be of possible. The governor challenged those who ” If Chile were to fall, “(God forbid),” they would know the “true affliction” that would little import. “provinces and kingdoms.” befall so many Spanish A.G.I. Lima 52. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes ú. Pedro de Toledo, Marqués de Mancera. 1644 és de Vaides, de Per -45. N. 4-A. El Marqu íos holandeses que habían llegado a Chiloé. Concepción. 16 gobernador de Chile, a V. sobre los nav November, 1643. Foja 3. 461 és de Vaides, gobernador de Chile, al V., sobre el enemigo A.G.I. Lima 52. N. 4-E. El Marqu ón. 3 December, 1643. holandes. Concepci 462 This message did have some truth to it, as the Dutch believed that gold in Valdivia would bring ón de un prisionero… Concepción, 23 November, 1643. more settlers. A.G.I. Lima 52. 4-D Declaraci
159 These messengers were sent with instructions to give the Indians whatever they
“obedience to His Majesty.”463 wanted to keep them in Ironically then, these groups were being asked to trust the Spanish, who had already forced them to work rather than the Dutch, who might do so.
The viceroy, who had proved reluctant to fortify Valdivia, was now obligated to ón had reported send troops to root out the Dutch there. Since scouts from Concepci that the Dutch were nowhere to be seen, the viceroy could confidently send his twenty-two ship fleet to take the port.464 The fleet arrived off the coast of Valdivia in
1645, with much fanfare and of course found nothing. Herckmans had wished to stay in Valdivia and had even sent to Brazil for reinforcements, but the Dutch colony had suffered the same fate of Nombre de Jesus and Rei Don Felipe. A breakdown in dialogue with the Araucanians meant that without the same frontier exchange that allowed Spanish survival, hunger forced a Dutch departure.465 The only task for the huge Spanish force was the capture of a handful of Dutch deserters.466 “pretensions in the Spanish South Sea” ha In fact, by 1645 Dutch d ended almost as quickly as they had begun. The Spanish had no way of knowing this however, and ’s reinforcements stayed behind in Valdivia. The seven hundred of the viceroy expedition of reconquest had cost 348,000 pesos, with maintenance of a Valdivia garrison projected to cost 20,000 annually. Added to other expenses such as the “the Dutch pirates fortification of Callao, soldier pay, and ship building we see that
Fojas 10-10v. 463 …sobre el enemigo holandes… Concepción. 3, December, 1643. A.G.I. Lima 52. 4-E. 464 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 290-91. 465 “relief force.” Herckmans returned to Recife to find that Prince Maurits had already outfitted the Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 87-90. 466 ó a A.G.I. Lima 52. N. 4-B. Copia de carta que el General Olandes Elas Harquemans escribi çique de Mariquina en 14 de otubre de Manqueante ca 1643. Valdiva.
160 and privateers had thus cost their enemies much more than they themselves
”467 realized. Despite the costs however, the viceroy announced that Valdivia now protected Chile from both European and Indian enemies.468
This was especially important after the testimony of Dutch stragglers. One such deserter, Antonio Juan, confirmed the worst Spanish fears by testifying that the Dutch had brought carpenters, ironsmiths, and a multitude of tools useful in construction and farming. They also brought a number of small arms, which Antonio Juan believed “to arm the Indians that befriended (us) to fight were against the Spanish and drive
”469 them out of the Kingdom (of Chile.)
Other witnesses claimed that the Dutch had told caciques in Valdivia that they “two thousand soldiers and a would soon return with twelve to fourteen ships,
”470 thousand African slaves, to relieve the Indians (of any forced labor.) The Dutch had also expressed that next time they would not only settle Valdivia, but would try to
ón as well.471 take Concepci
With Valdivia fortified, the viceroy believed that the main remaining obstacle in the protection of the Pacific coast was a lack of cooperation from the same Chilean colonists who so often appealed to him for help. The viceroy was especially és de Baides was unable to rendezvous his frustrated when the Governor Marqu
467 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 87-90. 468 ón del Estado del Gobierno del Perú que hace el Marqués de Mancera al Señor Virrey Conde Relaci ón de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los de Salvatierra, Lima, 8 October, 1648, Colecci ú Virreyes del Per , ed. by Angel de Altolaguirre, 198. 469 ón de un prisionero holandés que hizo traer de Chiloé el A.G.I. Lima 52. Num. 4-D. Declaraci és de Vaides. Concepción, 23 November, 1643. Fojas 3 Marqu -3v. 470 ú. Pedro de Toledo, Marqués de Mancera. 1644 Lima,52. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per - ón del puerto. 24 May, 45. N. 43, lib. III. El V. a S.M., noticia de holandeses en Valdivia. Fortificaci 1645. 471 ía en Holanda para Lima 52. Num. 52. El V. a S.M, noticias de una armada que se preven ú y Pernambuco y pasar al Mar del Sur. Propone medios para la defensa de las provincias del Puer ña. Nueva Espa 25 November 1645.
161 overland forces with the seven hundred soldiers who had come by sea.472 The ’s claim that the fortification of Valdivia viceroy was also upset by the governor “pernicious” would require another situado when officials were wasteful and even ’t want the war with the first one. The viceroy even added that the Army of Chile didn to end! To this end he argued, army officials had persuaded the governor that a land- based fortification of Valdivia would have been impossible even with two armies; one leading the attack, and another defending the frontier. At the very least, the viceroy wanted the governor to inform him of any sightings of the Dutch as he determined to sit on his silver shipment until the coast was clear. Chile was becoming central to the ’s economic livelihood viceroyalty . As he sent more resources sent to Chile, the viceroy moved to exert more authority over his colony, becoming increasingly critical
’s spending.473 of the prodigal colony ín de Mujica would be able to The viceroy hoped that the new governor, Mart “walk the … that so many eight of ten leagues (to Valdivia from the interior) ” had walked, and would show that such a trek “was not Spaniards with fewer troops
”474 impossible. The viceroy claimed that he wanted the new governor to have íca had sufficient resources and sent him three hundred troops, even though Muj requested 1,000. In the same breath that he mentioned reinforcements for Chile the
472 Before sending the rescue fleet, the viceroy had ordered the Governor of Chile to gather all his “the viceroy’s troops and march on Valdivia, driving the Dutch out to sea. This order merely revealed ’s situation” and was impossible to carry out. Gathering the Army of imperfect knowledge of Chile Arauco together as one force would have meant abandoning Spanish forts and exposing the column to a series of ambushes as they marched the hundreds of kilometers to Valdivia where they would meet an unknown number of Dutch and Indian enemies. Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 289-90. 473 A.G.I. Lima 52. El V. a S.M., noticia de holandeses en Valdivia, fojas 178-178v. 474 Ibid., fojas 185-186v.
162 viceroy proposed other ways to protect silver, such as bringing it overland to Callao instead of through Arica.475
Chile would have to wait almost thirty years for the appearance of its next
476 ’s first 150 years the colony saw fewer than ten European enemy. In Chile significant landings of European enemies on its coast, and only of handful of these ’s could be called attacks. Drake and others found very few objects of value on Chile under-populated coast, and potential settlers found the climate and the lack of supplies prohibitive. These factors only encouraged the English and Dutch to keep ’s silver and the sailing northward and westward toward their real reward; Peru ’s spices. Orient
Despite this, we have seen that officials in Chile were convinced for most of the
17th century that a larger scale European invasion of their distant colony was imminent. While officials in Chile were not averse to manipulating the viceroy, there was very real counter-reformation hatred between the Dutch and Spanish colonists. “heretic” Brouwer’s body and When the Spanish retook Valdivia they exhumed the burned it.477 Whether fears in Chile were genuine or were the equivalent of crying ’s War of wolf, they did prompt the viceroy to act. The very real threat from Chile
Arauco, combined with the potential threat from European enemies kept attention and resources directed toward this peripheral colony, even at the expense of other parts of
475 ía en Holanda para Lima 52. Num. 52. El V. a S.M, noticias de una armada que se preven ú y Pernambuco y pasar al Mar del Sur. Propone medios para la defensa de las provincias del Puer ña. Nueva Espa 25 November, 1645. 476 The Spanish had technically been at peace with the English since 1667, but rampant English pirate activity in the Caribbean prompted Queen Mariana to declare that the peace did not apply in the Americas. Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo V, 100-101. 477 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 291.
163 the viceroyalty.478 Therefore, even though Chile had kept its situado, Santiago and
Lima were back to square one, with Chile calling the viceroy stingy and the viceroy ’s wastefulness. pointing to Chile ’s wastefulness actually spiked after, and to Unfortunately for the viceroy, Chile some extent as a result of the scare of Dutch colonization efforts. Not only were officials being wasteful with the situado but the viceroy had begun investigating embezzlement of its funds and goods only a decade after it began to arrive. This skimming from the situado and other forms of corruption continued in the 1640s when governors and soldiers behaved as though the reinforcement of Valdivia was a victory for Chile and a license to continue to profit, often illicitly from the War of
Arauco. Some soldiers sold clothes destined for the army in local markets and others
479 íca (1646 doubled as horse thieves. Governor Muj -48) was forced to found fort í ío to keep soldiers away from the equine Nacimiento on the other side of the B o-B
ón.480 inhabitants of haciendas outside of Concepci
Despite some advances through parleys, Spanish soldiers continued to participate in illegal raids and were increasingly aided by governors. By the time Antonio de ña y Cabrera was named governor in 1650, illegal slave taking was significantly Acu ’s fragile peace, angering both affecting Chile indios rebeldes and more importantly
478 While they Dutch had not invaded Buenos Aires, the port was affected by their presence in Chile. In 1645 the viceroy requested 100 men from Valdivia to defend Buenos Aires from the newly “Los gobernadores de Buenos Aires (1617 antagonistic Portuguese in Brazil. Jose Torre Revello, - ” in 1777), Historia de la nacion argentina: desde los origenes hasta la organizacion definitiva en “El Ateneo,” 1939), 1862. 2d ed. Vol. III, Ricardo Levene, ed. (Buenos Aires: Librereia y Editorial 342. A year later however, the viceroy decided to put off that project until Valdivia was repopulated to ú. 1646 his satisfaction. Lima, 53. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per -1649. Pedro de Toledo, és de Mancera. N. 1, lib. iv. El V. a S.M., noticias del puerto de Buenos Aires del estado de sus Marqu defensas y fortificaciones. Callao, 5 July 1646. Foja 249. 479 ón, “Frontier Socieities,” 10. Gasc 480 óngora, “Vagabundaje y sociedad fronteriz ” G a en Chile, 7.
164 ’s foot soldiers.481 ón noticed indios amigos, the army Bishop Dionysio of Concepci that the Spanish used offensive war as a carte blanche to commit abuses, selling free “with little fear of God.” Many Indian slaves had appealed to the bishop for Indians “rebels” and didn’t understand why the help, arguing that they had never been
Spanish had deprived them of their freedom. 482 ña would have been hard Acu -pressed to turn this illegal activity around. The veedor Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos warned that illegal slave raids were spreading to cordillera Indians who once captured were shipped out from Valdivia.
The veedor warned that such practices threatened to turn back the conquest, provoke an Indian rebellion, and render meaningless the deaths of 26,000 Spaniards in the
’s 100 years.483 War of Arauco
Villalobos praised the new governor for cracking down on rampant slave export
484 ña when the in 1651. Diego de Rosales was also an early supporter of Acu governor returned forty-four illegally taken Puelches to their lands.485 Despite early ña’s nepotistic impul attempts to restrict it however, Acu ses seem to have compelled him to expand the illegal slave trade, with disastrous results.486
481 See footnotes in Chapter three for a discussion of the military role of indios amigos. 482 A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Letter ón, Fray Dionysio. Concepción, August 1659. from Bishop of Concepci 483 ña. Vol. 20 Pieza 5. Carta (a S.M.) de Francisco Fuentes Villalobos a A.N. Fondo Morla Vicu ón. S.M., de 20 de Abril de 1651, Concepci Fojas 25v.-26. The marquis had also been accused by “some benefit” from t Father Rosales of taking he sale of piezas but was never formally charged of illegal slave taking. Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo IV, 298. 484 ña y Cabrera and others. Carta BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2654. Antonio de Acu de la Real Audiencia de Chile a S.M. el Rey. Santiago, 22 Mayo 1651. Foja 29. 485 Rosales, Historia general: Tomo II, 1335-36. 486 ña’s change on his inability to resist the influence of his young and Eugene Korth blames Acu “comely” wife. Korth, Spanish Policy, 180-81. A number of witnesses agree that his wife did have ña’s decisions, but whether this was due to her beauty, youth, intelligence, significant influence on Acu ’t know. or malevolent charm is something we probably can
165 ña first found himself in hot water after he appointed his inexperienced Acu ña’s brother relatives to important army posts. Juan de Salazar, Acu -in-law and newly appointed Maestro de Campo General, angered a group of indios amigos in the first months of his command by leading them into an obvious indio de guerra ambush,
487 é threatening those who balked with the gallows. Both Juan and brother Jos obligated indios amigos to transport the wine and other items that they sold in their ías pulper , providing no compensation or even any food for jobs that often lasted over a month.488 The Salazars soon expanded their malfeasance to include illegal slave é and Juan in exchange for taking. One witness claimed that slaves were given to Jos promotions.489 Another testified that Juan beat a Spanish soldier to death when the latter refused to falsely testify that he had taken an Indian girl in war. In fact, Salazar had ordered the soldier to steal her from a group of indios amigos.490
Especially critical of this family racket was Diego de Rosales, who had inherited the Defensive War from Luis de Valdivia, and continued his missionary work in the ía even after the project ended. H Araucan is efforts against the enslavement of indios ña amigos developed into a very personal feud with the Acu -Salazar family. One ña became furious when his raids were interfered witness to the conflict said that Acu é de Salazar referred to Rosal “cuckold.” Rosales in turn was with and that Jos es as a upset because this abuse would not only erode his work, like it had Luis de
487 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Fran ñán. A.G.I. Escriban cisco de Pineda Bascu ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 385 Concepci -387. 488 ón sumaria que está mandada haver B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2706. Informaci érdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el genreal ín Ruíz sobre la p Mart ña y Cabrera y el Maestre de Campo don Juan de Gamboa al gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acu ís Henríquez, tomada al padre Diego de Rosales, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús, en la de Salazar y Sol ón en 3 de Jun(l?)io de ciudad de la Concepci 1656. Foja 281. 489 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. A.G.I. Escriban ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 380 Concepci -380v. 490 Ibid., foja 384v.
166 ’s, but would drive more and more groups into alliances against the Spanish Valdivia as word spread of this deception on the part of army officers.491 ña would have managed to get Even without the help of his relatives however, Acu himself into hot water. He was accused of permitting abuse and illegal enslavement of indios de paz, and in one case of personally inflicting a beating on an important
492 ña was at best slow to respond to accusations of abuse by his soldiers, cacique. Acu and ignored altogether complaints about the actions of his relatives. The governor
édula 493 was in fact reprimanded in a 1656 royal c for permitting illegal slave taking. ña would order officers to conduct illegal raids, even leaving written Often Acu
494 ña ordered Captain Luis Ponce de instructions for their sale. In one such case, Acu ón to raid a group of Le indios de paz. The survivors of this raid went to the governor “peace throughout the land.” directly to try and reach an agreement for the sake of ña had the emissaries followed back to their settlements and ordered Governor Acu ña’s involvement in these events did not go un them raided again. Acu -rewarded.
491 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. ó … A.G.I. Escriban Informaci n sumaria ón, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 315 Concepci -316. Rosales also claimed that on one occasion near Osorno, éndez with twenty an un-named cacique came to Lieutenant Manuel M -five of his people offering peace and agreeing to live next to the Spanish. The cacique wanted assurances that his people would éndez replied that the “royal word” was sufficient. Méndez eventually broke be fairly treated and M éndez’s superior got this word and the cacique and his people were imprisoned and enslaved. When M wind of this, instead of denouncing the lieutenant, he took the slaves himself, giving twelve to ña and six to Juan de Salazar. Some of the slaves were sold to Lima while others were Governor Acu ’s wife, María de Salazar. ía given to the governor A.G.I. Escriban 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of … given to General Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. 3 July, 1656. Concepción. Padre Diego de Rosales Fojas 536-538. 492 ía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Ratification of testimony from Juana de Sotomayor. A.G.I. Escriban Ciudad de ña had assaulted los Reyes. 23 November, 1655. Fojas 141-141v. This witness had heard that Acu “beating (him) with a cane and grabbing and shaking (him) by the hair.” Antonio de Chicaguala, 493 íquez de las Casas and A.G.I. Chile 57. Referred to in letter from Governor of Chile, Juan Henr others. Santiago. 19 October, 1671. 494 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. A.G.I. Escriban ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 383v. Concepci -384.
167 Juan de la Roa sent the governor 100 slaves who were later freed when the Audiencia de Chile put de la Roa on trail.495 ña also took advantage of indigenous desperation in famine and wartime and Acu greatly expanded the relatively new practice of uzanza.496 Most common during times “renting” a son or daughter of scarcity, Indians had begun to take the extreme step of to feed the rest of the family.497 Uzanza was declared illegal on several occasions and even made punishable by death, but these bans did not stop the practice.498 “a given time” but Juan de An uzanza agreement was only supposed to last for
Salazar and other officials could and did issue false certificates stating that soldiers had taken uzanza Indians in war. These certificates allowed the Indians to be taken to
ón and shipped to “other places.”499 ña had little to say about Concepci Governor Acu this fraud, as he too falsified these certificates.500 He also relaxed the restrictions on “reduced” Indians, allowing them to live closer to Santiago so that settlement of his
495 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor I ón sumaria… A.G.I. Escriban gnacio de Carrera. Informaci ón, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 294 Concepci -297v. 496 In his 1651 exit interview, the viceroy explained uzanza to his successor. He added that he had only ón recently learned of it and that the Audiencia of Chile had already requested that it be banned. Relaci de Estado en que deja el Gobierno de estos reinos el Conde de Salvateirra al Sr. Virrey Conde de Alba ón de las memorias o relaciones que escribieron los de Sesta, Los Reyes, 22 March, 1651. Colecci ú: Virreyes del Per Tomo II, 300. 497 ón sumaria que está mandada hacer BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2705. Informaci érdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el general Martín Ruíz sobre la p ña y Cabrera y al Maestre de Campo, don de Gamboa al Gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acu ís Henríquez, tomada al testigo don Ignacio de Carrera, Sargento Mayor del Reino, Juan Salazar y Sol ón en 27 de Junio de 1656. en la ciudad de la Concepci Foja 242 v. 498 A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Viceroy Conde de Alba. Lima, 14 March, 1659. In 1652 Isabel de Villagra was accused of selling twenty Indians, many of whom she had garnered through uzanza. ía 932 A. Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1660 ón a Pedro A.G.I. Escriban -1685. Pieza 1a. Comisi ña Solís y Palacio, oidor de la Audiencia de Chile, para proceder en la continuación de la causa de Aza ó Martín de Mújica, Presidente de la Audiencia de Chile, contra Antonio Ramírez que de oficio comenz de Laguna, fiscal y protector general de indios, sobre el mal uso de su oficio en tratos y contratos y los ó ejectutar en Gonzalo de Aculco, cacique principal del pueblo de Aculco. azotes que mand Testimonio de la causa que segui sobre que los Indios de servidumbre no se vendesen en conformidad írez de Laguna. 2 December, 1659. Foja 359. de la cedula de su Magd. Antonio Ram 499 ía, 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa … Fojas 4v. A.G.I. Escriban -5 500 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. A.G.I. Escriban ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 383v. Concepci -384.
168 501 ñán said he wife could carry out more uzanza trades. Francisco de Pineda y Bascu personally expressed his doubts to the governor about removing these Indians from “under (the control of) our arms,” but that Acuña responded by angrily ordering that he leave the room.502 Other critics claimed that this relaxation of settlement rules had made Chile vulnerable to an indigenous assault.503 ña’s worst offense and most foolhardy strategy was the enslavement of Acu indios amigos. We have already discussed the overall military value of indios amigos, but these troops were also very important in slave-taking raids. Indios amigos had taken hundreds of Indian captives in the 1640s alone, and as mentioned were very willing to sell them to the Spanish at a low rate or even better turn them over to the Spanish ña’s strategy to enslave directly. Acu indios amigos would in essence involve killing the goose that laid golden eggs. ña persisted in his belief that Despite evidence to the contrary then, Acu indios amigos were useless as allies but as enemies they would help he and his cohorts
“make themselves very rich.”504 His strategy was to pocket the salaries of indios amigos, and when they tired of mistreatment and rebelled he could collect again when they were captured and sold as slaves. To get them to turn against the Spanish,
501 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñán. A.G.I. Escriban ón. Concepci 29 June, 1656. Fojas 382v.-383. 502 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascuñá A.G.I. Escriban n. ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 382v. Concepci -383. 503 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña A.G.I. Escriban ón. 26 June, 1656. Foja 138v. y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepci 504 ía 932 C. Pieza ín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña A.G.I. Escriban 22. Mart ón. 26 June, 1656. Foja 140. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 C. y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepci ñán. ón. 29 June, 1656. Foja Pieza 22. Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascu Concepci 375. ña say he wished to force the Indians to rebel in order to justify a Another witness heard Acu “quemarlos a todos.” ía 932 C. Pieza 22. counterattack and to (Burn them all.) A.G.I. Escriban ón sumaria… ón, 27 June, 1656. Foja 306. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. Informaci Concepci
169 ña left a number of companies of Acu indios amigos without supplies or payment for their service.505 ña’s family were even more excessive than those of The violations of Acu previous governors in that their intent was to enslave the very indios amigos who allied with the Spanish, had brought some order to the frontier. The results of this
506 ña’s critics like Diego de excess were catastrophic for the entire colony. Acu úñez de Rosales and Francisco N Pineda would not have denied that they had ’s conversion efforts were benefited from the vida fronteriza themselves. Rosales aided by his understanding and use of fluid alliances between frontier indigenous úñez de Pineda converted groups. N his captivity narrative and service on the frontier into fame and a high ranking position within the army. However, both warned that ña’s attempt to benefit from the Acu vida fronteriza by purposefully interrupting the ’s colonial pact would have only disastrous consequences, much like Loyola úñez de Pineda even informed the governor of a expansion efforts did in 1598. N warning from various groups of indios amigos. The aborigines communicated to úñez de Pineda that if the poor treatment under Acuña’s government continue N d, they would have no choice but to revolt.507
One indio amigo leader bent over backwards to try and keep a rebellion from happening. Antonio de Chicaguala headed a contingent of indios amigos near Boroa
505 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. ón sumaria… A.G.I. Escriban Informaci ón, 27 June, 1656. Fojas 306 Concepci -306v. 506 James F. Brooks argues that Spanish slave taking also had a role in Pueblo Revolt of 1680 or as he “Great Southwest Rebellion.” The Pueblo army asked for head of Maese de Campo calls it the “first demand.” He had recently “been at Pecos, where, after extending his Francisco Javier as their guarantee of safe conduct to a visiting band of Plains Apaches, he had disarmed and distributed them ” Brooks, among his friends as captives, retaining some to sell south in Parral. Captives and Cousins, 52. 507 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. ñán A.G.I. Escriban Testimony of Don Francisco de Pineda Bascu . ón. 29 June, 1656. Fojas 372 Concepci -373.
170 and had close contact with the Salazar brothers who often sought, but usually ignored his counsel. Chicaguala had warned Juan de Salazar that indios amigos were angered by his abuse, and even scolded other groups of indios amigos for supporting an armed rebellion.508 Despite the constant warnings from the most reputable of sources, greed ña and his family to keep the colony on the road to disaster. prompted Acu
’s 17th The disaster came in the form of the largest Indian uprising in Chile century. Unlike the assaults of columns of indios de guerra led by Lautaro or
Pelantaro in years past, this 1655 attack was a coordinated uprising of indios de én Rivers with involvement from servicio that stretched from the Maule to Tolt toquis only coming in the planning stages.509 The pattern of Spanish abuse and climate of ña that thirty mistrust had become so universal and was ignored so long by Acu “subjected” Indians rebelled thousand against the Spanish, with 8,000 of them taking
510 ’s estancia, its more tha up arms. The assault forced the evacuation of the governor n
2,000 residents forced to flee dozens of miles under the cover of darkness to
ón. The rebellion reached as far north as Huasco and Copiapó,511 Concepci cost the ’s ranch, an important Spanish fourteen of their forts and presidios, the governor
508 ón del Gobernador de Chile. Confesión del Capitan A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destituci ónimo de Molina Basconcelos, Concepción, 17 March, 1654. Foja 38v. A.G.I. Escribanía 932 B. Jer “en nombre de” Juan de Pieza 9. Dated Ciudad de los Reyes, 10 April 1656. Letter (series of protests) Salazar by Antonio Perez de Villaroel. [Reyes, 10 April 1656.] Foja 28. 509 Barros Arana, Historia general: IV, 347-48. Juan de Salazar named Catinaguel of Boroa as one of ’s intellectual authors, a fact that makes its scale all the more impressive since Boroa was the revolt ía just north of the Toltén River. ía 932 B. located deep in the Araucan (See Map 4) A.G.I. Escriban ón de Fernando de Velasco y Gamboa, … Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1661. Comisi Pieza 9. “en nombre de” Juan de Salazar Dated Ciudad de los Reyes, 10 April 1656. Letter (series of protests) by Antonio Perez de Villaroel. [Reyes, 10 April 1656.] Foja 28. 510 ía 932 C. Piez ín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña A.G.I. Escriban a 22. Mart ón. 26 June, 1656. Foja 155. José, who was killed in the y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepci “Joseph.” aftermath of the 1655 uprising, was also named in documents as 511 ón sobre todo lo sucedido en Chile B.N. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2679. Informaci és del alzamiento general de indios y sedición de los españoles. (May, 1655) Foja 213v. despu
171 stable, 200,000 head of cattle, 512 and 8,000 horses. Hundreds of Spanish women and children were captured.513 ña did little to put down the rebellion that he had caused. In fact, witnesses Acu ña was in such a hurry to abandon his estancia that the Jesuits in t claimed that Acu he adjacent mission were left defenseless and could take nothing with them when they evacuated.514 Witnesses recounted that the stress of the exodus from the estancia caused a number of stillbirths, as well as the deaths of adults due to heat exhaustion
515 ón the refugees’ anger with Acuña or fatigue. By the time they reached Concepci had reached a boiling point, so much so that the authors of this account preferred not “offensive language” being used toward the governor. The refugees to record the ón, and together hunkered down in the city joined 4,000 other residents of Concepci center to fend off the assault.516 It was under the stress of this siege that a revolt by ña emerged. colonists against Acu ón’s On Feb 20, 1655 angry residents and members of Concepci cabildo “long live the overpowered an army company, took their weapons and shouting, ” ña’s residence with King, death to the bad governor and entered Governor Acu ña got wind of this mob in the nick of time, narrowly swords drawn. Governor Acu escaping through a back door and into the nearby Jesuit monastery. One observer ña by this multitude that it was “a noted that there was so much anger directed at Acu
512 ía 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa que A.G.I. Escriban resulta contra el ón del Alçamiento General que subçedio en el Maese de Campo General Don Juan de Salazar, en raz Reyno de Chile a los 14 de febrero de 1655. Reyes, 14 August 1656. Foja 5v. 513 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Qu ña A.G.I. Escriban erellas against Antonio de Acu ón. 26 June, 1656. Foja 154v. y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepci 514 ón del Gobernador de Chile. Letter from El Provincial A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destituci ñía de Jesus, Vicente Modele(?). Sant de la Compa iago, June 13, 16[55]. 515 ía, 932 B. Pieza 8. Testimony of Juana de Sotomayor. Ciudad de los Reyes. 18 A.G.I. Escriban November, 1655. Foja 81v. 516 ía 932 B. Pieza 19. Testimonio en Relación de la Culpa…Fojas 5v. A.G.I. Escriban -6.
172 ’t killed” and described how Acuña sought refuge among the Jesuits wonder he wasn
517 ña’s cleric brother until another governor was named. Acu -in-law, and an unpopular oidor were also sought by the mob, and they too found refuge in ón churches. The mob was quieted when Acuña complied with the Jesuit Concepci ña was demand that he submit his resignation. Acu then placed in irons and verbally ón abused by the conspirators. The Concepci cabildo elected its own Governor, the ’s army Veedor General Francisco de la Fuente Villalobos, and triumphantly paraded him about on their shoulders.518 ’s one hundred year existence that a governor had This was the first time in Chile “an act that under the regimen of laws and ideas of that era, ever been deposed, ” and one which was immediately condemned by the almost equivalent to sacrilege,
Audiencia de Chile. However, the viceroy ultimately sided with the mob, and ña stripped Acu of his post and replaced him with Pedro Porter Cassanate. The “dire events with His Majesty’s arms” that took viceroy based his decision on the “damages caused by place during his government and the the little experience and
’s most important posts.”519 abundant greed of his brothers-in-law in that army
There were a number of causes for this massive uprising, but most agreed that the “in hatred of Antonio de Acuña, his wife and brothers Indians rebelled -in-law
517 ón del Gobernador de Chile. Letter from El Provincial A.G.I. Chile 53. Expediente de la destituci ñía de Jesus, Vicente Modele(?). Santiago, June 13, 16[55]. de la Compa 518 ía 932 B. Comisiones Audiencia de Chile. 1661. Comisión de Fernando de A.G.I. Escriban ón de los Velasco y Gamboa, alcalde del crimen de la Audiencia de Lima, para la averiguaci ña y Cabrera, gobernador y capitán general del reino de Chile, y procedimientos de Antonio de Acu ómplice principal, en la causa de l Juan de Salazar, maestre de campo, su c evantamiento y tumulto de la ón de Chile. Pieza 6a. Charges against Sargento Mayor Don Martín Cerdan. ciudad de la Concepci Bartolome Maldonado y Madrigal. Santiago. 25 July, 1655. Fojas 1-2v. 519 ú, Conde de Alba a BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2692. Carta del Virrey del Per S.M. el Rey. Lima. 31 August, 1656. Foja 26.
173 ”520 because of the mistreatment that they received from them in word and deed. The ña rich then instead led to his ouster and very strategy that was designed to make Acu proved a financial disaster for him and the rest of the colony. Slaves were actually lost to the Spanish during this uprising when many of their owners were killed or enslaved themselves.521
The 1655 rebellion was merely the latest reminder of the fact that while the enslavement of prisoners of war was permitted as a means to end the interminable “War of Arauco,” it provoked abuse by governors and soldiers alike. These colonists sought to keep the war under control but very much alive so that they could continue to profit from the sales of legitimately and illegally taken slaves alike.
This rebellion, combined with a devastating earthquake in 1647, left the Chilean economy in a dire state. The viceroy of course did not blame colonists for the earthquake, but after spending so much on Valdivia only a decade earlier, Lima was in no mood to hear more bad news from Chile. The financial and territorial losses from the rebellion were bad enough, but further details about the events leading up to the uprising surely infuriated the viceroy.522 The illegal slave trade had been brisk enough for the Salazars to share the profits with a handful of others, principally their ía de Salazar. According to Father Rosales, María bought slaves and sent sister, Mar
520 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Sargento Mayor Ignacio de Carrera. ón sumaria… A.G.I. Escriban Informaci ón, 27 June, 1656. Acuña y Cabrera blamed the revolt on the “na Concepci tural malevolence and ” of the Indians who had infested the “tamer” unpredictability indios amigos and yanaconas who were born among and or lived with the Spanish and claims that up to the eve of the rebellion he had made some of the greatest strides in terms of achieving peace and colonizing to the south that had been seen ón sobre todo lo sucedido en in years. BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 142, Pieza 2679. Informaci és del alzamiento general de indios y sedición de los españoles. Foja 213v. Chile despu 521 ía 932 C. Pieza 22. Martín Ruíz de Gamboa. Querellas against Antonio de Acuña A.G.I. Escriban ón. 26 June, 1656. Foja 140 y Cabrera and Juan de Salazar. Concepci 522 Since Chile was again in a post-1598 position, the viceroy Conde de Alba counted as lost to the “re ” in 1600. Over 58 rebellion, all of the money sent from Lima since the beginning of the -conquest “of eight and three Reales and a half” had been spent. A.G.I. Chile 53. years, 16,109,663 pesos Certification from Viceroy Conde de Alba, Lima, 8 August, 1658.
174 523 ía paid for the slaves with goods from her personal them to be sold in Lima. Mar fortune, goods that were undoubtedly meant for the army.524 ’s European This was an especially unfortunate time for the viceroy because Spain enemies were making more difficulties for them in the Caribbean, which of course ’s silver shipment. What had “Spanish lake” was becoming a endangered Peru been a çao and Tortuga islands, the French Martinique European one as the Dutch took Cura and Guadalupe and the English claimed Barbados, St. Christopher, Antigua, and capped off the period by capturing Jamaica in 1655.525 These events were added to the unnerving news that the English had even bigger plans in the Spanish Americas. ón de Casseres, presented to Oliver Cromwell in 1655 called for a A plan by Sim double front attack on Panama from the Pacific and Caribbean, a plan that included details on how and where the Pacific leg would be re-supplied in Chile.526 Therefore, the 1655 rebellion became another excuse for officials in Chile to ask for resources, especially those who could claim they had no hand in provoking it.
After 1655, threats from pirates and Araucanians were now assumed. Officials in
Chile needed to do very little try and convince the viceroy that funds were needed, and the number of colonists who skimmed from the situado and committed excesses “just war” only increased. The War of Arauco, which had began as under the guise of
523 Considering the amount of money the viceroy sent in the yearly situado, it is surprising that no viceroy took an active role in prohibiting the sales of Chilean slaves in Lima, sales that were so obviously prolonging the War of Arauco. 524 ón sumaria que está mandada haver BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 143, Pieza 2706. Informaci érdida y alzamiento general del Reino de Chile, en la causa que sigue el genreal Martín Ruíz sobre la p ña de Gamboa al gobernador de Chile, don Antonio de Acu y Cabrera y el Maestre de Campo don Juan ís Henríquez, tomada al padre Diego de Rosales, Rector de la Compañía de Jesús, en la de Salazar y Sol ón en 3 de Jul(?)io de 1656. ciudad de la Concepci Fojas 293v.-294. 525 “Spain and America in the Six ” in J.H. Elliot, teenth and Seventeenth Centuries, The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume I, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 333-34. 526 Gabriel Guarda, O.S.B. Flandes Indiano: Las Fortificaciones del Reino de Chile 1541-1826 ólica de Chile, 1990), 9. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Cat
175 a tale of sacrifice and shortage, was now making a number of unscrupulous colonists rich.
176 CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: AN EARTHQUAKE RATTLES PERU AND SENDS ’S FRON RIPPLES THROUGH CHILE TIER ECONOMY
The revolt of 1655 was clearly shocking enough to bring major changes to Chile, especially when it came to indigenous slavery. However, the most shocking ón, outgrowth of 1655 remains how little in fact changed. The Bishop of Concepci
Fray Dionysio wrote in 1659 that while he agreed that the fear of being enslaved and “rebel” Indians seek peace, he also saw that the raids taken out of Chile made many ández de Córd were taking a toll on the Spanish. Just as Governor Fern ova had warned thirty years before, the raids had began to tire Spanish horses and soldiers and consumed tremendous amounts of scarce resources, especially when governors went along. 527 The viceroy reminded the king in 1662 that these raids were a distraction to ’ the overall war effort and that soldiers greed had even caused the Spanish to lose battles. 528
The revolt of 1655 was caused by rampant slave taking raids but produced an acute labor shortage in Chile. In 1659 the audiencia asked the king for African slaves, claiming that the devastating earthquake of 1647 coupled with the 1655 revolt had made feeding soldiers increasingly difficult.529 Fray Dioniso also noticed that so “bei many women and children were being sold out of Chile that the colony was ng
527 ón, Fray Dionysio. ón, August 1659 A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Bishop of Concepci Concepci 528 A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Conde de Santisteban Diego de Benavidas a S.M. Lima, 20 November, 1662 529 BN. Manuscritos Medina. Tomo 145, Pieza 2752. Carta de la Real Audiencia de Chile a S.M. El Rey, fecha en Santiago, a...de Junio de 1659. Fojas 110-111.
177 ” He argued that without the raids, more depopulated. yanaconas would remain in
Chile and feel safe enough to stay on their haciendas and Chile would return to the “sustain this and six other days when it had enough wine, bread, meat and legumes to
”530 armies.
Although it was widely recognized that abuse of the local indigenous population had led to the revolt of 1655, there was not an accompanying shift in sympathy to their cause. If anything, it became more difficult for officials in Chile to curb abuse by soldiers and encomenderos. If military tactics and labor needs did not change after ’s 1655, neither did the political attacks on critics of Indian abuse. In one case, Chile írez de Laguna Protector General de Indios, Antonio Ram was subjected to a defamation campaign and actually brought to trail on spurious charges by vindictive
531 írez and powerful encomenderos who thought he was doing his job too well. Ram de Laguna had previously rebuked at least three of his accusers for having their “ ” This of course infuriated the Indians work as slaves. encomenderos one of whom “provoke” Ramírez de Laguna while he was under house arr stopped by to est, and to
532 írez de Laguna was called inform him that he would be testifying against him. Ram ía, a womanizer, was accused of bribery and of running an illegal pulper the profits from which he supposedly added to an imagined and vast hidden fortune.533
If little change came within Chile, the events of 1655 did at least prompt the crown to restrict, if not ban this indigenous slave trade. Letters from Fray Dionysio
530 ón, Fray Dionysio. Concepción, August A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Bishop of Concepci 1659. 531 ánchez Chaparo. Ibid. One of the accusers was Maestre de Campo Domingo S 532 ía 932 A. írez de Laguna. A.G.I. Escriban Response to charges against him. Antonio Ram [Santiago, 1659]. Fojas 324v.-325. 533 ía 932 A. Verdict of the Au A.G.I. Escriban diencia de Chile. Santiago. 26 June, 1660. fojas 578- 580.
178 ’s 1662 and other Chilean ecclesiastics and government officials influenced the king édula order that all Chilean Indians sold to Peru be returned to Chile. In his c he ’s belief that these I shared Bishop Dionysio ndians could be divided among encomenderos in Chile and return abundance to the colony.534
As was to be expected, this extraordinary decision by the king brought no shortage of responses by those affected in Chile and Peru. The Viceroy of Peru,
Diego de Benavides asked that the order be delayed until the king could hear more from Chile and Peru. The viceroy provided the king with a summary of the wide range of arguments he had gathered. Some were against freeing the slaves because they were too valuable in prisoner exchanges and as laborers. Many argued that the
Indians killed and captured colonists and that without punishment and as they were “sin fe ni ley ni palabra” (without faith, law or the word of God) were sure to attack ’s aborigines again. Others argued that Chile outnumbered Spanish colonists and therefore selling Indian slaves to other colonies would mitigate the population discrepancy. Some pointed out that a number of Araucanians had behaved badly in
Peru, and if returned among their own people this would continue or get worse.
Finally there were those who argued that enslavement was justified because those captured were evangelized.535 ’s decision to free the slaves, arguing that sending Other voices supported the king slaves to Lima and slavery in general was an excessive punishment which none of the “rebel provinces of Europe” had endured. Still others felt the Spanish subjects of the ’t go far enough and should have banned slave taking in Chile altogether. king didn
534 édula of 9 April, 1662. A.G.I. Chile 57. Real C 535 Ibid.
179 They pointed out that the Spanish had unjustly conducted multiple raids against
“conspiracy.” 536 indios amigos and had led to an Indian Ultimately however the viceroy suspended the 1662 decree, because he needed the slaves in Peru. Historian
Eugene Korth argued that a reversal or even an interruption in slave supply from
“serious economic crisis” in Peru.537 Chile would have caused a
The decision of the viceroy protected and emboldened Chilean slavers, who needed little motivation to engage in the trade in the first place. Governors also must ’s insubordination lying down have known that the crown would not take the viceroy and would soon issue more restrictions if not a complete ban. Therefore, despite the lessons of 1655, and still suffering its effects, governors took advantage of the potential rewards to be had from slave raids while they were still legal. In fact, the ña’s extent of Antonio de Acu slave taking and corruption was surpassed less than a decade later by another governor, Francisco de Meneses.
One of the most serious accusations leveled by the audiencia against governor
Meneses in their intense 1660s feud was that he ordered slave-taking raids against groups of indios amigos, selling many of them himself for at least 400 pesos each. “a second general uprising,” The oidores feared that this practice would provoke “not unjustified.” In the same letter, the authors which they would have considered ’s right hand man had suddenly become quite wealthy, claimed that the governor acquiring riches that included a number of illegally taken Indian slaves.538 In another letter, the audiencia members wrote that the peace parleys that Governor Meneses
536 A.G.I. Chile 57. Letter from Conde de Santisteban Diego de Benavidas a S.M. Lima, 20 November, 1662. 537 Korth, Spanish Policy, 190. 538 A.G.I. Chile 55. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). Letter from Audiencia de Chile, Santiago, August 9, 1665. Fojas 10-11.
180 boasted of setting up were actually designed to bring potential slaves to him. The judges also claimed that many Indians that made war on the Spanish at this time did so because the Spanish had enslaved their family members, and that Meneses had cut off any possibility of a peaceful resolution by denying them access to the politically persecuted Protector General de Indios.539
The Bishop of Santiago added that Meneses committed abuses of, and within the encomienda system. According to the bishop, Meneses asked for the titles of all the “vacant” and then reissued the encomenderos in Chile, declared the encomiendas titles for a fee. In six months Meneses made 40,000 pesos through this scheme, and the bishop estimated that when the transactions were finished the governor would pocket close to 100,000. 540
The bishop was also concerned about the plight of encomienda Indians “enslave” their Indians, themselves. He said that the encomenderos continued to édula despite his constant admonitions that even included the reading of a royal c “personal service” from the pulpit. The bishop added that no religious or banning secular authority had been able to stop Meneses and the encomenderos, and he feared “excommunicated,” a prediction that came true in Meneses’s that they would die case.541
Through embezzlement, corruption and slave sales Meneses greatly contributed to
“p ” among the creole elite of the late 17th what one author calls the assion for luxury century. One of the main beneficiaries of this wealth was the Flores-Lisperguer
539 A.G.I. Chile 55. Letter to V.M. from Audiencia de Chile. Santiago, Feb. 10, 1666. foja 2v.-3 540 ón del Gobernador de Chile. 1663 A.G.I. Chile,126. Expediente de la actuaci -1665. Fr. D(iego?), Obispo de Santiago de Chile. Letter to S.M. Santiago. 9 August, 1664. 541 Ibid. Diego Barros Arana, Historia general de Chile: Tomo V. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1999), 56-58.
181 ’s family of the central valley. Descendants of a member of Pedro de Valdivia original expedition, the Flores-Lisperguers expanded their considerable fortune through abuse of indigenous servants and were suspected in the murders of a number ’ intervened on behalf of Catalina Flores when the of their political rivals. Meneses audiencia accused her of the murder of a number of her indigenous and African slaves, allowing the family to continue the business of expanding its fortune.
However, Meneses showed his true colors when he tried to take over the family estate
’s 542 upon Flores death citing the fact that she was under investigation. Thanks largely to governors like Meneses, while other colonies started with a boom and fizzled,
Chile began with a whimper but turned its frontier conflict into gain at the expense of its indigenous inhabitants and the royal treasury. ’s seemingly endless tale of malfeasance was an Another wrinkle in Meneses accusation that he was in fact a spy for the English. The captured officer of an íquez Clerque, claimed that he otherwise uneventful English expedition, Carlos Henr had met Meneses in Flanders and that the King of England was fond of him.543 íquez had not made plans to meet up with anyone Another captive testified that Henr in Chile, but that he had heard him say during the voyage that he had a powerful brother-in-law in Peru and that with all his connections he and his men would be
544 íquez later declared that he showered with gifts upon his arrival in Chile. Henr
542 Chile 55A. Expediente de los excesos del Gobernador Francisco Meneses. (1664-1668). án de Chile, Don ..., druante su Expediente relativo a los excesos cometidos por el Gobernador y Capit mandato. . Letter from Audiencia (leveling their accusations against him.) August 9, 1665. Fojas 3, 7v. 543 “Clerque” may have been his last name or his occupation (clerk). Lane, Kris Lane writes that Pillaging the Empire, 132-33. A.G.I. Lima 73. Copy of testimony dated 12 March, 1671 in íquez Clerque. Balparaiso from Dn. Carlos Enr Foja 6. 544 A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Don Juan Fortiscue, (sic) dated Valdivia, 14 March, 1671. Lane has the correct spelling is Fortescue.
182 ’t know whether Meneses was a spy or even if he had corresponded with the didn íquez did confirm King of England. However, Henr the presence of English spies in
545 ’s long and embarrassing administration came to an end the viceroyalty. Meneses in 1670, but he was simply replaced by an equally unscrupulous slave taking
íquez.546 ña’s governor, Juan de Henr Diego de Rosales, who witnessed Governor Acu abuses twenty years earlier, continued to write the king about illegal slave taking still occurring in 1672 and asked the king to put a stop to it. Rosales detailed that under íquez the Spanish continued to call “peace parleys” whose Henr purpose was actually to take more slaves. Rosales also claimed that Spanish officers continued to enslave indios de paz. In one of the more dramatic of these cases, the Spanish enslaved the án had three hundred of his people. When án indio amigo Mtumpill Mtumpill “that very night four masked men entered threatened to go to the governor about this,
”547 his house and killed him as he slept in his bed. ’s complaints, but a 1674 royal ban on slavery The crown did respond to Rosales án was just as ineffective as previous and personal service in both Chile and Tucum
548 íquez was accused of calling impromptu war prohibitions. Even after the ban, Henr ón and declaring raids as part of a “just war” against the Indians, councils in Concepci despite the fact that they had no authority to do so. The viceroy added that no governor had never consulted him or the Audiencia of Chile before calling such
549 íquez took his meetings, and that uzanza was also still regularly practiced. Henr
545 íquez (sic), Reyes, 28 April 1671. Fojas 47 A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Don Carlos Enr -49. 546 “Tres siglos y medio de vida fronteriza,” 39. Villalobos, 547 A.G.I. Chile 57: Expediente de la libertad de los indios esclavos de guerra. 1674-1683. Letter “Mem from Jesuit Rosales which he titles, oria de los caciques de paz, que degollo el Capan Pedro de ño de 1672…” 25 July, 1672. Ripete y de las piezas de paz, que cautivo en esta campeada del a 548 A.G.I. Chile 57. Consejo de Indios, 6 November, 1674. Madrid. 549 A.G.I. Chile,85. Cartas y expedientes de los Virreyes de Lima (sobre asuntos de Chile). Letter
183 noncompliance to such an extreme that his participation in slave taking raids actually led to his impeachment.550
While levels of corruption and abuse of viceregal resources had reached new heights, the return of European enemies in the Pacific once again made it impossible for Peru to rid itself of the Chilean lamprey by discontinuing or restricting the situado. The Spanish had reestablished themselves in Valdivia after the events of the
1640s, but viceroy Diego de Benavides noted that the soldiers there were mostly “the principal reason involved in fighting Indians and rarely saw the pirates who were
”551 for the (re)population of Valdivia. This attitude could probably be described as nervous rather than disappointed, as the viceroy did expect pirates to come. His state ’s failure to control Caribbean of alert was increased in 1669 when the English crown “was piracy led the Spanish crown to warn its colonies that the peace with England
” and that they should be wary of attacks.552 not understood in the Indies The viceroy ón to Valparaiso wrote that Chilean ports from Concepci were ready for an attack but mentioned no specifics. Most his preparations centered around defending Callao.
Chile was again reduced to a lookout role, where their poor intelligence and skittishness resulted in multiple false alarms.553
In 1671 reports reached the viceroy that twelve ships had been spotted off the coast of Valdivia and Lima moved to warn Quito, Panama, Guatemala and the
from Virrey Conde de la Monclova. Lima. 15 July, 1696. 550 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo V, 135. 551 ú, (vistos o resueltos en el Co A.G.I. Lima 63. Cartas y expedientes de virreyes de Per nsejo: Diego de Benavides, conde de Santisteban) 1662. N. 96. Lima, 5 February, 1662. 552 ández de Castro, conde de Lemos. V. a S.M. La A.G.I. Lima,71. Cartas... 1669-1670. Pedro Fern paz con Inglaterra, no le toca a los puertos de Indias. Lima, 1 February, 1670. 553 ández de Castro, Conde de Lemos. A.G.I. Lima,72. Cartas y ... 1671-1672. Pedro Fern V. to S.M. in which is included a copy of letter from Gov. Henriquez regarding English in Valdivia. Lima, 27 January, 1671.
184 Viceroy of New Spain.554 The viceroy was right to be alarmed, as in the same year
Henry Morgan sacked Panama. A month after the warning went out however, the viceroy updated that there was only in fact one ship, which turned out to be piloted by the Englishman John Narborough.555 Narborough landed peacefully in Valdivia in
1671 after exploring the Magellan Strait for a month.556 Just to be on the safe side however, the viceroy sent his own scouts to Chile, who found little evidence of more threats.557 While the perturbed viceroy tried to figure out how one ship became íquez Clerque and his four twelve, officials interrogated the aforementioned Henr fellow crewmen, left behind in Valdivia after English-Spanish talks went sour and
Narborough sailed off.558 ’s activity in “the Spanish Therefore, even though the Narborough expedition ” after these “the whole viceroyalty was in fact put Pacific was minimal declarations into a panic over possible spying connections among internationally mobile Spanish
”559 officials. By this point it was not only Spanish officials but Araucanians and other indigenous groups in Chile who were perpetuating the permanent war to play up the pirate threat. Indios de guerra could spread rumors inventing or exaggerating pirate landings quite readily, as the Spanish often did not have access to certain coastal areas. The indios de guerra did so to increase their reward for seeking peace, to keep the Spanish off guard, or to exact a measure of revenge on the Spanish as seemed to be the case in a 1670 report. The aforementioned erroneous twelve-ship
554 A.G.I. Lima 72. V. to S.M., Lima, 24 January, 1671. 555 A.G.I. Lima 72. V. to S.M., Lima, 14 February, 1671. 556 Barclay, The Lure of Peru, 104. 557 Ibid., 115-16. 558 “damage and The audiencia of Lima also investigated after the king expressed concern at the ” expense that resulted from such an inaccurate report. A.G.I. Lima 73. Real Audiencia de Lima a S.M., Lima, 8 April 1673. 559 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 133-34.
185 report was eventually traced to an eight-month-old rumor spread by enslaved indios de guerra. Those who testified about the twelve ships added that the fictitious é had provoked much excitement as these “ landing in Chilo moros huincas (white
Moors) would liberate them from the slavery the Spanish pretended to impose upon
”560 them.
Paid indigenous informants, while technically allied with the Spanish, were not above exaggerating or inventing indigenous-pirate alliances to keep themselves án employed. Cristobal Talgui Pill was one such informant who reported that the é, “toward the Magellan English had populated two islands 160 leagues from Chilo ” Talgui Pillán added that the English had two forts, artillery, sheep and goats, Strait. “a large ship whose wood was brought b had planted wheat, and were building y
”561 Indians loyal to them. On one island the English were said to have built a stone án described the wall and on the other a mill. In a final embellishment, Talgui Pill
“blond ”562 settlers as -haired and blue eyed.
Somewhat distrustful of the information but at the same time intrigued, the án viceroy sent an expedition to try and find these supposed settlements. Talgui Pill was to guide the group of forty Spanish soldiers and thirty Indians in seven canoes, and was given instructions not to return until he had found the settlements he had testified to viewing. The expedition proved unsuccessful, prompting the viceroy to án’s story. The viceroy argued that had the express his doubts about Talgui Pill
560 ón, aquel caçique prinçipal del ahillo de coipue en los llanos A.G.I. Lima 73. Declaration of Lonc ço por las armas de Valdivia en dhos llanos habra dos uno de los Prisioneros de la maloca que se hi ” 31 December, 1670. Foja meses. Taken en el castillo de San Pedro de Marzera isla de costantino, 110v. 561 ña. Vol. 20 Pieza 11a Fojas 91 ú a S.M., de 28 de abril AN Morla Vicu -101. Carta del virrey del Per ón inglesa en el Estrecho; dilgencias relaizadas para saber efectivamente; de 1675. (Posible colonizaci á para desalojar a los ingleses.), foja 93. medios que utilizar 562 Ibid.
186 án English managed to bring over two hundred settlers to these outposts as Talgui Pill had claimed, the news would have been all over Europe and confirmed by the English court. Having received no such confirmation, the viceroy began to refer to Talgui án’s claims as “fictions and falsehoods.” The viceroy late Pill r received information from captured English sailors who claimed that no such settlements ever existed. 563
The fact remained that the viceroy, albeit suspicious of the information he was getting from informants in Chile, was still very detached from his southern colony ’s best and had to relay these less than reliable reports to the crown. If the viceroy ’s information was based on rumors and hearsay, his task of enforcing the crown wishes was not becoming any easier.
Ironically, it was only after one of the few real pirate attacks on Chile that the fear of these invaders abated. In 1680 and 1686, near the end of the heyday of pirates in the Americas, English buccaneers attacked La Serena after sailing southward from
Panama. In the first attack the town was pillaged and burned, as the residents were caught off guard thinking that the South Sea Armada had chased off the buccaneers.564 The second attack, the last significant pirate activity in Chile was repelled by the Spanish infantry, a rather insignificant battle that nonetheless was “celebrated throughout (Chile) as a great (and rare at that time) victory for the
”565 Spanish army. Colonists would not soon have another chance to repeat this victory however, as the upcoming War of Spanish Succession would occupy most
European mariners and vessels.
563 Ibid.,95- 96. 564 Barros Arana, Historia general: Tomo V, 155. 565 Ibid., 179.
187 As conditions in Lima had much to do with Chilean attempts to prolong the War of Arauco, it is appropriate that events in the viceregal capital interrupted this trend.
A massive earthquake in October of 1687 heavily damaged Lima and left Peru unable to feed itself. A wheat blight that followed the earthquake rendered the Peruvian harvest insignificant for several years.566 As a result, wheat prices in Chile almost immediately tripled in response to the new demand. Although the colony struggled to “Peru’s Sicily,” providing the retool its agriculture, Chile eventually would become viceregal capital with its wheat for much of the 18th century.567 ’s southern frontie Economic viability of course brought changes to Chile r where ’s “tallow century” would soon come to an much of the wheat was grown. Chile
568 ’s main exports were fat, beef and hides to the mines end. In the 17th century Chile
í, while in the 18th of Potos exports shifted to wheat and cereals to Lima. The economy became centered on the more sedentary haciendas instead of the more mobile grazing patterns of estancias. Decreasing mobility meant a decrease in all ío ío. The profitability of wheat export kinds of raiding from both sides of the B -B also put a dent in raids as the illegal export of slaves was no longer such an attractive activity. 569
566 “black powder” fungus, Most historians agree that this blight was caused by the ustilago segetum or although it is not clear whether the fungus was caused by the earthquake or whether its appearance was a terrible coincidence. At the time of course, all manner of explanations were offered including the argument that the earthquake released nitrates and sulfates in the soil, and the belief that this was a punishment from God. Barros Arana, Historia general: 2d ed, Tomo V, 220(n). 567 Ibid., 219(n). 568 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 9. 569 In Chile an arroba of wheat was around five times more valuable than a cow in 1700. Barros Arana, Historia general: 2d ed. Tomo V, 218-220.
188 Also, for the first time since a permanent army was established in Chile in 1604, significant military cutbacks were made to fund mission activity and to provide wheat
570 ’s first to Lima. The War of Arauco was no longer Chile priority.
Missionary activity had been scant in Chile since the end of the Defensive War.
Franciscans and Jesuits worked mostly with indios reducidos and stayed close to or within Spanish settlements or forts. The missionaries lacked the funds and support required to establish new and independent missions, and secular and religious authorities alike were hesitant to send missionaries far into Araucanian territory after the murder of three Jesuits in 1612.571 After decades of failed military attempts to “spiritual conquest” end the conquest the king was ready to make another attempt at a ás Marín de Poveda was given instructions to of Chile. In 1692, new governor Tom establish new missions in Araucanian territory.572 In the next twenty years the Jesuits ín de Poveda’s government it had taken alone founded six new missions. Before Mar more than fifty years to establish as many.
Finally, this new landscape brought changes to frontier political relationships.
While the 17th century was one of raids, the 18th was dominated by parleys.573 This is not to say that conflict was eliminated.574 Some colonists took advantage of the new relative calm to take more slaves, while some indigenous groups used it to gather
570 Ibid. 571 Foerster, Jesuitas y Mapuches, 140. 572 Barros Arana, Historia general: 2d ed. Tomo V, 194. 573 th ón Solís, The authoritative work on 18 century parleys is Le Maloqueros y conchavadores. 574 Kristine Jones points out that much of this raiding simply moved to the more volatile Argentine pampa. She adds that this raiding economy persisted into the 19th century and had an important role in “modern nation states” of Chile and Argentina. Kristine Jones, “ the formation of the La Cautiva: An ío de la Plata: Challenge and Argentine Solution to Labor Shortage in the Pampas, in Brazil and R Response, Luis Felipe Clay Mendez and Lawrence W. Bates, eds. (Charleston, IL: Eastern Illinois University, 1983), 91-94.
189 strength for attacks.575 Demand for indigenous labor did not disappear, and populations continued to decline through abuse and disease.576 Overall however, a more sedentary frontier meant that new energy could be dedicated to cultivating stable relationships, cultivating wheat, and cultivating local labor pools to harvest it. ’s profit margin even decreased the need for tribute through personal Wheat export
th ’s indigenous laborers were lucrative exports, while service. In the 17 century Chile in the 18th they produced them.
While acculturation on the frontier became less and less violent during the 18th
th ’s concept of the poverty and sacrifice of the frontier still and 19 centuries, Valdivia ía and its is a useful one in Chile. Today the idea not only applies to the Araucan ’s sense of unique history, but has become important as a tool for establishing Chile ’s most eminent historians Cristián nationhood. In a 2002 article, one of Chile
Gazmuri, summarized what he believed to be the most important historical “Chilean mentality.” The second antecedent he mentioned antecedents of the modern ’s poverty. He claimed that Chile was the poorest Iberian was Chile -American colony “wealthy and that the crown maintained an interest in the colony only because it was
575 Future governors continued to permit and even order slave taking raids. In response to a 1696 “attempted uprising” by a group of mountain Indians, Governor Thomas Marín de Poveda decided to “take ” belonging to this group. More specifically, the Gover permit raids to piezas nor asked for volunteer soldiers to conduct these raids. Those who captured slaves could determine what to do with ín de Poveda to retract this decision as it was them. The Audiencia of Chile quickly ordered Mar “the liberty of the Indians.” contrary to the orders of His Majesty and infringed upon A.G.I. Chile,85. Cartas y expedientes de los Virreyes de Lima (sobre asuntos de Chile). Letter from Virrey Conde de la Monclova. Lima. 15 July, 1696. Just war doctrines provided a number of exceptions to the ban in New “Carlos II himself condoned the use of Mexico as well. Padre Juan Amondo Niel claimed in 1694 tat ” who were royal funds to ransom Pawnee and Jumano boys and girls held captive by Navajo raiders often destined for beheading if not purchased. Brooks, Captives and Cousins, 123. 576 The Spanish could do little about the epidemics that continued to decimate Indian populations. In a 1692 letter, a number of officials in the town of Mendoza complained of their shortage of Indian laborers, brought to a head by a smallpox epidemic. The authors claimed that the labor pool had been reduced to 175 Indians. They also requested that the crown lift the prohibition on moving African “the other side of the cordillera” so slaves from Buenos Aires to Peru and that Mendoza might survive this crisis.
190 ’s southern door, Peru which had to be defended against corsairs and against the ” Gazmuri added that this poverty not only contributed ambition of European powers. ’s mentality, but continues to be reflected in a national architecture that to Chile
“rustic” quality 577 maintains a from cities to farmhouses.
What began as a failed conquest by a group of experienced soldiers evolved into a ’s south and central valley, but the entire frontier pact that affected not only Chile
Viceroyalty of Peru. Throughout the late 16th century the residents of both sides of the frontier honed their ability to take advantage of this balance of power, until in
1598 when the rules of the colonial pact became crystallized when they were dramatically broken. The war could not be left only simmering if there were attempts to take territory like there were in the 1590s. In the 17th century this simmering conflict attracted even more resources from the viceroy with the sporadic appearance of European pirates near the frontier. By the early 1600s the Araucanians and
Spanish had solidified a formula that could maintain the focus of the viceroy on this otherwise forgotten colony. This formula involved was keeping the War of Arauco alive and exaggerating its threat to the viceroy. By the late 17th century, this formula had become so successful that abuse of the situado actually was getting in the way of the war effort, especially in the aftermath of the 1655 revolt. This cycle of profiteering eroded when after the Lima earthquake of 1687, stability became more profitable than the ebb and flow of raids, trading and peace treaties that had defined the War of Arauco.
577 án Gazmuri, érita. Nuestra historia y Cristi "Rasgos de nuestra mentalidad: Perspectiva pret ía," geograf El Mercurio, September 15, 2002. Available at
191 This project would have been impossible without the scores of enlightening studies by historians and anthropologists alike that have helped us understand the ’s frontier. events and relationships that created Chile Scholars have exhaustively evaluated the role of the multitudes of both local and global actors that determined the ’s frontier development. In that regard, the contribution of this study is a better understanding of how these factors interacted, and how residents of Chile acted not only as participants in the cross cultural exchange that was the vida fronteriza, but how this exchange had an important function in the Viceroyalty of Peru.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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