Rural Work in Nueva Vizcaya: Forms of Labor Coercion on the Periphery Author(S): Susan M

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Rural Work in Nueva Vizcaya: Forms of Labor Coercion on the Periphery Author(s): Susan M. Deeds Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 425-449 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2516301 Accessed: 05-08-2015 15:35 UTC

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This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Hispanic AmericanHistorical Review 69:3 CopyrightC) 1989by Duke UniversityPress ccc ooi8-2i68/89/$i.5o

RuralWork in Nueva Vizcaya:Forms of Labor Coercionon the Periphery

SUSAN M. DEEDS*

AT noonon a swelteringday in June 1674, a smallgroup of ConchoIndians, six men and fivewomen, watched from the shade of a greatalamo tree as ridersapproached. They could see that Captain Pedro de Zubia Pacheco, accompaniedby two servants,was clearlyagitated as he rode up. Wavinghis sword,he orderedthe Indiansto accompanyhim. At thisjuncture, Nicolks de Be- jarano, the tenantof the wheatfarm in theValle de San Bartolom6where these events took place,' emergedfrom his house and, enraged at his loss ofworkers, called forhis sword.Several neighbors who had hastened to the scene restrainedhim fromattacking the older Zubia. In replyto Bejarano'sangry charges that Zubia was stealinghis repartimientogang, the captaininsisted that these were his encomiendaIndians, and thatthe wheat harvestand corn plantingson his Hacienda de Cieneguillawere in danger of being lost forlack of a labor force. He then marchedthe startled,but compliant,Conchos out ofthere. Bejarano soon rallied,and lost littletime in carryinga complaintto the local alcalde mayor,who orderedCaptain Zubia's arrest.2 The subsequentcriminal proceedings highlight many of the tensions inherentin the seventeenth-and eighteenth-centuryevolution of labor systemsin NuevaVizcaya. The case, whichwas ultimatelydecided in favor ofthe repartimientouser, demonstrates that some encomienda grants sur- vived untilthe end of the seventeenthcentury, and offersa clue to the severe shortageof agricultural laborers at harvesttime, the use of Indian intermediariesin labor recruitment,the physicaland psychologicalcoer-

*The author would like to thankJose Cuello, Donna J. Guy, Curtis Hinsley, Jr., Thomas H. Naylor,James D. Riley,and JamesS. Saegerfor commenting on earlierdrafts of thisarticle. 1. Today,Valle de Allendein southeasternChihuahua. 2. Causa criminalcontra Capitdn Pedro de Subia Pacheco, Parral,June 1674, Archivo de Hidalgo de Parral(microfilm copy in the Universityof Arizona Library, cited hereafter as AHP withreel and framenumbers), r. 1674d,fr. 1970-1999.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 426 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS cion involved,and the shiftingadaptive strategies of economicelites in a peripheralarea. The purpose of this articleis to examinehow these diversepatterns fitinto an integratedpicture of labor relations in agriculturallyproductive areas of Nueva Vizcaya. The Nueva Vizcayanheartland examined here encompassesthe hill and valleyregion of the SierraMadre's centralplateau, runningbetween Durango and Chihuahua.This studywill illustrate that,for agricultural purposes, slavery and encomiendaflourished in the seventeenthcentury, and repartimientosurvived until late in the eighteenthcentury, long after"free" wage laborwas employedin miningand aftera smallpermanent class of residenthacienda workers had begun to evolve. In particular,forced draft labor performedby local indigenous peoples provedto be crucialin meetingthe seasonalneeds ofagricultural production. Two featuresof Nueva Vizcaya'slabor historystand out. One is the overlappingand simultaneousimplementation of a varietyof methods forrecruiting labor. The otheris the predominantexercise of coercion throughoutthe entirespectrum of labor systems employed to extractmin- eral and agriculturalsurpluses from the region'spopulation. The latter patternwill not surprisethose scholarsof colonial Latin Americawho have gained insightfrom core-periphery models which ascribe distinc- tivelycoercive characteristics to labor relationsin peripheralareas of the world.3 Nonetheless,as Steve Sternhas recentlypointed out,4 during the past tenyears a plethoraof carefully researched studies of mining, agricultural, and obraje labor has painteda muchmore diverse picture of the coexis- tence ofa varietyof labor arrangements in discreteeconomic enterprises.5 These studieshave generatedsignificant skepticism about the validityof a core-peripherymodel which rests on clear-cutdistinctions between labor systemsin the core (freelabor), the semiperiphery(share relations), and

3. For example: Andr6 Gunder Frank, Capitalismand Underdevelopmentin Latin America:Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York,1967) and ImmanuelWaller- stein,The Modern World System:Capitalist Agriculture and the Originsof the European World-Economyin the SixteenthCentury (New York,1974). 4. Steve J. Stern,"Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-Systemin the Perspectiveof Latin Americaand the Caribbean,"American Historical Review, 93:4 (Oct. 1988),829-872. 5. Ibid., 849-858, 870-871. Individualworks are too numerousto mention;for sum- maries,see Enrique Florescano,"The Formationand EconomicStructure of the Hacienda in New Spain," in The CambridgeHistory of Latin America,Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cam- bridge, 1984-), II, 164-171; Eric Van Young, "Mexican Rural Historysince Chevalier: The Historiographyof the Colonial Mexican Hacienda,"Latin AmericanResearch Review, 18:3 (1983); and ArnoldJ. Bauer, "RuralWorkers in SpanishAmerica: Problems of Peonage and Oppression,"HAHR, 59:1 (Feb. 1979),34-63. See also RichardJ. Salvucci,Textiles and Capitalismin Mexico:An EconomicHistory of the Obrajes, 1539-1840 (Princeton,1987), 40, 97-134.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 427 the periphery(forced labor) of a worldeconomic system. According to Wallerstein'sworld-systems theory, these forms of labor relations, in com- bination,benefit the developmentof the capitalisticsystem as a whole.6 Yet ifthe peripheryitself, in thiscase colonialLatin America,is characterizedby varyingcombinations of free and coercedlabor, then the world systemis not the onlydecisive causal forcein determiningeconomic and laborpatterns. Stern proposes two other "motors" of the colonial economy: "popularstrategies of resistance and survivalin the periphery"and "mer- cantileand elite interestsjoined to an American'center of gravity'."7 The firstsuggestion derives considerable support from the relativelyrecent workof Stern himself and otherslike NancyFarriss who have emphasized the abilityof lower socioeconomicstatus groups to fashionstrategies of resistancewhich allowed them more autonomy (including some choice in labor arrangements).8The second restson a longerhistoriography which has subdividedLatin Americancolonial economies into dynamic core and marginalperipheral areas and assignedthem distinctive labor characteristics.9 In the case of New Spain, labor systemswere seen as havingevolved in a sequentialand overlappingprogression from slavery to encomienda, to repartimiento,to freelabor.'0 The motorsof these shiftswere twofold: declininglabor pools caused by Indian populationloss and the transi- tionfrom premodern to capitalisticeconomies producing for the market. The demographicfactor declined in importanceas indigenouspopulations recoveredby the eighteenthcentury, but the linksto interregionaland world marketstended to growin importanceas commercialagriculture and miningexpanded at the end of the colonial period. Therefore,in core regionsof New Spain, or thosewith dynamic, productive enterprises linked to markets,free wage labor came to predominate.This was the case in the agriculturalenterprises of the Valleyof Mexico and eventu- ally Guadalajara,as well as in the minesof Zacatecas and Guanajuato.In

6. Wallerstein,The ModernWorld System, 126-127. 7. Stern,"Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System,"857-858. 8. "New Approachesto the Studyof Peasant Rebellionand Consciousness:Implica- tionsof the AndeanExperience," in Resistance,Rebellion, and Consciousnessin theAndean. Peasant World, z8th to 20th Centuries,Stern, ed. (Madison, 1987); Nancy Farriss,Maya Societyunder Colonial Rule: The CollectiveEnterprise of Survival (Princeton,1984). See also JamesC. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: EverydayForms of Peasant Resistance(New Haven, 1985). 9. Pioneeringin this respectwas JuanA. and JudithE. Villamarin,Indian Labor in Mainland Colonial Spanish America(Newark, DE, 1975). JamesLockhart and StuartB. Schwartz,in Early Latin America:A Historyof Colonial SpanishAmerica and Brazil (New York,1983), provide a synthesisbased on thishistoriography. 10. Silvio Zavala and Maria Castelo, Fuentespara la historiadel trabajo en Nueva Espara, 8 vols. (Mexico City,1939-46); Charles Gibson, The Aztecsunder Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519-1810 (Stanford,1964), 220-256.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 428 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS the commerciallyexpanding agricultural areas ofthe Bajio, sharerelations were common.11 In marginaleconomic areas, the evolutionaryprogress toward wage laborwas arrestedin the earlystages. Thus, areas likeYucatan and north- ern New Spain retainedmore coercive,servile labor systems,including modifiedencomienda and corv6eforms.'2 For FrancoisChevalier, these coercive relationsof productionfound their expression typically in debt peonage, but recentstudies have emphasizedthe persistenceof slavery, encomienda,and repartimiento.'3Paradoxically, then, these coercivein- stitutionstook root and endured in regionswhich had no preconquest mechanismsfor the allocationand distributionof goods and serviceson a suprakinshipbasis. Coercion providedwhat precedentcould not, and served as a fairlyrational, though inefficient, way to obtain labor from indigenousgroups who did not demandmonetary income and could not be induced readilyto workfor it. At firstglance, the variationin Mexicanlabor systemscould be seen to be linked to the distinctionbetween New Spain's core and marginal areas. On closer examination,however, one findsthat each core area ex- hibitsunique configurationsof labor patterns, that the pathto wage labor or indebtednessmay have deviatedfrom the classic sequence described by Gibson,and thatcoercion in someform is almostnever completely ab- sent.'4The same can be said ofcomparison among peripheral areas whose labor patternsperhaps demonstrateeven less homogeneity.One reason forthis is thatthe inherentpolitical and structuralinstability of frontier regionsengenders more idiosyncraticpatterns of local factorswhich in- fluencethe use of labor. And in peripheralregions, the shortsupply of labor has not servedthe same catalyticfunction that it did in the Valleyof Mexico in the transitionto wage labor,at leastfor agricultural work. In general, regionaldifferences in labor patternsindicate that re- sponses to labor needs were conditionedby peculiar configurationsof

ii. Gibson, Aztecs under Spanish Rule; Van Young, Hacienda and Marketin Eigh- teenth-CenturyMexico: The Rural Economyof theGuadalajara Region,1675-1820 (Berke- ley, 1981); Peter J. Bakewell, Silver Miningand Societyin Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546-1700 (Cambridge,1971); DavidA. Brading,Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajio: Le6n, 1700-1860 (Cambridge,1978). 12. Farriss,Maya Societyunder Colonial Rule, 47-48; PeterGerhard, The NorthFron- tierof New Spain (Princeton,1982), 164-165; Jos6Cuello, "The Persistenceof Indian Slavery and Encomiendain the Northeastof Colonial Mexico, 1577-1723," Journalof Social History, 21 (Summer 1988), 683-700. This phenomenonhad also been noted forother peripheral areas ofthe Spanishempire; see, forexample, James S. Saeger,"Survival and Abolition:The Eighteenth-CenturyParaguayan Encomienda," The Americas, 38:1 (July1981), 59-85. 13. La formationdes grands domainesau Mexique: Terreet societyaux XVIe-XVile sieces (Paris, 1952). On the questionof whether peonage was synonymouswith either debt or forcedservitude, see Bauer, "RuralWorkers" and Alan Knight,"Mexican Peonage: What Was It and WhyWas It?,"Journal of LatinAmerican Studies, i8: 1 (May 1986), 41-74.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 429 such local variablesas populationtrends, the relativevalue ofthe natural resourcesbeing exploited, the degree of elite solidarity, regional and inter- regional marketconsiderations, and indigenoussociocultural patterns. What were the local factorsthat sustained systems of forcedlabor in the Nueva Vizcayanheartland despite a shrinkingIndian labor force from the early seventeenthcentury through much of the eighteenth?What were theroles of government officials, the agricultural elites, and theindigenous populationin determiningtheir endurance? Although the primaryfocus of thisarticle is on agricultural,especially seasonal, work, other regional labor needs will be consideredto providean integratedpicture of labor strategies. In the late sixteenthcentury, silver first attracted settlers to the area northof Durango (see Map i). The frontiermoved northward to Chihua- hua and beyondwith successive silver strikes and boom-and-bustcycles in the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies. The well-wateredvalleys and rollinghills of the SierraMadre's centralplateau between Durango and Chihuahua became the source of foodstuffsfor the miningecon- omy. Despite the generalaridity of the region,the alluvial floodplains and basin floorswere suitablefor wheat and maize cultivationwith irri- gation. The semiaridgrasslands, dotted with springs,proved favorable forcattle ranching. The mostprosperous area was the Valle de San Bar- tolom6,where cereal and livestockproduction coexisted.'5 At the turnof the seventeenthcentury, the Nueva Galicianbishop, Alonso de la Mota y Escobar, notedthe cultivationof wheat, maize, manyvarieties of fruits and vegetables,and growingherds of cattle along the Rio Florido.'6Live- stockranches were also foundalong the Conchos,San Pedro, and Nazas rivers.To the east of the rollingupland areas was the Bols6n de Ma- pimi,.where the hot desertclimate limited land use to ranching.To the west rose the easternescarpment of the SierraMadre Occidentalwith its thousand-metercanyons. The productiveland in thatearly mining region of Topia was confinedto a fewriver valleys and isolatedcanyon bottoms wherecorn, sugarcane, and fruitswere cultivated.'7 The Spaniardswho came to thisarea did notfind it uninhabited.Over 30oo,ooorancheria Indians, sernisedentaryagriculturalists with no tradi-

14. For examples, see Cheryl E. Martin,Rural Societyin Colonial Morelos (Albu- querque,1985), 140-149 andVan Young, Hacienda and Market,238-245. Theauthor would like to thankJos6 Cuello forcontributing to the developmentof this insight. 15. For more extensivedescriptions of the region,see RobertC. West, The Mining Communityin New Spain: The Parral MiningDistrict (Berkeley, 1949) and Gerhard,The NorthFrontier of New Spain, 161-243. 16. Descripci6ngeografica de los reinos de Nueva Galicia, Nueva Vizcaya y Nuevo Le6n (Mexico City,1940), 186-200. 17. West and J.J. Parsons,"The Topia Road: A Trans-SierranTrail of Colonial Mexico," GeographicalReview, 31 (1941),406-413.

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N r NUEVA VIZCAYA Laa t .i de los

/.- Chihuahua Ro j COAHUILA

SONORA 0Sana Eulalia -A Cusiguiridchic San Pedro 'I, ,J \ Santa Marra de Conchas ( \ ~~~~deIas- t80L6N .Cuevas Satero :::t , Cs~~~~~~anFrancisco; D j 2 :>, Santa Cruzt

)Huejotitlan t Parral Flrd joquilla M A P IMI fSan Pablot Elo A Atotonilco ( 0 0 ~~~~~SanBartolom~ G El Fuerte \ \ San Miguel de las Bocas / -o Cerrogordo / Guanacevi Tizonazo 1 N SINALOA \ 0 t Mapimo'D > ~~tZape nd / El Gallo

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t MISSION\ : :% $ San Juan del Rio . o PRESIDIO - 0 SETTLEMENT ( San NPablo Durango / \ : :.>s ~~t~t t Durango0 / NUEVA GALICIA Pueblo Nuevo. r\ Pueblo Nombre de Dios' ( OSombrerete MAP REA -0 \ | t \\ : :< /l 0 Fresnillo

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MAP I: Sixteenth-century Nueva Vizcaya

tion of town life, posed a potential obstacle to Spanish domination.'8 The task of congregating the Concho, Acaxee, Xixime, Tepehuan, and lower

i8. See Edward H. Spicer,Cycles of Conquest:The Impactof Spain, Mexicoand the UnitedStates on the Indians of the Southwest,1533-1960 (Tucson, 1962), 8-14, fora de- scriptionof the dispersedsettlement patterns of these groups who tilledmaize, beans, chile, and squash in irrigablelocations and hunted,changing rancheria locations from valley to mountainin a formof transhumance during the year.A dissentingview whichhypothesizes a moreurban type of settlement for some northwestern Indians is Daniel T. Reff,"Old World Diseases and the Dynamics of Indian and JesuitRelations in NorthwesternNew Spain, 1520-166o," in Ejidos and Regionsof Refugein NorthwesternMexico, N. Ross Crumrine and Phil C. Weigand,eds. (Tucson,1987), 85-94. For populationestimates, see Gerhard, The NorthFrontier, 169-170.

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TarahumaraIndians fell to the Franciscanand Jesuitorders. It was a for- midabletask, but one thatproved crucial to thedevelopment of the Nueva Vizcayan heartlandbecause the missionenterprise facilitated the most efficientorganization of agriculturalmanpower in a labor-scarceregion. Althoughthe labor shortageeventually led to the creationof a predomi- nantly"free" work force in the northernmines, mission pueblos became the main sourceof seasonal agricultural labor. Both miningand agricultureused a varietyof labor systems,often overlapping,in the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies. Among the earliest workersused by Spaniardsin Nueva Vizcaya were Indian and black slaves. Indian captivesfrom the newlyconquered areas as well as fromZacatecas and black slaves and Nahuatl-speakingIndians brought fromcentral Mexico performed mining, agricultural, and domestictasks.'9 Many of the Indiansresident on haciendasin the Parralarea were classi- fied as naborios and tied to the land in serflikestatus.20 The less socially complexindigenous organization, coupled withnative hostility to the in- vaders,worked against ready exploitation of local Indianlabor. This posed a serious problemfor silvermining until a steadyextraregional supply of labor could be appropriated,but Spain's dependenceon silverbullion meant that inducementsto laborerswould favormining, especially for those tasksrequiring technical skills. A voluntary,paid labor systemdid develop in the farnorthern mines from the midseventeenthcentury, rep- licatingpatterns found in Zacatecas and otherareas of the near north.2' Ethnically,the mininglabor force encompassed Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and blacks.22 Still, forced labor, particularlyfor less skilled jobs, and

19. On Indian slavery,see CharlesW. Hackett,ed., HistoricalDocuments Relating to New Mexico,Nueva Vizcaya,and ApproachesThereto, to 1773,3 vols. (Washington,1926), II, 161-163;oln black slaves, see PeterBovd-Bowman, "A SpanishSoldier's Estate in North- ern Mexico, 1642," HAHR, 53:1 (Feb. 1973), 95-105 and reportof Padre Hernando de Santaren,n.p., n.d. (ca. i6oo), ArchivoGeneral de la Naci6n,Mexico City (hereafter AGN), Jesuitas,11-4. This practicecorresponded to a universalpattern in the Spanishcolonies; see MurdoJ, MacLeod, "Aspectsof the Internal Economy of Colonial Spanish America: Labour; Taxation;Distribution and Exchange,"in CambridgeHistory of LatinAmerica, II, 221. 20. Using matrimonialrecords from Parral, Chantal Cramaussel finds that at least half of the hacienda workersin thisarea duringthe second quarterof the seventeenthcentury were n-aboriosattached to the estates;she comparestheir status to thatof yanaconas in Peru. See "Haciendas y mano de obra en la Nueva Vizcayadel siglo XVII: El curatode Parral," paper read at the 46th CongresoInternacional de Americanistas,Amsterdam, July 1988, 2-5. The termnaborio was used variablyin thecolonial period to conveylegal statusranging fromslave to freeor even legallyfree but subjectedto slaveryin practice. 21. West, The MiningCommunity, 48-53; Ignaciodel Rio, "Sobre la aparici6ny desa- rrollodel trabajolibre asalariadoen el nortede Nueva Espafia(siglos XVI y XVII)," in El trabajo y los trabajadoresen la historiade Mexico,Elsa C. Frostet al., eds. (Tucson,1979), 92-11 1; Bakewell,Silver Mining, 121ff. 22. Visita of Alonso del Castillo to minesof San Diego and Santa Barbara,June 27, 1646, AHP, r. 1646a,fr. 13-22; West,The MiningCommunity, 48-53.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 432 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS otherforms of coercionincluding the withholdingof wages and emolu- ments,also characterizedmining.23 If some coercionwas necessaryto assure a steadywork force in the potentiallymore lucrative mining enterprise, in agriculturethe need for it was more pronounced.Although permanent resident work forces did evolve on northernhaciendas, these were relativelysmall; forthe most partthey consisted of a fewskilled workers and importedIndians, either slaves or naborios,who were bound to the haciendawithout wages or creditadvances. The bulkof agricultural labor, employed in seasonaltasks ofharvesting and planting,was recruitedthrough encomienda and repartimiento.Contrary to themodel for the north proposed by Chevalier,debt peonage was not the mostcommon means of labor procurement.In fact, bindinglarge numbersof workers,who would at the veryleast have to be fed,clothed, and housed,to the agriculturalestate was noteven desir- able.24The goal was to appropriatesufficient labor at peak times,primarily plantingand harvest. During the first50 yearsof Nueva Vizcaya'sexistence, periodic dis- coveriesof silverdeposits west and northof Durango in such places as Santa Barbara and Topia increasedthe demand forlabor, in the silver minesand on the stockranches and grainfarms which were establishedto supplythe mines. Spaniardscontinued to use slavesand to importlabor- ers fromoutside in variousbinding arrangements, but theyalso attempted to use the local indigenousgroups who were in the earlystages of con- gregation.Franciscans and thenJesuits began to establishmissions in the late sixteenthcentury. In theeastern portion, Franciscan missions congregated Tepehuanes and Conchosin the Santa Barbaraand San Bartolome districts,while the Jesuitsinitiated their labors on the westernedge. First,they set up missionsamong the Acaxee and XiximeIndians who in- habitedthe miningregion of Topia, straddlingthe present-dayboundary between Sinaloa and Durango; thenthey moved into the Tepehuan and Tarahumaraareas northof Durangoby the L630s.25 Congregationalmost invariably followed the establishmentof Spanish miningcamps and estates;this process occurred slowly and withmixed responsesfrom Indian groups,whose oftenreceptive initial stance could

23. Martin,"Labor Relationsand Social Controlin Chihuahua,1700-1750," paper read at the AmericanHistorical Association meeting, Chicago, Dec. 1986. 24. See n. 13. 25. On the Franciscanmissions, see William B. Griffen,Indian Assimilationin the Franciscan Area of Nueva Vizcaya (Tucson, 1979). The Jesuitmissionary provinces are studiedin Peter M. Dunne, PioneerJesuits in NorthernMexico (Berkeley, 1944) and Early JesuitMissions in Tarahumara(Berkeley, 1948) and Susan M. Deeds, "Renderingunto Caesar: The Secularizationof Jesuit Missions in Mid-EighteenthCentury Durango" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof Arizona, 1981).

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 433 shiftafter a few years to outrightrebellion, due both to civilianexploi- tationand missionarypressure.26 Spaniards sought encomiendas, first in lands theydiscovered as well as amongrancheria Indians being congregated into largermission units; later they claimed that their services in puttingdown rebellionsentitled them to encomiendagrants.27 In Nueva Vizcaya, it should be emphasized,the encomiendafunc- tionedonly as a laborinstitution. Even afterthe right to exactpersonal service fromencomienda had been abolishedin centralMexico (1549), north- ern encomenderosexercised the rightto commutetribute payments to labor,although personal service was limitedtheoretically to threeweeks per year.28The Nueva Vizcayanencomienda, then, although a different institutionto contemporarySpaniards, functioned as repartimiento;the only differencewas thatit was not a government-regulatedexchange of laborfor wages. It was used in bothmining and agriculture. Records of early encomiendasare rare,but documentsfrom judicial disputesover themin the 1640S containcopies of grantsissued forthree lives in the late sixteenthand earlyseventeenth centuries.29 Many of these encomiendasof Concho and Tepehuan Indianswere held by landowners in the Valle de San Bartolome.Other evidence of encomiendasin the 1580s and 1590S comes fromreports by Jesuitsin Topia, where grantsof Xixime and Acaxee Indians providedlabor in the mines of San Andres and Topia and even as faraway as Santa Barbara.The veryrapid popu- lationdecline amongthese Indians by the earlyseventeenth century was attributedby mostcontemporary accounts to disease and harshworking conditions.Exploitation is also cited as the reason for the Xixime and Acaxee revoltsin the firstdecade ofthe seventeenthcentury.30 The earliestencomiendas were drawnfrom Indian rancheriasrather than permanentpueblos, and Indian middlemenfacilitated recruitment. Subsequentcongregation of Indiansin missions,where successful,made themmore accessiblefor distribution. Ironically, this revitalized the en-

z6. These earlyrevolts occurred often in NuevaVizcaya: among the Acaxee in 16oi, the Xiximein 1609, the Tepehuan in i6ii, the Concho in 1644,and the Tarahumarain 1648. 27. Nueva Vizcayangovernors were authorizedto grantencomiendas from the timeof the firstgovernor, Francisco de Ibarra. See Jos6Ignacio Gallegos, Durango colonial,1563- 1821 (Mexico City, 1960), 109-110. Indianstaken prisoner in the rebellionswere also sold as slaves (Hackett,Historical Documents, II, 32). 28. Gov. Diego de Ibarra to king, Oct. 14, 1582, ArchivoGeneral de Indias, Seville (hereafterAGI), Audienciade Guadalajara,leg. 29. 29. Petitionof Pedro Vdzquez to Gov. Luis de Valdes, Valle de San Bartolom6,Jan. 9, 1645, AHP, r. 1648, fr.56-57; lease agreementof heirsof Sim6nCordero, Parral, Nov. 1652, AHP, r. 1652c,fr. 1049ff 30. Reportof Jesuit visitor Andr6s P6rez de Ribas,June 13, 1617and reportof P. Diego de Alejos, Teguciapa, May i8, 1617,both in AGN, ArchivoProvisional, Misiones, caja 2; reportof P. Diego Xim6nez,San Andr6s,n.d., AGN, Jesuitas,III-15.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 434 | HAHR | AUGUST i SUSAN M. DEEDS comienda at the same time that declining numbers of Indians should have made it less efficientbecause a few encomenderos were able to monopolize the local labor supply. Anotherfactor contributing to the perpetuation of encomiendas, traditionallygiven in reward formilitary service, was the continuous warfare which kept supplying new militaryheroes.3' Despite repeated prohibitions, new encomiendas were still being granted as late as the i66os.32 As the number of Spaniards demanding labor increased, especially afterthe Parral silver strikein 1631, encomenderos oftenrented out their charges. This mere palliative could hardly meet labor needs. Nueva Vizca- yan governorsof the second quarter of the seventeenthcentury recognized as much and began the practice of assigning Indian labor in repartimiento. In effect,officials began to limit the prerogatives of encomenderos and landowners in regulating labor exchange.33In this case also, the practice of repartimiento escalated at the very time its abolition was ordered in the viceroyalty. Nonetheless, viceregal officialstolerated and regulated the practice in the north, with periodic admonitions to observe the laws limitingthe numbers taken froma pueblo, the distances traveled, and the length of service. Jesuitand Franciscan missionaries,realizing thattheir reduction efforts could redound more to the benefitof Spanish encomenderos than to meet their own growing need for an agriculturallabor supply, viewed repartimiento as a compromise for sharing labor. Missions were often located near Spanish farmsand ranches in areas with adequate water supply. Mis- sionaries introduced agricultural techniques such as crop rotation, com- plex irrigationsystems, and horticultureto substantialnumbers of Indians, thus helping to engender a more skilled labor force by midseventeenth century. Because missionaries followed Spanish miners and settlers to much of this area, they were never able to monopolize Indian labor to the extent the Jesuitsdid later in Sonora, and were accordingly prepared to tolerate repartimientodrafts of mission Indians formining and agriculture. Although sharing labor was not theirpreference, the religious orders recognized that this arrangementoffered them some advantages, whereas

31. Capt. BernardoG6mez to Gov. Enrique Ddvila y Pacheco, Apr. 8, 1658, AHP, r. 1657b,fr. 895. G6mez attributedthe frequentlegal actionsconcerning encomiendas to the factthat governorshad rewardedmore soldiersthan could be accommodatedby existing bands of Indians. Gov. Diego Guajardo Fajardo freelydistributed encomiendas after the rebellionsof the 1640s; see petitionof Francisco Martinez Orej6n to governor,Valle de San Bartolom6,June 6, 1655,AHP, r. 1655b,fr. 640-650. 32. Real c6dula to Gov. Antoniode Oca Sarmiento,June 22, 1670,in Hackett,Historical Documents, II, 201. 33. Real c6dula to governorof Nueva Vizcaya, Marqu6s de Salinas,Mar. 11, 1629,AHP, r. 1652d, fr. 1784-86.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 435 the otheroptions of encomiendaand peonage would have allowed civil elites nearlyunlimited control over Indians.They were alreadyfamiliar withthe costs of hiringlaborers to begin buildingmissions; after paying importedIndian workersto dig irrigationditches and to prepare fields forplanting, they were anxiousto develop access to a freelabor source as expedientlyas possible.34Of course,the demandsmade by missionaries added to the Indians'burdens unless one judges thatthe benefitsof missionlife were compensatory. Following epidemics of smallpoxor measles in every decade after Spanishcontact and a particularlysevere one in 1639-40, the 1640s and 1650s broughtheightened conflict over access to agriculturallabor. From the timeof contact (between 1560 and 1590), populationdeclined 50 percent by 1650, reachingan overallfigure of 90 to 95 percentdecline by 1678.35In addition,several Indian rebellionsamong the Conchos,Tepe- huanes, and Tarahumarasin the 1640s and i650s temporarilyremoved these formerlaborers from the pool, while divertingother Indians, who servedas auxiliariesin thecampaigns to suppressthe rebellions, from pro- ductiveactivities. The TarahumaraIndians staged their first revolt after a smallpoxepidemic in 1645. Otherrevolts followed in i65o and 1652 after severalyears of drought, and theywere succeeded by new epidemics.36 Labor patternsat midseventeenthcentury were chaotic. As reparti- mientowas increasinglyemployed for seasonal labor, small cadres ofresi- dent workers,whose degree of autonomyvaried widely, provided year-

34. Evelyn Hu-Dehart, Missionaries,Miners and Indians: Spanish Contact withthe Yaqui Nation ofNorthwestern New Spain, 1533-1820 (Tucson, 1981), 45-48. The Jesuits respondedto chargesagainst their stranglehold in "Apologeticodefensorio y puntualmani- fiesto... 1657,"AGN, Historia316. On hiredlabor (naborios gaiianes), see the accountsin Cuentas de la Real Caja de Durango,May 22, 1599,AGI, Contaduria,980-982. The questionof whether missionaries should pay Indiansfor work on missionlands proved an ongoing one; see decree of Audienciade Guadalajara,1671, in Hackett,Historical Documents, II, 201, 207 and exchangebetween Jesuits and Gov. IgnacioJose Vertiz y Ontafi6n,1735, AGN, Jesuitas,I-ii. 35. Gerhard, The North Frontier,places the rate forall of Nueva Vizcaya by i650 at about 54 percent.Comparison of Jesuitcounts in 1590 and 1678 yieldsrates of decline rangingfrom 90 to 95 percentamong the Acaxee, Xixime, and TepehuanIndians; see Andr6s P6rez de Ribas, Triunfosde nuestraSanta Fe entregentes las indsbarbarosas yfieras del nuevo orbe (Madrid, 1645), III, lib. 9, cap. 2; the 1678 visitareport of Juan Ortiz Zapata, Documentospara la historiade Mexico(Mexico City, 1853-57), 4thseries, vol. III, 301-419 (hereafterDHM). Evidence on therole of epidemics in mortalityis foundin theJesuit cartas anuas of 1598, 1607, and i6o8 in AGN, Historia,vol. 19, exps. 7, 9, io; reportof P6rez de Ribas, Tesamo,June 13, 1617, AGN, ArchivoProvisional, Misiones, caja 2; reportsto padre provincialby P. Nicolas de Zepeda, San Miguel de las Bocas, Apr. 28, 1645; and P. Jos6 Pascual, San Felipe, June29, 1651, DHM, 4-Ill, 130-143, 179-209. 36. Capt. Baltasarde Ontiberosto governor,Dec. 26, 1645, AHP, r. 1648, fr.25; P. Gaspar de Contrerasto P. Prov. FranciscoCalder6n, Parras,May 1, 1653 and punta de annua, P. Ger6nirnode Figueroa,San Pablo, June8, 1662,both in DHM, 4-Ill, 210-222.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 436 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS roundservice on haciendas.In some cases, thesewere workerswho had originallybeen grantedfor limited service in encomiendasbut were now classifiedas propertyin estate inventories.37Resident workers also in- cluded black slaves, mestizos,and mulattos,but in Parralafter 1650, the majorityof hacienda residentsconsisted of Indian slaves fromSinaloa, Sonora,and New Mexico.38The practiceof rentingthe servicesof these permanentworkers to otherlandowners was common;the wages earned went to the owneror his mayordomo.Peons who complainedabout this practicewere consideredungrateful by theirpatrones and oftensubjected to corporalpunishment.39 Skilled workers(sirvientes) earned fromfour to eight pesos per month,more than the normfor hacienda workers in centralMexico. Accountbooks show substantialcredit balances to these workers,and thismay indicate they were not being paid, a situationwhich would have limitedtheir mobility. When voluntaryor forcedlabor was remunerated,it was rarelyin specie but mostoften in itemsof food and clothingwhich were overvalued.40Lest this descriptionpaint a picture whichhighlights only "unfree" conditions, we shouldnote that some workers were able to movefreely from one haciendato another.Those Indians who cooperatedwith the Spaniardsin puttingdown rebellionsseem to have enjoyedthis advantage. Furthermore,some northernIndians, particularlyTarahumaras and Yaquis, actuallysought wage labor in the mines. There are indications that mineownersattempted to bind Indian workersby debt, although theirefforts did not enjoymuch success. Nonetheless,the highdegree of mobilitydoes not necessarilymean thatIndians who wentvoluntarily to workin the minesalways fared well. In 1651,municipal officials in Parral chargedthat many Indian wage laborerswere dyingas a resultof terrible workingand livingconditions in the miningcamps and thatlocal priests refusedto burythem because theydied penniless.42

37. Sale of haciendaby FranciscoCano de los Rios to JuanCarrasco, San Diego de las Minas, Aug. 18, 1655, AHP, r. 1652C, fr.980-982; lease agreementbetween heirs of Sim6n Corderoand JuanPaydn, Valle de San Bartolom6,1652, AHP, r. 1652C, fr.1049. 38. Cramaussel,"Haciendas y mano de obra,"6-8. Indiansfrom those areas are also foundin the parishrecords of Valle de San Bartolom6,but theyrepresent a minorityuntil after1690; see Griffen,Indian Assimilation, 58-59. 39. Causa criminalcontra Francisco de Bustamante,Parral, June 1652, AHP, r. 1652d, fr. 1736-1767; this case refersto the commonpractice of corporalpunishment despite repeated royalprohibition. See also reportof Gov. Antoniode Oca Sarmientoto viceroy, Parral,Mar. 12, 1667, Hackett,Historical Documents, II, 193. 40. Accountbooks, Haciendas de San Juany de Bocas, 166o, AHP, r. 1668b, fr.590- 603; West, The MiningCommunity, 73. 41. Testimonyof Concho Indiansto governor,Parral, Nov. 29, 1652, aridJune 3, 166o, in AHP, r. 1652d,fr. 1785ff, and r. 166oc,fr. 1692-1724. The lackof overarching indigenous politicalstructures helped ensure that specificrevolts would not attractsupport from all bands or rancheriasof a particulargroup.

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Withinthis spectrumof labor systemsat midseventeenthcentury, disputesover labor escalated. Wheat farmersin Valle de San Bartolome complainedthat the governorwas assigningtheir encomiendaIndians in repartimientoto theirneighbors. Miners in Parralsought the resto- rationof theirencomiendas which had been brokenup by labor drafts formaking charcoal and harvestingwheat. In 1648, the governorautho- rizedalcaldes mayores to assignrepartimientos for public works projects.43 Althoughminers employed increasing numbers of mestizos and mulattos, local repartimientoIndians were also being sent to the mines.44Docu- mentsconcerning the draftof Indians from the Jesuit mission of Zape for the Guanacevi minesin 1648 indicatethat quotas of laborersfor one ro- tationalcycle were calculatedon thebasis ofone-third of the able-bodied adultmales, ratherthan the 2 to 4 percentstipulated by law.45 Encomenderosdesperately sought judicial redress to salvage their grantsfrom the 1650s throughthe i66os, buttheir efforts were doomedto failure.This was recognizedby CaptainBernardo Gomez de Montenegro, a wheat growerin San Bartolom6.The problem,as he saw it, was thatin rewardingsoldiers for their services governors had stretchedthe limits of encomiendaby awardingthe same encomiendato as manyas fouror fiveSpaniards. He spoke fromexperience, for he had done legal battle withtwo otherencomenderos; each claimedcontrol of the same Concho band and each had title,dated 1637, 1645,and 1655, respectively.46The necessityof redefining encomiendas after the numbers of Indians assigned in themwere successivelyreduced by rebellionsand naturalcauses also contributedto thischaos. In 1670, a royalcedula directedto the governorof Nueva Vizcaya forbadethe practiceof grantingrepartimientos under the titleof encomienda. That thislaw was enforcedis testimonyto the end of the enco-

42. SargentoMayor Juan Martin de Linerasto governor,Real de San Diego, June15, 1649, AHP, r. 1649, fr.1484; Lucas Merinoto governor,Parral, July 3, 1646,AHP, r. 1648, fr. s4ff;diputados del Real del Parralcontra curas de Parralsobre derechosde naborios, Audienciade Guadalajara,May 15, 1651, BibliotecaPublica de Jalisco,Archivo Judicial de la Audienciade Nueva Galicia (hereafterBPJ, AJANG), caja 3, exp. 9. 43. Capt. Diego Porrasto governor,Parral, Dec. 9, 1645, AHP, r. 1648, fr. 23-25; Sebastian Gonzalez de Vald6s to governor,Parral, July 30, 1646, AHP, r. 1648, fr. 38; decree of Gov. Luis de Vald6s, Parral,May 20, 1645, AHP, r. 1648, fr. 14-16. Most of the encomienda-repartimientodisputes occurred in May and Juneat the timeof the wheat harvest. 44. Visitade Alonso del Castilloa las Minas de San Diego y Santa Barbara,June 27, 1646, AHP, r. 1646a,fr. 13-22; petitionof Ind6 minersto governor,Sept. 19, 1646, AHP, r. 1648, fr.38; petitionof Alonso de Medina to governor,Parral, Mar. 13, 1641,AHP, r. 1648, fr. 12-14. 45. Petitionof Guanacevi minersto governor,Parral, Feb. 8, 1648, AHP, r. 1648, fr. 188ff. 46. This lengthyproceeding is foundin AHP, r. i657b, fr.820-897.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 438 | HAHR I AUGUST | SUSAN M. DEEDS mienda'sviability. No new encomiendaswere granted,although disputes overprevious grants, such as the incidentof 1674 describedat the begin- ningof this article, continued to flareup. GovernorJose Garcia de Salcedo refusedto recognizethe encomienda,fined Zubia, and orderedhim to pay anyIndians who workedfor him.47 In the 1670s and i68os, repartimientodrafts grew in number,draw- ing heavilyon Franciscanand Jesuitmissions. This increasereflected the expansionof Spanishsettlement into new miningareas and collateralac- quisitionof land. Throughoutthe region,pressures on missionvillages fromrepartimiento and frominternal obligations precipitated flight to zones of refugein the mountaincanyons or to miningtowns in searchof paid work.48Silver strikes around Cusihuiriachic opened up Tarahumara territorypreviously uncolonized by Spaniards.The Tarahumarahad never submittedeasily to forcedlabor, althoughnumbers of themhad sought workas temporarywage laborersin the Valle de San Bartolomeand in the Parralmines since the earlyseventeenth century. The labor needs of the new minesmade the Tarahumaraa primetarget for labor brokers who pressedthem into service in the minesand in cuttingwood forcharcoal. Theirlands began to be appropriatedfor agricultural purposes.49 In thosedecades, continueddemographic decline also stimulatednew land acquisitionsalong the Conchos and San Pedro rivers.50In the most spectacularcase of growth,Sargento Mayor Valerio Cortes del Rey ob- tainedthrough grants and purchasemore than 25,000 hectaresalong the Conchos river.His cattlehaciendas produced much of the beef supplied to miningtowns and laterbecame partof the Cortesdel Rey mayorazgo establishedin i689.5' Mostof the land grabbing,however, contributed to the formationof smallerholdings, ranging from small ranchos to moder- atelylarge haciendasof 8oo to 4,ooo hectares.Very often these holdings grewat the expense of missionvillages, whose lands began to be pared. In Topia, the parcelsacquired by vecinos tended to be verysmall, reflect- ing the subsistenceexistence of Spaniardsin this mountainousregion.52

47. See n. 2. For the c6dula of 1670 and argumentsconcerning pay forIndian labor, see real provision,Audiencia de Guadalajara,Nov. 23, 1670, BibliotecaPlblica de Jalisco, Archivode la Audienciade Nueva Galicia,caja 4, exps. 1-39. 48. Reportof Juntade Guerrato viceroy,Mexico City,Aug. 4, 1704, AGN, Historia, vol. 20, 1o0. 1. 49. Thomas Sheridanand Thomas H. Naylor,Rarannuri: A TarahuinaraChronicle, 1607-1791 (Flagstaff,1979), 39-70; individualmissionary reports, 1690, in AGN, Archivo Hist6ricode Hacienda,Temporalidades (hereafter AHH, Temp.),leg. 279, exps. 66, 67, 69, 70, 112-115. 50. Pestes were again reportedto have takengreat tolls amongchildren in 1666 and 1676 (reports of 1668 in DHM, 4-III, 223-230, 259 and OrtizZapata visitareport). 51. Varioussuits involvingthe Cort6s del Rey mayorazgoare in AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara,leg. 120 and AHP, r. 1724b,fr. 731-756; see also AHP, r. 1667,fr. 738-743. 52. Deeds, "Land TenurePattern in NorthernNew Spain," The Americas,41:4 (Apr.

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By 1690, proliferatingnumbers of Spanishlandholdings surrounded the missions;orders (mandamientos) forrepartimiento grew in proportion. In the 169os,a seriesof factors combined to precipitatea crisisin the generaleconomic state of the regionwhich did notbegin to be overcome untilthe second decade ofthe eighteenthcentury. At a timeof increased demandfor labor, famine and epidemicstruck. A droughtin thefirst three yearsof the decade resultedin shortagesof wheat and corn. Deaths from a measles epidemic in 1693 were reportedlyvery high throughoutthe province,and otherepidemics ensued in the nextthree years.53 During the decade, the Tarahumararevolted several times; the final rebellionwas suppressedonly at greatcost in livesand royaltreasury funds in 1698. The Tarahumararevolts laid bare theserious rift between the civil and religiouselites, as each groupstridently attributed blame forrebel- lion to the other'sexploitative forms of control.54 In fact,both were right; the Tarahumaratenaciously resisted coercion no matterwhat the source. Not thatthey would notwork when they wanted to; nearlyall colonialob- serverscommented favorably on theirindustry. Yet, ofall the indigenous groupsconsidered here, the Tarahumara were the mostresistant to Span- ish intrusions.They were guidedby an ethicwhich emphasized individual initiativeand voluntaryaction in groupeconomic tasks. They drew such strongdistinctions between themselves and outsidersthat they systemati- cally retreatedtoward the northwesternbarrancas of the SierraMadre in an effortto avoid contactwith Spaniards. When they could not,they were capable ofviolent resistance.55 Elsewhere in the region,missions and haciendas were subjectedto increasedraiding by nomadicIndian groupsto the northand east.

1985), 451-453; registro de un sitio . . . Huejotitldn, Nov. 3, 1670, AHP, r. 1669a, fr. 282-299; petitionof Capt. Diego de Quir6s, Jan. 1675, AHP, r. 1671a, fr. 379-395; P. Manuel Guti6rrezto padre provincial,Piaba, Apr. 10, 1681,AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 278, exp. 39; titulosde tierrasde Pedro Belti-rii,1675-1766, Archivo de InstrumentosPiblicos, Guadalajara(hereafter AIPG), Tierrasy Aguas,lib. 30, exp. 15. 53. Autossobre la faltade maiz y trigo,Valle de San Bartolome6,1694, AHP, r. 1694a, fr.110-135; reportof Gov. JosephMarin to viceroy,Parral, Sept. 30, 1693,AGI, Audiencia de Guadalajara,leg. 120; ordenpara que vayana trabajar. . , AHP, r. 1693, fr.13-18. In the Tarahumaramissions of Satev6 and Santa Cruz, the 1693 epidemicmay have killed at least one-thirdof the residents;this estimate is based on a comparisonof missionarycounts in 1690 (AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 279, exps. 67, 115) and 1725 (visitareport of P. Juande Guendulain,May 18, 1725, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 2009, exp. 99). 54. Aclaracionesa las acusacionesdel Gob. JuanIsidro de Pardiflassobre el alzamiento de los Tarahuimnaras,Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City,Archivo Franciscano (hereafter BN, AF), caja 12, exp. 207; RobertoMario Salm6n, "Tarahumara Resistance to MissionCongre- gationin NorthernNew Spain, 1580-1710," Ethnohistory, 24:4 (Fall 1977), 379-393. 55. On Tarahumaraethnohistory and ethnography,see William L. Merrill, 'God's Savioursin the Sierra Madre," Natural History,92:3 (Mar. 1983) and JohnG. Kennedy, Tarahmnaraof the Sierra Madre: Beer,Ecology and Social Organization(Arlington Heights, IL, 1978).

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 440 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS The shortageof workers resulting from epidemic deaths and the Tara- humararebellions brought great pressure to bear on the Concho Indians. With theirpueblos nearlydepopulated by the labor exodus, at the end of the decade the Franciscanspetitioned for the returnof Indians re- movedyears earlier by repartimientoand evenencomienda. The governor allowed a group of Concho Indiansto be resettledin the pueblo of San Franciscode Conchosdespite landowner protests that many of these Indi- ans had spent theirentire lives on the haciendasand despiteallegations by the Indian governorsthat conditions under the alcalde mayorand the Franciscanswere no better.56 In the midstof the subsistencecrisis, labor shortage,rebellions, and miningreversals in Parral,elites also succumbedto adversity.Nearly half of the Valle de San Bartolome'shaciendas changed hands between 1696 and 1707. The Cortes del Rey mayorazgosurvived only with large loans froma Parralmerchant, Cristobal de Orrantia.57The crisisof the 169os demonstratedthe fragilityof the region'seconomy. A majorsilver strike at Chihuahua(Santa Eulalia) in 1703 fueleda new boom in mining,tempo- rarilyreversing the downtrend,but the landownerscontinued to be at a disadvantagein competingfor labor. By 1715,however, many of them had begun to forgecloser alliances with local officialswhich could be used to ensurea morereliable work force. In thatyear, a groupof San Bartolome landowners,along withthe alcalde mayor,petitioned the governorfor a solutionto the labor shortage.Most had residentworkers, numbering be- tween5 and 2o. The problemwas seasonallabor. The new governor,Juan Manuel de San Juany Santa Cruz, had just receiveda viceregalorder callingfor an end to forcedlabor practices.58Given the rapidlygrowing needs ofan economybeginning to reversethe downward trends of the late seventeenthcentury, he formalizeda practicewhich would be followed by his successors.The governorsystematically visited Indian pueblos and countedtheir able-bodied males. Effortsto resettlefugitive Indians were stepped up, and the basis was now laid formore efficient use of repartimiento. Labor draftsintensified in the 1720S, providingincreasing numbers of labor gangsfor agriculture and mining.Demand forlabor grew in tandem withthe rise in the populationof non-Indiansin the region.Their num-

56. Petitionof Indian governor,Joseph de Neira y Quiroga, Feb. 10, 1699, AHP, r. 1699, fr-42-49. 57. On the suit againstthe Cort6sdel Rey heirs,see AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara, leg. 120. See also KeithW. Algier,"Feudalism in New Spain's NorthernFrontier: Valle de San Bartolom6,A Case Study"(Ph.D. diss., Universityof New Mexico, 1966),95. 58. This case is in AHP, r. 1715a, fr.459-521; see also the visitaof Gov. Manuel San Juande SantaCruz to San Franciscode Cu6llar,Nov. 1716, AHP, r. 1716a, fr.283-307.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 441 bers increasednearly fivefold between 1700 and 1750, afteronly doubling in the previous5o-year period.59 This greaterdemand was partlymet by modestdemographic recovery in manymission villages during the eighteenthcentury.60 Most draftsfor mines had a specific,temporary purpose such as drainageof a mineshaft or cuttingwood forthe smeltingprocess, but repartimientoworkers were occasionallyused forhauling ore. By far the largestnumber of draftssupplied agricultural labor, primarily for the sowing,weeding, or harvestingof wheat and corn. Carefulexamination of mandamientosduring the governorshipof JosephLopez de Carbajal (1723-27), forexample, indicates that certain mission villages must have remaineddepopulated of able-bodied males during the peak harvestperi- ods. About half of the draftsrecorded did not exceed the limitof one month,but the rest rangedfrom two monthsto the entireterm of the governor.6' Complaintsfrom the missionpueblos reachedthe governorsthrough lettersfrom Jesuit and Franciscansuperiors as well as fromIndian dele- gations.In some cases, Indiansactively resisted the drafts,claiming that they forfeitedtheir own plantingswhen so manywere forcedto leave the village at the same time.The distancesthey had to travelwere long and hazardous;returning to theirvillages during the rainyseason often resultedin drowningsat rivercrossings.62 In 1722, FatherPedro Hualde reportedto thegovernor that men, women, and childrenwere being taken indiscriminatelyfrom his missionof SantiagoPapasquiaro to workin the minesof Chihuahua,considerably more than the prescribedten leagues. Unauthorizedpersons carried off 30 missionresidents during Holy Week,

59. Gerhard,The NorthFrontier, 168-172. 6o. Althoughthe trendsvaried by village(with some experiencing continued decline), overallpopulation in theJesuit missions increased about 20 percentbetween 1678 and 1750. In some villages,the increasemay reflectthe presenceof castas, or the periodicinflux of previouslyuncongregated Indians to replacedead or fugitiveIndians. The populationinfor- mationcomes fromcounts made by ecclesiasticalor civilvisitors and officialsand comprises veryuneven time-seriesdata: Ortiz Zapata visitareport, DHM, 4-III, 301-419; Jesuitre- ports,AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 279, exps. 66-71, 112-119;Padrones, Santa Catalina and SantiagoPapasquiaro, 1707, AHP, r. 1707,fr. 74-81; Guendulainvisita report, May 18, 1725, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 2009, exp. 99; Jesuitvisita report, 1731, in GerardDecorme, La obra de losjesuitas mexicanosdurante la 6poca colonial,1572-1767, 2 vols. (Mexico City, 1941), 78-82; Raz6n de las misiones. . , ca. 1740, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 1126,exp. 4; Balthasarvisita reports, 1743-45, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 2009, exps. 20, 42; Jesuitreports to bishop of Durango, Archivode la Catedralde Durango (hereafterACD), Varios,Afio 1749. 61. Mandamientosde repartimiento,Gov. JosephL6pez de Carbajal, 1723-27,AHP, r. 1723d,fr. 2554-2561. 62. Report of Jesuitvisitor, Juan de Guendulain,Chihuahua, May 18, 1725, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 2009, exp. 99; lettersof Tepehuanapadres to bishop of Durango, July 1749, ACD, Varios,Afio 1749.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 442 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS counselingthem to saythey were goingof their own freewill.63 In the in- vestigationwhich followed, Governor Lopez de Carbajal discoveredthat the alcalde mayorhad allowed labor recruitersto take Indiansfrom the village,that wives and childrenwere also leaving,that Indians were being keptaway for months at a time,and thatoften they were notpaid. But he also learnedthat many of these Tepehuan Indians were unhappywith the excessivelabor demandsplaced on themby the padre himself.Besides providingmore than the customary amount of labor on landscultivated for the upkeep ofthe mission,Indians were used to carrymail, make adobes, tend cattle,and performnumerous other tasks for which they received nothing.Some ofthem claimed they preferred to leave thevillage because it was the only way to supplementtheir subsistence with needed food and clothing.In this case, the priestand the alcalde mayoralso argued overwhich of them would name the Indianofficials for the mission.Each wantedcontrol of an Indian governorwho wouldbe partialto his needs. Here, as elsewhere,a reshufflingof contendingparties in labor disputes can be discerned in the eighteenthcentury. Conflicts between landownersbecame less common,while disputesbetween missionsand vecinosincreased. Previously,individual landowners competed with one anotherfor scarce agriculturallabor; now theybegan to forgea united frontagainst their main competitors-the religious orders who dominated Indian village life. The landownersincreasingly enlisted the supportof pettyofficials, and the numberand frequencyof repartimiento drafts rose. In addition, judges tended more and more to favor vecinos in contests over land and water.64The presence of non-Indians in villages grew.65 In 1728, Nueva Vizcaya sufferedanother severe epidemic of measles, and Governor Ignacio Francisco de Barrutia reported that much of the harvest was lost forlack of laborers. Death tolls were highest in the Tara- humara region.66These disruptions,however, proved minorin comparison to the subsistence crisis of the late 1730s. A protracted drought began in 1737 and was followed in the next two years by an epidemic of matlazahuatl (probably typhus). Death tolls in Indian villages fromthis epidemic

63. Visitaque hizo el GobernadorL6pez de Carbajala SantiagoPapasquiaro y disposi- ciones que dict6,Apr. 1724, AHP, r. 1722b,fr. 659-687. 64. For example:AHP, r. 1700a, fr.33-88, r. 1711a,fr. 170-176, r. 1720b, fr. 1373- 1376, r. 1727a,fr. 323-357; AIPG, Tierrasy Aguas,lib. 12, exp. 78, lib. 18, exp. 8, lib. 19, exp. 17, lib. 20, exps. 4, 5; AIPG, Librosde Gobierno,vol. 43, f. 28. 65. Que los espafiolesno se introduzcana los pueblos de indios,Jan. 18, 1718, AHP, r. 1718a, fr.12-17. This trendwas universal,despite the prohibitivelegislation; see Magnus Morner, La corona espanola y losforaneosen los pueblosde indiosde Amrnica(Stockholm, 1970). 66. Governorto king,Parral, June 4, 1728,AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara,110; census ofTarahumara missions, 1728, in AHP, r. 1728a,fr. 157-170.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 443 were about threetimes higher than those from the measles epidemic of the previousdecade.67 Governor Juan Bautista de Belaunzarainreacted to the crisis in 1739 with emergencymeasures. Each alcaldia mayorwas orderedto surveyand impoundall grainstores. Because theseproved in- sufficient,the governorsolicited grain from areas to the south. Censuses were taken in Indian villagesin orderto assignall available Indians to agriculturalrepartimientos.68 The governoralso addressed the need for a more systematicallocation of manpowerby decreeingin 1740 thathe alone had the authorityto assignIndians in repartimiento,theoretically abrogatingthe exerciseof this authorityby alcaldes mayoresand their tenientes.That this decree was largelyignored suggests that there was considerablecohesion among labor users,which enabled them,with the supportof their alcaldes mayores,to resisthigher officials. Local officials (manyof themlandowners) often received "kickbacks" for their efforts in procuringlabor.69 In the recruitmentof labor, the role of the nativebrokers also merits consideration,but the evidence is scanty.They received special privi- leges and exemptionsin theircommunities in returnfor doing the Span- iards'bidding.70 Although they were constrainedby the limitsof what the communitycould bear, theywere apparentlyable to convinceat least the other inhabitantsof theirrancherias that without their intervention as arbitersthe exploitationcould be worse. In the case of band peoples withoutfixed settlements, the Spaniardsdepended heavily on caciques to roundup Indiansin remoteareas.7' Although we do notknow much about precontactgovernance within these particular Indian groups,apparently none had a triballeader. Leadership except in warfarewas decentral- ized, with each rancheriaor band havingits own elders who exercised

67. Burial registers,1659-1825, Parroquiade SantiagoPapasquiaro and burial registers, 1715-1825, Parroquiade SantaCatalina de Tepehuanes,in the microfilmedmanuscript collectionfor Mexico ofthe GenealogicalSociety of Utah. This epidemicwas widespreadin Mexico; see, forexample, Florescano and Elsa Malvido,Ensayos sobre la historiade las epi- demias en. M6xico (Mexico City, 1982) and MacLeod, "The Matlazahuatl of 1737-38: Some Villages in the Guadalajara Region,"in InvestigatingNatural Hazards in Latin American History, Robert H. Claxton, ed. (Carrollton, GA, 1986), 7-15. 68. AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara,104, i86; AGN, ProvinciasInternas, vol. 69, exp. 1. 69. Despacho del Virrey-ArzobispoJuan Antonio de Vizarr6n,Mexico City,Sept. 15, 1739, BPJ, AJANG, caja 48, exp. 14; governor to alcaldes mayores, May 11, 1740, AHP, r. 1740, fr.5-7; correspondencebetween Viceroy Revillagigedo and Franciscancomisario general, Fr. Juan Antonio de Abasolo, 1752-53, BN, AF, caja 15, exp. 274. 70. On the otherhand, theyquickly lost theirstatus as gobernadoresif theyfailed to complywith the mandarnientos:Quejas dadas contraNicolds de Valenzuelay Nicoldsel Vagre,indios del pueblo de Atotonilco,Santiago Papasquiaro, July i8, 1720,AHP, r. 172ob, fr. 1360-1367; 1532-1549. 71. Descriptionsof this processare foundin documentsfrom the Tepehuan visitaof i651, AHP, r. i65ia, fr. 186-204.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 444 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS moralauthority as opposed to an executivepower. In the earlyperiod of encomienda-repartimiento,before the missionariesimposed a morecom- plex systemof officials, it is notclear how the Spaniardsselected headmen to do theirbidding. If the previousrole ofleaders was one of protection and guidancewith a view to mediatingconflict and providingfor the well- being of the community,with what authoritydid those chosen exercise the abilityto coerce? And to whatdegree was theirauthority eroded by the machinationsof priests and alcaldesmayores who triedto imposetheir own candidates? Changingecological circumstances no doubtforced some restructur- ing of indigenoussocial systemsto preservegroup solidarity,and this may have includedextension or augmentationof executivepower across a broader spectrum.Later, the task of the Indian middlemanbecame easier when obligationsto the religiouscommunity made workoutside the missionsmore attractive.Moreover, it may be thatthe changingof rancherialocations and the complementarityof economicpursuits in dif- ferentlocations constituted a precontactprecedent which made seasonal or temporarylabor migrations less disruptiveeither physically or socially. Modest economic recoveryin the regionat mideighteenthcentury did not alterthe basic patternof labor coercion. Although substantial re- vivalof the miningindustry did nottake place untilthe 1780s and 1790s, continuousnew discoverieskept the industryalive as minersand mer- chantsshifted their operations from one real to another.No supravillage Indian rebellionsoriginated within the regionin the eighteenthcentury, althoughincreasing raids from Apaches and otherindigenous groups from the northand east resultedin the abandonmentof smallerrural settlements.The firstthree-quarters of the eighteenthcentury was a period of slowgrowth in agricultureand mining,during which modest local markets evolved in the main populationcenters of Durango,Parral, and Chihua- hua.72Commercial activity grew in responseto demographicgains,73 and the increasedproduction of grain and livestockmight have encouraged the developmentof a more permanent"free" labor force,given the relative scarcityof human resources. Insteadthe local elitessettled on repartimientoas the solution,at least untilthe latereighteenth century. Landowners and minerswere able to evade legal restrictionson forcedlabor because of theirdistance from the centralgovernment and because thatgovernment was morewilling to

72. Phillip L. Hadley, Mineriay sociedad en el centrominero de Santa Eulalia, Chi- huahua, 1709-1750 (Mexico City, 1975). 73. Michael M. Swann, TierraAdentro: Settlement and Societyin Colonial Durango (Boulder,1982).

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 445 tolerateabuses in miningareas withgreater potential for profit. The land- owningclass, a heterogeneousgroup whose holdingsranged from small ranchosto largehaciendas, appears to have achievedonly low profitmar- gins,impelling it to economizeseverely on laborcosts. Perhaps one option wouldhave been to encouragea systemof sharecropping like the one that evolved in the Bajio.74This system,however, could be advantageousto landownersonly when arable land was in plentifulsupply. The opposite was true in Nueva Vizcaya,and landownersdetermined that a source of cheap laborwas absolutelycrucial. It was not in theirinterest to bid up wages by competingfor scarce labor; rather,they would be betterserved by coercingand sharingit as a group.75It was far preferableto bind Indians in arrangementswhich offeredneither wages nor creditadvances and which allowed the land- ownersto employIndians only when therewas workto be done. Repar- timientooffered the optimalway to acquire laborerswhen they were needed in the agriculturalcycle without having to retainthem in the dead seasons. The repartimientosystem was alwaysstrained during the wheat harvest;the problemwas not so mucha generalshortage of laborersas a severeshortfall at keytimes. Still, for much of the eighteenth century, the draftserved the needs ofgrain producers in Nueva Vizcaya. For the systemto work,vecinos had to improvethe reliabilityof the workforce by maximizingaccess to settledIndians, and this meant in- creasingpressure on missions.In turn,the missionarieschallenged provincial and viceregalofficials to stem the erosionof theircommunities. In a 1740 reportto the lieutenantgovernor, the Jesuitsdescribed the disruptiveprocedures and excessivedemands of the labor draft which de- populated villagesat criticalpoints in the agriculturalcycle. The report inventoriedthe abuses, which includedpoor dietaryconditions, inade- quate lodging,excessive workdays, and paymentin kindor in noteswhich had to be redeemedin Parraland Chihuahua.76 Labor exoduseswere notthe onlyconcern; mission lands faceda new assaultin 1738 when a subdelegadode tierraswas createdfor Chihuahua by the Audienciaof Guadalajara. This official,alleged by the Jesuitsto be in league withhis compatriots,the heavilyBasque elite, challengedthe statusquo regardingmission landed property with measures which forced

74. Brading,Haciendas and Ranchos. 75. Wages forpermanent residents and fortemporary paid labor were already high comparedto centralMexico (variousaccounts, Haciendas de San Juany Bocas, Jan. i66o, AHP, r. i668b, fr. 59off;petition of San Bartolom6valley landowners, Aug.-Sept. 1715, AHP, r. 1715a, fr.459-521). 76. Borradorde carta,ca. 1740, BN, AF, caja 12, exp. 210.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 446 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS the Jesuitsto eitherpay taxeson lands previouslyconsidered exempt or forfeitthem.77 Already, slow but steadyusurpation of missionlands by non-Indianshad contributedto the processof coercingIndians into the labor marketby limitingtheir means of subsistence.The Jesuits,sens- ing a losingbattle and facingother pressures from viceregal officials, in 1743 offeredto secularize all theirTopia, Tepehuana, and Tarahumara Baja missions.78 For a while, it seemed that this gesturemight have been precipi- tous. The Audienciain Guadalajaraconfirmed tax exemption status for at least partof the missionlands, and in 1744 the lieutenantgovernor rec- ommendedto the viceroysweeping changes in the repartimientosystem whichwould have reduced the leverageof producersand modifiedthe abuses. Stillconcerned with how to avoidsubsistence crises like the recent one, he advocatedcommunal plantings in Indianvillages and the storage of grain.79In Mexico City,Jesuit advisors got the ear of newlyinstalled ViceroyRevillagigedo, and he incorporatedthe 1744 recommendations almostverbatim in an orderof October 31, 1746.80Nonetheless, according to viceregaland ecclesiasticalvisitors, the labor reformswere ignored.8' The provisionsregarding communal plantings did have repercussionsin the Franciscanmissions, where the corregidorof Chihuahua decided that theycould onlybe applied underhis directsupervision; he tookover the village lands and placed themunder mayordomos.82 The abilityof elites to make economicallyrational decisions more attuned to local structural realitiescontinued not only to counterbalancebut to subvertroyal intent. That factwas confirmedby the officialtransfer of the Jesuitmissions to the diocese of Durango in 1753 and 1754;the missionvillages were much

77. Oidor Martinde Blancas to Marqu6s de la Regalia, Guadalajara,Aug. 12, 1744, AGI, Audiencia de Guadalajara, io6, 113; variousletters of Jesuitmissionaries, 1743-49, in AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 316, exp. 5, leg. 1126,exp. 3, and in ArchivoHist6rico de la Provinciade los Jesuitas,Mexico City,no. 1389. 78. The Jesuitshoped to directlylink this action with royal support for the expansionof theirmissions into Alta California (Deeds, "Renderingunto Caesar," 65-86). 79. Tenientede gobernadoral virrey,Conde de Fuenclara,Sept. 1, 1744, AGN, His- toria,vol. 20, exp. 5. Althoughthe missionsalways had certain"communal lands" assigned to the upkeep ofthe mission,they did nothave the cajas de comunidadof their nonmission counterparts. 8o. P. Pedro Retes to P. JosephCalder6n, Santa Catalina,Nov. 27, 1745,AHPM, no. 1673. Jesuitlobbying efforts with viceregal officials were impressive;see RutilioGonzalez Ortega,"La Californiade los jesuitas"(Doctoral thesis, El Colegio de M6xico, 1973), 172- 183. A copy ofthe viceregalorder is foundin ACD, Varios,Afio 1753. 8i. Reportof VisitadorJos6 Rodriguez Gallardo, Aug. i8, 1750, AGN, ProvinciasIn- ternas,vol. 176, exp. 6, fols.218-268; P. VisitadorAgustin Carta to P. Prov.Juan Antonio Balthasar,Chihuahua, June 7, 1751, AGN, AHH, Temp., leg. 2009, exp. 41. 82. Correspondencebetween Revillagigedoand Abasolo, BN, AF, caja 15, exp. 274; reportof Visitador General Jos6 Rodriguez de Gallardo,Aug. i8, AGN, ProvinciasInternas, vol. 176, exp. 6.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 447 reduced in populationand in area afterstill another ten yearsof exposure to epidemic(measles in the late 1740s) and to the land-hungrymerchants who had profitedfrom the Chihuahuamining expansion.83 The breakupof Indian communitiesaccelerated after secularization. When Bishop Pedro Tamarony Romeralvisited these areas in 1765, he foundmany of the formerpueblos abandoned.Without the religious ordersas buffers(however ineffective and exploitativethemselves), Indians exercisedeven less controlover theirown land and labor. The commu- nitieswhich surviveddid so in a new guise; non-Indiansswamped the nativeinhabitants, hastening the processof mestizaje and culturalabsorp- tion. As Indians lost theirlands or were unable to cultivatethem in the face of demands on theirlabor and of raids by hostileApaches, some movedtoward the relativesecurity of haciendas as permanentagricultural laborers;others hired themselvesout as temporarywage laborers.84The transitionto wage laborwas facilitatedby theintensification ofcommercial activityfueled by populationgrowth in the late eighteenthcentury, but thatis a storywhich falls outside this study. As longas therewere even smallIndian enclaves to feedon, the repartimientosurvived in Nueva Vizcaya. Was thisremarkable in any way? A reviewof the stagesof forced labor suggests that in the earlystage, during whichit coexistedwith encomienda, repartimiento did not deviatemuch fromthe functionit servedin otherpoor marginalareas ofpopulation in sixteenth-and seventeenth-centuryHispanic America,before sustained demographicdecline took its toll. It was slightlymore remarkablethat repartimientolasted beyondthe midseventeenthcentury. In the second stage beginningjust beforemidcentury, an unwrittenagreement based on expediencyallowed agriculturalelites and missionaryorders to share local labor, while Indians were importedfrom the west and the north and attachedto haciendasin serflikearrangements. This stagelasted until about 1690. The crisisof the 169os marksthe thirdstage of repartimiento.Labor scarcitywas greatlyexacerbated by a conjunctionof factors: famine, disease, rebellion,and growingdisequilibrium between the Indian and non- Indian population.This crisispointed up the weaknessesinherent in re-

83. See AIPG, Tierras y Aguas, lib. 27, exp. 37, lib., 28, exps. 75-6, 130-35, 146, i66, 172; n6minade vecinosdel Valle de San Bartolom6,July 15, 1750, AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara, 120. 84. Tamar6ny Romeral,Demostraci6n del vastisimoobispado de la Nueva Vizcaya, 1765, Vito Alessio Robles, ed. (Mexico City, 1937), 62-133; Gov. Joseph Carlos de Agiuero to viceroy,Durango, July5, 1767, AGN, ProvinciasInternas, vol. 94, exp. 2; cura de Huejotitlanto governor,Nov. 26, 1767,AGN, ProvinciasInternas, vol. 94, exp. 1; land titles in AIPG, Tierras y Aguas, lib. 32, exp. 8, lib. 35, exps. i and 13, lib. 41, exp. 43; AGI, Audienciade Guadalajara,115.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 448 | HAHR I AUGUST I SUSAN M. DEEDS liance on a haphazardlyorganized draft labor systemand precipitateda reorientationof forces contending for labor. The fourthstage, beginning just afterthe turnof the eighteenthcen- turyand lastinginto its thirdquarter, was characterizedby the revital- ization and intensifieduse of draftlabor. Severalfactors contributed to thisrenewal. First, efforts by provincialand local officialsmade labor re- cruitmentmore efficientand systematic.The slow Indian demographic recoveryin missionvillages probablyfacilitated increased use of draft laborby reproducinggreater numbers of laborers in each generation.On the other hand, this advantagemay have been offsetby the relatively higherrate of growthamong the non-Indiansectors that vied forlabor surplus. Furthermore,in this period, a significantpolitical realignment produceda coalitionwhich united landowners, whose profit margins were small,with petty Spanish officials and Indiancaciques againstthe religious orderswhose missionsconstituted the mainobstacle to theirmonopoliza- tion of Indian labor. The missionaries'first reaction was to protest,and theydid win some legal victories.Then, aftersteady assaults on mission lands had caused theircommunities to disintegratefurther, they yielded control.Finally, and probablymost important in thisperiod of slow eco- nomicgrowth, repartimiento still offered the onlyviable economicoption giventhe low profitsand overwhelminglyseasonal needs ofthe landowners. Only when a regionalmarket began to evolveand the pool of Indian and marginalnon-Indian laborers expanded did use of repartimientode- cline. In thisfinal stage of draft labor, during the late eighteenthcentury, workbegan to lose itspredominantly seasonal character as a moredynamic regionalcommerce increasingly demanded year-round labor employed in wage and peonage systems. Thus, in thiscase, an internal(intra-New Spain) core-periphery model does have some application.In the Nueva Vizcayanperiphery, coercive practicespervaded labor relations over a longtime period. However,in a comparisonamong marginal areas themselves,and even withinthe north- ern Mexican fringe,the transitionsfrom coerced to wage labor do not conformto the same sequentialpatterns.85 Instead, they depend on a varietyof specificand local conditionswhich makes the labor systemsquite distinct.Several idiosyncraticpatterns are apparentin this Nueva Viz- cayan case, in which the durabilityof rotationalforced draft labor was somewhatunique giventhe demographicbase. First,silver mining did notcreate over time stable population centers

85. For comparisonwith Paraguay, for example, see Saeger, "Survivaland Abolition." For a northernMexican comparison,see Cuello, "The Persistenceof Indian Slaveryand Encomienda."In the Mexicannortheast, repartimiento was totallybypassed.

This content downloaded from 150.135.239.97 on Wed, 05 Aug 2015 15:35:23 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RURAL WORK IN NUEVA VIZCAYA 449 withpredictable labor needs. Althoughsilver production everywhere was subject to boom-and-bustcycles, boom periods in Nueva Vizcaya were relativelyshorter, and theirlocations were moredispersed, encouraging chaotic,migratory labor patternsin a sparselypopulated region. Within the largercompetition for workers, agricultural labor occupied a subordi- nate position.Agricultural elites, who could not competeeffectively on a costbasis, increasinglyrelied on coercionto ensureaffordable permanent and seasonal labor, thusperpetuating slavery, encomienda, and repartimiento. They were able to do so, despitea shrinkingregional population, for several reasons. Resistanceby northernIndians to Spanish domination meantthat new groupswere broughtinto the Spanishorbit continuously, but over more than a centuryand oftenafter protracted struggles. The recalcitranceof indigenousgroups fueled the continuedinflux of native workers,"justifiably" enslaved, from beyond the settledfrontier. This became a keysource of permanent unskilled agricultural labor. The solution to the more difficultproblem of securingadequate seasonal labor lay in the missionpopulation. Severe demographicdecline mighthave limited the use of missionlabor in repartimientoif the missionpopulation had representeda finitepool, buteven here replacements could be foundfrom the Nueva Vizcayanband and rancherfapeoples who resistedby retreat- ing to remoteareas, but periodicallywere congregated,substituting for otherIndians who died or fled.The variationin indigenoussociocultural organizationand the almostconstant threat of warfare also createda more heterogeneousand unstablemilieu to whichthe Spaniardshad to adapt, usinga varietyof coercive methods. Despite the conventionalwisdom that repartimiento could onlyfunc- tion effectivelywithin more sociallydifferentiated Indian societiesthat had tribute-and labor-exactingsystems before conquest, or withinareas of greaterindigenous population, the rotationaldraft system served the needs of the Nueva Vizcayanelites for over a centuryand a half.For the systemto workin thisperiphery, it requiredfirst that nonpueblo Indians become dependenton a structuredcommunity. Paradoxically, the repartimientosystem itself then eroded the communityand ultimatelyinduced its inhabitantsto seek workelsewhere.

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