JACK LEE Thesis

Education Hubs in the Making:

Policy Rationales and International Relations

Jack Tsung-Ying Lee

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto

Education Hubs in the Making: Policy Rationales and International Relations

Jack T. Lee Doctor of Philosophy Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education Ontario Institute for Studies in Education University of Toronto 2014

Abstract

Since the late 1990s, several governments worldwide have launched initiatives to transform their countries into education hubs in order to attract large numbers of foreign students, scholars, education providers, research institutes, and multinational companies. While many observers consider these initiatives as entrepreneurial projects typical of cross-border education, a proper analysis demands a closer examination of the multiple realities of education hub development and their implementation challenges.

This thesis investigates the development of Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong as education hubs. The research examines national initiatives as well as those that are specific to an economic zone (EduCity Iskandar) and a discipline (Islamic finance education hub). What are the rationales driving the development of theses education hubs? What patterns of engagement are evident as these societies forge regional and international ties through higher education?

Through policy document analysis and interviews with 36 policymakers and 42 context informants, this study has identified four key rationales: 1) economic benefits, 2) ii

talent development, 3) educational capacity, and 4) soft power. Each rationale generates specific policy objectives and implementation strategies. While Malaysia is keen to generate revenue through student fees and improve its quality of education by injecting competition, Singapore is eager to commercialize research innovations and develop talent in all forms (local, foreign, and diaspora). In contrast, Hong Kong remains skeptical of the economic benefits of an education industry and instead emphasizes talent development while cultivating local institutions. All three societies also aim to exert influence regionally and internationally though ties based on cultural heritage or networks with leading experts (i.e., soft power). These efforts meld a realist approach to international relations with neoliberalism and social constructivism. Nevertheless, serious contextual factors such as the prevailing political climate, deepening ethnic divisions, and the lack of academic freedom present challenges to the development of education hubs.

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Acknowledgments

Many individuals have contributed to my intellectual and professional development to make this dissertation possible. Foremost, I would like to thank my thesis committee members. To my incomparable supervisor, Dr. Ruth Hayhoe, I thank you for your penetrating insights on comparative education and commitment to my success. You have impressed me with your generosity as a scholar, a mentor, and a human being. To Dr. Jane Knight, I am forever grateful for your sharp analytical views, energy, and sense of humor. Without your guidance and marathon meetings, this project would have floundered during the proposal stage. To Dr. Glen Jones, I thank you for refining my thinking and writing to ensure greater clarity. I would also like to recognize the following OISE faculty members for their intellectual influence on my work and support of my research interests: Dr. Karen Mundy, Dr. Linda Muzzin, Dr. Vandra Masemann, and Dr. Tricia Seifert. I am grateful to Dr. Simon Marginson, my external examiner, for his insightful review of this thesis and encouragement of my work.

The fieldwork for this dissertation was exhilarating despite the inconvenience of a sprained ankle in Malaysia and an eye infection in Singapore. I am indebted to the nearly 100 people who carved time out of their busy schedules to meet with me for an interview or informal discussion. Thanks to their kindness, I found myself in places and situations I had never imagined for my fieldwork: the stately halls of the Prime Minister’s Office (Malaysia) and Chief Executive’s Office (HKSAR), luncheons with Islamic scholars, and tea with university presidents. For Malaysia, I am grateful for the hospitality provided by Dr. Morshidi Sirat, Myrna Damayanti Miraj, Wan Saifuddin, Chan Goang Yet, and Eric Tan. In Singapore, I benefitted from the support of Dr. Wing-On Lee, who provided me with a temporary office at the National Institute of Education, and Dr. Jason Tan and Dr. Benjamin Wong, who offered moral support. For Hong Kong, I would like to thank Mark Thomsen for letting me crash on his sofa for two months.

Every dissertation requires a team of therapists and jesters. At OISE, I have met a wonderful group of friends who provided valuable mental support, intellectual stimulation, and laughter. Patricia Gaviria, Pierre Piche, Meggan Madden, and Merli

Tamtik deserve special recognition for making this journey memorable. I also cherish the unconditional support provided by Eunsook Park, Rakhat Zholdoshalieva, Wesley Chiang, Julian Weinrib, Alice Chow, Kara Janigan, Derek Grosso, and Joe Wu.

I want to acknowledge the contributions of two people at the University of British Columbia who cultivated my interest in international higher education. To Dr. Pierre Walter, who sparked my interest in comparative education as my master degree advisor, I am grateful for your tireless support and commitment to learning and social justice. To my former boss Mackie Chase, Director of the Centre for Intercultural Communication, I thank you for mentoring me for nearly a decade and demonstrating intercultural exchanges in real life through humility and grace.

This dissertation required one year of analysis and writing in sanctuaries scattered across two countries. In addition to cafes, libraries, airplanes, trains, and hotels, my sister’s house in Halifax allowed me to transcribe many interview recordings. Half of the thesis was written in a small town in Norway thanks to Bjørn Oppegaard’s encouragement, wit, and grueling cross-country skiing training. The second half of the thesis was written in Vancouver thanks to my parents’ patience.

I would also like to thank three important people from my formative years. Mrs. Marie Kendrick, Mrs. Jeannie Wolfe, and Mrs. Arleen Porter “adopted” me when I arrived at an elementary school in Ohio not able to string together a sentence in English. Without their care during this critical period, I could not have built a foundation for further academic work or gained an early appreciation for intercultural communication and comparative education.

Finally, this dissertation is a tribute to my parents’ foresight in finding a better environment to raise kids. I am grateful for their dedication toward lifelong learning and their sacrifices for the sake of my future. This dissertation is dedicated to my 93-year-old grandmother, Lee Chuan. In the process of overcoming poverty in rural Taiwan, raising three children as a single mother, and toiling as a successful midwife for 40 years, she defied cultural and professional norms. Her fortitude continues to inspire me to reach greater heights.

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Acknowledgments ...... iv

Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 1 The Internationalization of Higher Education ...... 1 The Education Hub Concept ...... 4 The Research Sites ...... 5 Purpose ...... 9 The Research Problem ...... 10 Significance of the Study ...... 13 Organization of the Thesis ...... 15

Chapter 2: Literature Review ...... 18 Internationalization of Higher Education ...... 18 Definitions ...... 20 Rationales ...... 23 Cross-Border Education Strategies ...... 27 Education Hubs ...... 32 International Relations Theory ...... 41 Realism ...... 41 Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power ...... 45 Liberalism ...... 51 Constructivism ...... 54 Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses ...... 58

Chapter 3: Research Design ...... 62 Introduction ...... 62 Research Purpose and Questions ...... 63 Levels of Comparison ...... 64 Methodology ...... 67 Methods ...... 72

Literature Review ...... 74 Document Analysis ...... 74 Participant Interviews ...... 75 Participant Observations ...... 82 Data Analysis ...... 85 Limitations ...... 87 Summary ...... 89

Chapter 4: Context ...... 91 Introduction ...... 91 Malaysia ...... 94 History and Geography ...... 94 Economy ...... 95 Demography ...... 96 Government and Politics ...... 98 Higher Education ...... 100 Education Hub Origin in Malaysia ...... 104 Singapore ...... 109 History and Geography ...... 109 Economy ...... 112 Demography ...... 114 Government and Politics ...... 115 Higher Education ...... 116 Education Hub Origin in Singapore ...... 118 Hong Kong ...... 126 History and Geography ...... 126 Economy ...... 127 Demography ...... 129 Government and Politics ...... 130 Higher Education ...... 131 Education Hub Origin in Hong Kong ...... 134 Comparing Contexts ...... 138 Comparing Education Hub Origins ...... 143 Summary ...... 146 vii

Chapter 5 Rationales: Economic Benefits, Talent Development, and Educational Capacity ...... 147 Introduction ...... 147 Types of Rationales and Objectives ...... 150 Economic Benefits ...... 150 Talent Development ...... 154 Educational Capacity ...... 157 Soft Power ...... 159 Case Studies ...... 161 Malaysia ...... 162 Singapore ...... 188 Hong Kong ...... 212 Summary ...... 224

Chapter 6: Soft Power and International Engagement ...... 230 Introduction ...... 230 Education Hubs and Soft Power ...... 235 Objectives in Soft Power ...... 240 Strengthening Ties Based on Cultural Heritage ...... 240 Networking with Expert Individuals and Institutions Worldwide ...... 266 Becoming a Regional Leader and Broker ...... 275 Summary ...... 313

Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion ...... 316 Summary of Findings ...... 317 Contribution to the Literature on Education Hubs ...... 322 Reflections on Education Hubs in Asia: Challenges and Paradoxes ...... 325 State Regimes and Academic Freedom ...... 326 Deepening Divisions: Local, Ethnic, and Foreign ...... 331 The Free Market Logic ...... 337 The Rhetoric of “International” ...... 340 The Pursuit of Knowledge ...... 341 Future Prospects ...... 343

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Implications and Further Research ...... 350 Education Hubs ...... 350 Internationalization of Higher Education ...... 354 International Relations ...... 356

Bibliography ...... 358

Appendices ...... 383 Appendix A – Consent Form for Research Participants ...... 383 Appendix B – Interview Guide ...... 385 Appendix C – Ethical Approval ...... 387

List of Tables

Table 1 Rationales and Approaches in Internationalization ...... 25

Table 2 Modes of Supply of Educational Services under GATS ...... 31

Table 3 Types of Power ...... 51

Table 4 Number of Research Participants ...... 82

Table 5 Participant Observation Events ...... 84

Table 6 Balance of Payments (Malaysia) ...... 106

Table 7 Performance of the Services and Manufacturing Sector in Singapore ...... 113

Table 8 GDP Growth Rates of Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong 1970-2000 ... 141

Table 9 Contextual Comparisons ...... 142

Table 10 Relevant Entry Point Projects for Education Hub ...... 168

Table 11 Summary of Key Rationales: Economic Benefits, Talent Development, and Educational Capacity ...... 229

Table 12 International Students in Malaysia in 2011: Countries of Origin ...... 241

Table 13 Market Segments and Preferred Partner Countries ...... 247

Table 14 Foreign University Branch Campuses in Malaysia ...... 254

Table 15 Soft Power Rationales and Objectives ...... 315

Table 16 Rationales in Education Hub Development ...... 321

Table 17 Democracy Index ...... 327

List of Figures

Figure 1 Levels of Comparison ...... 67

Figure 2 Types of Research Participants ...... 78

Figure 3 Projected Supply & Demand for Education Services (Singapore) ...... 124

Figure 4 Planned Differentiation in Singapore’s University Sector (Singapore) ...... 124

Figure 5 Education as an Economic Multiplier (Malaysia) ...... 169

Figure 6 Iskandar Malaysia ...... 182

List of Appendices

Appendix A – Consent Form for Research Participants

Appendix B – Interview Guide

Appendix C – Ethical Approval

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Abbreviations

A*STAR Agency for Science, Technology and Research (Singapore)

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CDP Comprehensive Development Plan (Iskandar Malaysia)

CUHK Chinese University of Hong Kong

EDB Economic Development Board (Singapore)

EDB Education Bureau (Hong Kong)

EMB Education and Manpower Bureau (Hong Kong)

ERC Economic Review Committee (Singapore)

ESC Economic Strategies Committee (Singapore)

ETP Economic Transformation Program (Malaysia)

EPPs Entry Point Projects (Malaysia)

GKC Guangzhou Knowledge City (China)

HKBU Hong Kong Baptist University

HKD Hong Kong Dollar

HKSAR Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

HKU Hong Kong University

HKUST Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

IE International Enterprise Singapore

IPOS Intellectual Property Office of Singapore

IPSC Intellectual Property Steering Committee (Singapore)

IPTA Institusi Pengajian Tinggi Awam; Institute of Public Higher Education (Malaysia)

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IPTS Institusi Pengajian Tinggi Swasta; Institutes of Private Higher Education (Malaysia)

IRDA Iskandar Regional Development Authority (Malaysia)

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Malaysia)

MOE Ministry of Education (Singapore and Malaysia)

MOHE Ministry of Higher Education (Malaysia)

MP Malaysia Plans (Malaysia)

MQA Malaysian Qualification Agency

NEAC National Economic Advisory Council (Malaysia)

NHEAP National Higher Education Action Plan 2007-2010 (Malaysia)

NHESP National Higher Education Strategic Plan (Malaysia)

NKEAs National Key Economic Areas (Malaysia)

NUS National University of Singapore

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PEMANDU Performance Management and Delivery Unit (Malaysia)

PRDBC Pearl River Delta Business Council

RM Malaysian Ringgit

SGD Singapore Dollar

SMART Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology

SMU Singapore Management University

SUTD Singapore University of Technology and Design

TFEC Task Force on Economic Challenges (Hong Kong)

UGC University Grants Committee (Hong Kong)

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Internationalization of Higher Education

Over the last few decades, the internationalization of higher education has migrated from the fringes of policymaking to the core mission of many institutions and governments. Previously, universities and colleges operated largely within a local space and left international forays to keen researchers and the occasional development aid project. Governments funded higher education to produce an educated class to further nation-building. While higher education continues to serve many local needs today, universities and colleges cannot afford to ignore the challenges and opportunities presented by globalization. Globalization has led to the increased speed, magnitude and complexity of interactions among individuals, corporations, and other types and levels of social organization (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). Multiple avenues exist today for higher education to operate beyond the local space. Global crises such as climate change and poverty have created courses and research projects to understand and mitigate these challenges. On another front, the rise of the knowledge economy places greater emphasis on higher education. Industries and governments increasingly demand that higher education be both relevant and accountable in producing skilled labor and innovations. These contributions ultimately generate comparative advantages in the global economic order. Yet, funding reductions for higher education continue to force many institutions to seek alternative sources of revenue. International students and research partnerships generate critical revenue for many universities. Advances in information communication technology also present

2 many opportunities for teaching and research collaborations that were previously not possible. Therefore, from small-scale curricular reforms that incorporate a global perspective to bold strategic plans that aim to create world-class universities, internationalization has seemingly become a kind of panacea for contemporary higher education.

Among this flurry of activities, cross-border education attracts significant attention because it is the most visible form of internationalization. Namely, the mobility of people, programs, and providers in higher education has increased dramatically in recent years.

Presently, an estimated 4.1 million students are studying in higher education institutions outside their home countries (OECD, 2011). East Asia and the Pacific currently supply

30% of these students (UNESCO, 2009). The number of mobile tertiary students is expected to reach 7 million by 2020 with Asia supplying 70% of the mobile students by then (Bohm, Davis, Meares, Pearce, 2002; Altbach, Reisberg, & Rumbley, 2009). Not only are students traveling long distances to seek higher education, but education providers are also exporting programs to far-flung destinations. These exports include franchised programs by obscure colleges to twinning programs by established universities. Providers are also increasingly operating offshore to extend their reach.

These outposts range from modest alumni offices to ambitious research centers and branch campuses. The number of branch campuses has increased over the years from

24 in 2002 to 162 in 2009 (Becker, 2009). Although higher education has historically involved mobility, especially among scholars, the scale and scope of mobility today is unprecedented. In this regard, cross-border education has emerged as a critical component in the internationalization of higher education.

While the activities of cross-border higher education are well documented and clear, the rationales driving their expansion have received less attention. The widely cited statistics of international students and branch campuses provide evidence of a burgeoning area in higher education, but these numbers do not reveal the reasons that motivate mobility among people, programs, and providers. Obviously, education providers recognize the global demand for higher education and the commercial opportunity in the trade of education services. Members of the World Trade

Organization (WTO) have done considerable work to reach agreements on this form of trade. From the perspective of students, cross-border education provides an alternative to the local higher education system, which may be limited in access or poor in quality.

While the rationales of trade and student access are widely documented, they fail to provide a full picture of the reasons for cross-border higher education. Some cases of cross-border education defy these convenient explanations. As Marginson and

McBurnie pointed out, many governments in the Asia Pacific are eager to adopt cross- border education “regardless of the degree to which they pursue trade objectives in education or use cross-border education as a means of augmenting national capacity”

(Marginson & McBurnie, 2004, p.166). As an example, why do countries that have attained massification and built a mature higher education system continue to import foreign education programs and providers? If financial profit is the driver, why do some host nations provide generous funding to attract foreign students and education providers? What other rationales and contextual factors drive these countries to embrace cross-border education?

The Education Hub Concept

In the crowded landscape of cross-border education, education hubs represent a new and ambitious initiative in internationalization. Over the last fifteen years, several countries in Asia and the Middle East have launched bold plans to become education hubs. In the late 1990s, the idea of transforming a country or city into an education hub took root in Singapore, Malaysia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Singapore announced its plan to recruit world-class universities and become the “Boston of the

East.” This recruitment campaign attracted institutions such as the University of Chicago and INSEAD of France to establish a physical presence in Singapore and deliver degree programs. Likewise, Qatar attracted Carnegie Mellon University and Texas A&M

University to establish operations in its emerging Education City. Students can pursue degrees at these satellite centers and branch campuses without ever setting foot in the home campus. Subsequently, Botswana, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Sri Lanka, and

Mauritius also announced plans to become an education hub. What constitutes an education hub then?

A common thread in these plans is the desire to attract large numbers of foreign education providers and students. Higher education is the common denominator, but some education hubs also desire international schools at the primary and secondary level. Some hubs also recruit researchers and institutes to conduct advanced research.

Nevertheless, an education hub is more than a technology park, which focuses only on research. A technology park may exist inside an education hub, but these two concepts are not synonymous. More interestingly, the hosts of these education hubs provide significant public funding to attract education providers, research institutes, and even

5 international students in some instances – a phenomenon that stands in sharp contrast to the shrinking public funding for higher education in many Western countries. Finally, education hubs bring together multiple institutions in a deliberate manner rather than through haphazard coalescence as evident in some metropolitan areas (e.g., Boston).

The following definition of an education hub captures the essence of an education hub as conceived in this study:

An education hub is a planned effort to develop a critical mass of local and international actors who are strategically engaged in education, training, knowledge production and innovation initiatives (Knight, 2011a).

These characteristics collectively warrant research on education hubs as a compelling phenomenon in higher education planning and internationalization.

The Research Sites

This study focuses on the development of three education hubs in Asian societies: Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Several factors motivated the selection of these three societies for a comparative study, given crosscutting commonalities in education development, history, and political economy. First, Singapore and Malaysia have a long record of adopting cross-border education. In 1999, Singapore became one of the first states to launch an education hub initiative by outlining specific targets to attract world-class universities. Malaysia had experimented with many types of twinning and franchised programs in the 1990s before launching its own education hub plan a few years after Singapore. Both states presently host several foreign branch campuses and programs and figure prominently in many global discussions on cross-border education. Hong Kong launched its education hub initiative much later, but it continues

6 to pursue the education hub idea. Presently, these three societies are the most active sites of education hub planning and development in the Asia region. Second, these three societies share a common history under British colonialism. Singapore and

Malaysia have been independent for less than 60 years. Hong Kong reverted back to

Chinese administration only in 1997. Each society now practices very different forms of political governance: one-party rule (Singapore), multi-party coalition (Malaysia), and special autonomy (Hong Kong). A common colonial heritage followed by distinctive political trajectories provides a rich palette for comparative education research, given the critical role of the state in many higher education systems. Third, all three societies have witnessed dramatic economic growth in their short histories. As part of the Asian

Tigers, Singapore and Hong Kong developed rapidly through liberal economic policies between the 1960s and 1990s.1 Today, both are highly advanced economies and international centers of finance. Malaysia prospered later and more slowly in comparison to the Asian Tigers, but its transformation into a middle-income nation is nevertheless impressive with relatively high growth rates for many years. These commonalties in economic experience warrant an investigation of the role of cross- border education in each society’s future as they attempt to sustain high growth rates.

Fourth, all three societies exhibit diverse cultural and religious traditions. Both

Singapore and Malaysia contain vibrant communities of Chinese, Malays, and Indians.

Hong Kong combines Chinese values with British sensibilities as a thriving

1 The Asian Tigers (or Dragons) are Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. All four countries experienced rapid industrialization and sustained high economic growth rates for many decades until the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

7 cosmopolitan city. Many observers have marveled at Singapore and Hong Kong’s pivotal positions as bridges or gateways between the East and West, given the legacy of British colonialism. Malaysia infuses a similar legacy with a moderate Islamic identity.

Given the impact of culture on educational development, these rich cultural heritages raise questions about the place of cross-border education in each society. In summary, these similarities and differences have motivated the selection of the three societies as compelling examples of education hubs.

While education hubs are unique in contemporary higher education, it is important to recognize that many societies throughout history have built centers of higher learning in one format or another. Although the discourse on education hubs does not draw links to these historical precedents, a research study would be incomplete without mentioning them. In many ways, the aspirations of education hubs invoke the ideals and ethos of these historical precedents. For example, the Ancient

Library of Alexandria, established in the 3rd century B.C., thrived as a venerated archive of the world’s knowledge for many decades until the Roman conquest of Egypt. Both the ancient academies of Islam (madrasa) and China (shuyuan) housed and educated generations of scholars from nearby regions under close-knit personal mentorships. The shuyuan was also widely known as a refuge that supported intellectual freedom because it operated outside the control of the imperial government and ruling bureaucracy (Hayhoe, 1989). Nalanda in present day India flourished as a Buddhist center of scholarship between the 5th and 12th century (Altekar, 1944). From as far as

Greece and Persia, scholars of diverse faiths congregated in Nalanda to study religion, fine arts, medicine, and mathematics. The House of Wisdom (Bait Al-Hikma) in present

8 day Baghdad thrived between the 9th and 13th century as an intellectual hub when

Muslim scholars occupied the pantheon of science (Nakosteen, 1964; Al-Khalili, 2011).

During this Golden Age of Islam, this institution attracted both Islamic and Christian scholars from afar and sponsored extensive translations of texts from diverse civilizations.2 Visible centers of higher learning later emerged in many other societies:

Salamanca, Paris, Bologna, Cairo, and Beijing. These historical centers of higher learning exerted significant influence on the intellectual development of their societies and their wider civilizations. Modern day centers of higher learning such as Boston,

California, and London continue to dominate the production of knowledge. Similarly, places devoted to research and innovation such as the Silicon Valley and Bangalore

(India) attract bright minds and contribute significantly to technological advances. While some of these centers of higher learning and research emerged organically rather than through deliberate effort, they may provide a valuable historical context for reflection on the current development of education hubs.

2 The new multi-billion dollar King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia compares itself to this historical example (Ali, 2009; El-Tablawy, 2009)

Purpose

This comparative study has two main goals that guide its investigation. First, the study aims to identify and analyze the different rationales driving the development of education hubs. While the strategies and activities of many education hubs may be visible and well publicized, the rationales underpinning these activities are not entirely clear. The diversity of policymakers supporting education hubs raises questions about their widespread appeal and the motives of these policymakers. Second, the study aims to explore the relationship between education hubs and international relations. As large- scale projects that involve international actors (institutions, researchers, students, etc.), education hubs have the potential to act as an instrument of cultural diplomacy. The rapid development of cross-border higher education in Southeast Asia and the growing influence of the Asia region warrant the selection of Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong

Kong for this study. While this study examines education hubs in Asia and recognizes the importance of the local context, the primary focus is on the phenomenon of education hub development rather than the Asian experience. Inspired by grounded theory methodology, this study seeks to contribute to the literature on the internationalization of higher education through the prism of international relations theory.

The Research Problem

The discourse on the internationalization of higher education focuses extensively on student mobility and the commercialization of cross-border education at the expense of other developments. Few studies examine the emergence of education hubs worldwide, and even fewer use an analytical lens that deviates from the dominant neoliberal perspective. Although economic rationales are significant drivers of cross- border education, they fail to capture the impetuses behind education hubs fully. As more countries announce plans to become an education hub, more nuanced analyses are necessary to recognize the agency of policymakers and the interface between higher education and international relations. Studies that emphasize the large number of international students and branch campuses provide a superficial understanding of education hubs. Furthermore, extrapolating policy rationales from visible strategies and activities can result in erroneous generalizations. Consequently, this empirical study focuses on the people and policies that have steered the development of education hubs in the Asian context. The main research question of this study is:

What are the rationales driving the development of education hubs particularly

toward regional and international engagement?

In this study, rationales are defined as fundamental reasons for enacting a policy (e.g., mitigating labor shortages). A rationale differs from an objective in that the latter is often a measurable target located more downstream in the policymaking process (e.g., to recruit 2,000 skilled immigrants). The word driving emphasizes the agency of policymakers and their rationales. Similarly, development highlights the ongoing

11 process of building and cultivating education hubs rather than a historical study of their inception. Regional and international engagement signals a focus on the external dimension of education hubs (e.g., the recruitment of international students, import of educational services, and partnerships with foreign institutions). Using a constructivist approach, the study will elicit research participants’ views on regional and international engagement.

The scope of this study has been carefully defined to ensure its timely completion as a doctoral dissertation. Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong serve as cases to illustrate the rationales driving education hubs. The focus is on macro-level policymaking because the study concerns the why and what of education hubs rather than the how (i.e.,, a focus on policy rationales rather than strategies). Therefore, the views of intermediate actors such as university presidents, faculty members, and branch campus administrators are excluded from this study. Although these intermediate actors contribute to the development of an education hub, they implement rather than formulate the blueprint of an education hub. This study also recognizes that policy formulation is a complex process that undergoes constant changes rather than a static or historical milestone. The narrow focus on macro-level policymaking is also necessary given the challenges of conducting comparative research across three societies. The following sub-questions elaborate on the parameters of this study:

Rationales:

What are the rationales that motivate a place to develop itself as an education hub?

Policy Coherence:

To what extent do policymakers share the same rationales within each society and across the three societies? Have these rationales changed over time?

International Relations:

What motivates those who promote education hubs to forge links with foreign actors? What patterns of engagement are evident?

Development:

What are the main issues facing the development of these education hubs?

Identifying the policymakers and policy rationales that drive a specific education hub leads to internal comparisons. Policymakers in the education sector of that society may hold very different rationales than their counterparts in the trade sector. However, both sectors may be tasked with developing the education hub. The final question that compares the three education hubs is essentially an external comparison. These two forms of comparison essentially frame the study.

It is important to note that this study does not seek to evaluate the outcomes, outputs, or effects of education hubs – an endeavor that would be difficult, given the breadth of education hubs and the broad impacts of higher education. The dynamic nature of higher education makes the identification of cause and effect relationships

13 challenging. Furthermore, given the short histories of education hubs, it is premature to assess their impact at this point.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant in three ways in the context of internationalization and comparative education. Foremost, this dissertation is one of the first empirical studies on education hub development. It builds on a handful of studies that focus on the policy documents of particular education hubs. While policy texts are important, they are also bound by the time and space in which they were created. Many of these existing studies rely on policy texts that were released 10 to 15 years ago when education hubs were first launched. These studies assume that the rationales behind education hub developments have remained unchanged over time. By contrast, this study supplements a comprehensive policy analysis with the voices of policymakers responsible for education hub development today. Their voices enliven the interpretation of past and present policies on education hubs across three different societies. In some instances, the views of policymakers contradict existing policies and provide a more authentic account of education hub development.

Second, this study is significant in the research on internationalization because it is policy oriented, comparative, and non-Western. Presently, most studies on internationalization focus on institutional strategies and lack a comparative element

(Kehm & Teichler, 2007). The literature on internationalization is replete with studies on the different strategies universities use to internationalize (e.g., recruit international

14 students and partner with a foreign institution). By contrast, this study focuses on macro-level policymaking and compares the process across three societies. Moreover, the focus on three non-Western societies addresses a gap in the research on internationalization. Western nations continue to dominate the research on internationalization at the expense of alternative voices and perspectives from other parts of the world (de Wit & Jones, 2012). The rapid changes occurring in Asia (political, economic, and socio-cultural) warrant attention from social scientists. The “Washington

Consensus” is no longer the default arbitrator of international politicking and economic development. Rather, the emergence of the “Beijing Consensus” and “The Asian

Century” challenges previous conceptions of international order and the foci of power.3

What are the implications of this economic power shift for the field of higher education?

Are education hubs in the periphery designed to challenge the dominance of the center? Moreover, many experts also consider Asia to be a hotspot for cross- border higher education in terms of market size and innovations (McBurnie & Ziguras, 2001;

Marginson & McBurnie, 2004). Specifically, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and China may well be the main receivers of cross-border education through provider mobility

(Vincent-Lancrin, 2004). Currently, the bulk of the students originate from Asia to seek education in English-speaking countries in the West. While this pattern persists, emerging trends also paint a more complex picture of student mobility. Increasing numbers of students in Asia are pursuing higher education in nearby countries for reasons ranging from affordability to the promises of the “Asian Century.” Therefore,

3 Joshua Cooper Ramo, former senior editor of Time magazine, coined the phrase “Beijing Consensus” in 2004 to highlight China’s alternative approach to economic development in third world countries.

15 intra-regional mobility is an emerging pattern in higher education (UNESCO, 2009; Lee,

2012). The development of cross-border education in Asia may reveal different rationales than those espoused by policymakers in the West (e.g., U.S., U.K., and

Europe). Asia is also one of the two regions in the world leading the development of education hubs.

Third, this study is unique in employing international relations theory to examine an issue in comparative and international education. Despite the parallels between the internationalization of higher education and international relations, the literature of these two fields remains far apart with few links in scholarship or praxis. Comparative education continues to rely on sociological and anthropological theories to explain similarities and differences rather than political science or international relations theories. A university forges ties with foreign actors in ways that are often similar to a state pursuing diplomacy and influence on the global stage. The role of higher education in mediating international relations is thus a significant and under researched area. A key contribution of this study will be to infuse the scholarly traditions of comparative higher education with insights from international relations theory.

Organization of the Thesis

This dissertation contains seven chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced education hubs in the context of the internationalization of higher education. It has also presented the research problem and identified the significance of this study.

Chapter 2 reviews the relevant academic literature for this study. This review forms the conceptual and theoretical foundation of the dissertation. Previous studies on the internationalization of higher education provide valuable concepts for analyzing education hubs. These concepts include definitions, types of rationales, and cross- border education strategies. The review will also include the small number of studies on education hubs. The latter part of the chapter presents the major paradigms in international relations theory. These paradigms provide a theoretical frame for understanding the regional and international engagements of education hubs.

Chapter 3 provides details on the research design of this study. The chapter delves into the research questions and methods as well as the decisions that informed the data analysis process. The research methods include literature review, document analysis, participant interviews, and participation observations. This chapter also situates the research design in the context of broader discussions on research methodology (i.e.,, ontology and epistemology).

Chapter 4 presents the context of the three societies in this study: Malaysia,

Singapore, and Hong Kong. Specifically, the relevant background information includes a brief overview of five areas: 1) history and geography, 2) economy, 3) demography, 4) politics and government, and 5) higher education. The chapter then presents a historical account of the origin of education hubs in the three societies based on policy document analysis. Depending on the education hub in question, this historical account covers the first five to ten years of its life. Since Hong Kong has a shorter history of developing an education hub than Singapore and Malaysia, fewer policy documents exist for review.

Chapter 5 presents the major rationales driving the development of education hubs. This chapter brings together insights from official policy documents and the voices of policymakers who were interviewed to provide a comprehensive picture of each society’s development as an education hub. The analysis identifies four broad types of rationales: revenue generation, talent development, educational capacity, and soft power. Given the sheer volume of data, the chapter covers the first three rationales in detail, while leaving the fourth one (soft power) for Chapter 6.

Chapter 6 focuses on the rationale of soft power as an important driver in the development of education hubs. This chapter examines the ways in which education hubs exert influence regionally and internationally for the benefit of the host nation. The analysis incorporates international relations theory to elucidate the patterns of engagement that are identified.

Chapter 7 contains a discussion of the main findings of the study and a conclusion. The discussion reflects on the opportunities and challenges facing the three education hubs. The conclusion re-visits the significance of the study and its contribution to the field of higher education internationalization and international relations.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This study draws on ideas from two distinct bodies of literature: the internationalization of higher education and international relations theory. The former provides the conceptual framework for this study while the latter offers a theoretical foundation for analyzing education hubs in their engagement with the world. The first part of the chapter covers the literature on internationalization: definitions, rationales, and strategies. A review of existing studies on education hubs follows the review of internationalization. The second part of the chapter presents the major paradigms of international relations theory as well as an introduction to soft power.

Internationalization of Higher Education

Over the last two decades, internationalization has gained significant attention as universities and colleges expand their scope and activities to include international work.

The “mainstreaming of internationalization” (de Wit, 2011a) is evident in the latest global survey conducted by the International Association of Universities (IAU). Among the respondents, 87% of the higher education institutions identify internationalization in their institutional mission statement and/or overall strategic plan (Egron-Polak & Hudson,

2010). These main rationale for internationalization as reported by these institutions is to prepare students for the global/internationalized world. Secondary rationales include enriching the curriculum and raising one’s international reputation. The growing interest in internationalization has naturally led to a burgeoning body of literature on the topic

19 with diverse themes. This body of literature can be divided into three types: 1) conceptual definitions, 2) policies and strategies, and 3) experiential accounts.

Conceptual literature establishes parameters for analyzing and discussing internationalization. These writings advocate for a common understanding of a worldwide phenomenon in higher education while minimizing local differences. Defining internationalization and contrasting it to globalization or peace education is an example of conceptual literature. On a more practical level, other writings focus on the policies and strategies enacted by governments and higher education institutions to facilitate internationalization. These writings focus on improving policymaking and implementation rather than settling conceptual debates. For example, many studies examine student recruitment, regulation of education providers, curriculum reforms, international league tables, and branch campuses. Local influences on policies and strategies become more apparent in these empirical studies. Another approach at the practical level is to examine the lived experiences of faculty members, administrators, and students as higher education becomes more internationalized. These intensely personal studies address issues such as culture shock, intercultural dialogue, faculty engagement, and inclusive pedagogy. In other words, these studies address the fundamental question: how do individuals experience the internationalization of higher education? These three types of internationalization literature are not mutually exclusive, but they do provide a framework for making sense of the large corpus of work on the topic. Literature that focuses on concepts, policies, and strategies in internationalization are particularly relevant to this study because education hub represents a new variation in these areas. Although personal lived experiences are important to the development of internationalization and education hubs, the subject

20 matter is not within the scope of this study. Therefore, the review below will focus on the relevant concepts, policies, and strategies of internationalization. Specifically, the review will draw attention to the definitions and rationales of internationalization, the strategies of cross-border education, and the research on education hubs.

Definitions

Defining internationalization and classifying its various permutations remains a key area of research as the field evolves and matures. Although universities have historically been international, given the nature of research and higher learning, internationalization did not come to the fore of research and policymaking until the

1990s. Internationalization scholars Philip Altbach and Ulrich Teichler emphasize the importance of this development:

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the universities in the medieval period has higher education been so international in scope. Internationalism is a key part of the future, and higher education is a central element in the knowledge-based global economy. (Altbach & Teichler, 2001, p. 24)

Noticeably, this statement contains the terms international and internationalism. Are these terms synonymous with internationalization? While international is a relatively value-free label to describe the scope of an activity, internationalism is an ideology that advocates peace, democratic values, and humanist ideals (Jones, 1998; Cambridge &

Thompson, 2004). Therefore, an educational initiative could be international in scope and practice without being internationalist in ethos. Education for the sake of peace and cooperation attracted significant interest after World War II. Following this war, many governments supported and funded international projects in higher education to

21 promote solidarity and ward off another global conflict. Up until the 1980s, cooperation was the main rationale as industrialized nations provided technical assistance and scholarships for students from developing nations or war-torn nations. Geopolitical alliances prolonged the Cold War brinksmanship and affected the pattern of international aid in higher education. However, the purpose for international higher education has changed drastically over the last few decades, from cooperation to competition (van der Wende, 2001; Nilsson, 2003; Knight, 2008; Portnoi, Rust & Bagley,

2010; de Wit, 2011a). Even for a country such as Australia, traditionally known for its focus on internationalization as a way to generate revenue through tuition fees, attracting talent is an increasing priority in a competitive global economy (Meek, 2011).

Consequently, internationalization requires a definition that can accommodate diverse rationales, unique national contexts, and shifting political climates. In this regard, Jane

Knight’s definition of internationalization is by far the most widely cited by both scholars and practitioners, given its broad reference to a multitude of activities in higher education without being fixed to an ideology, rationale, or outcome. According to Knight, internationalization is

the process of integrating an international, intercultural or global dimension into the purpose, functions or delivery of post-secondary education. (Knight, 2004, p. 11)

Likewise, Altbach provides a value-free definition based on common international activities within higher education:

Internationalization refers to specific policies and programs undertaken by governments, academic systems and institutions, and even individual departments to support student or faculty exchanges, encourage collaborative research overseas, set up joint teaching programs in other countries or a myriad of other initiatives. (Altbach, 2006, p. 123)

While European scholar Jürgen Enders also offers a process-oriented definition, he adds the rationale of cooperation and the leadership of the state – an interpretation that reflects a European perspective given the scale of the Bologna Process:

Internationalization should refer mainly to processes of greater cooperation between states, and consequently to activities which take place across state borders. It reflects a world order in which nation states still play a central role. (Enders, 2004, p. 367)

Despite these definitional differences, these scholars agree that internationalization describes the voluntary interactions across persistent national borders and systems of higher education, while globalization is a broader phenomenon involving economic and technological convergence as borders erode. Although Teichler (2004, 2009) agrees to this dichotomy of border persistence and erosion, he argues that the concept of globalization is rapidly displacing internationalization in Europe and many other regions around the world. He points out the negative pressures that globalization exerts on higher education (e.g., marketization and competition), while interest in substantive humanist ideals wane. This pessimistic assessment may prematurely dismiss internationalization as a movement, yet it also frames internationalization in positive terms confined to its humanist roots. In reality, the internationalization of higher education can produce both positive and negative outcomes (e.g., fraudulent education providers and linguistic hegemony). The confusion between internationalization and globalization as well as reductionist definitions of both terms is common in the literature on higher education. Just as the descriptor global does not always represent the complex process of globalization, international does not necessarily denote internationalization or internationalism. The ubiquitous usage of global and international in higher education discourse has diluted their meanings, such that these two terms are

23 rapidly becoming euphemisms. More often than not, scholars frame internationalization as a response to the larger forces of globalization rather than the reverse (Kälvermark and van der Wende, 1997; Stromquist, 2007; Burnett & Huisman, 2010).

Research on internationalization requires a conceptual clarity on these terms.

Knight (2011d) and de Wit (2011b) have recently identified several misconceptions about internationalization as the movement gains greater visibility. An ongoing debate about re-defining or re-thinking internationalization to include a value-explicit framework is underway. Organizations leading this debate include the International Association of

Universities, the British Council, and the Canadian Bureau for International Education

(IAU, 2012a). This debate also elicits calls for alternative definitions of internationalization from the global South and greater attention toward global issues rather than the singular focus on the commercial and competitive side of internationalization. For example, in post-colonial societies, the internationalization of higher education was imposed through colonial languages, curriculum, and epistemology. The experiences of these societies reflect a different kind of internationalization than those observed in developed nations in the West.

Rationales

Several scholars have analyzed the different rationales driving the internationalization of higher education. A common typology identifies four types of rationales: socio-cultural, economic, academic, or political (de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2004; van der Wende & Middlehurst, 2004). From the socio-cultural perspective,

24 internationalization can promote mutual understanding among cultures. Developing intercultural communication skills is a key goal under this perspective. The economic perspective views internationalization as a means to generate revenue from the education industry as well as build a competitive economy. Charging international students high tuition fees and leveraging higher education to produce a skilled workforce are typical strategies under this rationale. The academic rationale values internationalization for its ability to enrich students’ learning experiences and boost the institution’s stature. Activities such as student exchanges, area studies, and international benchmarking fall under this category. Finally, the political rationale values internationalization as a means to build relationships with other governments and countries through initiatives such as technical assistance, scholarships for foreign students, and regional alliances for student mobility. These four rationales are also the same broad categories used by the International Association of Universities, an

UNESCO-based organization, for developing its periodic global surveys on internationalization in higher education (Egron-Polak & Hudson, 2010). In a similar fashion, Stephan Vincent-Lancrin (2004) of the OECD identifies four different approaches in cross-border education: 1) mutual understanding, 2) capacity building, 3) skilled migration, and 4) revenue generation. While these approaches are less abstract than rationales, Vincent-Lancrin also draws extensive links between all four approaches such that the typology becomes convoluted with significant overlap. More importantly, these approaches are essentially the motivations behind cross-border education just like the rationales identified by Knight and de Wit. For example, the mutual understanding approach can lead to different strategies ranging from providing development aid (political) to organizing cultural festivals (socio-cultural). The capacity

25 building approach can recruit scholars in critical areas where the host country lacks expertise (academic). Both the skilled migration approach and revenue generation approach can recruit fee-paying international students as a source of income and human capital (economic). In this sense, Vincent-Lancrin’s categories of approaches can be mapped to the broader rationales identified by other scholars (Table 1).

Table 1: Rationales and Approaches in Internationalization

Rationales * Approaches † socio-cultural mutual understanding political academic capacity building skilled migration economic revenue generation * (de Wit, 2002; Knight, 2004; Egron-Polak & Hudson, 2010) † (Vincent-Lancrin, 2004)

Other typologies on the rationales of internationalization also exist. In a comprehensive review of internationalization in the Asia-Pacific region, Marginson and

McBurnie argue that the three main rationales are 1) demand for foreign education by students and their families, 2) the policies and priorities of national governments, and 3) the interests of foreign and local institutions (Marginson & McBurnie, 2004). This perspective acknowledges the context of Asia-Pacific in that many jurisdictions have an unmet demand for higher education coupled with strong state intervention in higher education. It also acknowledges differences in stakeholder perspectives: national

26 government, institution, and student. An alternative breakdown of rationales is therefore possible using actor as the differentiator rather than the substance of the rationale. The same aforementioned scholars who dissect rationales also note differences at the national (government), institutional, faculty, and student level. Each level of actors may support internationalization for very different reasons. A state may support internationalization for the purpose of capacity building while a student may enroll in a transnational program to increase his/her employment prospects. Marginson and

McBurnie (2004) also identify global rationales that drive internationalization as evident in the activities of international agencies and NGOs. Agencies like the World Bank fund

“modernization projects” because it has “a prima facie faith in internationalisation as a medium of development” (Marginson & McBurnie, 2004). Knight (2004) also suggests that branding could be a fifth rationale for internationalization as institutions and governments vie for visibility in the global higher education landscape. Collectively, these ideas about the rationales driving internationalization have significant relevance to the development of education hubs given the scale of planning and the diversity of stakeholders involved. The literature makes it clear that the task of isolating these rationales is difficult if not impossible because these motivations are not mutually exclusive. Rather, both a convergence and divergence of rationales are evident in one country or one institution because different stakeholders pursue different interests in internationalization.

Cross-Border Education Strategies

In practice, internationalization occurs in two broad areas: internationalization at home and cross-border education. The former serves students who are home-bound while the latter covers a wide range of activities both at home and abroad. Different typologies exist to classify cross-border education strategies (also known as transnational education). A typology could be based on chronology or the mode of education delivery and consumption. Wachter’s (2003) review of internationalization in

Europe is an example of a chronological typology. Before the mid 1980s (Phase I), internationalization was a marginal activity characterized by the mobility of students and scholars as a personal initiative. From the mid 1980s to mid 1990s (Phase II), person mobility was still the focus; however, institutions began to organize mobility en masse.

The European Erasmus student mobility program, established in 1987, is an example from this phase. From the mid 1990s to late 1990s (Phase III), person mobility remained central but curricular reforms generated great interests as the internationalization at home (IaH) movement emerged. Swedish scholar Bengt Nilsson initiated the IaH movement in the late 1990s as a response to internationalization’s narrow focus on student mobility. This response recognizes that the fervor of internationalization fails to serve the vast majority of students at a university because they do not participate in study abroad programs. In Europe, roughly 10% of the tertiary students participate in study abroad programs, while the number is less than 1% in the United States (Nilsson,

2003; NAFSA, 2008). These disappointingly low numbers spurred Nilsson to focus his attention on home-bound students who do not have the time or resources to study abroad. The purpose of IaH is to enrich the learning experiences of these home-bound students through internationalized curricula and extracurricular activities. In this phase,

28 institution-wide planning for internationalization also began as senior leaders became aware of the need for a comprehensive approach. Since the late 1990s (Phase IV), globalization and competition have dominated internationalization as governments implement system-wide reforms. The Bologna Process and the commercialization of cross-border higher education exemplify this phase. Although Wächter’s chronological review is instructive for the study of internationalization, it is noticeably rooted in the

European experience. In some regions of the world, internationalization remains a nascent area characterized by very different activities and actors. For example, in Latin

America, internationalization is limited due to the lack of leadership from institutions and government (Gacel-Avila, 2009). In Asia and elsewhere, internationalization is often synonymous with the provision of programs taught in English or studying abroad. These developments do not match the European experience of internationalization, whereby generous financial resources and government support continue to promote the movement. Nevertheless, a typology based on time illustrates the changing priorities and demands in internationalization.

In another variation, a typology can focus on the mode of education delivery and consumption. As universities increasingly operate across borders, their activities allow categorization as visible signs of internationalization. For cross-border education,

Knight’s (2008) typology distinguishes the mobility of people, programs, providers, and projects. The traditional form of student and faculty mobility, as indicated in Wächter’s typology, is the most basic level of cross-border education. Presently, programs are also moving across borders in creative ways: franchised programs, twinning programs, joint and double degree programs. A university can franchise a program by permitting

29 another institution to deliver its program entirely. For example, a student in Malaysia could obtain a degree from a British university without ever leaving Malaysia. A twinning program splits the study period into two segments such that students begin a program offshore at one institution and then move to the home institution to complete the degree

(e.g., 1+2 or 2+2 years). Australian universities provide many twinning programs where international students begin their studies at home then move to Australia to complete the degree. Ultimately, students in both franchised and twinning programs receive a foreign degree for a fraction of the cost compared to spending the entire study period overseas at the degree-granting institution. An interesting development underway in cross-border education today is the emergence of joint and double degree programs.

These programs entail greater collaborations whereby each institution contributes to the curriculum design and teaching rather than just one institution acting as the source of intellectual capital (Knight & Lee, 2012). For graduate programs, joint supervision by two institutions is also emerging under this model. Finally, provider mobility is evident in the construction of offshore research institutes and branch campuses. For example,

New York University and Monash University both operate several branch campuses worldwide. Other institutions prefer more modest outposts such as small research institutes or student service centers. Another form of mobility, which receives less attention in cross-border education, is project mobility. Development aid projects or multilateral research partnerships are examples of project mobility.

A similar way of categorizing cross-border education strategies comes from the trade perspective. Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) promotes the liberalization of trade in services including education. Its General Agreement on

Trade in Service (GATS) attempts to eliminate barriers to the exchange and sale of services (e.g., preferential treatment, labor mobility restrictions, cross border supply and purchase of services). The WTO has a particular interest in increasing the participation of developing countries in the global trading system for the purpose of “economic development and the alleviation of poverty” (WTO, 2009, p. 23). More specifically, trade in services can contribute to the social and development needs of the least developed countries. While member states can request exemption of specific service industries from GATS, regulate other services conditionally, and offer preferential treatments to some partners, the ultimate goal is to liberalize trade in services among member states.

For the supply of services, GATS identifies four modes. These modes also apply to education services:

Table 2: Modes of Supply of Educational Services under GATS

Education Mode Explanation Mobility Examples 1. Cross-border The service crosses Online education, Program supply the border while the distance education, supplier and consumer twinning and do not move physically franchised programs. 2. Consumption Consumer moves to Students studying People (student) abroad the country of the abroad supplier

3. Commercial Supplier sets up Branch campuses Provider presence facilities in another country to provide the service

4. Presence of Person travels to Visiting professors People (faculty) natural persons another country to teaching in offshore provide the service programs temporarily

Source: Adapted from Vincent-Lancrin (2004).

Many countries have been hesitant to include education under GATS because it is deemed as a public service offered by governments for societal development rather than as a commercial enterprise for revenue generation (Robertson, 2006; Varghese,

2009). Other countries have only committed private education to GATS regulation while retaining control over their public education sectors.4 While these different typologies of cross-border education are useful for understanding the different modes of delivery and consumption in practice, they lack insight into the broader reasons that underpin the phenomenon. Furthermore, these typologies focus largely on the traditional conception of education (i.e., teaching and learning) while neglecting an area of higher education with a much longer history in internationalization: research. Teaching and learning may be bound by local norms and demands while scientific research has always had an international dimension involving international collaborations, standards, and peer reviews.

Education Hubs

While education hubs continue to appear in many publications on the internationalization of higher education, few research studies have focused specifically on the phenomenon. Presently, the academic literature on education hubs consists largely of descriptive works highlighting the policies and regulations of cross-border education. Many publications are single case studies. With the exception of a book published during the writing of this dissertation by Jane Knight and contributing authors

4 At the moment, the GATS negotiations have stalled since the Doha Round negotiations in 2001. Members have failed to come to an agreement on self-imposed deadlines in 2005 and 2006. The level of implementation among member states is fragmented, and the prospect of progress is uncertain. Some point out that bilateral agreements on trade of services (including education) have progressed much further than GATS (Tham et. al, 2013). It is important to note that a member state can still exempt certain services from foreign supply under GATS.

(2014), comparative and analytical studies of education hubs remain scant. However, significant grey literature exists on education hubs. Government agencies and private consultants (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers) have also conducted studies and published reports, which may or may not be publicly accessible. Policy documents and news articles also constitute a large portion of the grey literature on education hubs.

Definitions

Defining “education hub” has not been a priority among scholars because many accept the term as self-ascribed by the sponsors (e.g., government, investment firms, and institutions). This constructivist approach honors many variations of education hubs differing in scope and scale but also presents a problem of fragmented discussions lacking a common denominator. In grey literature, the term is even more ubiquitous as journalists and administrators brandish “education hub” freely to describe any collection of education institutions or activities (including initiatives within a single institution).

Interestingly, while many development plans for an education hub exists, few have publicly defined the term. Implicitly, the consensus is that an education hub contains a large number of education institutions and students. The size of this number, the origins of the institutions and students, and the types of activities vary widely. Some scholars have offered definitions of “education hub.” Kevin Kinser and Jason Lane (2010) define two types of education hubs: Acropolis and Archipelago. An Acropolis hub contains several higher education institutions located in a concentrated area, while the

Archipelago hub contains institutions scattered throughout a geographic area. They further specify:

An educational hub is a designated region intended to attract foreign investment, retain local students, build a regional reputation by providing access to high- quality education and training for both international and domestic students, and create a knowledge-based economy. (Lane & Kinser, 2011, p. 82)

This definition uses spatial arrangement as the differentiator and identifies some activities and rationales. In the same year, Hong Kong’s University Grants Committee

(UGC) offered a more specific definition:

The term [education hub] means a policy of investment in the competitive knowledge economy by providing educational services to a population that is non-local with a strong emphasis on inward pull. It also implies that these services are competitive because they are of comparative front-rank quality and delivered in an environment of high-level educational attainment and reputation. They can be delivered either in or outside Hong Kong, and are not necessarily confined to post-secondary education or indeed mostly to universities, but can also include secondary education. (UGC, 2010, p. 54)

This definition clearly emphasizes the recruitment of international students and treats higher education as a service industry in the knowledge economy. Interestingly, it recognizes both on-shore and off-shore programs as part of the hub. While the Hong

Kong UGC did not venture to define education hubs worldwide, it does offer a description to capture its own initiative. This description may not apply to other education hubs in the world. In a report for the United Nations, Cheng Kai Ming, a Hong

Kong scholar and policymaker, provides another definition:

An education hub is a concept where the hosting nation or city plays host to foreign students, international academics, international meetings and organizations, as well as generating knowledge and expertise that could benefit a larger international community. It is often a service that the host renders to other parts of the region or the world, but it is also intended to radiate the host’s influence, through soft power, over a larger region. (Cheng, 2010, p. 16)

This definition emphasizes international participation and highlights the broader rationale of soft power, a concept that does not appear in other hub definitions. In

35 another variation, Ada Lai and Rupert Maclean emphasize the synergy between knowledge production and economic development among education hubs:

An education hub should be a fountain of new knowledge and innovation that allows boundary spanning, knowledge transfer, technology spill-over and commercialization between universities, industry and the government, and can serve as a basis for the regeneration and revival of the local economy. (Lai & Maclean, 2011, p. 258)

Lai and Maclean go on to differentiate between an “education centre” and “education hub.” The former is strictly for educating students, while the latter is involved in both education and research (i.e., knowledge production). This useful distinction begins to set education hubs apart from other similar initiatives. Lastly, Knight defines an education hub according to the presence of actors and the activities they engage in:

An education hub is a planned effort to build a critical mass of local and international actors strategically engaged in education, training, knowledge production and innovation initiatives. (Knight, 2011a)

By this definition, an education hub at its very minimum must have both local and international actors. An actor could be an institution, a corporation, a researcher, an instructor, or a student. Therefore, an initiative that involves only local actors is not an education hub by this definition. This definition is unique in two ways. First, it does not project the rationales and motives that underpin education hubs. Second, it does not constrain itself to spatial arrangements. Therefore, an education hub can be developed for any reason and encompass any space (e.g., a country, city, or a zone). Granted, the list of activities places limits on the scope of an education hub and hints at some underlying rationales, but some basic parameters must be established. The definition also places education hubs in the context of international and cross-border activities.

This study uses Knight’s definition because it can accommodate a wide variety of education hubs that may contain different rationales.

In addition, Knight has created an education hub typology that draws on previous research on the internationalization of higher education (Knight, 2010). This typology marks out distinct paths for education hub development based largely on policy rationales. According to this typology, three different types of education hubs are evident: student hub, talent hub, and knowledge/innovation hub (Knight, 2011b; Knight

& Morshidi, 2011). A student hub focuses on the recruitment of international students and education providers to generate revenue for the country and higher education institutions. A talent hub focuses on the recruitment of skilled labor and professional development companies. A knowledge and innovation hub focuses on the production and application of research in order to remain competitive in the global knowledge economy. Knight and Lee (2014) further refined this typology to identify the different objectives, policy sectors, policy actors, and the strategies evident in each type of hub.

Rationales, Objectives and Strategies

Deviating from the conceptual approach, a handful of scholars focus on the policies and strategies for developing education hubs. Many of these studies focus on

Singapore given the city-state’s early launch of its education hub initiative. Mok writes prolifically on governance issues, regulatory regimes, and transnational education in

Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia from a neoliberal perspective (Mok & Lee, 2003;

Mok, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2011). Similarly, Lim (2009) focuses on the use of quality

37 assurance in Singapore as a policy tool to make its private higher education and ultimately its education hub more competitive globally. Although regulation is an essential part of transnational education, this operational approach sometimes loses sight of the education hub as a whole, given its functionalist analysis. Chan and Ng

(2008) conclude that Singapore takes a measured, selective approach to building its

“world-class” education hub unlike Hong Kong, which openly invites foreign education providers in a neoliberal approach.

Alternatively, Sidhu provides key insights into research partnerships, knowledge production, and the setbacks experienced by Singapore’s education hub such as the closure of the University of New South Wales’ branch campus (Sidhu, 2005, 2008,

2009a, 2009b). Placing Singapore’s education hub initiative in the context of neoliberalism and the global knowledge economy is a hallmark of Sidhu’s work on education hubs. From the perspective of a geographer, Olds (2007) focuses on the development of “global cities” through collaborations between foreign universities and local industries. Olds and Yeung (2004) also point out the Western-centric bias in literature as they grapple with the confluence of the developmental state, the contemporary city-state, and global city formation in the case of Singapore. Meanwhile,

Richards (2011) argues in a comparison between Singapore and Malaysia that the former takes a rational top-down approach while the latter relies on an emergent or

“muddling [through]” approach in building its education hub (i.e., less centralized planning). However, Richards points out that Malaysia is increasingly borrowing from

Singapore’s top-down approach and contends that the sustainability of education hubs requires academic and social support for international academic staff and students to

38 thrive. Despite their different foci, the common thread unifying these scholars is their recognition of the role of the state in building an education hub.

Some scholars also highlight the unique context of Singapore and Southeast

Asia. Notable reports in the grey literature on education hubs include a recent report for the United Nations Development Programme by Kai-Ming Cheng (2010). Cheng argues that there is an “Asian model” of education hubs given the region’s history of tying education policies to manpower planning. Although this is an interesting proposition, the absence of references to education hubs in the Middle East and the emphasis on economic rationales raise questions about the uniqueness of the Asian experience. In a separate effort, Y. C. Cheng and his research team produced a comprehensive report on developing Hong Kong as an education hub (Cheng, Ng, & Cheung, 2009). This study was sponsored by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council and naturally took on a narrow perspective of education hub as a revenue generating initiative in the service industry. Subsequent publications from Cheng provides fascinating analyses of distinct phases in Hong Kong’s development as an education hub, but these writings are largely prescriptive and oriented toward the marketization of higher education rather than empirical and holistic (Cheng, Cheung, & Yeun, 2011; Cheung, Yuen, Yuen, &

Cheng, 2011). Noticeably, neither the academic nor the grey literature examines international relations stemming from education, despite the strong focus on transnational education. Yet, in a recent study by Sidhu, Ho, and Yeoh (2011) on

Singapore’s efforts at cultivating entrepreneurial, innovative citizens through a partnership with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, local administrators

39 mention issues of soft power, geopolitics, and cultural identity being at stake even if these jargons were not verbalized.

In a later publication released during the writing of this dissertation, Knight (2014) also identifies five key rationales driving the development of education hubs: 1) economic reasons, 2) education and training reasons, 3) knowledge generation and innovation, 4) human resource development, and 5) status and soft power. Each rationale contains a set of objectives. For example, under economic reasons, the objectives are to strengthen the education industry, to attract foreign investment, and to diversify the economy. Under the rationale of education and training, the objectives are to align education and training with industry needs, to improve access to learning opportunities, and to enhance the overall quality of higher education in the host country.

Under the rationale of knowledge generation and innovation, the objectives are to create/enhance the research culture/capacity/outputs and to support applied research for innovation purposes. The rationale of human resource development includes objectives to train skilled workers for a knowledge and service economy and to prevent brain drain. The rationale of status/soft power includes the objectives to promote/brand the country as a regional center of excellence, to use education to increase attractiveness, competitiveness, and status within the region and beyond, and to create international partnerships for education and research. This exhaustive list provides a useful framework for analyzing the development of education hubs and raises many questions about the divergent developments of education hubs. The list of rationales also exhibits parallels to the four rationales identified in this study. Additionally, Knight also provides insightful comparisons of six education hubs based on case studies

40 provided by contributing authors: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Malaysia,

Hong Kong, and Botswana. By identifying key policy actors, challenges, opportunities, planning approaches, and implementation approaches, this comparative study maps out similarities and differences among education hubs. This impressive compilation of case studies and comparative analyses provide the first comprehensive study of education hubs as an international phenomenon.

A brief review of the three relevant case studies in the above compilation (Knight,

2014) is essential before concluding this section. The Singapore case study by Sidhu,

Ho, and Yeoh (2014) provides a critical analysis of Singapore’s recent push in research and development in order to become a knowledge hub. Specifically, the case study focuses on three research initiatives and two university medical alliances rather than the entire education hub initiative. The Malaysia case study by Aziz and Abdullah (2014) provides largely a review of policy documents with some attention given to the issues and challenges facing the country’s education hub. Lastly, the Hong Kong chapter by

Mok and Bodycott (2014) identifies key drivers, rationales, actors, and challenges. It is important to note that among the three case studies, only the Singapore one contains empirical data from interviews with policymakers. Policy document analysis is useful in providing a foundation for understanding these education hubs, but a broader inquiry is necessary to fully analyze their developments. This dissertation builds on these existing studies by engaging in discussions with policymakers who are responsible for building an education hub.

International Relations Theory

The theoretical framework of this study draws from the field of international relations, which provides insights into the motives and behaviors of both state and non- state actors on a regional and global scale. Four main paradigms in international relations are realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism. Although liberalism, and specifically neoliberalism, can explain many recent developments in higher education, the prominent role of the state and the generous public subsidies evident in most education hubs today contradict liberalism’s belief in a restrained state. Yet, the legacy of liberal thought in international relations can partially explain the desire for mutual understanding and revenue generation through cross-border higher education. Recent scholarship in realism and constructivism can also provide fresh insights into international higher education. Marxism is presently not evident in any of the policy discourses on education hubs worldwide nor is it a paradigm espoused by the three societies in this study. Therefore, the literature review below focuses on realism, liberalism, and constructivism as potential lenses for analyzing the international engagements of education hubs

Realism

The ideas underpinning realism date back to Sun Tzu (“Art of War”), Thucydides, and Machiavelli, even though the field of international relations did become a distinct academic subject until the end of World War I (1914-18). Given its dominance in the field of international relations, realism has weathered numerous critiques and spun off several variants: classical realism (Machiavelli and Hobbes), neoclassical realism

(Morgenthau), strategic realism (Schelling), and neorealism (Waltz).5 Some of these variants actually subsume scholars with very different assumptions, objectives, and methodologies (Telhami, 2002), thereby creating some confusion about the paradigm.

Rather than provide an elaborate account of the epistemological evolution of realism, the discussion here will focus on the core ideas of realism and the contributions of contemporary realist scholars. In other words, what are the common ideas shared by most if not all forms of realism? What contributions have contemporary realists added to this paradigm?

At the core of its intellectual edifice, realism asserts that sovereign states act mainly on self-interest to amass material power in an anarchical international system.

This principle draws on the belief that humans are innately self-centered and competitive rather than collaborative or idealistic. As long as international relations are affected by the vices of human nature, realism will prevail. In realism, the principal actor is the sovereign state, and issues of national security direct its interactions with other states. Anarchy is commonly defined as the lack of a supreme authority higher than the nation-state; therefore the state is mostly accountable to its people rather than to an external body (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). However, the principle of reciprocity demands that states respect each other’s sovereignty such that a balance of power prevents hegemonic control by any single country (McKinlay & Little, 1986). Realists often speak about the security dilemma when one state’s continual pursuit of material

5 This classification is based on Jackson and Sorensen’s (2007) lucid introduction of international relations theories. Others have also identified offensive realism (Mearsheimer) and defensive realism (Waltz) as other variants (Telhami, 2002; Jackson & Sorensen, 2007).

43 power only encourages other states to respond accordingly (e.g., an arms race). In this environment, international politics can be understood as a balance of power in a zero- sum manner whereby one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss (i.e., relative gains is the key rather than absolute gains). Therefore, realists are generally cynical about international alliances or cooperative arrangements because national interests will ultimately prevail over collective interests. For realists, international relations are essentially perpetual struggles for power akin to Charles Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” in the biological world. Although this is a very simplistic and pessimistic view of international order, classical realists do believe in the civic virtue of rulers to serve their subjects and “the republic” diligently through the wisdom of foreign policy – the core essence of classical realism dating back to Machiavelli (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007).

Neorealism later emerged in the United States as a positivistic interpretation of realism with a more moderate view of power and self-interest (Nye, 1988; Telhami,

2002). Kenneth Waltz is often considered the leading theorist of neorealism with his seminal 1979 book Theory of International Politics. Waltz argues that rather than international relations being at the whim of human nature, the structure of the international system (specifically the distribution of power) mediates and constrains the behavior of sovereign states. Actors are far less important than the meta structure, which dictates foreign policy. States are still driven by national interests and the desire to acquire material power. However, a state also has other concerns beyond material power; therefore, the pursuit of power is uneven among states due to different contexts and competing priorities. Although national security is still paramount, power does not necessarily provide security (Palmer & Morgan, 2007). Furthermore, state-to-state

44 collaborations are possible if mutual national interests are fulfilled. If Hans Morgenthau viewed states as “material power maximizers,” then Kenneth Waltz saw states as driven more by “self preservation” than a blind pursuit of power (Telhami, 2002). Put in another way, classical realism focuses on egoism and power politics based on human nature, while neorealism is more concerned about the structural constraints in an anarchical system (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, neorealism is also known as structural realism.

In another departure from classical and neoclassical realism, Waltz explicitly avoids the normative values held by classicists in an effort to inject scientific rigor into international relations as a discipline (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). However, there is significant disagreement among scholars regarding neorealism’s value-neutral stance.

Telhami concurs with most critics that Waltz offers a “descriptive enterprise explaining the way the world is organized, not as a prescriptive giving states advice on what to do” but points out that “nothing in neorealism precludes a theory, or an empirical finding, linking moral factors and the external behavior of states” (Telhami, 2002, p. 164). On the other hand, Joseph Nye argues that

Even the neorealist structural theories of Kenneth Waltz can best be read as exhortations to policymakers and fellow citizens about how they ought to respond to the structure of power rather than as accurate accounts of how the two superpowers behave. (Nye, 1988, p. 236)

Jackson and Sorensen (2007, p. 78) identify Waltz’s normative values on national security and sovereignty even if Waltz himself is not explicit about these assumptions:

• Independence is an “entitlement” that requires mutual respect. States are equal in formal-legal terms but not material terms.6

• States are worth fighting for.

• Great powers must act responsibly in managing the international system because international order is valuable.

• Bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity.

Consequently, neorealism is not as far removed from classical or neoclassical realism as Waltz’s positivistic approach might suggest (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). The issue of normative values in international relations will be addressed again later in comparison to constructivism.

Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power

The concept of “winning the hearts and minds” of the public dates back to as far as the 6th century BC when Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu (founder of Taoism) concluded that a ruler is most effective not when subjects obey him but when they barely know he exists (Nye, 2008). History is replete with examples of rulers who attempt to sway public opinion and action from a distance (e.g., through public largesse and third-party agents). In the area of international relations, many modern leaders and states have certainly applied this same principle to interactions with foreign states and people. In

6 Also known as the principle of reciprocity in realism (McKinlay & Little, 1986).

46 addition to the traditional channels of interactions between governments, states have also deployed culture to exert influence. For centuries, European nations exported their cultures en masse under colonialism to strengthen links between the colonized and the imperial motherland. While this effort generated violent resistance in many societies, many others also sought ties with Europe as a place of knowledge and culture. Elites from distant colonies often pursued higher education in European metropolises. Cultural diplomacy attracted great interest following World War II. As vanquished nations in

Europe and Asia rebuilt from destruction, the Allied victors provided generous support

(e.g., the Marshall Plan). These reconstruction efforts forged closer ties between donor nations and the recipients. During the Cold War, United States and the Soviet Union also invested heavily in cultural projects to attract foreigners to their respective spheres of influence. These projects included student exchanges, personnel training programs, collaborations in arts, and technical assistance projects. Likewise, the Commonwealth nations created the Colombo Plan to fund human resource development in the Asia-

Pacific with the hope of warding off communist influences in Southeast Asia. This plan educated generations of Asian students in Western universities. In fact, the practice of exerting influence through higher learning harkens back to the days of peripatetic scholars in antiquity. Ancient centres of higher learning such as Athens and Baghdad became powerful cities that exerted intellectual and political influence across civilizations. Thus, long before the emergence of nation-states in the 17th century under the treaties of Westphalia, higher education institutions were already operating across borders and cultures as pillars of civil society.7 These centers of higher learning

7 Universities such as Al-Azhar (Egypt), Bologna (Italy), and Nalanda (India) emerged between the 5th and

47 mediated contacts between different communities through the congregation of scholars and the exchange of knowledge.

Cultural diplomacy did not receive significant attention among academic circles until the 1990s when Harvard international relations scholar Joseph Nye coined the phrase “soft power” in his book Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American

Power. Nye further developed the concept in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to

Success in World Politics. In these publications, Nye attempts to provide some theoretical clarity to cultural diplomacy and the broader concept of soft power by using many examples from modern history. His efforts have even attracted the attention of diplomats such as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.8

According to Nye, power is “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants” (2004, p. 2). Two kinds of power exist in international politics: hard and soft power. Hard power stems from military might and economic resources – two areas of strength that are well researched in international relations. Soft power stems from more abstract resources that are attractive to outsiders. According to Nye, a country’s soft power can be found in three main resources (Nye, 2008, p. x):

10th century well before their respective nation-states were created. 8 In Clinton’s confirmation hearing in 2009 as a candidate for Secretary of State, she repeatedly used the term “smart power” to describe her vision of American foreign policy (Etheridge, 2009). Smart power is a term Joseph Nye advocates to indicate the effective combination of hard and soft power.

1. Culture – when certain elements are attractive to others.

2. Political values – when one lives up to these values at home and abroad.

3. Foreign policies – when these are seen as legitimate and moral.

In this conception, Nye broadens soft power to include both cultural and non-cultural resources. Therefore, soft power is more than just cultural diplomacy. In Nye’s view, culture also extends beyond popular culture and includes education, literature, and media. Higher education is an example of culture as well as a transmitter of values.

Even though many cross border education programs and providers today ignore local epistemology and traditions, students are nevertheless exposed to the local society’s values in their daily lives. While this study does not examine the values being promoted by education hubs, it does acknowledge value as a form of soft power and a strong undercurrent in international higher education.

In addition to identifying soft power resources, Nye examines the process of exerting influence. While the hard power of military might and economic coercion can extract concessions on the global stage, soft power can also produce desirable outcomes by appealing to foreigners. Nye emphasizes the importance of differentiating the resources that may produce the desired behavior from the behavior itself (see Table

3). Actors can exert influence through three processes: coercion (hard), inducement

(hard), and attraction (soft). For example, although military force is generally considered hard power, Canadian soldiers liberating France and Holland in World War II led to an enduring connection between the two countries and gave Canada significant soft power in the eyes of these two European nations. While American popular culture can translate into soft power in many countries, the late Kim Jong-il’s penchant for

Hollywood movies was unlikely to change his confrontational attitude toward the U.S.

(Nye, 2008). Other examples of soft power can be quite diverse: US military supporting rescue efforts in Southeast Asia after the 2004 tsunami bolstered its reputation in the region; Osama bin Laden inspiring segments of the Muslim society to act against the

West; Norway acting as a credible conflict mediator given its social democratic values and Nobel Peace Prize legacy.9 In higher education, soft power is evident through the influence of the Fullbright Program, the Colombo Plan, the Japan Foundation, the

British Council, DAAD, and Confucius Institutes. Therefore, Nye defines soft power as behavioral outcomes via attraction and influence rather than as a static resource. As a corollary, context is extremely important in the effectiveness of soft power (Nye, 2008).

The same cultural asset often does not lead to universal behavior changes. From these examples, Nye further infers the following about soft power:

• soft power functions less overtly and immediately than hard power;

• the state may control foreign policy and political values, but culture is embedded in civil societies and beyond government control;

• soft power could be exploited for malicious purposes, but it is not synonymous with propaganda.10

Interestingly, in Soft Power (2004), Nye rarely mentions “realism” and “realpolitik” even though soft power is essentially a variation of power politics under the realist framework.

In fact, on the first page of this book, Nye references Machiavelli’s belief that a ruler is more effective when feared than loved but then adds that a ruler must evoke both

9 The example of bin Laden and US humanitarian support in Southeast Asia comes from Nye, while the others are mine. 10 Nye is less explicit about the difference between soft power and propaganda. He only points out that soft power requires credibility to sustain long-term relationships, and propaganda ultimately fails because lacks credibility (Nye, 2004).

50 emotions in the age of globalization. By 2008, in a foreword on a book tracing United

States and Japan’s leverage of soft power, Nye clearly states that soft power is an example of realism rather than idealism or liberalism (Nye, 2008). Furthermore, Nye points out the common fallacy of equating the comparison of hard versus soft power to realism versus idealism. In Nye’s view, classical realists respect ideas too, but neorealists have abandoned values in their preoccupation with measuring power using a positivist approach. Clearly, Nye does not associate soft power with neorealism given that values and ideas are fundamental to the attraction between states in his view.

Contrary to a zero-sum game of power struggles, soft power is an interactive concept whereby “attraction is co-determined and persuasion is socially constructed” among state and non-state actors (Yasushi & McConnell, 2008, p. xxiv). Nye adds that soft power is descriptive rather than a normative concept (Nye, 2008). These unique concepts signal soft power’s departure from neorealism and begin to echo elements of constructivism in international relations theory. In his latest work, Nye advocates smart power as the effective combination of both hard and soft power in foreign policy (Nye,

2004).

Table 3: Types of Power

Hard Soft

Spectrum coercion inducement agenda attraction of behavior setting

Command Co-opt

Most likely force payments institutions values resources sanctions bribes culture policies

Source: (Nye, 2004, p. 8)

Liberalism

If realism presents a pessimistic view of nation states mired in power struggles, liberalism provides an optimistic view that advocates human potential and individual freedom. Liberals believe that human progress and modernization are attainable in all societies when human reasoning and rationality underpin governance. As a corollary, modernization relies on the capitalist economy whereby the state exists only to ensure individual liberty and a free market rather than to consolidate power as is the case with realism. Individuals can cooperate based on mutual interests and seek benefits for the greater good (domestically and internationally). Therefore, international relations can produce absolute gains rather than merely relative gains. The belief in progress for the majority is fundamental in liberalism even if there are serious disagreements among

52 liberals on the definition of progress and the magnitude of obstacles (Jackson &

Sorenson, 2007).

Prior to World War I, liberalism was also known as idealism and utopian liberalism. Early liberal thinkers include John Locke (1632-1704), Adam Smith (1723-

1790), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). After World War I, international relations emerged as an academic discipline due to widespread interests in preventing another traumatic worldwide conflict. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s belief in the importance of democratic ideals and international organizations (e.g., the League of Nations) was very influential in the 1920s. Wilsonian idealism contends that democratic states do not go to war against each other. Therefore, the propagation of liberal democratic values worldwide must be a priority in foreign policies and international relations. However, the harsh realities of World War II forced liberal scholars to reflect on their beliefs and generate four strands of liberal thought which collectively constitute neoliberalism (Nye,

1988; Jackson & Sorenson, 2007):

1. sociological liberalism – forming common values and identity

2. interdependence liberalism – increasing links between states

3. institutional liberalism – using institutions to promote liberal ideals

4. republican liberalism – relying on democratic states to ensure peace

Neoliberalism stems from the growing importance of trade, investment, travel, and communication in international relations starting in the 1950s (Jackson & Sorenson,

2007). A comprehensive review of these variations of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of this study, but a few key principles deserve attention for their relevance to higher education. Sociological liberalism rejects the view that international relations are simply

53 state-to-state interactions. Rather, the transnational contact between people, groups, and organizations are increasingly important as well. Therefore, a world with multiple layers of transnational networks and common interests will facilitate peace.

Interdependence liberalism also values the role of non-state actors but focuses on the economic integration of globalization. Rather than rely on military prowess and alliances, states are increasingly leveraging economic ties as a form of power (e.g., post-war Japan and Germany, contemporary China, etc.). Robert Keohane and Joseph

Nye (1977, 1987) wrote extensively about complex interdependence in which transnational actors such as businesses and civil society pursue diverse interests that may differ from the state’s interests.11 Interestingly, interdependence liberalism appears to be a precursor to Joseph Nye’s subsequent thinking on soft power attraction.

Lastly, institutional liberalism and republican liberalism are remnants of the

Wilsonian idealism from the 1920s. Although less optimistic than their predecessors, these liberals still believe in the role of international organizations in advancing cooperation and peace as well as the unlikelihood of democratic states going to war.

Institutional liberals also believe in the role of international regimes in averting conflicts

(i.e., international agreements such as maritime laws). Francis Fukuyama’s The End of

History and the Last Man (1992) certainly echoes the belief that the triumph of liberal democracies worldwide will create a halcyon era that is unprecedented in human history.

11 Among contemporary liberals, interdependence liberals are the most balanced in their views for not dismissing realism entirely while republican liberals represent the most normative form of liberalism; nevertheless, the four strands of neoliberalism are “mutually supportive” (Jackson & Sorenson, 2007, p. 44).

Although many educators today rightly interpret neoliberalism as an assault on the welfare state followed by rampant privatization, this view is fixated on economic liberalism rather than an accurate depiction of neoliberal thought in international relations. The contribution of liberalism toward understanding education hubs may be its belief that human progress and modernization can be attained through greater contacts among nations and free trade in the global economy. Admittedly, these values translate into two distinctly different rationales in the internationalization of higher education: mutual understanding and revenue generation. Are these rationales evident in the development of an education hub? To ensure a more robust theoretical framework, this study acknowledges that liberalism in international relations is more than free trade or the privatization of social services.

Constructivism

The social constructivist paradigm in international relations emerged in the 1980s as an alternative to realism’s fixation on material power and deterministic views of state interests (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). Neorealists’ belief in the stability of a bipolar world order was proven false when the Soviet Union collapsed, and a subsequent balancing of power based on the realist principle did not occur. Rather than focus on material power and structure as key determinants of international relations, constructivists stress the importance of ideas, identities, and values in shaping the interactions among state and non-state actors. For example, non-profit organizations such as Greenpeace and the Red Cross contribute significantly to international relations as civil society actors. For constructivists, ideas and values change constantly as actors

55 socialize. Therefore, one cannot assume that states are perpetually seeking more material power as the lone actors in international relations. Alexander Wendt is often considered the first proponent of constructivism in international relation theory. In 1992,

Wendt clarified the principles of constructivism in a landmark article: Anarchy is What

States Make of It. Wendt later published a book, Social Theory of International Politics

(1999), as a response to Waltz’s magnum opus on neorealism: Theory of International

Politics (1979).

According to Wendt (1992, p. 394), constructivists believe in a “conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.” This sociological approach differs fundamentally from the rational approaches of neorealism and neoliberalism.

Like individuals, each state has multiple identities, and these identities are highly subjective and relational based on interactions with other actors in the international arena. Furthermore, a state’s view on security varies depending on how it identifies itself in relation to other states: 1) competitive, 2) individualistic, and 3) cooperative

(Wendt, 1992).12 Both the first and second ideal types are examples of self-help, while the third one is communal and constructivist. Wendt does not deny that states function

12 Wendt’s typology (1992, p. 400) is extremely useful for understanding IR theories. In the competitive ideal type (realism), states perceive each other as threats, feel paralyzed by the security dilemma, and view power as relative gains and losses. This is the Hobbesian war of all against all, whereby collaboration with another state is unthinkable. In the individualistic ideal type (neoliberalism), states are indifferent to one’s own security relative to each other, more concerned about absolute gains in power, and open to the idea of collective action. In the cooperative ideal type (constructivism), states identify positively with each other such that the self and other are closely intertwined based on shared norms and values. Collaboration is motivated by collective interests more than by external threats or power imbalances.

56 in an anarchical system; however, “self-help is an institution, not a constitutive feature of anarchy” (Wendt, 1992, p. 402).

Building on Wendt’s work, Martha Finnemore’s version of constructivism focuses on the norms of international society and their ability to shape and be shaped by domestic norms. By norms, Finnemore specifically refers to prescriptive or evaluative standards with moral authority (i.e., “oughtness”). Norms emerge through the advocacy of individuals / states / organizations, cascade to a critical mass of states via socialization, and ultimately become internalized without further debate (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1998). An example of a norm that propagated throughout large parts of the world is the ban against landmines. States adopt new international norms for reasons of legitimation, conformity, and/or self esteem. In her book on the changing purpose of military intervention, Finnemore (2003) argues that states’ interests have changed over time and space, contrary to realists’ static definition. A change in social purpose requires a shift in beliefs at both the collective (states) and individual (political leaders) level. For individuals, this change is a social-psychological process involving cognitive and affective alterations (e.g., empathy, liking). Some scholars consider Finnemore and

Sikkink’s work as the first wave of norm dynamics research given its focus on international norms’ impact on domestic attitudes and behavior (Cortell & Davis, 2000).

In the second wave, researchers focus on how domestic politics and actors shape international norms.

In another variation of social constructivism, cosmopolitanism injects a social justice dimension into international relations. While most social constructivists recognize the pivotal role of norms and values in international relations, they refrain from

57 prescribing their personal norms and values. Social constructivism generally honors the dynamics of a collective in formulating norms and values. However, cosmopolitanism goes a step further by demanding an ethical conscience from a collective. David Held

(2003, p. 469) states, “Cosmopolitanism is concerned to disclose the cultural, ethical and legal basis of political order in a world where political communities and states matter, but not only and exclusively.” Held points out that globalization creates multilevel governance that challenges the authority of the nation-state, but “loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in traditional ethnic, regional and national communities.” In striving toward an “ethically sound” political community, Held asserts that four principles must be recognized: 1) the ultimate units of moral concern are individual people, 2) each person is of equal worth, 3) political processes must be non-coercive, and 4) decision-making must be inclusive. An example of cosmopolitanism in international relations is the World Order Model Project (WOMP). In explaining WOMP, Richard Falk implores that there must be “a social movement dedicated to the establishment of more humane politics throughout the world and a more viable political framework for the planet as a whole” (Falk, 1978, p. 532). Rather than provide easy answers, both Held and Falk emphasize collective action in ensuring an egalitarian or “preferred” future. In short, cosmopolitanism recognizes the agency of non-state actors in any collective decision-making process; however, it insists that the collective must deliberate on ethics and respect individual autonomy. These fundamental ideas in effect create a variant of social constructivism that is simultaneously sensitive to collective agency yet value- explicit (Hayhoe, 1989). It is important to point out that cosmopolitanism is not a subset of postmodernism because the former emphasizes a universal commitment to ethics

58 rather than celebrate cultural relativity. While cosmopolitanism values individual autonomy, it also speaks out against developments that are unethical and inhumane.13

Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses

The critique on realism has generated a large body of writing that can be highly technical and convoluted given the many variations of realism in existence (Nye, 1988;

Peou, 2002; Telhami, 2002; Finnemore, 2003; Palmer & Morgan, 2007; Acharya, 2008).

The weaknesses of realism are often the strengths of social constructivism given their diametrically opposite views. More specifically, constructivists’ raison d'être sometimes appears to be anything that is neglected by realism. As an example, Wendt’s influential

1992 article, which pioneered the field of constructivism in international relations, contains long passages refuting neorealism rather than elaborating on constructivism.

Most of the criticisms focus on realism’s state-centric approach, deterministic view of material power, and the logic of balance of power. Both liberals and constructivists point out rightly that non-state actors such as civil societies also contribute to international relations, states are driven by non-power motives as well, and international collaboration is possible for diverse reasons. How states define their interests and how

13 Held clarifies his view of cosmopolitanism, “This broad position runs counter to the view of moral particularists that belonging to a given community limits and determines the moral worth of individuals and the nature of their autonomy. It does so not to deny cultural diversity and difference, but to affirm that there are limits to the moral validity of particular communities – limits which recognise, and demand, that we must treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and moral choice in every human being” (Held, 2003, p. 470).

59 these interests change have always been poorly explained by realism (Nye, 1988). Nye adds:

Realist theory is better at explaining interactions than interests. A theory of interests defined solely in terms of power is an impoverished theory of interest. (Nye, 1988, p. 239)

One can easily disagree with Nye’s view that realism actually explains interactions when it portrays states largely as power-hungry automatons. Realism neglects the confluence of ideas, identities, values, culture, and institutions as state and non-state actors interact. It remains silent on how these elements may morph and diffuse. Wendt adds that realism can explain structure and anarchy but cannot predict the behavior of states

(Wendt, 1992). However, some would argue that constructivists merely identify ideas and norms but cannot predict behavior either (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007). While liberalism does recognize the potential of democratic ideals and common humanity, it is certainly not as sensitive to emerging ideals and interests as constructivism.

The most glaring weakness of realism and liberalism is that both paradigms ignore context, while the manner in which context is taken into account more or less defines excellence in comparative education research in the tradition of Nicholas Hans and Michael Sadler. Reminiscent of modernists and their metanarratives, both paradigms assume a predictable trajectory in international relations. Realists assume all states continuously seek power and resist cooperation in a bleak anarchical system punctuated by periods of peace. Contrary to this pessimistic view, liberals assume that democratic ideals and the free market will facilitate human progress and modernization in all societies. In essence, these two paradigms conceive state interests as relatively static: power and liberty. Social constructivists, on the other hand, are hesitant to

60 commit to such an ideological position. Yet this open-ended approach may exact a price by restricting constructivists to studies of the past and present because a value-free paradigm cannot begin to envision how state and non-state actors may behave in the future. However, cosmopolitanism (e.g., WOMP) furthers social constructivism by insisting on a universal commitment to ethics and moral conscience whenever the collective deliberates. These fundamentally different views on international relations may inform different configurations of education hubs.

While the concept of soft power is very appealing both in theory and in practice, it also has its weaknesses. Context and behavioral changes are important in the conceptualization of soft power. A valuable source of soft power at one place may be a liability elsewhere (e.g., Norway’s Nobel Peace Prize generates global influence for the country, but recently China restricted trade and diplomatic ties with Norway after the

2010 prize was awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo). Nye manages to bridge the divide between realism and constructivism in defining soft power, but his views can be quite American and state-centric nevertheless. The impetus for his work on soft power appears to stem from widespread antagonism in the world toward American foreign policy. Of the three resources he identified as potential soft power, foreign policy and political values are largely shaped by the state. Culture allows the involvement of non- state actors such as universities, but finding empirical evidence of changed behavior due to soft power can be a difficult task given its broad yet subtle impact. This kind of quiet diplomacy could be impossible to identify let alone analyze, whereas the hard power of military force and economic sanctions is visible. Ironically, Nye is renowned for his earlier work with Robert Keohane as one of the founders of neoliberalism in

61 international relations; yet he has developed a concept that recognizes the social psychological dimension of international relations. Perhaps soft power is Nye’s recognition that neoliberalism cannot adequately explain the behavior of states when the issues are not about individual freedom or the free market.

Most constructivists such as Wendt (1992), Finnemore (2003), and Acharya

(2008) astutely acknowledge that sovereignty and national interest are still salient issues, and one cannot dismiss realism entirely. This moderate view is also evident in interdependence liberalism. While neorealism explains power and structure, constructivism sheds light on the sociological dimension of international relations.

Constructivism’s strength lies in its capacity to account for behavioral changes among state and non-state actors. Issues of culture, values, identity, norms, and context are important to constructivists just as they are with many comparative education scholars.

By explaining behavioral changes and recognizing the potential for cooperation among states, constructivism is also far more optimistic about international relations than realism. Values and identity may be influential in the development of education hubs if policymakers recognize the potential of higher education to reproduce national and regional norms.

Chapter 3: Research Design

Introduction

This study uses qualitative approaches to capture the complexity of education hub development in three societies. Rather than harness the research design to a single methodology with predefined philosophical and epistemological constraints, the plan was inspired by ideas and concepts in qualitative research and informed by my own professional experiences in higher education administration. Different in-situ challenges also arose during fieldwork and demanded sensitive adjustments to the plan to accommodate cultural differences and logistical barriers. Qualitative methodologies provide space for such an inquiry, which seeks understanding rather than hypothesis testing. What remained unchanged throughout the fieldwork was the centrality of the main research question:

What are the rationales driving the development of education hubs particularly toward regional and international engagement?

In other words, the intent of the research is two-fold: 1) to identify the key rationales driving the development of education hubs and 2) to understand the international links being forged by education hubs. These two objectives are essentially the guiding beacons of this study. The voices of the research participants play a central role in this study as they highlighted issues of importance, identified other potential informants, and provided frank reflections on education hubs. The study utilized semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and participant observations. The first half of this chapter will review the research questions, identify the levels of comparison, and explain the

63 selected methodologies. The second half of the chapter will provide details on data collection, the participants, the interview process, and data analysis.

Research Purpose and Questions

The main purpose of this study is to identify the rationales driving the development of education hubs in three societies and particularly the international dimension of these hubs. The main research question, as stated above, is divided into the following subordinate questions:

Rationales: What are the rationales that motivate a place to develop itself as an education hub?

Policy Coherence: To what extent do policymakers share the same rationales within each society and across the three societies? Have these rationales changed over time?

International Relations: What motivates those who promote education hubs to forge links with foreign actors? What patterns of engagement are evident?

Development: What are the main issues facing the development of these education hubs?

The first question identifies the main rationales driving the development of education hubs. The second question acknowledges that a consensus on rationales may not exist among policymakers – this is particularly germane to a system-wide initiative, such as an education hub, which involves a myriad of actors with diverse vested interests. The third question on international relations recognizes that education hubs are operating well beyond local and national territories. The term “link” was specifically chosen for its

64 neutrality as compared to “partner” or “collaborate.” These latter terms imply equity in an interaction both in terms of agency and resources (i.e., equal ability to shape the nature and outcome of these interactions, equal contribution of resources, etc.). Link also encompasses many types of interactions ranging from recruiting international students and faculty to building a joint research laboratory. Therefore, the study is not restricted to institutional partnerships. Identifying the foreign actors and the pattern of links can enrich the study on rationales. The fourth question on development was not in the original design of this research. However, during interviews, many research participants highlighted implementation challenges and noted an education hub’s strengths and opportunities. In fact, some participants assumed that the rationales were obvious or common across all education hubs and, therefore, did not warrant clarification. It also became apparent during the fieldwork that a study confined to the rationales behind education hubs might become a regurgitation of policy rhetoric while ignoring the realities of policy implementation and the political climate of the day. Nevertheless, the primary focus of this study is on the rationales (Chapter 5) and international links

(Chapter 6) of education hubs. The translation of these rationales into specific strategies for implementation and development is a secondary focus of this study.

Levels of Comparison

Conducting research on three different societies raises many methodological questions about comparison. What exactly is being compared? How is the comparison being done? Traditionally, a multi-site comparative education research project involves multiple countries. This approach is evident in the works of comparative education

65 pioneers like Marc Antoine Jullien and Michael Sadler and more recent figures such as

George Bereday and Burton Clark. Similarly, this study is first and foremost a comparison at the national or state level. Education hubs that are national initiatives, as opposed to sub-national initiatives, are therefore well suited for this type of international or external comparison. While Singapore and Malaysia are sovereign states, Hong

Kong is in reality a city. However, Hong Kong’s long history as a colonial city-state with administrative autonomy and international representation typical of a country justifies its inclusion in this study. Hong Kong and Macau have greater autonomy than other

Chinese cities and many other metropolises worldwide. The Hong Kong Basic Law, a constitutional document signed between Britain and China in 1984, guarantees that the city can continue in its way of life and capitalist system for a period of 50 years after the

1997 handover. This document protects the freedoms and rights of Hong Kong residents.14

The second level of comparison is an internal comparison within a society (i.e., within an education hub). For example, to what extent do policymakers in Singapore share the same rationales for an education hub? This internal comparison provides a more realistic picture of education hub development rather than assuming homogeneity or coherence in policymaking. Lastly, there is also a diachronic comparison of past and present given that some education hubs were launched more than 10 years ago. Have the rationales changed over the course of time? While 10 years may be a short

14 Article 151, Chapter 7 of The Basic Law states that Hong Kong "may, on its own, ... maintain and develop relations and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states and regions and relevant international organizations in the appropriate fields, including the economic, trade, financial and monetary, shipping, communications, tourism, cultural and sports fields."

66 timeframe in the history of educational development, changes in government administrations and priorities may have considerable effects on a national initiative.

Figure 1 summarizes the different levels of comparison in this study as discussed here.

It is important to note that this comparative study does not seek to rank the three education hubs based on a battery of indicators. These types of exercises are often reduced to quantitative comparisons that strive for broad generalizations while neglecting the local context and agency of policymakers. The use of output measures assumes that the units of comparison (i.e., hubs) share a common end goal when in fact each could be pursuing a different set of objectives entirely. Ranking exercises suggest a zero-sum game or even an arms race in higher education development. The socio-political impetuses, enablers, and barriers to educational development are seldom addressed in these exercises. On a more practical level, there are presently limited data on education hubs whether in input or output measures. The scarcity of data is due to both incomplete record-keeping as well as restricted access by government authorities accustomed to keeping public records confidential. If data were more available in the future, an alternative to ranking education hubs could be a rating system that could be formative in highlighting development rather than summative in identifying winners and losers. For the purpose of this study, the comparison is a qualitative analysis focusing on rationales and international links.

Figure 1: Levels of Comparison

external comparison (education hubs)

internal comparison Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong (policymakers) (time)

(policymakers)

(time)

Methodology

This study makes a clear distinction between methodology and method.

Methodology is understood as the overarching framework guiding the inquiry. Every methodology has ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the conduct of research. One’s beliefs about the nature of being (ontology) and the nature of knowledge (epistemology) circumscribe the choice of methodology. In other words, methodology is the philosophical disposition of the researcher in approaching the research topic, while method(s) refers to the tools used to operationalize the inquiry.

Inevitably, there is some convergence between the methodology chosen and the appropriate methods required; however, these are not synonymous concepts. For

68 example, post-positivism and critical theory methodology can both utilize focus groups as a method despite their divergent aims.

This study draws from elements of post-positivism and constructivism at different junctures of the research even though some argue that these two methodologies are incompatible (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Positivism advances infallible, universal truths using rigorous tests that are valid and reliable. An objective researcher who forms and tests hypotheses in a deductive manner within a controlled environment exemplifies the positivist approach. This classical scientific tradition dates back to the Age of

Enlightenment, which replaced faith and tradition with reason in order to serve the advancement of society and science. Critics have subsequently labeled positivism as naïve realism for its allegiance to objectivity and its narrow definition of truth (Guba &

Lincoln, 1994). The recognition that truths are in fact tentative and imperfect led to the emergence of post-positivism, also known as critical realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).

Rather than test hypotheses to uncover universal truths, Karl Popper advocated conjectures and criticisms to refute or refine existing theories (Popper, 1963). More specifically, Popper’s concept of falsifiability demonstrates the value in refining a theory using empirical evidence rather than verifying it for universal acceptance as a canon. In other words, the pursuit of knowledge is perpetually tentative and evolutionary.

Nevertheless, post-positivism still subscribes to a metanarrative of the scientific method given its adherence to objectivity, the formulation of hypotheses, and deductive reasoning. An example of the post-positivist tradition in comparative education research is the work of Brian Holmes, who was inspired by Popper. Through the clever use of ideal types as a scientific tool, Holmes was able to analyze the impact of cultural and

69 societal values on education. The anticipated outcomes based on these ideal typical constructs were then juxtaposed against empirical evidence to absolve the researcher from weighing in on normative choices in social change (Hayhoe, 1989). Holmes’ approach recognizes the role of context (including normative values) in comparative education research while remaining neutral with regard to the preferred values for human progress. This post-positivist approach is methodologically and intellectually appealing given its logical and objective approach to analyzing social phenomena.

This study adopts elements of Holmes’ problem-solving approach by comparing the education hub rationales held by research participants against those stated in policy documents and by other policymakers. It is an objective and systematic comparison to determine policy coherence. While no ideal types were constructed, the policy rationales of education hubs are inevitably shaped by local values, norms, and concerns. Comparing the development of these hubs against the stated rationales also absolves the researcher from making a value judgment on education hubs. This value- freedom means the researcher does not “enter the business of prescribing what ought to be. Scientists… must not take sides.” (Jones, 1985, p. 108). Also, a loosely constructed hypothesis is evident in this study. The original impetus behind this study is my skepticism that education hubs are merely about revenue generation. Given that the purpose of higher education varies widely across different societies, stages of economic development, and eras in history, one would expect other rationales beyond revenue generation. The potential for alternative rationales driving the development of education hubs has been largely unexplored. If framed in scientific terms, the null hypothesis could be stated as: all education hubs are driven by economic interests for financial gain. But

70 rather than attempt to disprove this hypothesis for the sake of establishing a universal truth, the study aims to provide a more nuanced understanding of education hubs and generate a richer discourse on international higher education. This approach demonstrates the use of deductive logic and falsificationism in the Popperian tradition for the sake of furthering knowledge. The desire to draw some generalizations about education hubs, at least in the Asian context, also motivates the decision to compare across three leading hubs rather than focus on a single case study. In this sense, these decisions and beliefs retain the hallmarks of the post-positivistic tradition.

However, this study also began to depart from post-positivism as the research unfolded. Predispositions toward constructivism began to emerge during fieldwork.

Constructivism assumes ontological relativism whereby truth is subjective and transactional (i.e., socially constructed). Rather than make nomothetic propositions in the tradition of positivism, constructivism honors locality and specificity in providing idiographic interpretations. It also allows or demands an element of reflexivity, which is prohibited in positivism or post-positivism (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). The concepts of relativism and reflexivity are well suited to studying developments in higher education, given the diverse socio-cultural influences on education. During the fieldwork in this study, the realism in the narratives constructed by participants quickly superseded many of the theoretical considerations that had shaped the planning of the research.

Interviews were deliberately open-ended and conversational to allow all types of rationales for education hub to emerge. Participants were never asked to select from established rationales from the literature on internationalization. In the same manner, this openness allowed many participants to begin talking about implementation

71 strengths and challenges – which was not a line of inquiry in the original planning of this study. This openness also exposed me to numerous interactions that were not related to education hubs or higher education but provided a fuller understanding of the society in situ. The desire to understand from the perspectives of the participants, rather than distill generalizations as a neutral researcher, grew increasingly stronger. Concerns over unequal power relations and undemocratic practices that affect the development of education hubs also emerged periodically during reflections in the field. These concerns echo critical theory methodology whereby the researcher no longer assumes objectivity on the value spectrum.

While a comprehensive discussion on the philosophy of science is far beyond the scope of this study, several concluding points can be made. The methodological tensions between post-positivism and other more liberating paradigms, such as constructivism and critical theory, persisted throughout this study. While none of the aforementioned methodologies were rejected outright, this study also does not subscribe to the extreme variants of the paradigmatic spectrum: positivism and postmodernism, which are unequivocally incompatible. Balancing the desire to generalize from disparate cases and the respect for locality remains a fundamental challenge in this study as with many other studies in comparative education. Although theory was not a key concern during fieldwork, the analysis of data and the writing of this dissertation re-visit key theoretical issues. Without resorting to the abstract semantics of methodology, this study can be described as theoretically inspired but empirically grounded. Paradigmatic debates can create a paralyzing quagmire far removed from the realities of conducting research or educational development. Guba and Lincoln point

72 out that the “interbreeding” among paradigms recently has shown that arguments about competing paradigms are less useful than exploring “how paradigms exhibit confluence and where and how they exhibit differences, controversies, and contradictions” (Guba &

Lincoln, 2005, p. 192). Adding to this practical insight is Thomas Kuhn’s reflection on scientific inquiries and his notable humility:

No theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is confronted at a given time; nor are the solutions already achieved often perfect. On the contrary, it is just the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any given time, define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 146)

Phillip Jones, an active comparative education scholar, further points out that no researcher can ever be entirely detached and objective – a rather naïve and even immoral belief in his view (Jones, 1985). These practical insights on methodology mitigated the tensions created by paradigmatic differences in this study.

Methods

The research methods used in this study consist of literature review, document analysis, participant interviews, and participant observations. Qualitative methods are the most suited for the analysis of education policies (Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, & Henry,

1997; Creswell, 2008). Grounded theory, the most common qualitative methodology, also inspired the techniques used in this study (Morse, 20

09).15 According to Strauss and Corbin, “Theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or solely through speculation” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12).

Although grounded theory is ideal for studying social phenomena, given its inductive logic, its prescriptive procedures can be constraining and cumbersome to operationalize. The regimented use of a coding paradigm (open, axial, and selective) and the focus on causal conditions seem to contradict its core principle of openness.

However, Glaser’s (1992) emergent approach and Charmaz’s (2006) constructivist approach to grounded theory genuinely honor the centrality of raw data – a principle that this study strives to honor. Therefore, rather than adhere to grounded theory orthodoxy, this study draws from two key techniques used by many grounded theorists: constant comparison and memoing. Constant comparison continually juxtaposes concepts and themes as they emerge during fieldwork. Memoing links these concepts in a burgeoning bank of information for the purpose of theorizing. Both techniques sensitized me to the emerging data during fieldwork and clarified many terms and concepts used by research participants.

15 Grounded theory was first developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in 1967 and later modified and refined by several other scholars under diverse ontological orientations. The original version by Glaser and Strauss was post-positivist, but in recent years a second generation of scholars have modified it to fit constructivism and postmodernism (Morse, 2009; Corbin, 2009). Also, contrary to misconceptions about grounded theory as a purely inductive and qualitative methodology, it uses both inductive and deductive techniques and supports quantitative methods as well (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Its methods include constant comparisons, systematic categorization, memoing, and theoretical sampling to generate or modify a theory based on empirical data. Even if a study does not seek to contribute to theory, “high level conceptual ordering” is also a worthwhile endeavor under the framework of grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Literature Review

The literature review took place throughout the entire study as an iterative process that extended the breadth and depth of the research. Two main bodies of literature guided this study: the internationalization of higher education and international relations theory. The literature on the internationalization of higher education provides a foundation for understanding cross-border education activities. Since the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers have developed a large body of literature to document and analyze these activities. However, this body of literature often remains descriptive and confined to comparing statistics on student mobility or describing the culture shock facing international students. The broader discourse on the political dimension of international higher education is often noticeably absent. Given that the state is intimately involved in developing education hubs, a second body of literature is essential for understanding the politics of international higher education. The field of international relations provides insights into connections between state and non-state actors on the global stage. In addition to these two bodies of literature, some references to the literature on modernization and economic development were also necessary because these two issues emerged during document analysis and participant interviews.

Document Analysis

Document analysis also took place throughout the entire study. These documents include policy reports, strategic plans, public speeches, annual reports, newspaper articles, research reports, websites, comparative indices, and parliamentary records. These resources provide a contextual foundation and a broader understanding

75 of the general discourse on education hubs from the perspective of local politicians, institutional leaders, researchers, journalists, and concerned citizens. Most of the documents were available in English and accessible by the public.

Participant Interviews

Interviews and participant observations were conducted in person between

December 2011 and June 2012. I spent approximately two months in each society.

Malaysia was chosen as the first research site due to the prospect of an imminent call for a general election. An election would have preoccupied civil servants and perhaps displaced some key informants altogether during a political transition. In Malaysia, the interviews took place mostly in Putrajaya, the administrative seat of the federal government, and throughout Greater Kuala Lumpur. Fieldwork also included networking with informants at a higher education conference in Penang and a site visit to Johor

Bahru, where EduCity Iskandar was being built. In Singapore, I registered at the

Nanyang Technological University as an exchange student and worked from a temporary office at the National Institute of Education thanks to the support of its Dean of Education Research. In Hong Kong, the research required several visits to the

Central Government Complex and higher education institutions throughout the city because some education hub policymakers were also institutional leaders. This section will first explain how participants were selected and then briefly review the interview process and the ethical measures taken.

Education hubs, like other large-scale policy initiatives or projects, affect a myriad of individuals from different occupational sectors and strata in society. These individuals include local students, foreign students, parents, professors, higher education

76 administrators, researchers, employers, immigration officers, investors, and land developers. However, only a small group of individuals retains the power to craft policies and affect the direction of an education hub amidst the cacophony of interests.

Therefore, this study makes a distinction between two different types of interviewees: policymakers and context informants. Policymakers are defined as individuals who exercise control over the visioning and planning of an education hub as a whole. Their ability to influence the policymaking process is noticeably greater than that of anyone else. These individuals are the most qualified to explain the thinking, aspirations, objectives, and expected outcomes of an education hub. The policymakers in this study include officials from the prime minister’s office, directors at government ministries, advisory board members, economists, and regional developers. It is critical to note that these individuals do not qualify as policymakers merely due to their job titles or place of employment. Rather, they are individuals who are (or were) involved in the visioning and/or ongoing development of an education hub as a whole. For example, a senior official in the education ministry is not considered a policymaker if his responsibilities do not include overseeing the education hub. On the other hand, the chief executive officer of a company can be a policymaker if she sits on an advisory committee assembled by the government to expand education services. Context informants are involved in the development of an education hub, but their input in high level planning is minimal to non-existent. Nevertheless, these individuals contribute to the success of an education hub in more ways than stakeholders at large are able to do. The context informants in this study include university presidents, quality assurance regulators, public policy experts, and senior scientists of national research institutes. These individuals are extremely knowledgeable about the developments and implications of an education

77 hub. Context informants help establish a more comprehensive understanding of the education hub as well as the socio-political climate. During fieldwork, discussions with context informants often uncovered implementation challenges and led to other lines of inquiry and contacts with other informants (i.e., snowballing effect). Nevertheless, the primary focus of the study is on the perspectives of the policymakers, given their responsibility over education hub planning.

This study purposely avoids a term commonly used in policy studies: stakeholders. A stakeholder is broadly defined as any individual whom may be affected by a policy or project. In addition to policymakers and context informants, stakeholders include students, parents, professors, employers, branch campus administrators, and multinational corporations. Since this is not an impact study and most stakeholders are quite removed from the planning process of an education hub, the research did not actively seek out the views of stakeholders. A few stakeholders were consulted for the purpose of networking and developing an awareness of the cultural norms in conducting social science research. Stakeholders in this study include a former Senior Minister of

State, a professor of education, a political scientist, a public policy expert, and a historian specializing in Southeast Asia. Although these individuals expressed vocal opinions on education hubs and national development, their views are not included in this dissertation. Many of these individuals also prefer to remain anonymous.

The distinction among policymaker, context informant, and stakeholder reflects the principle of “rigor” in a constructivist methodology. Rather than use validity or reliability as the yardstick of rigor under positivism, constructivism looks for the

“trustworthiness” and “authenticity” of the informant in answering the research questions

(Guba & Lincoln, 2005). Informant credibility was a vital criterion in the selection of both policymakers and context informants for interviews. Figure 2 is a diagram illustrating the different types of research participants.

Figure 2. Types of Research Participants

Policymakers

Stakeholders

Context Informants

At each research site, I began by identifying some policymakers based on document analysis. While some of these individuals turned out to be context informants, these initial interviews ultimately led to other interviews through snowball sampling. This approach was essential because some policymakers are seldom identified in public documents but widely acknowledged by insiders as key individuals in the development of an education hub. Also, a few intermediaries and gatekeepers introduced me to some policymakers and facilitated interviews that would otherwise be impossible to secure, particularly in Asian societies that tend to be hierarchical. Among the contacts recommended by interviewees and intermediaries, some were excluded from this study

79 because they neither qualified as a policymaker or a context informant. The snowballing sampling technique fits well with a constructivist methodology. In addition to snowball sampling, I also independently and deliberately sought out other research participants for two different reasons: 1) to diversify the pool of interviewees based on policy sectors, 2) to clarify and explore confounding issues or interesting points raised by a previous interviewee. Casting a wide net to cover diverse policy sectors was also necessary to rule out sectors that are not active in the development of an education hub. In short, purposeful sampling maximized diversity and refined the data in a similar way as theoretical sampling in grounded theory.16

Interviews were guided by a list of questions that I scrutinized and modified before each interview. Considerable background research on each participant and his/her workplace was done before the interview. These background searches helped shape the interview questions to fit the person’s current job position and previous employment. As the fieldwork progressed, each interview added to my knowledge, which also shaped the list of interview questions for the next participant. Some questions were omitted during the interview if they were not applicable to the interviewee. Data collection at each research site concluded once the data saturation point was reached (i.e., no new information was forthcoming). The role of cumulative knowledge and data saturation in guiding the fieldwork is common in grounded theory.

16 Theoretically sampling is “driven by concepts derived from the evolving theory and based on the concept of ‘making comparisons,’ whose purpose is to go to places, people, or events that will maximize the opportunities to discover variations among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their properties and dimensions” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 201).

The Office of Research Ethics at the University of Toronto granted ethical approval for this study. Prior to each interview, each participant was briefed on the ethical parameters and asked to sign a consent form. Briefly stated, this form reminds participants that they can bypass any question and terminate the interview at any time.

It also ensures their confidentiality by pledging not to use their personal names in any reports resulting from this study. Participants were asked to give permission for audio recording the interview both in writing (on a consent form) as well as in person before the interview. The raw data was stored in a secured location only accessible by me and my supervisor. The following documents can be found in the appendices: consent form for research participants (Appendix A), interview guide (Appendix B), and ethical approval (Appendix C).

This study contains interviews with 36 policymakers and 42 context informants.

Over 170 individuals and organizations were contacted for this research. Policymakers are identified using an abbreviation for the jurisdiction in capital letters and an assigned number (e.g., MY18, SG12, HK18). Context informants are identified using lower case letters (e.g., my24, sg09, hk05). In presenting the research findings, every quote attributed to a research participant contains generic information about his/her place of employment (e.g., MY23, Regional Development Authority; hk22, University President).

The interviews ranged from 15 minutes at the shortest to 2.5 hours at the longest. Most interviews were approximately one-hour long discussions between the interviewee and me. A few interviews included a second or third participant in the room. These kinds of concurrent interviews, akin to a focus group, were purposely avoided due to the sensitive nature of some of the discussions; however, participants themselves

81 organized these meetings without informing me if they were colleagues working in the same office (e.g., Director and Assistant Director). The interviews were conducted mostly in English, except for a few comments inserted in Mandarin and Hokkien, which I understood. Only 6 interviewees requested no audio recording (4 in Singapore and 2 in

Hong Kong). Summary notes were taken during these un-recorded interviews. Private meetings with 9 stakeholders were also held for networking purposes (8 in Singapore and 1 in Malaysia). The discussions in these meetings are not audio-recorded. With some stakeholders, there were two to three meetings. Table 4 contains details on the research participants. The number of policymakers interviewed in Singapore is noticeably lower than in Malaysia and Hong Kong because access to key individuals was severely restricted. Self-censorship was also palpable in several interviews in

Singapore.

Table 4: Number of Research Participants

Context Policymakers Stakeholders Total Informants

Malaysia 15 11 1 27

Singapore 8 14 8 30

Hong Kong 13 17 0 30

Total 36 42 9 87

Participant Observations

The original design of this study did not include participant observations, but opportunities arose fortuitously during the fieldwork. I attended three different events: one private strategic planning session and two public events. The private event was the

Islamic Finance Education Hub workshop, a two-day planning session sponsored by

Malaysia’s Ministry of Higher Education. This event brought together approximately 20 academics, bankers, and financial regulators. The organizers invited me to attend, with the knowledge of this study. The consent form for research participants (Appendix A) was shared with the organizers. At the workshop, the organizers introduced me as a doctoral student and observer, explained the purpose of this study, and reminded the participants that no personal names would be used in any reporting from this event.

Participants gave the permission for observation via consensus and welcomed me. The second event was a high-profile public forum with panel discussions by the leaders of the Iskandar regional development initiative (including EduCity), an in-person speech

83 from Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, and several information booths highlighting Iskandar projects. This two-day event in Johor Bahru attracted a wide array of stakeholders (entrepreneurs, company executives, regulators, education experts, investors, ministry officials, students, etc.). The third event was a townhall meeting organized by Singapore’s Ministry of Education to update the public on the latest effort to broaden access in higher education. Presentations came from committee members tasked with providing recommendations for this reform as well as the Permanent

Secretary of Education (Tan Ching Yee) and the Minister of State for Defence and

Education (Lawrence Wong). These presenters fielded numerous questions from the largely student crowd. These three events provided a greater understanding of key initiatives affecting higher education in Malaysia and Singapore. Table 5 summarizes these three events.

Table 5: Participant Observation Events (2012)

Event Organizer Date Location Access

Islamic Finance Ministry of Feb. 22-23 Perdana Invited guest Education Hub Higher Leadership Workshop Education Foundation, Putrajaya, Malaysia Iskandar Malaysia Iskandar Mar. 9-10 Persada Johor Invited guest Corridor & City Regional International and open to Transformation Developmen Convention public Programme Open Day t Authority Centre, Johor Bahru, Malaysia

Committee on Ministry of Mar. 22 Ngee Ann Open to University Education Education Polytechnic, public Pathways Beyond Singapore 2015 (Townhall Meeting)

Data Analysis

All audio recordings of interviews with policymakers were transcribed, coded, and collated thematically using a word processor. Interviewees’ comments on the rationales behind education hubs and their international engagements constitute a large portion of the data. No a priori categories were created for the coding because participants were not asked to select from a fixed set of answers. Rather, the coding of successive interviews refined the thematic categories. In addition, implementation challenges, strengths and weaknesses of a locale, and other operational details of developing an education hub also generated a large volume of data. An original plan to categorize the data according to the policy sectors to which the participants belonged proved to be unmanageable (e.g., education, trade, science and technology, etc.). The reason is that a fair number of participants have professional experiences in multiple sectors especially civil servants, who are periodically rotated or cross appointed (e.g., in

Singapore). For example, a director at the Ministry of Education might have previously worked at the Ministry of Trade. A new university president might be poached from the science and technology sector. These individuals sometimes have more knowledge about the inner workings of his/her previous sector of employment than the current sector. Therefore, it is problematic to analyze the data based on participants’ present employment. Even if the data were categorized by the participant’s most relevant policy sector (past or present employment), some education hubs are dominated by one sector. Therefore, a comparison between hubs based on policy sector rationales would be forced and awkward. Consequently, the analysis prioritized key themes in each interview rather than focus on the participant’s policy sector. In this dissertation, each

86 insightful comment is identified by the person’s most relevant place or position of employment to provide context and illustrate informant credibility. The university president in the above example would be identified as a policymaker from the science and technology sector.

Data analysis continued throughout the writing of the two main chapters of this thesis: Rationales (Ch. 5) and International Engagements (Ch. 6). In other words, the thematic categories became more refined as the writing spurred greater reflections on the interview data – in essence similar to the technique of constant comparison as used in grounded theory. This iterative process also required frequent references to full interview transcripts in order to properly understand a comment in the context of a discussion rather than in isolation as a sound bite. This referencing clarified many comments that were otherwise unclear when viewed in isolation.

Through this analysis, four overarching rationales were identified in the development of education hubs: 1) economic benefits, 2) talent development, 3) educational capacity, and 4) soft power. These category labels emerged by grouping similar policy objectives together in an inductive approach. For example, the following objectives share similarities: to generate revenue through student fees, to commercialize research innovations, and to leverage education as an economic multiplier. These objectives constitute the rationale of economic benefits. Each rationale therefore contains three to four subordinate objectives. Granted, the policy objectives identified in this study are by no means the only ones possible under the development of education hubs. These policy objectives are simply the prominent ones evident through the analysis of policy documents and interviews. The challenge in labeling

87 these four categories was two fold. First, there was the challenge of selecting words that were generic enough to accurately contain their subordinate policy objectives but specific enough to stand as a unique category (i.e., without significant overlap with other rationales). The second challenge was to ensure that the categorization process remained faithful to the meanings expressed in policy documents and interviews rather than become a technical procedure of classifying text. Interview transcripts are particularly rich with layers of meanings – sometimes contradictory. Therefore, in categorizing rationales and objectives, the analysis aimed to achieve a balance between conceptual clarity and authenticity. I acknowledge that the first three rationales, as mentioned above, exhibit similarities to existing typologies developed by other scholars in internationalization as described in the literature review of Chapter 2.

However, the presentation of research findings (Chapter 5 and 6) elaborates on the meanings of these rationales in the context of education hubs rather than the general field of internationalization.

Limitations

The limitations of this study can be attributed to some elements of the research design as well as contextual matters beyond my control. First, this study targets high- level policymaking and education planning in three jurisdictions. The analysis has a clear focus on the views of senior policymakers and especially the state as an actor and driver. This focus effectively neglects the views of other stakeholders in the development of education hubs (e.g., education administrators, students, regulators, and foreign education providers). These stakeholders may provide very different

88 perspectives on education hubs. Therefore, instead of the multi-level vertical case study as proposed by comparative scholars Vavrus and Bartlett (2006), this study sacrifices breadth in stakeholder perspective for depth in policymaking. The decision to compare three societies required a strict limit on the scope of this study for practical reasons. To mitigate this narrow focus on policymaking, I tried to select diverse policymakers for interviews whenever possible, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the education hub planning process.

Conducting social science research in countries where censorship and restrictions on civil liberties exist also placed some limitations on this study. This constraint applies to Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia. Finding policymakers in

Singapore willing to meet for an interview was extremely challenging, as reflected in the lower number of participants in Table 4. Local context informants attributed the lack of response among Singaporean policymakers to this study to the following factors: 1) indifference to social science research, 2) concerns over confidentiality, 3) disinterest in allocating time for a graduate student, and 4) internalized racial prejudice against non-

Caucasians. The relative influence of each factor on a policymaker’s decision to decline an interview is unclear. However, participants’ concerns over confidentiality and state censorship loomed large during the fieldwork. Even participants who agreed to an interview or meeting were visibly concerned and refrained from disclosing too much information about policymaking and politicking. Therefore, it is difficult to judge the degree of authenticity in the comments and the amount of information that was omitted by the Singaporean participants of this study. This constraint on research also forced the analysis for this study to emphasize the comments from Singaporean participants

89 who talked relatively freely and provided balanced views. While their blunt comments are revealing, they may limit the representativeness and accuracy of the Singaporean portion of this study, compared to that of Hong Kong and Malaysia.

In the case of Malaysia, the challenge was less about censorship and more about sensitivities over the topics of race, ethnicity, and religion. For policymakers who are civil servants, openly disagreeing on affirmative action may be inappropriate and unprofessional when the government continues to support race-based policies and uphold Islam as the state religion. This constraint therefore has required sensitivity when interpreting Malaysian comments on these topics. It also required the study to access secondary information sources to compensate for any shortcomings in this area

(e.g., grey literature, press releases, speeches, program initiatives). While secondary information sources are proxies for policy rationales, this is at least one solution to address an imperfect situation.

Summary

In summary, this study draws from post-positivism and constructivism as methodologies that guide the inquiry on education hubs. While these two paradigms are not necessarily compatible, each offers valuable ontological and epistemological insights into developments across three societies. For this study, understanding the complexities of a social phenomenon supersedes the task of testing a hypothesis to generate theories and generalizations that claim universality. The methods of inquiry include participant interviews, document analysis, and participant observations. The

90 challenges of conducting fieldwork in the three societies required a mindful adaptation of the research design to accommodate local traditions of social scientific research.

Nevertheless, the study strived to select credible participants and preserve data authenticity in the analysis and presentation of the research findings.

Chapter 4: Context

Remember, everything ultimately comes back to context. Things happen in Singapore this way because Singapore is this way because of the way of the places in Asia and the way Asia is growing. And that can’t change. I mean, that’s very unique, you see. So the Chinese came here for years and years and said, “Look, we want to learn from you.” We said, “Yes, but don’t copy us. We’re not in China” (SG13, Economic Development Board).

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for understanding each of the three societies in this study and to review the origins of their education hubs. In conducting the research for this study, it became rapidly apparent that any question about education hub development requires a comprehensive understanding of the cultural and social context. In many interviews, research participants insisted on explaining key milestones in national and societal development before entertaining direct questions about higher education and education hubs. While these milestones and cultural features may be foreign to outsiders, locals share a tacit understanding of the importance of these contextual matters when discussing educational developments.

Different perspectives on some of these contextual matters obviously exist among locals, but the divergence in views does not diminish their impact on higher education policies. This chapter honors the input of local experts and the realities they face by drawing heavily on empirical data. With the exception of the early histories of these societies, the chapter relies on participant interviews and policy documents.

Comparative education research has a long tradition in recognizing the influence of the local context on educations and thereby tempering universal claims about

92 educational developments (Sadler, 1900; Kandel, 1955; Cowen, 2006; Bray, Adamson,

& Mason, 2007). An effective education policy or solution in one context may not necessarily work in another context, as the opening quote of this chapter affirms.

However, rather than provide an extensive overview of the history and culture of

Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, this chapter will focus on the salient features of each society as highlighted by policy documents and research participants themselves.

Without a proper introduction of these contextual features, it is difficult to understand and analyze the fundamental reasons driving the development of education hubs. In recognizing the local context, this study does not adopt a postmodernist stance that might honor all local peculiarities as unique dioramas. Therefore, this study will not refrain from generalizations in the way cultural relativists would. Common contextual factors do exist among the three societies in this study and thus comparisons are warranted. Striking a balance between cultural determinants and universal elements elevates comparative education research to a more productive level of discourse beyond ideological debates. In short, this chapter recognizes that “context matters” in the tradition of comparative education research (Crossley & Watson, 2003; Hayhoe,

2007) but focuses particularly on the features of the context that matter to locals.

The introduction of each society will also trace the origin of its education hub initiative. Where did the idea of transforming a place into an education hub come from?

What motivated the early planners behind an education hub? What did they envision?

Some research participants in this study had extensive institutional memory and intimate knowledge of higher education developments in the jurisdiction in question. As with any historical account, two time points are selected to delimit the period under

93 discussion. For the start date of an education hub, this is relatively easy to pinpoint, based on government archives and media reports. However, selecting an endpoint for this early period of education hub development is more difficult. Singapore and Malaysia have been pursuing the education hub initiative for 10 to 15 years starting at nearly the same time. The period reviewed in this chapter covers the first five to ten years of their development. Hong Kong has a shorter history in education hub development with fewer historical records. Therefore, the same time frame cannot be used to analyze its development. The introduction below will show that the idea of an education hub persisted for several years in all three societies before its official launch. More interestingly, the idea did not necessarily come from policymakers in the education sector.

The chapter first introduces Malaysia followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively. Each introduction begins with a brief synopsis of the society’s history and geography followed by details on its economy, demography, government, and politics.

The introduction then examines the local higher education system before reviewing the origin of its education hub initiative. The conclusion draws some comparisons on points of convergence and divergence among the three societies. The next chapter will analyze the current rationales of education hub development.

Malaysia

History and Geography

Different kingdoms of Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic orientations ruled the Malaya

Peninsula before successive waves of European colonizers arrived: Portugal (1511),

Netherlands (1641), and Britain (1826). The earliest British occupation in the area was known as the Straits Settlements, which consisted of Malacca, Dinding, Penang, and

Singapore. These trading posts were first managed by the British East India Company, starting in 1826, and later governed as British crown colonies (Turnbull, 2009).

Following Japanese occupation during World War II, the return to British colonial rule met strong resistance from Malays who demanded greater power for Malay rulers.

Consequently, the Federation of Malaya emerged in 1948 as a union of Malay states protected by Britain. Nevertheless, the Malayan Communist Party, led by ethnic

Chinese who were also active in resisting Japanese occupation during World War II, organized an ongoing insurgency movement against the British presence. The federation later achieved full independence in 1957 as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. In 1963, the federation adopted the name Malaysia and formed a union with three other territories: Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. Two years later the Malaysian

Parliament expelled Singapore from this union with much rancor, resulting in two independent countries (Lee, 2000).

Malaysia is composed of two large landmasses separated by the South China

Sea: West Malaysia (or the Malay Peninsula) and East Malaysia. West Malaysia

95 accounts for roughly 80% of the country’s population and economy with large cities such as Kuala Lumpur, the capital, and Penang. West Malaysia is bordered by Thailand in the north and Singapore in the south. While East Malaysia is less developed, it is larger in landmass and rich with oil and gas reserves. The two states in East Malaysia,

Sabah and Sarawak, lie north of Indonesia and enclose the independent country of

Brunei. Philippines lies a short distance north across the Suluu Sea. Due to Malaysia’s strategic maritime position and proximity to many other societies, its territories have witnessed centuries of intense trading, particularly along the Strait of Malacca.

Economy

Malaysia is presently a middle-income state on the cusp of becoming a fully industrialized country. In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad launched a blueprint called Wawasan 2020 or Vision 2020 for the country to become a developed country within thirty years (Vision 2020, 1991). Although several other plans and planning committees of a similar tenor have followed suit, Vision 2020 remains a pivotal framework in both policy discourse and the psyche of Malaysians across the country. As a legacy of British colonialism, central planning for economic development operates on a fixed cycle as outlined in Malaysian Five Year Plans – the first one developed in 1955 and the latest one (10th) covering 2011-15. These plans provide general directions to steer the country to greater economic prosperity. Malaysia’s economy previously relied on the export of raw materials such as tin, rubber, and palm oil with the former two making up more than 75% of the country’s exports in the 1950s (Yusuf & Nabeshima,

2009). In 2011, the service sector contributed to 54% of the GDP (MITI, 2013). From

1980 to 2000, Malaysia’s GDP climbed at an average rate of nearly 7% each year until the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 struck (World Bank, 2012). Today raw materials constitute less than 30% of the country’s total export, and the diverse economy includes strong sectors in manufacturing and services. In addition to its education hub initiative,

Malaysia is also aiming to become a halal hub (meat production and processing) and an

Islamic finance hub. However, there are widespread concerns that Malaysia may succumb to a “middle-income trap,” as its cost advantage begins to erode due to rising wages and a lack of innovations and skills (NEAC, 2010; Jimenez, Nguyen, & Patrinos,

2012). Historically, many middle-income economies, such as those in Latin America, have weathered through decades of stagnation rather than becoming high-income nations (Kharas & Kohli, 2011).

Demography

Malaysia’s population of 28 million exhibits tremendous diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, and languages. The largest ethnic group is the Bumiputra, which includes the Malays (50%) and the non-Malay indigenous people (11%) in the country.

Given the dominance of the Malay ethnicity, Bumiputra is often used interchangeably with Malay in referring to the Muslim majority. This majority speaks Bahasa Malaysian, the national language, and maintains control of the political system. While several decades of affirmative action programs have alleviated poverty among the Bumiputras, indigenous members of this group remain over represented in the lower socio-economic class (World Bank, 2010). Chinese (24%) and Indians (7%) form the second and third largest ethnic groups, respectively. Most of the Chinese immigrated in the 19th and 20th

97 century as laborers to work in mines and on rubber plantations. Today, Chinese-

Malaysians constitute one of the largest Chinese diasporic communities in the world and control many successful enterprises that drive the economy. They also speak several different dialects of Chinese. The Indian community has roots dating back to maritime trade as early as the 1st century CE. In the 11th century, the Tamil invasion of

Malaya brought forth more cultural influences. More recently, large numbers of Indians immigrated to Malaysia during British colonialism to take on both labor positions and administrative roles given their command of the English language. Malaysia’s multicultural composition figures prominently in contemporary political discourse in both positive and negative ways. Multiculturalism is celebrated and denounced simultaneously, depending on the different interest groups shaping public policies.

Although the violent race riots during the early days of Malaysian independence are dark reminders of a bygone era, visible ethnic divisions persist in many aspects of contemporary Malaysian society: conduct of commerce, urban development, and access to education and social welfare. In 1971, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak launched the controversial New Economic Policy, which aimed to narrow the socio- economic gap between the poorer Malay majority and other minority groups. This affirmative action program has been criticized for pursuing Malay supremacy or a Malay

Agenda (ketuanan Melayu) while marginalizing the Chinese and Indians as second- class citizens.

In 2011, the World Bank published a critical report on Malaysia’s brain drain and estimated that one million Malaysians are living overseas (World Bank, 2011). More than half of these Malaysians reside in Singapore. Unsurprisingly, ethnic Chinese are

98 overrepresented in this diaspora, supporting anecdotal evidence that non-Malays continue to leave the country after decades of discriminatory race-based policies. In addition to the local population, Malaysia attracts large numbers of illegal immigrants due to its relatively strong economy in the region and the government’s liberal attitude toward Muslim immigrants. For example, the close proximity between Sabah and

Philippines allows large numbers of Filipino Muslims to enter East Malaysia illegally.

Critics point out that the government has turned a blind eye to illegal Muslim immigrants because the influx adds to the country’s Muslim majority. Although ethnic divisions are palpable in the country, many locals also point out that cultural diversity is an issue politicized by public figures whereas personal interactions and relationships among

Malays, Chinese, and Indians have generally been amicable. It is not uncommon for children in Malaysia to grow up speaking a second or third language without any formal language training because they socialize among different ethnic groups.

Government and Politics

As a legacy of British colonialism, Malaysia has a Westminster parliamentary system with a prime minister as the head of the government. The country is a federation of 13 states with the central administrative seat based at Putrajaya, a grandiose planned city located 40 km south of Kuala Lumpur.17 In 2009, Najib Tun Razak became the country’s sixth Prime Minister following the footsteps of his father, Tun Abdul Razak

17 In 1999, Prime Minister Mahathir moved the administrative seat of the government from Kuala Lumpur to Putrajaya.

(Prime Minister 1970-76) and uncle Tun Hussein Onn (Prime Minister 1976-81). The ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN), has governed Malaysia since 1955. As per the norm of Malaysian politics, the three largest political parties of this coalition are all race- based: the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese

Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). This coalition has always been led by UMNO, a party that was active in Malaysia’s independence movement. In

1973, this coalition changed its name from Parti Perikatan to its current name Barisan

Nasional. In the 2008 General Elections, Barisan Nasional suffered one of its worst setbacks. Not only did it lose the two-third majority of the parliament for the first time since 1969, but it also lost control of 5 of the 12 contested state legislatures (compared to losing one state legislature in the previous general election). Nevertheless, BN still retained 63% of the parliamentary seats. In the 2013 General Election, BN’s control of the parliament eroded further to 60% of the seats. However, the results of the popular vote revealed a more realistic representation of a divided electorate. In both the 2008 and 2013 elections, the popular vote was nearly evenly split between the BN and the opposition parties. In 2013, the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), actually overtook the BN by winning 51% of the popular votes. The embattled Anwar Ibrahim leads the PR coalition, which contains two multiracial parties and an Islamist party. It is important to point out that the Barisan Nasional’s domination of governance, control of the media, and restriction of civil liberties have recently led to massive street protests demanding fairer elections and a corruption-free government. These rallies, known as

Bersih Rally, took place on three different occasions (2007, 2011, 2012) and drew in large numbers of individuals, political parties and civil society groups from across diverse backgrounds. Despite the lack of reforms from the government, these rallies

100 have amplified the national discourse on corrupt governance and raised Malaysians’ overall political consciousness.

Higher Education

Modern education in Malaysia began under British colonialism and inevitably reflected British traditions in the early years (Selvaratnam, 1989; Subramani &

Kempner, 2002). But throughout much of its colonial empire, Britain was not particularly interested in higher education but rather in social control and vocational education to maintain its colonies (Kim, 2007). The focus on primary and secondary education meant that higher education in the Straits Settlements did not appear until a medical school was built in 1905 in Singapore. The school was created purely out of a necessity to train healthcare workers to serve the colony (Selvaratnam, 1989). A second institution,

Raffles College, was created in 1929 to provide general education as well as produce teachers for growing middle class families. In 1949, these two institutions merged to form the University of Malaya, located in Singapore and regulated by the Inter-

University Council for Higher Education in the Colonies based in London.

After colonial rule ended, the University of Malaya split into two autonomous campuses (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore) in 1959 and later became two separate, national universities in 1962 (University of Malaya and University of Singapore). During these early years, public demand for education grew along with political support for

“Malayanization” (e.g., replacing expatriates with local manpower). The focus on national development through industrialization prompted the creation of a science and

101 technology institution in 1969: The University of Penang. This university was later renamed the University of Science Malaysia (Universiti Sains Malaysia). Although it adhered to British traditions and the Western concept of autonomy, this was the first sign of the Malaysian Government steering higher education to meet national needs

(Subramani & Kempner, 2002).

Universities in Malaysia operated relatively freely prior to 1969, but the race riots of 1969 spurred the government to assume a much larger role in higher education governance and delivery (Sidhu & Kaur, 2011). State intervention was justified on the grounds of national development and protection of the Malay majority (Morshidi, 2010;

Mok, 2011). Thus, in 1971, The University and University Colleges Act formalized the role of an interventionist state at the cost of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. A few more universities were built in the 1970s, and these institutions fell under tight state control. By the late 1980s, the state dictated financing, student admissions, staff appointments, staff promotions, and curricular content through directives and regulations (Lee, 2004a; Mok, 2011).

Malaysian higher education has historically been sharply divided between the public sector funded by the government and the private sector built by the initiatives of ethnic communities, philanthropists, and entrepreneurs. In the public education sector, known as IPTA (Institusi Pengajian Tinggi Awam; Institute of Public Higher Education), there are now 26 universities, 69 colleges, and 5 polytechnics with a total enrollment of

508,000 students (MOHE, 2011a). Public universities still abide by affirmative action policies, which favor Bumiputras in student admissions and faculty appointments. The student admission quota is commonly known as 7-2-1 meaning 70% Bumiputras, 20%

102

Chinese, and 10% Indians and others. The private higher education sector emerged in the 1980s and expanded rapidly in the 1990s to accommodate students who could not secure a place at public institutions or go overseas to study. Known as IPTS (Institusi

Pengajian Tinggi Swasta; Institutes of Private Higher Education), these private institutions expanded from 156 in 1992 to 707 in 2002 (Lee, 2004b). Twinning programs have prospered in this private sector since the mid 1980s (Mok, 2011). In 1995, the participation rate in higher education was only 6%, the lowest among ASEAN18 nations

(Lim, 1995), but by 2002 the rate had climbed to 29% (Morshidi, 2006). Today the private sector has a total enrollment of 429,000 students, which nearly matches the number in the public sector (MOHE, 2011a). The private education sector includes 25 universities, 23 university colleges, and 25 colleges (MQA, 2012). The total number of private institutions has declined to around 300 today after the government began to tighten regulations starting in 1996 (Sidhu & Kaur, 2011).

The year 1996 stands out as a milestone in Malaysian higher education for many reasons. In that year, the government enacted several key legislations to simultaneously regulate and liberalize higher education. Public universities became incorporated to minimize bureaucracy; however new measures also reduced institutional autonomy (Morshidi, 2010). One of the pieces of legislation is the Private

Higher Educational Institutions Act 1996, which regulates the burgeoning private

18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

103 sector.19 Private higher education in Malaysia is renowned for its expertise in transnational ventures, whereby a foreign institution partners with a Malaysian provider to offer programs that are partially or wholly delivered in Malaysia. The latter part of this chapter will elaborate on cross-border higher education in Malaysia. Another piece of legislation created an agency to accredit private institutions: the National Accreditation

Board (Lembaga Akreditasi Negara, LAN). In 2007, the government merged LAN with its counterpart in the public sector to form the Malaysian Qualification Agency (MQA). A desire to streamline accreditation and minimize the widening gap between public and private higher education prompted this merger. Another milestone is the creation of the

Ministry of Higher Education in 2004. Previously, higher education was subsumed under the Ministry of Education. A separate ministry dedicated to higher education marks the government’s seriousness about higher education planning and development. The foremost blueprint guiding higher education development today is the National Higher

Education Strategic Plan 2007-2020, which outlines seven major thrusts: 1) widening access and enhancing equity, 2) improving the quality of teaching and learning, 3) enhancing research and innovation, 4) strengthening institutions of higher education, 5) intensifying internationalization, 6) inculcating lifelong learning, and 7) reinforcing the

Ministry of Higher Education’s delivery system. Numerous research participants in this study referred to this plan during interviews and informal discussions.

19 The other legislations enacted in 1996 are as follow: Education Act 1996, Private Higher Educational Act 1996, National Council on Higher Education Act 1996, National Accreditation Board Act 1996.

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Education Hub Origin in Malaysia

While some claim that Malaysia decided to become an education hub as early as the 1980s or 1990 (A. Tan, 2002; Richards, 2011), the idea did not actually gain traction until the late 1990s. The genesis of Malaysia as an education hub is fundamentally rooted in its resolve to fix an economic problem that plagued the nation for decades: a trade deficit in the service sector.20 While Malaysia’s merchandise account has generally registered surpluses due to its robust export industry, its services account has been chronically anemic. From 1980 to 2005, the country’s service ledger consistently registered deficits, which sometimes eclipsed any surpluses in the merchandise account

(see Table 6). This deficit effectively drained the country of billions of ringgits each year despite profiting from the export of goods. While Malaysia is certainly not unique in running a trade deficit, a persistently weak service sector is a hurdle for any middle- income country attempting to become an advanced economy (Kharas & Kohli, 2011;

World Bank, 2011). The hemorrhaging of the Malaysian services account is often traced to high freight costs, high insurance fees, and the repatriation of profits to foreign investors (see Malaysia Plans from 1980s and 1990s). Interestingly, economists also blame the deficit on the large number of Malaysians studying overseas because funds

20 Many Malaysian documents label this as a deficit in the balance of payments (BoP), but this is an inaccurate usage of economic terminology. The BoP is a recording of all monetary transactions between a country and the rest of the world. It consists of two parts: current account (exports, imports, and investment income) and capital account (cash flow). A shortfall in one account must be balanced by surplus in the other account (e.g., trade deficits must be funded by capital inflows). The current account is essentially an indicator of trade performance. Trade is further divided into merchandise (goods) and services. The deficit in discussion here is actually in trade and not the summative BoP.

105 leave the country each year to pay for education services (i.e., an “import” of services).

As early as 1986, the government recognized the financial impact of this phenomenon:

Malaysian students continued to seek education overseas due to the shortage of places in local institutions as well as to pursue courses which were not offered locally, especially those in the sciences and technology. The large number of students overseas, however, resulted in an outflow of foreign exchange of about $1,200 million per year. (MP5, 1986, p. 489)

This grim condition persisted throughout the 1990s and consistently appeared as a macroeconomic concern in the Malaysia Plans, which the federal government releases every five years as its economic blueprints. Logically, the solution to stem the tide of students seeking education overseas was to encourage them to stay in Malaysia.

Specifically, under the leadership of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the government made the decision to expand private education because public institutions could not cope with the demand for higher education (Tham, Mahmod, & Alavi, 2013). By the early 1990s, the government had recognized that a large private higher education sector would serve the dual purpose of keeping Malaysian students at home as well as earning foreign currencies:

Efforts will be made to accelerate the development of the travel, tourism and leisure industries, the shipping industry, private post-secondary education as well as specialized health care in order to save and at the same time, earn foreign exchange. (MP6, 1991, p. 43)

In order to provide increased accessibility to higher education, especially in professional and managerial disciplines, twinning arrangements between reputable foreign and locally established private training and higher education institutions will continue to be encouraged. (MP6, 1991, p. 52)

106

Although there was no tangible national plan to recruit foreign students or become an education center, the seed for an education hub was planted with two strategies in mind: recruit foreign students to earn revenue and partner with foreign institutions to provide more academic programs.

Table 6: Balance of Payments (Malaysia)

Balance of Payments (% of GNP)

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Merchandise 10.9 12.3 6.4 0 25.6 26.7 18.2

Services -12.1 -14.4 -8.8 -9.1 -13.1 -2.2 0.2

Sources: Malaysia Plans 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and MITI 1980: 5th Malaysia Plan: calculated from $5238 M merchandise, and -$5813 M services. 2010: MITI: calculated from $134,727 M merchandise, and $1,699 M services. Used estimated GNI from Dept Statistics $739,451 M.

In the late 1990s, several developments coalesced and elevated the idea of an education hub onto the national agenda. First, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 depreciated the ringgit and suddenly placed an overseas education out of the reach of many Malaysian students. While some students were forced to terminate their overseas studies prematurely, others never managed to leave Malaysia. Most of these affected students enrolled in private institutions, given the limited capacity of public institutions and the barriers created by affirmative action. The second key development was a

107 concerted effort to improve the quality of private education. In 1996, the government passed several key pieces of legislations on education including the Private Higher

Educational Institutions Act, which lays out the criteria for setting up private institutions including branch campuses by foreign providers. Another piece of legislation created an agency specifically for accrediting private higher education institutions: the National

Accreditation Board (also known as LAN, Lembaga Akreditasi Negara). Several high profile cases of fraudulent institutions, illegal immigration, and students engaged in drug trafficking had compelled the government to tighten the reigns on the burgeoning private education sector. The third key development was the emergence of innovative transnational programs to fit Malaysia’s needs. A traditional twinning program is a 1+2 or 2+2 scheme, whereby a student spends the first one or two years of a foreign degree program in the home country (i.e., Malaysia) before going abroad to complete the degree at the mother institution (e.g., Australia). Due to the Asian Financial Crisis, private colleges in Malaysia began to lobby their foreign partners to permit 3+0 programs, which essentially converted a twinning program into a franchised program.

This arrangement therefore allowed Malaysian students to pursue a foreign degree without ever leaving home and draining wealth from the country. While some foreign partners saw this new format as a potential breach of academic integrity and quality, a substantial number recognized the financial imperative in signing on. If Malaysian students withdrew from twinning programs en masse due to financial difficulties, these foreign institutions would incur heavy losses in revenue. The new franchised format would avert such losses and potentially attract a larger number of students (Malaysians and Southeast Asians) when operating costs are lower in Malaysia.

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By the late 1990s, the idea of Malaysia “exporting” education in Southeast Asia or pan-Asia had entered the national discourse as evident in the 7th Malaysia Plan:

Simultaneously, additional measures will be instituted to improve the current account of the balance of payments. As the persistent deficit was attributable mainly to the services account... Aggressive promotion to develop selected services for export such as education, tourism, health and consultancy services will help to reduce the services deficit. (MP7, 1996, p. 12)

The export of educational services is expected to grow in line with efforts to establish Malaysia as a regional centre of educational excellence. (MP7, 1996, p. 54)

In this conceptualization, the government also justified the expansion of private education and the recruitment of foreign educational partners as strategies for developing the country’s human capital. A nation with aspirations to become an advanced economy demands a large and diverse higher education system capable of producing a highly skilled workforce. This rationale became more perceptible in the national discourse after the year 2000. However, the talent development rationale appeared less frequently, compared to the rationale of deficit reduction by using education services to generate revenue.21 Framing private education and transnational education as an export industry continued to dominate numerous national policy reports released after the Asian Financial Crisis. The 8th Malaysia Plan (2001-05) aimed to develop the country into a “regional centre of educational excellence” and an

“international centre for education” (MP8, 2001). The 9th Malaysia Plan (2006–10) includes a policy initiative to turn Malaysia into “a regional centre for excellence in

21 Malaysia’s services account did not register a surplus until 2007 (Economic Planning Unit, 2013).

109 education and training through smart public-private partnership” (MP9, 2006). In the

National Higher Education Strategic Plan 2020 launched by the Ministry of Higher

Education in 2007, education hub appears under the theme of internationalization – one of the seven thrusts the ministry has identified for system-wide development. According to this plan, Malaysia aimed to have a total enrollment of 200,000 international students by 2020 (NHESP, 2007). In 2007, there were 47,928 international students in the

Malaysian higher education system (Sidhu & Kaur, 2011). Two ambitious national policy documents in 2010 also reiterated the need to cultivate education as an export industry: the New Economic Model (2010) and the Economic Transformation Program (2010).

These pronouncements clearly position the Malaysian education hub initiative under the objective of revenue generation and the rationale of economic benefits.

Singapore

History and Geography

Singapore’s storied tale of nation-building is intertwined with Malaysian history.

Singapore was a part of the Sultanate of Johor from the 16th to 19th century (Johor is the southernmost state of Malaysia today). Portuguese invaders landed in Singapore as early as 1613, but the settlement remained obscured under vague political control for most of the next two centuries. In 1819, Thomas Stamford Raffles negotiated with the

Sultan of Johor to establish a trading post on behalf of the East India Company. The

British were eager to set up a stronghold in Southeast Asia to compete with Dutch

110 traders. Opposition from the Dutch over the control of Singapore was settled in the

Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. Two years later, Singapore formally became a British crown colony as part of the larger Straits Settlement. In 1836, Singapore became the capital of the Straits Settlement. British rule was interrupted by Japanese occupation during the Second World War. After the war, the locals demanded greater autonomy from Britain. In the 1959 election, Lee Kuan Yew led his People’s Action Party (PAP) to a major victory and formed Singapore’s first internal self-government with a cabinet and elected parliament. However, Singapore did not officially declare independence from

Britain until 1963. At the same time, it unified with Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak to form the Federation of Malaysia to affirm its separation from Britain, fortify its security as a small state, and ward off communist insurgents. However, this union was short-lived due to bitter disagreements between Singapore and the Malay government over ethnic policies, economic development, political turf wars, taxation, and language issues.

Malaysia was keen to pursue a pro-Malay agenda, which did not appeal to Singapore’s

Chinese majority. During this period, the PAP governed Singapore as a state in the federation but functioned as an opposition party at the federal level. The Malay government felt uneasy about the possibility of a Chinese-dominated party winning the federal election and ruling Malaysia. The tension reached a climax in August of 1965 when the Malaysian Parliament voted unanimously to expel Singapore from the federation. Some observers claim that Singapore is the only country in the world to become independent involuntarily. Lee Kuan Yew was shocked and dismayed by the expulsion because he truly believed in the federation for Singapore’s survival (Turnbull,

2009; K. Y. Lee, 2011). Once expelled, Singapore faced a precarious situation with housing shortages, high unemployment, racial tensions, and limited defense

111 capabilities. Since independence, Singapore has managed to transform itself from an obscured colonial trading post into one of the richest states in the world with extensive links to international commerce.

In terms of landmass, Singapore (710 km2) is roughly the size of New York City

(784 km2) and only slightly larger than the City of Toronto (630 km2). It joins Monaco and the Vatican City as the only three sovereign city-states in the world. Malaysia lies north of Singapore across the narrow Straits of Johor. Two causeways connect the two countries. Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, lies just south of

Singapore. In recent years, Singapore has actively reclaimed land by building into the sea as space becomes increasingly scarce.22 However, Malaysia and Indonesia banned sand export to Singapore in 1997 and 2007, respectively, to stall this land expansion and force Singapore to purchase sand from elsewhere (K. Y. Lee, 2011).

For several years, Singapore also relied on Malaysia for its water supply and this dependence festered as a contentious bilateral issue until the city-state developed its own water purification technology.23 Other bilateral disputes in the past included land, transportation, bridge construction, and airspace. Today the two countries exist peacefully as neighbors but historical distrust and even disdain remain palpable among

22 Two prominent examples of land reclamation are the luxurious Marina Bay in downtown and Jurong Island, an outpost created from amalgamating seven natural islands for industrial use especially by the petrochemical sector. The Jurong Island reclamation began in 1995 and finished in 2009 – 20 years ahead of the scheduled date. The project tripled the size of the outpost to 30 km2.

23 Singapore still imports a significant portion of its water from Malaysia after building its first NEWater treatment plant in 2002 (LKY, 2012). It aims to triple its purified water output by 2060 to meet half of its water demand (Singapore Public Utilities Board, http://www.pub.gov.sg/water/newater/Pages/default.aspx).

112 policymakers and civilians alike. Many families in Malaysia and Singapore actually have relatives on both sides of the border. A large number of Malaysians commute into

Singapore each day to earn higher wages. Malaysia is also Singapore’s largest trading partner, and both countries’ sovereign funds have cooperated to fund large scale projects particularly in the Johor (southern Malaysia).

Economy

Singapore’s economic development is nothing short of a miracle considering its impoverished conditions at the dawn of its independence. Like the other three Asian

Tiger economies, Singapore attained astounding economic growth rates between the

1960s and 1990s due to centralized planning, state intervention, strategic industrial policies, and high volume export of manufactured goods. Singapore’s Economic

Development Board actively scours the world for financial and human capital.

Domestically, large government-linked corporations dominate the economy like the large chaebol in South Korea except that these are state-owned rather than family- owned. Singapore hosts more than 6,000 multinational companies and facilitates trade as one of the busiest container ports in the world (ERC, 2003; Yahya, 2008). The Asian

Financial Crisis in 1997 was the first serious setback to the Asian Tigers’ meteoric ascent followed by the worldwide recession in 2001. The city-state recovered quickly from these crises, and it continues to pursue macroeconomic policies that elevate its performance up the value-chain through innovations and improvements in productivity

(Kharas & Kohli, 2011). For example, the government recently identified

113 pharmaceuticals and medical technology as niche areas with growth potential and continues to invest generously in these areas.

Although Singapore is an advanced economy by any measure and an avid proponent of the knowledge economy, manufacturing still contributes to nearly 30% of the country’s GDP and employs more than a fifth of its workforce (K. Y. Lee, 2011;

Department of Statistics, 2012). For example, Singapore produces more than 80% of the booming oil rigs, 40% of the disc drives, and 11% of the semiconductors used in the world (Kolesnikov-Jessop, 2005; SG13, 2012). Singapore is also one of the world’s top centers for oil refining even though it does not have a single drop of crude oil. In addition to its education hub initiative, Singapore is also planning to become a healthcare hub, tourism hub, and creative industry hub. In recent years, Singapore’s

GDP per capita regularly ranks among the top five in the world after places such as

Luxembourg and Qatar. The following table illustrates the stable ratio between manufacturing and services in the Singaporean economy from the 1980s to today.

Table 7: Performance of the Services and Manufacturing Sector in Singapore.

Share of GDP (%)

1986 1996 2001 2011

Manufacturing 24 23 22 27

Services 61 65 67 62

Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics (2012) and Economic Review Committee (2003).

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Demography

In terms of cultural diversity, Singapore consists of the same three ethnic groups as in Malaysia. Ethnic Chinese constitute the majority of the population (74%) followed by Malays (13%) and Indians (9%). These ethnic ratios have remained fairly stable since the 1970s (K. Y. Lee, 2011). The country operates on an impressive set of official languages: English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil. Furthermore, a large number of expatriates live and work in Singapore ranging from Chinese construction workers to

European business executives. Among its 5.3 million inhabitants, only 72% (3.8 million) are citizens and permanent residents (Department of Statistics, 2012). Unlike

Malaysia’s race-based politics, Singapore has purposely pursued a meritocratic, inclusive society since its independence.

One of the greatest demographic challenges facing Singapore is its declining birth rate. The current fertility rate of 1.2 births per female is insufficient to even replace the parents (Department of Statistics, 2012). Among the three main ethnic groups, the

Chinese have the lowest birth rates. Since the 1980s, the government has been encouraging women to reproduce by offering handouts, tax breaks, better daycare, maternity benefits, and parental leaves. However, the birthrate continues to fall, and there is widespread concern among policymakers that Singapore might become another

Japan with a shrinking workforce shouldering the weight of an aging population.

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Government and Politics

For its entire modern history of nearly half a century, the People’s Action Party

(PAP) and specifically its founder Lee Kuan Yew have dominated Singaporean politics.

Therefore, the distinction between PAP as a political party and Singapore as a state is often blurred. Lee governed as the Prime Minister from 1959-1990 and led the country through three decades of unprecedented growth and urban transformation. Following his long tenure as the prime minister, Lee acted as the Senior Minister (1990-2004) and

Minister Mentor (2004-2011). Presently, Lee’s son Lee Hsien Loong is the Prime

Minister. As the founding father of modern Singapore, the elder Lee remains a formidable figure in Singaporean society even though he has retired. Although free elections exist, freedom of speech and other civil liberties are visibly curtailed in

Singapore. The PAP has a reputation of suppressing dissent, gerrymandering, and suing critics into bankruptcy based on libel charges. The limits of free public discourse are widely known as OB (out of bounds) markers as coined by former Minister for

Foreign Minister George Yeo to indicate taboo subjects. The former editor-in-chief of the country’s largest newspaper, the Straits Times, also confirms in a recent memoir that the government privately meddled in news reporting for many decades and sacked vocal journalists (Cheong, 2012).

The lack of transparent governance and an overbearing state apparatus have led some to call Singapore a “nanny state” with a “semi-authoritarian” or “benevolent dictatorship.” In 2011, the PAP suffered its worst electoral performance since

Singapore’s independence even though it garnered 60% of the votes and won 81 of the

87 seats in Parliament. This watershed moment witnessed significant challenges from

116 opposition parties, raised the political consciousness of the electorate, and generated a cacophony of questions about the PAP’s future viability. The electorate also expressed strong resentments toward the endless influx of foreign labor made possible through liberal immigration policies. Specifically, the strain on public infrastructure such as housing and transportation has fomented some xenophobic sentiments which were previously uncommon in this cosmopolitan metropolis.

Higher Education

Singapore’s higher education shares its early history with its neighbor Malaysia because the two jurisdictions were previously governed as a whole by colonial Britain.

The small medical college in Singapore that trained health professionals for the Straits

Settlements in the early 1900s ultimately gave rise to the National University of

Singapore (NUS) and the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. NUS is the oldest and most prestigious higher education institution in the country. Until 1980, there were only two universities in Singapore (NUS and Nanyang University). In the last few decades,

Singapore has rapidly built three local, autonomous universities: Nanyang

Technological University (1991), Singapore Management University (2000), Singapore

University of Technology and Design (2009). These are called autonomous universities because institutional autonomy in Singapore was only possible starting in 2005 when the University Corporatization Act was enacted. However, in reality, these “autonomous” universities are accountable to the state on critical issues of governance, funding, performance, and even faculty appointments (Mok, 2006, 2011). In fact, the state initiated many high-profile international partnerships involving these autonomous

117 universities. The government has also been known to intervene in tenure considerations for scholars. Singapore does not have an intermediary body such as the University

Grants Committee, which exists in Hong Kong based on British traditions, to buffer the relationship between the state and higher education. The government has successively increased funding for research over the last 15-20 years as it tries to position Singapore as an innovation capital and cultivate strong ties between academia and industry. Both

NUS and NTU have benefitted from the emphasis on research as evident in their respectable rankings on international league tables.24 A myriad of transnational partnerships also exists in Singapore’s higher education landscape. Chapter 6 will explore these partnerships in detail.

Singapore also has a private, not-for-profit university which caters to working adults: SIM University (known as UniSIM), which was established in 2005 as an offshoot of the Singapore Institute of Management, the largest private provider of tertiary education in Singapore. In 2009, the government created the Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT), which partners with foreign institutions to offer foreign degrees.

Currently SIT offers degree programs from 10 foreign universities. Finally, there is also a strong polytechnic sector with five institutions and over 70,000 students today.

Approximately 20% of the polytechnic graduates continue on in universities to obtain full degrees (SG16, 2012).

24 Among Asian universities, NUS and NTU ranked 2nd and 11th, respectively, in the 2013 Times Higher Education ranking.

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A key plank of Singapore’s higher education policy today is expansion and differentiation. In 2012, the government accepted recommendations from the

Committee on University Education Pathways Beyond 2015. This committee conducted study tours of several developed countries to learn from their higher education systems.

The committee’s comparative research revealed that Singapore’s higher education system was excessively focused on research-intensive universities, namely NUS and

NTU, while marginalizing students whose interests are outside the traditional academic track. Another concern is that research universities may not be responsive enough to the needs of Singapore’s vibrant and diverse economy. Therefore, the committee recommended expanding enrollment particularly in applied degree programs with strong industry demands and supporting continuing education for adults. The target is to raise the cohort participation rate for publicly funded, full-time university places from the current 27% to 40% by 2020 (MOE, 2012a). This target would far exceed the 10-20% publicly funded cohort participation rates observed in developed Asian economies such as Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (MOE, 2012b). Two relatively new institutions will handle most of the extra students: UniSIM and Singapore Institute of

Technology.

Education Hub Origin in Singapore

Similar to Malaysia, the concept of an education hub gained traction in Singapore in the late 1990s. However, the idea of Singapore becoming a place renowned for education dates back to as early as the 1980s. With an economy closely enmeshed in international commerce and a government renowned for engineering social and

119 economic developments, Singapore regularly reviews its economy to ensure the country’s long-term prosperity. These comprehensive reviews often come at the heels of an economic crisis in order to identify Singapore’s shortcomings and develop new strategies to minimize similar shocks in the future. The reviews always rely on distinguished panels of leaders from the public and private sector as well as foreign experts. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) also conducts ongoing assessments of the economy to inform its work.

At the heart of Singapore’s economic miracle is a powerful institution within MTI that markets the country as a place of commerce to the rest of the world: the Economic

Development Board (EDB). Staffed by a cadre of dedicated professionals stationed in offices worldwide, EDB continuously reinvents Singapore by forging links between the tiny city-state and the world at large. As with many international ventures in Singapore,

EDB was intimately involved with the creation of its education hub. To appreciate

Singapore’s story of education hub development, one must first understand the history of these periodic economic reviews and the role of the EDB. After the 1985-86 recession, a comprehensive review concluded that the country must devote more effort to its service sector rather than just focus on exporting manufactured goods. At the time, manufacturing was beginning to show limited returns for Singapore due to rising local costs and declining commodity prices worldwide. According to this review, manufacturing and services should become Singapore’s “twin engines of growth” – a mantra that was repeated throughout the 1990s and well into the 2000s (Economic

Committee, 1986):

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World service trade has in recent years been growing twice as fast as merchandise trade... This trend is important to Singapore. Our comparative advantage in exporting services is greater than our advantage in exporting goods. We have comprehensive transport and telecommunication links to the rest of the world. We have a well-educated, English-speaking workforce. Together with manufacturing, services will clearly be a leading growth sector in future. (Economic Committee, 1986, p. 11)

The review identified 11 service industries (including education) with export-earning potential and set the goal of turning the country into a developed nation by the 1990s.

Under education services, the committee recommended creating more private schools particularly in areas with a market demand (e.g., language education). Although education was mentioned as one of the promising service industries, no serious progress was evident in the 1980s due to socio-political sensitivities in turning education into a business (Contact Singapore, 2011). Consequently, policymakers avoided commercializing the education sector and focused instead on promoting corporate training centers (C. Tan, 2002). However, in 1996, some leaders of EDB revisited the idea of Singapore specializing in education services. According to Tan Chek Ming,

Director of Services Development Division of EDB at the time, the idea of transforming

Singapore into the “Boston of the East” met strong resistance and ridicule from both local authorities and foreign academics:

It was harder to persuade the Vice-Chancellor of a university than the Vice- President of an MNC [multinational company], since the latter already had offices around the world, whereas globalization had not yet hit the academic world at that time. The academics were often visibly surprised at a business proposition from a marketing office of a government statutory board. (C. Tan, 2002, p. 265)25

25 Tan Chek Ming began his career at EDB when the agency created its services division in 1986. After a stint in EDB’s Boston office, he returned to Singapore in 1996 and became EDB’s Director of the Services Development Division. He attributes the “Boston of the East” metaphor to Daisy Goh, the regional director for EDB’s European operation at the time. Goh was instrumental in cultivating EDB’s relationship with INSEAD, which later established a branch campus in Singapore in 2000 (C. Tan, 2002).

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After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and an economic recession in 2001, EDB began to pursue the education hub idea with great intensity. These two crises injected a sense of urgency in recalibrating Singapore’s economy and reshaping its higher education landscape concomitantly. Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan announced in

1998 a plan to recruit at least 10 world-class universities to set up operations in

Singapore within 10 years. Operations could be in the form of a branch campus, a faculty unit, or a research center. The emphasis of this recruitment effort would be on the post-graduate segment of the education industry (ERC, 2003). Known as the World

Class University (WCU) program, this initiative is essentially the precursor and the foundation of the education hub initiative. In the same year, a government report on the country’s competitiveness proposed that Singapore become “the Premier Services Hub in Asia with a global orientation” (Committee on Singapore’s Competitiveness, 1998, p.143). Again, education was identified as a service industry with growth potential. Soon afterward, Singapore’s Minister of Education, Teo Chee Hean, was talking enthusiastically about creating a critical mass of higher education activities:

Our vision, in shorthand notation, is to become the Boston of the East. Boston is not just MIT or Harvard. The greater Boston area boasts of over 200 universities, colleges, research institutes and thousands of companies. It is a focal point of creative energy; a hive of intellectual, research, commercial and social activity. We want to create an oasis of talent in Singapore: a knowledge hub, an ‘‘ideas- exchange,’’ a confluence of people and idea streams, an incubator for inspiration. (Teo, 2000)

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One key outcome of the financial crisis of 1997 and recession of 2001 was a comprehensive economic review led by then Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.26

The Economic Review Committee (ERC) released its final report in 2003. This comprehensive report became an influential blueprint that reverberated throughout

Singaporean society because some projections were up to 15 years into the future.

Emerging economies such as China and India were posing considerable threats as low- cost production centers and magnets for foreign investment, while uncertainties in

Southeast Asia were forcing Singapore to look beyond its vicinity for collaborations

(ERC, 2003; Lee, 2003). The report pointed out that growth in the services sector

“helped cushion the sharp plunge in manufacturing output” during the recessions of

1981-85, 1996-98 and 2001 (ERC, 2003, Sub Committee on Service Industries report

Part1 p.4). Under the ERC, the Sub-Committee on Service Industries assigned an entire working group to assess the education industry and put forth recommendations. This sub-committee and working group reaffirmed the benefits of Singapore becoming an international education center:

The proposed vision is as follows: to develop a self-sustaining education ecosystem offering a diverse and distinctive mix of quality education services to the world, thus becoming an engine of economic growth, capability development and talent attraction for Singapore. (ERC 2003, Sub Committee on Service Industries, Education Report, p. 3)

26 Lee Hsien Loong is the current Prime Minister of Singapore and the son of Lee Kuan Yew. He assumed office in 2004. He led the 1985/86 economic review as the Minister of State (Trade and Industry) and the 2003 economic review as the Deputy Prime Minister.

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Some 250,000 students from major Asian countries study in the US alone, contributing a massive $9 billion SGD to the US economy. A 5% share of these US-bound Asian students for tertiary and executive education would yield a significant spin-off to our economy. In particular, China is a huge potential market for us. There are 25,000 Chinese students who study abroad annually, making it the largest student exporter in the world… With rising affluence, the number is set to rise, and we should continue to capture a good slice of the market. (ERC 2003, Sub Committee on Service Industries report Part1 p. 12)

Consequently, the ERC set several ambitious targets for 2015: triple the number of foreign students in Singapore to 150,000, recruit 100,000 executive trainees, and boost education’s economic contribution from 1.9% of GDP to 3 to 5%.27 This expansion would also create 22,000 new jobs in the process. While capability development and talent attraction were mentioned as additional reasons for developing the education industry, the potential to generate revenue clearly dominated the ERC documents on education services. In fact, the ERC report contains a detailed market segmentation of the “education ecosystem.” Tertiary institutions and commercial and specialty schools would act as major suppliers serving both consumers and corporations (Figure 3). The university sector is further divided into three strata with foreign world-class universities at the apex specializing in research and post-graduate studies. The three local, public universities would continue to be premier institutions for undergraduate studies, while the lowest tier, private universities (local and foreign), would accept the bulk of fee- paying international students (Figure 4).

27 The ERC report draws comparisons with other countries to justify its targets for the education industry. It notes that the education sector in Australia and UK contributed 5.5% and 5.6% to each country’s GDP in 1999, respectively. Building five more universities in Singapore to make a total of eight was deemed as a realistic undertaking considering that two other places with a similar population size as Singapore’s had the same or more number of universities – the state of Victoria in Australia (8 universities) and the city of Boston in U.S. (65 universities) (ERC, 2003).

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Figure 3: Projected Supply and Demand for Education Services in Singapore.

Source: ERC (2003, Education Services main report, p. 4)

Figure 4: Planned Differentiation in Singapore’s University Sector.

Source: ERC (2003, Education Services main report, p. 6)

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With the Economic Development Board intimately involved in Singapore’s education service sector, it was not a surprise that the Minister for Trade and Industry, George

Yeo, announced in the same year that Singapore aimed to become an education hub called the Global Schoolhouse:

The global demand for international higher education will exceed 7 million students by 2025. Asia will dominate, accounting for 70% of this future demand... A large part of this demand will be met in Asia itself in advanced cities like Singapore. Our objective is to make Singapore a 'Global Schoolhouse' (Yeo in 2003 as cited in Sidhu, 2005).

Singapore quickly surpassed its original goal of recruiting 10 world-class universities by

2007. Rather, 16 foreign universities had established operations in Singapore by 2005

(EDB, 2007; IIE, 2011). These foreign universities included Stanford, MIT, Wharton

School of Business, Duke, University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, INSEAD,

Shanghai Jiao Tong, the Technical University of Eindhoven, and the Technical

University of Munich. In summary, Singapore’s education hub initiative began as an effort to commercialize all levels of education as well as provide corporate training.

There was also a visible emphasis on partnerships with foreign elite universities that can offer graduate programs.

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Hong Kong

History and Geography

Hong Kong is the quintessential gateway between the East and the West with its history steeped in two cultural traditions. When the Qing Dynasty refused to import

British opium in 1839, the First Opium War ensued. British forces quickly defeated the

Chinese and enforced a set of exploitative conditions outlined in the Treaty of Nanking.

Formalized in 1842, this treaty gave Britain favorable trading rights, access to ports, war reparation payments, and control over Hong Kong as a crown colony in perpetuity.

Originally, British sovereignty was contained within Hong Kong Island but it later expanded to the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860 and the New Territories in 1898 upon further threats against the Qing government (Tsang, 2004). The addition of the New

Territories enlarged the size of colonial Hong Kong 12 fold under an agreement of a 99- year lease. During the Second World War, Japan invaded China and seized large portions of the country as well as Hong Kong. Japan’s surrender in 1945 restored Hong

Kong to British control. In 1984, Britain and China ultimately came to an agreement under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which set the date for Hong Kong’s return to the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997. This agreement also specified that

Hong Kong would continue to exist as a free capitalist system with individual freedom for at least 50 years after its return to China. The Hong Kong Basic Law, adopted by

China in 1990 and enacted in 1997, further specifies that Hong Kong shall have a high

127 degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign relations and military defense. In short,

China agreed to govern Hong Kong as a special administrative region (SAR).

With only 1100 square kilometer and 40% of its land set aside as parks and natural reserves, Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated places in the world.

The terrain is remarkably hilly with developments concentrated on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. Just north of Hong Kong lies Shenzhen, a rapidly growing Chinese city designated as a special economic zone. Shenzhen houses numerous companies such as Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics manufacturer whose clients include Apple and Huawei, the Chinese telecommunication giant. To the west of Hong Kong lies the

Pearl River with Macau on the other side. South of Hong Kong lies the South China Sea framed by Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia.

Economy

Hong Kong is widely recognized as one of the most open economies in the world. The government provides an environment that ensures laissez-faire capitalism with extremely low taxation rates. In the 1950s and 1960s, Hong Kong’s economy was driven by the export of textiles and electronics like the other Asian Tiger economies.

However, unlike the other Asian Tigers, Hong Kong’s economic transformation depended on small and medium sized enterprises rather than state-led industrial planning (Taiwan and South Korea) or foreign capital investments (e.g., Singapore). In

1978, Deng Xiao-Ping’s open door policy started a new era for Hong Kong as trade and investment increased between the two. Labor-intense industries moved quickly to the

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Mainland starting in the 1980s while the service sector grew rapidly. As a major international financial center today, Hong Kong relies heavily on banking and the flow of international capital while the manufacturing sector has withered away. About 90% of the economy depends on service industries. Hong Kong is also one of the world’s busiest ports as a key node in international trade dating back several centuries.

Successive administrations have steered Hong Kong away from budget deficits while enabling it to amass an impressive foreign reserve that rivals those of much larger countries. Today the four key industries in the Hong Kong economy are financial services, trading and logistics, tourism, and professional services (Census and Statistics

Department, 2012). One of the ironies, or ingenuities, behind this open economy is the government monopoly over land ownership. Virtually all the land is owned by the government and leased to tenants. The sale of land lease rights is deliberately controlled to limit the supply, inflate prices, and generate the bulk of tax revenues for the government. Lease modifications and renewals also require premium fees. While this

“hidden tax” effectively funds public infrastructure, this entrenched legacy of British colonialism has also created an oligarchy of wealthy land developers and exacerbated housing shortages and social inequities (Poon, 2011). Hong Kong’s heavy reliance on the financial and real estate sectors has also made it vulnerable to global economic crises (Cheng, 2010).

Hong Kong’s economy currently faces two issues with significant implications for its future. First, external competition from other Chinese cities is spurring policymakers to reflect on Hong Kong’s role in China’s booming economy. What can Hong Kong contribute? How is Hong Kong different from other Chinese cities? Since the 1997

129 handover, Shanghai has become a constant source of comparison as Mainland China’s leading financial center. Second, Hong Kong is located in the heart of the Pearl River

Delta, a large region covering southeastern China with 50 million people in total (Cheng et al., 2011). In 2008, the Chinese Government designated the Pearl River Delta as an economic zone for further development (The National Development and Reform

Commission, 2008). Hong Kong’s increasing ties with nearby factories in Shenzhen have strengthened both cities’ economic prospects as engines of growth in the Pearl

River Delta.

Demography

Among Hong Kong’s 7 million residents, over 90% are ethnic Chinese with roots tracing back mainly to the province of Guangdong. Many Chinese sought refuge in

Hong Kong during the turbulent times of the Civil War, the Great Leap Forward, the

Cultural Revolution, and even after the Tiananmen Square incident. The influx of people from Mainland China continues today in the form of migrant workers, young students, and pregnant women. In 2011, nearly half of the live births in Hong Kong were attributed to women residing in Mainland China – the majority of them without a Hong Kong spouse (Census and Statistics Department, 2012). Even with the prevalence of

Mainland Chinese women giving birth, Hong Kong still has one of the lowest fertility rates in the world at 1.1 births per female (World Bank, 2012). The influx of Mainlanders raises concerns among locals over cultural differences, overcrowding, and the encroachment on Hong Kong’s sovereignty. In addition to the ethnic Chinese, 6%

(450,000) of the population is non-Chinese (Census and Statistics Department, 2011).

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Indonesians and Filipinos make up 60% of this group and work mostly as domestic helpers. The government promotes Hong Kong as a trilingual city with Cantonese,

English and Putonghua as the official languages.

Government and Politics

China governs Hong Kong today under the principle of “one country, two systems.” The Chinese government grants the city greater autonomy than anywhere else in the country. Macau also receives unique considerations as another special administrative region in China. The head of the government is the Chief Executive, who is elected by a 1200-member committee consisting of appointed individuals from functional constituencies (i.e., different sectors of the society and economy) and ex- officio members from the legislature. After the election, the Central People’s

Government in Beijing officially appoints the Chief Executive. The Executive Council is essentially the cabinet, consisting of the different secretaries who work closely with the

Chief Executive. The Council also contains non-official, appointed members who are drawn from different sectors of society (e.g., civil service, legal, corporate, education). In addition, the Central Policy Unit (CPU) is a government think-tank that advises the Chief

Executive on many aspects of public affairs. On July 1, 2012, Leung Chun-Ying took office as HKSAR’s third Chief Executive. He governs with the Hong Kong Legislative

Council, which has 70 members, half of whom are elected by voters in geographic constituencies while the other half are elected by functional constituencies. These functional constituencies are led by appointed individuals from their respective industry sectors or special interests group (e.g., engineering, finance, labor, and social welfare).

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Eligible voters in a functional constituency may include individuals, corporations, and other legal entities. Pro-democracy advocates have pointed out that functional constituencies unfairly concentrate power in the hands of corporate elites and even magnify the voting power of some individuals. Universal suffrage thus does not presently exist in Hong Kong. Under the Basic Law implemented after the handover, universal suffrage was mentioned as a possibility by 2007/08. However, this target has now been postponed amid great controversy to 2017 and 2020 for electing the Chief

Executive and members of the Legislative Council, respectively. Several other recent attempts by Beijing to influence legislation and education reforms have also led to large street protests from locals.

Higher Education

Before the 1970s, two institutions dominated the higher education landscape in

Hong Kong: the University of Hong Kong (est. 1912) and The Chinese University of

Hong Kong (est. 1963). For many decades, the pursuit of higher education was very elitist. The University of Hong Kong is regularly ranked among the top three universities in Asia.28 To diversify the higher education landscape and meet the demands of a growing population and economy, several more universities were built in the 1990s from scratch or by merging existing colleges: Hong Kong Baptist University, the Hong Kong

Polytechnic University, the City University of Hong Kong, the Open University, the Hong

28 In 2013, the QS World University Rankings and Times Higher Education ranked HKU as the 2nd and 3rd university in Asia, respectively.

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Kong University of Science and Technology, and Lingnan University. The Vocational

Training Council also represents 13 member institutions closely connected to different industries. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong government invested heavily in higher education and helped several universities rise in the international rankings; however, funding was drastically reduced starting in 1998 due to the Asian Financial Crisis

(Cheng et al., 2011). The University Grants Committee (UGC) advises the government on the development and financing of public higher education. This body is a legacy of

British colonialism even though its British equivalent no longer exists. Hong Kong’s

UGC currently funds eight higher education institutions and essentially acts as a buffer between the state and public universities. Due to this buffer, Hong Kong public universities enjoy considerable institutional autonomy as well as academic freedom.

The state does not have a direct influence on university governance, faculty appointments, or research agendas. Hong Kong higher education leaders and scholars are fiercely proud of this tradition of independence even though there are occasional challenges to it.29 In addition to advising the government, the UGC also conducts quality audits, distributes research funding, and evaluates research performance through

Research Assessment Exercises.

A comprehensive review of the entire education system also took place after the

1997 handover. At the time, there was widespread criticism that the existing system was conformist and unable to produce the flexible graduates that Hong Kong society needed

29 For example, Hong Kong University’s Public Opinion Project made headlines in 2012 when it held a mock election online for the HKSAR Chief Executive as a protest for the lack of universal suffrage. Despite a cyber attack that disabled some access from smartphones, over 200,000 people participated.

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(Cheng, 2010). This review culminated in a report released in 2000 with several recommendations. The key recommendations for higher education included a new academic structure, a target participation rate of 60% among secondary school leavers by 2011-12, and the development of private institutions to meet the rising demand for higher education (Education Commission, 2000; EMB, 2005). The reform reduced the

7-year secondary education (3+2+2) to 6 years (3+3) years. It also consolidated the two onerous secondary school-leaving exams into one, thus allowing students to pursue a broader curriculum rather than worry about high-stakes testing. The undergraduate degree program was also lengthened from three to four years. The new structure became known as the 334 Scheme to represent six years of senior secondary education followed by four years in university. These major changes essentially align the Hong Kong academic structure to those of Mainland China, United States, and

Australia. The new structure was implemented in secondary schools starting in 2009, and in universities in 2012. The participation rate for higher education doubled between

2000 and 2006 and reached 66% -- surpassing the 60% target five years before the expected date (Education Commission, 2006; Wan, 2011). However, degree program enrollment remained only at 18% (Cheng, 2010). Despite the myriad of programs and institutions today, some still criticize Hong Kong higher education as elitist with HKU at the apex while self-financing and sub-degree programs fail to garner respect.

In terms of education policymaking, the Education Bureau (EDB), led by the

Secretary of Education, oversees Hong Kong’s entire education system. The EDB retains the power to pass policies, but other bodies exert significant influence on policymaking. For example, the UGC advises the government on the development of

134 the seven public universities and Hong Kong Institute of Education. In addition, the

Education Commission, a non-statutory body, advises the government on the overall educational objectives, policies, and priorities for implementation. The Education

Commission is a very active and influential body whose membership draws from key leaders in education as well as the society at large. As an example of its influence, the report which launched the large-scale reform starting in 2000 was produced by the

Education Commission: Learning for Life, Learning Through Life – Reform Proposals for the Education System in Hong Kong (2000).

Education Hub Origin in Hong Kong

Compared to Malaysia and Singapore, Hong Kong’s education hub initiative began much later and experienced many false starts. In 1989, the Hong Kong

Government commissioned the University Grants Committee to review the expansion of undergraduate programs in public universities. The scope of this review was later enlarged beyond UGC-funded institutions to encompass the entire higher education system. When the final report was eventually released in 1996, it entertained the idea that Hong Kong could become a regional center for higher education:

We believe that it would be of advantage to Hong Kong to adopt a much wider regional role in higher education… to become a regional centre for higher education… Recruiting very good students from China and other nearby countries would undoubtedly imply additional costs for the Hong Kong taxpayer. But there would be substantial benefits. Some students would remain and work in Hong Kong, thus adding to the pool of high level talent. Those who returned to their own countries would be likely to maintain links with Hong Kong which would be of benefit to us as they acquired seniority in trade or government. All of them would add a leaven to our institutions which would be useful to our local students. (UGC, 1996, executive summary)

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This statement provides perhaps the first indication of Hong Kong’s interest in becoming an education hub. The UGC reiterated this interest again after conducting a review of publicly funded institutions in 2000 (UGC, 2000). Mainland China remained at the fore whenever the concept of a regional center for higher education appeared. Each time the government incrementally increased the quota for non-local students in UGC-funded institutions. By 2000, this quota stood at 4% for undergraduate and taught postgraduate programs and one-third of the positions in research post-graduate programs

(UGC, 2000). However, without implementation details or further commitments in planning or resources, these declarations of becoming a regional center of higher education remained ambiguous and largely rhetorical. Moreover, the UGC only represents a slice of the higher education landscape in Hong Kong since it is the planning and funding agency of public universities only. These early discussions on becoming a regional center did not appear to include private education providers or technical institutes.

In 2004, the idea of developing Hong Kong as a center for higher education gained greater momentum. Planners began to position higher education as an essential pillar of “Asia’s World City” as promoted by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa in his 1999

Policy Address. Tung’s annual policy address in 2004 highlighted the idea of providing higher education for non-locals,

As Asia’s world city, Hong Kong should be where talents from around the world congregate… We will continue to improve our living conditions in such areas as environmental protection, education, recreation and culture, and promote high quality services to attract those who meet the criteria to settle here. Hong Kong’s education, medical and health care services enjoy high professional standards. Apart from catering for local needs, they can be further developed into industries to serve people in the Mainland and elsewhere in Asia. (Tung, 2004, p. 11)

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Therefore, in addition to talent attraction, higher education was now conceived as a service industry as well. In the same year, both the Secretary for Education and

Manpower and UGC began to call for the development of Hong Kong as a “regional education hub” based on the city-state’s strong links with Mainland China, high quality universities, and cosmopolitan outlook (Li, 2004; UGC, 2004a; UGC, 2004b). As

Secretary Li explained,

Due to our close proximity to the Mainland and the unique blend of Chinese and Western cultures, we have a social environment that enriches the educational experiences of non-local students. We can become the regional centre of excellence for lifelong education… With the rapid expansion of the postsecondary education sector in recent years, we understand that service providers see great potential for recruiting non-local students, in particular Mainland students. (Li, 2004)

Again, Mainland China remained at the fore of these discussions. In discussions with research participants, the year 2004 was often identified as the year the education hub initiative launched.

In 2007, the government announced several measures to help build an education hub: 1) increase the non-local student quota for publicly funded programs at the sub- degree, degree and taught post-graduate levels from 10% to 20%, 2) establish a scholarship endowment of $1 billion HKD for local and non-local students in publicly funded full-time programs, 3) relax employment restrictions on non-local students, and

4) allow non-local graduates to remain in Hong Kong for employment purposes (UGC,

2010). Thus, policymakers began to think more broadly about the structural barriers that prevented Hong Kong from attracting a large number of foreign students.

The worldwide recession in 2008 further fueled Hong Kong’s desire to become an education hub. Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang established the Task

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Force on Economic Challenges (TFEC) in October 2008 to assess the city-state’s economic prospects. This group concluded its review by identifying six key industries in which Hong Kong retains a competitive advantage and which it should therefore cultivate as growth sectors: medical services, education services, environmental industries, innovation and technology, testing and certification, and cultural and creative industries. The Task Force emphasized “Hong Kong has potential to meet the educational and research needs of the Pear River Delta” especially through self- financing programs (TFEC, 2009). Rather than talent attraction through fixed quotas for non-local students in public universities, the pendulum for developing an education hub swung toward revenue generation by leveraging the private education sector, where quotas do not apply. The government quickly revitalized the Land Grant Scheme and launched the Start-Up Loan Scheme to help private education providers construct buildings. The Land Grant Scheme, originally established in 2000, set aside subsidized plots of land for private higher education providers (both local and foreign).30 This was a welcomed initiative given Hong Kong’s notoriously expensive real estate market. The

Start-Up Loan Scheme was endowed with $2 billion HKD to provide interest-free loans for private higher education providers. To qualify for either scheme, not only must the institution be privately funded but also non-profit as well (EDB, 2010). In summary,

Hong Kong’s education hub began officially in 2004 but was not really launched until

30 In March 2010, the Land Grant Scheme contained three plots of land with the following developable gross floor areas: Ho Man Tin (21,500 m2), Siu Lek Yuen (11,200 m2), and Wong Chuk Hang (23,000 m2) (EDB, 2010). This is a total of 55,700 m2 or approximately 600,000 square feet. In December 2010, a new site at Queen’s Hill in Fanling with 160,000 m2 became available; this is a former British army camp near Shenzhen. Nine HEIs from Hong Kong and overseas submitted proposals for the Queen’s Hill site, but the status of this land remains uncertain because it may be appropriated for public housing instead (Sharma, 2013).

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2007-08 when substantial strategies were put in place. The early rationale of talent attraction was also crowded out by the intent to leverage education as an industry following an economic recession.

Comparing Contexts

From the background sketches provided in this chapter, it is quickly apparent that all three societies developed under British colonialism and achieved tremendous economic growth in the last five decades. Singapore and Malaysia continue to use a

Westminster parliamentary system and a common law system.31 Although Singapore and Hong Kong are clearly advanced economies with remarkably high GDPs and massive foreign reserves, Malaysia nevertheless achieved comparable annual growth rates, which surpass those of OECD members in the last 40 years (Table 8). Malaysia and Singapore share not only a common history in casting off the shackles of British colonialism but also a legacy of one-party rule in the post-independence era. Malaysia has been led by the same political coalition for over 50 years with the UMNO party as the de facto leader. Singapore’s PAP party has retained a similar grip on politics and governance since its independence in 1965. Both political parties are notorious for undermining opposition parties and restricting civil liberties based on the dubious claim of national security. Interestingly, the latest general election in both countries also dealt the ruling party unprecedented losses (Singapore in 2011 and Malaysia in 2013).

31 In fact, the Singapore Court of Appeal became the highest appellate court only in 1994 when appeals could no longer be made to the Privy Council in London.

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Although both UMNO and PAP remain in power today, these electoral tremors may signal watershed moments in each country’s political history. The demands for democratic rights and civil liberties grow louder each day. In comparison, Hong Kong residents enjoy far greater individual freedom, but they are also increasingly disenchanted with a political system that is ultimately controlled by Beijing. The lack of universal suffrage remains an irony for one of the world’s most open economies and cosmopolitan cities. Hong Kong experienced decolonization only in 1997, much later than Singapore and Malaysia. The lack of full democracy under British occupation and now Chinese rule continues to frustrate its people. In short, widespread political discontent is palpable in all three societies.

In higher education, all three societies are also presently pursuing some form of system-wide reform. What is the key policy plank dominating the local discourse on higher education? In the case of Malaysia, the National Higher Education Strategic Plan

2007-2020 remains the central blueprint that guides many policy decisions and supports the national aspiration to become a developed country by 2020. For Singapore, policymakers are focused on expansion and differentiation in the system in order to serve more students and fulfill the demands of a vibrant economy. For Hong Kong, the key policy initiative of the 3+3+4 reform scheme arrived at the doorsteps of universities in 2012 as they welcomed the first group of students into 4-year degree programs.

These system-wide reforms inevitably affect how an education hub is conceived, prioritized, and implemented. Furthermore, marked differences in institutional autonomy and academic freedom greatly influence the development of higher education. For

Singapore and Malaysia, the state retains strong control over many aspects of higher

140 education particularly among public universities. For Hong Kong, even though its political system is constrained by its relationship with China, higher education enjoys significant institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The different roles of the state affect the development of an education hub as subsequent chapters will illustrate.

In many discussions with policymakers for this study, several contextual similarities also emerge. Despite the glaring gap between their levels of economic development, Malaysia and Singapore both have diverse economies with the manufacturing and service sectors contributing to national income. Both governments also favor centralized planning and state interventions to constantly re-calibrate the economy (e.g., Malaysia’s Five Year Plans and Singapore’s periodic economic reviews). This level of diversification and state intervention is not evident in the Hong

Kong economy. The service sector, particularly financial services, dominates the Hong

Kong economy, which is generally unfettered by state interference. Some similarities can also be seen through demographic comparisons. Both Malaysia and Singapore are incredibly diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language. While Singapore publicly operates on a meritocratic system protected by laws, Malaysia continues to practice race-based politics favoring Malays. This is not to suggest Singapore is a multicultural utopia. Ethnic prejudices are not uncommon among Singaporeans, and there is also growing discontent with foreigners working in the country. Similarly, Hong Kong residents increasingly resent the growing number of Mainland Chinese settling in their city. Not only do both Singapore and Hong Kong share this nascent form of xenophobia, but they also share a record of declining birthrates, which concerns policymakers.

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Table 8: GDP Growth Rates of Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong 1970-2000.

Average GDP Growth (%) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Malaysia 7.7 5.9 7.2 4.8 Singapore 9.4 7.8 7.3 5.2 Hong Kong 9.6 7.4 3.6 4.2 OECD members (average) 3.6 3.1 2.6 1.6

Source: World Development Indicators Database (World Bank, 2013).

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Table 9: Contextual Comparisons

Malaysia Singapore Hong Kong Population 28.3 million 5.3 million 7 million Land Mass 330,000 km2 710 km2 1,100 km2 GDP per capita* $8,690 $41,986 $32,374 (USD; 2010) Foreign Reserve (millions of USD $144,000 (20th) $247,000 (14th) $295,000 (11th) and rank)+ Ethnicity 50% Malay 74% Chinese 94% Chinese 24% Chinese 13% Malay 6% Other 11% Indigenous 9% Indian 7% Indian 8% Other Fertility Rate* (births per female) 2.6 1.2 1.1 Economic Sectors Manufacturing Manufacturing (30%) Services (90%) Services Services (70%) Natural Resources

Colonized by Portugal Britain (1826-1963) Britain (1839-1997) Netherlands Britain (1826-1957) Official Languages Bahasa Malay English, Chinese, English and Malay, and Tamil. Chinese.

Unit responsible for Ministry of Higher Ministry of Education Education Bureau HE policymaking Education Universities in the None NUS #26 HKU #43 top 100! NTU #76 HKUST #57 * World Bank World Development Indicators (2013) + http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/11859-international- reserves-by-country.html#axzz2GkPw9xZi ! Times Higher Education 2013

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Comparing Education Hub Origins

The geneses of the education hub idea in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong share many striking similarities and differences. The fundamental reasons that spurred the creation of an education hub differ slightly in each jurisdiction. Malaysia was keen to correct a trade deficit in services that was partially due to the large exodus of local students studying abroad each year. A burgeoning private education sector with expertise in delivering transnational programs suddenly became the godsend which could stem the tide of students leaving the country as well as earn foreign exchange by attracting international students. On the other hand, Singapore recognized that manufacturing alone would no longer provide the impressive economic growth it had become accustomed to. Rather, the “twin engines of growth” must combine both manufacturing and services. The instrumental roles played by the Ministry of Trade and

Industry and more specifically the Economic Development Board in launching

Singapore as an education hub speak volumes about the rationales driving its hub.

Clearly, for both Malaysia and Singapore, higher education was explicitly conceived as a service industry that can generate revenue to advance the economy. By contrast, creating an education hub for the purpose of revenue generation was less of a driving force in Hong Kong even though this perspective has appeared occasionally in its policy discourse. Attracting talent and assisting Mainland China’s modernization appeared more often as the rationales behind Hong Kong’s education hub at least in early policy formulations.

Aside from these differences, economic crises have unequivocally fueled the launch of all three education hubs. From the view of the Malaysian Government, the

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Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 serendipitously priced an overseas education out of the reach of many Malaysian students. A deficit in the trade of services also became more glaring during this currency crisis. Therefore, the conditions for expanding the private education sector to serve both local and foreign students were ripe. For Singapore, the

Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and recession of 2001 culminated in a comprehensive economic review that identified education as a profitable service industry. This assessment only affirmed existing efforts to recruit foreign universities to set up operations in Singapore. Although Hong Kong’s education hub did not emerge from the ashes of the Asian Financial Crisis, the worldwide recession in 2008 did precipitate an economic review that identified education as one of the six industries with growth potential. Even if the motive of revenue generation were incompatible with earlier visions of an education hub in Hong Kong, the recession certainly generated renewed interest in education as a service industry. In short, these economic crises elevated whatever murmurs or imaginations of an education hub at the time to the level of national or state agenda.

Another early similarity shared among all three education hubs is the desire to recruit large numbers of foreign students. Singapore and Malaysia have both announced ambitious student recruitment targets. Hong Kong has not identified a target, but it has continuously raised the quota on non-local students and begun to relax immigration and employment restrictions to appeal to prospective students. Evidently, the belief that an education hub consists of large numbers of international students became prevalent among the architects of these education hubs. Measuring or defining an education hub based largely or entirely on the number of international students

145 continues to dominate the discourse on education hubs today even though some jurisdictions have developed strategies beyond student recruitment. In addition, all three societies also conceived higher education as the centerpiece of its education hub.

Singapore’s vision of an education hub includes all levels of education as well as executive training, while Hong Kong’s vision occasionally includes adult education and continuing education in the spirit of lifelong learning. At this early stage, research received minimal attention in the education hub discourse. Singapore occasionally referred to the research expertise of foreign universities, but many foreign universities were recruited to deliver degree programs.

Lastly, the background of the key actor leading each education hub at this early stage of development reveals a potential schism in future developments. From the onset, actors outside the education sector were the leading proponents of the education hub in Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysian economists framed education services as an issue of trade imbalance that can be rectified through the involvement of private education providers. Likewise, Singapore’s Economic Development Board instigated the recruitment of foreign universities and later spearheaded its Global Schoolhouse initiative. The Singapore Tourism Board was also responsible for promoting these initiatives and attracting foreign students in this early period. By contrast, the early visions of an education hub in Hong Kong came from the education sector (University

Grants Committee and Education and Manpower Bureau). Economists and entrepreneurs did not become involved in Hong Kong’s education hub initiative until a few years later. How will these differences in ownership and leadership of education

146 hubs affect their later development? The next chapter will examine the key actors in present day education hub development.

Summary

By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the concept of an education hub had fully captured the imaginations of policymakers in Malaysia, Singapore, and

Hong Kong. Malaysia and Singapore began to pursue the education hub concept seriously starting in the late 1990s while Hong Kong did not fully adopt this idea until around 2005 or even later. As shown in this chapter, the early years of these education hubs reveal that economic crises were instrumental in accelerating their development.

While these education hubs were created to resolve domestic issues and serve national interests, they were certainly not designed to serve only the local population. Inherent in the design of these education hubs is both a local and international dimension to bring together diverse actors. Going forward, have the rationales driving the development of these education hubs changed since their launch? To what extent do policymakers in the three societies today share the same views as the early architects of these education hubs? Do recent developments support or contradict these early visions of an education hub? The next chapter on rationales will explore these questions in presenting the research findings.

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Chapter 5

Rationales: Economic Benefits, Talent Development, and Educational Capacity

Introduction

The main research question in this study asks policymakers to identify the reasons driving the development of their country/city as an education hub. The physical scale of the hub could encompass a country, city, or a zone depending on the policy initiative in place. In analyzing the interview transcripts, four broad themes emerged as the rationales driving the development of education hubs. Comments from participants were first grouped into one of the four generic themes: economic, human capital, academic, and political. These themes are also evident in the existing literature on cross-border higher education. However, these themes proved too broad to adequately deal with the complex phenomenon of education hubs. Therefore, an iterative process of coding and re-coding participant comments was done to reflect the views of education hub policymakers with as much precision and nuance as possible. Comments that were ambiguous when viewed in isolation required reviews of interview recordings to clarify and contextualize their meanings (i.e., re-visiting the raw data). This process not only refined the categories of rationales and uncovered specific policy objectives in the development of education hubs, but it also improved data reliability. In short, the analysis began with what might be described as a crude process of deduction informed by the existing literature, but it ultimately progressed to a process of induction from participants’ voices, which I hope may more accurately represent the phenomenon of

148 education hubs. The four refined rationales are as follow:

• Economic Benefits • Talent Development • Educational Capacity • Soft Power

Each rationale essentially captures one idea or aspiration for creating an education hub.

A rationale is defined as the overarching purpose and end goal for an initiative. A rationale contains multiple interrelated objectives, which are more specific and tangible in their expression. Objectives are closer to the daily realities of education hub development. Put another way, rationales address the why, and objectives address the what of a policy initiative. For many policymakers and context informants involved in education hubs, identifying the what is easier than identifying the why because the underlying reasons may not always be clear. In fact, when asked to explain the reasons behind the development of an education hub, many research participants immediately listed the objectives. While objectives do suggest the reasons for building an education hub, they are imperfect proxies for understanding a society’s broader aspirations and contextual challenges. Rationales are at the heart of policymaking as guiding beacons that affect all downstream planning. Therefore, a rationale must be broad enough to encapsulate all the nuances and interpretations of an idea or aspiration. Although the four rationales emerging from the interviews are not mutually exclusive, they are distinctive enough to exist independently and warrant recognition (i.e., interviewees frequently reference them as pathways for an education hub). Granted, a country could pursue one or more rationales simultaneously, given the breadth of education hubs. The diversity and ambition of policymakers involved in education hub development would also suggest diverse rationales rather than a clear consensus. Nevertheless, each

149 education hub does exhibit an orientation or inclination toward one or two rationales.

This chapter first introduces the four rationales and their supplementary objectives without delving into contextual details. This general overview will provide the foundation and conceptual framework for comparing education hubs. The second part of this chapter will focus on three rationales and their relevance to the education hubs in this study: 1) economic benefits, 2) talent development, and 3) educational capacity.

These rationales are closely tied to national development, nation-building, and domestic affairs. The fourth rationale, soft power, will be covered in the next chapter because it emphasizes external outreach and international engagement, which is a separate line of inquiry in this study. Soft power also entails different theoretical concepts than the other rationales. This chapter presents the latest policy documents along with excerpts from interviews with research participants as evidence of the driving rationales. The analysis will highlight any discrepancies that may emerge between present day views and the original intentions for building an education hub – essentially an internal, diachronic comparison to identify any changes in rationales over time. The third part of the chapter compares the three education hubs (i.e., external comparison). In short, the chapter first constructs a comprehensive taxonomy of rationales and objectives, then locates each education hub in this taxonomy while recognizing the impact of time and the diversity of research participants, and finally provides a comparative analysis across three cases.

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Types of Rationales and Objectives

Economic Benefits

The most conspicuous rationale behind an education hub is to leverage higher education as an industry with great economic promise. Economic motives are well documented in both policy documents and existing studies on education hubs, which point to the neoliberal agenda (Mok, 2008b; Cheng, 2010; Cheng et al., 2011; Knight,

2014). The ubiquitous reliance on private, for-profit education to develop an education hub attests to the financial motives of these initiatives. The objective to generate revenue from tuition fees is a strong incentive for both the state and higher education institutions as each education hub competes for international students. However, generating revenue from tuition fees is only one objective under the rationale of economic benefits. A proper account of this rationale demands scrutiny of all the related objectives even if an education hub only pursues some of them. From interviews with policymakers, the following objectives are evident under economic benefits:

• To generate revenue through student fees • To commercialize research innovations • To leverage education as an economic multiplier

These objectives range from short-term to long-term goals. They signal the use of the education hub as a tool to spur economic growth as well as ensure economic resilience.

Economic growth is often associated with tangible results within a specified time frame.

Growth has less regard for sustainability. On the contrary, economic resilience emphasizes strategic maneuvering to ensure long-term economic health and sustainability even if it means sacrificing short-term gains. Resilience also seeks to

151 minimize future shocks to the economy. While sustainability is not a shared concern among all the research participants, minimizing future shocks figures prominently among the research participants.

Generating Revenue Through Student Fees

As with many other initiatives in cross-border higher education, the objective of income generation through student fees dominates the discourse on education hubs.

Cross-border higher education has become a lucrative industry for countries and institutions that recruit large numbers of international students who can pay a premium price. In the case of education hubs, this objective is more germane to privately funded institutions because public institutions in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong are subject to strict quotas on international student enrollment and regulations on tuition fees (at least at the undergraduate level). These public institutions do not currently rely on fees from international students to the extent seen in some British, Australian, and

American institutions. On the other hand, private for-profit institutions are usually free to recruit international students and set their tuition fees. Often these institutions charge the same high fee for both local and international students compared to public institutions. At some private institutions in Malaysia, the proportion of international students could be as high as 50%. For these institutions, international students constitute a major source of revenue. As shown in the previous chapter, several early policy documents on education hubs clearly justified the development of an education hub based on the lucrative market of international education.

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Commercializing Research Innovations

In some instances, the justification for an education hub draws links to the knowledge economy with a strong emphasis on research and development (R&D).

Research occurs both in the public and private sector and increasingly through public- private partnerships involving universities, governments, and industry partners. These developments are also evident in many higher education systems worldwide. However, the quest for research capacity and knowledge production in the case of education hubs involves coupling the expertise of foreign universities and multinational companies to local capital and clinics for the purpose of commercialization. When “knowledge production” appears as a rationale for an education hub, this objective of profiting from research dominates the discourse. Commercializing research is particularly evident in the assessment of knowledge production as planners equate research performance to the revenue it generates. Policy documents and research participants who highlight the imperatives and opportunities of the knowledge economy never provide a holistic view of knowledge. Rather, they narrowly define knowledge in terms of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) particularly in applied areas. For these reasons, the commercialization of research is an objective under the rationale of economic benefits.

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Leveraging Education as an Economic Multiplier

In addition to the inflow of international student fees, an education hub also generates wider economic activities beyond the purview of education. International students require support services in their daily lives. These services include housing, transportation, healthcare, food, telecommunication, and entertainment. Moreover, friends and family members visiting from overseas also generate another layer of economic activities. Foreign investment also flows into the country to support infrastructure and services related to education. In sum, policymakers recognize that these contributions easily exceed the contribution of tuition fees alone. Therefore, not only is education an industry in itself, but it actually magnifies other service industries.

Several research participants readily cited the “multiplier effect” on the economy as a driving rationale to create an education hub. This multiplier effect includes job creation as different industries expand to accommodate the needs of an education hub.

Singapore’s initial plan for its education hub estimated that 22,000 new jobs would be created in the education sector over the course of 10-15 years as the plan unfolded

(ERC, 2003). Estimating the scale of job creation outside the education sector is more difficult, but policymakers clearly recognize the employment opportunities an education hub can provide.

Another type of economic multiplier is less visible but nevertheless an impetus in some education hubs: real estate development. By building a critical mass of educational institutions, some planners anticipate a sharp rise in the value of land in the vicinity. Schools and universities are appealing amenities that attract both families and real estate investors. While this objective may appear far-fetched to higher education

154 experts, it is the normative view among some land developers leading the development of education hubs.

Talent Development

The second type of rationale driving the growth of education hubs is talent development. The knowledge economy coupled with the global competition for talent motivates policymakers to fashion an education hub as a magnet of talent. The discourse of brain drain and brain circulation focuses on the cross-border ebb and flow of skilled individuals swayed by professional opportunities, immigration policies, and a higher quality of life. In addition to attracting foreign talent and responding to manpower needs, many education hub planners also value the task of nurturing the talent among the local population. Talent is not always linked to economic imperatives either.

Therefore, the broader concept of talent development captures this rationale more accurately than the economically oriented concept of human capital. Development indicates formative progress in cultivating an individual. The following objectives are apparent under the rationale of talent development:

• To develop local talent • To attract foreign talent • To repatriate the diaspora

These objectives vary widely in importance to different education hubs. The task of developing local talent may not necessarily involve assistance from foreign experts and education providers. Research participants also differ sharply in their views on attracting

155 foreign talent as an objective of an education hub. Therefore, the term “talent attraction” does not accurately represent the three objectives here because it suggests an indigenous deficit of expertise to justify external intervention – a view that generates considerable discord among the research participants in this study.

Developing Local Talent

Nurturing the talent of the local population is the most common objective under the talent development rationale. Despite the rhetoric of attracting foreign students and experts through an education hub, many policymakers attach a high priority to the educational and training needs of the local population. In some jurisdictions, this priority supersedes any consideration for the corresponding needs or interests of foreigners. By offering a myriad of educational and training opportunities, an education hub can cater to diverse individual interests. Talent in this interpretation includes conventional occupations in engineering and medicine as well as non-traditional fields like visual and performing arts. Some policymakers also mentioned the potential of an education hub to engender traits such as creativity and risk-taking among local students.

Attracting Foreign Talent

Attracting foreign talent is a key objective for some education hubs. First, international students and executive trainees could become highly skilled immigrants worthy of retaining. Second, accomplished educators, scholars, and scientists recruited from abroad could contribute to the society’s overall development. These individuals

156 inject invaluable expertise that would otherwise take generations to cultivate domestically. Some policymakers position the recruitment of foreign talent at the heart of an education hub by drawing comparisons with other countries that have leveraged higher education as an immigration platform (e.g., United States). Although the objective of attracting foreign talent is evident in the data, it is certainly not a universal objective common to all education hubs as some existing literature suggests.

Repatriating the Diaspora

For some policymakers, an education hub could appeal to the country’s diaspora to return and contribute to national development. Specifically, this objective targets nationals who had left the country to seek advance education, training, and employment for various reasons. An education hub provides not only employment opportunities in the education sector but also in industries which were previously nascent or non- existent. For example, an international student pursuing a doctorate in nanotechnology at Stanford may not be motivated to return home if this field does not exist back home.

What opportunities or scholarly community would be available to this student upon returning? Some members of this diaspora are neither academics nor researchers but successful entrepreneurs in areas that an education hub is attempting to cultivate (e.g., pharmaceutical and information technology).

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Educational Capacity

Several participants identify objectives that improve educational capacity as one of the key rationales in constructing an education hub. In their view, the mixture of local and foreign individuals and institutions can elevate the local standards of higher education. In some cases, the standard is in teaching and learning, an area that foreign students and academics can enrich through their diverse perspectives and lived experiences. In other cases, policymakers expect foreign education providers to elevate the level of competition across the entire higher education system – greater competition begets greater quality of education. These objectives clearly differ widely in their anticipated level of impact: the modest level of a classroom and the ambitious level of a system. However, the commonality binding these objectives is the fundamental belief that cross-border education can improve the higher education system both qualitatively and quantitatively. An education hub can effectively tackle internationalization on a large scale. The following objectives are evident under the rationale of educational capacity:

• To expose local students to global perspectives • To diversify programs and institutions • To promote competition among institutions and students

Exposing Local Students to Global Perspectives

At the most basic level, an education hub can enrich the learning experiences of local students. Local students can gain a more cosmopolitan perspective by interacting with foreign students and faculty members. Gaining intercultural competency is another outcome of this interaction. This kind of personal interaction would be impossible on a

158 mass scale given the prohibitive cost of sending students abroad to gain a global perspective. The policymakers who reinforce the importance of mixing local students with international students essentially view internationalization at home as a mark of excellence in higher education.

Diversifying Programs and Institutions

With the presence of foreign education providers, an education hub can significantly diversify a higher education system and increase its capacity. The cohort participation rate can subsequently increase through two ways. First, the overall number of seats will increase to alleviate the demand for higher education. Second, foreign providers can provide alternative programs and attract students who would otherwise opt out of the country’s higher education system (to pursue employment in the home country or study abroad). Foreign providers can provide franchised and twinning programs as well as unique hybrid programs developed through local-foreign collaborations. A joint or dual degree program may provide students with learning experiences at different locations around the world. These new opportunities serve to address local structural problems that prevent access to higher education.

Promoting Competition Among Students and Institutions

Some policymakers justify the development of an education hub on the basis of increased competition among students and institutions. As more and more foreign students, programs, and providers enter the country, there is an expectation that

159 competition will beget quality and excellence throughout the entire higher education system. While local students and institution might find this Darwinian view of higher education disconcerting, some policymakers involved in education hub development fully subscribe to this belief. These policymakers advocate the liberalization of a higher education system to promote greater competition for the sake of capacity building.

Soft Power

The fourth rationale in the development of education hubs is to exert influence internationally through higher education. This rationale targets foreign relations and diplomacy rather than higher education per se. Some historical examples of higher education as a diplomatic tool include hosting scholars from war-torn countries and offering scholarships to students from developing countries. For example, as noted, organizations such as the Colombo Plan, Fulbright, the Japan Foundation, and DAAD have supported higher education initiatives to facilitate bilateral relations. These initiatives generate goodwill and promote a positive image of the host country. With similar intentions, education hubs aim to exert international influence through teaching, training, research, as well as policymaking (i.e., exporting model policies). For policymakers who subscribe to this rationale, they are cognizant of geopolitical issues and the relative position of their country in the international order. What kind of influence can an education hub exert through international engagement? Higher education thus becomes a political instrument that can help facilitate interactions between states. Soft

160 power, as a concept in international relations, captures the essence of the policy objectives below. The next chapter will elaborate more on the concept of soft power and its theoretical underpinnings.

Strengthening Ties Based on Cultural Heritage

The most basic objective under the rationale of soft power is to strengthen a country’s ties with foreign individuals, institutions, and states based on cultural heritage.

These ties may be religious, ethnic, or historical (e.g., colonial ties). A shared cultural identity essentially expedites the interactions between an education hub and a foreign actor (student, scholars, institutions, etc.). While this objective is not evident across all education hubs, culture acts as a strong pivot in some of the international initiatives pursued by education hubs.

Networking with Expert Individuals and Institutions Worldwide

An alternative to using cultural heritage to mediate international academic relations is to pursue individuals and institutions worldwide for their expertise in education, training, and research. This pragmatic objective aligns an education hub with leading foreign experts such that these individuals develop an awareness of the host country as well as a vested interest in its development and success. These experts may remain overseas yet continue to contribute to the development of an education hub as informal advisors or contract consultants. Therefore, the operative word here is

161 networking with foreign experts rather than recruiting foreign talent to relocate to the education hub.

Becoming a Regional Leader and Broker

A visible element of many education hubs’ international engagement is the regional dimension of its activities. Whether it is to become a regional leader in higher education, contribute to regional studies and research, or to broker contacts between two regions, an education hub often exhibits a regional intent. Moreover, policymakers define “region” differently to include both physical areas (e.g., neighboring countries) as well as more abstract notions of civilizations (e.g., East and West). Exerting influence in a regional sphere as a leader or broker is a fundamental objective for many education hubs.

Case Studies

This section moves the discussion from the conceptual framework above to the three education hubs in this study. Specifically, it examines the relevance of the following rationales to each education hub: 1) economic benefits, 2) talent development, and 3) educational capacity. The case studies below clarify the different motives underpinning each education hub. Some strategies and implementation details are included here as supporting evidence; otherwise the focus is on the overarching rationales and their related objectives. Case studies provide rich examples that elucidate a broader phenomenon “when the boundaries between phenomenon and

162 context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p.13). After the presentation of these case studies, the chapter will conclude with a comparison of the dominant rationales across the three education hubs. The fourth rationale (soft power) will be covered in the next chapter.

Malaysia

Malaysia is perhaps the most committed torchbearer of the education hub initiative among the three case studies here. The country’s expertise in developing franchised and twinning programs dates back to the 1980s, and the Asian Financial

Crisis of 1997-98 spurred further innovations in these cross-border arrangements

(Morshidi, 2005; Sidhu & Kaur, 2011). These developments provided a fertile ground for its education hub. Malaysia continues to prioritize the education hub as a national agenda item and to dedicate resources to planning and regulating cross-border higher education. Several recent national development plans include the education hub and the private education sector, which hosts the bulk of international students in the country. In the last five years, Malaysia’s education hub aspiration has expanded to include two other hub initiatives: Iskandar EduCity and the Islamic finance education hub. Iskandar is a regional development project in southern Malaysia that touts several education cities. The Islamic finance education hub is a national initiative. In short,

Malaysia is pursuing the education hub initiative on at least three fronts: 1) a national

163 level education hub, 2) a national level Islamic finance education hub, and 3) a zonal level Iskandar project. Consequently, any discussion on Malaysia’s education hub development must include all three initiatives.32 The research findings below include interviews with policymakers from all three initiatives. This comprehensive approach seeks to provide a clearer picture of Malaysia’s efforts in developing education hubs than would be possible in studies that only examine one of the three initiatives. The case study on Malaysia will first start with the national level education hub then discuss

Iskandar separately because the actors involved and the rationales are not entirely the same across all three initiatives. The Islamic finance education hub will be dealt with in

Chapter 6 because it is primarily pursuing a soft power rationale.

At the highest level of planning, two recent policy documents encapsulate

Malaysia’s efforts to turn the country into an education hub: 1) the National Higher

Education Strategic Plan 2020 and 2) the Economic Transformation Programme. The federal government released these blueprints in 2007 and 2010, respectively. These documents reveal the rationales and objectives of an education hub, even if largely only in generic terms. Research participants frequently referred to these two blueprints in interviews and affirmed the active implementation of these documents. In fact, some of

32 There are at least three other education hub initiatives in Malaysia: 1) Kuala Lumpur Education City, 2) Pagoh Education Hub, and 3) the Sandakan Education Hub. The Ministry of Higher Education approved and launched the Kuala Lumpur Education City (KLEC) in 2007. However, in discussions with local experts, none knew about its status or viability. Key informants responsible for monitoring education projects under the Economic Transformation Programme confirmed that KLEC is not an active project. At the moment, only Epson College, a British boarding school, is set to open in 2014 as part o KLEC. Pagoh Education Hub is in Northern Johor. So far, a few Malaysian institutions have announced plans to be a part of this hub, which will open in 2015 with a capacity for 16,800 students (Benjamin & Sah, 2011). Sandakan is a city in Sabah, East Malaysia. Its education hub covers 500 hectares and contains only Malaysian institutions at this moment. This hub aims to serve Sabah students first and other Malaysian students next. For these reasons, the discussion here will not include these three nascent education hubs.

164 the research participants were personally involved in drafting parts of these blueprints, while others are responsible for their ongoing implementation.

Launched in 2007 by the Ministry of Higher Education, the National Higher

Education Strategic Plan 2020 (hereby known as the Strategic Plan or NHESP) maps out system-wide goals to be accomplished by 2020. The plan contains seven major thrusts, one of which is internationalization. Education hub occupies a special section under the thrust of internationalization. The Strategic Plan takes a fairly broad view of internationalization:

To enhance competitiveness and to strengthen Malaysia’s position as a global leader, the country needs to adopt and implement practices that are on par with the best practices through intensified internationalization efforts. This thrust aims to make Malaysia an international hub of higher educational excellence through internationalization programmes such as exchange of academicians, students and courses, collaborative research and networking linkages with renowned universities. With these programmes, Malaysia will be able to attract more international students to further their studies in HEIs. At the same time, local students will benefit from the interaction, exposure and exchanging of experiences with their international counterparts. Eventually, they will be more open-minded, competitive and have a global outlook. In addition, the international students will be global ambassadors to uplift the image of Malaysia upon their return to their home countries. (NHESP, 2007, p. 33)

This holistic view recognizes the benefits of internationalization for both local and foreign students as well as the soft power currency of international education when alumni can raise Malaysia’s profile internationally. However, in clarifying the specifics of the education hub, the prospect of revenue generation and the role of private education dominate the discussion:

Private HEIs play a crucial role in the development of the country’s higher education in terms of their contribution towards making Malaysia an international hub of higher educational excellence, providing ample education opportunities, and making substantial savings in foreign exchange. (NHESP, 2007, p. 96)

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At the time, the estimated outflow of foreign exchange due to Malaysian students studying abroad was estimated at RM 7.5 billion annually or over $2 billion US (NHESP,

2007, p. 117). This financial drain overshadowed the RM 1.3 billion that the private education industry was contributing to the national economy each year. By expanding private higher education, policymakers expect to retain more Malaysian students and attract international student simultaneously. The Strategic Plan recommends several strategies to market and promote Malaysian higher education internationally. The recruitment goal is to have international students represent about 10% of total enrollment in higher education institutions by 2020. Without a doubt, the Strategic Plan sees the purpose of the education hub as primarily to generate revenue for the country.

In October 2010, Prime Minister Najib launched the Economic Transformation

Programme (ETP), which outlines the necessary steps for turning Malaysia into a developed country by 2020. The precursor to the ETP is the New Economic Model, a plan released by the government six months earlier to address the challenges and opportunities facing the Malaysian economy. While the New Economic Model offers a blunt assessment of the economy from the macro perspective, the ETP is a work plan with actual implementation strategies and targets. The goal of becoming a developed country by 2020 dates back to 1991 when Prime Minister Mahathir introduced Vision

2020. Common to all these plans, the definition of a “developed nation” is essentially a high-income country based on international benchmarks.33

33 The World Bank defines a high-income country as one with a GNI per capita of at least $12,476 USD (World Bank Data, 2011). Malaysia’s ETP seeks to increase its GNI from USD 6,700 or RM 23,700 in 2009 to more than USD15,000 or RM 48,000 by 2020 (ETP, 2010). Based on ETP’s calculation, Malaysia’s economy must grow 6% each year over the next 10 years to attain this goal.

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To show the seriousness of this plan and differentiate it from countless other national economic plans preceding it, Prime Minister Najib created a new unit within his office to monitor its progress: the Performance Management and Delivery Unit

(PEMANDU). The head of this unit functions as a minister equivalent in the cabinet.

Through extensive consultations with 1,000 professionals and leaders from both the public and private sector, PEMANDU has identified 12 National Key Economic Areas

(NKEAs) that can boost Malaysia’s national income. These 12 areas form the foundation of the Economic Transformation Programme:

1. Oil, Gas and Energy 2. Palm Oil 3. Financial Services 4. Tourism 5. Business Services 6. Electronics and Electrical 7. Wholesale and Retail 8. Education 9. Healthcare 10. Communications Content and Infrastructure 11. Agriculture 12. Greater Kuala Lumpur / Klang Valley

Noticeably, education and healthcare stand out as two social services on a list of mostly private industry sectors.34

34 An NKEA is defined as “a driver of economic activity that has the potential to directly and materially contribute a quantifiable amount of economic growth to the Malaysian economy” (ETP, 2010, p. 12). Eleven are industries while the 12th is a geographic region with high economic potential.

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To understand how the ETP affects Malaysia’s education hub development, one can begin by examining ETP’s vision for education as one of the 12 key industries targeted for expansion:

The focus of the Education NKEA will be on strengthening the private education services sector by increasing private consumption and investments as well as expanding education exports. We envision a rebranding of Malaysia – from a stopover location for education to a major education centre of choice and a pivotal hub in the global education network. We envision a 2020 where education is a big business that delivers significant, widespread and sustained GNI impact, while raising standards and widening access. Only then will Malaysia be able to develop the first-world talent base that it both needs and deserves. (ETP, 2010, p. 40)

This rationale of expanding the education sector as an industry deviates sharply from the holistic view of internationalization as expressed by the Ministry of Higher Education in its Strategic Plan. Public education institutions receive scant attention in the ETP.

Instead the main focus of the ETP is to promote private education, which includes cross-border higher education (e.g., twinning programs and branch campuses). In fact, the government expects that 92% of the funding for the ETP will come from the private sector (ETP, 2010). The state only facilitates the ETP by eliminating bureaucratic barriers and monitoring the progress closely.

Malaysia’s Minister for Higher Education, Mohamed Khaled Nordin, further clarifies the role of private education in this transformation plan:

The Education NKEA focuses on the role of private institutions in leading innovation and driving growth in the industry. We see the private education sector as catalysts for industry transformation, and as indispensable partners in the Government’s efforts to raise quality standards and to create an international higher education brand for Malaysia. (Nordin as cited in ETP, 2010, p. 475)

This view broadly links private education to the attainment of educational excellence in the country. From the 12 NKEAs, the government further identifies 131 projects for

168 implementation. Known as entry-point projects (EPPs), these items are not merely recommendations but rather actual projects that constitute an action plan. The Prime

Minister’s Office monitors these projects closely and holds the respective cabinet minister(s) accountable for each EPP through his/her individual performance reviews

(MY18 and MY19). Among the bewildering 131 projects at the outset of the ETP, 13 are in the education sector. About half of these education projects deal with cross-border higher education (Table 10 lists these relevant projects and their anticipated GNI contribution and job creation). The health sciences education cluster is included here because Southeast Asia has an estimated shortage of 1.2 million healthcare professionals, and Malaysia has “the ability to take a leading role in addressing this shortage” but so far “lacks the scale and industry linkages” (ETP, 2010, p. 493). This explanation indicates talent development at the regional level as a rationale. Scaling up international schools is not a higher education project, but it shows the scope of

Malaysia’s education hub.

Table 10: Relevant Entry Point Projects for Education Hub

Relevant Entry Point Projects for Education Hub 2020 GNI Jobs (RM millions) Scaling up international schools 2,644 10,371

Expanding international distance learning 350 3,920 Building an Islamic finance and business education 1,190 4,365 discipline cluster Building a health sciences education discipline cluster 2,870 11,854

Launching EduCity@ Iskandar 1,016 1,164

Championing Malaysia’s international education brand 2,788 152,672

Source: ETP (2010, p. 48).

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Under the ETP, the education sector’s contribution to the GNI would more than double in about 10 years – from RM 27 billion (2009) to RM 61 billion (2020). A key goal is to increase the enrollment of foreign students from 70,000 to 200,000 in the same period. If successful, the full battery of education projects would create 536,000 new jobs. Astutely, the ETP points out that education ranks first as a sector that can multiply economic activities. As Figure 5 shows, education provides an additive benefit of doubling economic output.

Although the ETP does link a few Figure 5: Education as an Economic Multiplier education projects to talent development and educational capacity, the plan is unmistakably motivated by revenue generation. Specifically, the main objective is to generate income via tuition fees and ancillary services. The Minister of Higher Education has stated, “A foreign student is estimated to spend RM 30,000 annually on his studies here and if there are

150,000 of them, imagine the amount we can earn” (Mohamed Khaled cited in Foreign

Students Will Boost Economy, 2010). The ETP Source: ETP (2010, p. 478). even states that “A comparison of fees at

170 competitor hubs suggests that we can increase our fees for international students by up to 100% and still be competitive, due in large part to our low living costs” (ETP, 2010, p.

499). In fact, ETP’s ambitious plan for education will “require the private education sector to grow six-fold” (ETP, 2010, p. 40) – an ambitious target given Malaysia’s large private education sector today.

Publicly funded education is seemingly incompatible with ETP’s philosophy and irrelevant to the country’s economic transformation. The National Higher Education

Strategic Plan also touts the role of private education in developing the education hub.

This conspicuous division raises two important questions. Is the Malaysian education hub the onus of private education providers while public universities and colleges remain on the sideline? Do policymakers espouse other rationales beyond economic benefits? The following discussion analyzes comments from research participants.

Economic Benefits

In interviews, policymakers affirmed the rationale of economic benefits and specifically the objective of revenue generation through student fees. This rationale is particularly germane to the private education sector. In speaking about the private institutions, one Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) policymaker commented,

Money is the driving proposition because they [private institutions] have to operate on the basis of income and expenditure (MY10, Ministry of Higher Education).

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A former senior administrator at MOHE who participated in drafting the Strategic Plan summed up Malaysia’s education hub candidly:

If you want to make sure the hub is successful, you must start with a business model with revenue. You must be able to generate income for you to re-invest. The marketers must be good. The quality and structure must be good. Your cash flow must be right. So all this cannot be found in the public [system] because public says, “This is our budget. You’re not allowed to do this and that.” You’ve been put in such a situation that you’re more in a compliant system than creative system (MY05, MOHE).

These comments echo the perspectives of many other Malaysian participants. Several participants used business terminology to describe the development of the country as an education hub: marketing, branding, trade of services, sector liberalization, etc. Even more revealing is the admission from one policymaker involved in creating the Strategic

Plan that the chapter on internationalization was written largely with the private education sector in mind rather than public universities. Apparently, not only have policymakers consigned the education hub to the domain of private education, but they have also placed the onus of internationalization on private institutions.

In discussions with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), three policymakers responsible for the service sector also affirmed that the objective behind the education hub is to generate revenue. MITI, a ministry that has historically focused on the trade of manufactured goods, created a unit devoted to the service sector in

2007. This unit supports the education sector as a service industry. In addition to revenue generation, MITI policymakers viewed the education hub as an initiative to stem the outflow of foreign exchange:

I think Malaysian government wants to build education hub so at least we don’t have to send [so many] students overseas. We can have our own Malaysian confidence, our own education hub (MY07, MITI).

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If the education hub is largely a service industry initiative, how do these trade experts compare Malaysia’s education hub initiative to Australia’s high-volume export of higher education? One MITI policymaker found it difficult to distinguish the two countries’ approaches but placed the education sector in the broader context of the Malaysian economy:

Definitely not similar! I think in Australia it’s a natural thing [exporting education]. But I think one of the reasons in making Malaysia into an education hub is to contribute to our GDP. So I wouldn’t really say it’s different, but it’s not the same. I don’t think we expect Malaysia to generate the biggest chunk contribution to GDP through education. We do have other resources like petroleum and other areas (MY06, MITI).

In other words, the education sector is a valuable economic engine flanked by ambitious targets, but it would never become as large as the key industries underpinning

Malaysia. In discussions with these trade experts, it was clear that MITI’s primary interest in higher education is to liberalize the sector in accordance with international norms such as the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). Although the adoption of GATS for higher education is uneven worldwide and heavily criticized by many in the education sector, these MITI participants felt that the economic benefits of liberalization far outweigh the advantages of protectionism – this view is also obvious in the ETP through its embrace of an open marketplace for higher education.

Liberalization would ultimately open the entire higher education system to more foreign students and education providers to truly establish an education hub.

The notion of commercializing research to generate revenue does appear in some Malaysian policy documents (e.g., the Strategic Plan and National Innovation

Strategy 2011), but this is not a rationale for its education hub. Malaysian higher education certainly promotes the knowledge economy just as vigorously as other higher

173 systems around the world. However, in this discourse, Malaysia rarely draws a link between research and internationalization, let alone its education hub initiative.

Research and innovation are largely the responsibility of local universities rather than the foreign institutions that are establishing a presence in Malaysia through collaborative programs and branch campuses. The Strategic Plan goes as far as to caution against too many research partnerships with foreign entities:

To enhance global competitiveness, Malaysia must not rely too much on industrial activities based on research undertakings of foreign commercial organisations. It is therefore critical that Malaysia develops its own indigenous research capability in order to reap the benefits of research. (NHEAP, 2007, p. 37)

Granted, building local research capacity independently and maintaining indigenous integrity are laudable approaches to development. The point here is not that an education hub must include research partnerships but rather that research and internationalization are disparate discourses in Malaysia. No interviewee in Malaysia mentioned research and development in discussions on the rationales for building an education hub. In short, participants view the economic benefits of the national-level education hub as largely coming from student fees.

Talent Development

If the path between education hub and economic benefits is well marked in

Malaysia’s policy landscape, the link between education hub and talent development is very faint, with multiple twists and turns. Like many other developing countries, Malaysia places great emphasis on developing human capital as a strategy to become a developed economy. Following the release of the Strategic Plan, the Ministry of Higher

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Education produced the National Higher Education Action Plan 2007-10 with large sections devoted to human capital development. In this plan, MOHE states explicitly:

Wealth will continue to be created in countries that can develop and attract human capital that is able to generate new knowledge and commercialise it to meet the world’s needs. (NHEAP, 2007, p. 7) The production of human capital is the singular rationale for the existence of all HEIs. All other considerations are subordinate to this imperative. Nations rise and fall on the quality of their human resources and the institutions that produce them. (NHEAP, 2007, p. 14)

This action plan further points out that the country’s human capital development would benefit from foreign infusion:

To improve the R&D output… tighter collaboration and networking must also be extended internationally where appropriate to ensure better outcomes and to attract foreign talent, research opportunities and funding. (NHEAP, 2007, p. 32)

A few years later, the Ministry repeated its call for foreign talent in an implementation plan for developing “innovative human capital,” and the ETP followed suit:

The plan aims to nurture, attract and retain local and global talent in the workforce via a fully capable innovation ecosystem. (MOHE, 2010, p. 1) To address the human capital needs of the various EPPs and business opportunities, the Government will take action to build the capabilities of existing talent in Malaysia, attract foreign talent to work in Malaysia and ease immigration rules to facilitate the entry of foreign talent. (ETP, 2010, p. 45)

In the same year, planners behind the New Economic Model summarized the human capital shortage in Malaysia in blunt terms typical of its recommendations:

Malaysia suffers from an exodus of talent. Not only is our education system failing to deliver the required talent, we have not been able to retain local talent of all races nor attract foreign ones due to poor prospects and a lack of high skilled jobs. (NEAC, 2010, p. 60)

The 10th Malaysia Plan (2011-15) also expounds the need to attract foreign talent particularly in areas in which the country lacks expertise. At face value, these pronouncements suggest that the country could use the education hub as another

175 channel to attract foreign talent. However, foreign individuals and institutions remain at the fringes of the talent development discourse in Malaysia. References to these foreign actors are often very generic. These plans do not explicitly associate talent development with the education hub or internationalization of higher education. In interviews, a few policymakers pointed out that an education hub is valuable for the development of local talent and attracting foreign talent. However, far many more participants expressed deep reservations about recruiting foreign talent to Malaysia. A member of the respected National Economic Action Council, which produced the New

Economic Model that led to the ETP, cautioned against bringing in too much foreign talent:

It is important to look at bringing in foreign talent in the context of the society because we also don’t want to be like in Singapore where you bring in so much foreign talent at the expense of the local people. That would cause other social problems later: resentment and all those things. So it has to be done carefully. We need talent but in specific areas because you have to balance social structure... you cannot upset or change it so much. We train people, and then they’re unemployed. We have to examine why they are unemployed and improve that [situation] rather than bring in foreign talent – well, maybe for a short-term to fill in a gap, but long-term you can’t do that (MY13, National Economic Action Council).

The need to strike a delicate balance between local and foreign talent also surfaced in a discussion with an advisor for MOHE’s strategic planning:

It's true that you need talents. You've got to have this nice balance between local and foreign to get this synergy. You cannot have one outnumbering the other. You can have the locals outnumbering the foreign – it'll still work. But you cannot have the foreign outnumbering the locals. You just cannot in this country (MY14, MOHE Advisor).

In a discussion with one of the architects of the Strategic Plan, a senior policymaker at

MOHE noted United States’ effective strategy of attracting foreign talent by using higher education:

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They [US] can afford to choose the best. So just imagine if most important universities or any big public university continue to do that over the years, of course their contribution towards their society is very big. And in fact some people are very clever; they offer scholarship and so on. Normally they tend to stay there and get permanent residence and so on. So the country tends to benefit in a way. But we have not reached that stage yet (MY03, MOHE).

After several other interviews, it became readily apparent that the discourse on talent in

Malaysia is implicitly about local talent. Concerns over ethnic sensitivities and rising unemployment among local graduates preclude the use of the education hub to attract foreign talent. A senior administrator at a national agency on human resource (HR) provided a vivid metaphor for Malaysia’s pragmatic approach to talent development:

If you’ve got water leaking out of a pipe, what do you do? You can try and fix it, but you’ve got too many leakages. Because you want water coming out to your hands, what you probably do is open the pipe to as maximum as possible so there is as much water flowing out. So at the end when you are at the bucket down there, there is still water left in the bucket. Our strategy, as far as Malaysian talents are concerned, is to produce and to channel as many as possible into the job market (my11, National HR Unit).

This national unit publicly pursues three sources of talent: 1) local Malaysians, 2) overseas Malaysians, and 3) foreigners. Yet in the interviews, it was quite clear that the hierarchy of talent on the national agenda consists of local Malaysians at the top followed by the Malaysian diaspora. Recruiting foreign talent is a distant third priority with limited strategies and fraught with political baggage. In April 2011, the World Bank actually released a comprehensive report on the problem of brain drain in Malaysia, deploring the large exodus of talent from the country (World Bank, 2011). Several

Malaysian participants referred to this report to highlight the problem of brain drain. Yet the same policymaker from the national HR unit also reaffirmed the need to focus on local talent:

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We know that we cannot just focus on the Malaysians who have gone abroad. The April 2011 World Bank Report states that 1.1 million Malaysians have gone abroad and one-third are professionals. Logic tells us that even if you bring back all the 1.1 million Malaysians back, it will not meet the talent requirements of the companies involved in the ETP let alone just the professionals. So we know that we need to retain, nurture and develop talent in this country – Malaysians who are here (my11, National HR Unit).

The objective of attracting talented members of the diaspora back to Malaysia appeared in discussions with a few other research participants. However, this objective does not necessarily rely on initiatives under the education hub or even higher education. In other words, cross-border higher education projects are not designed with the goal of attracting the Malaysian diaspora in mind. Rather, attracting overseas Malaysians to return home is an issue of broader economic development rather than higher education planning.35

Educational Capacity

The rationale of using an education hub to improve educational capacity in

Malaysia is not particularly obvious in policy documents, but several policymakers identify two important objectives in this area. First, by hosting foreign students, many institutions can expose local students to a global perspective. Second, by bringing in foreign students and providers, the entire higher education system can become more

35 As early as 1994, the Malaysian Government started a program to bring back Malaysian scientists and engineers as well as attract foreign researchers (7th Malaysian Plan, 1996). The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation also launched Brain Gain Malaysia in 2006 to attract talent to the country. This program has a noticeable emphasis on recruiting overseas Malaysians with very limited success (my11; Welch, 2013).

178 competitive. Policymakers mentioned the second objective more frequently than the first.

Malaysian policy documents that mention the education hub or foreign students do not usually consider intercultural exposure for local students as an objective despite laying out ambitious recruitment targets for international students. For example, the

National Higher Education Action Plan (2010) devotes considerable attention to the development of human capital. Rather than adopt a narrow view of human capital along the lines of manpower planning, this plan defines human capital very holistically to include the development of moral, spiritual, and interpersonal traits. However, this inclusive view of learning and personal growth surprisingly neglects the development of a global perspective. The plan does mention the value of language skills and student exchanges in passing, but intercultural learning via contacts with foreign students in

Malaysia does not appear anywhere in this plan. While this may be an institutional issue of teaching and learning rather than a national planning issue, interviews with a few institutional leaders also did not reveal internationalization at home as a priority.

In stark contrast to the muted interest in intercultural learning, policymakers expressed a strong interest in using an education hub to increase competition among institutions and students and ultimately elevate the quality of education in the country.

For the education industry, the ETP points out that “private sector participation can also spur competition in the industry, leading to improved processes, more choices for consumers and improved quality” (ETP, 2010, p. 478). Many participants affirmed this view:

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Let’s put it this way, by making Malaysian as an education hub of course we need to elevate ourselves. Domestically we stand to reap that benefit of that elevation, that’s one [reason] (MY03, MOHE).

The rationale at that time for Malaysia giving out so many licenses for private providers was to encourage competition and force providers who are not efficient out of the sector (MY14, Advisor to MOHE).

The belief that an education hub can uplift the quality of education applies to both the public and private education sector (the latter is historically marred by low quality providers and fraudulent practices). Policymakers view the introduction of foreign providers as a healthy and overdue challenge to complacent public universities:

Internationalization is not just about us going out but also getting branch universities to come in, and that goes well with our liberalization policy. When that happens, a lot of private sector or private universities are a bit worried. But the Minister [of Higher Education] is very adamant and steadfast in saying that you guys have to be more competitive here because the branch campuses coming in are not just any Tom, Dick, or Harry. They are Nottingham, Swinburne, Monash, Johns Hopkins… The private sector is worried about competition, but to a certain extent the public sector is also worried because especially for the postgraduate students (MY02, MOHE).

Implicit in this view is that foreign providers offer higher quality programs and perhaps also research opportunities. For some policymakers, competition also comes in the form of high-achieving foreign students, as noted by a policymaker at MOHE who gave the example of a local university he previously worked at:

We [as a university] had students from more than 60 to 70 countries. You have this diverse environment. Then we really, truly have different cultures and a competitive environment – internationally competitive environment in a local university… therefore, you provide that additional aura or environment for local students (MY03, MOHE).

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In this competition, branch campuses may also become conduits of good practices in higher education:

The good thing about having foreign providers, particularly branch campuses, is that it really helps the Ministry [MOHE] to set up a really good framework for higher education in Malaysia in terms of governance issues, best practices, etc. You know, these foreign universities probably set a high bar because they’ve been in the business for so long. I think they were hoping that with all these competitions, students will start thinking if they can afford to shift to [attend] private universities. And over time, this would be a wake-up call to public universities (MY19, Office of the Prime Minister).

Overall, the rationale of educational capacity in the case of Malaysia translates largely into the objective of increasing systemic competition by introducing foreign institutions and students.

EduCity Iskandar

In addition to Malaysia’s national effort to become an education hub, a separate initiative is also in place to build an education city. Iskandar is a large regional development project located in Johor, the southernmost state of Malaysia. Johor is important economically and geographically given its large size, access to sea routes, and proximity to both Indonesia and Singapore; the latter is only a short drive away across the Straits of Johor. Johor figures prominently in the national psyche given that its dialect is the basis for the national languages of Malaysia and Indonesia. Johor also gave rise to the political party UMNO, which has ruled Malaysia since its independence.

In 2005, the federal government asked its national investment arm, Khazanah Nasional

Berhad, to conduct a feasibility study on the prospects of South Johor as a special

181 economic zone.36 This study produced the Comprehensive Development Plan (CDP) to address “socio-economic development in a holistic and sustainable fashion” (Khazanah,

2006). Under the Ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-10), the government then allocated RM 4.3 billion (USD $1.4 billion) for the development of South Johor Economic Region

(Khazanah, 2006). The CDP identifies nine pillars of the economy for this region to cultivate (including educational services). The region later adopted a new name:

Iskandar Malaysia. According to its slogan, Iskandar Malaysia aims to become “the choice destination for global citizens to invest, work, live and play” (IRDA, 2011, p. 18).

Covering 2,217 square kilometers, Iskandar Malaysia is more than three times the size of Singapore. It is divided into five flagship zones for development. Developers are building or expanding higher education institutions in at least three of the zones.

However, only EduCity Iskandar (Zone B: Nusajaya) exhibits a noticeable international dimension involving foreign students and providers. In another zone, Bandar Seri Alam is also aiming to become an education hub under the branding “City of Knowledge.”

However, so far the institutions are mostly local Malaysian providers with the exception of two international schools. Although some higher education institutions at Seri Alam host a high percentage of international students (e.g., 30%) and offer twinning programs with foreign universities, it is unclear at the moment if cross-border higher education is a key component of its plan. On the other hand, EduCity Iskandar has numerous foreign

36 Khazanah is essentially a sovereign fund like Temasek Holdings in Singapore. Khazanah has stakes in more than 50 companies with a net asset value of US$ 28 billion as of December 2012 (Khazanah, 2013).

182 providers and a slightly longer history. Therefore, Iskandar is the primary focus of the discussion here.37

Figure 6: Iskandar Malaysia

EduCity Iskandar is in Zone B. Bandar Seri Alam, the City of Knowledge is in Zone D. Source: Iskandar Investment Bhd. Corporate Brochure (2009)

Khazanah is the de facto proprietor of EduCity Iskandar though its majority ownership of Iskandar Investment, a corporation which oversees and promotes the

37 In Iskandar Malaysia’s publications, Bandar Dato Onn (in Zone A) appears as another “education node” equivalent to EduCity Iskandar and Bandar Seri Alam. Currently, Bandar Dato Onn only has two institutions; both are local Malaysian colleges. Two institutions do not qualify as an education hub in this study.

183 development of the region. The original plan for this education hub allotted 1.2 square kilometer (300 acres), but this has since doubled. Currently, the following foreign higher education institutions have moved in or will be moving into EduCity:

• Newcastle University Medicine Malaysia (UK) • University of Southampton (UK) • University of Reading (UK) • Netherlands Maritime Institute of Technology (Holland) • Johan Cruyff Institute for Sports Studies (Holland) • Raffles University (Singapore) • Management Development Institute of Singapore (Singapore)

Four universities are scheduled to open in 2013 and accept 4,000 students (IRDA,

2011). EduCity provides common facilities (e.g., library, sports complex, dormitories) to reduce the capital cost and space required by each institution. Iskandar Malaysia also provides tax incentives to both institutions and employees to facilitate the growth of this economic zone. Once fully completed, EduCity will accommodate up to 16,000 students. Authorities expect that EduCity will require ten years to build (2008-18).

In policy documents from Khazanah and Iskandar Investment, the focus on educational services echoes the views of national policymakers who view higher education as a service industry to generate revenue and act as an economic multiplier

(see Khazanah’s Comprehensive Development Plan, 2006, and Iskandar Regional

Development Authority’s Invest Education report, 2011). The reliance on private education is also evident in Iskandar Malaysia’s plans. After all, EduCity Iskandar is one of the projects prioritized by the federal government’s Economic Transformation

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Programme. Therefore, the discussion here will not repeat these economic rationales from Iskandar policy documents because they mirror the larger discourse on the national education hub. Comments from Iskandar policymakers also affirmed the rationale of economic benefits. More specifically, these policymakers value the education sector more for its potent strength as an economic multiplier than its ability to generate revenue based on student fees:

At the end of the day for education, you would look at the economic benefit of it. So on one hand, yes, this is a national agenda but you have to make money, right? Money is maybe not from here [EduCity], but from around it. They [government] may not agree with me, but I would look at it this way (MY22, Regional Development Authority).

According to Iskandar Investment, catalytic projects such as EduCity can attract complementary businesses and investment: “The multiplier effect created results in a virtuous circle of exponential population and business growth which other developers and investors can tap into for their own projects’ success” (Iskandar Investment, 2012).

Interestingly, land developers are spearheading some of these education initiatives rather than the government or education actors. MY22 pointed out that EduCity did not purposely seek out Newcastle University as a potential tenant. Rather, a land developer initiated the negotiations to bring this British institution to Malaysia. For Bandar Seri

Alam, the City of Knowledge, the role of land developers is even more striking. Unlike

EduCity, which is devoted to education, Bandar Seri Alam contains a mixture of both commercial and residential land – all owned by a single land developer (UM Land).

When asked if Bandar Seri Alam is leveraging an education hub for gains in the real estate market, regional policymakers replied:

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It is sort of an indirect link. Once you have students coming in, there will be different businesses that follow. For example, photocopy places, small grocery stores, student cafes, etc. So you develop the ecosystem because otherwise your housing real estate will be like us leaving our houses at 8 AM and coming home at 6 PM, so in between nothing [empty neighbourhood]. But students will create that ecosystem. Normally if you look at the economic multiplier, it’s 2.19... Like I said, because of the multiplier, so land developers like Bandar Seri Alam and other ones want to create that ambience (MY22, Regional Development Authority).

That [real estate market] is Bandar Seri Alam’s objective because UM Land is profit oriented. They have seen the spillovers from Damansara and Subang Jaya – all these places were first filled by education institutions and later the rest of the development just flourished! 38 (MY23, Regional Development Authority)

The implicit objective of using an education hub to raise the value of real estate in

Bandar Seri Alam has also appeared in media reports (Nayagam, 2011; Cheng, 2013).

Beyond revenue generation, the more pertinent question regarding Iskandar is whether or not its planners have other motives for constructing all these education cities. Is Iskandar merely reflecting the national discourse on education hub development? Developments at EduCity do exhibit differences from the national effort.

Namely, the objective of talent development is a strong element of this economic zone.

Iskandar Regional Development Authority (IRDA) identifies two clear objectives for building EduCity (IRDA, 2013):

38 Damansara is an affluent township in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. It is known as a commercial hub. Subang Jaya is a suburb located 25 km outside Kuala Lumpur. It is widely known for its concentration of education institutions ranging from primary to tertiary education as well as international schools. For tertiary education, Subang Jaya houses well-known private Malaysian institutions such as Taylors University, INTI College, and Sunway University. It also houses the branch campus of Monash University, Australia.

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• To create a best-in-class higher education destination, with a superior urban environment to attract academic institutions, students and visitors to work, live, study and play.

• To provide a feeder system for the economic pillars of Iskandar Malaysia and contribute to the nation’s aspiration to become a regional hub for education.

In discussions with Iskandar planners, this feeder system is first and foremost about producing talent to sustain the economic zone’s nine economic pillars rather than for the country at large. The success of these nine pillars requires a substantial number of skilled professionals (e.g., medical doctors, nurses, petrochemical engineers, multimedia designers). Graduates from a film program and hospitality program could find employment in the nearby Pinewood Iskandar Malaysia Studio and Legoland

Malaysia Theme Park, respectively. From the view of Iskandar planners, talent comes in the form of both local and foreign students and faculty members. Unlike the lukewarm interest in recruiting foreign talent among national level policymakers, Iskandar actively promotes itself as a place for expatriates to work, live, and play. Through tax incentives and other employment benefits, the zone can provide greater flexibility in hiring expatriates than the rest of the country (IRDA, 2011). In fact, foreign enterprises that operate in Iskandar are exempt from affirmative action policies that require them to partner with a Malay entity (Grant, 2013). The CDP advises at the outset of planning for

Iskandar:

A liberal policy with respect to foreign skilled and professional workers needs to be adopted. Critical gaps that have appeared and shall appear in the local supply must be quickly filled by the importation of foreign skills and expertise. (Khazanah, 2006, ch4, p.13)

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The following comment from a regional policymaker illustrates openness toward foreign talent:

A nation who wants real talent to be in their country you have no choice but to open up and let foreign talent to come in. That’s what happens in Singapore. That’s what happens in the US. Most developed nations, if you look at their histories, there are a lot of immigrant families (MY23, Regional Development Authority).

At the heart of the Iskandar vision is a self-sustaining ecosystem of specialized education and training programs coupled to the nine pillars of the economic zone

(IRDA, 2011). One policymaker explained the region’s slogan of “work, live, and play” in simple terms:

As regional planners, our primary goal is to drive investment here. So we want to bring in quality investment into Iskandar Malaysia so we will grow the income. So when people graduate and if there are opportunities here, why go away?... It is an investment opportunity as well as a way to provide the workforce – the good talent (MY22, Regional Development Authority).

In essence, EduCity Iskandar seeks both economic benefits as well as talent development.

In summary, Malaysia’s education hub development exhibits a strong orientation toward the rationales of economic benefits and educational capacity. There is a high level of policy coherence and consensus among policymakers. On the economic front, revenue generation through student fees is a dominant objective as the country continues to expand its private education sector and import transnational programs and providers. This objective has persisted since the late 1990s. In addition, policymakers today aim to leverage education as an economic multiplier to generate more jobs and industry growth elsewhere. They anticipate a ripple effect that will expand ancillary services nation-wide for students and benefit real estate development especially in

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Iskandar. On the educational front, policymakers strongly believe that the rising number of foreign providers and students in the country will also spur systemic competition and therefore elevate the overall quality of education in the country (i.e., competition begets quality). Compared to the early years of Malaysia’s education hub development, the objectives of economic multiplication and systemic competition generate far more interest among policymakers today than in the past. Finally, the objective of recruiting foreign talent is not evident in Malaysia despite the recognition that brain drain continues to impede national development. The discourse on talent in Malaysia is still largely about local talent and disconnected from the education hub. However, EduCity

Iskandar provides a glimmer of hope in aligning policy with practice as it cultivates local talent and pursues foreign talent simultaneously.

Singapore

After Singapore launched its campaign to recruit world-class universities in 1998 and the Global Schoolhouse initiative in 2003, no further policy document has emerged to shed light on the direction or progress of its education hub. The idea of Singapore as an education hub gained widespread media attention between 2000 and 2005 followed by several research studies, but references to “education hub” seldom appear in public discourse in Singapore today or even in its higher education policies. One may wonder if the education hub initiative is still alive in Singapore. Is the lack of visibility a retraction from an ambitious plan, a sign of wavering political interest, or even a silent admission

189 of policy failure? When viewed in the context of Singapore’s history, which is replete with public policies underpinned by extensive research, ambition, tenacity, and long- term visioning, its education hub initiative is hardly a matter of impulse or fancy. The number of cross-border higher education initiatives in Singapore continues to rise unabated, with new programs, institutions, and partnerships emerging each year. The impassioned views of the research participants in this study also attest to the country’s commitment to the education hub initiative. Therefore, it is important not to underestimate Singapore’s education hub initiative due to the lack of a policy trail – particularly so in a country where the policymaking process is not readily accessible to members of the public. At the same time, it is also paramount not to assume that

Singapore’s rationales for developing an education hub have remained static since the late 1990s when the initiative was first launched. Relying on historical documents to understand Singapore’s motives for developing an education hub would ignore the agency of policymakers and the constant flux in higher education development.

Economic Benefits

Singapore’s education hub initiative began largely as a project to ensure economic resilience in the face of a competitive global economy. The country’s lack of land and other natural resources amplify the pressure to recalibrate its economy periodically to sustain growth. In launching the Global Schoolhouse in 2003, the

Economic Development Board (EDB) and Economic Review Committee clearly presented education as a promising service industry that can strengthen the service portfolio of the city-state. Generating revenue through the provision of education is still

190 an important objective to Singapore today as confirmed by research participants and ongoing initiatives that support the private education industry. As one senior member of a private institution said, “Of course, for private institutions it’s revenue generation, as well. We’re doing very well (SG06, Chancellor of a Private University).”

For many years, the Singapore Tourism Board was actively promoting

Singapore’s brand of education to foreign students in international venues. While organizational changes have recently removed this task from the board’s work, the government continues to support the private education sector as a service industry. For example, SPRING Singapore, a government agency dedicated to cultivating

Singapore’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs), recently awarded the Association of

Private Schools and Colleges a grant of $1.8 million SGD. This grant will promote the association’s member institutions internationally and train its administrators over the course of two years.39 Large private education providers such as Raffles and MDIS also continue to operate in Singapore and expand operations overseas.

While many cross-border education experts view revenue generation as a short- term goal, Singaporean policymakers offer a more astute view of the sector. In an interview with a business leader who was also a member of the 2009 Economic

Strategies Committee, the promise of education as an industry remains a strong incentive for building an education hub:

One of the unique things about education is by its nature it keeps growing. So if

39 From discussions with officials from the Association of Private Schools and Colleges.

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you can get the right kind of educational institution to set itself up, then, in theory, it could last forever because built into it is its constant re-definition. If you’re making a physical product, it doesn’t work that way (SG20, Member of the 2009 Economic Strategies Committee).

Interestingly, this perspective deems higher education not as a public or private good, as widely debated in many parts of the world, but as a renewable good akin to a sustainable energy source worthy of investment. A director of the international office at a local polytechnic also echoed this view in succinct terms even though all polytechnics in Singapore are public institutions subject to government quotas on international student enrollment:

The official rationales are about revenue generation for the economy using education. Education is a sector with potential for growth, and it has no downturns. It is recession-proof (sg19, Polytechnic).

These views demonstrate tremendous faith in education as a revenue generating industry. In a discussion with a former cabinet minister with an intimate knowledge of country’s higher education, the person summed up Singapore’s education hub initiative as the brainchild of a former deputy prime minister and chairman of the Economic

Development Board: “One likes to spend money, and the other likes to make money for

Singapore!”40 Although revenue generation is still germane to Singapore today, not many policymakers identified it as a key objective for the education hub initiative. In fact, a former senior official of the EDB responsible for the Global Schoolhouse initiative dismissed revenue generation as an impetus. Compared to the case of Australia exporting its higher education, this policymaker replied:

40 Tony Tan, the former deputy prime minister, is now the current President of Singapore. Philip Yeo, the former chairman of the Economic Development Board, is now the chairman of SPRING Singapore.

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In Australia, the foreign students subsidize the locals. We don’t need the foreign students to subsidize our locals. Australia needs the money to run institutions. We have a healthy budget. We don’t need this. Now, will we end up like Australia one day? Maybe. Who knows? (SG13, former EDB policymaker)

This comment reveals a different view at the heart of education hub planning and suggests that policy objectives have changed over time since the Global Schoolhouse was first launched. Presently, Singapore’s modest tuition fees and generous bonded scholarships for international students enrolled in its public universities challenge the conventional wisdom that revenue generation drives the development of all education hubs.

Commercialization of Research Innovations

Beyond the provision of education, many Singaporean participants spoke about research and the imperative for the country to become a place for innovation and knowledge production. The idea of Singapore moving up the “value chain” of economic output using knowledge and innovation dates back to the 1990s when it realized that rising production costs would ultimately price the country out of competition compared to low-cost centres such as China and India. In the Budget Speech of 2006, Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong identified research and development as a top priority in restructuring Singapore’s economy:

We must become a knowledge hub in Asia. Innovation, enterprise, and R&D will increasingly be the new sources of our growth. We are strengthening R&D efforts in the universities, research institutes, and industry… R&D is the foundation upon which we will build Singapore’s competitiveness. Just as investment in education builds up our human capital, so will investment in R&D build up our intellectual and knowledge capital base. (Lee, 2006)

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Interestingly, when asked about the rationale(s) driving the development of its education hub, numerous Singaporean policymakers prefaced their answers with a long historical review of the country’s economic development: moving from a labor-intensive economy in the 1960s, to skill-intensive and capital-intensive in the 1970s-80s, then to technology-intensive in the 1990s, and finally knowledge-intensive starting in the 2000s

(A*STAR, 2011). Attempts to interrupt these historical reviews of macroeconomics during interviews were futile because these policymakers insisted on establishing an understanding of Singapore’s economic trajectory before they could properly explain the intensity of research and development today. This pattern of answering speaks volumes about the economic rationality of Singapore as an education hub as well as the role of context in educational developments. However, what exactly do Singaporean policymakers mean by knowledge and innovation? What kind of knowledge do they hope to produce and for what purposes? To explore these questions, several interviews were conducted with policymakers from agencies that promote concepts such as knowledge production, knowledge economy, and innovation. More than promotion, some of these policymakers coordinate and fund initiatives that produce knowledge.

In an interview with the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS), a policymaker explained the role of knowledge in the context of Singapore:

Knowledge is something that we can scale [up], and scale is important for us to reach beyond our size. We are obviously being constrained now by not only land but also the number of people. We believe that knowledge will help us get to a better tomorrow – more than what [we can achieve with] the natural resources that we have inherited (sg12, IPOS).

This comment reflects the appeal of knowledge as a commodity that can overcome the limitations of geography and population size (a normative view shared by many other

194 jurisdictions worldwide not only among small countries). In the case of Singapore, these limitations are more acute because they have persisted since the country’s independence in 1965. If anything, land constraints and a declining birthrate have heightened the anxiety among policymakers in recent years as economic growth becomes more difficult to attain. How else do Singaporeans view knowledge and innovation in light of its education hub development?

At the heart of Singapore’s drive toward knowledge and innovation is the Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR), which funds and coordinates research on behalf of the government. This agency is the equivalent of the U.S.

National Institutes of Health or a national ministry of science in other jurisdictions.

A*STAR facilitates many research partnerships between Singaporean institutions and foreign institutions and scientists. Its own research institutes also have significant links with foreign institutions. More revealing, in the hierarchy of Singapore’s national administrative structure, A*STAR is a unit housed under the Ministry of Trade and

Industry (MTI). Two major policy documents currently guide the country’s research and development agenda: Research, Innovation, and Enterprise 2015 (RIE2015) and the

Science, Technology & Enterprise Plan 2015 (STEP2015).41 These two complementary blueprints emphasize the commercialization of research as an imperative for

Singapore’s future. Characteristic of the city-state’s ambition, both blueprints boldly state that the goal is to turn Singapore into “Asia’s Innovation Capital.” STEP2015 also

41 The Research Innovation and Enterprise Secretariat of the Ministry of Trade and Industry released RIE2015 in 2010 to provide a broad overview. A*STAR released STEP2015 a year later with details on strategies and programs. Both blueprints cover the period 2011-15.

195 highlights the involvement of the EDB as an economic agency in ensuring the success of this research and development plan. In A*STAR policy documents, it is clear that research for the purpose of commercialization is the overarching goal behind the agency’s work. The comments below from a director at A*STAR and a former director at

EDB clarify this goal:

The whole journey into the knowledge-based economy is a continuum of what we have to do – Singapore’s development. If we don’t do it, we will not be able to position ourselves against Shanghai and Bangalore… Education is just the basis. The next stage is what can we get more out of it. It’s really about people who can innovate, giving them tools to innovate, but we must also think of platforms by which this can be demonstrated on… If you just train people to be clever, clever can’t produce anything (SG04, Director at A*STAR).

If you want to make something that makes a difference, how do you do it? I want to see [us] building that kind of hub because, you know, everybody can do research. You can’t beat China and India in research. No Western country can. They can pump out more PhDs than you have university students. You can’t beat volume. Neither can we. We’re tiny. But when you can have labs with people from all over the world, coupled with companies from all over the world matching the supply and the demand and needs for what you need and then using Singapore as a business hub to productize and sell it – that’s the name of the game… Novelty and innovation in itself is a nice thing, but it’s fluffy. I’d like to see something come out of it that makes money, but not only for money’s sake but makes money so they can then create jobs, build businesses, and make a difference (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

These utilitarian views of knowledge and innovation was repeated many times by other

A*STAR interviewees as well as the two aforementioned blueprints. Innovation for the sake of advancing knowledge or intellectual enlightenment is utterly inadequate from the perspective of Singaporean policymakers. Unless an idea can be translated into a product or process with commercial potential and employment opportunities, knowledge remains esoteric. It is by no small coincidence that the term “enterprise” repeatedly latches onto the heels of “research” and “innovation” throughout both blueprints as a reminder of the ultimate purpose of knowledge production. In an interview with a foreign

196 scientist leading a research institute in Singapore, this researcher draws from both insider and outsider knowledge:

What “Asia’s Innovation Capital” means for Singapore is that they will generate new intellectual property (IP) which will bring revenue into the country – if you think about innovation as valuable IP. Singapore is very commercially driven. We call it Singapore Inc… The rationales are economic benefits, but this can be many things. They can be straight IP, they can be licensed, they can be devices or products or things that are made. It can be a better standard of healthcare, which obviously will have economic benefit for the country. So there are many different levels that can come in, but ultimately it’s economic benefit for the country (sg09, Senior Scientist).

Clearly, Singapore’s relentless drive toward knowledge and innovation falls under the overarching rationale of economic benefits. To add to this comment, innovation is not only about inventing new products but also about refining workflow processes to increase productivity, which is a major plank in Singapore Government’s policies today.

Comments from the two policymakers below identify a new juncture in Singapore’s thinking on economic growth by using innovations in workflow:

At the moment, the government strategy is productivity, innovation, and entrepreneurship. Whereas in the last 10-15 years, the focus has been to get the world’s best companies to have a footprint in Singapore and also to ensure that we don’t completely abandon manufacturing. So manufacturing is still 22% of our GDP (SG17, EDB Board Member).

The issue facing Singapore now is productivity. You can’t improve productivity because you make the same thing over and over again. You could make the product, bring in low labor, and produce it. Rather than trying to figure out a new way to make it, they just brought in more people. So that whole scheme caused the problem (SG20, Member of the 2009 Economic Strategies Committee).

Agencies such as SPRING are actively pushing local enterprises to embrace the culture of research and adopt new processes that will increase productivity. Behind this movement toward innovation of workflow and productivity is the intent to reduce

Singapore’s reliance on foreign labor. In fact, the government provides companies with

197 financial incentives to spur innovations that improve productivity and reduce the number of foreign workers. SPRING provides several grants to support these initiatives:

We give out money to encourage fundamental shifts in how you do things. If you have an idea that raises productivity, we are very interested in funding your idea (SG15, SPRING).

Unequivocally, knowledge and innovation in the Singaporean discourse is about accruing economic benefits. While revenue generation via student fees may not be relevant to well-funded public universities, this objective remains relevant to the private education sector today just as in the late 1990s when Singapore launched its education hub. More importantly, revenue generation via research and development has emerged as an equally strong if not a stronger objective in Singapore’s education hub. Public universities are aggressively pursuing research partnerships with foreign universities and multinational companies. Many of these partnerships seek to commercialize research innovations. Some of these innovations improve productivity through changes in manufacturing processes. These partnerships represent another dimension of the economic rationale of an education hub. RIE2015 and STEP2015 are not merely blueprints for scientific inquiry or research and development. Instead, they are inherently economic development plans that meld scientific ambition with economic rationality. The role of the Economic Development Board in shaping Singapore’s research agenda cannot be underestimated.

The objective of leveraging the education hub as an economic multiplier in

Singapore is more about foreign investment rather than revenue generation through ancillary services for international students. While virtually no Singaporean interviewee spoke about generating investment as an objective of its education hub, it is apparent

198 that foreign direct investment is flowing into Singapore as the country continually seeks out research partnerships with both foreign universities and multinational corporations

(Normile, 2007; A*STAR, 2011). An A*STAR policymaker also explained his agency’s relationship with EDB in the following manner:

We are sister agencies. We both report to the same Minister of Trade & Industry. So our job is to attract foreign direct investment to Singapore (SG04, A*STAR).

Even though the Singaporean government generously funds international research collaborations, the foreign partner must also invest capital in the city-state. These investments may be in the form of research funding, infrastructure, or personnel. The financial details of these partnerships are often sealed in confidentiality agreements – this may also explain why investment did not appear as a theme in interviews. However, reports touting the investments made by the foreign partner in these joint ventures are common (Lim, 2010; A*STAR, 2011). Recent examples of foreign companies setting up research operations in Singapore include Proctor & Gamble, L’Oreal, Roche, Eli Lilly,

Exxon, and Novartis. Investment constitutes a form of economic multiplier

(infrastructure, jobs, etc.).

Talent Development

Central to Singapore’s meteoric rise as a developed nation has been its assiduous cultivation of human capital to compensate for the lack of natural resources.

Manpower planning for the purpose of economic growth has been at the fore of this cultivation. However, there are also indications that the country is beginning to take a broader view of talent development beyond the narrow confines of economic dictates.

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Through discussions with policymakers across different sectors, talent development emerged as a fundamental rationale driving its education hub initiative. From their view, an education hub must develop human talent for the country even if it falls short of meeting other objectives. Talent in their conception is all encompassing: local talent, foreign talent, and diasporic talent. In a long discussion about policy rationales with a former EDB policymaker responsible for the Global Schoolhouse, the person summed up Singapore’s approach today:

So your question: how relevant is the [education hub] strategy? It’s still core. And what do we call it? We call it talent strategy (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

More than anything else, talent development is the most enduring rationale behind

Singapore’s education hub. The comments below from research participants illustrate the different objectives under this rationale.

For many Singaporean policymakers, an education hub’s foremost responsibility is to serve the local population and cultivate local talent before it can even consider talent from elsewhere. The use of public funds to build an education hub demands that it at least supports the aspirations of local students. There appears to be two different perspectives on developing local talent. One perspective is rooted in human capital theory whereby education and training are for the purpose of meeting the needs of a profession or economy. Another perspective is broader in conception whereby talent development is to support human potential at its fullest. In the case of Singapore, human capital theory dominates given the country’s pragmatic approach to national development. In response to the question on policy rationale, a board member of the

Association of Private Schools and Colleges answered, “Quite simply, we want to leverage on our global reputation of our education system and our national pursuit of

200 talent and human development” (sg10, APSC). In A*STAR’s drive to turn Singapore into

“Asia’s Innovation Capital,” senior management recognizes that the lack of human capital may be the crux of this initiative:

If you want to build a knowledge base, you’re talking about high tech research, basic science, and biomedical research. But where are the people? Where are the PhDs? So it’s a whole ecosystem that has to transform itself (SG04, Director at A*STAR).

More specifically, the same policymaker prioritized the development of local talent as

Singapore continues to expand links with foreign universities and corporations:

We have to work closely with EDB, anticipate who [which companies] is coming and therefore train and provide opportunities for collaborative research for companies so when they come to Singapore to set up an R&D center, they have people to hire from the ecosystem instead of hiring everyone from overseas (SG04, Director at A*STAR).

An example of a foreign company setting up a research operation in Singapore is

Proctor and Gamble, which is building its Singapore Innovation Centre in Biopolis. In mentioning this example, SG04 commented, “It’ll house 500 staff, and they will focus on skin biology for Asian skin. If we didn’t know they were coming, and we don’t train people who understand skin biology, where would they hire from?” To illustrate the importance of developing human capital, two policymakers went as far as to prioritize job creation over the pursuit of research and innovation:

Can we make sure people who live in Singapore have good jobs going forward? For all the innovation and all that in the world needed to translate it, [without jobs] otherwise forget it. I’m not trying to make Emily [an intern] into a billionaire. I want to let her children and family have a good life. And to do that, you need a good job (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

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A*STAR’s mandate is to generate jobs. Our mandate is not to generate start-ups. Let me be very clear. Start-ups, if they happen, it’s serendipitous. If it happens then it happens. But we are not an entity to incubate companies or create a lot of IPs – to commercialize, that’s one of the many things we do but not the only thing we do. Commercialization is the responsibility of the whole ecosystem including the tech transfer offices at universities, venture capitalists, SPRING… (SG04, Director at A*STAR).

These pragmatic views place job creation at the heart of two agencies whose policy documents and activities might suggest otherwise. From the outside, the EDB is mainly about attracting foreign investment while A*STAR is mainly about funding research and translating innovations into profits. However, these two policymakers clarified that job creation is equally important if not more important than any other objective suggested by their agencies’ public image. A closer examination of Singapore’s discourse on research and innovation reveals the following statement from Prime Minister Lee in

2010:

Singapore’s long-term aim is to be among the most research intensive, innovative and entrepreneurial economies in the world in order to create high value jobs and prosperity for Singaporeans. (Lee, 2010)

In addition, A*STAR’s webpage introduces itself as an agency that “strives to help

Singapore develop into a world-class scientific research hub by building up three types of capital: human, intellectual and industrial” (A*STAR, 2013). According to A*STAR, human capital fulfills manpower needs while intellectual capital increases research capacity and drives innovation. Industrial capital stems from commercialization via industry engagement. In essence, talent development dominates A*STAR’s work (i.e., generating human capital and intellectual capital).

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While talent development is linked mostly to economic rationality in Singapore, there are also signs that policymakers are beginning to adopt a broader view of talent. A few policymakers expressed unconditional support for young Singaporeans’ development even if the process is not aligned with economic needs. Many of the initiatives launched by the Ministry of Education in the last few years aim to cultivate traits such as creativity, morality, and critical thinking. In the area of higher education,

MOE’s main policy initiative at the moment is to create diverse pathways to support the aspirations of young Singaporeans rather than present university education as the only route to success. Polytechnics, vocational institutes, and fine arts schools receive significant promotion as well. This inclusive view is evident even in cross-border education. In private discussions with senior administrators at the new Singapore

University of Technology and Design (established with MIT’s assistance) and the new

Yale-NUS liberal arts college, they expressed deep concerns about their ability to support the diverse aspirations of young Singaporeans in the face of social and economic changes. The focus of these discussions was not about international students or economic growth but rather curriculum innovations and transformative education to cultivate local talent.

The objective of building an education hub to stem brain drain is not relevant to

Singapore even though there are speculations that this may be a factor given the country’s declining birthrate. No research participant mentioned brain drain as a

203 concern. In fact, a former EDB policymaker corrected this misconception when speaking about foreign delegations visiting Singapore to learn about its education hub:

So many countries came to study this [our education hub development]. I have delegations of Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Africans… coming to try and learn this. And the Korean one was the most interesting because I recognized within the first 5 minutes of the discussion that they wanted to do this to prevent the Koreans from going overseas. They’re trying to stem the brain drain. That’s not a rationale for Singapore. We want our students to go overseas! (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

In the Budget Speech of 2006, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reminded the country that the success of Singapore as a knowledge centre ultimately requires an influx of foreign talent as is the case with many Singaporean initiatives, “To become a knowledge hub and a centre for enterprise, we must continue to attract global talent”

(Lee, 2006). At the highest level of leadership, Singapore is fully aware of the global competition for talent and the need to constantly re-assess its recruitment strategy as noted by a board member of the EDB:

I remember having this lunch with the Prime Minister and other very senior people, and we were asked, as global organizations, “Are you finding it easy to get talent? What are the issues?” And I was asked, “So how do countries like Australia and Canada attract talent? They seem to be more successful than Singapore.” This was 2005/2006. Singapore decided, “No, we have to step up our game.” We must become much more friendly towards attracting talent. And it has to be a holistic approach. It has to get people to come and study here, come and work here, come and live here, and live and work (SG17, EDB Board Member).

For several policymakers in Singapore, using an education hub to attract foreign talent is a key objective enmeshed with the country’s immigration policy. This objective cuts across the different sectors represented by the research participants. An education hub is essentially another platform for Singapore to bring in foreign skilled labor. At the most basic level is the recruitment of international students as potential immigrants.

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According to SG13 (a former EDB policymaker), if Singapore were only interested in serving local students, then an expansion of the local universities would suffice rather than building an education hub with foreign providers. Even a senior leader of a private university viewed international students beyond the tuition fees they bring in:

In Australia it’s really about earning foreign exchange. For us, we have a dual role. We earn foreign exchange, as well as, increase the talent pool. Our thinking has always been “we hope they stay” (SG06, Chancellor, Private University).

Combining studying and working in Singapore is a logical choice for many international students given the country’s high standard of living and the promises of social mobility in a meritocratic system that is well maintained by the government. By subsidizing the education of international students in public universities, the government also expects a return on its investment. The use of bonded scholarships formalizes this process for many international students (i.e., student contractually agrees to work in Singapore for three or more years after graduation). As Singapore builds its reputation and capacity in higher education, growing interests from international students also allows the country to become more selective in admitting students. The following comment refers to a recent study that estimated the foreign demand for education in Singapore:

We would get something like another 3+ million of these highly educated young international talents [if we open our borders according to the research study]. Of course, we couldn’t absorb that many. But the point is, we can afford to be choosey. We can afford to choose and choose people who will fit, align and be the best at things… Make sure there’s a good mix of people. So why do we want all this talent and all that? Well, probably because we knew that we couldn’t fill every type of area and commit to every area. Number two, the companies we attract, the industries we build, are incredibly diverse (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

For many international students who accept bonded scholarships, most end up staying in Singapore permanently (Singapore Parliament, 2012). Additionally, many

205 international students who complete their undergraduate education in Singapore continue on with graduate studies in the country. Some of these students immigrate to

Singapore because some A*STAR scholarships for graduate education are only open to

Singaporean citizens. As one A*STAR scientist said, “So if you are not a Singaporean national, you have to convert to take up Singaporean citizenship to get one of those

[scholarships]. Many young kids are happy to do that if they are living in Singapore”

(sg09).

In addition to international students, attracting foreign talent is also about recruiting skilled professionals such as scientists and business executives. A*STAR actively recruits top foreign scientists to lead Singapore’s research agenda. These eminent scientists are known as “whales” for their ability to attract research partners, post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and funding from around the world. In essence, the “whales” are catalysts that can build a critical mass of researchers. For many policymakers, relying merely on local talent for Singapore’s science and technology sector is simply not an option. The following comment from a senior administrator at the Singapore University of Technology and Design illustrates this view:

If we develop our S&T using strictly local talent and expertise, we will become like Japan. We do not want to take that route. It is too insular. Ultimately, these whales may end up leaving Singapore, but we do hope they will stay. It is important that we do not develop a reputation where people come and leave within 2-3 years. It’s not just about getting them here but also about creating an environment for them to stay (sg16, SUTD).

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More specifically, the pursuit of science by its very nature is borderless and collaborative according to one A*STAR scientist:

If you really want to be at the cutting edge, it’s absolutely essential to bring in foreign talent. There’s no good institute anywhere in the world which is totally one nationality. As a scientist, you need to be thinking outside the box. You need to be thinking laterally and mixing ideas all the time. And if you have a research community which is only built up of your immediate national group, then I think that restricts its creativity, almost by definition (sg09, Foreign Senior Scientist).

A few research participants mentioned the chronic shortage of engineers in Singapore.

The higher education system is not producing enough engineers to meet the demands of the economy (SG06). Many Singaporean students are also not interested in engineering as a career (sg07). Therefore, without foreign engineers, a bottleneck would hinder the country’s growth. In an interview with a director at IE Singapore

(SG21), an agency responsible for helping Singaporean enterprises expand overseas, the person identified the development of human capital for multinational companies in

Singapore as one of the key objectives for the education hub.

The objective of repatriating diasporic talent was mentioned by only two research participants, but policy documents and media reports provide substantial evidence that this objective is relevant, if not as a primary objective then at least a secondary objective. In Singapore’s drive to become a place known for research and innovation, the country set a goal in 2001 of producing 1,000 doctorates in STEM fields. These elite students receive generous scholarships from the government (i.e., A*STAR) after a competitive screening process. Many of these students are pursuing their doctorates at top universities in United States and UK (e.g., Stanford, MIT, Harvard, and Cambridge).

At the moment, more than 25% of these fully funded scholars have completed their

207 doctorates and post-doctoral training (A*STAR, 2011). An A*STAR policymaker pointed out that it is crucial for Singapore to provide employment opportunities for these emerging scientists:

Having universities from overseas allows us to retain Singaporean talent and also attracts regional talent here. For example if you’re interested in doing some special discipline in the past, the only way to do it is maybe to go study at Yale. After that, you may not come back. But if you have a joint Yale-NUS program, then you can do it here! But the fact is that we have to think about the jobs after they finish. It’s not just having the university education alone. What happens after they finish [university] is the most important thing. Or else we train thousands of PhD students and there are no jobs! That’s why it has to be centrally planned together with EDB. EDB will bring in the employers, and then we work backward 5-10 years (SG04, A*STAR).

A*STAR’s former chairman, Philip Yeo, was instrumental not only in launching

Singapore’s research ambitions and inking partnerships with top foreign partners but he also took on the monumental task of mentoring many of these 1,000 students at home and abroad. Yeo’s interest in this area extended far beyond policy instruments because he spent a considerable amount of personal time advising these students and meeting them in person whenever he traveled abroad. Yeo’s personal touch was highlighted by sg09 (A*STAR scientist), and it is also well documented in the media (Cyranoski,

2005b). Under the scholarship agreement, these A*STAR scholars must return home upon the completion of their doctorate programs. One scholar has complained about the restrictive nature of these scholarships and being treated as an economic resource rather than a human being (Rodan, 2006). A*STAR and Yeo responded by launching a defamation lawsuit against the student, who has since retracted his criticisms.

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Educational Capacity

The rationale of developing educational excellence through an education hub received minimal attention in interviews with Singaporean policymakers. A few interviewees mentioned internationalization at home as an important objective particularly in the context of Singapore:

Singapore, being a small country, we don’t want our students to be insular and inward looking. So you have a foreign student, you interact with them, at least Singaporeans then know many parts of the world are not like Singapore… Foreigners interact with our local citizens, so that we have a wider mindset (SG06, Chancellor, Private University).

I like Singaporeans to be international. [But] not every Singaporean can afford or wants to be, because of family reasons, go overseas. So, instead of bringing them to the world, you bring the world here, right? Let’s say Emily [an intern] goes to university. Maybe one-third of her class are people from all over the world. Not just [developing] connections, she grows up different. She doesn’t grow up as the parochial Singaporean who thinks that the world revolves around Singapore. She’s forced to grapple with the fact that her friends live in a different environment. She goes visits them, realizes their lives are different, and it expands her mind. She gets a better education (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

Diversifying programs and institutions using an education hub is perhaps a more relevant objective in Singapore today than in the late 1990s because the city-state is becoming more selective in the types of institutions it recruits and builds. After the launch of its education hub, several foreign business schools and research institutes were established. Now, more than ten years later, Singapore’s higher education landscape has no shortage of foreign providers or MBA programs. In reflecting on

Singapore’s experience with cross-border education, the following comment from an

EDB policymaker illustrates a shift in priority over time:

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The strategic outlook and alignment needs that we had in 1990s are not the same as today. You see, it’s changing. Today we have a diversity of institutions. Every new one that comes in, I ask, “What’s your differentiator? What’s so special about you? What’s different?” Because we don’t want you to come in if you can’t differentiate yourself because you will die (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

Diversification for the sake of capacity building also fits with the latest policy initiative from the Ministry of Education (MOE). In a recent townhall meeting organized by MOE

(March 22, 2012) to discuss reforms in higher education, the overwhelming concern expressed by both policymakers and the audience was student access in a system with limited capacity (both in terms of the quantity of seats and the types of programs and institutions). Many people feel Singapore’s higher education system is not diverse enough even with all its cross-border programs and institutions. Despite being a highly developed country with heavy investments in higher education, Singapore has a low participation rate at 26% today – lower than most OECD countries as well as other developed Asian economies (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong). Therefore,

MOE is now actively diversifying and expanding the system to accommodate more students with the aim of attaining a cohort participation rate of 30% by 2015 (i.e., an extra 2,000 seats beyond the current capacity). The public universities are operating at full capacity; hence, the plan is not to expand these institutions. Instead, policymakers expect that the extra seats must come from non-university institutions, private education, and cross-border provisions. For example, the new Singapore University of

Technology and Design, which was created in collaboration with MIT, combines design and technology in a way that is not available anywhere else in Singapore. The upcoming Yale-NUS liberal arts college also fills a gap in Singapore’s higher education landscape as “Asia’s first liberal arts college.” An older example is the Duke-NUS

210 medical school, which began offering a graduate medical degree in 2007 based on the

American model of medical education rather than the British model, which already existed in Singapore.42 Government policy documents and institutional promotional materials present these cross-border ventures as valuable additions that will increase diversity and capacity in Singapore’s higher education. The increase in cohort participation rate would also support Singapore’s engagement with the knowledge economy as one research participant noted:

It’s part of our national strategy to move to a knowledge economy, and if you want a knowledge economy, you need to have high levels of education in the work force. And if you put the clock back 20-25 years, the educational levels in Singapore were not that high. We had maybe only 5 or 10% of our population who were university graduates (SG17, EDB Board Member).

Overall, Singapore’s education hub initiative today prioritizes economic benefits and talent development. At the launch of its education hub initiative in 1998, the goal was to recruit foreign universities to establish a presence in Singapore and deliver academic programs. The education industry captured the imaginations of policymakers at that time as evident in the early policy documents presented in the previous chapter.

Fifteen years later, the rationale of economic benefits remains a strong driver in

Singapore’s education hub. However, the main objective has shifted from revenue generation through student fees to the commercialization of research innovations. The

Economic Development Board in conjunction with A*STAR are aggressively recruiting universities and multinational companies to establish research operations in Singapore.

These laboratories vary widely in their linkages with local higher education institutions,

42 There are presently three medical schools in Singapore. The oldest is NUS’s Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, which predates NUS as a university. Created in 1905 under British colonialism, this medical school continues to offer an undergraduate medical degree modeled after the British.

211 but they share an inclination toward applied research with commercial potential.

Cultivating a research landscape also attracts significant foreign investments (i.e., education hub as an economic multiplier). The scale of this investment is difficult to assess due to the confidential nature of these partnerships, but media reports regularly highlight joint investments by the Singapore government and foreign institutions.

Although research and development has emerged as the new imperative in Singapore’s education hub, the country has not abandoned the trade of education services (i.e., revenue generation through student fees). Amidst the flurry of research activities in

Singapore, the business of cross-border education continues. State agencies such as

SPRING and IE Singapore continue to cultivate the private education industry through grants and business development support. Some private institutions offer transnational programs in Singapore while others export their programs to neighboring countries.

These activities do not generate as much media attention as multimillion-dollar laboratories or publicly funded international students, but they have persisted as an important part of the education hub initiative since 1998. Public universities are not the main actors in these activities, but a proper analysis of Singapore as an education hub must include these efforts.

Another dimension of Singapore’s education hub that has remained unchanged since 1998 is the rationale of talent development. If anything, this is the most dominant rationale in Singapore’s education hub narrative. The country is keen to develop local talent, attract foreign talent, and repatriate its skilled diaspora. These efforts address the chronic shortage of human capital and the declining birth rate among locals. New transnational institutions such as the Yale-NUS College and the Singapore University of

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Technology and Design aim to cultivate the diverse talents of locals as well as attract foreign talent. Talent development even preoccupies the minds of policymakers at the

Economic Development Board and A*STAR, two agencies outside the policy sector of human resources.

A secondary goal in Singapore’s education hub development is to diversify the higher education system using cross-border education. After 15 years of development,

Singapore touts many transnational programs and branch campuses. Singapore can now afford to be selective in choosing the foreign students and providers it adds to its higher education landscape as a matured education hub. In this sense, the education hub serves as a tool to diversify the higher education system and improve system capacity both in terms of seat numbers and program offerings.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s pursuit of an education hub truly began in 2007-08 when its Chief

Executive, Donald Tsang, came to power and identified education as one of the six pillar industries for the city’s future. With these six industries, the Tsang Administration hoped to reduce the city’s reliance on the financial and banking sector. After Tsang launched into this economic diversification, people began paying closer attention to the education hub (HK27, EDB). Given its ambiguous start and political rhetoric, what do policymakers have to say about Hong Kong’s education hub initiative today? Has the initiative sustained the momentum from 2007? Despite the lack of visible

213 implementation progress, policymakers gave impassioned responses on the rationales behind Hong Kong’s education hub and even openly disagreed with official statements from the government. Interviews conducted in Hong Kong were by far the liveliest of the three case studies here. These responses may be indicative of the nascent stage of policymaking when an initiative generates confusion and discord. However, the responses are more likely emblematic of Hong Kong’s traditions in the freedom of speech and civic engagement. Interestingly, in this cacophony of opinions on education hub development, a set of key objectives emerged. These objectives either emphasize issues marginalized in official policy documents or contradict the official stance entirely.

In setting the stage for this case study, the following comment from a member of the

Commission on Strategic Development, a body advising the Hong Kong Chief

Executive, exemplifies the critical perspectives expressed by many Hong Kong policymakers:

It’s not Hong Kong’s intention [to become an education hub]. But Donald Tsang [HKSAR Chief Executive] in his first year suddenly found that we had to have direction so he invented the six pillars – basically as a narrow kind of policy thinker who is closed in economic discourse. Education had to fit into that framework to make sense… Therefore, he started with... ‘We have good education so we should earn money from that.’ It’s a product to be sold overseas, and this fits very well in those few years with WTO, the World Trade Organization, GATS agreement and the four modes of cross-border trade. And of course, Australia was very impressive with 12% of their income due to trade in education (HK11, Commission on Strategic Development).

Another noticeable pattern in discussions with Hong Kong policymakers is the widespread belief that existing conditions (context) represent intentions (rationales). In nearly every interview, the question on the rationales behind Hong Kong’s education hub immediately elicited an exhaustive list of the city’s strengths rather than its goals or purposes for building an education hub. The strengths commonly identified by

214 participants include an excellent education system, highly ranked universities based on global rankings, the use of English as a medium of instruction, the cosmopolitan nature of the city, and its status as the gateway to China. The following two comments illustrate this typical response:

Hong Kong is an international hub of business where a lot of very clever people come to Hong Kong and base themselves here to do business in Asia, in China – in that sense it’s not unlike London or New York which also has those characteristics. Those natural characteristics mean there’s a group of very international people here to begin with anyway... so it just lends itself very naturally into that international education hub… So those things all lead to an enhancement in the diversity and competitiveness of a city, state, or country… We’re just enhancing what is already occurring naturally (HK10, Education Commission).

The good thing is that we already have good professors, and we don’t need to invest in that. It’s about how to sell it. We just need some policy on how to sell it to outside people (HK06, Advisor to the Central Policy Unit).

Although context is important to any educational development, existing strengths do not constitute a policy rationale. If anything, many policies aim to correct or overcome contextual or existing shortcomings. Consequently, discussions with Hong Kong policymakers required further clarification and probing to get at the reasons behind its education hub initiative.

Economic Benefits

The notion of an education hub as a commercial enterprise that generates revenue received not only great skepticism but also visible scorn from nearly every policymaker interviewed in Hong Kong. In 2009, the Taskforce on Economic Challenges identified education as one of the six pillar industries that can generate revenue for the

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Hong Kong economy – a pronouncement that was noted by every Hong Kong research participant in this study. A member of the Central Policy Unit, which advises the Chief

Executive of HKSAR directly, commented at the beginning of an interview:

I think we can learn from the experience of UK and Australia. I think for Australia education is their second largest export. If Australia can do that, why can’t Hong Kong do that? We don’t want to rely too much on one pillar: finance. If we can do that, then we would expand finance indefinitely (like Macao relying on gambling). But if you rely just on finance, it’s unhealthy if there’s a financial crisis. We have to diversify our industries and GDP (HK06, Advisor to the Central Policy Unit).

The motives of the Taskforce on Economic Challenges are therefore well understood.

The Education Bureau (EDB), the equivalent of an education ministry, naturally supported Tsang’s vision as the agenda of the government. On the other hand, EDB also relies on the input of the Education Commission, a powerful advisory group consisting of appointed members drawn from different sectors of Hong Kong society

(e.g., law, business, academia, etc.).43 Some of these members have extensive knowledge and experience in education policymaking through their service on school boards, foundations, teaching councils, grant councils, and university boards. In response to the report by the Taskforce on Economic Challenges, a member of the

Education Commission commented candidly:

43 An example of the influence of the Education Commission is the recent 3+3+4 reform, which overhauled the structure of secondary and tertiary education in Hong Kong such that it is now aligned with the systems of Mainland China, US, and Australia. The Education Commission conceived and advocated this reform while the Education Bureau implemented it.

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Well, I think the government likes to create slogans, and this sounds like a nice slogan. Is it [education] a huge revenue generator like investment banks? Actually Hong Kong has got a huge number of investment banks, and this generates a lot of money here (e.g., renminbi, bonds, IPOs, lawyers too). This makes big money, but education is never a rich industry. Education is in fact for love and not for money. So can you create a lot of wealth by just collecting school fees? How high fees can you collect? You can collect a lot of money from students who live in accommodations. But how much do students pay for accommodations? Not much. How much do students pay for food? Even less (HK10, Education Commission).

A discussion with a policymaker who is both a senior university administrator and a member of the University Grants Committee, which oversees the funding of all public universities in Hong Kong, elicited the following comment on revenue generation:

It [revenue generation] is something that as academics and so on, we never say that out because we don’t feel easy at all. First, it should not be put under a pillar of economy. How can you? What if you say it’s Australia? Then yes, the revenue generated is huge… So if Mainland Chinese students are not going there, then they have to cut a lot of things, and so it’s building up something which is not healthy at all because you are too much dependent on foreign students and that affects your balance of all the academic… It [education hub] could be for revenue generation, but the government cannot say so. And it’s not viable, right? (HK07, UGC).

Even in interviews with two senior policymakers from the EDB on separate occasions, both participants went to great pains to refute revenue generation as a primary objective. Specifically, the policymaker from the higher education unit pointed out that

Hong Kong’s education hub involves both the public and private providers rather than just the latter. As an example of public institutions’ commitment, this policymaker pointed to the increase in the quota for non-local students in publicly funded programs

(i.e., at the sub-degree, degree and taught postgraduate levels). Starting from 2007, this quota changed from 10% to 20%. More importantly, this EDB policymaker added:

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We do not have targets for international student recruitment like many other education hubs worldwide. This is a conscious decision. Revenue generation is not the main rationale for us (HK01, EDB).

Other research participants questioned revenue generation as a realistic objective given the nature of private education in Hong Kong. First, the small size of the private education sector in Hong Kong precludes any substantial revenue generation. A former

Chairperson of the Education Commission with a long career in public policy and education pointed out,

Hong Kong’s private education market is very small! This is not so much because the sector is restricted but rather that people prefer to put their kids in public. Why attend private when the government finances public institutions entirely? (HK23, former Chairperson, Education Commission).

Even the member of the Central Policy Unit who initially compared Hong Kong’s education hub positively to Australia’s education industry expressed serious doubts later in the interview on education as an industry in Hong Kong:

Education already takes up 20% of the government expenditure, which is about 4% of the GDP. But this is mostly public education through government subsidies, so it’s not a market. In terms of private market share of education, it’s probably less than 1% of GDP. So unless all the universities privatize, charge a school fee, and you profit, then you can’t count it toward the GDP. So it’s still under developed [our education industry] (HK06, Advisor to the Central Policy Unit).

Secondly, the government still heavily subsidizes international students in both public and private institutions despite using a differential fee structure for local and non-local students. This subsidy is evident in universities, vocational institutes, and even in private primary and secondary education. Several policymakers noted these subsidies in interviews:

How can you depend on that [international students] to generate enough revenue to cover anything? We are actually heavily subsidizing them, and you cannot charge a lot. So it’s a major discrepancy really (HK07, UGC).

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International students at our institutions pay 1.8 times the local fees, but they are still heavily subsidized by the government! Self-financing or private education in Hong Kong is not the same as in the West. It is still heavily subsidized by the government (e.g., one-off subsidies like land/loans rather than recurring subvention). Therefore it is not 100% private (hk25, Vocational Training Council).

If revenue generation via student fees received a resounding rejection as an objective, leveraging education as an economic multiplier and commercializing research were largely ignored as objectives by policymakers during interviews. Only two participants peripherally mentioned education as an economic multiplier:

As an income generator, I can’t see that education would double your GDP. It won’t do that. But I think that as a generator of jobs, it can do something. I mean if you look at international education hub there are lots of the things that go around education (HK10, Education Commission).

When Hong Kong talks about expanding “education services,” it’s not what you think as revenue-generation via tuition fees. What Hong Kong is interested in are the broader economic benefits that come from hosting international students (for example, housing, food, healthcare, tourism, etc.). Basically we’re talking about education tourism here and the broader economic benefits. Profiting from tuition fees is not the main goal for Hong Kong (hk05, Private Institution).

While some research participants in Hong Kong mentioned research issues, no one identified the commercialization of research as an objective for its education hub. In fact, the lack of a strong manufacturing industry in Hong Kong stunts the growth of applied research. The objective of commercializing research innovations also does not appear in policy documents.

Overall, the rationale of revenue generation using education services is clear in policy documents but policymakers overwhelmingly rejected it in interviews. A member of the Central Policy Unit explained this discrepancy in the context of Hong Kong politics:

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Don’t take it [Taskforce on Economic Challenges] seriously because the new Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, also proposed another six pillars. So it comes and goes with these chief secretaries. We just view it as a slogan rather than an actual plan! (HK06, Advisor to the Central Policy Unit).

Other research participants also minimized the importance of the Taskforce on

Economic Challenges and dismissed the treatment of education as an industry. This view is not confined to experts in education. Even a context informant from the Hong

Kong General Chamber of Commerce, which monitors the city’s economic pulse very closely, also expressed serious skepticism about education as an industry (hk02,

HKGCC).

Talent Development

While research participants consistently rejected revenue generation as a rationale, many identified talent development as an important rationale. Talent development received far greater attention in interviews than in policy documents. As one policymaker pointed out, Hong Kong’s future, regardless which avenue it pursues, ultimately relies on a supply of talent:

It’s not coming out with a policy to leap in the future, sustainable development of Hong Kong. It’s not just a finance centre. Essentially logistics and all these, it has to be backed up by a very important pool of talent (HK07, UGC).

A senior policymaker from the Education Bureau’s higher education unit summarized the education hub as an initiative to increase the talent pool of the city and “make Hong

Kong and its people more competitive” compared to neighboring economies (HK01).

This view of talent development for manpower planning also appeared in an interview with a policymaker from the vocational education sector:

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Hong Kong needs top end talent. I don’t mean IQ but skill level and knowledge- based competencies. We need innovative minds, fast learners, and people who can adjust quickly. Soft skills really! People must be versatile and able to adapt (hk25, Vocational Training Council).

While these comments clearly illustrate the human capital perspective, other policymakers took a broader view of talent development. In speaking about talent development as a rationale for Hong Kong’s education hub, a member of the Education

Commission clarified that manpower planning is a practice that is typical of Singapore and less compatible with the Hong Kong tradition and his personal view on education:

Manpower is always an issue in any community: manpower, talent, creating the talents… But if you take a slightly more liberal arts view of education, you don’t necessarily have to have one career for the rest of your life – that’s a bit old- fashioned thinking. Some people think that because you study biology then you’re a biologist for the rest of your life. Increasingly people can have many careers in their lives… So I am not so concerned about which particular degree as long as you offer degrees which train the mind. But Singapore is still thinking about “We need so many engineers. We need so many of these people” (HK10, Member of the Education Commission Working Group on the Development of Ed. Services).

This broader perspective on talent development begins to overlap with discussions about the pursuit of educational capacity as a rationale for Hong Kong’s education hub.

These views will appear later in the section on educational capacity.

The issue of retaining local talent and preventing brain drain did not appear as a concern among Hong Kong policymakers. Only one research participant identified this objective as important, albeit a secondary one, given the large numbers of Hong Kong students leaving to study in the United Kingdom (HK01, Education Bureau). Several other policymakers voiced opposing views and actually encouraged the mobility of both local and non-local talent even if it meant a permanent departure from the city:

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Of course if I have a student who does very well and says, ‘I want to further my study.’ I would advise her, ‘Yes of course you should go somewhere else, and don’t have all your pathways in Hong Kong’ (HK11, Commission on Strategic Development).

Not concerned at all [about brain drain]! Hong Kong is a very free and open society. People should be free to come and go. If a student leaves, that’s fine. We have always had talent coming in and out. If talent does not go out, how can new talent come in? Having a free and open society is key to Hong Kong (HK23, former Chairperson of Education Commission).

We are not concerned that non-local students leave Hong Kong to look for jobs elsewhere, just as we have no control, nor should we have such control, on our local students seeking employment outside Hong Kong upon graduation (HK29, former Chairperson, UGC).

Hong Kong’s liberal view on the mobility of talent naturally welcomes foreign talent as an objective of its education hub. Senior policymakers from the EDB identified the attraction of foreign talent as a key objective behind its education hub (HK01 and

HK27). Several policymakers went further and claimed that the very essence of an education hub is to attract foreign talent. The following comments from members of the

University Grants Committee and Central Policy Unit illustrate this view:

To be viewed as a cosmopolitan city, we must also attract the best and the brightest people to the region, worldwide to come here to study and work and committed to develop Hong Kong as the regional education hub… the whole purpose of that is to have all these interflows of talents from all the rest of the world, and many of them are willing to stay and contribute to the overall development. They raise the overall standard of living and education… You are backed up by a certain type of research infrastructure and people. Not that we can do all things, but without these you would not have people out here (HK07, UGC).

We want to attract the best students to come here and work in Hong Kong if they can. It’s a long-term investment instead of just earning education fees (HK06, Advisor to the Central Policy Unit).

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Building excellent universities and research infrastructure is therefore a means to attract foreign talent. Academe in Hong Kong already touts an incredibly diverse faculty culled from all corners of the world. Research participants repeatedly mentioned this diversity as Hong Kong’s strength in building an education hub. In a virtuous cycle, an education hub can further attract more foreign scholars to buttress Hong Kong’s global position in higher education:

Another part of the hub is obviously attracting a very strong body of academics who are international… hopefully of very high standing, whose fields of research could be in many areas. Basically doing original research here and teaching here. So it’s also a hub where there is a concentration of internationally renowned academics (HK10, Education Commission).

In terms of implementation strategies, Hong Kong introduced its Immigration

Arrangements for Non-local Graduates (IANG) in 2008 to encourage non-local students to stay and work upon graduation. If a student applies under this scheme within six months after his/her graduation, there is no need to secure employment first. By the end of 2012, a total of 22,115 non-local graduates were approved to work in Hong Kong under this arrangement (HK Immigration, 2012). In addition, non-local students can also apply under the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals or the

General Employment Policy (for non-Mainlanders). The former was established in 2003 to specifically attract talent from the Mainland “to meet local manpower needs and enhance Hong Kong's competitiveness in the globalised market” (HK Immigration,

2012). This scheme has no sectoral restrictions. At the end of 2012, a total of 57,126

Mainlanders were admitted under the scheme (HK Immigration, 2012).

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No interviewee in Hong Kong mentioned the recruitment of diasporic talent. This is not a surprise considering that several policymakers were not worried about local or foreign talent leaving the city to pursue opportunities elsewhere upon graduation.

Educational Capacity

For Hong Kong policymakers, an education hub can improve educational capacity by exposing local students to global perspectives. Several policymakers raised concerns about local students’ insular nature and limited worldview (HK01, HK11,

HK25, and HK27). The recruitment of international students would therefore ameliorate this problem when local students are exposed to alternative views and cultural norms even if the source is Mainland China. UGC’s recent report “Aspirations for the Higher

Education System in Hong Kong” also recommends the recruitment of non-local students to improve the learning environment because local students are “too inward looking” and “know too little about the outside world” (UGC, 2010, p. 57). Even in the vocational training sector, internationalization at home is an important objective under the education hub initiative:

Our rationale to recruit non-local students is to have a multicultural campus and widen our local students’ perspectives. We do not view non-local students as cash cows (hk25, Vocational Training Council).

From the perspective of the Education Bureau, an education hub can also effectively diversify the educational opportunities available to students. A senior policymaker from the higher education unit at EDB pointed out that the bureau is presently pursuing two main initiatives: 1) creating multiple pathways for students, and 2) developing private education in parallel with public education. In the context of an education hub, cross-

224 border provisions and private institutions (local and foreign) can therefore dovetail into the bureau’s present agenda and satisfy both initiatives. However, only EDB policymakers expressed this view among the Hong Kong interviewees.

Overall, the main rationale driving Hong Kong’s development as an education hub is talent development. The objective of cultivating local talent and attracting foreign talent are particularly pertinent. Policymakers overwhelmingly rejected the economic rationale of developing an education hub. Specifically, the idea of generating revenue from education services received widespread condemnation from research participants.

This marks a striking difference to policy documents that frame Hong Kong’s education hub in economic terms. Related to the concern over local talent, policymakers also view the education hub as a means to expose local students to a global perspective and ward off insular thinking. Of secondary importance is the use of an education hub to diversify Hong Kong’s higher education system.

Summary

In comparing the rationales driving the development of education hubs, it is apparent that policymakers at each jurisdiction hold strong views about the direction of such a large-scale initiative. Some of their views overlap while others stand out as unique among education hub planners. Under the rationale of economic benefits, leveraging education as an industry remains important to Malaysia and Singapore.

Today Malaysia continues to pursue the objective of revenue generation through

225 student fees as ardently as it did at the outset of its education hub a decade ago. While this objective is still relevant to Singapore, the commercialization of research innovations has superseded the pursuit of student fees. Singapore’s ambitious plan to become “Asia’s innovation capital” is fundamentally about profiting from the knowledge economy rather than the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of intellectual inquiry.

However in its drive toward research, Singapore has not abandoned the idea of education as a service industry. The state continues to support the private for-profit education industry. For Hong Kong, revenue generation through student fees is evident in policy documents from the government. However, policymakers unanimously rejected this objective in interviews on the basis of both practical and ethical concerns. In addition, the objective of leveraging education as an economic multiplier is evident in

Malaysia and Singapore. While Malaysia eyes lucrative ancillary services and real estate development stemming from its education hub, Singapore is eager to attract foreign direct investment in the form of branch campuses, research institutes, and joint ventures. Unsurprisingly, Hong Kong is not interested in this economic multiplier effect considering its aversion to the commercialization of education.

For the rationale of talent development, supporting the needs of local residents remain fundamental to all three education hubs. Given the deep public investments in both time and money, policymakers shared a sense of responsibility to local needs in education, training, and research. The major point of contention is the objective of attracting foreign talent. For Malaysia, its political climate simply does not support the recruitment of foreign talent when affirmative action and graduate unemployment remain at the fore of policy thinking. Despite the recognition that foreign talent brings

226 tremendous benefits, policy pronouncements remain rhetorical with numerous failed attempts at attracting foreigners. In the case of Hong Kong and Singapore, foreign talent has been at the heart of their development for the last fifty years. An education hub is therefore a natural platform to recruit foreign talent. Singapore pursues this objective much more aggressively than Hong Kong most likely because the constraints of its land and demographics loom large in all policy sectors while Hong Kong has

Mainland China to buffer its shortcomings. The objective of attracting the diaspora to return home is evident to Malaysia and Singapore but for very different motivations.

Bringing home the diaspora to Malaysia is a welcomed undertaking because these individuals are considered “locals” by kinship. However, the country’s efforts at repatriating the diaspora have led to mixed results and remain removed from its education hub planning. On the contrary, the return of the diaspora to Singapore is a highly orchestrated strategy that dovetails with its research and development agenda.

Singapore’s gleaming research laboratories aim to attract both foreign talent as well as provide jobs for elite Singaporeans trained at top universities overseas. Without a robust research sector at home, public investment in these emerging Singaporean scientists would incur a heavy loss.

The rationale of educational capacity manifests very differently across the three education hubs. Capacity may be in the form of teaching and learning, institutional performance, or systemic diversity. Hong Kong is keen to use an education hub to expose its students to a global perspective. Policymakers there express a strong interest in mixing local students with non-local students and scholars to enhance learning. On the contrary, Malaysia expects the education hub to promote competition

227 among institutions and students as foreign branch campuses and students populate its education landscape. In the minds of Malaysian policymakers, competition will ultimately raise the level of quality in the entire higher education system – a logic that the final chapter will challenge. The objective of diversifying higher education provisions is evident to some extent in Singapore and Hong Kong. By importing foreign providers and programs, a higher education system can rapidly diversify its offerings and increase its cohort participation rate. Both Singapore and Hong Kong currently have low participation rates; therefore policymakers view the education hub as a useful initiative toward widening access. For both jurisdictions, diversification is of secondary importance in comparison to the other objectives under economic benefits and talent development.

These multilayered comparisons reveal fundamentally different contextual factors driving the development of education hubs even though some may share the same objectives. Malaysia has remained true to its original intent of building an education hub in that revenue generation is still the main objective. Singapore has rapidly expanded the scope of its education hub to include high-stakes research initiatives, which have eclipsed the objective of profiting from the cross-border academic programs.

Nevertheless, Singapore continues to support its private education providers and their entrepreneurial initiatives at home and abroad. As a relative newcomer to the education hub phenomenon, Hong Kong has made several pronouncements and conducted several studies to plan its education hub. However, it seems to lack the fortitude to carry forward the initiative. The central government’s plan to develop education as a service industry received widespread criticism among the policymakers interviewed for this

228 study. However, this discrepancy between policy rhetoric and the views of research participants is not a rejection of education hub as an initiative but rather a disagreement over rationales. Therefore, in terms of policy coherence, Malaysian and Singaporen policymakers are largely unified in their rationales for developing an education hub.

Their views resonate with the rationales stated in policy documents. For Hong Kong, a deep schism between policy documents and contemporary policymakers exist. The official rhetoric views the education hub largely as a service industry to generate revenue while policymakers unanimously reject this approach. Table 11 summarizes the discussion of the rationales as presented in this chapter. The table differentiates between primary and secondary policy objectives.

The next chapter will focus on the fourth rationale in the development of education hubs: soft power. The views of policymakers on the international engagement of an education hub reveal another layer of complexity. Although economic benefits, talent development, and educational capacity are important rationales, these are largely domestic issues with endogenous development in mind. By contrast, as an education hub seeks out foreign partners, scholars, and students, the boundary between higher education and diplomacy begins to blur. The expanding constellation of international ties radiating from an education hub has repercussions beyond the realm of higher education. To properly capture the reasons behind education hubs’ international engagement, a separate chapter is required to illuminate this exogenous dimension.

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Table 11: Summary of Key Rationales: Economic Benefits, Talent Development, and Educational Capacity.

Rationales Objectives MY SG HK Economic To generate revenue through student fees Benefits " #

To leverage education as an economic multiplier " "

To commercialize research innovations " Talent To develop local talent Development " " "

To attract foreign talent " " To repatriate the diaspora # "

Educational To expose local students to global perspectives Capacity "

To diversify programs and institutions # #

To promote competition among institutions and students "

" primary objectives # secondary objectives

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Chapter 6: Soft Power and International Engagement

Why do people pay so much money to go to a hub like Australia? It’s not because they want a degree. They say networking! They could become the president of a bank or a director of this and that. So to have some business problem, and it happens that your friend is in the department, then the two countries can resolve a lot of things. Just more on the personal contact (MY05, Ministry of Higher Education).

Introduction

As an initiative that is inherently international in its design, an education hub raises many questions about higher education’s contribution to international relations.

For many observers, the most visible sign of an education hub is the constellation of international partnerships created for the pursuit of education, training and research.

This constellation acts like a web of synaptic nerves transmitting expertise, resources, and personnel – albeit neither a symmetrical nor a transparent process. While numerous studies have identified the factors that sway international students to migrate and motivate universities to build branch campuses overseas (Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002;

British Council, Universities UK and IDP Education Australia, 2004; Becker, 2009;

Dimmock & Leong, 2010; Gonzalez, Mesanza, & Mariel, 2011; Wei, 2013), few have investigated the political motives of a host country in engaging with the world at large via higher education. Reflecting on the connections between higher education and geopolitics might seem more appropriate for the bygone eras of colonialism and the

Cold War. The prevailing discourse in higher education today devotes attention to the knowledge economy and the competition over resources rather than cooperation or

231 development aid (Vincent-Lancrin, 2004; Naidoo, 2009; IAU, 2012a). In an era without a major global conflict or polarizing superpowers, one may assume that states view higher education as a minor player in geopolitics. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, institutional autonomy insulates the university from the foreign policy directives of the state. This chapter argues, nevertheless, that higher education mediates geopolitical interests just as intensely today as in the past, if not with more sophistication. The pivotal role of the state in many Asian societies also challenges the assumption that universities are autonomous actors on the international stage. The previous chapter has certainly shown that the state is intimately involved in developing education hubs. This chapter turns the discussion on education hub development from endogenous issues to exogenous engagement. The discussion will focus on the connections between higher education, diplomacy, and international relations.

From the previous chapter, it is evident that policymakers design education hubs with the clear intention to build international links in one form or another. A commitment to internationalization is necessary if an education hub plans to recruit foreign talent, expose local students to cosmopolitan views, and partner with foreign institutions.

However, the decisions that guide these engagements are neither straightforward nor neutral. The following questions challenge the belief that economic benefits, talent development, and educational capacity can sufficiently explain the rationales behind education hubs:

• Why are there biases and patterns in the recruitment of international students? • Why are some policymakers not worried by the prospect of foreign talent leaving an education hub? • Why do education hubs court some foreign partners while ignoring others of

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equal or greater stature? • What is the regional role (if any) of an education hub?

Senior planners have often mapped out the international links of an education hub with foresight and strong preferences. Comments from research participants regarding international engagement are distinctive enough to constitute a fourth type of rationale driving the development of education hubs: the pursuit of soft power.

Before a discussion on education hubs and international relations can proceed, a few caveats require attention. First and foremost, this study does not equate international relations to deliberations on national security or foreign policy. International relations are broader and more complex than the management of security threats, the pursuit of military conquests, and the implementation of policy doctrines. To properly analyze the creative ways that higher education is mediating contacts between societies, the analysis cannot be constrained by the realist framework of hard power.

Higher education may of course contribute to a country’s security through technical assistance and weaponry research, but one must not reify these approaches such that they become the yardsticks of international relations. Moreover, providing technical assistance is only one type of international engagement by universities. The international dimension of higher education presently encompasses diverse activities ranging from recruiting international students to building branch campuses.

Secondly, as a corollary, international relations extend far beyond state-to-state interactions (i.e., traditional diplomacy). When pursuing international ties, higher education institutions do not always solicit the assistance of the state. Higher education presently operates at many different levels with crosscutting links: individual,

233 institutional, national, regional, and global (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002; Lingard &

Rizvi, 2009). The role of the state in higher education also differs widely across societies such that its influence on institutional governance and strategic planning varies widely. Therefore, higher education institutions and civil society (i.e., non-state actors) may exert significant agency in pursing international ties. A department dean or a philanthropic foundation may spearhead an international initiative. Consequently, the analysis here is not confined to state-to-state interactions.

Thirdly, contacts, linkages, relationships, and engagements are purposely chosen as the operative words here because these are neutral terms that can describe all types of international activities evident among education hubs. These activities include student and faculty recruitment, transnational programming, joint research ventures, consultancies, and technical assistance. Engagement does not imply an equitable relationship as may be suggested by terms such as collaborations and partnerships. While balanced engagements are evident in some education hubs, they are certainly not the norm. Like any relationship, one party can control the terms of engagement in higher education through financial or intellectual capital. Collaboration is also an awkward term to describe the recruiting and educating of international students

– activities important to all education hubs. Therefore, the discussion here will avoid using these euphemisms in order to recognize the realities of international engagement in higher education.

Fourthly, some of the soft power objectives are sensitive matters pertaining to diplomacy and ethnic relations. Given the history of ethnic strife in Malaysia and

Singapore, some policymakers were hesitant to discuss these topics openly. Therefore,

234 interpreting the comments from policymakers requires a measure of contextual sensitivity. The analysis also requires that secondary data sources (i.e., visible strategies and media reports) supplement the primary data (policy documents and participant interviews). Collectively, these caveats hopefully clarify the conceptual, methodological, and theoretical positions taken in this chapter.

Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter is organized by themes rather than by locales or case studies, as is the tradition of comparative education research. The themes are the three objectives under the overarching rationale of soft power: 1) to strengthen ties based on cultural heritage, 2) to network with expert individuals and institutions worldwide, and 3) to become a regional leader and broker. For each objective, examples will be given to show how a particular education hub expresses this goal. Granted, an objective may not be relevant to all education hubs as the last chapter has shown. This chapter highlights the outward projection of power by education hubs rather than the internal issues driving their developments. Admittedly, local issues certainly shape a country’s global engagement. The local-global divide is increasingly a blurred boundary in educational developments. However, the previous chapter has already established a foundation by outlining the contextual issues, which will not be repeated here. Instead, a thematic presentation in this chapter allows an immediate, crosscutting comparison across different education hubs. The phenomenon in question here is higher education’s contribution to international relations rather than the development of education hubs per se. Part One will provide an overview of generic comments from policymakers on soft power. Part Two will examine the specific objectives under the rationale of soft power and present supporting examples. Part

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Three will reflect on education hubs’ contributions to soft power. It is important to note that the term “soft power” was rarely used during interviews. This term was popularized by international relations scholar Joseph Nye and is generally familiar only within circles of international relations and foreign affairs.

Education Hubs and Soft Power

Cultivating relationships with individuals is a fundamental component of developing soft power. For an education hub, the most obvious group of individuals is international students. The influx of international students provides an opportunity for the host country to introduce its culture and people to outsiders on a large scale.

Through this connection, these students develop a meaningful relationship with the host country. Ideally, these students would then become advocates who can facilitate ties between the host country and their countries of origin or residence. Therefore, building relationships with international students differs conceptually from recruiting foreign talent as discussed in the previous chapter. An education hub can still build relationships with international students without retaining them as skilled labor. The following comment from a former policymaker at the Singapore Economic Development

Board illustrates these different objectives in practice:

Why should we be concerned about international students graduating and leaving? We have too many to absorb. If an international student graduates, works only a short time, and then goes back [home] and does well elsewhere. What would the benefit be? Well, if we can keep in touch with him or his [Singaporean] friends keep in touch with him, then we now have a network overseas (SG13, Economic Development Board).

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Policymakers from all three education hubs recognized the great opportunity for the country to exert influence through its connection with international students:

Through higher education, you open up an avenue for trade links and so on. Maybe in 15-30 years time, you may trade with your own classmates who are Malaysians who happened to be here with people from other countries who had studied here. Some small countries like Maldives because they send many of their students to our Islamic International University, now they have three or four cabinet ministers who have studied in Malaysia… The same thing has happened for US universities. When you are here for four years to study, some become very passionate about Malaysia given the backdrop of their countries. Because they’ve been here, their level of confidence and trust [in Malaysia] is far better, but that’s provided if they had a very good experience (MY03, Ministry of Higher Education).

Our aim is that over time these people [students] will flow out. They may not be in Singapore but over time they are emotionally tied to Singapore. They may also bring the business sector to Singapore (SG04, A*STAR).

Education is not for the sake of collecting school fees. Education, I think, is to create connections. If people are educated in a certain country, they have a particular fondness for that country and understanding of how to do business in that country and perhaps a passion for the people and the culture – and that would eventually lead to more opportunities whether in the arts, sciences, or business for links (HK10, Education Commission).

Singapore is an excellent example that illustrates the value placed on ties with international students. The generous subsidies provided by the Singaporean

Government for international students have attracted the attention of locals. Some

Members of the Parliament have inquired about the financial cost of hosting international students, but the Ministry of Education and Economic Development Board have only provided vague answers. In 2012, the Government revealed that each year it provided at least 2,000 scholarships worth S$36 million (USD $28 million) to foreign students (Seah, 2012). One report claims that only 5% of the international students in

Singapore pay full tuition without government subsidies (Becker & Kolster, 2012).

Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew personally stated that even if only 20% of the

237 international students settle permanently in Singapore, the financial cost of subsidizing their education is justified:

Besides, some scholarship students return home to assume top posts in the government or private companies, which can help smooth bilateral relations with Singapore (Lee, as cited in Seah, 2012).

Therefore, cultivating ties with international students is a legitimate policy objective distinct from the recruitment of foreign talent. Many studies on higher education’s contribution to soft power also focus on international students as agents of cultural diplomacy (Hong, 2004; Atkinson, 2010; Butcher, 2012). When discussing United

States’ soft power resources, Nye often cites American universities’ uncanny ability to attract and influence successive generations of international students despite the negative views of the country in many parts of the world:

The ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half a million foreign students who study every year in American universities and then return to their home countries, or in the minds of the Asian entrepreneurs who return home after succeeding in Silicon Valley, tend to reach elites with power. (Nye, 2004 p. 13)

While the objective of cultivating ties with foreign students is also evident among education hubs, it is too generic as an analytical lens for understanding international engagements in higher education. Beyond generating goodwill and feeling hopeful that these ties will produce benefits, education hub policymakers do not have much else to elaborate on the long-term benefits of educating international students. Frankly, this objective is not unique to education hubs or even higher education. Countless countries host and educate international students at all age levels to promote mutual understanding and bilateral relations. Rather, the discussion in this chapter will burrow deeper into more substantive objectives of relationship building that are evident among

238 education hubs.

Officially, the three education hubs welcome contacts with institutions and individuals from all over the world as evident in policy documents, promotional brochures, speeches, and websites. In interviews, policymakers largely reaffirmed an open, inclusive approach of engagement particularly in the recruitment of international students. However, it is difficult to imagine an international initiative without any strategic direction particularly given the substantial investments in time and money in creating an education hub. What factors are important when an education hub reaches out to a foreign actor?

In terms of recruiting international students, many policymakers identified nearby countries with an unmet demand for higher education as prime sites of engagement.

For example, several Malaysian informants cited Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and

Vietnam as key places to target their marketing efforts (i.e., the CLMV nations). This supply-and-demand approach to student recruitment is unsurprising given the objective of generating revenue particularly in the case of Malaysia. Interviews with leaders of private education institutions in all three jurisdictions also point to this approach as their modus operandi. However, discussions with a substantial number of research participants also revealed recruitment efforts that are driven by alternative considerations. Market demand for higher education is still an important factor, but it is certainly not the universal pivot in student recruitment. In fact, in some policy quarters, market demand is a secondary issue.

In terms of selecting institutional partners, many policymakers identified

239 reputation and quality as the key criteria. Granted, no education hub would knowingly collaborate with a low quality foreign institution. A partnership based on the reputation and quality of the foreign provider is a form of soft power. As the case of Singapore will show below, collaborations with elite foreign institutions can wield significant influence.

However, quality and reputation are also not the only factors in the selection of foreign institutional partners. Despite the rhetoric of recruiting world-class higher education institutions, it is common to find obscure and dubious institutions among education hubs. In one anecdote provided later in this chapter, one policymaker explained why

Harvard, with its world-renowned reputation, was actually not an ideal partner after preliminary meetings with officials there. These discrepancies suggest that alternative objectives are steering education hubs’ engagements with foreign institutions.

Based on interviews with policymakers and document analysis, the following three objectives are evident among education hubs in their efforts to gain soft power and exert influence in international relations:

• To strengthen ties based on cultural heritage • To network with expert individuals and institutions worldwide • To become a regional leader and broker

These objectives meld geopolitical interests with educational goals. Education and research are not merely for the sake of intellectual enlightenment, revenue generation, knowledge production, and talent development. Rather, policymakers express long- range ambitions that recognize the potential of higher education to affect international relations. This chapter includes examples of implementation strategies to illustrate the pursuit of soft power because a discussion on such a topic may be highly abstract at times.

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Objectives in Soft Power

Strengthening Ties Based on Cultural Heritage

One of the objectives in soft power development is to strengthen ties based on cultural heritage. While Nye (2004) rightly points out that soft power includes both popular culture (e.g., Hollywood) and high culture (e.g., literature, art, and education), he does not elaborate on how a country can gain influence through culture. For some education hubs, there is a clear intention to mobilize cultural capital to attract outsiders.

The sources of this cultural capital include language, ethnicity, religion, and even colonial legacy. An example of a strategy under this objective is the selective recruitment of students from countries sharing the same religion or language as the host country. More interestingly, the colonial experience has permanently altered the social fabric of many societies such that a hybridity of cultures is a core element of its heritage.

As a strategy, some education hubs actively tout the country’s cultural hybridity and pursue partnerships with universities from former colonial powers. Therefore, the objective of strengthening ties based on cultural heritage can translate into different strategies. While no education hub or country relies entirely on cultural heritage as the platform for international engagement, culture does contribute to noticeable patterns of engagement.

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Malaysia

At first glance, a moderate Islamic country building an education hub and educating Muslim students from around the world seems like a logical foreign policy strategy. With strong diplomatic ties to Islamic countries, proximity to the most populous

Islamic country in the world (Indonesia with 237 million inhabitants), and extensive experience in cross-border education, Malaysia is well poised to become an education center for the Islamic world. Since the early 2000s, the number of Middle Eastern students in Malaysia has been rising steadily as the government develops strategies to recruit students from Indonesia and the Middle East (Sidhu & Kaur, 2011). In the last few years, Iranian students have surpassed Chinese students as the largest group of international students in Malaysia. Indonesia and Yemen also consistently rank in the top five countries sending students to Malaysia. Among the top five countries sending students to Malaysia now, only China is a non-Islamic state (Table 12).

Table 12: International Students in Malaysia in 2011: Countries of Origin

Number of Rank Country of Origin Students 1 Iran 9,888 2 Indonesia 8,569 3 China 7,394 4 Nigeria 5,632 5 Yemen 3,552 Total Number of International Students in 70,509 Malaysia

Source: Statistics Higher Education Malaysia MOHE (2012)

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In discussions with senior policymakers in Malaysia, it was clear that they valued the country’s connection with international students. However, these policymakers were quick to dismiss Islamic heritage as a factor in the country’s recruitment of international students. The following responses are typical of policymakers from the Ministry of

Higher Education:

No favoritism whatsoever in our higher education. It’s totally open to the market. Whoever wants to come can come. We look at China as one of the major forces. That’s why the biggest number of international students here is not from an Islamic country. In 2000/01 we talked about Indonesia, China, and certain parts of Africa. Iranians were not in the picture. Iranians and the Muslim countries were basically in the Islamic International University. But Islamic countries started to look at Malaysia after September 11 (MY05, MOHE).44

So we have more Arab students coming here to study and Malaysia is their second choice after their first choice (United States). But now I think one of the largest groups of international students is Iranians. But I don't think that is the result of 9-11. I think they were coming here anyway before 9-11, but I've got to check my data (MY02, MOHE).

Interpreting these comments requires some contextual knowledge. In the 1970s, the

Malaysian government put in place affirmative action policies to assist the economically disadvantaged Malay majority. Millions of Malays have witnessed their standards of living improve over the course of three decades due to these policies. However, the same policies have also drawn sharp criticisms of discrimination and corruption as large numbers of Chinese and Indians left the country to seek opportunities elsewhere

(Cyranoski, 2005a; Kee, 2012; World Bank, 2011). An example of affirmative action in

44 MY05 might be referring to outdated data because Iranian students eclipsed Chinese students as the largest group of international students in Malaysia in the last few years.

243 higher education is the ethnic quota for student enrollment at public universities. These quotas favor Malays, who are mostly Muslims, and continue to marginalize minority students with excellent academic records (Sharma & Tan, 2013b; Tan & Sharma,

2013). Given this backdrop, it was not a surprise that several civil servants swiftly denied that religion had a role in the recruitment of international students – a tactful reply that minimizes a controversial local matter as well as extends an open invitation to the world. The two comments above also reveal the difference between push and pull factors in student mobility. While Malaysia may not be deliberately recruiting or “pulling”

Muslim students, external factors and events such as September 11 in United States could push these students toward more hospitable countries (Morshidi, 2008).

As the fieldwork for this study progressed, the issue of religious heritage became difficult to ignore yet convoluted, with multiple perspectives and contradictions emerging. Even if government policymakers downplayed the role of religion during interviews, Islam is no trivial matter in the administration of Malaysian higher education and its engagement with international students. The Ministry of Higher Education has specifically organized education fairs in the Middle East and North Africa to recruit students. MOHE has stated that Malaysia must capitalize on its Islamic heritage and bilateral relations with these countries in order to recruit more students (Rashid, 2007).

In addition to the recruitment of international students, religion also appears in the curriculum for international students. The Malaysian government mandates that all

Muslim students, whether local or foreign, must take a course on Islamic Studies as a part of their tertiary education; non-Muslim students must take a course on moral values and ethics. This requirement only applies to undergraduate students. Private institutions

244 must include these mandatory courses in their programming (i.e., hiring instructors and setting aside time and space in each program). Furthermore, Malaysia is now developing Islamic courses for Saudi universities (Estimo, 2013). In short, the policy rhetoric of international engagement may be secular to avoid controversy, but the practice of engagement is far from secular. If civil servants were quick to deny religious favoritism, leaders of private education institutions were equally quick to provide a litany of anecdotes illustrating an opposing view. These anecdotes show significant favoritism toward Muslim students, scholars, and Islamic states. Through exhausting interviews that lasted two to three hours each, these impassioned institutional leaders expressed deep frustrations with a corrupt government that turns a blind eye to fraudulent students from Islamic countries as well as private institutions owned or operated by Malays. In speaking about the bureaucratic delays in visa processing for international students, two leaders in the private education sector raised the issue of religion.

Chinese students used to be the number one foreign students [largest group], but now it’s Iranians. Why? First of all it’s a Muslim brotherhood thing. The government is always very worried that too many Chinese come here and all that (my08, Malaysian Association of Private Colleges and Universities).

They [Immigration] apply some other standard for some students coming from certain countries: the Middle East, Indonesia, Muslim countries... quite lenient. You know, it’s unthinkable for the Director-General of Immigration to tell in public to the press, “We know that Iranians are drug traffickers but because they are OIC [Organization of Islamic Cooperation] members we have to give them a pass. Whereas with the Chinese students, they are so strict with them. And we know from experience, the Chinese students are far better students than the Iranians – most of them are not here for serious studying (MY24, Private

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Education Institution).45

While the leaders of private institutions interviewed in this study do not create national-level policies, their perspectives carry significant weight as context informants with 20 to 30 years of experience each in Malaysian higher education. Their comments unequivocally point to the Malaysian government’s use of religion in higher education as a conduit for closer ties with Muslim students and Islamic states.

In a recent policy document released by the Ministry of Higher Education, the influence of religious heritage in international engagement is also implicit. MOHE’s

Strategic Plan 2007 is currently in Phase II of implementation (2011-15). Calling for a

“paradigm shift” in this phase of implementation, MOHE then released an entire action plan on the use of soft power as its international engagement policy. Titled Malaysia’s

Global Reach: A New Dimension, this plan includes development projects, technical assistance, and training programs for “preferred partner countries.” The following two statements capture the essence of this plan:

Soft power in the higher education sector refers to the capabilities and intentions of institutions to capture the hearts and minds of local and international stakeholders to collectively accept values, ideologies and cultures of learning that can benefit communities. (NHESP2, 2011, p.18)

The aim of this soft power approach is to win over the hearts and minds of the

45 In 2011, in response to a rise in drug trafficking among Iranians in Malaysia, the Director-General of the Immigration Department, Datuk Alias Ahmad, noted that citizens of OIC member states have the right to remain in Malaysia for three months without a visa. He added, “We abide by the policy of allowing them to enter Malaysia without a visa (for three months). So any issue concerning drugs, as long as they have valid documents, proper and genuine passport, we consider them as visitors” (Bernama, 2011).

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preferred partner countries with a long-term view of creating trade of higher education between Malaysia and preferred partner countries. (NHESP2, 2011, p.60)

While this plan never cites Joseph Nye’s work, it draws heavily from his sociological ideas on international relations (i.e., relationship building through educational contacts).

The plan also unabashedly injects economic rationality into soft power because the ultimate goal is to increase trade in higher education once bilateral relations have been strengthened. In fact, a comment from a senior policymaker at MOHE summed up this new action plan as “aid before trade”:

Let them be attracted to us in terms of Malaysia as a society that's willing to help, sharing and things, rather than go there to sell something. So, our idea is aid before trade. Not just go in and trade right away! You must have this concept of aid when you go to Cambodia and Laos. That's why we now have community development… bring our expertise to them, help them with water treatment, water supply… That shows them that we have expertise in rural water supply and community development… They are attracted to those [expertise], then only we can propose to them, ‘Why don't you come to Malaysia to study? We have shown you the skills that we can offer you in Malaysia especially for post-graduate students’ (MY10, MOHE).

In selecting the preferred partner countries, the MOHE lays out two key criteria:

1) the demand for higher education based on age cohort participation rates and 2) financial capability based on the country’s GDP (i.e., the ability to pay for higher education). The plan categorizes countries into nine market segments using a matrix that ranks a country on the two criteria (high, moderate, and low). The preferred partner countries exhibit a moderate to high demand for higher education as well as financial capability (see Table 13).

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Table 13: Market Segments and Preferred Partner Countries.

Demand for Higher Education Preferred Partners High Moderate Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, none Libya, Oman, Qatar, High Saudi Arabia, UAE.

Financial Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Gabon, Botswana*, Capability Jordan, Lebanon, Namibia*, Cape Verde* Morocco, Tunisia, South Swaziland*. Moderate Africa*, Mauritius*, China*, Thailand*.

Source: NHESP2 (2011, p. 28-29) *Not members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The countries in Table 13 are noticeably concentrated in the Middle East. Among the 20 countries with a high demand for higher education, 16 are members of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation while Asian and Latin American countries are noticeably absent.

In 2011, MOHE released a comprehensive internationalization policy report that also recognized Malaysia’s connection with Islamic states as a strength:

Building upon its strategic geographic location in the fastest growing region in the world, a strong base of foreign investment as well as its active role in international organizations such as Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), Malaysia has the right elements to succeed in the global race. (MOHE, 2011c, p. 23)

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Relationship building with Islamic states also includes bilateral agreements that further support reciprocal exchanges, as one policymaker pointed out:

There is an MOU with Islamic countries for higher education. Lately the Islamic countries are sending their students here from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran because of this MOU. We are also sending our students over there. It’s a two-way flow. We are sending our students, especially undergraduates, to Islamic countries. In a way, you can call it, economic trade (MY01, MOHE).

Beyond the purview of the state, many other examples of international engagement via Islamic heritage are also visible at the institutional level. There are far too many to enumerate here, but a few cases are worthy of mention. The Albukhary

Foundation, established by a local businessman and philanthropist, funds several initiatives both nationally and internationally to foster dialogue between the Muslim world and the West as well as to support research on Islamic knowledge. Over the years, it has provided funding for the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia, the

International Islamic University Malaysia, the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and the

Islamic Academy Cambridge. It also offers scholarships to students from underprivileged backgrounds to pursue higher education in Malaysia. Launched in

2005, this program has sponsored over 800 students from 50 countries, and 90% of the students are Muslims (Al Bukhary Education, 2012). In 2007, the Foundation created a separate scholarship program to bring 1,000 Saudi students to Malaysia over the course of four years (Ramkumar, 2007). Another example is the Open University of

Malaysia, which has started collaborations with a Yemeni and Indonesian university as well as the Arab Open University in Bahrain (Anuwar, 2010). These connections not only forge closer ties between Malaysia and other countries through religion and higher education but they also elevate Malaysia as a leader in the area of Islamic studies,

249 research, and dialogue with non-Muslim states.

Islamic Finance Education Hub

Among the various efforts by Malaysian higher education to leverage religion as a platform for international engagement, the most interesting example is the Islamic finance education hub project. Over the last decade, the Malaysian Government has gradually built up Islamic banking as an industry through diligent planning and regulations. This form of banking emerged from grassroots efforts to manage personal savings for the Haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). In 1963, a Malaysian institution was created to manage the Tabung Haji, the collective pilgrims fund. Twenty years later, Bank Islam

Malaysia opened as the first Islamic bank in the country. Today Malaysia has one of the largest Islamic finance markets in the world with assets worth US$ 1 trillion (RM 3.2 trillion) and ownership of 67% of the world’s Islamic bonds (Sukuk) (ETP, 2010). A comprehensive review of Islamic finance and the philosophical debates among Islamic scholars is beyond the scope of this study. However, a few features deserve attention to provide a basic understanding of this niche industry. Unlike conventional banking,

Islamic banking prohibits interest (riba) and uncertainty (gharar). The transfer of debts or risks common in Western financial systems is forbidden under Islamic banking.

Gambling (maisir) and other speculative practices are likewise banned. Instead, Islamic banking aims for wealth distribution by the sharing of debts and risks. Investments must be in ethical ventures compliant with Shariah, the moral and legal code of Islam. For example, the import and export of alcohol is prohibited. The system also supports the giving of alms (zakat) as stipulated under the Quran to further distribute wealth. Some

250 describe Islamic banking as more ethical than conventional banking because of its social justice orientation (Rammal, 2010; Kettell, 2011). Without fluctuating interest rates and speculative practices, Islamic finance is also more conservative and representative of the actual economy compared to conventional banking. Therefore, after the global financial crisis in 2007, Islamic finance began to garner more attention as an alternative system with greater stability. Presently, Islamic financial institutions exist in 75 countries, and secular multinational banks such as Britain’s HSBC and

Singapore’s Overseas-Chinese Bank Corporation have also acquired licenses to conduct Islamic banking (PWC, 2008). In recent years, at least half a dozen business schools in Britain, including the University of East London and Bangor University in

Wales, have set up M.B.A. programs in Islamic finance (Ang, 2013).

In 2006, Malaysia’s central bank, Bank Negara, created the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance. This center is actually a higher education institution dedicated to the teaching and training of scholars and professionals (master and doctorate programs available). In the last few years, Malaysia has been active in sponsoring multilateral meetings around the world to encourage a consensus on

Shariah compliant financial instruments and other regulatory standards. Industry leaders praise Malaysia for its track record in regulating the industry and developing innovative financial products (PWC, 2008). Malaysia is also conveniently adjacent to the world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia, and active in parts of Central Asia, a region rich in Islamic heritage. Despite these advantages, the Malaysian government is only starting to capitalize on its leadership position in Islamic finance. Even though the country owns one of the largest Islamic financial markets in the world, Malaysia only

251 produces 3% of the global talent for the Islamic finance sector (ETP, 2010). Therefore, one of the key objectives of the ETP is to develop the country into an Islamic finance education hub.

Through discussions with planners behind Malaysia’s Islamic finance education hub and observations of a two-day strategic planning session, the objective of generating revenue through education seldom appeared. Members of the planning session were a fascinating mix of finance researchers, religious scholars, and banking professionals. The Ministry of Higher Education provided a grant to fund the work of this planning committee. The head of the planning committee explained the rationale for a national level Muamalat 46 and Islamic finance (MIF) education hub:

It’s not just for revenue generation. I’m looking from macro or satellite view in terms of an education hub. Two things I notice time and again… I notice the mindset still prevails: people are thinking “Well, we want Malaysia to be the gateway for MIF, and people can come and study here. They become professionals and experts. We then have an excellent education hub and can regard ourselves as an international education center for MIF. We will become a point of reference, and we get more money.” No, I don’t see from that point of view. I see Malaysia being the enabler, the education hub being the enabler… that means it enables all parties, all potential stakeholders, students, and etcetera to come here, to learn, to train themselves, to equip themselves with the state of the art technology… and also to be able to share good practices so they can go back to their respective countries and develop something similar over there. We’re talking about the concept of brotherhood and sharing (MY16, Islamic Finance Education).

The focus on talent development (both locals and foreigners) as well as soft power was noticeable in many discussions with these planners. Recruiting international

46 Muamalat is an Arabic word meaning business / trading / commercial transactions.

252 students who can ultimately contribute to the industry of Islamic banking professionally and to society at large as civic leaders is a strong impetus. The Malaysian government also facilitates the recruitment of foreign talent in the area of Islamic finance by offering tax incentives. The strategic planning session was the culmination of a year’s work by the committee in creating a standardized curriculum for Islamic finance education. The committee planned to disseminate this curriculum not only to Malaysian higher education institutions offering programs in Islamic finance but also to foreign universities. Discussions on this curriculum touched on many Islamic values and principles, which are fundamental to Islamic finance. The head of the committee clarified his view on Malaysia as an Islamic finance education hub:

I don’t see ourselves only as a training center. I see ourselves as a motivating and inspirational center. This is an avenue where our local experts will be able to part with not just knowledge but also to motivate and inspire the younger generation, the future leaders of the world. We will continue to groom and nurture them at the best possible level so they do good for mankind when they go back to their respective countries. They will definitely travel the world and continue to preach. I always believe in behavior breeds behavior. So if you display and show good behavior to others, then definitely others will admire you (MY16, Islamic Finance Education).

One committee member explained the impetus for such a hub in the broader context of changes in Malaysian society:

In the early 80s, there was a growing awareness of Islam. Islam has always been our official religion but at that time people became Muslim by birth through their parents. But during the 80s, there was a movement of increasing awareness of Islamic values probably because of the way Islamic knowledge had been disseminated. They used a lot of TVs, radios, and discussions. People started to discuss in a broader perspective (MY17, Islamic Finance Education).

These statements and committee discussions mark a sharp departure from the national discourse on education hub. Rather than focus on revenue generation, the planners of the Islamic finance education hub are more concerned about talent development and

253 soft power. In other words, how can Malaysia contribute to the Islamic world and provide leadership? Furthermore, planners did not confine their interests to the Islamic world either. Instead, they viewed the growing interest in Islamic finance from non-

Muslims and secular banks as an opportunity to transcend religious boundaries and impart values and traditions important to the Muslim community. The realities of international student recruitment and construction of an Islamic finance education hub attest to the importance of religious heritage in Malaysia’s international engagement through higher education. Even if policy text and rhetoric strive to be secular and inclusive, deep-rooted religious and ethnic heritage mediates Malaysia’s pursuit of soft power through higher education.

A second dimension to Malaysia’s international engagement through cultural heritage is the influence of colonial legacy. A quick glance at any list of transnational programs and branch campuses in Malaysia will reveal that institutions from the United

Kingdom and Australia provide the majority of programs. According to one brochure by

Education Malaysia, 75% of the 3+0 degree programs offered in Malaysia come from the U.K. (MOHE, 2011b). Among the eight foreign branch campuses operating in

Malaysia now, six are from the UK and Australia, and two more British universities plan to build branch campuses in the next few years (see Table 14).

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Table 14: Foreign University Branch Campuses in Malaysia

Foreign Branch Campuses Origin Established 1. Monash University Australia 1998 2. Curtin University of Technology Australia 1999 3. University of Nottingham UK 2000 4. Swinburne University of Technology Australia 2004 5. Newcastle University UK 2009 6. Netherlands Maritime Institute of Technology Holland 2011 7. University of Southampton UK 2012 8. Raffles University Singapore 2013 9. Reading University UK 2014 10. Heriot-Watt University UK 2014 11. Xiamen University China 2015

Sources: Foreign University Branch Campus Programmes (MOHE, 2011a) and Current Progress on Catalytic Projects (EduCity, 2012)

While one can certainly attribute the dominance of British and Australian institutions in transnational education to their entrepreneurial spirit in the face of fiscal cutbacks, Malaysia nevertheless exhibits a strong affinity for British norms in education.

The roots of Malaysian higher education trace back to small vocational institutions established by the British colonial government in the early 1900s. British matriculation standards are still widely used in the Malaysian education system today (i.e., O Levels and A Levels). A policymaker involved in the development of Iskandar EduCity explained Malaysia’s educational ties with Britain in the broader context of colonialism:

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Being a Commonwealth country also helps because many Malaysian students have been going to the UK and Australia for a long time. Even the government has been sending more students to UK and Australia compared to the US. So it’s also historical reasons probably. I mean this is my opinion: Malaysians have a closer relationship with the English and Australian universities. In fact, even our chief minister [Johor] was educated at an Australian university and both of his children too (MY23, Iskandar Regional).

From the perspective of private education institutions, partnering with UK and

Australia is a practical decision due partially to demands from students for internationally recognizable degrees that can facilitate academic and professional mobility. As a former university president explained,

It’s pointless to have partnerships with Islamic institutions when no one wants to get a degree from these universities. Therefore, most partners are U.S., UK, Australia, and New Zealand. Islamic partners are only a handful (my09, Private University).

Not only has colonialism reproduced education systems in former colonies as a legacy, but it has also cultivated an insatiable demand for higher education from the colonial powers. Numerous Malaysian research participants interviewed for this study received advanced degrees from the United Kingdom and spoke fondly of their study experiences. These individuals hold senior positions within the government, academia, and the business community. While one may perceive Malaysia as powerless in its academic relationships with the UK, the reality is that Malaysia is leveraging its colonial ties to build an education hub (i.e., attracting institutions from UK and Australia and marketing their pedigrees to international students). The presence of American universities in Malaysia pales in comparison to their British and Australian counterparts.

On the practical level, Malaysia recognizes that many international students place great value on credentials from these Anglophone countries. On a policy level, higher

256 education provides another avenue for Malaysia to maintain ties with Commonwealth states. For example, the Malaysian branch of the Royal Commonwealth Society recently launched a scholarship to attract students from member nations to study in private institutions in Malaysia (ICHS, 2011). The export of Malaysian higher education also reveals close ties to Britain. Presently, few Malaysian HEIs operate branch campuses outside Malaysia. However, the Limkokwing University of Creative

Technology became the first Malaysian university to set up a campus in London in

2007. In 2013, Allianze University College of Medical Sciences, based in Penang, acquired the former site of Middlesex University’s Trent Park campus in London (Tan,

2013). These nascent branch campuses illustrate another form of cultural heritage ties in higher education. Colonial legacy may not be the primary factor steering Malaysia’s international engagement in higher education, but it certainly facilitates ties with

Commonwealth nations.

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Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s approach to relationship building via an education hub mirrors the

Malaysian approach in many ways. Hong Kong is also leveraging cultural heritage to engage with outsiders. However, culture in this instance is broadly defined as ethno- cultural heritage (i.e., Chinese and British) rather than religious heritage. From the perspectives of several policymakers in Hong Kong, an education hub should aim to build ties with foreign students rather than derive profits from them:

If they [international students] return home, they are a student from here. They’re alumni from here, and this is what you build up the network with. It would subtly, directly, indirectly help. And I think that is the softer side, it could be more important. Not the financial side (HK07, University Grants Committee).

In 2010, the Hong Kong Institute of Education hosted a symposium on “The Quest for

Regional Hub of Education in Hong Kong.” In a speech by the head of the Central

Policy Unit, which advises the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Dr. Lau Siu-Kai identified four points for discussion. In his first point, Lau asked rhetorically, “Education hub for what?” and answered:

To become the education hub, one of the aims and goals is to inherit and innovate the Chinese culture for the purpose to revive the Chinese culture. In this connection, the Chinese culture can have greater impact towards the human civilization. Thus, this education hub is not a general education hub, and it is not a hub in anywhere. It is an education hub with cultural mission and ambition. (Lau, 2010)47

The large number of Mainland Chinese students in Hong Kong and the growing links between Hong Kong and Chinese universities attest to the strength of a common

47 Lau’s four discussion points are: 1) education hub for what? 2) education hub for whom? 3) how to serve? and 4) strategies and synergies (Lau, 2010). Some of these points will be discussed later in regional engagement.

258 cultural bond. Mainland students make up over 80% and 90% of the non-local student enrollment in self-funded and UGC-funded programs, respectively (Cheng et. al, 2009).

In discussions with several policymakers from the government and universities, these officials considered this skewed composition of non-local student population as unhelpful for promoting diversity, but they also expressed little desire to change the status quo. The following response from a policymaker illustrates this perspective:

If you look at postgraduate students all over the world, a large percentage of them are from Mainland China. You go to Europe, when you talk about research students almost 80% of them are from China… You go to U.S., of course, the top universities might have more from other countries, but you come to second tier universities and when you talk about postgraduate students they are largely from Mainland China. So I wouldn’t say in Hong Kong that is a significant problem. But diversifying, of course, is much better (HK11, Commission on Strategic Development).

In other words, given that Chinese students are ubiquitous everywhere in the world, why should a special administrative region inside China be alarmed by the same phenomenon? On a practical level, Mainland students can even submit test results from the Chinese entrance exam (gao kao) when applying to Hong Kong universities. More interestingly, some top scorers of the gao kao are now turning down admission offers from the pantheon of Chinese higher education (Peking University and Tsinghua

University) to enroll at Hong Kong universities instead (Sharma, 2011b). Therefore, supporting Mainland Chinese students based on a shared cultural heritage continues to receive substantial support among policymakers in both the government and higher education institutions. Hong Kong’s quasi-Chinese society certainly attracts students and institutions from the Mainland, but it may also turn away some foreign institutions.

For example, when French business school INSEAD was looking for a place in Asia to build a branch campus, its staff felt Hong Kong was too Chinese as a city and opted for

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Singapore instead (Olds & Thrift, 2004).

Like Malaysia, Hong Kong also draws from the legacy of colonialism and cultivates close academic links with Britain. Hong Kong universities now actively recruit international students by promoting its unique Chinese-British heritage and excellence in higher education. Until recently, Hong Kong’s education system was closely aligned with the British one. The scale of cross-border education in Hong Kong is nowhere as large as in Malaysia or Singapore. However, when Hong Kong looks for transnational program providers, Britain is the preferred partner. Currently there are over 1,100 courses in Hong Kong being offered by over 200 non-local institutions (HK01).

Approximately 70% of these transnational programs are from British institutions (HK01;

Matthews, 2013). When asked why British institutions are so dominant in this regard, one policymaker answered:

The legacy of colonialism. British system has been entrenched here the last 100 years. Connection to Britain allows us to articulate to many education systems in the Commonwealth (hk25, Vocational Training Council).

In another interview, a policymaker from the Education Bureau explained that some bureau staff recently returned from a trip promoting Hong Kong higher education in

Brunei and Scotland because the two countries have historical ties to Britain (HK01).

Cultivating relationships based on Chinese culture and the British legacy illustrates the importance of heritage in the development of Hong Kong as an education hub.

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Singapore

Assessing Singapore’s cultural engagement with outsiders and institutions is a challenging task because ethnicity and race are sensitive topics in the country. Opaque policymaking and restrictions on information further constrain research on these topics.

In Singapore, any suggestion that a policy might be culturally or racially biased flies against the government’s very public embrace of multiculturalism and meritocracy.

Since gaining independence in 1965, multiculturalism and meritocracy have functioned as the cornerstone of the Singaporean psyche and set the country apart from its

Southeast Asian neighbors struggling with ethnic tensions (e.g., Malaysia and

Indonesia). The failure of Lee Kuan Yew’s bilingual language policy also illustrates

Singaporeans’ own misgivings about directives that instill cultural heritage.48 Therefore, in both policy documents and interviews with policymakers, developing international ties based on cultural heritage does not appear as an objective for Singapore’s education hub. If anything, Singapore’s policy discourse on education hub is culturally sterile despite the country’s rich heritage in Chinese, Indian, and Malayan traditions. However, like Malaysia, interviews with context informants revealed a more complicated picture of international engagement. Unlike Malaysia, few participants in Singapore were willing to speak openly about ethnic issues.

Since the inception of its education hub, Singapore has never released detailed

48 Soon after it gained independence, Singapore launched its bilingual language education policy requiring every student to learn English as the official language plus his/her mother tongue. This policy was widely regarded as a failure because many families spoke only English at home and the mother tongue curriculum was too difficult and didactic (Wee, 2011). In fact, Lee Kuan Yew himself admitted that bilingualism was the most difficult policy he had to implement (Wee, 2011).

261 statistics on its international students. No research publication or media report contains this information. Some Members of the Parliament have inquired about the composition of the country’s international students, but the Ministry of Education continues to evade the question. The Singapore Tourism Board, which handled the international marketing of higher education until recently, also does not release statistics on foreign students. In interviewing a senior administrator of the Council of Private Education, the person confirmed that data on international student enrollment is kept but not available to the public. Rather, only the total number of students and the top countries of origin can be released. In no particular order, the top sending countries are China, India, Indonesia

Vietnam, Myanmar (SG01). Other reports include Malaysia and South Korea among the top sending countries (Rubin, 2008; Becker & Kolster, 2012).

Through discussions with context informants, some disclosed that the Singapore government has been selectively recruiting students from China for several years now.

The dual objectives of strengthening ties with China and maintaining the ethnic Chinese majority in Singapore drive this strategy. In the1990s, Singapore began to recruit large numbers of Chinese professionals to immigrate to the city-state (Dolven, 1999a). In the last several years, there has been a visible spike in the number of Mainland Chinese students studying in Singapore’s secondary schools. Each year the Singaporean

Government conducts recruitment drives in China using rigorous tests and interviews.

Successful candidates receive generous scholarships to live and study in Singapore and ultimately pursue higher education in Singapore at a local university or foreign branch campus. These youngsters’ mothers, known as “Study Mothers,” receive special visas allowing them to stay in Singapore (Yeoh & Huang, 2010). While the details of this

262 recruitment drive and the scale of its operation remain murky and off the public record, the phenomenon is widely known among Singaporean schoolteachers and social scientists because they have taught these students or witnessed the changing demographics inside schools. Media reports have also highlighted this ethnicity-based recruitment drive (Rubin, 2008). Telltale signs include the multiple student recruitment offices set up in China by the Singapore Tourism Board, faster visa processing for

Chinese students, and the selective recruitment of ethnic Chinese students from

Southeast Asian countries (Rubin, 2008).

Several Malaysian policymakers in this study also noted that Singapore has been aggressively poaching top students from Chinese secondary schools inside Malaysia as long as they can remember. As one former president of a Malaysian private university explained,

Many Malaysians are in Singapore! Top brains! Many are from our Chinese schools. There are 60 independent Chinese secondary schools that do not follow the government curriculum. These were in existence during the time of the British [colonialism]. So when we became independent, the government did not want to touch these schools because the schools wanted to continue using the Chinese medium (my09, Private University).

Through this recruitment effort, many Chinese-Malaysians have completed higher education in Singapore under scholarship funding and ultimately settled in the city-state.

Even if a talented Mainland Chinese or Malaysian-Chinese student leaves Singapore after completing secondary or tertiary education, Singapore still benefits from establishing a connection with this person. Although there is no evidence of an actual policy to selectively recruit ethnic Chinese students, the fact remains that Singapore strategically nurtures a large number of them at all levels of its education system.

Observers have also pointed out similar student recruitment drives in India, Vietnam,

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Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, and the Middle East, but these efforts do not appear as extensive or systematic as the ones targeting ethnic Chinese in China and Malaysia.

In regards to cultivating academic links based on colonial heritage, Singapore is far less sentimental about this than Hong Kong and Malaysia. While British education programs are present in Singapore, the colonial connection was not a sufficient reason for engagement in the minds of policymakers. Among the foreign branch campuses in

Singapore today, few are British. A handful of Singaporeans interviewed for this study hold doctorates from Oxford and Cambridge, but none indicated they were nostalgic or enamored with British higher education. The only research participants who mentioned colonial heritage were two context informants who were not responsible for education hub policymaking:

We are from a UK system, so it’s more familiar to us. Many key senior people in Singapore and Malaysia are UK educated. And also Australia too because of the Colombo Plan. Australia is part of UK system. Why are Australian programs so popular here? Cost! And of course distance and time zone (close to us and in the same time zone) (sg07, Vocational Institute).

The legislature in Singapore is modeled after Westminster in the UK. PM Lee Kuan Yew and his son Lee Hsien Loong (current PM) are both UK educated like a significant number of Singaporean politicians and civil servants. They are very familiar with the UK education system. Our A-Levels and O-Levels are standards linked to the UK education system (sg14, Intellectual Property Legal Expert).

Overall, cultivating relationships based on heritage of any kind appears to be of minor to moderate importance in Singapore’s education hub development. This finding is emblematic of the country’s desire to bury the memories of colonialism and ethnic strife as it continually chases modernization and economic growth – a quintessential

Singaporean narrative. In an interview with the International Herald Tribune, Lee Kuan

Yew once elaborated on this view when explaining Singapore’s trajectory:

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In 1965, we had 20 years of examples of failed states. So, we knew what to do to avoid racial conflict, linguistic strife, and religious conflict. We saw Ceylon. Thereafter, we knew that if we embarked on any of these romantic ideas, to revive a mythical past of greatness and culture, we'd be damned. So, there's no return to nativism. We have left our moorings… Our sources of culture, literature, ideas are now more from the English text than from the Chinese or the Malay or the Tamil. (Lee, 2007)

The apparent lack of a cultural conduit in Singapore’s education hub may also stem from the limitations on social science research in a country with information censorship rather than a true reflection of policy intentions. Without transparency in policymaking and access to statistics on international students, the relevance of cultural heritage to

Singapore’s education hub development remains ambiguous. Singapore might in fact be covertly leveraging its Chinese heritage as a conduit, but it certainly does not constrain itself to a single conduit. A very recent initiative in Singapore does exhibit an interest in cultural heritage: the Yale-NUS liberal arts college. This college specifically infuses Western and Eastern canons of knowledge and celebrates this cultural hybridity, which is unusual in the landscape of Singaporean higher education. Later sections in this chapter will elaborate on the other factors that guide Singapore’s engagement with foreign individuals and institutions as it develops into an education hub.

In summary, the objective of strengthening ties based on cultural heritage is the strongest in Malaysia, moderate in Hong Kong, and weakest (or unsubstantiated) in

Singapore. By melding religion and higher education, Malaysia attempts to exert influence in the Islamic world as a leading nation. It employs strategies such as the recruitment of Muslim students, funding for Islamic studies centres, and the creation of an Islamic finance education hub. In Hong Kong’s case, the education hub melds

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Chinese and British culture with higher education. While non-local students are largely

Chinese and many partnerships are with Chinese universities, the transnational programs in the city are largely British in origin. Hong Kong’s return to China pulls it closer into the orbit of Greater China, yet it strives to maintain its connection to Western modernity. Unlike Malaysia, which deliberately seeks out connection with Islamic states,

Hong Kong’s strong cultural link to China is both a product of policy intention as well as a necessity of geography. Nested at the southern shore of China, Hong Kong inevitably has strong connections to its motherland especially after the 1997 handover. For

Singapore, the promotion of cultural heritage is muted, despite its rich history in diverse societies. Although Singapore selectively recruits ethnic Chinese students from China and Malaysia, this strategy may be more about capitalizing on the unmet demand for higher education in both countries rather than a genuine interest in a shared Chinese heritage. Higher education initiatives in Singapore rarely celebrate cultural heritage.

Without forthcoming information on its international student population and recruitment plan, it is also difficult to assess the role of cultural heritage in Singapore’s academic engagement with the outside world.

With respect to colonial heritage, it is interesting to note that all three societies are former British colonies but only two societies maintain substantial academic links to

Britain and other Commonwealth nations. Many features of the Malaysian education system are remnants of British colonialism. The similarities between the two education systems amplify Malaysia’s uptake of British and Australian transnational education provisions. Until recently, Hong Kong’s education system also mirrored the British system. The large number of British transnational programs in Hong Kong attests to the

266 close academic ties between the two systems. On the contrary, Singapore does not dwell on its colonial past as it continuously seeks out international opportunities. The next section will introduce Singapore’s alternative approach to international engagement.

Networking with Expert Individuals and Institutions Worldwide

Singapore

An alternative to strengthening ties based on cultural heritage is to network with experts worldwide. Among the three education hubs, Singapore pursues this objective the most aggressively as it continually seeks out outsiders for their expertise in education, research, and strategic planning. As Lee Kuan Yew explained once in an interview:

What is absolutely essential is to survive. Never mind the military and security side. More important is the economic prospects. We have to be very different from our neighbors. (Lee, 2007)

The practical considerations of economic competitiveness and relevance demands expertise that can fuel Singapore’s continual growth. This imperative is clearly evident even to a foreign scientist leading an A*STAR research institute:

Our success as a research group depends upon the research that we get done. So we look for strategic partnerships where we either get access to knowledge, materials, or people that will help us toward our ends (sg05, A*STAR Researcher).

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This explicitly pragmatic approach to international engagement values foremost expertise and ultimately a shared vision of the future rather than a shared cultural heritage. Expertise is measured not only in terms of intellectual capital or professional acumen but also in terms of individual or institutional access to greater networks of contacts, which can amplify Singapore’s international engagement. Granted, Malaysia and Hong Kong also pursue foreign experts, but comparatively speaking neither societies exhibit the same level of intensity or depth as Singapore in this regard. The discussion below will illustrate how Singapore exerts soft power by cultivating a global network of experts.

As a small nation, Singapore has a record of seeking out foreign experts that can facilitate its development. Singapore’s former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew was widely known for undertaking exhausting international tours, which connected him with as many experts as possible and introduced these individuals to opportunities in Singapore

(Bock, 2002; Jayakumar, 2011). The task of promoting Singapore Inc. to foreigners has been the raison d'être of the Economic Development Board since it was created over 50 years ago (Schein,1996). Interestingly enough, Singapore created EDB based on the advice of a Dutch economist, Dr. Albert Winsemius, who led a United Nations

Development Programme Survey Mission to Singapore soon after the country gained independence. Winsemius later worked as the country’s chief economic advisor for almost 25 years (1961-84) and contributed significantly to its industrialization process

(Schein, 1996). Today, the EDB is a large organization with over 500 employees spread out over 22 offices in 12 countries. With this network, the task of recruiting foreign education providers to set up operations in Singapore naturally belongs to the EDB

268 rather than the Ministry of Education. On another front, International Enterprise

Singapore (IE) builds Singapore’s external economy by helping local enterprises venture abroad (including higher education institutions). Together, these two agencies have built multiple bridges linking Singapore to expert individuals and institutions worldwide.

The most prominent example of Singapore’s engagement with outside experts is its use of foreign consultants and advisors. Unlike the recruitment of foreign talent for full-time employment in Singapore, this kind of flexible engagement requires less commitment and attracts less public attention. Yet, the contacts can be immensely valuable as Singapore amasses a collection of expert advice. In fact, many of the top foreign scientists working in Singapore today began their relationships with the country as consultants and advisors before making the leap to relocate completely. Fieldwork for this study continuously unearthed efforts by Singapore to connect with individuals and institutions in unexpected locations. For example, in its effort to diversify pathways to higher education, the Ministry of Education recently sent a fact-finding mission to study alternative models of higher education in several countries – an effort reminiscent of the early days of comparative education research in Europe and planning by the Meiji

Government of Japan in the late 1800s. This Singaporean team visited institutions in

Finland, Germany, Hong Kong, as well as the University of Waterloo and University of

Toronto in Canada (MOE, 2012c). Each year the Ministry of Education also sends small teams of school administrators on similar missions to learn about the latest innovations

269 in education from around the world.49

A glance at the board membership of the key agencies involved in the development of Singapore’s education hub reveals a significant number of eminent foreign experts. For example, at the Economic Development Board, nine out of 14 board members are foreign chief executives representing multinational companies (e.g.,

Siemens, Samsung, and Chevron). Foreigners also constitute at least half of A*STAR’s

Biomedical Research Council Board and the Science and Engineering Council Board.

Sydney Brenner, a Nobel laureate of South African origin, has contributed significantly to Singapore’s development as a research center for over a decade. He continues to advise the Biomedical Research Council. Government review committees and strategic planning teams also frequently include foreign experts (e.g., reviews conducted after the

Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and recession in 2008). Senior leadership in Singapore maintains close contacts with advisors such as Harvard Business School professor

Michael Porter, a leading authority on competitive strategies and economic development, and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Porter’s close ties to

Singapore grants him access to economic data for performance evaluation and theory testing. Today, Porter is the lead advisor for the Asia Competitiveness Institute at the

National University of Singapore. Sometimes Singapore engages with expert individuals and institutions simultaneously to maximize the impact of relationship building. In 2006,

Singapore recruited the husband-and-wife team of Edward Holmes and Judith Swain

49 I personally met and advised a group of five Singaporean vice-principals who were planning a fact- finding mission to schools in the Greater Toronto Area as well as the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.

270 from the University of California San Diego. Both were previously on advisory panels for education and research in Singapore. In addition to appointing Holmes as the deputy chair of the Biomedical Research Council at A*STAR’s and Swain as the head of the

Institute for Clinical Sciences, Singapore also funded a new grant program at the

University of California San Diego with $1.8 million USD (Somers, 2006). Holmes and

Swain were tasked to connect Singapore to the biomedical research community in San

Diego (Joint Press Release, 2006), a city that boasts the prestigious Salk Institute established by the inventor of the polio vaccine Jonas Salk and staffed by long-term luminaries such as Sydney Brenner. After their arrival in Singapore, Holmes and Swain also advised NTU on building a new medical school with the Imperial College of London

(MOE, 2009). Swain also sits on the steering committee for the Singapore-Stanford

Biodesign program. These overlapping ties maximize Singapore’s influence in the world of research.

Two examples of institutional partnerships that illustrate Singapore’s prowess at expanding ties through education are its partnerships with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Wharton School of Pennsylvania. MIT’s first significant project in Singapore took place between 1991-96 when more than two-thirds of its faculty of the Sloan School of Management traveled to Singapore to help set up the

NTU School of Accountancy and Business (MIT, 1998). In 1997, Singapore asked MIT to evaluate NUS and NTU’s engineering programs. One of the conclusions from this evaluation was that program graduates were not entrepreneurial enough (Sidhu,

2009a). Singapore then invited MIT to enter into a trilateral partnership with NUS and

NTU to improve their programs. Launched in 1998, the Singapore-MIT Alliance (SMA)

271 aimed to promote global engineering education and research collaborations.50 Distance education and joint graduate programs connected students in Cambridge and

Singapore. A separate initiative, the Singapore-MIT Gambit Game Lab, was later created to focus on video game research for six years (2006-12). More importantly, in

2007, MIT selected Singapore as the location for its first research institute outside

Cambridge: the Singapore-MIT Alliance for Research and Technology (SMART). In

2010, MIT further expanded its presence by assisting the creation of the Singapore

University of Technology and Design (SUTD), the fourth university in the country. With at least SGD $1 billion (USD $771 million) from the Singaporean government to build this new university, MIT President Susan Hockfield called this venture “MIT’s most extensive collaboration with an overseas educational institution to date” (Hockfield as cited in MIT, 2010). MIT’s role is to provide the curriculum, train the new faculty members, and conduct joint research with SUTD. SUTD’s inaugural president is former

MIT Dean of Engineering, Thomas Magnanti. The third partner in creating this new university is China’s Zhejiang University, which provides insights into the Chinese consumer market and links students to internship and employment opportunities in

China.51 In a discussion with a senior administrator of SUTD, it was quite apparent that members of this triumvirate contribute different forms of capital: intellectual capital from

50 Singapore’s then Deputy Prime Minster and Defense Minister, Tony Tan, was instrumental in directing NTU and NUS to enter this partnership. He is an alumnus of MIT (obtained a master degree there in 1964).

51 Zhejiang University is designing five elective courses for SUTD students to understand the Chinese consumer market better. For example, the courses include "Business Culture and Entrepreneurship in China," "Sustainability of Ancient Chinese Architectural Design in the Modern World," and "History of Chinese Urban Development and Planning" (Young, 2010).

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MIT, financial capital from Singapore, and socio-cultural capital from Zhejiang. While

MIT is the de facto brain behind this new university, SUTD is not a carbon copy of MIT.

Rather, this “concept university” provides an opportunity for MIT to experiment with teaching methods and curricula that are otherwise impossible in its home campus due to program constraints and resource limitations (Young, 2010). In effect, Singapore and

SUTD students are the first beneficiaries of the latest innovations in engineering education even if pedagogical ideas emanate from MIT. MIT leaders expect that the lessons learned in Singapore will ultimately shape its programs at Boston in the future

(Young, 2010). Over the years, MIT has also placed its students in internships at

Singaporean research institutes and companies. MIT Professional Education, which normally delivers continuing education courses in Cambridge, has also provided courses in Singapore by drawing on the work of its faculty posted there (MIT, 2009). By deepening its ties with MIT, Singapore aligns itself closer to a world-class higher education institution and influences MIT’s activities in teaching, research, faculty development, and internationalization. In return, MIT views Singapore as a valuable foreign partner and the relationship as a template for partnerships with other foreign governments (e.g., building MIT research institutes in Abu Dhabi and Russia, in 2007 and 2011, respectively).

In a similar fashion, Singapore built its third university, Singapore Management

University (SMU), by drawing on the expertise of the Wharton School of Business,

University of Pennsylvania. Established in 2000, SMU’s inception relied on Wharton for its curriculum design, faculty development, and research. SMU’s inaugural president was Janice Bellace, former deputy dean of the Wharton School. Wharton and the

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Nanyang Business School also operate a joint executive education program requiring participants to spend time in both Singapore and Philadelphia (Nanyang-Wharton

Senior Leaders Programme). In addition, the Wharton-INSEAD Alliance brings together two top business schools in the world and allows its students to take courses at four campuses: INSEAD in Fontainebleau (France) and Singapore; Wharton in Philadelphia and San Francisco. Singapore also recently built two new institutions using the same approach of leveraging foreign expertise: the Yale-NUS liberal arts college and the Lee

Kong Chian School of Medicine, which is a joint venture between NTU and Imperial

College London. These two institutions began accepting students in 2012 and 2013, respectively. With these institutions, Singapore taps into foreign expertise for capacity building, inserts itself into powerful multilateral partnerships, and acts as a location for training elite students (both local and foreign) in diverse disciplines.

Although Singapore’s engagement with foreign experts suggests a simplistic utilitarian approach based on merit, discussion with a policymaker at the Economic

Development Board, who was involved in the Global Schoolhouse initiative, revealed a second dimension to this courtship that is not always visible to the public. In EDB’s worldwide recruitment of higher education institutions to set up operations in Singapore, merit was merely the minimum criterion. After all, the precursor to the Global

Schoolhouse initiative was the World-class University Program. Therefore, EDB only seeks out foreign institutions of great distinction. However, something else is even more important than merit as the EDB policymaker explained,

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When we select partners, yes, we try to fit our needs. But you can see you’re trying to select to fit several things. The first question is: are they strategically aligned? Their vision and our vision. Because when you want to do a partnership that lasts, you’re doing a marriage. You’ve got to make sure your worldview is the same. What is the kind of vision you have where you are for each other? How do you grow old together? …Don’t marry somebody who is fundamentally different. It doesn’t mean you can’t collaborate or can’t do programs. Don’t do serious strategic alignment that way (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

The issue of shared vision appeared several times in this interview. Merit by itself was insufficient for forming institutional partnerships. At a deeper level, Singapore is seeking a philosophical alignment that will sustain its education hub over the long run. The EDB policymaker explained this courtship process further by sharing anecdotes of negotiating with elite foreign universities:

Some of these partnerships they look complex from the outside, and they come down to very fundamental things. What is your ambition? So I asked some top universities like Harvard, ‘What is your ambition? What is your internationalization strategy?’ Harvard’s internationalization strategy is everybody comes to me [Boston]. I said, ‘OK sounds good. See you next year.’ Harvard asked me, ‘What is your vision?’ And I say, ‘We want to be a hub for diverse programs, attract the best talent in Asia and beyond, to then engage with the industries so we have a tripartite of research, education, and industry… all working together and building an ecosystem where talent benefits, research benefits, and industry benefits.’ They looked at me and go, ‘You want Harvard in Singapore? What have you been smoking?’ They think we’re crazy. There’s no alignment! Now, I’ve also talked to Oxford and other top universities. On the other hand, you can talk to MIT. They say, ‘You know, what you say sounds interesting because our vision is to tap the talent of the world. And that doesn’t necessarily mean that everybody goes to MIT [in Boston]’ (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

From these comments, it is clear that Singapore chases leading experts and institutions worldwide not only for their expertise and utility but also for a common understanding of the preferred future – a future reliant on the knowledge economy with very liberal views about the delivery of education and the conduct of research. These linkages with

275 experts and institutions weave a powerful network of global connections that supports

Singapore’s growth and development far beyond its education sector. Agencies such as the Economic Development Board, IE Singapore, and A*STAR are highly skilled at pursuing all types of linkages that can accommodate different commitments in time and scope. The linkages range from short-term consultations to medium-term research projects to long-term operation of institutions. The examples listed above constitute only a tiny fraction of a larger phenomenon in Singapore. Networking with foreign experts and institutions is deeply ingrained throughout Singapore as a means to cultivate relationships and accrue soft power.

Becoming a Regional Leader and Broker

Another key objective in the development of soft power is to become a regional leader and broker using an education hub. Education hub policymakers frequently expressed concerns over the relative standing of their society in the region. Their concerns are not merely about economic competitiveness, but they also speak about educational advancements, social progress, and international leadership. However, these policymakers rarely define the region in discussion. Analysis of their comments reveals divergent views on two important issues in the regional dimension of education hubs: the scale of “region” and the purpose of regional engagement. Implicit in the comments by many policymakers is the definition of region as a collection of nation- states in a defined geographic area (e.g., Asia or Southeast Asia). This supranational

276 interpretation is typical in the field of international relations (Hettne, 2005). Furthermore, education hub policymakers conceive region more as a sphere to exert influence rather than to engage in collective action (i.e., their interests are not about regional pacts, regional integration or regionalization). While nation-states figures prominently in the conception of region among policymakers, a closer examination also reveals alternative interpretations of region that employ other markers: economic development, scientific capacity, cultural and civilizational heritages. Some education hubs also use “region” to refer to a sub-national area. These divergent interpretations of region become apparent only by juxtaposing the views of policymakers within an education hub and across education hubs.52 The volume of remarks on “region” in this study warrants the inclusion of regional engagement as an important objective under the rationale of soft power development.

A discussion of education hubs’ regional engagement first requires a clarification between the role of regional leader and a regional broker. At the most basic level of understanding, this regional role is not confined to the core activities of higher education: teaching, learning, and research. While many education hubs worldwide are keen to become a regional leader in these academic activities, there are also clear signs that higher education is merely a vehicle or catalyst for greater ambitions of a regional scale as the discussion will show later. In brief, a regional leader aims to excel

52 This form of comparison is reminiscent of the vertical and horizontal comparison advocated by comparative education scholars Francis Vavrus and Lesley Bartlett (2006). But rather than examine the different levels of stakeholders (e.g., policymakers, teachers, and students) across jurisdictions, the approach here uses the same level of stakeholders (i.e., diverse policymakers) drawn from three jurisdictions.

277 or dominate by rising above the rest of a collective. Power in this sense stems from exercising comparative advantages and specialized knowledge in a zero-sum fashion.

This approach resonates with the realist framework in international relations even though the pursuit is not military power. On the other hand, a regional broker aims to mediate between two or more parties (e.g., institutions, countries, regions). This mediatory role accrues power for the broker as it operates as a critical node between parties. A broker must therefore exhibit sensitivity toward different worldviews and gain the trust of the parties involved rather than act independently – this approach illustrates the constructivist framework in international relations, which is more dynamic and collaborative. In other words, a regional broker views power as relational while a regional leader views power as exclusive. An education hub can pursue both forms of power simultaneously as the discussion below will illustrate. The common goal is to gain influence within a defined space or spaces. Space is the operative term here because it encompasses both physical and conceptual regions. The following discussion will use examples from the three education hubs to further clarify the distinction between regional leadership and brokerage.

Malaysia

In Malaysia’s international engagement, there is a strong desire to exert influence at a regional level through its education hub. Despite the shortcomings of its government, Malaysia has managed to perform relatively well economically compared to its Southeast Asian neighbors in recent years. In interviews, both government policymakers and non-government leaders often referred to Malaysia as a regional

278 center or hub for higher education rather than the “international education hub” as described in many promotional materials. The following comments from policymakers at the Ministry of Higher Education address this discrepancy:

Actually the two [regional and international] are interchangeable. When you say international, to be practical, we mean regional. But even becoming regional is very difficult. But if you’re talking about step-by-step push, it’s better to do first what is attainable rather than high sounding and so on where you do very well from day one – it’s not going to happen (MY03, MOHE).

Of course we want to go international. I think there is a distinction between what is regional and what is international. It is not just geographical. It’s not just putting ourselves there but also making us accepted by our neighboring countries first – basically to test the ground, to test the water to see how things go. But it’s not planned or structured in the sense that we go regional first and then we go international… It is about getting that recognition (MY02, MOHE).

These comments reflect the Ministry’s concern with the country’s standing in Southeast

Asia both in exclusive and relational terms. In its Internationalization Policy 2011,

MOHE identified several priorities with a regional scope: building regional research centres, creating regional studies programs, and engaging with regional associations

(MOHE, 2011c). In a discussion with one MOHE policymaker responsible for system- wide planning, the person cited Malaysia’s “prosper thy neighbor” policy:

If you want to prosper, your neighbours must also prosper. If you are the only one that is prosperous, in the long run you will end up not prosperous because no one else is there (MY01, MOHE).

Conceiving prosperity in relational terms is also evident in MOHE’s strategic plan

“Malaysia’s Global Reach” (NHESP2, 2011), which emphasizes development aid:

Global engagement presents the new yardstick in measuring efforts for the internationalization of Malaysian higher education where Malaysia can put to use her experience to facilitate sustainable and transformative development of the higher education sector. This is in line with the Prosper-Thy-Neighbour policy that has been adopted by Malaysia in reducing the developmental gap amongst members of ASEAN countries. (NHESP2, 2011, p. 23)

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Implicit in this statement is the desire to become a leader of education in the Southeast

Asia region. The goal is for Malaysia to exert influence as a respected country with expertise in higher education. Although this aid policy is commendable, in reality it translates largely into student recruitment for the time being. Presently, most Malaysian higher education institutions are not engaged in development aid projects. MOHE’s

“Malaysia’s Global Reach” is a very new policy that speaks more about aspirations than reality. In discussions with both government policymakers and leaders of private higher education institutions, the topic of regional engagement often elicits examples of student recruitment and education fairs. Specifically, Malaysian research participants are keen to recruit students from the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam).

As one senior member of the Malaysian Association of Private Colleges and

Universities explained,

I would be wasting a lot of money if I go to Canada to recruit. No point. Same for USA. I would be wasting a lot of money if I go to Australia to recruit as well! So I might as well go to these developing countries nearby (my08, MAPCU).

Malaysia is also very active in Southeast Asian initiatives in higher education. In 2008,

SEAMEO RIHED collaborated with the Malaysian Quality Assurance Agency to help establish the ASEAN Quality Assurance Network (AQAN).53 Malaysia is currently participating in the developmental phase of SEAMEO’s credit transfer system

(Singapore is not involved). It is also one of the states behind the Malaysia-Indonesia-

Thailand (M-I-T) Student Mobility Programme Pilot Project. Launched in 2009, this

53 SEAMEO is the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation. RIHED is the Regional Center for Higher Education and Development, which is located in Bangkok, Thailand.

280 program hopes to become a model of student mobility and contribute to higher education harmonization in Southeast Asia (SEAMEO, 2010).

A closer examination of Malaysia’s regional engagement reveals that its activities are not confined to Southeast Asia as some of its policy statements may suggest.

Rather, the de facto region is developing countries worldwide. As a middle-income country on the cusp of becoming a developed economy, Malaysia retains the credibility and insight to understand the plight of Third World nations more so than Hong Kong,

Singapore, or any advanced Asian economy. MOHE’s strategic plan on global engagement clearly favors developing nations in the Middle East and Africa as recipients of Malaysian higher education aid (see NHESP2, 2011). In an interview with a member of the National Economic Action Council, the importance of attracting students from developing nations was apparent:

When you train people in Malaysia they will then have links and affinity for the country. We have seen some of the advantages and benefits of this. For example, key people in Turkey, one is now the foreign minister and I think one is an advisor to the Prime Minister. They were educated at the Islamic University in Malaysia. So they have close [connections with Malaysia]… same thing with people in Africa. So the policy is good for developing countries that are coming up that we get to know their potential leaders (MY13, Member of National Economic Action Council).

Another policymaker acknowledged the role of students from developing countries in

Malaysia’s evolution as an education hub:

When we had franchising [programs], we also realized it attracted students regionally – the influx of Indonesians coming to study, then there were South Asians, and Africans. I think it was just a progress, a process that happened. Of course initially it was just for Malaysians [students] but now we realize we can really become an education hub (MY18, Prime Minister’s Office).

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Region is therefore conceived as the sphere of developing nations rather than the geographical area of Southeast Asia. By using the level of economic development as a marker for a larger collective, Malaysia seeks to expand its influence beyond its physical vicinity. This realist approach also entails a socially constructed sense of solidarity among developing nations. For example, a former president of a private university deduced that Malaysian education programs are equally relevant to other developing nations when explaining the accreditation process set up by the MOHE:

When we submit the application [to MOHE to start a new program], we have to give the rationales on why we want to start this program. And because Malaysia is a developing country and the students who come to us are also from developing countries, so whatever is applicable to us applies to these people (my09, Private University).

According to some policymakers, Malaysia’s rapport with developing nations can be traced back to its foreign policy under Prime Minister Mahathir. During Mahathir’s tenure

(1981-2003), Malaysia actively engaged with Third World nations. One policymaker who specializes in international relations reflected on the evolution of this policy:

Previously, Mahathir always wanted to champion the developing mandate but now it’s a bit less in terms of philosophy [ideology]. Now it’s mixed between being developing country and being potential economic benefits and such. So this is now a combination of both in terms of strategic role of this country plus the economic relationships (MY13, National Economic Action Council).

A foreign policy of solidarity tempered by neoliberal promises is obvious in

MOHE’s latest internationalization policy: Malaysia’s Global Reach. This policy identifies developing countries that have a reasonable level of income as the ideal partners for

Malaysian higher education. Developing countries that have very low GDPs (i.e., financial capability) are therefore not ideal partners (NHESP2, 2011). This approach to regional engagement in higher education infuses aid with self-interest rather than

282 provide purely unconditional aid. In effect, this is a marriage of neoliberalism and realism for the sake of gaining soft power. The following summary statement in

“Malaysia’s Global Reach” captures this marriage:

The only way Malaysian higher education can survive the test of time and competition is by leveraging on its niche areas and sharing knowledge generated to a wider audience and society at large, particularly countries which are currently developing their higher education systems. This approach of global engagement is not only noble but could also bring long term loyalty, brand equity and positive goodwill to Malaysian higher education. Malaysia now stands on solid ground in this respect as the country has a good reputation among Muslim countries as well as neighboring ASEAN countries such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam. As such, we are in a strong position to lead global engagement initiatives that could earn Malaysia not just excellent reputation but potentially leveraging it for good returns of investment in the future. (NHESP2, 2011, p. 26)

The promise of neoliberalism is also evident in the regional scope of EduCity

Iskandar even though it defines region differently. First, Iskandar is a sub-national region. Second, rather than target developing nations that can afford cross-border higher education, Iskandar EduCity aims to appeal to two types of actors: 1) local and foreign students seeking quality education in the vicinity of southern Malaysia, and 2) any education provider seeking a regional foothold. This approach carves out an amorphous region based on a market demand for education rather than one based on sovereign borders or cultural heritage. In many promotional materials for EduCity

Iskandar, the following statement appears:

Iskandar Malaysia is strategically located within eight hours flight time from major cities in Asia, ideal for international players to build market presence and to be closer to their student catchment market in Asia. (IRDA, 2011, p. 26)

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Foreign policy and state-to-state relations are thus far removed from the minds of

Iskandar policymakers as they construct an economic zone. Engagement based on market demand trumps traditional notions of diplomacy. For instance, in explaining the origin of EduCity Iskandar, nearly every policymaker cited the phenomenon of thousands of Malaysian students commuting to Singapore each day for schooling.

Border patrols in both countries are accustomed to processing this daily ebb and flow of youngsters. This extreme example of student mobility is possible only because of the proximity between Malaysia and Singapore. By setting up education institutions in

Iskandar, Malaysia hopes to educate more students on the home turf. Concurrently,

Iskandar is also recruiting Singaporean enterprises, which include private education institutions, and students from Singapore (locals and expatriates). The availability of land and the lower operational costs in Malaysia appeal to Singaporean enterprises. In fact, price levels in Johor Bahru, the state capital in southern Malaysia, are lower than

Bangkok or Jakarta (IRDA, 2011). A context informant in Malaysia explained the regional dimension of Iskandar in practical terms:

Iskandar was, I believe, started as an important project to create economic activity in the southern most tip of peninsula Malaysia, right next door to Singapore. So if you look into the future… Singapore has limited land size. Whatever additional land they want, they have to reclaim from the sea and that’s very expensive. It’s cheaper if they just cross over into Malaysia – 20 minutes later they’re in Malaysia. Same people, same language. So Khazanah felt they should develop the southernmost part into a center for many things – education is just one of them. Universities don’t need a lot of land. Plantations you need a lot of land. If you have 10 universities, that’s enough (my09, Private University).

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A policymaker at IE Singapore confirmed that Singaporean higher education institutions are keenly monitoring the developments in Iskandar:

Singapore’s private education institutions are certainly very interested in expanding to Malaysia. They’re not only looking at Iskandar even though that certainly provides opportunities (SG21, International Enterprise Singapore).

The largest private education provider in Asia-Pacific, Raffles Education, is a

Singaporean corporation with 23 years of history. Raffles recently opened an international school and a university in Iskandar. Another long-standing private institution in Singapore, the Management Development Institute Singapore (MDIS), will also establish an institute in Iskandar. At the newly opened Marlborough College

Malaysia, an elite British boarding school, approximately half the students come from

Singapore (Ang & Kwok, 2012). In fact, Singapore is the largest foreign investor in the

Iskandar economic zone having poured $2 billion USD since the zone was created in

2006 (UEM Land taps land-starved Singapore, 2013). In essence, Iskandar has become

Singapore’s de facto hinterland. With an increasing population in a confined space and ambitions for greater economic growth, Singapore finds it difficult to resist the opportunities offered by an economic zone located only 15 km away. Prime Minister

Najib of Malaysia reflected on this bilateral venture:

I told Prime Minister Hsien Loong [of Singapore], “I don’t mind, you can be the Manhattan, we’ll be New Jersey. But we’ll prosper together” (Najib as cited in UEM Land taps land-starved Singapore, 2013).

While region in this instance is one defined by market potential rather than cultural or national borders, the objective is nevertheless for Malaysia to exert influence as a regional leader in education and training.

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Also, as the previous discussion on cultural heritage has shown, Malaysia’s education hub engages specifically with Islamic states. One can view the Islamic civilization as a conceptual region without the constraints of geography. One member of the National Economic Action Council explained Malaysia’s role as one of brokerage rather than leadership:

Important to us are Muslim countries because of ties, social ties and close affinity, and we feel we could be the gateway for other people to enter and have relationships with these other [Muslim] countries. So we are quite close to the Middle East (MY13, National Economic Action Council).

The role of a gateway is in essence a mediator between two parties. From this perspective, Malaysia can be the interlocutor between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations. Interestingly, this objective of becoming a gateway between civilizations was not a dominant theme in discussions with most Malaysian policymakers – at least for its national education hub initiative. The absence of this objective in most interviews might be due to political sensitivities over the place of religion in higher education. On the other hand, planners behind the country’s Islamic finance education hub had no hesitation in emphasizing the role of brokerage. The comment below from a planner illustrates this view:

The education hub will not be comprised of just local experts. We provide the avenue, the platform. Therefore, we can have various other experts from all over the world congregate in Malaysia. Physically they can be here to train internationals. If they cannot be here, the world of connectivity… we can go via Internet, video-conferencing, so that classes can be conducted in that manner so you don’t necessarily have to be in Malaysia physically (MY16, Islamic Finance Education Hub).

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As the planner emphasized, physical constraints should not hinder the role of a broker.

Rather, the main objective is for Malaysia to act as the facilitator and thereby exert influence in the teaching, training, and practice of Islamic finance. Malaysian planners hope that other jurisdictions interested in teaching Islamic finance will adopt the standard curriculum they recent developed. In effect, region is defined as a civilization rather than a collection of adjacent nation-states.

In conclusion, Malaysia’s regional engagement through higher education aims to place itself as a leader in education and training among developing nations and the

Islamic civilization. In its recent internationalization policy, Malaysia’s Global Reach, the

Ministry of Higher Education calls this policy “aid before trade.” Without limiting itself to

Southeast Asia, the selected partner countries in this policy are largely developing countries in the Middle East and Africa with a reasonable level of income to afford higher education services. Region, in this sense, is the sphere of Third World nations with modest income levels. On another front, EduCity Iskandar defines region as an area with market demand for education services. Finally, Malaysia’s Islamic finance education hub seeks to exert influence both as a regional leader and broker whereby region is a civilization. These overlapping definitions of regions provide a framework for international engagement by Malaysia as an education hub.

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Singapore

As a highly developed nation well embedded in the global economy, Singapore rarely confines its engagement to its locale of Southeast Asia even though it is one of the five founding members of ASEAN. Unlike Malaysian policymakers, few

Singaporeans interviewed for this study expressed an interest in Southeast Asia or the desire to contribute to its development. In response to the question about the regional dimension of its education hub, a senior member of the Economic Development Board, the agency responsible for the Global Schoolhouse initiative, answered:

So if you ask us: are we aiming for regional or international hub? There’s no such thing as regional hubs. You’ve got to be international. We can’t afford [to be] regional. What’s our region? ASEAN? Come on, what’s that? If you’re relevant only to ASEAN, you can’t grow. Now, do we want to be relevant in ASEAN? Yes, because you want to be relevant to your neighbors. But Singapore is in a neighborhood which is less developed than it is – that’s useful. And we want to help that, but we also need to be relevant to a global economy, a global business thing because they are the ones with the money to buy our stuff. So, innovation hub has to be international. In terms of the market, it’s international. In terms of the ideas, it has to be international (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

Singapore is largely absent from many current initiatives by SEAMEO-RIHED, the

ASEAN unit for higher education collaborations, even though it founded the precursor of

RIHED in 1959. RIHED was reorganized and established in Thailand in 1993.

If Southeast Asia appeared in discussions with Singaporean policymakers, it was often limited to the region’s unmet demand for higher education and Singapore’s unrivaled development in relative terms. Like Malaysia, Singapore recognizes the value in recruiting students from nearby developing countries. The same policymaker explained the benefits of this kind of regional engagement:

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If you look at the top five markets of international students who come here: China, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia (not in that order)… Look at Vietnam, we have huge alumni there. Huge alumni in Myanmar. And now that Myanmar is opening up, guess what? So it’s useful. Myanmar only came much later. But Indian, Chinese, Malaysians, and Indonesian students have been coming for a long time. You can see instinctively and logically that it makes sense [to recruit regionally] (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

This very limited yet pragmatic connection with Southeast Asian nations is essentially an investment in social capital to further Singapore’s economic interests in the region.

As the case of Myanmar indicates in the above comment, Singapore wants to ensure it has advocates to facilitate its interests when emerging markets open up.

In the minds of Singaporean policymakers, the region of utmost importance is pan Asia rather than Southeast Asia. Despite the rhetoric of an international education hub and the presence of numerous American and European branch campuses, there are many examples of Singapore exerting influence in Asia through higher education, research, and policymaking. Singapore is far too strategic to ignore the unbridled opportunities Asia can offer with two of the world’s emerging giants (China and India) and several New Industrializing Economies (NIEs) nearby. In interviews, some

Singaporean policymakers pointed to the present economic woes of United States and

Europe to underscore the necessity of engaging with Asia. Presently, Singapore is implementing an array of strategies to gain influence in Asia. Unlike other education hubs that rely on student recruitment as their main approach to soft power, this conventional strategy represents only a small fraction of Singapore’s connection with

Asia. For example, Lily Kong, NUS’ Vice President of University and Global Relations, emphasized the influence Singapore can exert in policymaking by creating the Yale-

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NUS liberal arts college:

NUS and Yale hope to introduce fundamental innovations in education that could serve as a model for others in Asia, and that may help reshape approaches to liberal arts education in existing institutions including Yale itself (Kong as cited in Contact Singapore, 2011).

Influence stems from providing innovative education programs that can be modeled elsewhere. In the parlance of comparative education, Singapore would become the template for policy borrowing.

Singapore’s most visible example of regional engagement with Asia is the control tower phenomenon. For many decades now, the country has been aggressively promoting itself as the ideal location for multinational companies (MNCs) to set up their regional headquarters. With English as an official language, a solid infrastructure for transportation and communication, a business-friendly environment, and little corruption, Singapore has attracted approximately 7,000 multinational companies. A regional office coordinates a company’s entire operation in Asia like a control tower.

More recently, Singapore is promoting itself as the location for corporate training. A board member of the EDB, who was also an industry leader, summarized the control tower as follows:

We are running short of land, so we need to have control towers here. So, we need to attract large companies to locate their regional CEOs here, regional finance people, regional treasury people. So all the brain power. We call it the control tower of MNCs. We want them to be here. And we say, “You can have your manufacturing in China, in India, but put your brains in Singapore” (SG17, EDB Board).

Although the control tower phenomenon is not new, several Singaporean policymakers used the control tower metaphor repeatedly when explaining the impetus for its education hub. For example, a member of the 2009 Economic Strategies Committee

290 referred to the regional opportunity for Singapore:

Singapore is becoming more and more the corporate headquarters because if you think about a big company that has a location in Manhattan, another location in London, and another in Dubai, these places are not the only place they do business. They are the corporate headquarters for those areas, and they run and manage the whole region from there. So Singapore is saying “we should be the same” (SG20, Member of the 2009 Economic Strategies Committee).

Even an A*STAR policymaker involved in drafting research policies was cognizant of the regional dimension of Singapore’s future. In explaining how A*STAR selects foreign partners, this policymaker remarked:

What we bring to the table is to partner with anyone who is interested in coming to Asia. So we have a very strong relationship with America, Canada, Europe, and Japan. We offer joint PhDs for research, joint partnerships with universities... It’s basically talent and training people for the ecosystem (SG04, A*STAR).

Further evidence of Singapore’s selective engagement with Asia can be seen in

EDB’s latest effort to promote Singapore. Rather than just invite multinational companies to set up a regional outpost, EDB now appeals to these companies to establish permanent roots in the country:

With its “Host to Home” strategy, EDB aims to move Singapore from being a host to companies to become a home where business, innovation and talent are nurtured (EDB, 2013).

This strategy presents Singapore in three variations: Home for Business, Home for

Innovation, and Home for Talent (EDB, 2013). This strategy is essentially a summation of the different initiatives under EDB’s auspice over the last few decades. Education hub and higher education appear under the talent section in EDB’s new policy. EDB highlights Asia in this strategy and calls Singapore the “education hub for the region”:

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“Home for Talent” is about positioning the country as a hub where talent is harnessed and developed to drive business and innovation in Asia. (EDB, 2013)

An example of this strategy is the Nepal Hill initiative. While the Global Schoolhouse initiative receives little attention in Singapore’s media these days, there is great interest in Nepal Hill, an area designated by the government for establishing business schools and conducting research on human resource issues in the Asian context (JTC, 2010).

Led by EDB, this initiative is called LINK, which stands for Leadership Initiatives,

Networks and Knowledge. The chairman of the EDB explained the purpose of Nepal

Hill:

The idea is to develop a strong physical cluster of leading business schools, professional services firms and corporate universities that will foster collaboration and leverage the strengths of one another. This cluster will generate new thought and practice leadership on talent management and leadership development in Asia, for Asia and the world. Business schools and human capital consultancies will work together with corporate universities to develop new knowledge and practices on developing leaders and human capital for companies in Asia, for Asia and beyond. (Yip, 2011)

An example of a corporate university at Nepal Hill is one built by Unilever, an Anglo-

Dutch consumer goods giant that owns over 400 brands. Named “Unilever Four Acres

Singapore,” this university specializes in global leadership development and aims to cultivate future business leaders (EDB, 2013). Unilever aims to deliver half of its corporate training in Singapore (i.e., training 900 leaders per year) in conjunction with local universities such as the Singapore Management University. Whether Singapore acts as control tower or a talent magnet, Singapore is in effect operating as a regional broker for Asia by liaising with third party actors (e.g., governments, companies, universities, researchers, and investors). Through this intermediary role, Singapore

292 exerts tremendous influence throughout Asia far beyond what its size may suggest. The role of brokerage appears again and again in many Singaporean initiatives, as the following examples will illustrate.

Singapore’s recent drive to become an innovation center is intimately tied to its regional engagement. Contrary to the grandiose vision presented by a few policymakers during interviews and perpetuated by some observers, Singapore is not attempting to be the world’s innovation capital or hub. In many policy documents and promotional materials supporting its focus on research, “Asia’s Innovation Capital” and Asia’s dynamism figure prominently. For example, the latest Economic Strategies Committee clearly lays out Asia as Singapore’s foremost region of interest:

We should capitalise on our cultural affinity with the region, and develop Singapore into the pan-Asian location of choice – from which consumer insights are developed, consumer-centric businesses are grown and managed, products and services developed, tested and launched, and intellectual property and trademarks owned and anchored. (ESC, 2010, p. 19)

The last chapter already covered the objective of revenue generation underpinning this initiative, so this objective will not be repeated. Rather, the discussion here will focus on the geopolitical motives and the regional dimension of this initiative. Integral to

Singapore’s aim to become Asia’s innovation capital is a regulatory framework for intellectual property (IP). Without a robust framework to safeguard the fruits of high- stake investments in research, investors and multinational companies alike would be hesitant to participate. Yet, the primary purpose of a regulatory framework is not to serve the domestic market of Singapore. Instead, Singapore views intellectual property rights as a powerful currency of influence in Asia. The following comment from a policymaker at A*STAR reveals a nuanced understanding of Singapore’s role in

293 research innovations:

We’re seeing more and more companies recognize that what you can do in Singapore what your R&D people can do in Tokyo, in Bay Area, in Cambridge – same quality of work, same output, but the fact that this [Singapore] is more important because it will go straight to the Asian market. That means Singapore may not be a place where you invent but as a site where you can do subsequent product development and commercialize (SG04, A*STAR).

This comment challenges the conventional wisdom that an innovation hub must produce innovations by its very definition. Rather, Singapore aims to be a regional broker that mediates ties between multinational companies and the enormous consumer market of Asia – this is a more realistic goal than churning out innovations for the world at large. Singapore already hosts many regional offices in Asia and touts a robust legal system and superior research infrastructure compared to many of its neighbors. Therefore, becoming a regional broker in research and innovations is a natural progression. Judith Swain, the eminent cellular cardiologist recruited from San

Diego by A*STAR, also talks about Singapore as a gateway:

Singapore is the crossroads in Asia in terms of biomedical research. It gives us access to India, China, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait – all countries that have had relationships with Singapore for years. It gets us introduced (Swain as cited in Somers, 2006).

This view of Singapore as a gateway or broker does not necessarily preclude a leadership role in research and innovations; however, it does reveal the influence

Singapore aims to exert across a vast region without the typical assets of hard power

(i.e., natural resources, a large population, and military).

To understand the use of intellectual property as an instrument of soft power, an examination of recent efforts in Singapore to build expertise in this area is necessary. In

2001, the Ministry of Law established the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore

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(IPOS) with the foresight that multinational companies would benefit from a sound regulatory framework to protect its intellectual assets. In 2005, the World Intellectual

Property Organisation (WIPO) set up its first office outside the US and Europe in

Singapore and later added an arbitration and mediation center. Together with IPOS, this regional office promotes IP development and standards throughout Asia. For example, in 2006, Singapore hosted the “the first intellectual property diplomatic conference in

Asia” bringing together WIPO member states to draft an international treaty on trademark laws (Lee, 2006). According to the Minister of Law, Singapore is well positioned to become an “Asian Intellectual Property Hub” given its well-developed legal and financial system and growing investments in science and technology (Shanmugam,

2012). In March 2013, a steering committee organized by the Ministry of Law produced a 10-year master plan to develop Singapore into an intellectual property hub. The chairman of this committee explained the reasons for this initiative:

In this knowledge-based, innovation-driven globalized economy, IP has become an increasingly important driver of business growth. The growth in the IP sector is especially apparent in Asia… There is a window of opportunity for Singapore to develop itself as a Global IP Hub in Asia – a trusted, neutral node that services the needs of local and international companies in IP, and supports the development and growth of the larger IP landscape in Asia (Teo cited in IPSC, 2013).

Interestingly, the hub is now simultaneously global and regional. A closer inspection of this master plan shows that global refers to the origin of intellectual properties (i.e., multinational companies) while regional refers to the targeted area of regulation (Asia).

In many ways, this approach parallels Singapore’s education hub initiative whereby education providers are largely international while students are largely local and regional. The IP hub plan points to the rapid rise of patent registrations in East Asia –

295 eclipsing both North America and Europe since 2010 (IPSC, 2013). Asia figures prominently in this master plan:

The globalization of IP is also evident from the greater confluence of IP activities from the East and the West. Companies from the US and Europe are seeking a larger presence in Asia, just as Asian companies are pushing to enter new markets in the West... IP disputes between the East and the West are becoming more common too, e.g., Samsung (Korea) vs. Apple (US); Huawei (China) vs. Cisco (US), as technology powerhouses from Asia start to establish themselves globally. There is opportunity for Singapore to play a role in these interactions, and help navigate the differences between the two regions. (IPSC, 2013, p.11)

The new battleground for economic prowess will go beyond the mere creation of ideas and knowledge, and hinge on the harnessing and exploitation of such intellectual capital to the fullest. Considering the rise of Asia, the future growth story in IP will progressively shift towards the East. (IPSC, 2013, p. 66)

The focus on Asia in this initiative also appears in previous public documents as well

(Lee, 2006; IPOS, 2011a; IPOS, 2011b). Beyond these policy pronouncements, the idea of Singapore as an IP hub is best understood through a discussion with a senior policymaker at the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore. In plain language, this policymaker pointed out the inequity of knowledge production in the world:

I think the producers of IP, the creative side, are still for sometime to come in North America and certain parts of Europe. But the consumers will be in Asia, so there’s this flow of ideas and obviously there will have to be a flow of ideas across the world. We are seeing it being done in a very big way. MNCs bring ideas from the West, go to emerging countries, build it, and I supposed they try to get a lot of profit out of it. But in the process they want their IPs to be protected (SG12, Intellectual Property Office of Singapore).

Granted, MNCs do generate profits, and Singapore reaps the benefits of hosting them as well. Yet, the motivations behind hosting MNCs and building an IP hub extend far beyond purely economic calculations. The same policymaker elaborated further:

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So the role of Singapore [as an IP hub] is not quite the role of a physical Singapore but the role of Singapore as a concept where we are sufficiently neutral for this transaction to take place. We are a trusted node. Our legal system is neutral, not subjective, and I think we are comfortable culturally and acceptable culturally for both the East and the West, so they are quite comfortable to do their business here. That’s where the whole knowledge hub concept comes in. They use Singapore as a place to transact ideas. It’s no different from say the Harvard Square. You go there, and you see nothing. People play chess, go to bookshops, and have coffee. Nothing is being created there physically, but it is a place for people to interact and transact ideas and hopefully create ideas (SG12, Intellectual Property Office of Singapore).

This lucid metaphor portrays Singapore once again as a regional broker mediating foreign interests in Asia. The physical constraints of Singapore, its small domestic market, and the pressure to innovate suddenly become less relevant compared to the ultimate goal of succeeding as a regional broker. Without proper knowledge management (i.e., patent registration, licensing, and prosecutions), knowledge production suddenly loses its currency in the global economy. As a “trusted node” in the knowledge economy, Singapore would become a valued member of the international community flanked by MNCs and foreign governments with vested interests. The IP hub master plan makes a clear case for Singapore “to play a facilitative, bridging role for regional and international transactions; and to provide a trusted, neutral platform to support the development and growth of the IP landscape in Asia” (IPSC, 2013, p.1). The importance of this brokerage role is especially apropos to an economically vibrant region with poor regulation of intellectual property rights.

Other examples of Singapore exerting influence in Asia through higher education and related activities abound. For many years now, Singapore has been strengthening its ties to China and India. These ties are not motivated by cultural heritage even though

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Singapore has thriving Chinese and Indian communities. Rather, these engagements are based on economic and political interests at the regional level. In 1978, Deng

Xiaoping remarked famously that China should learn from Singapore after a visit to the city-state to witness its miraculous development.54 China’s appetite for the Singaporean model of development continues today. Each year approximately 7,000 Chinese government officials come to Singapore for management training (IE Singapore, 2013).

In these programs, Singapore imparts its expertise in governance, policymaking and urban planning. In January 2013, IE Singapore launched the Singapore Talent

Development Alliance to provide education and training customized for the Chinese market.55 The Chinese Government aims to train 10 million government officials and 4.5 million technicians in the coming decade, and Singapore intends to capitalize on this demand (IE Singapore, 2013). Training Chinese government officials is a soft power strategy that strikes closer at the heart of diplomacy than educating international students en mass.

On another front, Singapore is now exporting its education hub model to China.

With several elite higher education institutions and 15 years of experience in building its own education hub, Singapore can now confidently act as an advisor and investor in similar ventures. In 2010, construction began on the Sino Singapore Guangzhou

54 Deng visited Singapore in November 1978. During his southern inspection tour in 1992, he stated, "Singapore's social order is rather good. Its leaders exercise strict management. We should learn from their experience, and we should do a better job than they do" (SIPAC, 2004; Dimmock & Leong, 2010).

55 This alliance consists of seven local Singaporean HEIs: the Civil Service College, ITE Education Services, Nanyang Polytechnic, Nanyang Technological University, National University of Singapore, NTUC Learning Hub, and the Singapore Management University.

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Knowledge City (GKC). Singapore’s sovereign fund, Temasek, co-owns this project together with Chinese enterprises and the Guangzhou Municipal Government. The goal is to attract 10 world-class universities to this hub (reminiscent of Singapore’s own

World-class University Program in 1998). Singaporean HEIs operating in this knowledge city include NUS, Nanyang University, and Nanyang Polytechnic. Singapore has also provided training for Chinese officials involved in this project.56 Planners state that GKC is the model for Guangdong’s economic transformation, and “products and services that have proven successful within the GKC can expect demand from other parts of southern China” (GKC, 2013a). Replicating an education hub in China is a natural calling for Singapore after it built a few industrial parks in that country. Singapore collaborated with the Chinese government to build the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) and

Tianjin Eco-city in 1994 and 2007, respectively. Both are government-to-government collaborations involving senior political leaders from both countries and significant financial investments from Singapore. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan

Yew personally conceived SIP as a model to showcase the Singaporean expertise in planning and development, but it suffered serious financial losses in the beginning

(Dolven, 1999b).57 The social security system offered to workers within the SIP was

56 In December 2012, 23 officials from the Guangzhou Development District Administrative Committee and Luogang District received training in Singapore. Courses include “Introduction of Singapore Service- Oriented Government Structure and Models,” “Human Resource Management in the Singapore Public Service,” “Singapore Legal System and Law Enforcement and Corruption Control” (GKC, 2013b).

57 By 1999, Singapore had invested a total of US$147 million in the park and posted a total loss of US$90 million. This scandalous loss led Singapore to reduce its ownership of the park from 65% to 35% in 2001. (“Suzhou Park problems,” 1998; “Losses in Singapore,” 1999). The park now includes the Suzhou Dushu Lake Higher Education Town, which contains the first Sino-British university to be approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education: Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University. It is unclear if Singapore was involved in the establishment of this education city.

299 even based on Singapore’s Central Provident Fund scheme (Wong et al., 2009).

With India, Singapore has not built an education hub yet, but it has a history of building technology and industrial parks there as well. Since the 1990s, Singapore has been expanding ties with India through trade and investment as a counter balance against close economic ties with China (Yahya, 2008). An overreliance on any single economy contains serious risks if the partner country falters in its growth. In 1998, India opened its very first IT park, International Technology Park Bangalore (ITPB), which has become the model for other technology parks in the country. ITPB is a government-to- government project between Singapore and India. Today, Ascendas, a Singaporean government-linked corporation fully owns ITPB and continues to build other similar parks in India. The Singaporean Government has also built similar parks in Indonesia,

Vietnam, and Philippines. These initiatives essentially provide a platform for Singapore to exert its influence in the two largest economies of Asia through knowledge production projects.

From these examples of regional engagement, it is clear that Singapore has its eyes set on Asia as the region of importance rather than Southeast Asia. Changes in

Singapore’s external trade over the last few decades also reflect its diminishing connection to Southeast Asia. In the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore’s trade with ASEAN members decreased because its economy matured and processed fewer raw materials

300 from Malaysia and Indonesia (Wong et. al, 2009). Since the 1980s, Singapore’s rapid industrialization has steadily brought it closer to non-ASEAN members with advanced economies. George Yeo, a stalwart of the Singaporean regime, once explained the country’s shifting orientation toward the world during his tenure as the Minister for Trade and Industry:

For Singapore, the new wave of globalization presents an acute challenge. In anything and everything we do, we must achieve international standards to be competitive. It is not good enough now to be the best in Southeast Asia; we must go beyond that. Either we compete globally, or we are not in the game (Yeo, 2001).58

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 briefly interrupted this policy of looking beyond

Southeast Asia. The crisis made Singapore realize the value of ASEAN as a regional bulwark against China’s burgeoning economy and the whims of global trade (Wong et. al, 2009). Nevertheless, Singapore does not constrain itself to Southeast Asia as the above examples of regional engagement have shown. One A*STAR policymaker reaffirmed Singapore’s global outlook in its drive to become an innovation capital:

From the mid 1990s to early 2000s, we did a lot of soul searching. We recognize that we have to differentiate ourselves not against ASEAN because we are already well positioned in ASEAN. Rather, it’s in the world (SG04, A*STAR).

In short, Singapore seeks to become a regional leader in education and research by creating new institutions, training foreign government officials, and building knowledge cities and technology parks. Singapore’s policy rhetoric may be about global

58 Yeo has been the Minister for Information and the Arts (1991-99), the Minister for Health (1994-97), the Minister for Trade and Industry (1999-2004), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (2004-11).

301 competition and eminence, but the present realities of economic growth coupled with

Singapore’s own expertise in hosting regional offices mean that engagement with Asia is critical to its education hub. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said in a speech, “We should develop human capital not just for Singapore, but for the whole of Asia. After all,

Singapore is at the crossroads of Asia. If we can help Asian economies to gain talent and grow, we ourselves will in turn grow with them” (Lee, 2009). In addition, Singapore aims to become a regional broker by facilitating intellectual property rights and the commercialization of applied research in Asia. Through regional leadership and brokerage, Singapore will accrue soft power to further its interests in Asia.

Hong Kong

Among the research participants from the three hubs, Hong Kong policymakers placed the greatest emphasis on regional engagement. In multiple interviews, they expressed concerns over the future of Hong Kong in a regional context. Their concerns indicate a desire to become both a regional leader as well as a regional broker.

Unsurprisingly, policymakers spoke implicitly about different kinds of regions: pan Asia,

East Asia, Greater China, southern China, and the Eastern civilization. Noticeably,

Hong Kong’s colorful history as a British colony located at the doorstep of China has instilled a keen sense of geopolitics among its policymakers. In a discussion with a former Chairperson of the influential Education Commission, the person identified three main reasons for developing Hong Kong as an education hub. One reason is for Hong

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Kong “to exhibit leadership in education regionally” because “an education hub is not just for Hong Kong people!” (HK23, Education Commission).59 Several other policymakers insisted that an education hub must contribute to regional development.

The discussion below will elaborate on the meaning of regional engagement from the perspectives of Hong Kong policymakers.

At the most basic level of regional engagement, Hong Kong policymakers view pan Asia as a region. A senior policymaker at the Education Bureau clarified that Hong

Kong’s education hub is unequivocally focused on Asia at this early stage of its development, while the scope may later expand to an international one (HK01, EDB). In speaking about the education hub’s connection with Asia, policymakers often highlight student recruitment and sometimes curriculum design as the key activities of engagement:

We target recruitment of Mainland and Asian students. We don’t target Americans or Europeans because they’re too far away, plus they also have very good universities. So it’s not our incentive or objective to recruit them. We’re interested in East Asia, China, and maybe India (HK06, Central Policy Unit).

Our programs are very different from university education in that vocational is very regionally focused. Our programs serve the local and regional economies! Hong Kong is driven by what’s happening in the region – which includes South China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. We must be sensitive to what’s happening at these places and be quick and flexible to change our programs (hk25, Vocational Training Council).

59 The other two reasons are “to provide people with choices in education” and “to turn education into a business” (HK23, Education Commission).

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Another policymaker spoke about Hong Kong as a hub for educational and professional testing services, a niche area which the government is also trying to develop as one of the six pillars of the service industry:

Because of Hong Kong international nature and international connections… we can do short courses as the education hub develops – things like regional training programs. We have the facilities and resources here to bring people here. For example, executive training, or just qualification examinations of various kinds all can be done in Hong Kong because here the system is clean, fair, no corruptions. So if we administer an exam here, you know it is administered fairly and no cheating. So a qualification that comes from Hong Kong you can be quite sure those are very rigorous (HK10, Education Commission).

These generic views on engagement with Asia or East Asia do not differ much from

Malaysia and Singapore’s engagement with Southeast Asia and Asia, respectively. In other words, Hong Kong views Asia and East Asia as regions for recruiting students and exporting education services.

However, Hong Kong policymakers’ most passionate views on regional engagement focus on Greater China and, more specifically, southern China as the sphere of influence. In discussing these areas, the complexity of engagement began to emerge. With China’s rapid economic growth and guardianship of Hong Kong, a gravitational pull toward the Mainland is only natural for its education hub. A policy analyst at the Central Policy Unit explained this pull from a historical context:

The link between ASEAN countries and Hong Kong used to be very strong until China opened up… because in the late 1970s and early 1980s the problem of rising cost of land and labor forced industries to consider moving factories out to farther places. So some of the factories moved to Southeast Asia, but then China opened up, so they moved to China. Somehow the emphasis, enthusiasm, and attention all turned north upward rather than down south (HK18, Central Policy Unit).

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The head of the Central Policy Unit underscored the connection to the Greater China region in a recent speech:

As a regional education hub, Hong Kong education should serve the region. “Region” has two meaning here. The first meaning is more concrete; it refers to the geographic region. The second meaning refers to the cultural region: the Greater China region (Lau, 2010).60

Lau repeated the need for a “Greater China Agenda” and “Greater China Strategy” in the development of Hong Kong as an education hub. In reflecting on Hong Kong’s role as China rises on the global stage, one CPU policy analyst presents two kinds of opportunities for the city:

You [Hong Kong] want to give some consideration on how you would want to take that advantage and upgrade yourself with their development [China]. And also you also want to contribute a bit and not just taking advantage and upgrading yourself. You also want to show the Mainland the invaluable position that Hong Kong still possesses. So there’s that complication [fulfilling two goals] (HK18, Central Policy Unit).

As an education hub, Hong Kong is keen to recruit students from Mainland China. But rather than recruit any Chinese student for the sake of generating revenue, Hong Kong wants to cultivate top talent for Greater China. With a demand that far outstrips supply,

Hong Kong universities can be very selective in their admission of Chinese students.

One policymaker spoke about China and southern China as prime areas to poach exceptional students:

As a metropolitan city, it has to be an education hub whether you like it or not. If you are not, that means you are not fulfilling your responsibilities. You should have the top class of universities. We have it, but we don’t have the top class students [locally]. That’s a contradiction. Like a pyramid, the universities are at

60 While Lau emphasized Greater China in his speech, he also stressed that an education hub must espouse a “global, an international, or a universal vision” (Lau, 2010).

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the apex, but the students are in a normal distribution. So one thing to do is to expand Hong Kong’s education catchment area to at least southern China (regional) or even the whole nation (HK11, Commission on Strategic Development).

From this perspective, the education hub becomes intimately tied to the destiny of Hong

Kong as a major urban center in southern China. Poaching students from the Mainland can strengthen Hong Kong’s position as a hub renowned for education and training.

One member of the University Grants Committee spoke about the purpose behind his university’s satellite center in the Mainland:

It’s not just for our students in Hong Kong that they have chances of getting more exposure, internship, whatever, but it’s also to help the region in sort of educating talents which they are so much in need of to build up the whole region (HK07, University Grants Committee).

In another example, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) has accepted some of the highest scorers on the Chinese university entrance exam

(gao kao). In a media interview, HKUST President, Tony Chan, commented, “We want to produce leaders for the whole region, including for the big enterprises in China - they could be our graduates. By helping to train the next generation of Chinese leaders,

Hong Kong is exerting and extending its influence on the mainland” (Chan, cited in

Sharma, 2011a). Therefore, developing talent is not simply an educational or manpower planning exercise for an education hub. Instead, talent development takes on a regional dimension vested with geopolitical motives.

The region that generated the most intense interest among Hong Kong policymakers is the Pearl River Delta (PRD), a region in southern China that has witnessed rapid industrialization since the 1980s and become a national manufacturing hub. Since China began to open up in the late 1970s, Guangdong has become a living

306 laboratory for economic development and liberal fiscal policies. The Pearl River Delta covers only a third of Guangdong, the most populous province in China, but it produces nearly 80% of the province’s GDP (PRDBC, 2012). With nine major cities and two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macao), the Pearl River Delta is home to

56 million people.61 In the last five years, both the Chinese Government and Hong Kong

Government have moved quickly to integrate the PRD region and liberalize trade within it. In the history of China’s national five-year plans, the Chinese government has never elaborated on Hong Kong’s future development until recently. In the 12th Five-Year Plan

(2011-15), China dedicated an entire chapter to the future of Hong Kong and Macao:

“Maintaining the Long-term Prosperity and Stability of Hong Kong and Macao.” In interviews, some policymakers drew attention to this milestone to underscore the opportunities facing Hong Kong higher education particularly within southern China.

Chinese provincial and municipal governments are also ardent supporters of PRD’s regional integration. The thinking behind this integration is that the different jurisdictions can complement each other. While Guangdong has a strong manufacturing base, its continual economic development requires an agile service sector to market, export, and manage distribution channels overseas – a task that Hong Kong is well qualified to support given its international linkages and expertise in the service sector (PRDBC,

2012).

61 The nine major cities of PRD are Guangzhou, Foshan, Zhaoqing, Shenzhen, Dongguan, Huizhou, Zhuhai, Zhongshan and Jiangmen. Two regional development plans released by Chinese government authorities in 2009 have marked out three “economic circles” or zones with the following core cities: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai.

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Coupling a manufacturing powerhouse to a mature service economy presents many opportunities for Hong Kong higher education. These opportunities include research with industrial applications, training programs for professionals, internships for students, and collaborative academic programs. In a comprehensive report in 2010, the

Pearl River Delta Business Council (PRDBC) provided many recommendations for closer educational linkages between Hong Kong and the PRD. Titled “Hong Kong's

Roles and Positioning in the Economic Development of the Nation,” this report provides more details for the implementation of Hong Kong’s education hub than documents from the Hong Kong Education Bureau itself. These recommendations cover teaching, learning, research, professional development, testing, and institutional management as put forth by the PRDBC subgroup on Services Industry Development and Human

Resources. One recommendation is to develop the PRD into “an exemplary zone for national integrated education reform” using Hong Kong’s expertise:

Promote projects where Hong Kong has accumulated some experiences and achieved outcomes, e.g., institutional reform, school leadership, curriculum reform, building teachers’ group, etc. and strengthen co-operation with the Mainland. (PRDBC, 2010, p.142)

Another recommendation encourages the recruitment of more Chinese students to study in Hong Kong to foster closer ties with the Mainland:

We recommend that suitable platform or mechanism should be put in place to attract more students from the Mainland, in particular PRD, to study in Hong Kong. Mainland students graduating from HK’s universities are well able to contribute to the future HK-Mainland co-operation and the development of the nation as they are familiar with the Mainland culture and also trained under Hong Kong’s western education system. (PRDBC, 2010, p. 36)

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In another report in 2012, the PRDBC emphasizes collaborations between Hong Kong and the Mainland in research and talent development:

The importance of talents is all the more pronounced as we develop modern services industries. It is also the basis for moving up the value chain. Hong Kong and Guangdong can promote cooperation and exchange in R&D and education to attract talents from all over the world and thus achieve a congregation of talents in the Greater Pearl River Delta. (PRDBC, 2012, p. 20)

These regional initiatives essentially allow Hong Kong to influence the socio-economic development of southern China through higher education. The initiatives dovetail with the HKSAR Government’s plan to develop education services as one of the six pillar industries for Hong Kong’s future growth. In short, the Pearl River Delta functions as a hinterland for an overcrowded yet ambitious Hong Kong just as Iskandar is a hinterland for Singapore.

A conspicuous sign of Hong Kong higher education’s engagement with the Pearl

River Delta is the number of satellite offices and centers it has established in the region over the last five years. Unlike most Malaysian and Singaporean universities, which remain physically rooted in their jurisdictions, most Hong Kong universities today have a physical presence in the Mainland.62 The United International College, established in

2005, is a full-fledged Hong Kong branch campus in the Mainland. Located in Zhuhai, a key city in the Pearl River Delta, this college is a joint partnership between the Hong

62 The National University of Singapore is an exception in that it has several offices overseas to serve its students.

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Kong Baptist University (HKBU) and the Beijing Normal University.63 The students at this branch campus are mostly Mainland Chinese. In a discussion with a senior administrator at this branch campus, the person revealed that senior leadership at

HKBU supports this ambitious project for two basic reasons: 1) to establish closer links with the Chinese government and 2) to cultivate a network of Chinese alumni to support

HKBU’s future development (e.g., fundraising).

At a more modest level of engagement, many Hong Kong universities have established research centers or study centers in China rather than full-fledged branch campuses. Many of these centers are located in Shenzhen, an industrial city in the

Mainland just across the border from Hong Kong. As early as 1999, HKUST opened a joint institution with Peking University in Shenzhen. Since then, it has added another research institute, a medical centre, and a small business enterprise in Shenzhen. The

Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) opened a joint research institute in Shenzhen in 2006 and an independent institute in 2012. CUHK recently secured approval to open a branch campus in Shenzhen, which will admit students starting in 2014. HKU opened a hospital and a research institute in Shenzhen in 2011.64 HKU’s latest strategic plan affirms its responsibility to act as an East-West gateway and contribute to China’s development (HKU, 2009). In fact, HKU’s mission is to broker relations:

63 Chinese regulations require all foreign education providers (including Hong Kong) to partner with a local institution when setting up a branch campus. Presently there are efforts to exempt Hong Kong from China’s Regulations on Sino-Foreign Co-operative Education.

64 In 2013, HKU also began construction of the University of Hong Kong Zhejiang Institute of Research and Innovation in Linan, China. HKU also has a study center in Shanghai that delivers programs in architecture, business, and journalism.

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To serve as a focal point of intellectual and academic endeavour in Hong Kong, China and Asia and act as a gateway and forum for scholarship with the rest of the world (HKU, 2013).

There are also plans to link Hong Kong to Qianhai, a port district in Shenzhen, in order to form a cooperative zone specializing in service industries for the Asia-Pacific region.

Education is one of the targeted industries.65 In addition, the HKSAR Government recently earmarked an area near Shenzhen to be a higher education, science, and creative industries hub. Lok Ma Chau is an area that was originally in sovereign China but now falls under Hong Kong’s administration after the Shenzhen River was straightened in the 1990s. The Pearl River Delta, Shenzhen, Qianhai, and Lok Ma Chau are all sub-national regions marked for development with education and research initiatives. This form of regional engagement, which infuses economic development and higher education, parallels the economic zone of Iskandar in Malaysia. Hong Kong higher education’s involvement in these initiatives is purposeful and indicative of a clustering effect with geopolitical motives. Rather than erect research centers and branch campuses elsewhere in China or Asia, Hong Kong is targeting the Pearl River

Delta to influence the region’s development.

In addition to exerting influence as a leader in southern China, Hong Kong also aims to broker relations between China and the Western civilization. The objective is to become a gateway to China in physical, economic, and cultural terms. In this sense, a

65 See the “Overall Development Plan of Qianhai for the Cooperation between Shenzhen and Hong Kong in Modern Service Industry” (2008). Qianhai is a 15 sq km port district in Shenzhen.

311 region is broadly conceived in relation to the Chinese civilization rather than China as a nation-state. Hong Kong’s historical role as the nexus of East and West makes it a natural candidate for facilitating ties between civilizations. A researcher and expert on

Hong Kong-Mainland relations at the Central Policy Unit explained this intermediary role:

Hong Kong is on good terms with the Western world and the Mainland, but the Mainland and the West may not always be on good terms. We’re in the middle. You don’t want to be caught in their fight. You want to somehow facilitate their understanding of each other. Hong Kong ought to tell to the Western world China’s story (what has happened in the Mainland, what are their major problems, what are the major concerns of Mainland people, frustrations, problems, etc.). Hong Kong has the language ability and the perspective to tell to the rest of the world what’s happening in China. And also to convince the rest of the world that China’s development is not a threat… How would you convey that message to people who don’t really trust you [China] that much? And how would you gradually build that [trust] through your reputation there? So Hong Kong has that kind of role to play rather than being caught between Mainland China and the Western world (HK18, Central Policy Unit).

This policymaker then explained that Hong Kong higher education must be a conduit for this civilizational exchange and trust-building given that the city is a gateway to China.

Similar to the previous comment that a metropolitan city must be an education hub by its nature, the view here is that a gateway must fulfill its duty as a regional broker. Hong

Kong’s delicate position and unique status were not lost upon policymakers during interviews. A member of the Central Policy Unit reflected on Hong Kong’s unique status as China continues to develop:

As long as Hong Kong can preserve its rule of law, international standard of accounting, and its own legal system, then it can survive… as long as it’s different from other places in the Mainland. It’s our way of surviving because we cannot develop as fast as other cities in China. Our competitive edge is in software. We have to make the city… at least make people feel safe once they enter Hong Kong border. All people when they come from Shenzhen into Lo Wu [entry port] they feel safe (HK06, Central Policy Unit).

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While the role of regional brokerage remains more aspirational than concrete at the moment in the landscape of Hong Kong higher education, there is nevertheless a strong awareness that Hong Kong universities must contribute to China’s relationship with the rest of the world. This civilizational interpretation of region presents yet another form of external engagement for Hong Kong as an education hub.

The examples above illustrate a strong desire in each education hub to exert influence in a region – albeit with different interpretations of “region” and different strategies. For Malaysia, region is both geographical (Southeast Asia and Iskandar-

Singapore) and conceptual (Third World and Islamic civilization). Exporting higher education to these regions underpin many internationalization efforts by Malaysian institutions. Concurrently, Malaysia is staking its claim as a leader in Islamic finance education and acting as a broker to mediate ties between the Islamic civilization and the rest of the world. For Singapore, the operative region is no longer the confines of

Southeast Asia, which supported its early economic growth. Rather, the critical region is the expansive area of Asia with unbridled trade opportunities and complex geopolitical interests. However, Singapore’s approach to regional engagement is far more than the conventional export of education programs. Rather, Singapore is strategically exporting its expertise in human resource training, governance, and the development of technology parks and education cities. Singapore also aims to act as a key broker between multinational companies and the vast Asian consumer market by specializing in intellectual property rights. These areas of expertise collectively generate soft power for Singapore. For Hong Kong, its immediate interest is in the sub-national region of the

Pearl River Delta. The city aims to become a regional leader in education and attract

313 talented students from the rest of China. A recent strategy is to expand its influence in

China’s development is to establish research centers and branch campuses within

China. More interestingly, Hong Kong is also keen to become a regional broker by mediating ties between Greater China and the West. In this pursuit, region is a civilization like the Islamic world in the case of Malaysia’s engagement.

Summary

From the three case studies, it is clear that each education hub pursues soft power using different approaches. The limitations of hard power and the expanding involvement of non-state actors in international relations have spurred states to explore alternative forms of power. Education hubs exhibit tremendous potential to generate soft power for a country through international engagements. Although soft power emanates from a realist foundation, exercising influence requires the infusion of a secondary framework in international relations. In strengthening international ties based on cultural heritage, social constructivism is evident in the use of shared identities, values, and history to facilitate connections. Malaysia and Hong Kong utilize this approach albeit with nuanced interpretations of heritage (religious heritage in the case of Malaysia and ethno-cultural heritage in the case of Hong Kong). To a lesser degree, both societies leverage their colonial heritage by importing education services from Britain and other

Commonwealth nations. Despite the end of colonialism, the education systems of former colonies still retain shared norms that facilitate academic ties with the colonial power of yesteryear. These norms create a porous space that allows the mobility of people, programs, and providers between societies. By contrast, Singaporean higher

314 education does not engage internationally based on cultural heritage. While there is empirical evidence of recruitment efforts that target ethnic Chinese students, Singapore also actively pursues connections with all corners of the globe in its eternal quest to remain competitive and relevant as a small state without natural resources or a large population. Rather than rely on cultural heritage, Singapore strategically networks with expert individuals and institutions worldwide. This highly pragmatic approach melds realism with neoliberalism by accumulating knowledge as the new currency in the post-

Fordist era.

In an effort to engage externally, education hubs also share an intent to exert influence as regional leaders and brokers. The three case studies reveal divergent interpretations of region as well as substantial differences in strategies. Malaysia’s engagements with developing countries and Islamic states reflect the use of shared identities to connect states with similar levels of economic development and religious traditions. An imagined solidarity creates a conceptual region, which illustrates social constructivism in international relations. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s policy of “aid before trade” recognizes the financial rewards of exporting higher education to aid recipients in the near future. For Singapore, neoliberalism also drives its expansion into the Asia region. However, Singapore has moved far beyond the orthodoxy of education export.

Rather, it supplements this approach by exporting expertise in economic development, policymaking, and human resource management. By constructing and operating technology parks and knowledge cities in China and India, Singapore is also leading the frontiers of research and education. While neoliberalism is conspicuous in these endeavors, Singapore is effectively exporting norms of governance and development to

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Asian societies that aspire to be like itself. Influence through norm dissemination is particularly noticeable in Singapore’s current initiative to become an intellectual property hub. Singapore recognizes the opportunities in Asia as a region with limited protection for knowledge and innovations. For Hong Kong, many sectors, including higher education, are focusing on the sub-national region of the Pearl River Delta. While revenue generation from student fees is not a politically viable objective, the broader economic potential of a vast region motivates Hong Kong universities to build research centers and branch campuses in China (e.g., Shenzhen). Concurrently, Hong Kong aims to become a regional broker to mediate ties between the Chinese and Western civilization. However, this intermediary role is more aspirational at the moment, at least in higher education.

Table 15: Soft Power Rationales and Objectives

Hong Rationale Objectives Malaysia Singapore Kong Soft To strengthen ties based on Power cultural heritage " "

To network with expert individuals

and institutions worldwide " To become a regional leader and broker " " "

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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion

By comparing Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, this study reveals a diverse set of rationales and objectives driving the development of education hubs. At the most superficial level, all three societies are keen to attract international students by providing quality education and research. The internationalization of higher education, and specifically cross-border education, is a key component of education hubs. Also, the most important policy actor is the state, whether the education hub encompasses a country, a city, or a zone. The state wields considerable influence by planning, funding, and regulating the wide array of activities that comprise an education hub. Beyond these similarities, education hubs differ widely in their interests and approaches. A common activity (e.g., recruiting international students) may be motivated by different rationales. Through policy document analysis and interviews with 78 policymakers and context informants, this study has identified four different rationales in the development of education hubs: 1) economic benefits, 2) talent development, 3) educational capacity, and 4) soft power. Each rationale generates a set of policy objectives and strategies for implementation. While the rationales are not mutually exclusive, they do represent distinctive end goals or pathways for building an education hub. Some rationales are obviously more dominant than others in an education hub as the previous chapters have shown. Most importantly, these rationales and objectives capture the complex realities of policymaking in education hubs rather than prescribe a template for their development.

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This closing chapter contains five sections. The first section will first summarize the research findings: the rationales and objectives that drive the development of education hubs in three societies. The second section will discuss how the findings in this study contribute to the literature on education hubs. The third section will reflect on the challenges and paradoxes of developing education hubs. The fourth section will deliberate on the future of Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong as education hubs. The final part of the chapter will discuss the wider implications of this study for policy and research.

Summary of Findings

In reviewing the research findings of this study, it is obvious that the rationale of economic benefits dominates the policy discourse on education hubs. The fact that the three education hubs emerged shortly after economic crises speaks volumes about their intentions. Whether it is for economic growth or economic resilience, an education hub is designed to generate economic activities. However, the rhetoric of economic benefits masks substantial differences among education hubs. While Malaysia continues to pursue revenue generation through student fees, Singapore has shifted its focus to the commercialization of research. Singapore’s race to become Asia’s innovation capital is ultimately about the exploitation of scientific knowledge. Yet, Singapore and Malaysia share a common interest in leveraging an education hub as an economic multiplier. For

Malaysia, this multiplier expands ancillary services throughout the country as the number of international students rises (e.g., food, housing, and tourism industry).

Planners in Malaysia’s Iskandar economic zone also recognize that that new schools

318 and universities can trigger a boom in the local real estate market. For Singapore, an education hub generates a steady flow of foreign investment as universities and multinational companies establish operations in the city-state. By contrast, Hong Kong policymakers overwhelmingly reject the idea of commercializing education for any purpose even though its central government first conceived the education hub as a new pillar of a service economy.

Probing beyond economic benefits, another major rationale driving the development of education hubs is talent development. The three hubs share the common objective of cultivating local talent for human capital needs (i.e., manpower planning). Supporting the broad spectrum of human potential is less common, but promising initiatives are emerging in this area (e.g., liberal arts and creative arts programs). In terms of attracting foreign talent, Malaysian policy documents recognize this imperative but the realities of Malaysian politics and society prevent the implementation of this policy. On the other hand, Singapore and Hong Kong actively recruit foreign talent through their education hub initiative. The foreign talent comes in the form of international students, scholars, and scientists. By offering scholarships and immigration opportunities, both Singapore and Hong Kong continue to attract foreign talent. Talent development is by far the most important policy rationale in Singapore since it launched its education hub in 1998. Lastly, the objective of repatriating the diaspora is a secondary objective in Malaysia and Singapore. An education hub can create new employment opportunities to attract members of the diaspora to return home.

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Another strong rationale in the development of education hubs is the pursuit of soft power. Education hubs are inherently international by design; therefore it is unsurprising that policymakers have high expectations for a hub’s ability to accrue soft power. For Hong Kong and Malaysia, the goal of strengthening ties based on cultural heritage is a key objective. Malaysia’s efforts in recruiting Muslim students, mandating

Islamic studies courses, and specializing in Islamic finance education attest to the importance of religion to its education hub. Even if policymakers present a largely secular agenda in interviews, the religious dimension of Malaysian higher education is difficult to ignore. In a similar vein, Hong Kong promotes its dual Chinese-British heritage and engages largely with China in its external activities. Over 90% of the non- local students in Hong Kong come from Mainland China. Hong Kong universities have also recently established several research centers inside China. In contrast, Singapore does not engage internationally on the basis of cultural heritage. Instead, Singapore seeks out foreign partners (individuals and institutions) for their expertise. This approach resonates with the country’s very public embrace of meritocracy and capitalism while minimizing cultural differences. Some evidence shows that Singapore specifically recruits ethnic Chinese students, but the scale of these efforts remains unknown as a sensitive matter. Overall, all three societies seek to become a regional leader and broker through their education hub initiative. For Malaysia, the effective region is Southeast Asia, the Third World, and the Islamic civilization depending on the initiative at hand. For Singapore, the region is pan Asia as it seeks to secure its status as an advanced nation among emerging economies. For Hong Kong, the most important region is the Pearl River Delta, a sub-national area of vibrant economic activities, followed by Greater China as a civilization. In similar ways, each society aims

320 to broker relations between its effective region(s) and the rest of the world using higher education. These diverse approaches among education hubs allow a country to exert influence in a region through education, training, research, and policy export.

The rationale of educational capacity received the least attention among policymakers across the three societies. For Malaysia, policymakers strongly believe that the influx of foreign providers and students can promote competition in its higher education system. This competition would ultimately elevate the quality of education across the country. For Hong Kong, policymakers expect that an education hub will expose local students to global perspectives. To some extent, Hong Kong and

Singapore value an education hub for its ability to diversify higher education programs and institutions. Ultimately, a diverse higher education landscape will increase the cohort participation rate.

The brief summary above presents the key rationales and objectives driving the development of education hubs in three different societies. Table 16 summarizes these points. The next section will build on this summary and discuss this study’s contributions to the literature on education hubs.

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Table 16: Rationales in Education Hub Development

Rationales Objectives MY SG HK Economic To generate revenue through student fees # # Benefits " To leverage education as an economic multiplier

" " To commercialize research innovations

" Talent To develop local talent Development " " " To attract foreign talent

" " To repatriate the diaspora # " Educational To expose local students to global perspectives

Capacity " To diversify programs and institutions #

To promote competition among institutions and students "

Soft Power To strengthen ties based on cultural heritage

" " To network with expert individuals and institutions worldwide "

To become a regional leader and broker " " "

" primary objectives # secondary objectives

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Contribution to the Literature on Education Hubs

The findings from this study validate some existing literature on education hubs while contradicting other literature as one might expect. While revenue generation from the education industry remains an important objective as identified by other studies

(Chan & Ng, 2008; Mok, 2011; Cheng et al., 2011), it is certainly not the only objective or the most important objective. This study expands the understanding of the economic dimension of education hubs beyond the education marketplace. One expects that education hubs would exploit research for economic benefits as many universities do presently. However, the author did not expect the widespread belief among policymakers that education can multiply other sectors (e.g., ancillary services, real estate, foreign investment). This intent to leverage an education hub as an economic multiplier receives little attention in the literature. Knight (2014) has highlighted the objective of diversifying the economy, but the discourse is still largely about cultivating education as a service industry rather than expanding non-education sectors. The objectives of building research capacity, developing talent, and increasing geopolitical influence are evident in some recent studies even if they emphasize the economic rationale (Sidhu, et al., 2011; Ibnouf, Dou, & Knight, 2014; Knight, 2014).

This study also demonstrates that education hubs are not merely about the recruitment of international students and the construction of branch campuses as portrayed by many studies (Chan & Ng, 2008; Cheung et al., 2011; Kell & Vogl, 2012).

In all three societies, there is ongoing effort to cultivate the local private education industry as a critical component of the education hub. These local, private institutions may or may not deliver foreign degree programs. Tham (2010) and Mok (2011)

323 recognize the importance of the private education industry in Malaysia and Singapore, but existing studies on education hubs generally ignore locally grown institutions. As

Chapter 5 has shown, Malaysia’s grand plan as an education hub relies on its robust sector of local, private education institutions. These local institutions enroll far more students than the handful of foreign branch campuses. Similarly, Hong Kong public universities are now actively delivering self-financed programs through affiliated private colleges or continuing education departments.

While some studies have identified the different approaches to building an education hub, the persistence of attitudes and values in each society toward higher education receives little attention. Chan & Ng (2008) point out that Hong Kong takes a neoliberal, laissez faire approach whereby the state intervenes minimally in the education sector. Foreign providers are welcome to establish operations in Hong Kong.

In contrast, Singapore tightly regulates the foreign provision of education to ensure only

“world class” programs and providers are invited. This distinction is valuable and partially accurate, but it does not take into account the fact that Hong Kong policymakers are highly skeptical of the economic benefits of an education hub as shown in this study. These policymakers are also wary about inviting foreign providers into Hong Kong when local universities already provide high quality education. Without understanding the psyche of Hong Kong policymakers, one may easily conflate their skepticism with a laissez faire approach or inaction. Likewise, Malaysian policymakers are sensitive about the ethnic and religious divisions in the country despite the policy rhetoric of an inclusive education hub. In comparison, Singapore does continue to be very selective about foreign provisions as it searches for expertise worldwide (Chang &

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Ng, 2008; Mok, 2011). These distinctive attitudes in each of the three societies continue to mediate an education hub’s engagement with foreign institutions.

Lastly, this study provides interesting points of comparison with the education hub typology created by Knight (2011a) and later modified by Knight and Lee (2014). By examining the six leading education hubs in the world, Knight (2014) ranks the importance of the key rationales as follows: 1) economic, 2) education/training, 3) skilled work force, 4) status, 5) research. Singapore is thus considered a research hub, while

Malaysia and Hong Kong are student hubs. While this study certainly attests to the economic rationale behind education hubs, it also reveals the high priority that policymakers place on talent development and soft power (i.e., geopolitical influence as a subset of the status rationale in Knight’s work). Malaysia is indeed a student hub based on this typology. However, Singapore’s interest in becoming a “talent hub” is equally strong, if not stronger, than its desire to become a “research hub.” Hong Kong is driven more by talent development and soft power rather than the economic promises of an education industry. Granted, there is overlap between Knight’s five rationales as well as the ones identified by this study. However, talent development and soft power are prominent issues expressed by the policymakers in this study.

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Reflections on Education Hubs in Asia: Challenges and Paradoxes

In many policy initiatives, a gap between rhetoric and reality commonly exists as action falls short of grand visions. Education hubs are particularly susceptible to this malady given the enormous ambitions fueling their growth and the wide range of policy actors involved. In some ways, education hubs are perceived as the panaceas for many shortcomings in higher education, human resource management, and economic development. Chapter 5 and 6 show a wide array of activities under the aegis of education hubs. A challenging task is to ensure that these activities fulfill their stated rationales and objectives. In translating from policy rationales to strategies and outcomes, there are often broader contextual issues that present challenges. Some of these issues receive little attention in policy documents and among the research participants in this study. However, these issues remain critical to the success of an education hub. Perhaps research participants felt that these issues were beyond their control or too sensitive to discuss openly. A null finding in field research constitutes an important discovery nevertheless. Put another way, collective silence is equally revealing if not more so than hegemonic rhetoric. For these reasons, this section reflects on the challenges and paradoxes of education hub development. Some of these issues overlap because they are difficult to untangle. The discussion will focus on context and implementation – two matters that are critical to any large-scale policy initiative.

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State Regimes and Academic Freedom

One of the most important contextual issues in education hub development is the role of the state. In all three societies in this study, the state plans, funds, and regulates many education hub activities. While the main policy actor differs across the hubs, they are nevertheless state ministries and statutory boards: Malaysia’s Ministry of Higher

Education, Singapore’s Economic Development Board, and Hong Kong’s Education

Bureau. The state ultimately owns the blueprint of the education hub, but success requires participation from higher education institutions, researchers, students, industry, and other government agencies. Given that the pursuit of higher education requires significant autonomy and critical introspection, it is ironic that the three leading education hubs in Asia are hosted by states with limited civil liberties. In a global ranking on democracy, the Economist Intelligence Unit rates Malaysia and Hong Kong as

“flawed democracies” and Singapore as a “hybrid regime” bordering on authoritarianism

(The Economist, 2012).66 These unfavorable labels seem incongruous with the aspirations of education hubs: cosmopolitan societies that attract people as centers of learning and innovation. This irony raises the question: can an education hub thrive under restrictions on institutional autonomy and academic freedom?

66 The Economist Intelligence Unit provides a global ranking of democracy each year. Countries are classified into four regime types: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes (The Economist, 2012).

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Table 17: Democracy Index

Rank Categorized as (out of 167 countries) Hong Kong 63 flawed democracy Malaysia 64 flawed democracy Singapore 81 hybrid

Source: The Economist, Intelligence Unit (2012)

Several examples of state intervention raise serious concerns about these societies’ legitimacy as education hubs. Malaysia’s controversial Universities and

University Colleges Act, enacted in 1971, forbids students to join political parties or conduct political activities on campus. This legislation was only amended in 2012 in an attempt to appease young voters before the general election (Virdee, 2012). Despite the amendment, university boards still retain the right to ban political activities on campus if necessary. Similarly, academic staff at the University of Nottingham’s branch campus in

Malaysia revealed that their employment contracts forbid any critical comments about the host government (Jaschik, 2013). Furthermore, the Malaysian Parliament recently mandated the continued use of ethnic quotas for university admission. These quotas favor the Malay majority and marginalize talented minority students (Tan & Sharma,

2013). The state also requires Muslim students, both local and foreign, to take Islamic studies courses. Interviews with senior leaders of private education institutions in

Malaysia were replete with anecdotes of a state that impedes their activities: interfering with staffing decisions, rejecting new curricula, suggesting new paint colors for classrooms, and withholding accreditation for new programs that lack an equivalent in

328 public universities. Although the relationship between the state and the private education sector has improved since the 1990s, private institutions in Malaysia remain very frustrated and marginalized. Paradoxically, Malaysia’s education hub hinges on the success of its private education industry because this sector houses the bulk of international students and transnational programs.67 The challenge here is less about regulation because the Malaysian Qualification Agency has streamlined quality assurance procedures and improved the private education industry by weeding out low quality and fraudulent providers. Rather, the issue is the overbearing role of the state in educational development. What progress would Malaysia witness as an education hub if the state had a more productive relationship with universities and colleges (particularly private institutions)?

In Singapore, the state leads and underwrites many new transnational initiatives rather than the local university or college (e.g., partnerships with MIT and Wharton).

Although Singapore’s education hub has focused mainly on instrumental disciplines that do not generate controversy (e.g., business, science, and technology), its recent effort to build a liberal arts college with Yale University has attracted a storm of criticism. The decision by Yale’s senior leaders to collaborate with the Government of Singapore has baffled many observers including its own faculty members, who passed a resolution expressing “concern regarding the history of lack of respect for civil and political rights in the state of Singapore” (Gideon & Woodford, 2012; Lewin, 2012; Montesano, 2012).

The contractual details of this partnership remain private despite demands from Yale’s

67 Foreign branch campuses receive preferential treatment from the Malaysian government even though they are considered private institutions as well.

329 faculty association for full disclosure. The Human Rights Watch and the American

Association of University Professors have also expressed concern over the rights of faculty and students at Yale-NUS (AAUP, 2012; Simon, 2012).68 Singapore also has a track record of silencing scholars critical of the government through either lawsuits or the denial of tenure as the recent case of Cherian George illustrates.69 The culture of surveillance and fear has even turned away some foreign institutions. Prior to the Yale-

NUS joint venture, there were at least two attempts to build a liberal arts college in

Singapore. In 2005, the University of Warwick declined an invitation to build a campus in Singapore because of concerns over academic freedom (Becker, 2009). California’s

Claremont Colleges made the same decision in 2009 and objected to the idea that the president of the new college would report to NUS rather than Claremont (Wilner, 2009;

Shoenhard, 2011).70 In this study, a senior administrator of a branch campus also admitted that her institution seriously vetted Singapore as a location but ultimately decided to build elsewhere in Asia because it could not guarantee its faculty and staff academic freedom. Moreover, this institution was hesitant to accept the generous funding that the Singaporean state was offering. These are only three examples that illustrate Singapore’s failure to recruit a foreign institution because of its lack of institutional autonomy and academic freedom. How many other examples exist outside

68 “At stake are not simply ‘cultural differences’ but whether Yale recognizes universal human rights and the protections for academic staff” (AAUP, 2012). 69 Cherian George, an esteemed journalism professor at Nanyang Technological University, was denied tenure in 2013 in his second attempt. 70 Claremont also felt that the land Singapore was providing for the new institution would be too small for a residential college.

330 the domain of public knowledge? Three public examples of institutional concerns over academic freedom are perhaps three too many for any education hub.

Although Hong Kong does not exhibit as high a level of state control as in

Singapore and Malaysia, it would be naïve to assume that education is immune from state directives. In 2012, the central government and the Education Bureau tried to implement a new curriculum for “moral and national education.” Critics deemed this pro-

China curriculum a lesson in patriotism and brainwashing (Bradsher, 2012). Tens of thousands of teachers, parents, students, and civil society members protested in the streets and ultimately postponed this reform, but the encroaching role of the state in many policy sectors is palpable since the 1997 handover. As shown in Chapter 5, Hong

Kong policymakers are fiercely independent and forthright in their criticisms against education as an industry. One common assertion is that the central government must do more to develop the education hub (i.e., define rationales, create policies, and provide funding). Ironically, some policymakers go as far as to praise the Singapore

Government’s commitment to its education hub initiative. Given that the state dictates many policies in Singapore, this begs the question: would Hong Kong policymakers prefer Singapore’s form of governance to run its education hub? Some Hong Kong policymakers seem to imply that the city’s laissez-faire approach to policymaking, which has worked so well for its capitalist economy and other areas of governance, is suddenly inadequate for its education hub. At the same time, Hong Kong prides itself on upholding institutional autonomy and academic freedom. The calls for greater state leadership in its education hub perhaps come from frustrations with the lack of progress rather than a true longing for an interventionist state like Singapore’s.

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One may argue that institutional autonomy and academic freedom draw from liberal conceptions of higher education rooted in the Western civilization, and therefore these criticisms are unjust. As Lee Kuan Yew often reminds foreign critics, Singapore is pursuing an alternative form of governance engineered for the context of Singapore and distinct from the liberal democratic ideals of the West.71 However, cultural relativism aside, these incidents of state interference do not inspire foreign universities, scholars, and students to participate. In Nye’s conception of soft power, political values can be a strong resource to attract outsiders. If a society’s political values contravene the ideals of higher learning, how can it legitimately act as an education hub?

Deepening Divisions: Local, Ethnic, and Foreign

Interestingly, the socio-political climate of all three societies is leaning toward insularism as locals face greater competition to maintain or increase their standard of living. With rising income disparities in all three societies, it is not a surprise that protectionist measures receive substantial support. Among the three societies,

Singapore is the most welcoming of foreign talent but also ironically the most anxious about the influx of foreigners. Rising xenophobia unfortunately targets many newcomers from China, given that Singapore is the third most desirable immigration destination for affluent Chinese after United States and Canada (Jacobs, 2012). In the last general election (2011), the country’s dependency on foreign talent became a hotly debated

71 Lee wrote in his recent book, “I don’t believe that democracy is the best form of government for all countries and will spread throughout the world. If it is, why are the Western countries so keen to force it down people’s throats?” (K. Y. Lee, 2011, p. 48).

332 issue. The ruling party (PAP) suffered unprecedented losses in the polls as voters blamed its open door policy for crowded subways, housing shortages, and an increasingly competitive job market. Following the election, Prime Minister Lee Hsien

Loong quickly tightened immigration and placed limits on the country’s dependency on foreign workers. In his post-election National Day Rally speech, Lee acknowledged a general view among Singaporeans, “One unhappiness is the feeling that maybe foreign students have taken the place of locals in the universities” (H. L. Lee, 2011). Lee promised to increase access for local students while capping the number of foreign students at the present level such that their proportion in public universities would eventually drop. The Minister of Education has declared a goal to reduce foreign students from the current 18% in public universities to 15% (Tan, 2011). With a university participation rate of only 27%, Singapore trails many other developed nations, particularly their Asian neighbors who have reached universal higher education. Parents and students continue to demand greater access to higher education. Hence, the

Ministry of Education’s present priority in higher education is to create different pathways for Singaporeans.

In 2012, Lee also launched a national conversation to gather the thoughts and concerns among citizens (see Our Singapore Conversation). These concerns include anxiety over competition from foreign workers and students in the country. The recent release of the White Paper “A Sustainable Population for a Dynamic Singapore” also alarmed many locals because the current trajectory would still raise Singapore’s population from the present 5.3 million to nearly 6 million by 2020 with 30% being non- citizens (Government of Singapore, 2013). This white paper reiterates, “Singaporeans

333 form the core of our society and the heart of our nation. To have a strong and cohesive society, we must have a strong Singaporean core” (Government of Singapore, 2013, p.

14). Nevertheless, more than 4,000 people attended a rally to express frustration with this white paper. For a country that carefully manages public gatherings, this was one of

Singapore’s largest protests ever (BBC, 2013).

Among the Singaporean policymakers interviewed for this study, one individual provided a rare critique of the country’s import of foreign talent:

Relying on foreign talent in our science and technology sector is not sustainable at all! We’re not talking just human capital here or the lack of infrastructure to handle the influx. With the recent general election and the resentment toward foreigners in this country, you must understand that there are socio-political issues too. It’s not just an economic issue whereby a Singaporean feels like he/she lost out on a job opportunity or a place in a university due to a foreigner coming in. People forget that there are socio-political barriers as well (Singaporean policymaker).

In this climate of discontent over immigration, housing, employment, and education, compounded with insecurities over national identity, how sustainable is Singapore’s strategy of importing foreign students, scientists, and institutions? If the state reduces the generous scholarships, compensation packages, and grants for foreigners, how will this affect Singapore’s development as an education hub?

Socio-political division takes a different form in Malaysia and Hong Kong. Rather than target foreigners, these two societies increasingly draw lines between the local majority and ethnic minorities. In Malaysia’s highly politicized multicultural society, the position of international students is tenuous. Over the last three decades, Malaysia has become increasingly Islamic in many facets of life (Abbott & Gregorios-Pippas, 2010).

Many of Malaysia’s affirmative action policies take on a religious overtone because the

334 majority is Muslim. Ethnicity and religion are therefore intimately intertwined in

Malaysian society. As Malaysia develops into an education hub, its Islamic heritage will continue to present both opportunities as well as challenges. As Chapter 6 has shown, religion facilitates Malaysia’s engagement with other Islamic states. However,

Islamization also hinders its development as an education hub. Previously, only Muslim students (local and foreign) are required to take a course on Islamic studies. However, beginning in September 2013, all students (Muslims and non-Muslims) at private institutions are also required to take a course titled Islamic and Asian Civilization

Studies, like their counterparts in public universities. This new course requirement also applies to students at foreign branch campuses. Although the new course will also cover other faiths and civilizations, critics worry that it will be largely Islamic and Malay- centric as is the case with existing courses in secondary education (Boo, 2013; Sharma

& Tan, 2013a). On top of this, international students are also required to take a course on Malaysian studies and language. One Malaysian policymaker in this study noted that parents of students from Kyrgyzstan have actually complained to the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education for requiring their children to take Islamic studies courses:

We assumed that we are basically a Muslim country. We also assumed that Kyrgyzstan is a Muslim country so we should be able to relate well. But we were wrong. Their perception of Islam and our perception are two completely different views… We then discovered that what we have packaged for them is not what they want, especially in terms of religion. Their perception of Islam, because of Soviet influence and everything, is different from ours (MY10, MOHE).

In other words, Kyrgyzstan parents sent their children to Malaysia to pursue higher education, not to study Islam. From another perspective, an Iranian student in this study pointed out that Malaysia’s interpretation of Islam is moderate and progressive compared to the extremism of the Iranian regime. However, he pointed out that religious

335 heritage was not a strong pull factor among his Iranian friends studying in Malaysia.

Greater differences emerge because Malaysians are largely Sunnis while Iranians are

Shiites. In fact, the Malaysian Government views Shia as a “deviant” sect, and a decree has banned Shiites from proselyting (Gooch, 2011; Manimaran, 2011).72 Considering that Iranian students currently represent the largest group of international students in

Malaysia, this form of persecution is counterproductive to its education hub initiative.

One study has documented the difficulties Middle Eastern students face trying to integrate into Malaysian society (Ambigapathy, 2008). These examples indicate that ethnic divisions and Islamization may present serious challenges to Malaysia’s engagement with outsiders. International engagements via cultural heritage may rely on false or optimistic assumptions about shared identities and values. As with any religion, divergent interpretations of Islam exist among followers in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Unfortunately Malaysia’s political quagmire over ethnicity and religion drains substantial energy from policymaking and debilitates initiatives such as the education hub. To what extent can a society with deepening political and ethnic fault lines attract and include foreign students, scholars, and institutions in its development?

In a similar fashion, the challenging socio-political division in Hong Kong creates a rift between the local Cantonese and the Mainland Chinese. Despite closer ties with

China since the 1997 handover, locals object to the lack of universal suffrage and the influx of Mainland Chinese who buy properties, use social services, and flout local

72 There are an estimated 40,000 Shias in Malaysia. A 1989 Islamic law and a 1996 fatwa by the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia banned Shiite Islam for its “deviant ideology” (Gooch, 2011).

336 standards of civility. This influx includes tourists, investors, professionals, and school children commuting from Shenzhen daily. A large number of pregnant women from the

Mainland also flock to Hong Kong each year to give birth because their newborn can gain the right to permanent residency, free basic education, and visa-free travel to many countries.73 The Hong Kong government has responded by placing quotas on

Mainlander births in hospitals and tightening border checks. In this environment of anti-

Beijing and anti-Chinese sentiments, how do Mainland Chinese students fare? Hong

Kong’s university participation rate of only 18% is even lower than Singapore’s. In 2013, a staggering 13,000 local students could not find a place in publicly funded universities despite meeting the minimum university requirements (Lai, 2013). For those who can afford to leave the city, studying abroad is an option. Meanwhile, the government has gradually raised the quota for non-local students at public universities. The irony of

Hong Kong as an education hub is that the bulk of its cross-border education involves a single country: China. Most non-local students come from the Mainland, and local universities are actively inking partnerships with Mainland counterparts. Hong Kong universities’ interest in China does not appear to wane. However, frequent confrontations with China and Chinese may jeopardize Hong Kong’s earnest efforts to become a regional leader in the Pearl River Delta and a gateway to China.

73 In 2011, Mainland Chinese women whose spouse is not a Hong Kong resident gave birth to 35,736 babies or nearly 40% of total births in the city (Census and Statistics Department, 2012).

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The Free Market Logic

The dominance of the economic rationale in both Malaysia and Singapore provides several junctures for reflection. Although the two countries differ in their economic formulations for an education hub, both are nevertheless operating on free market logic. For Malaysia, generating revenue from student fees and leveraging education as an economic multiplier are clear objectives. At the implementation level,

Malaysia is rapidly liberalizing its education system by supporting privatization and welcoming foreign branch campuses. For Singapore, the objective of commercializing research innovations has eclipsed the goal of generating revenue from student fees.

State-of-the-art laboratories led by eminent scientists continue to sprout up in Singapore just as quickly as private education institutions in Malaysia. Less apparent in this flurry of activities is the two country’s shared belief in the free market. Malaysian policymakers believe that a crowded marketplace with many educational institutions can promote competition and ultimately elevate the quality of its entire education system. Such optimism ignores the fact that Malaysia’s higher education system is far from an equal playing field. The glaring division between public and private higher education in

Malaysia is steeped in history. The state favors the public sector as the previous discussion on state regime has shown. Therefore, the landscape of Malaysian higher education is replete with barriers that segregate rather than integrate to allow an open competition. Even if competition were possible, improving the quality of education requires another leap of faith. Competition among higher education institutions in other countries has generally led to mission drifts and institutional isomorphism (Singh, 2008).

As institutions compete for the same resources and benchmark themselves against the leading universities, they begin to resemble each other (e.g., the preoccupation with

338 world-class status and international rankings). Rather than competition begetting excellence, competition may actually stifle innovation as institutions march toward a monolithic single model of higher education. If competition does not improve quality, will

Malaysian policymakers continue to embrace foreign provisions? What alternative courses of action are possible to raise the quality Malaysian higher education?

Although institutional competition and isomorphism is not relevant to Singapore,

Singapore’s approach to research and development also operates on the same free market logic as Malaysia’s education industry. By investing heavily in the biomedical sciences, Singapore hopes to extract a profit in the knowledge economy. As a strategy, the country is also acquiring expertise in intellectual property rights because commercializing an innovation relies on a robust legal framework. Building a world-class research infrastructure from scratch is a high-risk gamble because innovations may not materialize or may not translate into profits – the same perils that entrepreneurs face in any free market. However, Singapore’s capacity to handle failures in this gamble is not as large as its generous spending may suggest. Voices that demand greater accountability of public spending on research have grown louder in recent years. Lee

Wei Ling, a neuroscientist and the daughter of Lee Kuan Yew, recently questioned if

A*STAR has been too ambitious in transforming Singapore into an innovation capital

(Burton, 2007; Shanley, 2007). Lee suggested that A*STAR should scale down its investments and target regional diseases (e.g., hepatitis) rather than try to compete against the West in research. Her comments turned into a public spat with the then

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Chairman of A*STAR, Philip Yeo, who defended public spending on research.74 In short, although senior leaders in Singapore may have a high tolerance level for the uncertainties of research, taxpayers may not be comfortable. Even the high-stakes gamble of research is beginning to constrain research policies in Singapore. In 2011, top scientists Neal Copeland, Nancy Jenkins and Edison Liu left Singapore due to disagreements with a shift in funding strategy at A*STAR (Lim, 2012). The shift aligned research closer to industry and economics. In this study, two leading foreign scientists working in Singapore also expressed concern over the latest directive that holds their work accountable to commercial applications. They emphasized that basic science and the pursuit of knowledge must be the bedrock of research rather than commerce. The free market logic for research clearly places considerable stress on Singapore’s research agenda. In this climate, how sustainable is Singapore’s drive to become Asia’s innovation capital when its taxpayers, policymakers, and scientists hold dissenting views on research spending? At what cost will Singapore continue to pursue a narrow knowledge economy over a holistic knowledge society?

74 Lee Wei Ling stated, “Mr. Philip Yeo, having never practised as a doctor, is strategizing about biomedical research directions in an ivory tower... We’re talking about billions of taxpayers’ money. I will not let this mistake continue” (Lee as cited in Burton, 2007). Observers have surmised that Yeo’s departure from A*STAR after six years as its Chairman (2001-07) was a demotion because his new role as the head of SPRING Singapore deals only with only local SMEs (small and medium enterprises).

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The Rhetoric of “International”

All three societies liberally employ the term “international” to promote their education hub initiatives. From international programs to international research teams to international consortiums, the discourse portrays an education hub as the limitless epitome of internationalism. How international are these education hubs in reality? In terms of foreign students, Malaysia caters largely to those from Southeast Asia and

Islamic countries. Hong Kong’s non-local students are overwhelmingly Chinese.

Singapore does not provide statistics on the origins of its international students or immigrants, but the large number of Chinese newcomers is evident in schools and other public settings. In terms of program and provider origin, most transnational provisions in

Malaysia come from Australia or U.K. In Singapore, transnational education and research activities are more diverse in origin, but Anglophone partners still dominate.

Transnational programs in Hong Kong are largely British in origin. Presently there are two branch campuses in Hong Kong, and both are American (University of Chicago and the Savannah College of Art and Design). These asymmetries raise questions about the international nature of education hubs. The composition of foreign students is skewed toward neighboring countries or alliance partners (e.g., Organization of Islamic

Cooperation) while the foreign providers are largely from Anglophone countries.

Beyond a simple accounting of countries of origin, do students in an education hub experience an intercultural learning environment? While this question is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that educational objectives are noticeably marginalized among education hubs. Only Hong Kong ranks an educational objective highly: to expose local students to a global perspective. But how realistic is this

341 objective given that most non-local students in Hong Kong come from Mainland China?

While ethnic homogeneity does not preclude a learning experience with a global perspective, intercultural learning is more likely in an environment with diverse cultures and ethnicities. The fact remains that very few policymakers in this study pay attention to the student experience in the larger scheme of an education hub. The common assumption is that bringing together students from nearby countries to partake in programs provided by largely Anglophone institutions automatically constitutes an international education hub. In addition, there is an assumption that the presence of foreign providers automatically promotes synergy between local and foreign institutions.

The reality is that local and foreign institutions often operate in isolation under different sets of regulations. Without a conscious effort to engage locally, a branch campus is prone to become an oasis serving only the privileged. If an education hub is truly about global and intercultural connections, policymakers must ensure that student experiences and institutional partnerships are collaborative and transformative rather than parochial and asymmetric.

The Pursuit of Knowledge

Another paradox in the development of education hubs is the conspicuous use of the terms “knowledge” and “knowledge economy.” By virtue of investing in higher education institutions and research facilities, an education hub contributes to a country’s competitiveness in the knowledge economy (UGC, 2010; Knight, 2011a; Lane & Kinser,

2011). While there is some truth in this interpretation, the centrality of knowledge remains questionable in all education hubs. The findings of this study demonstrate that

342 other end goals supersede knowledge. For example, developing talent for all sectors

(manufacturing, service, and creative) and amassing soft power are also important end goals. The goal of knowledge production is only partially evident in one education hub.

Even then, Singapore pursues a parochial definition of knowledge, which is mostly about STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). This narrow view is further circumscribed to knowledge that has commercial value in the global marketplace. A broader conception of knowledge that includes social sciences and humanities is missing from these education hubs. Even more alarming is the collective silence on indigenous or local knowledge in both the policies and research on education hubs. Transnational programs generally contain curricula exported directly from the home institution in the West. Singapore’s cornucopia of international partnerships in education and research continues to rely heavily on foreign intellectual capital.

From its recruitment of foreign elite universities in the late 1990s to its newest university built in collaboration with MIT in 2012, Singapore has a history of injecting its higher education system with foreign expertise to accelerate development. What is the role of local knowledge in this accelerated growth? Do transnational partnerships actually meld local and foreign knowledge? Hong Kong stands out as the lone education hub that values its local higher education institutions, yet policymakers peripherally address local knowledge. In short, these education hubs raise serious questions about epistemology and suggest that a more accurate term to describe some education hubs may be knowledge reproduction rather knowledge production. A comprehensive discussion on knowledge transfer and knowledge (re)production is

343 beyond the scope of this study, but future research must examine these processes in education hubs.

Future Prospects

The future of education hubs in Asia remains uncertain despite the enormous resources devoted to them and the emergence of more education hubs worldwide recently. As the longest running education hub in Asia, Singapore exhibits great agility and astuteness in maneuvering policies to reap the maximum benefit. Rather than fall prey to the changing tides of popular opinion or the whims of globalization, Singapore pursues long-term goals with steadfast determination – an approach that illustrates the

Chinese expression 吃苦 (eat bitterness), which appreciates present hardship for its promise of future prosperity. Singapore’s commitment to long-term goals is impressive even if one disagrees with the strategies it employs. The state will continue to take great risks in building new institutions and industries because its raison d’être is about strategic renewal. The legitimacy of the Singaporean state lies in its ability to continuously reinvent the country to remain competitive in the global economy. The education hub initiative is only one of many reinventions on the state’s current policy agenda. Singapore’s economic success over the last 50 years also allows it to take bold initiatives today because it has amassed one of the world’s largest sovereign funds. The country appeals to many foreigners seeking a base in Asia because of its widespread use of English, political stability, and low crime rate. These advantages bode well for

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Singapore as an education hub, but an increasingly disenchanted citizenry and competitive global environment will challenge the state’s ability to engineer economic growth at all costs. Greater political participation and contestation in the country signal a restless electorate that is more vocal than previous generations. The lack of academic freedom raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the country as an education hub. However, with the world of higher education monitoring the development of the new Yale-NUS liberal arts college, it is unlikely that Singapore will take drastic steps to curtail academic freedom at this institution. Yale-NUS is the culmination of many years of effort in recruiting a foreign liberal arts institution. If anything, Yale-NUS epitomizes

Singapore’s ability to reinvent. Draconian measures toward this institution would be a public relations disaster for its education hub initiative. Alternatively, it is also unlikely that staff at Yale-NUS will challenge the boundaries of academic freedom given the sensitivities in this joint venture and the asymmetry of governance. In a sense, the situation is akin to a détente between two superpowers as each treads cautiously to ensure mutual benefits rather than lurch toward public confrontations.

More pressing than the issue of academic freedom is perhaps Singapore’s effort to innovate and profit from the knowledge economy. Nearly a decade into its drive to become a nucleus for research, widespread skepticism exists inside and outside the country (Wong, Ho, Singh, 2005). Two World Bank economists predicted that

Singapore’s gamble to become a biomedical research hub has a 50% chance of succeeding (Yusuf & Nabeshima, 2006). The capacity of Singapore to innovate depends not only on foreign expertise but also on local talent. In a society steeped in conformity and capitalist pragmatism, exploring the frontiers of science with uncertain

345 returns does not appeal to most youngsters. The chronic shortage of engineers in

Singapore is only a small symptom of local disinterest in science and technology. In an interview, one foreign scientist in Singapore reflected on local students’ capacity to innovate:

Calcutta has like 4 million people in the streets. And my thought, after having come back from there and listening to one of the [Singaporean] Ministers talk about how Singapore needs to strive for innovation and such… Well, if you want innovation, then send the [local] students over for two weeks on the streets of Calcutta rather than two weeks in a shopping mall! It’s really important to inculcate within the students the desire to do something different. And there is a certain level of uniformity over here and following directions that flies in the face of that (sg05, Foreign Scientist).

This foreign scientist then compared the privileged lives of Singaporeans today to those of their forbearers, who toiled in hardship and produced brilliant solutions to dig the country out of poverty. In essence, Singapore has become a victim of its own success like many advanced economies. Despite its tireless efforts to attract foreign institutions, foreign talent, and foreign investment, the biggest stumbling block to it’s future as a knowledge economy may be the core of its existence: societal culture. While a state may be adept at mobilizing policies under the narrative of modernization, culture persists in the face of change (Parsons, 1966; Hayhoe, 1989; Marginson, 2011). The growing discrepancy between policy and society can alienate individuals and ultimately challenge the legitimacy of the state. Singapore’s biomedical science initiative already shows signs of this discrepancy when segments of the citizenry cannot relate to its grand aspirations. Despite the state’s remarkable record in attracting foreign universities and multinational companies, the future of its education hub remains questionable. The state is ambitious and efficient in its relentless drive toward modernization, but the

346 society cannot or will not keep apace. For Singapore to succeed as an education hub, this discrepancy cannot grow too large.

Malaysia’s strength as an education hub draws on many aspects of its society and history. With at least three different education hub initiatives underway, the country is abuzz with cross-border higher education activities. These initiatives build on the country’s long history in transnational programs. Policymaking in Malaysia also benefits from meticulous blueprints with attention to details. On a personal level, Malaysians are incredibly dynamic and welcoming of outsiders. The country’s Islamic heritage allows the state to draw on connections that are unavailable to many other Asian nations.

Furthermore, its status as an emerging middle-income country projects legitimacy and relevance when it interacts with Third World nations and advanced economies alike.

These advantages contribute to Malaysia’s strengths as an education hub.

However, policy implementation and ethnic politicking present serious challenges to its future development as an education hub. While the country is proficient in planning, policy implementation falters due to either a lack of commitment or ingrained political resistance. Waning interest in a policy initiative is not unique to Malaysia, but the country’s political discord creates fault lines that contradict the inclusive nature of

Malaysian culture and the warm relations among locals. The state perpetuates an exclusionary form of Islam that alienates even some Muslims (e.g., moderate followers and Shias). From mandatory Islamic courses to the marginalization of private colleges brimming with non-Malays, higher education remains segregated. Although its Islamic finance education hub appears inclusive and cosmopolitan, it is also too early to judge this initiative. Similarly, it is also premature to judge the state’s new approach to

347 international engagement through higher education aid. Few Malaysian universities presently engage in international development aid. In spite of the policy motto of aid before trade, the hub is still ultimately about the rationale of economic benefits. It is also questionable if partner countries would welcome this type of engagement given the growing critique of development aid (Altbach, 1977; Samoff & Carrol, 2004; King, 2007;

Moyo, 2009).

Unless a drastic change occurs in governance, political discord will continue to constrain Malaysia’s potential as an education hub. The multiethnic Bersih grassroots movement, which is demanding electoral reforms, is a promising sign that the political discourse is changing in the country even if the Barisan Nasional coalition continues to win elections. More importantly, Bersih illustrates that Malaysian society is not as fragmented as what is presented by the state and the media; voters can rise above the ethnic politicking and coalesce around fundamental issues. Therefore, in an odd reversal of the Singaporean predicament, Malaysian society exhibits great potential to support its education hub, but the state erects barriers to limit its success. The private education sector receives unfair treatment by the state and the media. Low quality private education institutions do exist, but many other ones provide innovative, high- quality programs and contribute to national development. Without these private institutions, nearly half a million non-Malays and foreign students would need to seek education elsewhere. In the foreseeable future, Malaysia will continue to focus on the rationale of economic benefits as an education hub. Objectives and strategies may change, but the economic rationale will continue act as a pivot. Perhaps the Islamic finance education hub will witness greater success than the national education hub and

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EduCity Iskandar? Finally, without first addressing the development of local talent and unemployment among graduates, Malaysia cannot fully contemplate the use of foreign talent.

As a newcomer to the education hub phenomenon, Hong Kong is a fascinating case that exhibits potential. Three fundamental features will continue to set Hong Kong apart from other educations hubs in the region. First, Hong Kong is not particularly keen to build an education hub to generate revenue or accrue other economic benefits. The neoliberal discourse lacks traction among policymakers and institutional leaders even if the senior leadership of the state finds it appealing. Second, unlike other education hubs that eagerly import transnational programs and foreign branch campuses, Hong

Kong prefers to cultivate its local higher education institutions. This approach values local capacity and speaks volumes about the confidence and quality of Hong Kong higher education. Third, a lively culture of academic freedom and free speech fosters diverse scholarship and social conscience. This cultural context is perhaps Hong Kong’s greatest strength as an education hub because it can support a beehive of higher learning that bridges Western and Eastern civilizations. The city’s cosmopolitan society resonates with the spirit of academic freedom rather than quarantining it in the ivory tower. However, considerable barriers also face Hong Kong’s future as an education hub. The lack of political will is perhaps its greatest challenge. Hong Kong’s financial industry and its relationship with China are formidable anchors in many policy initiatives.

Transforming the city into an education hub is not always a priority on the government’s agenda especially when leadership changes every five years.

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To truly become an education hub, Hong Kong must make more substantial commitments beyond a scholarship fund for non-local students and a few plots of land for private education institutions. The physical limitation of the city is a valid concern because exorbitant land prices and housing shortages make it difficult to construct new campuses and student dormitories. However, the shortage of land for education hub construction is also overblown as a convenient excuse. Considering that the state owns virtually all the land in the city, and significant areas remain to be developed, the sight of exclusive country clubs and hotels on prime real estate raises questions about political will rather than land shortages. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and the Hong Kong Institute of Education have thrived on remote mountainous terrain, therefore creative precedents do exist for educational infrastructure. The proliferation of ties between Hong Kong and China will surely continue and further Sinicize the education hub such that the term “international education hub” may become awkward in describing Hong Kong. Hong Kong is quickly becoming a regional education hub or

Chinese education hub oriented toward the Pearl River Delta. This orientation is not necessarily a negative development because different higher education systems are accountable to different constituents. Also, an orientation toward China does not necessarily inhibit Hong Kong’s role as a bridge between China and the world at large just as New York City is simultaneously very American and very cosmopolitan.

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Implications and Further Research

The findings of this study have implications for three areas of policymaking and research: 1) education hubs, 2) internationalization of higher education, 3) international relations. In attempting to become education hubs, the experiences of Malaysia,

Singapore, and Hong Kong provide valuable lessons for similar initiatives worldwide.

The findings of this study provide some generalizations particularly for the Asian context.

Education Hubs

This study affirms that the rationales behind education hub are both diverse and dynamic. Different societies pursue different goals, and these goals are not static. The three education hubs in this study arose under the stimulus of economic crises, but they have become more than antidotes to economic woes. Some education hubs morph faster than others, but each has the potential to change purpose and strategy just like any complex education policy. The nuances in policy rationales would not be evident if the study had relied strictly on policy document analysis like many studies on education hubs. Policy documents can become outdated and obscure the changing attitudes among policymakers and their influence in the policymaking process (i.e., agency). In short, policy documents may reify a phenomenon that lacks empirical substance.

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The policy rationales and objectives presented in Table 16 can provide a framework for analyzing other education hubs. These categories are not mutually exclusive, but they do represent distinctive trajectories in education hub development.

Some of the policy objectives are more pertinent to local affairs while others are more germane to exerting international influence – a proper analysis of education hubs must recognize both dimensions. This study adds to the existing body of literature on education hubs by elucidating higher education’s contribution to international relations

(i.e., soft power). The framework is a work in progress, and it is expected that additional rationales and objectives will emerge in the future.

In addition, this study illustrates that cross-border education is not always central to an education hub as suggested by the literature. Many policymakers and researchers equate the term “education hub” to the recruitment of international students – a common denominator that unites education hubs. Even as an education hub expands into other activities (e.g., research), recruiting international students remains an important objective. Research laboratories depend on the contributions of international students especially if local students are limited in numbers or uninterested in postgraduate work.

Seemingly, a place cannot justify itself as an education hub without large numbers of international students. To be more accurate, non-local student is a more appropriate term than “international student” because an educational hub could cater to students from sub-national regions (e.g., Hong Kong and EduCity Iskandar). However, the recruitment of non-local students by itself does not constitute an education hub because places like Boston and Australia do not identify themselves as such, despite hosting large numbers of non-local students. Japan also has a national plan to recruit many

352 international students, but it does not employ the term “education hub.” Beyond student mobility, education hubs differ widely in their reliance on program and provider mobility.

While some hubs embrace foreign provisions for the purpose of capacity building and branding, others may prefer to invest in local institutions instead. Either approach is legitimate. Therefore, the barometer of success for education hubs should not be based on the number of foreign providers. The excessive focus on franchised programs, twinning programs, and branch campuses in many studies on education hubs presumes that foreign providers are essential to all education hubs when in reality it is only one strategy for building a hub. Conflating strategy with outcome obscures fundamental differences in the antecedent rationales.

Furthermore, even in education hubs that embrace foreign provisions, branch campuses may constitute only a tiny segment of the higher education system. For example, Malaysia has eight foreign branch campuses, but there are over 500 higher education institutions in the country. The number of students enrolled in local private institutions eclipses those at foreign branch campuses by many folds. In Singapore, two government agencies (SPRING and IE Singapore) are actively cultivating local education institutions and facilitating their expansions overseas through seed capital and business development. Local experts in higher education and trade are aware of these activities, but outsiders studying Singapore as an education hub remain largely unaware or uninterested in these grassroots efforts. Researchers must be cognizant of local context and local agency rather than become complicit in prescribing an education hub template.

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The findings of this study also illustrate that every education hub has its strengths and weaknesses such that no single locale or society should be the gold standard for this phenomenon in higher education. Some observers may present Singapore and

Qatar as leading examples in education hub development and cross-border education.

Even some policymakers in this study spoke favorably of Singapore as an education hub. However, the reality is that both countries are small, affluent states with a centralized government. Therefore, the state can fund bold initiatives and implement policies quickly without the resistance commonly found in politically pluralistic societies.

Most national higher education systems are many times larger than those of Singapore and Qatar. Singapore has also had its share of setbacks in education hub development

(e.g., closures of foreign branch campuses and joint research institutes, departures of leading scientists, etc.). Therefore, idealizing these two countries as education hubs ignores their unique context. How many countries can truly mimic Singapore and Qatar in building an education hub? In an interview with a Singapore policymaker closely connected with its education hub project, the person recognized the importance of context:

So many countries came to study this [education hub development]. I have delegations of Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, Africans… coming to try and learn this. And one group was the most interesting because I recognized within the first five minutes of the discussion that they wanted to do this to prevent a brain drain. That’s not our reason! … Some delegations, especially for many unfortunately developing countries ask the question, “How did you do it?” They spend 90% of the time asking, “How did you do it?” And some countries they ask us WHY. The “why” question is very powerful because when you are trying to contextualize it you’ve got to ask why (SG13, former EDB Policymaker).

This comment underscores the importance of understanding policy rationales before mimicking strategies. In other words, it cautions against policy borrowing without reflecting on contextual differences – a caveat that is well documented in the canons of

354 comparative education (Sadler 1900; Hans, 1982). Rather than identify a gold standard, a more valuable exercise is to understand the different reasons for building an education hub and the lessons that can be drawn from each case.

Internationalization of Higher Education

This study has implications for the discourse on the internationalization specifically on two contemporary issues: the value of internationalization and competition. Leading scholars have recently debated the lack of a value-explicit definition of internationalization while others lament that competition has replaced collaboration as the modus operandi (Hudzik, 2011; Knight, 2011c; de Wit, 2012; IAU,

2012b). Internationalization has changed dramatically from its initial roots in peace education and development aid to its present preoccupation with world-class rankings and commercial profit. Education hubs also reflect this trend to some degree; however, they also provide nuances that question these polemic arguments on values and competition. As an education hub, Malaysia simultaneously pursues conventional revenues from education and the more emotive concept of cultural heritage, which relies on shared values and identities. Islamic values appear in several higher education initiatives in Malaysia. In a related manner, Hong Kong policymakers seek an education hub that can expose its students to global perspectives and minimize insularity.

Therefore, the role of values in higher education has not been forgotten in these two societies.

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In regards to competition as the new modus operandi, there is no doubt that education hubs are in competition with one another just like many other initiatives in internationalization. Whether it is recruiting international students or courting foreign institutions, the race toward building a critical mass of actors is visible. Some research participants in this study spoke about other education hubs favorably while others took offense at being compared against a hub they deemed inferior. Clearly, the competition among hubs is alive. However, amidst these competitions, there are also significant collaborations among scholars, institutions, and countries. Transnational programs demand collaboration between two institutions to be successful. The soft power approach to engagement often requires mutually beneficial collaborations too.

Singapore’s biomedical hub would be stunted without collaborations with foreign scientists, universities, and multinational companies. Therefore, rather than speak about the dichotomy of competition and collaboration, an alternative conception is collaboration for the sake of competition. The soft power rationale illustrates this approach in many ways. Whether is cultural capital, financial capital, or intellectual capital, these education hubs are cleverly leveraging their resources to collaborate then compete as a larger aggregate.

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International Relations

The soft power objectives of education hubs indicate that states continue to deploy higher education as a diplomatic tool. Higher education forges ties that range from personal connections between students to long-term operations of joint institutions.

A state accrues influence through these ties to further its national interests on the global stage. In this respect, soft power melds realism with a second ideology in international relations to maximize the impact of the interaction. For education hubs, this second ideology could be neoliberalism or social constructivism. Neoliberalism is evident in engagements that value revenue generation through education and research. On the contrary, social constructivism values shared norms and identities such as religious heritage, ethnic ties, colonial legacy, and intellectual property rights. These are not mutually exclusive approaches, but international relations theory can provide explanations for the behavior of the state. Furthermore, soft power is not restricted to cultural resources or cultural diplomacy as some literature may suggest. Singapore has clearly shown that economic capital can positively expand its international influence through funding for biomedical research. Singapore’s recent effort to become an intellectual property hub also shows that legal capital can function as another form of soft power especially in Asia, where legal frameworks for intellectual property are weak.

What other forms of soft power resources will education hubs leverage in the future?

Given the central role of the state in many education hubs, the interface between higher education and international relations warrants greater attention. While this study focuses on policymaking, many other areas of education hub development could also utilize international relations theory as an analytical lens. According to Nye (2004), soft

357 power is more than a resource. Influence must precipitate behavioral outcomes. This assertion raises many other questions about education hubs. For example, among the

Muslim students studying in Malaysia, how have their actions raised Malaysia’s standing in the Islamic world? Similarly, has the cadre of foreign scientists working in

Singapore forged closer ties between Singapore and the people and institutions from their home country? What forms of networks are these foreign actors creating to help advance the host nation’s interests? Certainly there is no guarantee that a foreign actor will contribute to bilateral ties especially if his/her experience in the host country was less than positive. Nevertheless, these fundamental questions about influence and behavior in international higher education demand greater attention.

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Appendices

Appendix A – Consent Form for Research Participants

To the participants in this study,

I am a doctoral student at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto under the supervision of Dr. Ruth Hayhoe. Currently I am conducting research for my dissertation on education & knowledge hubs in Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong. My study examines the rationales driving the development of these hubs particularly toward regional and international engagement. This study relies on policy analysis and interviews with policymakers and industry leaders responsible for developing an education/knowledge (EK) hub.

By participating in this study as an interviewee, you have the opportunity to contribute to the discussion on education & knowledge hubs as a new phenomenon. Presently, research on these hubs is very limited and contains a lot of speculation. Your perspectives as the actual planners of an EK hub will enrich this discourse by adding credibility and depth. Your input will also raise the visibility of your jurisdiction’s EK hub among others worldwide.

Our interview should last approximately one hour. For the purpose of research, I hope you will allow me to audio tape the interview so I can later transcribe our discussion into text for analysis and reflection. Of course you may decline audio-recording if you wish as well as any question that makes you uncomfortable during the interview. Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. You may withdraw from the interview process at any time. If you decide to withdraw from the study after the interview, please contact me and I will destroy my notes and all data collected from you.

In order to keep the interview confidential, I will assign a number to you that will correspond to your interview and transcript. The information obtained in the interview will be kept in strict confidence and stored at a secure location in my office. Any electronic information stored on computer servers will be encrypted at all times. You may also request a copy of the interview transcript if you want to add any further information or to correct any misinterpretations that could result. All information will be reported in such a way that individual persons cannot be identified. However, if you wish to disclose your name in publications resulting from this study, you can indicate this at the end of this letter. All raw data (i.e. transcripts, field notes) will be destroyed five years after the completion of the study.

Upon completion of the study, if you wish to receive a summary of the research, please contact me. You can contact me or my supervisor if you have questions about this study. The Research Ethics Board of the University of Toronto has approved this study, and their information is listed below if you wish to contact them regarding your rights as a participant in this study:

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Jack Lee Professor Ruth Hayhoe, Ph.D. [email protected] [email protected] 416-500-0935 416-978-1213 4-61 Beaty Avenue 252 Bloor St. West Toronto, ON M6K 3B3 Toronto, ON M5S 1V6 Canada Canada

University of Toronto’s Office of Research Ethics [email protected] 416-946-3273

Thank you for your participation.

Sincerely yours,

Jack Lee

By signing below, you are indicating that you are willing to participate in the study, you have received a copy of this letter, and you are fully aware of the conditions above.

Name (printed): ______

Signature: ______Date:______

Please initial if you agree to have your interview audio-recorded: _____

Please initial if you want to disclose your name in publications resulting from this study: _____

Would you like a copy of the interview transcript? !No !Yes

Please keep a copy of this letter for your records. A completed form can be returned by postal mail or email to:

Jack Lee [email protected] 4-61 Beaty Avenue, Toronto, ON M6K 3B3 Canada

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Appendix B – Interview Guide

Interviewee inclusion / exclusion criteria:

The key informants to be recruited in this study are individuals involved in developing policies for education hubs. Specifically, these are 1) policymakers responsible for creating the overarching plan of an education hub and 2) industry leaders advising policymakers on the development of an education hub. The former are generally employees of government ministries, boards, and agencies. The latter may include leaders in education, business, and science and technology acting as advisors. Individuals who are knowledgeable about education hubs but not involved in policymaking are excluded from this study (e.g., researchers and higher education administrators responsible for implementing as opposed to formulating policies).

X = interviewee’s own country / jurisdiction

What has been your involvement in developing X as an education hub?

How would you define an education hub?

Who are the key policymakers in X’s education hub? What sector is the most influential?

From your position as a [profession/title], why is it important that X develops as an education hub?

Have the reasons for developing an education hub changed over the years?

Some observers have speculated that education hubs are also designed to minimize the brain drain of local students seeking education overseas. What are your thoughts on this?

On what basis do you choose regional and international partners for your education hub?

In recruiting students, which countries or region(s) are you targeting? Why?

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Is this different from recruiting faculty, education providers, and research partners? Why?

Does your education hub focus on regional or local issues for research?

Some people consider Australia as some kind of an education hub with higher education as a key sector of its economy. How does your education hub compare to the Australian approach?

In the long run, do you think X will become more influential internationally as outsiders develop a more positive view of X through the success of the education hub? If yes, what kind of influence do you envision?

What indicators are you using to track the success or progress of your education hub?

What do you think are the future prospects of X as an education hub?

Who else would you recommend that I talk to about your education hub?

What documents would you recommend that I read?

PROTOCOL REFERENCE # 26994

November 8, 2011

Dr. Ruth Hayhoe Mr. Jack T. Lee OISE/UT: DEPT. OF THEORY & POLICY OISE/UT: DEPT. OF THEORY & POLICY STUDIES IN EDUC. STUDIES IN EDUC. OISE/UT OISE/UT

Dear Dr. Hayhoe and Mr. Jack T. Lee,

Re: Your research protocol entitled, "Education Hubs in the Making: Policy Rationales and International Relations"

ETHICS APPROVAL Original Approval Date: November 8, 2011 Expiry Date: November 7, 2012 Continuing Review Level: 1

We are writing to advise you that the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Board (REB) has granted approval to the above-named research protocol under the REB's delegated review process. Your protocol has been approved for a period of one year and ongoing research under this protocol must be renewed prior to the expiry date.

Any changes to the approved protocol or consent materials must be reviewed and approved through the amendment process prior to its implementation. Any adverse or unanticipated events in the research should be reported to the Office of Research Ethics as soon as possible.

Please ensure that you submit an Annual Renewal Form or a Study Completion Report 15 to 30 days prior to the expiry date of your current ethics approval. Note that annual renewals for studies cannot be accepted more than 30 days prior to the date of expiry.

If your research is funded by a third party, please contact the assigned Research Funding Officer in Research Services to ensure that your funds are released.

Best wishes for the successful completion of your research.

Yours sincerely,

Margaret Schneider, Ph.D., Dean Sharpe, Ph.D. C.Psych REB Manager REB Chair

OFFICE OF RESEARCH ETHICS McMurrich Building, 12 Queen's Park Crescent West, 2nd Floor, Toronto, ON M5S 1S8 Canada Tel: +1 416 946-3273 Fax: +1 416 946-5763 [email protected] http://www.research.utoronto.ca/for-researchers-administrators/ethics/