Affaire Relative Aux Activités Armées Sur Le Territoire Du Congo

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Affaire Relative Aux Activités Armées Sur Le Territoire Du Congo COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE AFFAIRE RELATIVE AUX ACTIVITÉS ARMÉES SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO c. OUGANDA) RÉPLIQUE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO VOLUME 1 RÉPLIQUE Mai 2002 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 CHAPITRE 1. L'ETENDUE DU DIFFEREND RELEVANT DE LA COMPETENCE DE LA COUR ............................................ 4 Section 1. L'objet de la requête de la RDC .......................................................... 5 A. La requête a un objet propre et indépendant du résultat des négociations diplomatiques qui se poursuivent parallèlement à l'instance engagée devant la Cour........................................................................ 6 B. La requête vise à ce stade à démontrer qu'un comportement illicite peut être attribué à l'Ouganda, et non à préciser l'étendue du dommage qui en résulte ..................................................................................... 7 C. La requête a pour objet le comportement illicite de l'Ouganda envisagé dans son ensemble, et non une multitude d'actes illicites particuliers.. ................................................................. 1 1 Section 2. L'étendue de la compétence de la Cour ...............................................14 A. Les conséquences limitées de l'absence du Rwanda à l'instance ........................... 15 B. Les conséquences limitées de la prise en compte par la Cour de certaines demandes reconventionnelles ougandaises.. ........................................ .2 1 C. Les conséquences du rejet par la Cour des demandes reconventionnelles ougandaises relatives aux Accords de Lusaka ..........................25 Section 3. L'étendue du désaccord persistant entre les parties .........................27 A. La portée et les limites de l'accord des parties sur certains éléments de fait .......... 28 1. L'Ouganda admet avoir envoyé puis maintenu son armée en territoire congolais, mais nie avoir soutenu des forces rebelles congolaises ............................................................................................. 28 2. L'Ouganda admet que la RDC est victime d'une exploitation illégale de ses ressources naturelles et que des exactions ont eu lieu à l'encontre de la population civile congolaise, mais nie toute implication dans ces événements .............................................................30 B. La portée et les limites de l'accord des parties sur certains éléments de droit ......... 32 1. L'Ouganda a renoncé à invoquer plusieurs causes de justification ...................... 32 2. L'Ouganda a implicitement. accepté les principes avancés par la RDC en matlere. de réparation........................................................................... 33 3. L'Ouganda a explicitement accepté la validité et les effets juridiques de la résolution 1304 (2000)du Conseil de sécurité .............................................. 36 C. La controverse relative aux standards de preuve .....................................................39 1. Les objections formulées par 1 'Ouganda à 1 'encontre de la méthodologie suivie par la RDC en matière de preuve sont dépourvues de fondement ....................................................................................... 39 a) Les documents présentés par la RDC sont pertinents, même lorsqu'ils n'établissent pas expressément l'imputabilité de certains faits à l'Ouganda, ou ne concluent pas à la responsabilité de cet Etat .....................40 b) En dépit de ce que prétend l'Ouganda, il suffit au Congo d'établir les faits sur la base de « preuves convaincantes » qui permettent d'atteindre une « certitude raisonnable >> ................................................................ 42 2. Les éléments de preuves produits par la RDC permettent d'établir avec une certitude raisonnable la matérialité de faits allégués par le Congo .................................................................................. .45 a) La pertinence des actes institutionnels et des rapports d'organisations internationales comme éléments de preuve ....................................45 b) La pertinence des déclarations officielles comme éléments de preuve .....................47 c) La pertinence des monographies et articles de presse comme éléments de preuve ....................................................................................48 d) La pertinence des rapports des organisations non gouvernementales comme éléments de preuve ........................................................ 50 3. Les procédés suivis par l'Ouganda en matière d'établissement des faits ne correspondent pas aux standards internationaux requis ....................53 a) La formulation d'affirmations essentielles pour la résolution du litige, mais qui ne sont étayées par aucun élément de preuve .............................54 b) Le renvoi fréquent à des documents élaborés par la seule administration de 1'Etat défendeur ..........................................................................55 c) La production de témoignages ougandais présentés par le biais d'affidavits déficients ................................................................................ 56 d) La production de documents neutres qui ne confirment pas ou infirment la thèse ougandaise ............................................................................58 CHAPITRE II - L'INTERVENTION MILITAIRE DE L'OUGANDA EN RDC .......................................................60 Section 1. Les raisons de l'intervention militaire ougandaise ..........................64 A. Les raisons politiques : la volonté d'indépendance du nouveau régime congolais ..................................................................................... 65 B. Les raisons économiques: les intérêts ougandais dans le nord et l'est de la RDC ...................................................................................................67 C. La dégradation des relations personnelles entre Yoweri Museveni et Laurent-Désiré Kabila ........................................................................................69 Section 2. L'intervention militaire directe des forces armées ougandaises....... 72 A. Les prémisses de l'intervention militaire ougandaise 1. La mise en place des unités des FAC dans les provinces du Congo frontalières de l'Ouganda et du Rwanda par le colonel Kabarebe ........................73 2. L'échec de la tentative du coup d'Etat à Kinshasa dans la nuit du 2 au 3 août 1998 ............................................................................................... 7.5 B. La participation de l'armée ougandaise à l'opération militaire aéroportée tendant... à renverser le gouvernement congolais à partir de la base militaire de Kitona .................................................................................. 77 1. Le déroulement de l'opération .............................................................................. 77 2. Les preuves de l'implication de 1 'Ouganda dans l'opération aéroportée sur Kitona ....................................................................... 78 a) Les témoignages directs attestant de l'implication de l'Ouganda ...........................78 b) Une pièce à conviction confirmant l'implication de 1'UDPF : le char ougandais capturé à Kasangulu ................................................................... 81 c) Les sources journalistiques et scientifiques attestant de l'implication de l'Ouganda ................................................................................... 82 d) Les déclarations de personnalités politiques ougandaises dénonçant la participation de I'UDPF à l'opération aéroportée ............................. 84 C. La participation de l'armée ougandaise à l'opération militaire menée dans l'est du territoire du Congo dès le 2 août 1998 ...................................87 1. L'avancée des troupes de I'UPDF sur le front sud (provinces du Sud-Kivu et du Maniema)................................................................ 88 2. L'avancée des troupes de I'UPDF sur le front est (province du Nord-Kivu )...................................................................................... 90 3. L'avancée des troupes de 1'UPDF sur le front nord-est (province Orientale)............................................................................................... 91 a) L'entrée de I'UPDF dans la province Orientale et la prise de Kisangani .......................................................................................... 91 b) L'avancée de 1'UPDF sur l'axe Kisangani - Banalia - Buta - Aketi ..................... 93 c) L'avancée de 1'UPDF sur l'axe Isiro - Poko - Dingila - Ango - Bondo .............. 93 4. L'avancée des troupes de I'UPDF sur le front nord-ouest (province de 1 'Equateur)....................................................................................... 94 a) L'avancée de 1'UPDF sur l'axe Kisangani-Isangi-Bumba- Lisala-Makanza (vers les villes de Mbandaka et de Kinshasa ) .............................. 95 b) L'avancée de I'UPDF sur l'axe Kisangani Lisala-Businga- Abuzi-Wapinda-Yakoma -Gbadolite (vers le nord de la province).......................... 95 c) L'avancée de I'UPDF sur l'axe Lisala-Bongandanga-Basankusu- Befale (vers le sud de la province) .......................................................................... 96 d) L'avancée de I'UPDF sur l'axe de la rivière Ubangui: Gbadolite-Zongo-Gemena-Libenge-Dongo-Imesse-Mobenzene..........................
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