www.africa-confidential.com 4 April 2003 Vol 44 No 7 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL /RWANDA 2 UGANDA Soccer war, Congo war In the phoney war, the score was The great U-turn nil-nil as Rwanda and Uganda President Museveni calls for the freeing of parties and the chance of played a qualifier in Africa’s Cup of a third term at the top Nations soccer tournament last It was the sharpest of U-turns. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who has vehemently defended his weekend in Kigali. In the real war in eastern Congo-Kinshasa, ‘no-party system’ of government since he won power in 1986, now wants to lift the ban on multi-party and Kigali back rival politics. He told delegates at an apprehensive congress of the ruling National Resistance Movement at militias and may be preparing for Kyankwanzi, north of Kampala, on 26 March, that they should accommodate those politicians who had another direct confrontation over persuaded ‘about 20 per cent’ of Ugandans to vote against his no-party system. The NRM would remain Congo’s mineral riches. unchanged, a broad church: ‘Those who want to experiment again with political parties can do so alongside the Movement, which should maintain its present identity’. So the no-party system (with its 3massive state subventions) is to compete with others in the presidential election due in 2006. The change of heart is more pragmatic than ideological. The NRM’s middle ranks are increasingly Victory is not enough calling for political liberalisation and modernisation. They also want more power within the Movement Two interlinked questions gnaw at over its ruling clique, who have been conspicuously enjoying the spoils of government. Its National the credibility of President Kibaki’s Secretariat follows rather than leads debates and most of its officers are loyal to the President rather than government: will the presidency the NRM. Some activists have peeled off to the Reform Agenda group, led by Museveni’s former doctor exert leadership in economic and and challenger in the 2001 election, Kizza Besigye. He was last seen in Rwanda which, says the NRM, political reforms and will the ruling finances the Reform Agenda’s armed wing, the People’s Redemption Army. Support for the Reform coalition stay together? Central to Kibaki’s problems is the row over Agenda is growing, though it is not formally organised as a party. constitutional reform. If he can’t The constitution says that Museveni must hand power to a successor in 2006, at the end of his two pacify coalition partner Raila elected five-year terms. Insiders say that he believes he can use his political strength to manage the Odinga on this, the government transition to multi-party politics. Opponents claim he is using the confusion of multi-party politics to will split. negotiate another term after amending the constitution. At the NRM’s National Executive meeting this week, only one senior figure, Local Government Minister Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, opposed discussion on CÔTE D’IVOIRE 5 extending the two-term limit. Unity’s opponents Kaguta’s halo fades President Gbagbo grudgingly Museveni sees Uganda’s halo fading in the region, now that Kenya and Tanzania have functioning cooperates with the French- multi-party systems; December’s elections in Kenya allowed a peaceful succession and change of ruling brokered peace accord and power- party (AC Vol 44 No 1). Museveni doesn’t want Uganda’s political idiosyncracies to chip away at its pro- sharing deal while his powerful wife foreign investment stance, which has brought a growing trickle of capital from Asia and Europe into Simone openly opposes it. Rebel farming and service companies. There is also pressure for multi-partyism from Western friends and representatives are yet to attend a meeting of the new power-sharing lenders such as Britain and the United States. Some 50 per cent of Uganda’s budget is provided by the cabinet but have promised to do so International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Western states. Museveni does not want to put that at risk, this week as we went to press. which helps to explain why Uganda joined Rwanda, Eritrea and Ethiopia as the only African states to endorse the US-UK war on Iraq. GUINEA 7 Museveni’s about-turn on parties was extensively trailed. The independent Kampala daily newspaper The Monitor wrote about the presidential conversion a month ago; two years ago, the NRM National Up for grabs Executive set up a committee to consider political liberalisation. Museveni said that a meeting with this committee earlier this year had convinced him that it was time to lift the ban on parties. Some cynics As President Conté lies dying, a reckon that, by saying his piece on parties now, Museveni may win plaudits – but that unbanning the dangerous power vacuum is developing in Conakry. Politicians parties, plus holding a referendum and parliamentary vote, could take another year or two, leaving the are divided about a military-backed newly unbanned parties little time to organise for the 2006 elections. interim government to prepare for A week before Museveni’s announcement, the Constitutional Court had ruled that a law banning parties fresh elections but, unsurprisingly, from national political activity was unconstitutional. Opposition leaders such as the ’s the army is warming to the idea. Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, Winnie Byanyima and Okumu Ronald Reagan, had petitioned against the 2002 Political Organisations Act, which banned parties from holding rallies, campaigning in elections POINTERS 8 and opening offices outside Kampala; they claimed that this rendered political parties ‘non-functional and inoperative’, imposing a one-party state. The NRM hierarchy, including Foreign Minister James Zimbabwe, Sudan, Wapakhabulo, Defence Minister and Political Commissar Crispus Kiyonga, Nigeria & Algeria responded with 120 counter-affidavits. After six months of argument and submissions, all five Constitutional Court judges ruled for the petitioners. The NRM immediately announced it would appeal. 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7 Soccer war, Congo war So it’s war then. Uganda’s was unequivocal: ‘Rwanda, The Rwanda-Uganda falling out is mainly about grabbing Congo’s Uganda go to war in Kigali!’ screamed the headline. In fact, the Monitor was resources but not exclusively so. Both sides are trying to position themselves reporting a qualifying match between Kampala and Kigali in Africa’s Cup as other parties in Congo edge towards a peace deal and a new power-sharing of Nations soccer tournament on 29 March. Thankfully for Ugandan soccer government agreed in South Africa on 2 April. Next week, Presidents fans who travelled to Kigali for the match, the final score was nil-nil. Some and Paul Kagame are due to discuss their differences Ugandans had feared serious violence if their team won. Such are relations with mutual friend President Thabo Mbeki. between these former staunch allies. Prospects aren’t good, with Uganda still ahead in the propaganda war. On Others suggest that the hype before the soccer game and the no-score 31 March, Rwanda’s former Defence Minister, Brigadier General Emmanuel draw is a metaphor for the Kigali and Kampala governments’ inept diplomacy Habyrimana, walked across the Katuna border post and defected to Uganda. – bluster without result. True perhaps for Uganda and Rwanda, but the About five Rwandan officers have fled to Uganda this year complaining of people of eastern Congo-Kinshasa are the grass which these two mini- persecution; and at least three Ugandan officers, including Colonel Samson elephants trample. As in Rwanda’s and Uganda’s battles in Congo’s north- Mande, have defected to Rwanda, which hosted opposition leader Col. eastern diamond centre of Kisangani in 1999 and 2000, Congolese civilians Kizza Besigye after he fled Uganda in 2001. bear the brunt. But the coup de grâce was the ‘capture’ last month in Ituri of 22 fighters Now the theatre is Congo’s eastern Ituri region, where Kigali and of the People’s Redemption Army, which Uganda’s Director of Military Kampala back different militias in a murderous proxy war which has killed Intelligence, Col. Noble Mayombo, claims is a Rwandan-financed group of over 50,000 people in the last three years and displaced half a million more. Ugandan oppositionists trying to destabilise the Museveni government. The All five militias operating in Ituri are accused of gross abuses by international 20 or so journalists who have interviewed the PRA captives weren’t entirely human rights organisations and of looting Congolese gold and diamonds by sure. There is plenty of smoke but the fire is yet to be found – still less the United Nations panel on resource exploitation (AC Vol 43 No 21). extinguished. The Kyankwanzi congress dismissed the legal contest as irrelevant, a local bid for the state airline. However, they failed to raise the money insisting that the real political agenda would be set by the Movement and Uganda Airways was liquidated. Similarly, parliament delayed and its activists. After Museveni’s statement on multi-partyism, most approval of the Bujagali dam for two years. seem to accept that grand changes are looming. Members believe the Museveni’s proposal to debate the ending of the two-term presidential Movement will remain politically dominant though its role is not clear. limit may prove more controversial still. Few NRM people were keen If the President has (reluctantly) accepted multi-party politics, will the on this apparent attempt by Museveni to extend his stay in office – NRM campaign for unbanning parties through a referendum, alongside even though he has publicly assured Ugandans (and privately assured all the other parties? Delegates disagreed over Museveni’s other diplomats) that he has no interest in a third term. The charitable proposals, such as ending the requirement of educational qualifications explanation is that he wants room to manoeuvre should his planned for political office-seekers, increasing the president’s powers and transition to multi-party rule go badly wrong. He remains far more opening a debate about the two-term limit on presidents. Must all this popular than the NRM across Uganda and, if the NRM looked like be wrapped up in a constitutional referendum? Many supported losing badly in 2006, a Museveni candidacy would be its best chance. ending the educational requirements for politicians, arguing it was elitist; others dismissed the proposal as dangerously populist, Favourites after Museveni undermining efforts to extend schooling across Uganda, which served Would-be successors are lining up in the NRM, although the starting as a model for Kenya’s new policy of universal free primary education. pistol has not been fired. The field is led by a smooth operator, Foreign There was less support for giving the president more executive Minister Wapakhabulo. Museveni is said to prefer Defence Minister powers, such as: Mbabazi but he lacks a strong enough base in the Movement or even ● The right to override parliament. At present, a bill becomes law if in the Uganda People’s Defence Force. Another senior candidate is parliament passes it three times with a two-thirds majority, even the Vice-President, Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe; a female candidate without presidential assent. would be welcomed by those who support women’s advancement ● The right to dissolve parliament and the government and call fresh under NRM rule but her abrasive style has made powerful enemies. elections; both presidential and parliamentary terms are now fixed at The First Deputy Prime Minister, Eriya T. Kategaya, is liked and five years. respected but tells friends he would be happy to retire after the ● The sole right to censure ministers for abuse of office; now transition; his mother is Munyarwanda which could prove awkward parliament can (and often does) criticise ministers, even Museveni’s while the two countries’ governments are at odds (see Box). A dark close associates. horse candidate is parliamentary Speaker Edward Ssekandi. ● The right of government to acquire land for any ‘national purpose’, If the favourites fail, there are three outsiders: Kiyonga, the NRM’s including for large-scale private investment and to end the constitutional National Political Commissar, coordinator of the report which proposed ban on compulsory land purchase by the state. unbanning political parties; Prime Minister Apollo Nsibambi, widely Dissenters, inside and outside the NRM, oppose more centralisation liked and respected but lacking steel; and Local Government Minister of power. Museveni’s proposals to rein in members of parliament were Bidandi Ssali, popular with the Movement’s reformists but distrusted received with a rumble of murmurs and hisses at the NRM congress, by its hardliners. The gap between reformists and die-hard although his supporters claim with some justification that parliament ‘Movementists’ could soon widen. They are battling for the soul of the has been irresponsible. For example, it blocked the sale of the failed NRM, which will remain formidable even if the multi-party reforms Uganda Airways to South African Airlines, which wanted to invest go through. heavily in making Entebbe Airport the hub of its East African operations. The NRM still debates policies as vigorously as it did 17 years ago, Parliament’s opposition was blamed on Ugandan businessmen pushing when it won power. The big idea then was compulsory village 2 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7 democracy and the election of resistance councils at local, district and of civil society groups, such as the Free Movement based at Makerere regional level through a complex system of indirect voting which gave University, Kampala. most Ugandans more votes each year than in all the preceding 24 Divided, the opposition lacks the muscle to challenge the NRM. If it years. The leadership, realising that the resistance council system was united in a coalition for political reform, as some of its politicians now getting beyond them, tried to regulate the councils better and control advocate, it could help to shape the new agenda. In the 2001 presidential a bold experiment with participatory democracy. election, Besigye won 27.8 per cent at the head of an opposition alliance The relentless programme of elections and political participation at (and many believe the government cheated him of 15-20 per cent more), local level earned the NRM legitimacy across the complexity of the against Museveni’s 69.3 per cent. Besigye is unlikely to come home to country’s social cleavages. Despite a worsening human rights record fight an election but somebody else could unite the opposition and some and despite accusations of looting in Congo-Kinshasa (AC Vol 43 No Movement dissidents against the NRM candidate. 21), that credibility has endured. Even Museveni’s sharpest critics The NRM is determined to hold a referendum on multi-partyism next concede that NRM rule stabilised much of Uganda after the ravages of year, which would keep the parties on a leash until then. One option for Dada and . them is a protest campaign to bring the referendum forward and a The political elite was at first mollified by the strategy of ‘broad- national conference at which aspiring politicians could agree on the based government’, under which ministries and senior posts were conduct of the campaign. We hear that one group is proposing the offered to opposition politicians and independent technocrats; they formation of a National Coalition for Peace and Democracy to rally went along with the no-party system while reorganising their old support for political change. parties. Those parties could play a role in government even they didn’t Some believe Museveni will try to coopt the DP leaders and some subscribe to Museveni’s ten-point programme or his pragmatic view from the Reform Agenda into an NRM-backed party. By adopting of an African democracy comprising ‘popular councils, parliament multi-party politics, the NRM has removed the opposition’s main plank and an adequate standard of living’. Nor did the parties accept and with its power and money, it would be well placed to organise its Museveni’s view that Africa has only one class, the peasantry, and that own coalition. That may be just what Museveni is working for. African political parties would therefore represent ethnic and religious differences rather than the economic and class interests that they represent in Western industrial societies. KENYA

No-party or one-party state? With the promulgation of the new constitution in 1995, tolerance ran Victory is not enough out and the parties stepped up pressure for multi-partyism. The NRM A row about government posts and the new had never really transcended the base that brought it to power in 1986 constitution threatens the ruling coalition after six years of guerrilla fighting, especially in Buganda and western Uganda, where its support was strongest. The Movement’s opponents Two interlinked questions gnaw at the credibility of President Mwai accuse it of exploiting the one-party credo to lock out opposition, Kibaki’s government: will the presidency exert leadership in economic while forming the ruling establishment in a one-party state. Its and political reform and will the ruling coalition stay together? After 90 handling of Museveni’s succession will show whether the Movement days in power, the Kibaki government’s record raises serious doubts on system and its organisations are sustainable beyond the Museveni era. both those scores. Moreover, time is running against it as it tackles The reforms he offered at Kyankwanzi could lead to the throwing out former President ’s legacy of economic collapse and of much of the Movement’s political apparatus, setting Uganda on a grand corruption. political path similar to that of its Kenyan and Tanzanian neighbours. On the face of it, the Moi-Kibaki transition was better than anyone First comes the political contest in 2006. The NRM elite crafted the dared to hope – and President Kibaki still basks in the afterglow of one election rules to minimise any challenge from within or without the of Africa’s most popular election victories (AC Vol 44 No 1). The Movement. The old parties, with no offices outside Kampala and Kenya shilling has firmed against hard currencies and the Stock government-regulated finances, must even give three days’ notice Exchange index has gone up by more than a third since his inauguration. before they hold rallies. Within the Movement, the leadership has Formerly classed as the world’s third most corrupt country, Kenya has shown no interest in internal democracy. Until 1995, it had held no won international aid for its free education policy and is negotiating new national convention, its officers had never been elected and its members credits from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Some had never been consulted about policy. True to the NRM’s roots in KSh15 billion (US$187.5 million) stolen during the Moi era has been guerrilla warfare, an unchallenged leader headed a ruling cabal which recovered, according to Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister dictated policy. At the first national conference in 1995, the chair, , and investigative commissions into the worst cases vice-chair and national political commissar were all elected unopposed. have started. The oligarchy will remain in charge in the difficult months ahead. Yet these indices are less significant that the complex problems of Museveni wants to avoid the mistake of Kenya’s ex-President managing the government’s policy agenda and securing agreement for Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, who imposed his own unsuccessful it from the ruling coalition’s 14 member parties. That’s where the candidate, , on the ruling party. Movement activists government’s stumbling looks most alarming. Kibaki remains popular. believe that, if Museveni does not stand himself, he will allow fairly Initially, many welcomed his relaxed management style as a change open primary elections. from the obsessive control freakery of his predecessor. Kenyans also The NRM enters multi-party politics with the advantages of sympathised personally with 71-year-old Kibaki at the inauguration, incumbency and a comfortable lead in popular support. Both could wheelchair-bound and recuperating after a car accident during the dissipate if the transition is mishandled, to the advantage of Besigye’s election campaign. Then in late January, another health crisis, purportedly Reform Agenda, Ssemogerere’s DP, the Uganda People’s Congress a mini-stroke or thrombosis, again hospitalised Kibaki and temporarily (once headed by Obote and still wracked by internal conflict) and a raft removed him from effective executive control. With his recent return

3 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7

to health, the ruling coalition between his National Alliance for Kenya When Moi anointed Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU’s presidential (NAK) and ’s Liberal Democratic Party is in the sick candidate, Odinga stormed out, taking an improbable gang of KANU bay. Kibaki’s failure to tackle sniping between the coalition’s rival stalwarts with him, such as , Joseph Kamotho, Kalonzo wings raises an awkward question: is he unable or unwilling to do so? Musyoka and Fred Gumo. This broke KANU in two. Then when A deafening silence from the presidency followed Transport Minister Odinga’s new party, now called the Liberal Democratic Party, and Kibaki associate ’s call on 30 March for the break- negotiated an alliance with Kibaki’s NAK, electoral victory for the up of the election-winning National Rainbow Coalition (Narc). ‘Now new alliance looked arithmetically certain, at least in a free election. that the intended unity has been achieved and the elections successfully A memorandum of understanding between Odinga and Kibaki held, whose interest is the Summit serving?’ Michuki asked, referring before December’s elections stipulated that afterwards, the President- to the Narc’s executive body. Odinga’s group has a clear answer: elect would convene the Narc Summit to discuss jobs and ministerial break up the Narc Summit and that breaks up the government. Neither duties. Ministerial and other senior appointments were to be split side wants that but Kibaki’s failure to rein in Michuki shows either that 50:50 between Odinga’s LDP and Kibaki’s NAK groupings. The collective responsibility isn’t taken seriously in the cabinet or that constitutional review, which would reduce the presidency’s executive Michuki was speaking Kibaki’s mind. Either option looks untenable. powers and establish a prime ministership (to be filled by Odinga), Resentment is boiling in Odinga’s LDP. Odinga is publicly would be finished within the government’s first year in office. reasonable and diplomatic although in private, he assures friends that It hasn’t worked. The Narc Summit hasn’t met since the elections; history will not repeat itself, a reference to his fall-out with Moi last its failure to do so is blamed on figures such as Michuki and Kibaki’s year. Of the 14 parties in the governing coalition, the LDP is the advisors, who view Odinga and the LDP as dangerously destabilising largest, providing just over half of the members of parliament on the influences. If Kibaki shares that assessment, the government could government’s side. The unpalatable reality for Kibaki and his acolytes break up within months. Kibaki’s team has to cooperate with the LDP is that they would not have won the election without Odinga’s tactical if it wants government business to pass through parliament. That was sense and determination. clear when LDP MPs didn’t attend a debate on a new anti-corruption bill and sunk Kibaki’s attempt to pass the law. More than $300 mn. in Poles apart cheap credits from the World Bank depend on these laws being Odinga and Kibaki are polar opposites. Odinga lives and breathes enacted before Kenya’s economic programme is discussed at the politics and is hyperactive, sleeping just three to four hours a night. executive boards of the World Bank and IMF in June. This allows him plenty of time to catch up on reading and nighttime political meetings, for which Kenyan activists are renowned. Although Post-election volte-face he’s no intellectual, Odinga can roll out the Western ‘development The LDP’s informal parliamentary boycott pointed to rising tensions. vocabulary’ with the ease and authority needed to convince in A clash over a parliamentary budget committee followed late last negotiations; a few minutes later, he can speak just as plausibly to poor month. The committee is to be staffed with economists and policy and illiterate wananchi in Nairobi’s Kibera slum about the cause of advisors to provide statistics and economic analysis to inform discussion Kenya’s political ills. Contemptuously dismissed a year ago as of parliamentary bills. Before the election, Kibaki and lacking the skills and patience of his late father, opposition leader (now Finance Minister) backed the budget committee proposal as a , Raila is now second in importance only to way to improve the low level of policy debate in parliament. Kibaki (much to Vice-President Michael Wamalwa Kijana’s Behind that battle is a deeper policy rift: between Kibaki and frustration) and his presidential ambitions are harder to rubbish. Mwiraria on one hand and the rest of the government (particularly the Even before his accident, Kibaki was more detached from the spending ministries) on the other. Kibaki’s government faces a fiscal political hurly-burly; he affects a gentlemanly demeanour, leading crisis set to worsen this year without substantial new aid and capital some to suppose he would prefer to be on the golf-course. An flows. Apart from negotiating with the Bank and IMF, Treasury has impressive academic economist, he knows his way around the policy to tackle three main imperatives: anti-corruption laws to clean up arguments and is an instinctive liberal on issues such as capital government and cut waste; banking reform to tackle the fiscal mess punishment and social spending. However, he lacks Odinga’s political caused by grand corruption at Eurobank, Kenya Commercial Bank energy, preferring to delegate to a coterie of middle aged professionals and others; rapid reform and sale of parastatals to cut state subvention and businessmen known as the ‘ Mafia’. Pining for the and produce privatisation revenue. intrigues of the Kenya African National Union era, Kenyan journalists Treasury fears that if these issues become subject to a political portray the Mt. Kenya group as an old-style ethnic cabal (Kikuyu, auction of trade-offs and compromises, Kenya’s economic recovery Embu and Meru) running the government and defying elected will stall and the government fail. Against this, ministers and activists representatives – something equivalent to the Kalenjin mafia headed in Narc fear their social and political priorities will be sacrificed in the by Moi and his business-political ally Nicholas Kipyator Biwott. fiscal battles. Narc’s much praised free primary education policy is on That overstates the case but Kibaki will have to guard against such the line. Promised backing from the United Nations and World Bank perceptions shaping political reality. won’t be enough to fund thousands of new teachers, books and new The 14-party Narc coalition is full of personal rivalries (such as that schools. Teachers are seething, many have worked unpaid double between Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka (AC Vol 44 No 4) and shifts to meet the influx of new pupils, even though government Health Minister ) and ethnic intrigues – but the ‘swing delayed their pay increases promised last year and MPs have just voted politician’ is Odinga. Without his cooperation, the coalition collapses. themselves 25 per cent rises. Just a year ago, Odinga took his National Development Party (which More explosive still are the looming battles over constitutional has the support of over a million voters from Nyanza Province) into reform. Since the elections, Kibaki and his advisors have been less alliance with KANU, then the ruling party. After agreeing with Moi enthusiastic about early reform. Most agree that Yash Pal Ghai’s on cabinet representation and a free contest for the presidential constitutional reforms, framed and canvassed during Moi’s imperial candidacy, Odinga merged (or submerged) NDP with KANU. presidency, went too far in cutting back the presidency’s executive

4 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7 power. The Ghai plan would make Kenya’s president a quasi ceremonial hardliners will now blame the national unity government for not figure like Italy’s, although the majority view in Narc is for a French- immediately getting it out of it, even though the government will have style system, in which President and Prime Minister share executive to move very slowly and cautiously to have any hope of success. powers. A minority view, attributed to the now legendary Mt. Kenya Already the FPI’s rabidly nationalist daily Notre Voie is complaining Mafia, is that the weight of executive powers should stay with the that disarmament of the rebels has not started, though in reality it will president while the prime minister should be a super-manager of take months to reach the point where it will be possible to start parliamentary business. disarming. With the exception of Finance Minister Bohoun Bouabré This is a battle of personalities as well as ideas: Odinga was and Energy and Mines Minister Léon Emmanuel Monnet, who kept promised the prime minister’s job. He has already offered Kibaki a their posts, the FPI lineup in the unity government is remarkable for deal in which he retains all his presidential powers under transitional its lack of heavyweights. Figures such as former Foreign Minister and provisions – Odinga would take the premier’s post with some powers party number two Abou Drahamane Sangaré and former Prime suspended – until the next election. However, after the LDP’s Minister Pascal Affi N’Guessan have been kept out. informal boycott of the anti-corruption debate, Kibaki’s NAK faction responded by voting Odinga from the chairmanship of parliament’s The agreement – on paper and temporary constitutional review committee and replacing him with Kikuyu The FPI complains that the powers accorded to the prime minister lawyer and former political rival . contradict the presidential regime enshrined in the constitution but Constitutional reform could stall as the coalition’s factions get out Premier Seydou Elimane Diarra’s powers have already been watered the knives. That would please those of Kibaki’s advisors who are down. The Marcoussis accord envisaged a three-year derogation of happy with an all-powerful presidency but it would probably break the powers but Gbagbo has signed over many of his powers to Diarra for government. Almost all the groups in Narc want constitutional reform an initial period of only six months. (a wider distribution of power to reward them for the election victory) Filling the Defence and Interior posts presented particular problems. and would rebel if it were thwarted. Constitutional reform requires The army Chief of Staff, General Mathias Doué, was mentioned as a big-tent politics in Kenya: in parliament that means getting two thirds possible defence minister, though he has (so far) shown an admirable of MPs (or at least 145) to endorse the reform. One scheme said to be reluctance to get involved in politics. Then Gen. Gaston Ouassenan quietly canvassed by some anti-Odinga elements is to see whether the Koné was proposed but he proved controversial because he heads the much weakened KANU could be persuaded into replacing LDP as parliamentary group of former President Henri Konan Bédié’s Parti coalition partner, which would then agree to less thorough-going Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), which would give the constitutional changes. Mathematically, it would work (provided the former single party an extra seat. Once notorious for ordering the now rudderless KANU held together) but politically it would be beating and tear-gassing of opposition demonstrators during the 1995 disastrous. That such a scheme has even gained currency is a measure presidential election, he is best remembered for having had Sangaré of how desperate relations have become in government. beaten in his office because of a defamatory article in a satirical newspaper he published. It is a grim indicator of the country’s decline that he could be put forward as a competent, relatively neutral CÔTE D’IVOIRE professional but in this era of death squads and mass graves, he looks like a model of propriety. In the event, the Defence portfolio went to the FPI’s Assou Adou, Unity’s opponents while the Interior Ministry will be headed by Fofana Zemogo, the mild-mannered Foreign Affairs Spokesperson of the opposition Gbagbo grudgingly cooperates with a Rassemblement des Républicains, who is said to have fallen out with French-brokered peace agreement party leader Alassane Dramane Ouattara. Yet any attempts by the The 5 pm traffic jam of cars with African Development Bank licence RDR to change anything can easily be blocked by the FPI majority in plates heading out of Abidjan’s Plateau business district to leafy villas parliament. Despite the progress made at Marcoussis on revising in Cocody and Deux Plateaux is gone. Instead, the streets are clogged constitutional clauses setting tough nationality conditions for with empty orange taxis – some cruise round all day without a client presidential candidates and limiting who can own land, the constitution – and the white United Nations’ 4x4s that flock to Africa’s humanitarian can be changed only if the FPI chooses to supply the necessary two- emergencies but have never been needed in Côte d’Ivoire before. For thirds majority in parliament. So RDR Secretary General Henriette now, people are no longer being dragged from their homes at dead of Diabaté may be the RDR’s 2005 presidential candidate and Konan night and the curfew has been put back to midnight but the rebels who Bédié, now comfortable in Paris, will need to think about moving back control half the country refuse to take up their posts in the national to Abidjan soon if he wants to meet the residency requirement. unity government and clashes continue in the west (AC Vol 44 No 2). The first two cabinet meetings took place in Yamoussoukro, the The Front Populaire Ivoirien, especially its hard line, led by the political capital and birthplace of Côte d’Ivoire’s founding father President’s powerful wife, Simone Gbagbo, and the likes of FPI Félix Houphouët-Boigny. However, once it became clear that the Secretary General Sylvain Miaka Ouretto, makes no secret of its rebels would not immediately be taking their seats, meetings moved opposition to the national unity government in which it holds ten posts. back to Abidjan. It is still government policy to move the seat of Miaka Ouretto cites the support of what he euphemistically calls ‘civil government (at long last) to Yamoussoukro this year, though in society movements’, the bands of thugs conjured up on demand by practice, this looks highly unlikely. youth leader Charles Blé Goudé. President Laurent Gbagbo’s Gbagbo is aware that his political survival in the short term depends remarks about January’s Marcoussis peace accord always make clear on his ability to keep the economy turning over. Lacking the expertise that he doesn’t like it but that the country has to put up with it. himself (he is a historian by training) he depends on Bouabré, a With all parties included in the government, opposition will come competent technocrat whose efforts to lighten the national debt burden from the presidency. Having got the country into this mess, FPI and repair relations with donors have been appreciated by the

5 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7 Hard-core Gbagbo Around President Laurent Gbagbo is a hard core which is fiercely opposed on the RDR. Alassane Ouattara, who is more often abroad than at home, is to the Marcoussis peace accord and firmly convinced of the truth of Pastor probably now unelectable. Moïse Koré’s assertion that opposition leader Alassane Ouattara is the The Justice Minister and RDR Secretary General Henriette Diabaté has devil incarnate. Koré, an Evangelical, is Gbagbo’s spiritual advisor. the highest profile. Yet while she would like to tackle the present all- Gbagbo is Catholic but his wife Simone, who heads the Front Populaire pervasive culture of impunity by shedding light on the death squads, as well Ivoirien parliamentary group, is a Protestant Evangelical more open to the as earlier cases such as the ‘charnier de Yopougon’, the 57 young northern Pastor’s message. Operating from offices in the National Assembly, FPI Muslim men whose bodies were found dumped outside Abidjan after the Secretary General Sylvain Miaka Ouretto is another hardliner, along with 2000 presidential election, she will find it difficult to drum up the political the parliament President, Mamadou Koulibaly. will from the government as a whole. The kitchen cabinet also includes Gbagbo’s influential Freemason uncle, General Mathias Doué is still managing to stay out of politics, having Laurent Ottro, trusted former ministers such as Bertin Kadet and Moïse resisted French pressure to lead a coup early in the rebellion. Another Lida Kouassi (both ex-Defence) and Paul Yao N’Dré (ex-Interior), and a determinedly neutral figure is Prime Minister Seydou Elimane Diarra, a selection of lobbyists of varying credibility and influence. FPI President respected northern businessman who led the National Reconciliation Forum and former Premier Pascal Affi N’Guessan represents the party’s more in 2001 and has had to use all his diplomatic skill just to get most ministers moderate, pragmatic tendency, along with Finance Minister Paul Bohoun to a cabinet meeting. Bouabré. The party is weakened by infighting over who should step in if The Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) also seems to be Gbagbo fails to survive the crisis but its large majority in parliament will staying out of politics. Former President Henri Konan Bédié is in Paris and ensure nothing much alters the status quo. Laurent Dona Fologo has been shunted upstairs to the advisory Conseil Holed up at an Abidjan hotel and guarded by West African troops, the Economique et Social, where he can mourn the welcome for foreigners ministers of the Rassemblement des Républicains look like strangers in preached by Côte d’Ivoire’s first President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, their own land. Many people blame the RDR for the Côte d’Ivoire’s without rocking the boat. As long as the PDCI can’t bring itself to cooperate successive problems, particularly the rebellion, which nationalists blame with the RDR against the FPI, little will change. international financial community. His government has performed midnight-6 am, instead of 10 pm-6 am. The threat of protest action last quite well on the financial front, gaining access for its goods to United month forced outgoing Defence Minister Bertin Kadet to shelve States’ markets under the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. proposals to reduce the daily allowance for troops at rear bases to 1,500 Reports of the economy’s collapse have been somewhat exaggerated. CFA francs (US$2.50) from CFAfr3,000, while leaving it unchanged The government made a priority of the cocoa harvest because its at CFAfr6,000 for frontline troops. Recruitment is still going on (in revenue was vital for paying salaries. The processing factories are contravention of the Marcoussis accord) and the strain on the budget working again. The cotton harvest has been gathered in the north and is considerable. There are political strains, too. The army spokesman, the highly successful Uniwax cloth factory in Abidjan has reopened. Colonel Jules Yao Yao, was sacked on 19 March, apparently for being Lebanese-owned businesses have continued unscathed and the too outspoken, after he dismissed talk of a supposed coup plan as packaging companies owned by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan’s nonsense. Gen. Doué sent envoys to the frontline to tell his troops he Industrial Promotion Services are working normally. The International wanted the peace deal to work and French troops have begun handing Cocoa Organisation is going ahead with its move from London to over some sectors of the ceasefire line to West African ‘Ecoforce’ Abidjan. The war has not caused significant infrastructure damage troops from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo (representing and a certain amount of goods are able to cross the ceasefire line. the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS). French troops, meanwhile, detained about 110 mostly Liberian The ADB heads for Tunis fighters after an attack on the western rebel-held town of Bangolo on The biggest blow to the economy has undoubtedly been the evacuation 7 March, a reminder that the key to any solution lies not in Côte to Tunis of the African Development Bank but this has as much to do d’Ivoire but next door in Liberia. Unable to pay his troops, President with the animosity between Bank President Omar Kabbaj and Charles Taylor has opened up a new front for them to loot in western Gbagbo’s government as with the security situation (AC Vol 44 No 3). Côte d’Ivoire. UN sanctions on him come up for review on 7 May and Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade said in France in February momentum is building for the UN Security Council to take a wider that it was the Bank’s departure, with its catastrophic knock-on effects regional approach to the problem. for Abidjan’s landlords, restaurants and supermarkets, that made Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré, though, will continue Gbagbo realise he had no choice but to cooperate with Marcoussis. to get off scot free. There are fears that the full truth about his Kabbaj did not appreciate the personal attacks that appeared in pro- involvement in Côte d’Ivoire’s army rebellion cannot be revealed government newspapers and has made it clear that he has no intention without unleashing war between the two countries, though as the of returning to Abidjan. His presidency ends in 2005. situation normalises and contacts with the northern rebels increase, In general, international organisations whose investment is limited more and more of the truth will come out. to office space have been more likely to leave than companies with The UN sent a mission to Côte d’Ivoire to examine whether an significant infrastructure investments. European governments are international commission should inquire into human rights abuses on expected to change their travel advice soon, which could encourage both sides. The new government would have to request such a many business people to return. Incongruously, there is plenty of new commission, so it will depend upon whether the political will exists. building going on, obviously planned before the crisis but at least in The Special Court in Sierra Leone may yet indict Charles Taylor, part carried out by FPI members looking to invest their gains before though arresting him would pose a certain number of problems. The the tide turns against them. indictment papers for several of those already targeted by the Court On the security front, the curfew was shortened on 20 March to cite Taylor as an accessory.

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was Ambassador in Paris when Conté took power on 3 April 1984. GUINEA Conté is less than keen on appointing Somparé, who spoke out against military rule at the time of his coup, to such a sensitive post. He would prefer the President of the Committee for the Fight against Corruption, Chaïkou Yaya Baldé. Yet while Somparé is a weak successor, he has Up for grabs no serious rival within the PUP. Premier Sidimé is even less popular. As President Lansana Conté lies dying, the No one is sure how the après-Conté will develop. Alpha Condé has international community courts Guinea substantial support among the Malinké but his backing of President Gravely ill with complications from diabetes, President Lansana Laurent Gbagbo, despite attacks on Guineans in Côte d’Ivoire, has Conté has withdrawn to his home village of Moussayah, leaving the created a rebellion within RPG ranks. Then Condé’s declaration last army and the divided opposition holding their breath (AC Vol 44 No year, made without consulting his FRAD colleagues, that he would 6). Officially, he is due to stand for a third term in December but few contest the presidential election has created much bad feeling. expect him to live that long. With no obvious successor, a dangerous Elections present practical problems. No effective infrastructure power vacuum looms in a region already struggling with linked exists. The government never bothered to count votes for last June’s conflicts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Fodé Soumah, Deputy parliamentary elections but instead invited opposition leaders to share Central Bank Governor and a leading figure in the ruling Parti de out seats. This was an improvement on the November 2001 referendum, l’Unité et du Progrès (PUP), has the surreal task of travelling Guinea which showed overwhelming support for a third term for Conté. The to drum up votes. The independent media are asking questions about European Union criticised the polls but did not condemn the result his campaign funds: L’Economiste has reported that he has a budget (AC Vol 43 No 24). of 40 billion Guinean francs (US$20 million) of state funds. Siradiou Diallo, Bâ’s rival as UPR leader, believes that military Guinea’s presence on the United Nations Security Council has led rule is not the answer and that the opposition must press for the respect to unprecedented processions of senior diplomats filing through of the constitution by all. Diallo and Bâ are ethnic Peulhs, who form Conakry airport. Not all of them get to meet the President. Those that 35 per cent of the population and suffered persecution under Sékou do must travel the 100 kilometres to Moussayah; those that don’t must Touré, a Malinké. Another figure jostling for position is former Prime be content with Prime Minister Lamine Sidimé, a man with virtually Minister Sidya Touré, leader of the Union des Forces Républicaines. no power under Guinea’s presidential regime but who can at least greet A minority Diahanké and one-time directeur de cabinet for Ivorian guests. Socialist President Ahmed Sékou Touré broke with France former Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara, he made a good at Independence, leaving Guinea in unsplendid isolation. Relations impression on Guineans who associate him with a time when the with the United States have recently warmed (AC Vol 43 No 18). power supply was reliable. But he is likely to fall foul of the profound Conté is obliged to appear from time to time to show that, nominally conservatism of a people terrorised by successive dictatorships. at least, he remains in charge. On 18 March, he held a rally at the All eyes are on the army, especially on General Arafan Camara, Sékhoutouréyah presidential palace and warned the opposition not to Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff. Once cited as a possible campaign in army barracks. ‘Soldiers do not obey politicians, they successor, he seems to have fallen from Conté’s favour lately. Some obey the government. And until proven otherwise, I am the one who junior officers show signs of dissent and much depends upon whether commands the Guinean army,’ he said. ‘Anyone who disagrees with the high command can keep them in line. One universally respected me can wait until election day and vote against me. I’m not dead yet.’ officer, Lieutenant Colonel Sama Panival Bangoura, was killed Those present said the President had lost weight and though he spoke mysteriously in the Madina Oula forest near Kindia as the army for over an hour, chain-smoking, he had to lean on a stick and on the deployed to ward off Liberian cross-border attacks in September shoulder of his aide-de-camp, Major Mamadouba Soumah. 2000. The results of an investigation into his death are not public. Instability in Guinea will complicate efforts to address regional Shadowy communiqué security and tackle Liberian President Charles Taylor. The military Two days earlier, a communiqué had appeared signed by a shadowy nearly toppled Conté in February 1996 when the presidential palace ‘military committee for democracy’. It called on soldiers to ‘take their was destroyed. Armed Forces chief Gen. Kerfalla Camara has responsibilities’ and warned those taking advantage of the President’s toured barracks, reminding his men that the army’s role is to defend the illness to loot the country. Conté’s health deteriorated in December republic, whatever the political situation. and he was flown to Morocco for treatment at Rabat’s military hospital. He regularly receives only Fodé Soumah, Foreign Minister Visit our website at: www.africa-confidential.com Published fortnightly (25 issues per year) by Africa Confidential, at François Louceny Fall and influential businessman Mamadou Sylla. 73 Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JQ, England. The Front Républicain pour l’Alternance Démocratique (FRAD), Tel: +44 20-7831 3511. Fax: +44 20-7831 6778. a five-party alliance including Alpha Condé’s Rassemblement du Copyright reserved. Editor: Patrick Smith. Deputy Editors: Gillian Lusk and Thalia Griffiths. Administration: Clare Tauben and Juliet Amissah. Peuple de Guinée (RPG), says it will support a one-year military Annual subscriptions including postage, cheques payable to Africa transition for electoral preparations. The FRAD gathered an impressive Confidential in advance: 20,000 supporters in Conakry’s Kénien stadium on 19 January, Institutions: Africa £328 – UK/Europe £385 – USA $970 – ROW £502 despite the brutality used to break up recent opposition demonstrations, Corporates: Africa £424 – UK/Europe £472 – USA $1093 – ROW £589 Students (with proof): Africa/UK/Europe/ROW £91 or USA $131 and there have been smaller protests provoked by recent power cuts. African Studies Assoc. members: UK/Europe £70 – Americas $102 – ROW £70 FRAD spokesman Mamadou Bâ, of the Union pour le Progrès et All prices may be paid in equivalent convertible currency. We accept le Renouveau (UPR), says the coalition has little faith in the constitution, American Express, Mastercard and Visa credit cards. which stipulates that if the head of state dies in office, power passes to Subscription enquiries to: Africa Confidential, PO Box 1354, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2XG England. National Assembly president, who has 60 days to organise elections. Tel: 44 (0)1865 778315 and Fax: 44 (0)1865 471775 Current President Aboubacar Somparé is from the Soussou minority Printed in England by Duncan Print and Packaging Ltd, Herts, UK. like Conté. A veteran of Sékou Touré’s postcolonial revolution, he ISSN 0044-6483 7 4 April 2003 Africa Confidential Vol 44 No 7

as much as 40 per cent or 800,000 barrels a day. Pointers SUDAN The new violence, just before local elections on 12 April, was triggered by competition for control in local government areas (LGAs), often ZIMBABWE War spreads flashpoints of tension between Ijaw, Itsekiri and A double tragedy of fighting and famine threatens Urhobo communities. The upheaval began with a drought-stricken Darfur (AC Vol 43 No 23). A river blockade by Ijaws and exploded when two Votes and gaols major assault is expected by the National Islamic soldiers were killed. Worst affected are Warri Barely noticed abroad because of the war on Iraq, Front government which has declared it will no South, Warri South-West and Warri North. Ijaw on 31 March the Movement for Democratic Change longer negotiate with the far western region’s groups are frustrated that federal government has regained some of the momentum it had lost with fledgling armed movement, the Darfur Liberation ignored their demands for new wards. LGA two bye-election victories in its Harare Front, now confusingly renamed the Sudan control in Delta would give them federal funds strongholds. In Kuwadzana constituency, the Liberation Army. SLA leader Abdel Wahid under the ‘derivation formula’: the State’s share MDC won 12,548 votes, the ruling Zimbabwe Mohamed Ahmed Nur, who is 37, Fur and a in revenue from its oil. African National Union-Patriotic Front 5,002. In lawyer, has vowed to fight to the bitter end. By This coincides with a revival of tension between Highfield, the MDC took 8,759 votes, ZANU satellite telephone he told Africa Confidential the Ijaw groups and Delta Governor James Ibori. An 4,844. After a campaign in which each side SLA had ‘hundreds, no, thousands’ of armed Urhobo, he is accused of favouring his own. The accused the other of violence and hundreds of supporters and was ‘controlling our places well’ Ijaw Derivation Front and the Delta Elders want people were injured, polling was fairly peaceful. in largely mountainous terrain around the 3,024- him disqualified from the election. Urhobo are the The MDC, which had pronounced the poll neither metre Jebel Marra massif; it has, he says, beaten biggest group in Delta, but Ijaws feel free nor fair, swiftly accepted victory, calling on back NIF troops and militia which had tried to disenfranchised and cheated of Delta oil revenue. the government to restore law and human rights or retake Tine, captured by the SLA on 25 March. The Olu of Warri, Delta’s top tribal leader, has a risk civil unrest. President Robert Mugabe (AC Sudan’s northernmost official crossing point to department liaising with Chevron on the Urhobos’ Vol 44 No 6) promised to crush the MDC. Chad is a garrison town and capital of one branch behalf. Ijaw groups protest they have no such The polls followed a general strike called by the of the Zaghawa, who constitute many of the SLA. representation and have again turned to violence. MDC on 18-19 March which shut down towns and Abdel Wahid accused Khartoum of hushing up was followed by hundreds of arrests and reports of a famine that is starting to kill local people. Raids ALGERIA beating and torture. The government-owned by government militias had hampered harvesting Sunday Mail urged the arrest of MDC leader and helicopter gunships were deployed against Morgan Tsvangirai, for ‘violating his bail light weapons. ‘We want to be in a united Sudan,’ Boom to bust conditions’ in the continuing treason trial. ZANU he said, claiming the SLA has no links to any The collapse of Abdelmoumen Rafik Khalifa’s Administration Secretary Emmerson political or military movement; supported by both El Khalifa Group (EKG) has seen investors Mnangagwa said the Politbureau was concerned pastoralists and nomads, its priority is economic mobbing banks in search of their savings, French ‘that a person facing serious charges of treason development in Darfur, in a ‘New Sudan’. The intelligence leaks about power brokers’ roles in can move around campaigning and encouraging SLA’s unstructured leadership includes lawyers, EKG’s rise – plus a local aviation crisis. people to be violent.’ Home Affairs Minister teachers and ex-army officers. Government Khalifa founded EKG, Algeria’s biggest private Kembo Mohadi urged the judiciary to review its officials claim it’s a group of ‘armed bandits’. group with 14,000 employees and nearly US$1- position so that Tsvangirai could be detained. On When Khalil Ibrahim, a Darfurian close to billion turnover. EKG bought German 31 March, MDC Vice-President Gibson Sibanda Hassan el Turabi’s NIF faction, claimed the SLA construction giant Philipp Holzmann, sponsored was arrested in Bulawayo but not charged. as an ally, many oppositionists began to suspect it Olympique Marseille football club and created a Gaoling Tsvangirai would be risky after his was a government ploy. But senior, non-SLA, satellite television channel. Now El Khalifa Bank, victory. Yet with world attention elsewhere, Darfur politicians say it is broad-based and not EKG’s main backer, is in administration, Khalifa Mugabe may feel he has sufficiently divided the Islamist. ‘The message from the Machakos peace Airways is bankrupt, and close associates await Commonwealth and won fresh support from the process is that you have to carry arms to be trial. Khalifa is in London, saying he won’t go Non-Aligned Movement and the Common Market included’, said one. home without ‘guarantees’. for Eastern and Southern Africa (which has just The Inspection Générale des Finances says met in another pariah state, Sudan). The European NIGERIA that huge sums were sent abroad from El Khalifa Union and United States have suspended financial Bank. Ex-Finance Minister Abdellatif aid and targeted sanctions on Mugabe’s circle. Benachenhou is investigating how so much public Washington recently imposed an assets-freeze on Delta force company money went into EKG – but he’s late: the top fifty politicians and plans to extend it to Just when oil markets needed abundant West France’s Direction Générale de la Sécurité their business allies but Britain seems afraid to African crude supplies (AC Vol 44 No 6), an Extérieure was concerned about Khalifa long follow suit. explosion of violence in Delta State has cut off a before Benachenhou was called in. ● Index on Censorship, an international third of Nigerian production. Attacks by Ijaw One DGSE report linked EKG to power-brokers campaigning group, awarded its ‘Golden youth groups on 22-23 March forced including Presidency Secretary General Larbi Raspberry for Services to Censorship’ to Mugabe’s ChevronTexaco, Shell and TotalFinaElf to shut Belkheir and presidential brother Abdelghani confidant, Information Minister Jonathan Moyo. down oilfields. Chevron has closed its Escravos Bouteflika, a Paris lawyer, said to have a big role He faced stiff competition from Eritrean President system and evacuated its 1,800 staff while the in EKG. Like Khalifa’s late father, Laroussi, Issayas Aferwerki, Uzbekistani President Islam Shell Petroleum Development Company struggles Abdelghani belonged to the intelligence apparatus Karimov and the US Immigration and to protect Forcados and Bonny Light streams. of the Independence fighters. Such ties go back a Naturalization Service. With global prices high, the shutdowns are costing long way.

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