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The Kenya General Election

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The Kenya General Election AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 14 January 2003 The Kenya General Election: senior ministerial positions from 1963 to 1991; new Minister December 27, 2002 of Education George Saitoti and Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka are also experienced hands; and the new David Throup administration includes several able technocrats who have held “shadow ministerial positions.” The new government will be The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has ruled more self-confident and less suspicious of the United States Kenya since independence in December 1963, suffered a than was the Moi regime. Several members know the United disastrous defeat in the country’s general election on December States well, and most of them recognize the crucial role that it 27, 2002, winning less than one-third of the seats in the new has played in sustaining both opposition political parties and National Assembly. The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition Kenyan civil society over the last decade. (NARC), which brought together the former ethnically based opposition parties with dissidents from KANU only in The new Kibaki government will be as reliable an ally of the October, emerged with a secure overall majority, winning no United States in the war against terrorism as President Moi’s, fewer than 126 seats, while the former ruling party won only and a more active and constructive partner in NEPAD and 63. Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and of bilateral economic discussions. It will continue the former the NARC opposition coalition, was sworn in as Kenya’s third government’s valuable mediating role in the Sudanese peace president on December 30. talks and will bring a much-needed new perspective to the Somali discussions in Eldoret. Although there are strains in the KANU’s time had run out. In 1992, massive spending and new government—particularly between the former opposition divisions in the opposition had resulted in a narrow KANU parties and its ex-KANU members—the new administration victory; in 1997, the recruitment of popular opposition figures provides Kenya with a real opportunity to address its economic and even greater disarray in the opposition parties had and social problems, to tackle corruption and the produced an even narrower victory. In 2002, KANU leaders mismanagement of public funds, to rebuild its infrastructure, appeared to realize that the party stood little chance of victory schools, and health services, and to restore ordinary Kenyans’ against a united opposition, and most of them decided that they confidence in their government and their future. Provided its could live with a Kibaki presidency. As a result, the party two key figures—President Kibaki and Raila Odinga— failed to launch its anticipated campaign of bribery, rigging, continue to work closely together and to trust one another, the and intimidation. KANU did bribe, it did rig, it did intimidate new government’s secure majority in the National Assembly, voters, but in a spasmodic, half-hearted manner, which merely bolstered by Kibaki's overwhelming popular majority in the ensured its defeat. presidential election, should ensure that it will have little trouble in passing legislation and expediting reforms. Kenya and the United States NARC Victory or KANU Surrender? What does this historic change mean for Kenya and for the United States’ relations with the country? The new government The scale of Kibaki and NARC’s victory was surprising. It enjoys widespread national support; there is a palpable sense of exceeded the predictions of many commentators—including relief at the end of 24 years of authoritarian rule and a feeling the author of this note—for a number of reasons. KANU of national renewal. leaders from President Moi on down seemed to accept that the national mood had finally turned against the regime. The Although the new government may appear to lack the attempt to revitalize the ruling party under the young Uhuru administrative experience of its predecessor, its general level of Kenyatta’s leadership never really gathered momentum. Once education and competence is higher than KANU’s. Kibaki Raila Odinga had shepherded former vice president Saitoti and himself is singularly experienced, having served in a series of cabinet ministers Joseph Kamotho, William ole Ntimama, and Africa Program • Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006 • Tel: (202) 775-3135 • Fax: (202) 775-3199 • www.csis.org 2 Kalonzo Musyoka first into the Rainbow Coalition and then worked, and KANU held on to virtually all of its rural Coast out of KANU into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in early Province seats. There were few indications to suggest that the October, “Project Uhuru” was in deep trouble.1 Unlike in result would be different this time. Indeed, if anything, KANU 1992, however, President Moi and other senior KANU figures appeared better placed in Kwale and Kilifi Districts than it had were willing to let Kenyatta go down to defeat. Although some in the run-up to the 1997 election. KANU’s tried and trusted money was diverted from state coffers to the campaign, much strategy, however, failed this time as NARC won not only all less money was spent than in 1992 or 1997, and a considerable four Mombasa constituencies, but seven seats in the rural proportion of what was disbursed came from the coffers of the hinterland. Kenyatta family rather than from the state or the personal accounts of President Moi and other KANU “big men.” The Presidential Results Unconfirmed reports suggest that KANU probably spent 10 Kibaki defeated KANU’s Uhuru Kenyatta by 61.3 percent to billion shillings—less than one-third of 1992 spending—and 31.6 percent of the popular vote, while FORD-People’s probably half of this was provided by the Kenyatta family. Simeon Nyachae won 6.5 percent of the presidential vote, and Consequently, although individual KANU candidates spent James Orengo of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and large sums of money, the anticipated avalanche of funds from Waweru Ng’ethe of Chama cha Umma, secured only 0.4 and KANU headquarters never materialized. Kenyatta was not 0.2 percent. Kibaki’s victory was overwhelming. He met the quite abandoned, but President Moi and his inner circle did not constitutional requirement of winning 25 percent of the vote in go out of their way financially to support his campaign. five provinces by reaching the 25 percent target in all eight provinces. His worst performance was in the Somali-populated Although he campaigned hard for Kenyatta and KANU, Northeastern Province, where NARC won only one of the 11 President Moi on several occasions during the last three weeks parliamentary seats, and Kibaki himself secured 37.1 percent. of the campaign signaled that he would accept a victory by As the DP’s presidential candidate in 1997, he had reached the Kibaki and NARC. His visit to Kibaki in hospital in London, target only in Central (88.6 percent), Nairobi (43.7 percent), on his way back from meeting President Bush, was and Eastern (28.2 percent). Kibaki’s biggest gains were in unprecedented and was seen by the Kenya media as heralding Western and Coast Provinces where his share of the Moi’s personal acknowledgment that Kibaki would be his presidential vote jumped from 1.4 percent to 74.9 percent and successor. Moi’s remarks a few days later in his Jamhuri Day from 12.7 to 64.0 percent. In Rift Valley Province, his share speech also seemed to indicate that he no longer believed that increased from 20.9 percent to 43.0 percent; in Nyanza from Kenyatta would win. NARC leaders sensed victory, while 15.1 percent (mainly in the three Gusii Districts) to 58.9 KANU activists became increasingly demoralized as they percent (almost entirely in Luo-Nyanza); and in Northeastern waited for the disbursement of funds that never came or, at from 21.1 percent to 37.1 percent. least, never came in the anticipated quantities. Uhuru Kenyatta’s performance differed significantly from Secondly, and equally importantly, Kenyatta and KANU’s President Moi’s in 1992 and 1997. KANU’s presidential vote parliamentary candidates performed much less well than increased considerably in Central Province, rising from 5.6 anticipated in three crucial regions—the southern parts of percent to 30.0 percent, and holding steady in Nairobi where Western Province, Ukambani District in Eastern Province, and Moi had won 20.6 percent and Kenyatta took 20.7 percent. Coast Province—which include about one-fifth of the seats in Outside the areas with large Kikuyu populations, however, parliament. In the Vihiga and Busia Districts of Western KANU’s share of the vote fell. The collapse was greatest in Province, KANU was virtually annihilated, winning only one Coast Province, where the revolt that KANU had managed to constituency, despite Kenyatta’s selection of Musalia contain in 1997 now became fully evident with its share of the Mudavadi as his vice presidential running mate. NARC also vote falling from 63.1 percent to 32.0 percent. The fall in swept to victory in the four Kamba districts. Five years ago, in Western Province was almost as great—and, indeed, cost the the immediate aftermath of violent clashes in Likoni former ruling party 13 of its 15 parliamentary seats—declining constituency near Mombasa, KANU had faced a serious revolt from 46.0 percent to 21.6 percent. KANU’s decline was less in parts of rural Coast Province. With less than three months to precipitous in Eastern Province, where Moi had received 35.3 go to the 1997 election, the party had moved swiftly and percent compared to Kenyatta’s 25.0 percent; in its ethnic ruthlessly to discard discredited politicians, enlisting new heartland in the Rift Valley, where its share of the presidential standard-bearers recruited from the opposition.
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