UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Mocking Hitler: Nazi Speech & Humour in Contemporary German Culture

by

Annika Orich

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INTERDISCIPLINARY DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF GERMANIC, SLAVIC AND EAST ASIAN STUDIES and DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER, 2008

© Annika Orich 2008 

    ISBN: 978-0-494-51133-6   





UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance, a thesis entitled “Mocking Hitler: Nazi Speech & Humour in Contemporary German Culture” submitted by Annika Orich in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the interdisciplinary degree of Master of Arts.

6XSHUYLVRUDr. Florentine Strzelczyk, GSEA

&R6XSHUYLVRU, Dr. Adrienne Kertzer, English

Dr. Michael Taylor, GSEA

Dr. Lorraine Markotic, Faculty of Humanities

'DWH

ii

$EVWUDFW

Mocking Hitler is by now an integral part of Germany’s contemporary culture of remembrance. Germans ridicule their former leader and his fellow myrmidons in jokes, films, comics, plays, cabaret, and anti-neo-Nazi satire. Yet, instead of making fun of the historic individual, Germans generally deride Hitler’s (self-)portrayal as the )KUHU and his mythological afterlife as the incarnation of absolute evil – a perception that is embodied by representations of Hitler the orator and Nazi speeches in general. On the basis of different examples of humour about Nazi speechmaking, this thesis identifies the reasons and functions that ridicule plays in Germans’ coming to terms with the Nazi past as well as its problematic and beneficial implications. While humour, on the one hand, demythologizes and exposes Hitler, it serves Germans, on the other hand, as a medium to normalize the memory of Hitler and to distance themselves from their perpetrator past.

iii

7DEOHRI&RQWHQWV Approval Page...... ii Abstract ...... iii Table of Contents ...... iv List of Tables...... v List of German Terms ...... vi Chapter One: Introduction...... 1 Chapter Two: The Hitler Myth & Humour ...... 10 2.1 The Hitler Myth...... 11 2.2 Humour & Hitler ...... 21 Chapter Three: The Orator Mytheme & German Humour during the Third Reich...... 28 Chapter Four: The Orator Mytheme & Contemporary German Humour ...... 45 4.1 Goebbels & Geduldig and Mein Führer...... 46 4.1.1 The Orators: Hitler & Goebbels...... 49 4.1.2 The Audience ...... 53 4.1.3 Nazi Speech...... 56 4.2 Ich hock in meinem Bonker ...... 67 4.3 Wittmann, Somuncu, & Front Deutscher Äpfel...... 71 4.3.1 Hitler Leasing!...... 72 4.3.2 Tagebuch eines Massenmörders & Stunde der Idiotie...... 76 4.3.3 Front Deutscher Äpfel...... 81 Chapter Five: Conclusion...... 87 References ...... 99

iv

/LVWRI7DEOHV Table 1 p. 83

v

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$5' (Arbeitsgemeinschaften der one of Germany’s national television öffentlich-rechtlichen broadcaster Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands)

EHODVWHWH6SUDFKH burdened/tainted speech

%XQGHVODQG German province

%XQGHVWDJ German Parliament

'HQNPDOIUGLHHUPRUGHWHQ-XGHQ Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe

(XURSDV

(QGO|VXQJ Final Solution

(QGVLHJ Final Victory

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU culture of remembrance

(UPlFKWLJXQJVJHVHW] enabling act

)OVWHUZLW] H whispered joke(s)

*DX Nazi term for district

*OHLFKVFKDOWXQJ nazified and aligned with Nazi culture

*RHEEHOV6FKQDX]H Goebbels’s mouth(piece)/People’s radio

-XGHQIUDJH Jewish Question

NRPPXQLNDWLYH*HGlFKWQLV communicative memory

NXOWXUHOOH*HGlFKWQLV cultural memory

/DQGWDJ Parliament of a Bundesland

13'(Nationaldemokratische Partei National Democratic Party of Germany

Deutschland)

16'$3(Nationalsozialistische National Socialist German Workers’ Party

Deutsche Arbeiter Partei)

6FKDQGYHUWUDJ Treaty of Shame (Treaty of Versailles)

6SRUWSDODVWUHGHRU³:ROOW,KUGHQ Goebbels’s total war speech

WRWDOHQ.ULHJ"´

9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ coming to terms with the Nazi past

9RON people

9RONVHPSIlQJHU People’s radio

9RONVJHPHLQVFKDIW (German) national collective

9RONVJHQRVVH national

:HKUPDFKW German military during the Third Reich

=HQWUXPJHJHQ9HUWUHLEXQJHQ Centre Against Expulsions

=') (Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen) one of Germany’s national public television broadcasters

=XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW willingness to content

vi 1

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“Anything Adolf . . . the Nazi commemorating industry hums.” (Henryk M. Broder)1

More than sixty years after the Second World War, the memory of the Third Reich and the Holocaust is omnipresent in contemporary German society. Coming to 2 terms with the Nazi past (9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ) engages Germans almost daily, be it, for example, through countless acts of commemoration, equally numerous heated debates about the right approach to this legacy, or the fight against right-wing extremism.

In this active culture of remembrance ((ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU), Adolf Hitler is a central site of memory – a significant, ubiquitous, yet dubious OLHX GH PpPRLUH (Nora) in Germans’ 3 cultural memory (NXOWXUHOOH*HGlFKWQLV) (Assmann). For the last thirty years, Hitler – the

)KUHU – has remained a constant – a vital part – in this discourse of commemoration and, in recent years, has further come to the fore, particularly in the media and entertainment industry. Indeed, Hitler is ever-present in contemporary Germany: “Anything Adolf . . . the Nazi commemorating industry hums,” states Henryk M. Broder

1 If not noted otherwise, all translations are my own. 2 While no group of people is a homogenous entity, the term “Germans” is applied in the following to circumscribe the social collective that is made up of Germany’s citizens. It is assumed that this collective is held together by common beliefs, customs, and cultural attitudes, which, for example, result in certain views about the Nazi past that are generally shared by a majority. Of course, this study also acknowledges the existence of a minority, which, to a lesser or larger extent, may not agree with the rest of the collective. 3 According to Jan Assmann, the NXOWXUHOOH*HGlFKWQLV is a collective’s archived, textual memory that is, for example, made accessible through museums and rites: “The cultural memory . . . is a matter of institutionalized mnemotechnics” ('DVNXOWXUHOOH*HGlFKWQLV 52). Its fundaments are, as Aleida Assmann explains, “both PDWHULDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV in form of texts, images, and monuments and V\PEROLFSUDFWLFHV in form of celebrations and rites” (32). This conception of cultural memory implies the act of writing and storing. Jan Assmann defines writing “as a general term encompassing all the systems of notation that mankind has ever used to fix the contents of memory, from cave paintings to computers” (5HOLJLRQ 95). These media were often created thousand of years ago but are still accessible today. Past events are internalized and turned into established beliefs; they become cultural traditions and myths that the collective, for instance, the Germans, still practices and shares. The remembered event – and not the historical, factual event – is the signifier of a social group’s cultural memory. The latter differs from communicative memory (NRPPXQLNDWLYH*HGlFKWQLV), which is composed of personal memories that are shared and formed by an entire generation and connected to universal events. Both types of memory shape our understanding of the past. Pierre Nora defines OLHX[GHPpPRLUH as sites “where memory crystallizes and secretes itself” (7).

2 consequentially (170). Klaus Hansen concludes that Hitler has turned into “a global multipurpose weapon” (159): his name and image are used in almost every way imaginable, for example, as a promotional tool, as a common comparison or invective.4 In his study on contemporary Germans’ awareness of the Third Reich, Norbert Frei concludes that “there is as much Hitler as there has never been before. The media presence of the ‘Führer’ six decades after the end of the ‘Third Reich’ not only by far exceeds his public presence in the bunker during the last months before the ‘downfall’ but it also seems to surpass all Hitler waves5 of the last decades” (7).6 At the beginning of

4 Advertisement industry: a German genealogical research agency, Ahnenforschung LtD., relied on Hitler’s face to persuade people to explore their ancestral roots (“Rüge”); a specialty department store for hats advertized for its products by showing oversimplified images reminiscent of Hitler (typical Hitler haircut and moustache) and Charlie Chaplin (moustache and bowler hat) and accompanied by the phrase “It’s the hat!” (Vehlewald); an international case in point is the real estate agency &RQTXHURU in Dubai, which praised its services with the slogan “The world is yours!” beside Hitler’s image (Zand); comparisons: present-day politicians, like George W. Bush, John McCain, Barack Obama, Tony Blair, Angela Merkel, Stephen Harper, and many others, have been – often repeatedly – compared to Hitler to emphasize their apparent incompetence, riskiness, or villainy; cat owners may identify the level of similarity between their pet and Hitler on the website FDWVWKDWORRNOLNHKLWOHUFRP: apparently, so-called “kitlers” – cats that look like Hitler – enjoy great popularity; carnival/Halloween: in 2007, the carnival parade of the city of Düsseldorf featured a Hitler figure with dropped pants excreting the 1DWLRQDOGHPRNUDWLVFKH3DUWHL'HXWVFKODQGV (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany; one of Germany’s leading right-wing extremist parties);

“Hitler” has become a popular carnival or Halloween outfit, a practice that the 1HZfascism, and other works dealing with Hitler emerged. While most scholars have questioned if the Hitler wave of the 1970s had a profound and illuminative impact on our understanding of the dictator – an often noted exception is Joachim Fest’s biography of Hitler – (Jäckel “Literaturbericht;” Kershaw, 166WDDW 114), the Hitler wave clearly showed “that a lot of people were fascinated by the bizarre personality of the Nazi leader in a macabre way”

(Kershaw, 166WDDW 114-115) (cf. Bracher who particularly highlights the contrast between a majority of works “that satisfy private curiosity” and a minority of publications that “have something to say on the question of Hitler’s historical role and weight with respect to the great currents of our time” (213); and cf. Jäckel “Literaturbericht” for critical reviews of works published during this period). While the Hitler wave is generally situated in the 1970s, Lukacs argues that this phenomenon is far from over: “a wave has a crest and a trough, and that trough has not yet appeared. During the last twenty-five years the price of Hitler memorabilia has risen steadily, outpacing not only inflation but the price of almost all other objects or works of art or of manuscripts and autograph letters achieved at world auctions” (4). Although Lukacs made this assessment in 1997, it is, in my opinion, still a valid one, which also describes today’s situation (cf. “Der Führer, echt falsch”). 6 A short survey of television and theatre programs, news headlines, and articles published in March and

April 2008 exemplifies these statements. On April 10, 2008, the German parliament (%XQGHVWDJ) held an hour of commemoration of the passing of the enabling act ((UPlFKWLJXQJVJHVHW]) (1933), which granted Hitler unrestricted power and allowed him to consolidate his rule. Hitler’s role in this decisive event was repeatedly emphasized by news captions such as “How Hitler came to power” (for example,

3 the twenty-first century, Hitler – in a strange way – continues to pervade German society and, without doubt, dominates German remembrance of the Nazi past.

Current debates concerned with Germany’s (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU deal not only with Hitler’s prevalence in mainstream culture but especially with the way Hitler and the Third Reich are represented. In recent years, Hitler is often portrayed through comic stylistic means – an increasingly common practice that has repeatedly sparked fierce controversy. While the majority of Germans still views humour7 about the Nazi past as problematic and tends to be critical of such representations,8 a growing number of German directors, artists, writers, or comedians have chosen the comic over tragic or dramatic means of expression. Playwright George Tabori (0HLQ .DPSI (1987)), director

Helmut Dietl (6FKWRQN (1991)), caricaturist Achim Greser ('HU )KUHU SULYDW (The

Führer in Private) (1995-2000)), comedian Serdar Somuncu (6HUGDU 6RPXQFX OLHVW DXV

GHP 7DJHEXFK HLQHV 0DVVHQP|UGHUV ± 0HLQ .DPSI (Serdar Somuncu reads from the

Diary of a Mass Murderer – Mein Kampf) (1996); 6HUGDU 6RPXQFX OLHVW -RVHSK

“Gedenkstunde;” “Gedenkstunde im Bundestag”). Five days later, HLQHVWDJHV (one day), an online archive of contemporary history, featured a report on Hitler’s appeal on German women who wrote passionate love letters to the )KUHU (“Liebesbriefe”). A revue dealing with the same issue premiered in the 7KHDWHUDP

6FKODFKWKRI in Neuss on March 27, 2008 (/LHEHVEULHIHDQ$GROI+LWOHU (Love Letters to Adolf Hitler) directed by Johann Wild at http://www.tas-neuss.de/ (12 April 2008)). A search in an online TV program guide reveals that one could watch at least one show on Hitler every day of this week in mid-April, and, on some days, one is spoiled for choice, for example, between “Hitler and Mussolini – Accomplices of Power

(2)” and “Searching for Hitler’s Body,” which both air on Tuesday (I used the German television guide 79

7RGD\ for this search since its search engine includes programs aired during an entire week (www.tvtoday.de)). It is important to note that the following examples by no means represent an extensive list. Rather, they are mere samples that demonstrate how pervasive the Nazi era and, especially, Hitler are within German culture and how diversely Germans approach the Nazi past. Not only could I have cited from other sources but I could also easily have used other incidents to illustrate this point. 7 This study understands humour as “[t]hat quality of action, speech, or writing, which excites amusement; [sic] oddity, jocularity, facetiousness, comicality, fun” (“Humour”). 8 In view of the release of the tragicomedy 0HLQ)KUHU±'LHZLUNOLFKZDKUVWH:DKUKHLWEHU$GROI+LWOHU (My Führer – The Truly Truest Truth about Adolf Hitler) by Dani Levy in 2007, a survey conducted by Forsa showed that fifty-six percent of participants were opposed to the existence of a German comedy about Hitler (“Hitler-Komödie”). Thirty-six percent approved of the release of Levy’s film (ibid.). A survey from 2000, which was ordered in the wake of the production of the tragicomedy *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, showed similar results. Fifty-nine percent were opposed to comedies about the Nazi past, while twenty- seven percent were in favour of such projects (“Mehrheit der Deutschen”). A comparison between both surveys shows that the approval rates were slightly higher in 2007, suggesting that laughter about Nazis is

4

*RHEEHOV 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH ± µ:ROOW ,KU GHQ WRWDOHQ .ULHJ"¶ (Serdar Somuncu reads Joseph Goebbels. This Hour of Idiocy – Do You Want Total War?) (2000)), writer

Walter Moers ($GROI ± 'LH 1D]L6DX (Adolf – the Nazi Pig) (1998-2006)), director Kai 9 Wessel (*RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ (2001)), film student Florian Wittmann (+LWOHU

/HDVLQJ), director Dani Levy (0HLQ)KUHU±'LHZLUNOLFKZDKUVWH:DKUKHLWEHU$GROI

+LWOHU (My Führer – The Truly Truest Truth about Adolf Hitler) (2007)) as well as organisations fighting right-wing extremism, like the satirical group )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO (Front of German Apples), were among the first who deliberately made a mockery of Hitler and the Nazi regime for a primarily German audience after 1945.10 These artists gradually broke the cultural agreement that dictated Germans to depict the Nazi past in serious terms only, establishing humour about Hitler in mainstream German culture. Therefore, it seems that Sander Gilman’s assessment that “[a]s a German film about the Shoah, the taboo of the comic is firmly in place” (293) may no longer be as easily maintained. Rather, making fun of Hitler and the Nazi past is now an integral part of 11 Germans’ 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ. Despite its commonness in contemporary Germany, humour about the Nazi past remains a highly controversial form of representation of this era, and the question if one – that is, a German – is DOORZHG WR ODXJK about Hitler still elicits mixed reactions. While

becoming more acceptable. However, a majority still questions the appropriateness of such approaches (this conclusion, however, does not imply that these Germans do not laugh about Hitler). 9 Peter Steinbach, the original writer of the film *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, redrafted the script for the theatre. The play had its premiere in May 2004. Since this thesis will not cite from this play, any references about

*RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ will refer to the film. 10 To enhance readability, Levy’s 0HLQ)KUHU±'LHZLUNOLFKZDKUVWH:DKUKHLWEHU$GROI+LWOHU will be denoted as 0HLQ)KUHU, Somuncu’s$XVGHP7DJHEXFKHLQHV0DVVHQP|UGHUV±0HLQ.DPSI and -RVHSK

*RHEEHOV'LHVH6WXQGHGHU,GLRWLH³:ROOW,KUGHQWRWDOHQ.ULHJ"´ as 7DJHEXFKHLQHV0DVVHQP|UGHUV and 6WXQGHGHU,GLRWLH, respectively. 11 This argument is further corroborated by the newest German film about the Nazi era, 8, which was released at the beginning of October 2008. While both Wessel and Levy emphasized that their films are tragicomedies, 8 by Sven Unterwaldt jr. is entirely a comedy, a satire of Wolfgang Petersen’s acclaimed drama 'DV %RRW (1981) (due to its release date, the film cannot be considered in this study).

Moreover, Urs Odermatt currently films George Tabori’s 0HLQ.DPSI, which features Tom Schilling as Hitler and Götz George as Shlomo Herzl and is planned to be released in 2009. Moers has also played with the idea to produce an animated film version or a musical of his $GROI-series in the future (“Der Führer nackt”).

5 one can certainly find affirmative as well as negative arguments to this issue,12 it seems that the problem of the taboo simply has been taken care of by the continuous use of the comic in depictions of the Nazi past and by the growing number of people who believe humour is an essential medium, which one must use to remember, and who are actually amused by these accounts. In the context of (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and

9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ, the questions ZK\ Germans currently feel the need to laugh about Hitler as well as ZKDW they are laughing – or supposed to laugh – DERXW seem to be of far greater significance, as possible answers provide insight to Germans’ point of view regarding this period. These general problems are the starting point of this thesis, which will particularly focus on the works of Wessel, Levy, Moers, Wittmann, and Somuncu as well as on the activities of the )URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO. The main arguments of this study are that it is not so much the actual individual

Adolf Hitler who arrests our attention but rather the mythological construct of the )KUHU figure that we commemorate and, accordingly, ridicule. On the one hand, the Hitler myth, as ably fabricated by the Nazis, still shapes our understanding of the Nazi past. On the other hand, we have appropriated the concept “Hitler” for our own contemporary purposes – for example, to identify a main perpetrator responsible for the Holocaust and other war crimes – and are further attributing disputable qualities to Hitler – for example, absolute evil. As a result, the majority of representations of Hitler may rather be conceived as reflections of the idea of Hitler than the actual individual. This notion is best reflected in the depiction of Hitler as a skilled orator, which is the prevalent characterization as well as arguably the most significant feature of the Hitler myth today. On the basis of the portrayal of Hitler as a speaker, the following discussion will examine if and how these comic approaches to the Nazi past portray, mock, reflect, criticize, and debunk our contemporary understanding of Hitler and, thus, challenge or, respectively, confirm Germans’ prevailing (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU. The subsequent analysis will

12 Possible pros and cons will be further explicated throughout this paper.

6 particularly focus on the portrayal of the relationship between speech and Hitler’s power, on the use of Nazi language and the content of Nazi rhetoric, and on the depiction of Hitler’s audience. This study assumes that ridiculing Hitler is not problematic in itself; however, when humour fails to demythologize and question existing perceptions about Hitler and the functions his memory has in present-day Germany, it may actually further strengthen Germans’ general perception of the Nazi past as well as common misconceptions and, more significantly, the Hitler myth – instead of offering new insight into these issues. Comic representations of this period may therefore be problematic for similar reasons as non-humorous depictions, and not simply for their comical approach or content. While the following study will center on the representation of the mythologized orator Hitler in humorous approaches to the Nazi past, the discussion will also – to a lesser extent – include the portrayal of Hitler’s propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels and

Nazi rhetoric in general. Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU strikingly focuses on a few Nazi leaders, such as Hitler, Goebbels, Speer, or Göring. Since these functionaries are repeatedly portrayed with the same characteristics and typically fulfil similar purposes in the rise and downfall of the Nazi regime, one can argue that they function like stock characters. Although each figure has a particular, unvarying role to play, this Nazi ensemble as a whole allows Germans to shift any responsibility they may have had for the Third Reich to these key culprits. In regards to this study, Goebbels is of particular interest because he is generally portrayed as Hitler’s closest ally – a manipulative, fanatic puppet master who relies on rhetorical coercion to exercise his power. Other minor Nazi characters function as loyal devotees of these main leaders. The formers’ rhetoric often seems to serve as a means to contextualize and illustrate the ideological and social climate of the period under discussion. The depiction of Goebbels and Nazi speech complements Hitler’s representation as an orator and, thus, corroborates the purpose that Hitler and Nazi speechmaking play in contemporary Germans’ memory. By including Goebbels as well as a few other, carefully selected Nazi protagonists in this analysis,

7

arguments that will be made about 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ, humour about the Nazi past, and the Hitler myth can further be contextualized and substantiated. In the past, Hitler has been the main focus of a vast number of critical studies. However, his current occurrence in German (popular) culture still warrants further investigation as the Nazi past constitutes such a vital, influential component of present- day German society. The trend to ridicule Hitler has not been explored by many scholars nor has it yet been analyzed in detail. In particular, the comic representation of Hitler and its function in Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and its meaning for Germans’ 13 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ have not been fully examined. For example, the 2003 anthology /DFKHQ EHU +LWOHU ± $XVFKZLW]*HOlFKWHU" )LOPNRP|GLH 6DWLUH XQG

+RORFDXVW (Laughter about Hitler – Auschwitz-Laughter? Comedy Film, Satire, and Holocaust) edited by Margrit Frölich, Hanno Loewy, and Heinz Steinert includes a few essays that explicitly deal with the topic of laughing about Hitler. However, they focus on satire created during his lifetime, for instance, Charlie Chaplin’s 7KH *UHDW 'LFWDWRU

(1940) or Ernst Lubitsch’s 7R%H2U1RW7R%H (1942). Papers dealing with contemporary films, such as Roberto Benigni’s /LIH ,V %HDXWLIXO (1997) or Radu Mihaileanu’s =XJ GHV

/HEHQV (Train de Vie) (1998), center on laughter about the Holocaust but not explicitly on the portrayal of Hitler. Sander L. Gilman has already discussed the comic portrayal of the murder of the Jews in an essay titled “Is Life Beautiful? Can the Shoah Be Funny? Some Thoughts on Recent and Older Films” in 2000. Gilman, like others, concentrates on the depiction of the Holocaust rather than on the portrayal of Nazis and, because of its publication date, was not able to include any recent German attempts of humour about the Third Reich. In 7KH:RUOG+LWOHU1HYHU0DGH$OWHUQDWH+LVWRU\DQGWKH0HPRU\RI

1D]LVP (2005), Gavriel D. Rosenfeld comes to the conclusion that “[s]ince the 1990s, narratives of the Nazi era have been defined less by prurience and aesthetic delight than

13 This assessment refers to scholarly publications only. Numerous articles, interviews, and commentaries about this issue have been published in Germany’s mainstream media in the past years. International newspapers have also reported about this trend.

8 humor . . . the Nazi era has ceased to serve the ends of titillation and begun to serve the ends of comic relief” (19). While Rosenfeld’s study includes humorous depictions of

Hitler, for example, Walter Moers’s $GROI ± 'LH 1D]L6DX series, its focus lies on the subject of alternate history and its role in commemorating the Nazi era, yet not on comedy about the Nazi past and its function in remembering this period. Klaus L.

Berghahn, Jost Hermand, and others examine cultural depictions of Hitler in 8QPDVNLQJ

+LWOHU &XOWXUDO 5HSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI +LWOHU IURP WKH :HLPDU 5HSXEOLF WR WKH 3UHVHQW (2005): several essays target the use of ridicule common during Hitler’s life, and, in fact, two scholars, Klaus L. Berghahn and Thomas Jung, analyze examples of modern humour about the Nazi past, namely George Tabori’s 0HLQ .DPSI and, respectively, Walter

Moers’s $GROI-series as well as Achim Greser’s comics. Since Jung particularly focuses on the meaning of these Hitler comics for Germans’ collective memory, his essay shows a comparable approach to the one applied in this study. In view of the release of Oliver

Hirschbiegel’s 'HU 8QWHUJDQJ (The Downfall) (2004) and Levy’s 0HLQ )KUHU, the

'HXWVFKH .LQHPDWKHN ± 0XVHXP IU )LOP XQG )HUQVHKHQ (Museum for Film and

Television) organized the conference +LWOHU GDUVWHOOHQ =XU (QWZLFNOXQJ XQG %HGHXWXQJ

HLQHU ILOPLVFKHQ )LJXU (Representing Hitler. About the History and Meaning of a Cinematic Character) in Berlin in October 2007; the extended conference proceedings, of the same title and edited by Rainer Rother and Karin Herbst-Meßlinger, were not published until October 2008.14 While the authors refer to most of the previously mentioned comic portrayals of Hitler, none of the featured papers solely focuses on the role of humour in contemporary German (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU in a comparative manner. However, some of these scholars certainly veer toward similar conclusions in their analyses than the results that will be suggested in this thesis (for example, a common subject of discussion is the aspect of normalization, which will be addressed in the following). However, although scholars have begun to turn their attention to present-day

14 As a result of its recent publication date, this study can only make limited use of this publication.

9 comic representations of Hitler as well as their cultural implications, they have not focused primarily on the comic depiction of the Hitler myth, especially not on Hitler the orator, or examined the comic portrayal of the Nazi past across different genres. This thesis also distinguishes itself from other studies by confining the scope of research to depictions created by German-speaking artists for a predominantly German audience and to works that either take place during the Third Reich or include original Nazi sources. The first part of this study will define the meaning of the Hitler myth as well as the significance of Hitler the orator. A general overview about the connection between Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal and humour will also be given. The second part of this thesis will then analyze the comic representation of Hitler the orator and its meaning in contemporary German culture in detail on the basis of the aforementioned films, cabaret shows, video clips, and active engagement against neo-Nazism. Finally, a conclusion will summarize the findings of the previous discussion and comment on the role of humour in contemporary German culture.

10

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[Hitler’s] individual profile furthermore remained faint, and, at times, it almost seems that he emerges more clearly from the imprint that he impressed on governmental and social circumstances than from his personal life; as if the statue, which he had created amidst all the pomp of political self-portrayal, would reveal more of his self than the person behind the appearance. (Joachim Fest)

When examining reasons why National Socialism became such a powerful political force in Germany, one can hardly ignore the role that Hitler played in the founding of the Third Reich and, especially, in winning Germans’ support for the Nazi regime.15 Hitler, as the figurehead of National Socialism, ultimately united the Nazi party’s program with Germans’ desire for a strong, national sovereign – which a majority believed Hitler to be. However, when taking a closer look at the historical Hitler, one realizes soon that it is difficult to differentiate the private person from his public portrayal as Germans’ leader. According to Joachim Fest, the public )KUHU character largely conceals the real, private individual named Hitler (cf. 698, quoted above). Fest’s description of Hitler points to the curious fact that Germans followed “the statue, which he [Hitler] had created amidst all the pomp of political self-portrayal” rather than an actual person (698). Of interest for this study is therefore not Hitler’s biography16 per se but the image of the )KUHU persona that he and his Nazi henchmen carefully constructed and that Germans readily trusted. In order to come to a conclusion about the significance that comic Hitler portrayals have in contemporary Germany, it is essential to grasp the relationship between Germans and the image they had of their leader – a rapport that Ian Kershaw, as will be explained in detail below, described as a consciously constructed and carefully nurtured myth. An understanding of the way Hitler has been represented in

15 Kershaw provides a brief overview over the different controversies about the significance of Hitler (16

6WDDW, 112-147). 16 While there are numerous biographies about Hitler, noteworthy accounts are especially Joachim Fest’s

+LWOHU (1973) and Ian Kershaw’s +LWOHU+XEULV (1998) and +LWOHU1HPHVLV (2000).

11 humour and of the cultural functions this type of memory has served after 1945 is only possible from this point of origin, as jokes about Hitler generally mock Hitler’s (self-) portrayal as Germans’ )KUHU and his mythological afterlife rather than the historic individual. The first part of this chapter will thus examine the creation and present-day significance of the Hitler myth. Following this overview, the connection between myth and humour will be discussed in more detail.

7KH+LWOHU0\WK

[T]he ‘Hitler myth’ – by which I mean a ‘heroic’ image and popular conception of Hitler imputing to him characteristics and motives for the most part at crass variance with reality. (Ian Kershaw)

To speak of Hitler . . . is above all to speak about an entity that, in crucial regards, was never all there. Let us explore the problematic continuing fascination of Hitler, a fascination, that is – and indeed in large measure was – the fascination of a fake. (Eric Rentschler)

Our contemporary understanding of Hitler is predominantly based on the personality of the )KUHU figure that the Nazis skilfully constructed, Germans’ memory of this time, and our present-day efforts to explain and comprehend Hitler’s rule as well as the atrocities Germans committed in his name. In either case, “Hitler” is a mythologized, appropriated version of the actual, historic individual. When remembering, representing, or ridiculing Hitler today, we generally do not look at the human being Hitler but normally confront the myth that he personified during his lifetime and that has lived on in modified form until this day. The Hitler myth – according to Ian Kershaw – denotes “a ‘heroic’ image and popular conception of Hitler imputing to him characteristics and motives for the most part at crass variance with reality” (+LWOHU 0\WK 2). An essential component of shaping Hitler into the “heroic” leader of the German nation was the creation of a charismatic, yet authoritarian persona – the )KUHU. Kershaw, following Max Weber, explains that “‘charismatic authority’ is founded upon perceptions – by a ‘following’ of believers – of heroism, greatness, and a ‘mission’ in a proclaimed

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‘leader’” (+LWOHU 10; cf. +LWOHU0\WK 8-9). In fact, “[p]erceptions are more important than reality,” because “[t]he mass appeal of a ‘charismatic’ leader has only an indirect relation to that leader’s actual personality and character attributes” (Kershaw, +LWOHU 48). In other words, “Hitler,” or Germans’ understanding of him during the Third Reich, is a constructed image made up of mythologized characteristics. This notion is also reflected in Joachim Fest’s description of Hitler as an “unperson” (+LWOHU (LQH%LRJUDSKLH) as well as in Eric Rentschler’s conclusion that “[t]o speak of Hitler . . . is above all to speak about an entity that, in crucial regards, was never all there” (177). However, not only Hitler’s coevals revered an idea rather than a person. Rentschler argues that our contemporary interest in Hitler is also directed at a phantasm: “Let us explore the problematic continuing fascination of Hitler, a fascination, that LV – and indeed in large measure was – the fascination of a fake” (177; emphasis added). Present-day representations of Hitler also depict the German dictator in mythological, yet modified terms, which are expressions of our contemporary concerns, ideas, and fantasies. To this day, Hitler has remained a “mythical object” (Atze 18). Thus, representations of Hitler should rather be conceived as a mythologized concept than accurate depictions of the historic individual. As different character traits constitute an individual’s personality, the “mythical object” Hitler is also composed of diverse features. They interact with each other to yield a congruent entity – the “God-Father-Führer-Object” (Alexander & Margarete Mitscherlich 142) – and are nevertheless distinct enough to remain unique identification points. Based on Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural analysis of myth, Marcel Atze dismantles the mythological image of Hitler into its individual components, the so-called “mythemes,” which, according to Lévi-Strauss, make up every myth (26-27):

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Mythemes can stand for individual traits of the myth’s carrier; they can define his character (‘fond of the environment and animals’) or talents (‘artist,’ ‘orator’). Hitler was not only considered to be the infallible mouthpiece of ‘popular sentiments,’ but the mythemes ‘vegetarian’ and ‘asexuality’ also refer especially to the concept of the ‘divine human being’: this is how Hitler, who was propagated as an ascetic, was supposed to be perceived. Even his symbolic-like appearance, for instance his severely geometrized face, can represent a mytheme, when, as in the case of Hitler, it – as a signature feature of ideology – is charged in such a way that it becomes itself an ideologem and, thus, part of the myth’s meaning. Finally, individual mythemes can activate entire mythological narrations by referring to – in principle, in an interchangeable manner – established mythemes of other (persons’) myths. This applies to the ‘redeemer’ Hitler, since Braunau [Hitler’s birthplace] as a Nazi site of remembrance was officially declared a German Bethlehem17: in this instance, the Jesus of the New Testament was the inspiration. (27)

In other words, features such as “fond of animals,” “vegetarian,” and “bachelor” may or may not accurately characterize Hitler’s personality. However, they describe vital characteristics of the mythological )KUHU persona that the Nazis ably devised. More significantly, each of these attributes always signifies more than a simple personal quality or talent, as each trait simultaneously possesses another, mythologized meaning. The mythemes “fond of animals” and “fond of children,” for example, point at Hitler’s role as the loving, understanding father figure of the German nation – Hitler was thought to be the paternal protector who would always and under any circumstances guard and fight for his German 9RON (people), for the weak and the poor, for the socially disadvantaged. In order to do so, Hitler abdicated marriage and – or so the myth claims – lived a life of self-

17 Kershaw states that the Berghof, Hitler’s private residence in Southern Germany, was also a popular place of pilgrimage for Hitler’s admirers (+LWOHU0\WK 60). Both Braunau am Inn and the %HUJKRI still fulfil this function for neo-Nazis today.

14 sacrifice, a way of life that is reminiscent of Jesus’s existence. In addition, Hitler relied on body language to further validate certain attributes’ mythological implications. While images of Hitler – slowly walking, absorbed in thought, lonesome – evoke the redeemer- narrative again, Hitler’s clenched, raised fist and unfaltering facial expressions, for instance, symbolize his alleged intention to fight for Germans’ well-being to the bitter end. Of particular importance for Hitler’s mythological persona is his (self-)portrayal as a gifted orator. Hitler the speaker personifies the Hitler myth and constitutes the key means through which other mythemes are communicated. While the next chapter will shed light on the meaning of the orator mytheme in detail, it is, at this point, imperative to recognize that literally every single characteristic of Hitler – real or construed – served as a component of the )KUHU figure: Atze’s short listing of a variety of mythemes clearly mirrors the extent to which Hitler was mythologized.18

18 While the Nazis’ move to stage Hitler as a heroic leader undeniably was a politically calculated decision, one can argue that the myth – and, therefore, the Nazi movement may have never been as successful if its creators had not believed unswervingly in it themselves. Hitler eventually conceived of the myth as reality, primarily because he generally viewed the world in mythological terms and because he ultimately identified with the )KUHU role in all aspects of his life: “he thought mythological, not societal . . . the world and humanity, the thousandfold interwoven strands of interests, [in Hitler’s mind,] temperaments and energies were reduced to a few antagonisms that were comprehended based on instinct, there were friends and foes, good and evil, purity stood in contrast to impurity, poor against rich, the shining knight . . . against the . . . dragon“ (Fest 732). Hitler’s mythological weltanschauung enabled him to see himself as a heroic, superior )KUHU – as the “shining knight” whose goal it was to rescue the Germans. His predilection for Richard Wagner’s operas exemplifies this understanding of the world, and Hans Rudolf Vaget rightly argues that Hitler remodelled his )KUHU persona after Wagner’s opus. Essentially, Hitler’s inherent mythological perception of the world lent further authenticity and potency to his heroic self-portrayal and, thus, strengthened the Hitler myth to an extent that not only Hitler but an entire people believed in its genuineness.

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Despite Hitler’s death in 194519 and our present knowledge of the criminal nature of his regime, contemporary representations of Hitler show a similar degree of mythologization. On the one hand, they frequently portray the German dictator with the same mythemes that the Nazis used to create the )KUHU persona. On the other hand, they, for example, characterize Hitler as the incarnation of absolute evil and, therefore, mythologize him for a second time (an aspect that will be explored below). Since modern portrayals of the dictator are certainly influenced and often make use of original images, authentic audio recordings, accounts of contemporary witnesses as well as other such details, we, the present-day audience, also encounter the mythologized )KUHU. Documentaries as well as more popularized or fictional works borrow these Nazi documents and uncritically resurrect Hitler without contextualizing the origin and purpose of the re-used material: “[t]o this very day few filmmakers have succeeded in finding a visual or discursive distance from Nazi images” (Rentschler 189). As a result, Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal is neither questioned nor demythologized. The depiction of Hitler as the loving father of the German nation, which the Nazis, for instance, showcased by producing countless images of Hitler in the presence of children and their mothers exemplifies this problematic interaction. The notion that the Third Reich was essentially a family-friendly regime has partially remained unaffected until this day because of the prevalence of such original sources as well as modern fictional

19 Hitler’s suicide must be seen as an integral and the final part of his mythological self-portrayal. “The death, which entirely occurred behind the scenes, can be understood as the last conscious act of the myth’s creators. It was supposed to be conceived and passed down as the culmination of Hitler’s redeemer life, as a self-sacrifice” (Atze 99). By carefully staging his death and representing the suicide as a last offering to the Reich and its inhabitants, Hitler ensured that the myth continued to live on beyond his passing – one may even argue that the Soviets’ refusal to disclose Hitler’s body and to establish clarity about the circumstances of his death ensured and consolidated Hitler’s mythological afterlife. The uncertainty surrounding his suicide has certainly led to endless speculations, which often resulted in wild stories (cf., Rosenfeld). For instance, after years of hiding secretly in the sewers, Walter Moers’s Adolf, the Nazi pig, walks on the wild life: he has, for example, sexual intercourse with Göring, who now works as a prostitute, and is responsible for the deaths of Lady Diana and Dodi al-Fayed (cf. $GROIbFKELQZLHGHUGD (I’m back again)).

16 versions of this mytheme.20 This common belief is, for example, reflected in the Eva- Herman-controversy that occupied Germans in the fall of 2007.21 By adopting this particular mytheme for current portrayals of Hitler and by failing to scrutinize such characterization, Germans ignore the fact that Hitler’s family policies – like any other of his political intentions and acts – were inseparably intertwined with his racial weltanschauung and governing style. Hitler’s interest in children was limited to their potential to become soldiers in the future. For Hitler, they merely signified the continuance of the German race. By not questioning Hitler’s love of children, the myth that shows Hitler as the paternal protector of the German nation remains essentially intact. To conclude, the dependence on portrayals of Hitler that were created by Nazis results more often than not in the corroboration of the Hitler myth and fosters Germans’ continuous belief in its truth.22 Besides using the same mythemes as the Nazis, contemporary representations are moreover reflective of our present fantasies and ideas about Hitler. Our current fascination with Hitler has unfortunately led to his second mythologization. Since his death in 1945, Hitler has gradually become the embodiment of absolute evil, the personification of diabolical insanity, and a symbol of unlimited power. Although this portrayal, to some degree, represents the opposite of the “God-Father-Führer-Object”

20 A perfect case in point is Heinrich Breloer’s 6SHHUXQG(U+LWOHUV$UFKLWHNWXQG5VWXQJVPLQLVWHU (Speer and He. Hitler’s Architect and Minister of Armaments and War Production) (2005), which depicts Albert Speer’s life by combining original images and documents with a fictional narrative. The docudrama repeatedly shows footage of Hitler interacting with the architect’s children. Goebbels’s offspring have particularly gained notoriety in recent portrayals of the Third Reich: they – often providing amusement to

Hitler – are featured in *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ and 'HU8QWHUJDQJ as well as in numerous documentaries about the Nazi past. 21 On October 9, 2007, Johannes B. Kerner, a popular German talk show host, asked author and former news anchor Eva Herman to leave his show after she repeatedly refused to distance herself from statements in which she had praised Nazi familial values and policies. She also claimed on the show that anyone who discusses the Nazi past jeopardizes one’s life and reputation. Her statements, fuelled by her already controversial claim that women’s place in society is in the home, catapulted her “at the center of a growing culture war” (“Eva”), in which Germans passionately disputed, amongst other things, if one is allowed to view the Third Reich in positive terms. 22 The influence that authentic images as well as other original material have on our contemporary mythologized understanding of Hitler will be further illustrated by the subsequent, detailed analysis of Hitler the orator.

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(Alexander & Margarete Mitscherlich 142), it is nevertheless a mythological representation. Rentschler argues that “Hitler is above all the nothingness of a projective space, a container for strong fantasies and immense yearnings, the embodiment of great hates and fierce desires” (191). Hitler gratifies our need to assign responsibility for the Holocaust to one specific person. Any hatred and outrage is thus solely targeted at the German dictator. By characterizing him with the mythemes “absolute evil” and “insane,” contemporary portrayals quickly disregard further, mundane reasons that may give explanations for the genocide of the European Jews and the Second World War. At this point in time, his name, or image, has also become the epitome for all kinds of other atrocities and horror. Hitler is now a rather general symbol of wickedness, which mythological features now literally point at Jesus’s antagonist, namely the devil. However, Hitler was neither the heroic leader, the “shining knight” (Fest 732), that Germans believed in nor the embodiment of evil and madness, the “dragon” (Fest 732), that we make him out today. By turning Hitler into WKH symbol of absolute evil and raging insanity, we mythologize his life in a similar way than the Nazis did decades earlier. In both instances, the historic individual remains hidden behind a veil of obscurity: “[w]hen we speak of the historical figure Hitler, it is difficult to pin down the object under discussion” (Rentschler 188). One of the main reasons why it is complicated to identify the individual Hitler is Germans’ participation in the Hitler myth’s original creation as well as its subsequent preservation. While the constant Nazi propaganda of Hitler’s )KUHU image certainly played a decisive role in the establishment of the myth, Germans – the “‘following’ of believers” (Kershaw, +LWOHU 10) – first had to be responsive to – and then acceptive of – the )KUHU cult. In short, many indisputably were open to the idea of Hitler as their sovereign: they passionately admired, applauded, and followed him loyally. The cheering masses and their emotional bond with their leader ultimately became an essential mytheme of the myth. As Ian Kershaw – and many others – has argued, “Hitler was not a tyrant imposed upon Germany. He was in many respects, until well into the war, a highly popular national leader” (+LWOHU 194). Contrary to common belief today, Hitler did not

18 simply usurp power by force and oppression. Many Germans were quite smitten by their

)KUHU and enabled Hitler and the Nazi government to consolidate their rule and, more significantly, to remain in power. “Neither admiration, nor respect, nor even fear seems to characterize perfectly the attitude of the Germans toward Hitler,” Eberhard Jäckel claims, “What they felt for him, especially during the war years, was an almost childlike devotion to a beloved father, a devotion that could easily dissolve into compassion” 23 (+LWOHU 94). Germans’ favourable response lent further credibility to Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal and, therefore, made its realization possible in the first place. The Hitler or Nazi salute24 and Germans’ preferred way of referring to Hitler, namely as “our Führer,” clearly illustrates this point.25 A majority of Germans remained out of touch with reality on many occasions by simply projecting their wishful thinking onto the dictator and by accepting the different mythemes and their implications readily. They indeed recognized in Hitler a paternal, well-meaning leader who was meant to guide the nation. Eventually, many, driven by their own motives and irrespective of obvious contraindications, believed in the Hitler myth unconditionally and largely

23 cf. Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich who attempt to explain the special tie that existed between

Germans and Hitler in Freudian terms in 'LH8QIlKLJNHLW]XWUDXHUQ*UXQGODJHQNROOHNWLYHQ9HUKDOWHQV (The Inability to Mourn. Principles of Collective Behaviour). 24 The Nazi salute comprises the raising of the right arm accompanied by exclaiming “Heil Hitler!” The greeting was generally seen as a sign of loyalty to Hitler and became the standard German salutation soon after Hitler came to power. 25 Most commonly, Hitler went by the name of “my Führer” or, from a collective perspective, “our Führer,” a form of address that the Nazi movement cultivated in its attempt to mythologize their leader: “May he remain to us what he has always been and still is: Our Hitler!” (Goebbels 392; cf. Kershaw, +LWOHU0\WK 59). With these or similar words, Joseph Goebbels closed his yearly birthday speeches in honour of the dictator. The possessive pronouns “my” and “our” express fondness but, more importantly, signify family ties. Hitler literally became a part of the family or, in a bigger context, of the German national collective, the 9RONVJHPHLQVFKDIW. The term “Führer,” however, conveys the necessary respect one would show toward a leading figure held in high esteem and establishes Hitler as a patriarchal authority that, to some degree, has always remained distanced from and higher ranked than the people. By actually denoting Hitler as

)KUHU, Germans made the materialization of the Hitler myth possible. The phrases “my (or, respectively, our) Führer” and “Heil Hitler!” then symbolize the extent to which Germans internalized the Hitler myth. Their willing acceptance, which is expressed in these forms of address, imparted authenticity and potency to Hitler’s mythological self-portrayal and, thus, allowed for Hitler’s rise to power, which remained largely unquestioned throughout his rule. It is worth noting that the usage of the Hitler salute slowly waned among Germans when the realization that the war would not end soon and the fear that a ceasefire may be a

19 deceived themselves about the political and social reality as well as the criminal energy pivotally inherent in Hitler and National Socialism. Jäckel avers that, “[i]n general, the relationship of the Germans to Hitler rested on deception, conscious deception on his part and self-deception on their part” (+LWOHU 90). Both parties’ delusional perception of reality resulted in the Hitler myth’s potency and welded Hitler and the German people together for many years.26 In contemporary Germany, the Hitler myth, one can argue, is still prevalent as a result of a comparable, delusive memory of the past. Commonly, Germans tend to downplay their own – or their ancestors’ – support of Hitler. At present, Germans are often not remembered as willing, enthusiastic supporters of Hitler, who believed their

)KUHU to be their saviour, but solely as his victims. John Lukacs argues that this process is “an understandable tendency that somehow separated him [Hitler] from them [Germans], distinguishing his life and his doings from their lives and their doings during the war” (3). This splitting of a shared past entails denying any close relationship that did exist between Hitler and the German people. After the downfall of the Nazi regime, most

Germans then not only obliterated their feelings for the )KUHU but more surprisingly forgot that they had felt such admiration in the first place (cf. Haffner 106).27 This idea

change for the worse began to damage Germans’ trust in and support for Hitler and gave way to resignation and indifference (Kershaw, ‘+LWOHU0\WK’ 195, 202). 26 The extent of Germans’ self-deception is probably best reflected in the following common saying: “Perhaps nothing characterizes the relationship of the Germans to Hitler so aptly as a phrase that was making the rounds in those days and went like this: ‘If only the führer knew about that!’” (Jäckel, +LWOHU 90 cf., for example, Haffner 106; Kershaw, +LWOHU0\WK 95; Lukacs 3 and chapter 7). Many Germans viewed Hitler as impeccable, barely criticized his decisions, and sometimes even separated him from less favourable aspects of National Socialism and the actions of other high-ranking Nazis in particular. A case in point is the euthanasia Action T4 program, which targeted the mentally and physically handicapped. Although Hitler had given orders to implement the killing of disabled people, many not only assumed that he had not endorsed this practice but that he had also remained unaware of the program in the first place. Irrespective of contradictory evidence, the myth that Hitler was the protector of the weak and poor remained untouched. By officially abandoning the procedure as a result of Germans’ disapproval, Hitler gave in to mounting pressure but, by doing so, further established a public persona that stayed morally flawless as well as superior to other Nazi leaders. 27 Germans’ misleading view of the past and their indifference toward their role in the Holocaust led to Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich’s famous conclusion that Germans were unable to mourn properly, especially for Hitler. During the immediate post-war years, they found the existence of collective “‘defence mechanisms against the Nazi past’” (16). They claimed that “the inability to mourn for the bereavement of

20 allows Germans today to sustain two common views of the past: in reality, only Hitler, and not them, was responsible for the Holocaust, and, with the exception of the war and Hitler, life in the Third Reich had its benefits.28 The Hitler myth, as it circulates today, enables Germans to maintain this perception of their Nazi past in a twofold manner. Hitler, as the incarnation of evil, allegedly chose Germans to be his first and main victims; this )KUHU came to power without any effort on their part. On the other side, mythemes that have been adopted from the Nazis enable Germans to reconcile their (happy) memories of their daily life during the Third Reich with their contemporary knowledge of the Holocaust and Hitler’s true intentions. This double-sided view of Hitler and the Nazi past actually fuels our contemporary fascination. The sheer enormity of the crimes that Hitler is held responsible for and the seemingly irreconcilable contradictions between his criminal doings and other personal characteristics as well as political achievements that are attributed to him titillate our interest. In respect thereof, Hitler provides us with the opportunity to enjoy banality and, at the same time, to experience evilness without committing it ourselves. In summary, present representations of Hitler are reflections of our mythological perception of the German dictator. The Hitler myth, as it circulates today, is composed of the artificially, by Nazis constructed, )KUHU persona and our present desires that we associate and project onto Hitler. As a result of this process of mythologization, which Hitler has undergone, it seems justified to think of Germans’ former leader as a concept, since the historic individual is generally difficult to separate from the myth. The conception “Hitler” is composed of a number of mythological attributes, the so-called mythemes, which represent different points of identification for receptive believers.

the Führer is the result of an intensive defence of guilt, shame and fear; . . . The Nazi past is derealized” (34). 28 In connection with the Eva-Herman-controversy, the magazine 6WHUQ conducted a survey that showed that 25% of Germans still are of the opinion that “the Nazi past had its merits” (Schmitz). This view was particularly prevalent among interviewees that were older, had lower levels of education, and described themselves as supporters of more right-wing parties.

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Without the not to be underestimated participation of Germans, the Hitler myth could not have fully materialized during the Third Reich. Likewise, contemporary Germans rely on the myth to come to terms with their Nazi past. It seems likely that, as long as Hitler serves as “an imaginary signifier, a sign with an uncertain referent” (Rentschler 188), the Hitler myth will remain in place and continue to conceal the Nazi past. This observation, however, directs our attention to humour, which supposedly has the power to demythologize and dismantle our present-day conceptions of Hitler. The following section will therefore take a closer look at this claim and the relationship between myth and ridicule.

+XPRXU +LWOHU

While the mythologization of Hitler explains the prevalence of the dictator as a

OLHX GH PpPRLUH in contemporary German culture, the existence of the Hitler myth may also account for the past and present commonness of ridicule about the )KUHU. The Hitler myth lends itself insofar to mockery as it epitomizes incongruity: neither Hitler’s performance as the charming, invincible )KUHU nor the representation of Hitler as the personification of insane evil could and can at all times mask the historical, political, social, and personal realities. The gap between what Germans wish(ed) to see in Hitler, between what they project(ed) onto him, and what he really was and did is not always easily concealed. Humour has the ability to critically disclose the inconsistencies between reality and appearance. Through ridicule, one can highlight these contradictions. This capacity of humour, which is explained by the incongruity theory, is arguably the most widely accepted explanation of what makes us laugh.29 According to this school of thought, we find amusement in situations that appear to contradict each other. We laugh when something does not meet our preconceived expectations and deviates from our

29 Peter Berger avers that “there is widespread agreement that the sense of humor leads above all to a perception of LQFRQJUXHQFH, or LQFRQJUXLW\” (208).

22 usual ideas. John Morreall defines the incongruity theory in terms of “amusement [that] is an intellectual reaction to something that is unexpected, illogical, or inappropriate in 30 some other way” (7DNLQJ/DXJKWHU 15). Today, we do not expect Hitler to be ineloquent

(Helmut Qualtinger’s and Somuncu’s readings of 0HLQ.DPSI), it seems illogical that he rants about a car lease and the mob (Wittmann’s +LWOHU /HDVLQJ) or fights Jesus and Gandhi in a wrestling match,31 and the fact that Hitler is made a laughing stock is often still considered to be an improper act, which can nonetheless cause amusement (as illustrated in the current German debate about the question “if one is allowed to laugh at Hitler?”). Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal has also given rise to the idea that the comic is an inherent character trait of Nazis. Their predilection for gaudiness and performance has resulted in the perception that they, to some degree, were clownish by nature.32 Cabaret artist Dieter Hildebrandt couches this common view: Nazis “were basically a bunch of comedians only they also had the power to kill people” (/DXJKLQJ 33 ZLWK+LWOHU). Embodying the Hitler myth essentially meant Hitler’s transformation from the petty bourgeois into the “great” leader of Germany – a process that implies masquerading and that always leaves the door open for comparisons between the little man and the apparently successful social climber.34 This lingering contrast, for instance,

30 “In principle, any incongruence may be perceived as comical – between what is alive and what is mechanical (as [Henri] Bergson proposed), between the demands of censorious morality and the blind urges of our libidinal nature (the Freudian angle), between the pretensions of political authority and its underlying fallibility (the fodder of much satire), and so on” (Berger 208). For an overview of the incongruity theory: cf., for example, Billig 57-85 (chapter 4) and Morreall, 7DNLQJ/DXJKWHU 15-19 (chapter 3). 31 The contest can be viewed on the following website: (available on August 31, 2008). 32 Many people also considered – and probably do even more so now – certain Nazi customs and regulations to be rather absurd. Examples include the Nazi salute, military-like behaviour, the fact that slander against Hitler was grounds for divorce, or that the German textile industry awarded a label that assured consumers they bought “clothes made by Aryans only” (Hans-Jörg and Gisela Wohlfromm 154, 28). 33 cf. quotation by Dani Levy at the beginning of chapter 3 and Hannah Arendt in chapter 4. 34 Since Hitler’s metamorphosis found numerous imitators who also turned from nobodies into leaders as a result of their participation in the Nazi movement, the potential to laugh about such instances of self- portrayal, which are founded on an irreconcilable contrast between appearance and reality, is certainly not limited to Hitler.

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served Chaplin as a guideline for his brilliant satire of Hitler in 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU. Since the materialization of the Hitler myth essentially means to believe in a lie, which cannot entirely conceal the truth, the mythologization of Hitler has ultimately facilitated the use of the Nazi leader and his henchmen as easy objects of ridicule. At first glance, it seems obvious to assume that humour that is aimed at exposing incongruities is a perfect means to demythologize and also debunk Hitler. Humour supposedly has the ability to deprive Hitler of his power as well as attraction by contrasting the myth with reality. In fact, Hitler’s critics resorted to ridicule to rally against the Nazi leader the moment he entered the political stage. Comedians were reportedly the first people to pass harsh criticism on the Nazis and provoke their audiences to opposition; they hoped to expose the true face of Hitler – even before political parties or ecclesiastic institutions expressed their objections (Morreall, “Resistance” 105). German and international opponents – the former particularly prior to the Nazi takeover – relied on cabaret, comedy, and caricature to criticize and root against Nazi ideology and leadership. Even the majority of the German populace frequently enjoyed such jokes, the so-called )OVWHUZLW]H (“whispered jokes”). “Political jokes were dime a dozen during the dictatorship,” Rudolph Herzog claims (9).35 Germans commonly poked fun at Nazis like Hitler, Goebbels, and Göring and mocked daily life during the 36 Third Reich. A case in point is the following )OVWHUZLW], which explicitly mocks

Hitler’s )KUHU persona and points at the incongruity between appearance and reality: Vom Duce hat er die Montur, die römischen Allüren, von Marx die Kollektivnatur, die Lust am Nivellieren. Am Staat, der über Leichen geht, ist Machiavell beteiligt,

35 cf. Gamm, Hartmann, Herzog, and Wöhlert regarding jokes circulating during the Third Reich. 36 These three Nazi leaders soon became stock characters in political humour, and all three often appeared together. While the individual jokes differed, the subject of ridicule generally remained the same. People, for example, joked about Göring’s obesity and predilection for medals, Goebbels’s clubfoot and numerous love affairs, and Hitler’s megalomania or political intentions.

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und St. Ignatius Pate steht beim Zweck, der alles heiligt. Da man die Attribute nicht von der Substanz kann trennen, was, frag ich, ist am großen Licht noch Original zu nennen? (qtd. in Gamm 106)37

This particular comic rhyme clearly demonstrates that people were not blind to the Hitler myth. By suggesting that Hitler essentially created his political image based on a collection of diverse, arbitrary chosen role models and theories, which resulted in concealing the real individual, the verse unambiguously questions Hitler’s mythological

(self-)portrayal. In view of the popularity of the )OVWHUZLW] and other such humour, it seems natural to wonder why Germans joked about the myth during the Third Reich, yet nonetheless flocked to Hitler and believed in him steadfastly. Contrary to popular belief today, humour about the Nazi regime and its leaders was generally not “whispered” but in reality circulated openly and spread among the populace quite rapidly. The idea that joking was a sign of active resistance – or even passive opposition, for that matter – is as much a myth as the Hitler myth in itself (cf. Gamm 169-172; Herzog 10-12; Speier 1395; Wöhlert). In present-day Germany, the belief that Germans who joked, or enjoyed, a

)OVWHUZLW] faced serious repercussions by the Nazi regime continues to persist. This myth serves as another proof that Germans were in reality opposed to Hitler and became his main victims. While there are some reported instances, in which persons who ridiculed the Nazis paid a high price for their sense of humour – worst-case punishments included time in a concentration camp or the death penalty, one was, in fact, rarely persecuted for merely telling or laughing at so-called anti-Nazi jokes, especially if this proved to be one’s only misdemeanour. Draconian measures were exceptions to the

37 The very literal translation is: From the Duce [Mussolini], he has the uniform,/ the Roman airs and graces,/ from Marx comes the collective nature,/ the lust for sameness./ To the government that stops at nothing/ contributed Machiavelli,/ and St. Ignatius is the inspiration/ for the philosophy that the end justifies the means./ Since one can’t separate the attributes from the essence,/ what, I ask myself, of this great beacon,/ can be called original?

25 norm, and only a minority of joke tellers ended up in front of a judge. Most of these accused received no severe sentences. While humour can play an important role in debunking Hitler and actually did so in many instances, such joking, unfortunately, had no relevant and changing impact on the Hitler myth or Germans’ perception of their )KUHU. Laughter about Hitler and the Nazi regime was generally only an outlet for anger or annoyance on the authorities. This perhaps disillusioning insight is reflected in Herzog’s summary of this issue, for he ultimately comes to an even bleaker conclusion about the significance of humour during the Third Reich: Although many Germans were aware of the seamy side of the Nazi society, although they were annoyed at the arbitrary measures, the ‘big shots’ and the state-run despotism, they nonetheless did not rebel. . . . The so-called ‘Flüsterwitze’ were no manifestation of civil and moral courage but its surrogate. (11)

In the end, joking about the Hitler (myth) only represented an easy alternative to actually acknowledging the truth about the )KUHU and facing the consequences. Herzog’s observation echoes Hans Speier’s conclusion that “[i]n all rigidly controlled organizations, such as the army or the prison, bitter joking is a regular occurrence. But the soldiers and prisoners who laugh at the superiors whose order they follow are not to rebel” (1395). Not only does humour have literally no impact on the status quo but, to some extent, essentially sustains the society it ridicules. In other words, joking about Hitler, one can argue, contributed to the preservation, instead of the destruction, of

Hitler’s power. Mocking the )KUHU was a vital component of Germans’ self-deception, which led to the materialization of the Hitler myth in the first place. This thought is reflected in Speier’s claim that “[w]hispered jokes can also serve as a psychological alibi” (1395). “By occasionally telling or laughing at a subversive jest, one can live more easily with nagging, half-conscious insights about accommodation or one’s own failure to

26 revolt,” he suggests (1395).38 In conclusion, humour certainly has the capacity to demythologize Hitler. However, despite its ability to shed light on the truth, the humour that circulated during Hitler’s lifetime had no substantial, far-reaching effect on the myth that ensured the Nazis’ power. It definitely did not weaken the latter in its essence but rather served Germans as a means to justify their support for Hitler and to nonetheless sustain a sense of resistance. Since then humour brought no significant changes to the perception of Hitler, the following questions arise: What functions does ridicule have today? In other words, why do Germans mock Hitler? What impact, if any, does humour have on our contemporary understanding of the dictator? Prior to finding answers to these issues, it is worth pointing out that Germans who are generally not opposed to laughter about Hitler have high hopes in the effectiveness of humour and believe that mocking Hitler contributes to Germans’

9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ in a constructive manner. While joking about Hitler is certainly no longer an active attempt to impede his rise to power, many contemporary Germans still use humour for similar purposes: they mock and laugh to show their resentment of neo-Nazis, to criticize prevalent practices of commemoration, and to question the Hitler myth. Networks such as 1HW]JHJHQ1D]LV (Network against Nazis) or campaigns such as /DXW JHJHQ 1D]LV (Loud against Nazis) collect and produce satire to fight against right-wing extremism. Likewise, groups such as )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO believe that they can deconstruct Nazi symbols and ideology through caricature. Dani

Levy argues that “0HLQ )KUHU is the attempt to deal with National Socialism in a comedic – but serious – manner” (“Director’s Point” 213). In his mind, the comedy is a better medium to do so than traditional, dramatic means of representation (cf.

3UHVVHVSLHJHO 41). Serdar Somuncu avers that one must ridicule Hitler and 0HLQ .DPSI to destroy the myth (for example, cf. Koelbl 65). And, finally, documentary filmmaker

38 Apparently, Goebbels’s shared Speier’s assessment. The Propaganda Minister believed that occasional ranting was the “bowel movement of the soul” (cf. qtd. in Wippermann 8). In his belief, allowing Germans to express their frustrations therefore contributed to the stability of the regime.

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Winnie Gahlen – in the misleading belief that joking during the Third Reich was a lethal offense – couches what many think: “Laughing about Hitler, I think, is very important for a healthy society.” Gahlen’s comment also alludes to the common opinion that only laughter can ultimately free Germans of Hitler. In summary, among people in favour of mocking Hitler, there seems to be little doubt that laughing about the dictator is a good experience that will also have positive effects on our understanding of the Nazi past and

Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU. However, based on the findings on the role of joking during the Third Reich, one can assume that humour may have similar consequences, especially since the incongruity factor also applies to present-day humour. While mockery, on the one hand, may disclose Hitler’s mythological fundamental nature and question Germany’s (ULQQHUXQJNXOWXU, it may also simultaneously contribute to the sustainment of the Hitler myth and strengthen prevalent beliefs about the Nazi past. Most likely, Germans have their own diverse, present-day reasons for joking about Hitler. And neo-Nazis may very well be as immune to ridicule as their role models. The following chapters, discussing the role of Hitler the orator and Nazi speech in Germany’s

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and then humour, will now further examine this assumption.

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&KDSWHU7KUHH7KH2UDWRU0\WKHPH *HUPDQ+XPRXUGXULQJWKH7KLUG5HLFK

I could ‘speak.’ (Adolf Hitler)

[I]t is quite obvious that National Socialism has a lot of comedic potential. . . . It is already a howl to say ‘Heil Hitler.’ Hitler with his gestures and his babble, a caricature of himself. Also, these internal schemes, Goebbels’s vain pomposity, the entire propaganda machinery, which sabotaged itself ... One thinks that one can only invent this for a film but it was actually reality. (Dani Levy)

By stating that “National Socialism has a lot of comedic potential,” Dani Levy puts into words what many of us may think when looking back at the Nazi regime (“Director’s Point” 213). From today’s perspective, the horrors that Hitler stands for apparently do not diminish his and his disciples’ ability to look outright foolish. This contradictory nature of National Socialism and its followers is perhaps best reflected in the cultivation of Hitler’s image as an orator. Hitler believed himself to be a born speaker (196; quoted above). Levy’s statement, “It is already a howl to say ‘Heil Hitler.’ Hitler with his gestures and his babble, a caricature of himself” (“Director’s Point” 213), draws attention to an interesting fact: both then as well as today, Hitler the orator is the most important, most influential, and certainly most visible mytheme of the Hitler myth. Yet, while Hitler’s coevals were seriously spellbound by the “gestures” and “babble,” contemporary Germans tend to react to Hitler’s speechmaking with a mix of disbelief, amusement, rejection, and curiosity. More importantly for the focus of this study,

Germans, in contrast to other topics, rarely joked about the )KUHU’s speeches during his lifetime. Now, however, they cannot stop mocking Hitler the orator. Since the orator mytheme has remained of comparable significance for Germans’ view of Hitler, yet has altered in its meaning, it may likely provide the best insights into why Germans laugh about Hitler today and for what reasons. Thus, in order to get to the bottom of these questions, the following section will describe the role of the orator mytheme in Germans’ understanding of Hitler as well as in past humour. The next chapter will then take a detailed look at the representation of the orator mytheme in contemporary German culture.

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The so-called orator mytheme – Hitler’s self-portrayal as a public speaker – is one of the primary elements of the Hitler myth. Addressing an audience at mass events, smaller party conventions, and private gatherings39 was an essential component of Nazi image cultivation and, especially, of Hitler’s self-concept. Hitler was convinced that he was a gifted speaker, a talent that supposedly made him an equally outstanding leader. In

0HLQ.DPSI, he noted that “I started out with the greatest enthusiasm and love. For all at once I was offered an opportunity of speaking before a larger audience; and the thing that I had always presumed from pure feeling without knowing it was now corroborated: I could ‘speak’” (Hitler 196). The certainty in his allegedly outstanding speaking skills fuelled Hitler’s grasp for power, and giving speeches – an event that was always carefully staged in later years – became a preferred method to transmit the party program, disseminate propaganda, and mobilize supporters.40 In fact, Germans’ relationship with National Socialism and particularly Hitler was largely established through Hitler’s speaking performances, which played a vital role in the construction of the “charismatic leader” Germans longed for (for example, Kershaw xxvi-xxx; Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 14; cf. chapter 2). His listeners’ generally enthusiastic reactions further boosted Hitler’s conviction in the potency of (his) speeches, which led him to believe that he was indeed Germany’s chosen leader. The frantic response of the audience turned into a vital component of the orator mytheme, which – one can argue – Hitler embodied more than any other element of the myth. Marcel Atze stresses that “Hitler as orator became the personified medium of his myth” (254). Significantly, Hitler the speaker became the primary device through which the Nazis successfully communicated other attributes of the Hitler myth as well as their weltanschauung – Hitler’s rise to power is hardly

39 In this context, Hitler’s so-called “table talks” – discussions, or rather monologues, he held at the Führer Headquarters – are of importance and may be understood as Hitler’s personal attempt to induct and unite his closest followers. 40 In 0HLQ.DPSI, Hitler already discusses “the significance of the spoken word” in one specific chapter, giving detailed instructions on how to successfully win over the masses (421-436).

30 imaginable without these distinctive Nazi speeches, as the Hitler myth, in its entirety, materialized in Hitler the orator. Hitler’s distinct voice and expressive gestures played decisive roles in the realization of the orator mytheme as well as shape our present-day memory of Hitler.

Claudia Schmölders states that “it was indeed Hitler’s YRLFH that won him his early audience in the smoky restaurants he liked; it was his YRLFH that would remind his fellow soldiers of the singular event of 1914, when German troops in the fields of Langemarck sang the Deutschlandlied [Germany’s anthem] before dying” (“Face” 19). The former became “WKH instrument that cultivated the myth” and persistently echoed through the

9RONVHPSIlQJHU (People’s Radio) (Atze 254) – its peculiarities have been permanently imprinted into our contemporary understanding of Hitler. Likewise, images of Hitler speaking in front of thousands of fervent supporters while gesticulating wildly dominate our visual memory of the German dictator today. Ulrich Kühn, for example, gives a vivid summary of the specifics of Hitler’s orating performances: A straightened male body in uniform, rigid, the face as if frozen, large eyes aimed into the distance. Long-lasting silence. Finally, a movement, the anticipation of a slight cough – again, silence and waiting. Then, the first three words, a break; words, a break; words – a sentence. Low baritone register, an R, rolled through the tongue, guttural sounding vowels. The voice accelerates, increases, shouts, goes up and down, across two-and-a-half octaves, scoffs, coos, shrieks to a halt, cracks. He pushes his voice back, thick veins on his neck. In addition, the hands: one upon the other in front of the genitals or the belt, into one another in front of the body, clenched as fists, rose accusingly. The right hand is the one to vow, to prove, to strike: points and castigates, twists and turns, flings onto the heart and chest assuringly, slaps down, sideways, up, edge, palm, fist. Delivers judgements: beats up and down, ascends, forces destiny onto the earth, halts in front of the chest to the left, becomes a fist, strikes out, swings down, turns into the palm, pushes something to the right front, “brushes off,” “destroys,” “ruthless,” “radical:” Jews, Bolshevists, the enemy. The body gains momentum from the knees, raises, chin protruding, head thrown back: a single provocation. Then silence – the hall erupts in uproar. As if from

31

somewhere else, the hand reaches for his head, adjusts the strand of hair, dabs his forehead: everyone sees this, in the sweat of his brow he does what he must do. The next attack of speech already surges, the next glossolalie already rushes forward, the next execution already pushes on. The ones who witness this groan loudly, overwhelmed. He has done it: surrender. (369)41

The blatant interplay between rhetoric, voice intonation, interruptions of the sentence structure, and distinctive forceful gestures has become Hitler’s trademark as a speaker and a symbol of the obsession and violence that characterizes the Nazi era as well as the seductive power and fascination that National Socialism yielded over so many. Hitler the orator is synonymous with the personification of Hitler the fighter who allegedly struggled for the welfare of the German nation relentlessly. From Hitler and his supporters’ points of view, this fight found expression not only in Nazi rhetoric but moreover in Hitler’s body language, and the physical dedication Hitler depicted while speaking lent further sincerity to his statements. “[N]o dictator thrust himself upon his voters with the sheer corporeality of Hitler, with his increasingly virtuoso visual propaganda, with his voice, with his stare eye to eye” (Schmölders, +LWOHU¶V)DFH 3). The Hitler myth materialized in the orating Hitler, National Socialism and its promises thus became tangible in its leader. In short, Hitler’s body projects individual mythemes and is simultaneously an essential part of the myth surrounding him. The same is true for Hitler’s audience whose subordinate, yet feverish response is an equally vital component of the Hitler myth and the Nazi struggle in general (cf. chapter 2). Both aspects, to a large extent, also characterize contemporary representations of Hitler and the Nazi past and constitute a vital component of our understanding of Hitler today.

41 While I acknowledge that Kühn’s quotation is perhaps lengthy, it captures Hitler’s self-portrayal as an orator perfectly and in graphic detail. In the end, every little feature of these performances complemented one another and added up to a unified image of Hitler the orator. Kühn’s writing also echoes Hitler’s actual speaking style.

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As Dani Levy’s statement about the “comedic potential” of National Socialism illustrates (“Director’s Point 213), Hitler’s speeches, including his own exertion as well as his supporters’ reactions, often appear today to be only a curiosity, even a farce. The orator mytheme has actually turned into one of the most commonly ridiculed features of National Socialism – a trend that the below discussed contemporary examples clearly reflect. At first sight, this choice of satire does not come as a surprise since Hitler and other Nazis’ predilections for elaborate speeches and self-dramatization already caught the attention of many humorists from the 1920s to the 1940s. Since Hitler the orator embodies the Hitler myth, one can argue that any incongruities between reality and appearance become very apparent in this role. A perfect case in point is Charlie Chaplin’s

7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU, a film that specifically targets the orator mytheme and – deservedly so – has served as a role model for most of its successors. Another well-known example is Ernst Lubitsch’s 7R%HRU1RW7R%H. The film mocks Hitler’s excessive self-portrayals through the character of the actor Joseph Tura and his performances of Hamlet. Klaus Hansen also reports on the popularity that Hitler the orator gained at the time as a target of ridicule across all comic genres in non-German humour (165). Yet, while Chaplin and other international comedians made a mockery of Hitler’s speaking performances during his lifetime, German humorists apparently did not pay as much attention to the orator mytheme as their colleagues had abroad. After analyzing German jokes, Hansen comes to the conclusion that “Hitler the speaker virtually does not exist in the Flüsterwitz” (167). Comparably, Hitler’s speeches do not seem to have been a major object of ridicule in the satiric magazine 6LPSOLFLVVLPXV, which was published until 1944.42 In view of the ubiquity of Hitler’s voice and the fundamental function Hitlerian speeches had for the Nazi movement, Hansen finds this absence of Hitler as the orator in the )OVWHUZLW] genre rather surprising (165). One can easily agree with him, especially

42 An examination of references to Hitler showed that the speaker myth was not a prevalent attribute of

6LPSOLFLVVLPXV’s early satire about Hitler. The weekly journal fell, of course, victim to the Nazis’

*OHLFKVFKDOWXQJ (meaning the magazine was nazified and aligned with Nazi culture) in 1933.

33 since Germans made fun of Hitler for other reasons.43 Concluding that “Hitler’s rhetoric killed any joke” (168), Hansen identifies two main reasons for the “null finding” of jokes about the speaking Hitler (167). First, “Hitler the speaker walked the talk . . . This fidelity made him ‘serious’ and ‘dangerous’ – and an indigestive object for a joke” (168).44 Secondly, Hansen argues that Hitler’s listeners were incapable of joking because of the mesmerizing effect that Hitler had on his audience: “Hypnotized people, however, have no wit and also make no jokes. The joke demands alertness and presence of mind; yet, hypnotized people are numb” (168). Hansen’s second point about the influence of Hitler’s mesmerizing charisma on people’s ability to joke, however, seems to be too narrowly considered to explain why Germans did not mock Hitler the orator. While many contemporaries indeed gave numerous accounts about Hitler’s charismatic and even intriguing aura, not every

German was enthralled by the )KUHU (cf. for example, Fest 217-224, 705-708; Hansen 166; Kempowski; Kershaw; Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 14-16; Kopperschmidt, “War

Hitler” 185-186, 187-188; Schmölders, “Face” 27-28; Schmölders, +LWOHU¶V )DFH 3, 35- 38). The notion that Hitler’s hypnotizing speeches prevented people from joking about him is also not corroborated by the reaction of international observers. While many foreigners were also impressed by Hitler’s rhetoric (Fest 707), they – as previously stated – nonetheless found humour in the dictator’s self-portrayal as an orator – while Germans did not. Hansen’s second argument also lacks validity insofar as it does not explain why Germans made fun of other characteristics of Hitler: they, after all, satirized other aspects

43 This observation also appears to be unexpected since Hitler’s speaking talents were seriously discussed by many of his contemporaries, both by supporters as well as opponents (for example, by Viktor Klemperer and Thomas Mann or Otto Strasser and Joseph Goebbels, respectively). Moreover, there are a few cases that did not follow the trend of avoiding the orator mytheme as an object of satire: an example is Bertolt

Brecht’s 'HUDXIKDOWVDPH$XIVWLHJGHV$UWXUR8L (The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui) (1941). Brecht debunks Hitler’s rhetoric through the gangster boss Arturo Ui. It is worth noticing that his work appeared relatively late in the Third Reich – thus, at a time, when Hitler rarely made public appearances anymore. 44 In this regard, Hansen also cites, among others, Meike Wöhlert’s finding that Germans rarely joked about Heinrich Himmler (168). According to Wöhlert, Himmler was “a symbol of terror” and “too terrifying to titillate satire, to make jokes about him” (117).

34 of National Socialism that were part of Nazi events (for example, the Nazi salute). Finally, Hansen’s theory that “[h]ypnotized people . . . have no wit” and are “numb” has further, problematic implications (168). If people were so captivated by Hitler’s speeches that they had no “alertness and presence of mind” (168), one can also argue that they simply did not know what they were doing when cheering for Hitler. In other words, this line of argument suggests that Germans’ support for Hitler was not an expression of a voluntary, conscious decision, an expression of deep admiration. If one agrees with this conclusion, one can hardly hold Germans accountable for their actions during the Nazi regime: acting under hypnosis enables them to claim diminished responsibility. This belief plays into the hands of the majority of Germans who are – wrongly – of the opinion that Hitler coerced them into supporting him. However, as explicated in the previous chapter, Germans’ bond to Hitler was not a forced relationship but “an almost childlike devotion to a beloved father” (Jäckel, +LWOHU 94). Hansen’s second explanation of why there are literally no )OVWHUZLW]H about Hitler the orator is thus not convincing. Yet, as will be shown below, the idea that Hitler, as the embodiment of absolute evil, simply controlled his unwilling audience is one of the main reasons why the orator mytheme is a common object of ridicule in contemporary German culture: precisely, because such an interpretation of the Nazi past shifts the responsibility from ordinary Germans away to Hitler and other leading Nazi officials. However, Hansen’s first conclusion comes closer to an acceptable explanation and, to some degree, represents a contradiction to his second hypothesis about the impact of Hitler’s hypnotizing talents. The argument that people generally do not joke about persons or subjects they take seriously is convincing.45 Meike Wöhlert argues that “[t]o

45 This argument certainly finds support in humour research, and the three main theories on humour (superiority theory (experiences feelings of superiority when laughing; cf. chapter 5), incongruity theory (chapter 2), relief theory (laughter as a form of liberation); cf. chapter 5) also provide some supporting arguments – although to a different extent. John Morreall, for example, states on humour’s general ethics that “[i]n finding something funny, we are for the moment not concerned about truth or about consequences. . . . To laugh about something is not to take it seriously” (“Humour” 70). These observations, however, do not imply that humour cannot be a serious matter.

35 mock someone, to make fun of someone, always means to dismiss this person” in some way (117). In order to determine the sincerity of a statement or a message, one must be able to think and form an opinion; “alertness and presence of mind” are essential (cf. Hansen 168). Hence, one may argue that most Germans did not ridicule Hitler the orator because they essentially agreed with his rhetoric and believed him (cf. Kershaw; Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 18; chapter 2). Hitler had a keen, intuitive sense of people’s anxieties, which in turn were fuelled by his aggressive rhetoric. Coeval supporters, like Otto Strasser, believed Hitler’s success as a speaker originated in this skill: “I have only one explanation for this [rhetorical triumph], namely his incredible intuition, which enabled him unerringly to identify the exact nature of discontent his audience suffered from” (qtd. in Kopperschmidt, “War Hitler” 189-190). Hitler was successful because he shared similar beliefs with his listeners, who provided the foundation of his rhetorical and political career. Such power, as Hitler held, “by all means, is not possible without the =XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW [willingness to consent] of the ones who allow themselves to be led” (Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 13; cf. chapter 2). This connection between Hitler and Germans caused Kershaw to conclude that “[t]o explain his power . . . we must look in the first instance to others, not to Hitler himself” 46 (+LWOHU  xxvi). The majority of Germans then did not pick the orator mytheme as an object of ridicule because Hitler the speaker embodied the realization of their hopes and secret desires. Believing in the entire Hitler myth meant first believing and trusting in Hitler the orator. The fact that Hitler convinced people that he was serious – substantiated through his expressive body language – and that he would indeed realize his words attracted Germans. The orator mytheme – the personification of the myth – became the main characteristic with which Germans identified. The close, trusting relationship Germans formed with Hitler the orator may explain why Germans commonly

46 Kershaw’s “the others,” however, also include Nazis’ opponents and their failed attempts in overthrowing Hitler.

36 did not mock Hitler the speaker in his lifetime: because they took him and his rhetoric seriously, they saw no incongruity between what he represented and promised and between what he delivered in the end. They were neither angry nor annoyed with the speaking )KUHU. Germans simply had no reason to laugh at Hitler the orator: in the end, he did what he said he would do and had personified all along.47 As previously indicated, the situation in contemporary Germany looks quite different; the orator mytheme is now a popular target of German humour about Hitler.

The cause for this change seems to originate in Germany’s (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and

9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ. The vast majority of contemporary scholarly accounts emphasizes Hitler’s self-portrayal as an orator, focuses on the mesmerized response of his audience, and stresses the function of speechmaking for the formation of Nazi rule

(for example, cf. Fest; Kershaw; especially, +LWOHU GHU 5HGQHU edited by Josef Kopperschmidt). The notion that Hitler’s rhetoric had a significant impact on his role in the Nazi movement and World War II is an accepted fact in today’s research on the German dictator (cf. Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 14; “War Hitler” 182, 187, 192): “Without Hitler the speaker and his rhetoric, which verifiably fascinated his listeners,

Hitler the leader would not have existed and, consequently, also not WKH Hitler ‘without whom World War II would have never happened’” (Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 14). From today’s point of view, Hitler’s rule is intrinsically tied to his speechmaking;

47 Since this thesis focuses on humour about Nazis, it would go beyond the scope of this study to include the representation of Jews and the Holocaust in German humour. With regard to the omission of Hitler the orator in the )OVWHUZLW], it seems in order to point to the comparable absence of Jews’ fate in German jokes. While Jewish humour of this period is often quite revealing of the atrocious realities Jews had to face (cf., for example, Lipman and Morreall “Resistance”), gentile German jokes rarely addressed Jewish suffering. After comparing Jewish gallows humour with the standard )OVWHUZLW], Herzog rightly argues that this analysis “shows with painful clarity how differently the Third Reich was experienced by German society and how much the outlooks of victims and followers differed” (14). This difference in humour originates from the fact that people mostly ridicule issues that directly influence them. Since the Jews’ fate did not have a direct negative impact on Germans, and since a majority of Germans did not actively defy anti-Semitism, their humour is also not concerned with the suffering of their Jewish fellow citizens. (However, this observation does not imply that Germans had no knowledge of Jews’ plight. Concentration camps and the Nazis’ arbitrariness were certainly objects of ridicule (cf. Gamm; Herzog; /DXJKLQJZLWK

+LWOHU).)

37

“Hitler’s biography [can be read] like a consistent rhetorical way to success” (Kopperschmidt, “War Hitler” 182). As a result of the significance that is now attributed to Hitler’s speaking performances, the orator mytheme – and, thus, the Hitler myth in general – has come to the fore in Germans’ contemporary understanding and remembrance of Hitler. Besides scholars’ attention, Hitler the orator has also gained significance in representations created for an everyday audience. In contemporary Germany, not only Hitler is omnipresent, but, in fact, it is Hitler the speaker who dominates Germans’ remembrance of the Third Reich. According to Marcel Atze, the orator mytheme has been a prevalent theme in German postwar literature (cf. chapter 5: 253-370). The aforementioned claim particularly applies to Germans’ visual memory of the dictator (cf. Jung 239), which corresponds to the description Ulrich Kühn gives of the speaking Hitler (369) and which has been greatly influenced by Guido Knopp’s historytainment 48 documentaries about the Third Reich. Knopp, editorial director of the =ZHLWH'HXWVFKH

)HUQVHKHQ (ZDF, one of Germany’s national public television broadcasters) since 1984, has built an entire business from his television productions about the Nazi past. The historytainment (or histotainment) genre aims to communicate history to a mass audience by representing it in a fun and entertaining way; the past is often sold as a mysterious entity that needs to be unravelled. Such shows have frequently been criticized for suggesting to viewers that they depict the past accurately – instead of pointing to the artificiality of representation –, the shows’ limited foci, and for leaving out information on the context in which authentic documents were produced. For example, scenes from

Leni Riefenstahl’s 7ULXPSK RI WKH :LOO (1935) are used without further contextualizing them. Thus, these images often do not lose their original purpose and fascination, and a second platform is given to Nazi propaganda. This latter observation also applies

48 Knopp’s shows have, of course, played a very influential role in sustaining the Hitler myth – and not just the orator mytheme, as his documentaries rely on a vast number of original Nazi images to bring the dictator into Germans’ living rooms (for example, footage of Hitler with children, cf. chapter 2).

38

especially to authentic Nazi speech. Despite attempts from the $UEHLWVJHPHLQVFKDIWHQGHU

|IIHQWOLFKUHFKWOLFKHQ 5XQGIXQNDQVWDOWHQ GHU %XQGHVUHSXEOLN 'HXWVFKODQGV (ARD, Germany’s other national television broadcaster) to offer a similar series,49 Knopp and the =') still hold “almost a monopoly in the depiction of National Socialist history in the media” (Kirchner 172).50 In the nineties, Knopp established his dominance in this genre through the production of +LWOHU(LQH%LODQ] (Hitler. A Record), which centers on different attributes of Hitler’s life and power. As Alexander Kirchner states, Hitler’s rhetoric is a constant topic in the series (176): Be it the numerous clips of speeches, which make audio- visually tangible how massive and powerfully eloquent Hitler appeared in reality; be it the asides in the narrator’s explanatory comments, which allude to his powerful rhetoric . . .; finally, be it the photos and freeze images that show Hitler gesticulating . . . All of that serves as proof of the oratory talent of a man who cast a spell on the German people. . . . [Hitler’s rhetoric] is again and again demonized and theatrically exaggerated. Barely a shot that zooms in on an oratorical pose and that is not accompanied by a fortissimo of an orchestra, which takes the audience entirely by surprise. Images of Hitler to the music of a horror film. (177)

49 In late 2007, the ARD launched its own historytainment show, *HKHLPQLV*HVFKLFKWH (Mystery History). So far, host Thomas Kausch has not been able to seriously challenge Knopp. 50 Wulf Kansteiner’s discussion of Knopp’s television documentaries corroborates Kirchner’s assessment (626). According to Kansteiner, Knopp’s success, which is reflected in high audience ratings, originates in his innovative, aesthetical use of images and an ability to engage his audience, for example, by giving the impression that the majority of Germans were opposed to Hitler (629). While Knopp is rightly being criticized for ignoring ordinary Germans’ participation in National Socialism’s rise, for focusing solely on Germans’ victim status in recent shows, or for the use of original images, he is nonetheless largely responsible for waking Germans’ interest in the Nazi past. For example, as Kansteiner points out, “Knopp [is] the first German television producer who explicitly and extensively focused on Hitler and made him the main subject of discussion” (628). In brief, Knopp has played a large part in educating contemporary ordinary Germans about the Third Reich – without his documentaries and accompanying books, one can argue, Germans would probably be less informed about this era of recent history. A case in point is Knopp’s recent documentary about the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff in 1945, which carried over 9000

German expellees: Knopp’s 'HU8QWHUJDQJGHU*XVWORII (The Sinking of the Gustloff) (2008) reached higher audience ratings than Vilsmaier’s television film 'LH*XVWORII (2008) (Knopp). (Both film and documentary were broadcasted together and are also offered together for the DVD home viewer’s market).

39

In +LWOHU(LQH%LODQ]as well as in Knopp’s later shows, Hitler is intrinsically tied to his role as a speaker. Hitler the orator is simultaneously represented as a gloomy seducer possessing almost superhuman mesmerizing qualities. Such portrayals emphasize Hitler’s supposedly innate villainy51 and establish an aura of absolute evil that evokes feelings of unease in the observers.52 As a result, the orator mytheme is characterized by evilness. Since these post-war depictions put such strong emphasis on the orator mytheme, other aspects of Hitler’s personality and causes for his claim to power are ignored. Consequently, an unbalanced portrayal is generated, in which Hitler’s speaking skills are equated with his entire appearance and rule and account for the RQH reason why Hitler came to power. Furthermore, such representations do not question the validity of Hitler’s rhetorical talent or emphasize the artificiality of these speaking performances. Thus, they also do not construct the Hitler myth but rather contribute to its existence. In view of the prevalence of such portrayals of Hitler, it is perhaps logically consistent that images of Hitler speaking fanatically as well as of thousands of Germans applauding him equally fervently dominate Germans’ memory of the dictator. While the representation of Hitler speaking has certainly been engraved in Germans’ visual memory as a result of its constant screening, the orator mytheme has also gained popularity as it provides Germans with the ideal opportunity to solely focus on Hitler’s role instead of confronting their own responsibility in the establishment of the Third Reich. A vital, yet misleading component of the orator mytheme is the idea that no one could withstand Hitler’s charisma and mesmerizing speaking skills (a hypothesis

51 The individual subtitles of the series, which may be understood as reflections of important mythemes of the Hitler myth as it exists today, illustrate this observation and depict clearly how the show represents the dictator: “Der Privatmann” (The Private Citizen), “Der Verführer” (The Seducer), “Der Erpresser” (The Blackmailer), “Der Diktator” (The Dictator), “Der Kriegsherr” (The Warlord), “Der Verbrecher” (The Criminal). 52 Since feelings of unease may also be enjoyable, such documentaries are problematic insofar as Hitler is suddenly compared to protagonists of normal horror films. The historical dimension – as well as a moral one – is thus often neglected, and Hitler may turn into a dark hero with whom one can identify. It seems that these emotions of suspense draw the audience’s attention and are one of the many reasons why Germans watch Knopp.

40 that, to some extent, is reflected in Klaus Hansen’s explanation for the absence of jokes about the speaker Hitler). The notion that Hitler the orator was always surrounded by an aura of evil gloominess further substantiates this claim. In other words, the belief that the seduced Germans had no other choice than to support Hitler is easily corroborated by the orator mytheme and, thus, also explains the prevalence of the Hitler myth at large. Supporters of this argument prefer to ignore the fact that Hitler’s power was based on

Germans’ “=XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW” (Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 13; cf. chapter 2). They also take no notice of Kershaw’s conclusion that the role and action of the others created Hitler and his myth (+LWOHU  xxvi), and that Hitler could not have reached rhetorical and political success without the approval of his audience. Therefore, the prevalence of the orator mytheme, like the Hitler myth, in contemporary portrayals of Hitler is an indication of a limited confrontation with one’s own past and one’s responsibility for the Nazi regime. As we will see below, this argument also seems to be substantiated by the fact that some comedians pay no or little attention to Hitler’s audience in their attempt to ridicule and, thus, expose the dictator. Furthermore, it seems that the orator mytheme has gained significance in today’s

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU because this particular attribute is no longer Hitler-specific. To some degree, it is equated with the Nazi regime in general and also characterizes other high- ranking Nazi officials, particularly Joseph Goebbels.53 As explained above, the orator mytheme has become one of the key explanations why the Nazis successfully came to – and remained in – power. This claim, for example, receives further support by also highlighting Goebbels’s rhetorical talent and its alleged, equally seducing, impact. Like Hitler, Goebbels discovered “the effect of the spoken word” early on (Reuth 87); his rhetorical skills as well as outspoken fanaticism contributed to his advancement from party speaker to Leader of Propaganda for the NSDAP, and, later, to Minister of Public

53 Dani Levy’s statement about Nazis’ inherent comic nature mirrors this perception. Besides Hitler’s “babble,” Levy also lists Goebbels’s “pomposity” and the “propaganda machinery” (“Director’s Point” 213).

41

Enlightenment and Propaganda. He concentrated his energy particularly on the German broadcasting system. In Goebbels’s view, “broadcasting belongs to us, and not to anybody else! And we will put broadcasting into our movement’s service, and no other opinion shall have a say” (qtd. in Reuth 277). Goebbels certainly realized his plans and turned the radio into the mouthpiece of the Nazi movement. He also eventually became the Nazis’ second most important speaker – Hitler, of course, being the first.

In today’s (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU, Goebbels has emerged as one of the most commonly referred to and portrayed Nazi leaders. He is widely presented as “the man behind Hitler.” The Propaganda Minister and his family are a constant subject matter on

Knopp’s historytainment documentaries (for instance, +LWOHUV +HOIHU , ± *RHEEHOV 'HU

%UDQGVWLIWHU (Hitler’s Helpers I – Goebbels: The Incendiarist); +LWOHUV )UDXHQ ± 0DJGD

*RHEEHOV 'LH *HIROJVIUDX (Hitler’s Women – Magda Goebbels: The Loyal Follower). 54 They play a major role in Oliver Hirschbiegel’s 'HU 8QWHUJDQJ. Also in 2004, Lutz

Hachmeister released the documentary 'DV *RHEEHOV([SHULPHQW, which focuses solely on Goebbels’s view of the Nazi regime by mixing excerpts from his diaries with photos and film material from that time. To this day, Goebbels is especially remembered for the

6SRUWSDODVWUHGH (often also referred to as the ³:ROOW ,KU GHQ WRWDOHQ .ULHJ"´VSHHFK (total war speech)) from February 18, 1943, in which Goebbels incited Germans to wage a total war against the Allies, Jews, Bolshevists, and others. In 'LH *XVWORII (2008), the speech is played at the very beginning of the film to provide a (questionable) reason for the expulsion of Germans from the Eastern territories. As a result of Goebbels’s commonness in Germany’s (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU, it is not surprising that German humorists have also discovered Goebbels as an ideal object of ridicule. Cases in point are the tragicomedies *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU or Serdar Somuncu’s cabaret program -RVHSK *RHEEHOV 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH In humorous and non-humorous

54 The prevalence of the Goebbels children have certainly contributed to sustaining the myth that Hitler was the protector of the poor and weak.

42 works alike, rhetorical talent is a key character trait of the Propaganda Minister. Assumingly, the emphasis on Goebbels’s role as a speaker serves similar purposes as

Hitler’s speaking skills have in Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU. As a result of being in charge of Nazi propaganda and the media as well as being responsible for the organisation of most mass events, Goebbels must naturally also be the focus of any examination of the role that Hitler’s rhetoric played in the Nazis’ rise. Moreover, Goebbels’s own speeches certainly contributed to the consolidation of Nazi rule, and his rhetoric is especially known for its fanatical and radical outspokenness. After all, there is a reason why Germans commonly called the 9RONVHPSIlQJHU “Gobbels-Schnauze” (Goebbels’s mouth(piece)). Like Hitler, Goebbels the orator is simultaneously the fanatic agitator who ensnared and forced allegedly unconvinced Germans to lead a total war.55 Since he is Hitler’s main disciple, Goebbels also serves as proof of the effectiveness of Hitler’s mesmerizing character as well as the potency of the Hitler myth. Therefore, in order to understand the prevalence of Nazi speechmaking in German culture and humour, both the representation of Hitler and Goebbels as speakers must be taken into consideration. Finally, the orator mytheme is so ubiquitous in present-day Germany because Nazi language signifies Nazis’ reign of terror, the atrocities that were committed under Hitler’s rule, and the deceptive nature of the Nazi government. A significant element of

Hitler’s )KUHU persona was the creation and constant use of a specific Nazi language. Hitler and Goebbels gave new meanings to words or simply invented new ones; they impressed their ideology on the German language, reshaping grammar and concepts, and formed a particular speaking style, which both propagated through their speeches. Nazis’ racial vocabulary, which was also published in different dictionaries, and their habit to

55 Germans’ understanding of the role that Goebbels played in the Third Reich is explicitly reflected in common descriptive bynames that are often attributed to him today: “Verführer” (seducer), “Brandstifter” (incendiary), “Anstifter” (agitator), “Scharfmacher” (stirrer). In contrast to Hitler, however, Goebbels is only viewed in negative terms and certainly not regarded as a great politician – this relationship between Germans and Goebbels, however, seems to substantiate the thesis that the Hitler myth continues to live on.

43 speak in superlative terms are probably the most prominent manifestations of Nazi language. Nazis’ extensive (ab)use of speech has had a lasting effect on German language: to this day, certain terms are considered to be EHODVWHWH 6SUDFKH (burdened/tainted speech). Using such language can cause as much public outrage as a rash comparison with Hitler. A local fire department in Eastern Germany faced much criticism over wearing t-shirts with a saying that Hitler had used to express his ideals of a perfect German youth: “Fast as a greyhound/ tough as leather/ and hard as Krupp steel” (Meiritz & Wittmann). Nazi rhetoric serves as a means to depict National Socialism’s barbarity, the regime’s ideology and character as well as its policies of wilful deception and inherent absurdity. It is a main stylistic device to re-create the cultural climate prevalent during the Third Reich. When portraying Nazis, filmmakers and writers frequently rely on speech to characterize protagonists as Nazis in the first place and, especially, to illustrate inherent aggressiveness – the latter is commonly also expressed through sound intensity: Nazis often yell. Language is often the first indication if a character is a die-hard Nazi or one who is decent at heart and, thus, essentially an ordinary, innocent German (for instance, Nazi doctor Ernst Günther Schenck in contrast 56 to Hitler and Goebbels in 'HU 8QWHUJDQJ; the brothers Harald, the Nazi, and Hellmut

Kehding in 'LH*XVWORII). Nazi speech is also used to depict the deceptive and dictatorial nature of the Nazi regime: Nazis hid their true intentions behind language. Goebbels’s

6SRUWSDODVWUHGH as well as bureaucratic jargon serve as examples of this type of deception. Nazi language thus plays an important role in any representation of the Nazi past, especially in portrayals of Hitler the orator. It functions as a symbol of Nazis’ brutality and as an indicator that offers valuable clues to help differentiate between “Nazis” and “decent Germans.” At the same time, Nazi speech signifies Nazis’ politics, which were based on lies and deception, as well as the extent of their power. In the case

56 While the film ultimately portrays Schenck as a hero, it is not a portrayal that actually corresponds to the historical reality.

44 of Hitler, Nazi rhetoric is, of course, an essential element of his orator persona. The general depiction and use of Nazi language thus add further to the overall meaning of the orator mytheme and corroborates its ambiguous function in contemporary German culture. Moreover, in view of the fact that neo-Nazis still make use of Nazi speech and also invent new language to describe modern life, knowledge of Nazi terminology seems to be an essential prerequisite in the fight against right-wing extremism. In summary, Hitler the orator personified the Hitler myth both in the Nazi regime as well as in present-day Germany. During both eras, Hitler the speaker has served Germans as an identification point. In former times, Hitler’s speechmaking convinced Germans of his sincerity and honesty. They believed and trusted him in his role as a speaker. As a result, Hitler the orator represented no ideal object of ridicule and became no subject matter for German )OVWHUZLW]H. Currently, Hitler the speaker has become the place where absolute evil has materialized. The orator mytheme, corroborated by Goebbels’s characterization as an equally talented speaker, serves Germans as an optimal opportunity to sustain the beliefs that they were simply seduced by Hitler’s extraordinary speaking skills as well as deceptive language, and that they were indeed his first victims rather than his first admirers and fellow perpetrators. As a result of this shift in perception – between saviour and incarnation of absolute evil, the orator mytheme now offers ample reason to make a mockery of Hitler the orator, particularly because it is a constant feature of non-humorous representations. Thus, the following section will discuss contemporary German ridicule of Hitler the speaker.

45

&KDSWHU)RXU7KH2UDWRU0\WKHPH &RQWHPSRUDU\*HUPDQ+XPRXU

[Incomprehensible, harsh gibberish] ... My character reserved ... [incomprehensible, harsh gibberish] ... My speech cultivated. (Somuncu imitating and quoting Hitler)

As joking during the Third Reich was a reaction to the Nazi movement, contemporary humour about Hitler, Goebbels, and Nazi speech is a response to the prevalence of the orator mytheme and its functions in today’s (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU. Since humour has the ability to point out incongruities, it can help to correct and question modern ideas of the Nazi past. Hence, ridiculing Nazi speechmaking constitutes an attempt to debunk as well as to reflect on our present-day understanding of the Nazi past as well as our attempts of 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ. Mocking Hitler and Nazis in general provides an opportunity to deconstruct Nazi language and to examine Germans’ role in the Nazi regime. Moreover, it is a chance to scrutinize present-day beliefs and attitudes toward the Nazi past. Of course, comic representations are also an integral part of Germans’ discourse about the Third Reich and, hence, also shape their relationship with this era. Of primary interest for the subsequent analysis is whether these works debunk and challenge, or whether they consolidate and contribute to traditional conceptions of the orator mytheme and the current functions it has in German society today. Finding answers to these problems may then provide insights into the questions why Germans currently feel the need to laugh about Hitler as well as what they are laughing – or supposed to laugh – about. Any results may shed light on the general function of humour about the Nazi past in contemporary German culture, which will be discussed in detail in the conclusion (cf. chapter 5). In order to find answers to this question, the following discussion will first focus on the tragicomedies *RHEEHOV XQG 57 *HGXGLJ (2001) by Kai Wessel and 0HLQ)KUHU±'LHZLUNOLFKZDKUVWH:DKUKHLWEHU

57 Information on the release and production of these research samples are given again, as a small reminder to the reader.

46

$GROI +LWOHU (2007) by Dani Levy. The animated video clip ,FK KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU (I’m sitting in my bunker) (2006) based on Walter Moers’s Adolf, the Nazi pig, will also be looked at. Subsequently, Florian Wittmann’s clip +LWOHU /HDVLQJ (2005) and Serdar

Somuncu’s cabaret programs $XV GHP 7DJHEXFK HLQHV 0DVVHQP|UGHUV ± 0HLQ .DPSI

(1996) as well as -RVHSK *RHEEHOV 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH ³:ROOW ,KU GHQ WRWDOHQ

.ULHJ"´ (2000) will serve as counter-examples to Wessel and Levy’s films and ,FKKRFN

LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU. This chapter will conclude with a discussion of the activities of the satirical group )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO. The following analysis will particularly examine the representation of the orator mytheme, the relationship between speechmaking and power, and the role of the German audience. The use of Nazi language will be discussed as well.

*RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ 0HLQ)KUHU

On the following pages, I will focus on the two recent German films that portray the Nazi past in a comic manner, the tragicomedies *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ

)KUHU. German filmmaker Kai Wessel’s *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ was the first German- made film that depicts the Third Reich through tragicomic stylistic devices. It first aired on Germany’s national broadcaster $5' as the feature film of its evening programme on

November 22, 2002. 0HLQ )KUHU by Swiss-Jewish director Dani Levy hit German theatres in January 2007 and was the first German-made tragicomedy whose plot mostly centers on Hitler. Both films are labelled as tragicomedies, and both filmmakers decided to portray the life of the Jewish protagonists as “tragic” and to characterize their Nazi characters as “comic.” This strict separation of “tragicomic” differentiates the film from its international predecessors, for instance Chaplin’s 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU or Benigni’s /LIH

LV %HDXWLIXO. It seems likely that this clear allocation of tragedy and comedy reflects

Germans’ specific (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU, which has special sensitivities as a result of being

47 the perpetrator nation. This argument is further corroborated by the films’ production histories. After seven years of planning, two years of internal discussion, fifteen or so scripts later, and some experimental, well-received screenings abroad,58 Germany’s national broadcaster $5' finally decided to release *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ to a German audience. In the case of 0HLQ)KUHU, Levy re-wrote the script, re-shot and added certain scenes, and re-cut the final product after the audience harshly criticized the first version of the film at a public screening (this does not mean that the final product was welcomed by Germans with open arms). Like *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, international audiences were also less critical.59 Clearly, both films are products of Germans’ particular

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and their cultural attempts of 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ. Before discussing the representation of the orator mytheme in these two films in detail, I will give brief summaries of both, starting with Wessel’s tragicomedy. *RHEEHOV

XQG *HGXOGLJ tells the story of the Jew Harry Geduldig who is the spitting image of Joseph Goebbels. By order of Heinrich Himmler – and without the knowledge of Goebbels, Harry has been held captive in a concentration camp in Southern Germany for the last ten years. In captivity, Harry is trained to become Goebbels’s doppelganger in order to secretly replace the propaganda minister if necessary. While Harry naturally looks like Goebbels – the likeness includes the deformed foot and appertaining limp –, Harry must constantly practice Goebbels’s idiosyncratic speech and other peculiarities. When Goebbels loses weight, Harry is put on a diet; when Goebbels develops a fondness for smoking cigars, Harry must learn to smoke as well. After learning of his double’s existence, Goebbels attempts to kill Harry. Yet, in a moment of confusion, Harry is mistaken for Goebbels and manages to escape along with his lover, inmate Grete Zipfel, to the Berghof, while Goebbels, believed to be Harry, is left behind in the camp. Harry

58 The film, for example, was nominated for the Rocky Awards at the Banff World Television Festival in 2001. 59 Levy, for instance, received the main award at the Festival of European Film Smiles 2007 and the Freedom of Expression Award at the San Francisco Jewish Film Festival.

48 successfully misleads the German public and Nazi officials, including Hitler. Goebbels, on the other hand, passionately tries to convince his guards of his real identity – to no avail. Only Magda Goebbels sees through Harry’s masquerade and agrees to maintain silence about Harry’s real identity if he kills Goebbels in return. After facilitating Grete’s escape to Barcelona, Harry dies in a bomb attack supposedly carried out by Nazi opponents. The film ends with Goebbels’s release and reinstatement as the propaganda minister.

Like *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, Levy’s 0HLQ)KUHU is also set during the last year of the Third Reich. Alarmed about Hitler’s mental state – the dictator is depressed and incapable of giving captivating speeches –, Goebbels decides to fetch Hitler’s former acting coach, the Jew Adolf Grünbaum, from the concentration camp Sachsenhausen and accommodates him and his family in the Neue Reichskanzlei (Hitler’s residence in Berlin). Grünbaum’s task is to restore Hitler, whose affliction is primarily caused by childhood trauma, mentally and physically to former greatness so that Hitler is again able to encourage Germans and to boost their perseverance in a major speech at the turn of the year 1944/45. In several sessions, Grünbaum successfully treats Hitler with counselling and prescribes exercise. A relationship between both men develops; this bond prevents Grünbaum from killing Hitler and enables the latter to open up about his life and problems. While Grünbaum helps and connects with Hitler, his closest follower, Goebbels concocts the plan to murder his leader and to lay the blame for the assassination on Grünbaum. As a result of Hitler’s dependency on Grünbaum, the latter is in a position to secure the release of his family. Grünbaum’s request to liberate the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, however, is not fulfilled by Goebbels; the propaganda minister only simulates the closing of the camp. On the day of the New Year’s speech, Grünbaum is forced to speak in lieu of Hitler who suddenly lost his voice: he, hidden underneath the podium, lends his voice to Hitler, who, simultaneously and in sight, gesticulates and acts as if he was talking. Since Grünbaum finally sees through Goebbels’s deceit and knows his family is safe, he changes the original speech and begins to ridicule Hitler instead. In the end, Grünbaum is shot, and Hitler escapes the assassination attempt.

49

7KH2UDWRUV+LWOHU *RHEEHOV

The notion that speech(es) played a key role in the rise of the Nazi regime and its maintenance of power is reflected in both *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU. In brief, 0HLQ )KUHU centers on a burnt-out, speechless Hitler who receives a mixture of speech coaching and psychoanalytical therapy by the Jew Adolf Grünbaum to regain 60 confidence and former speaking skills. *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ relies on Goebbels’s rhetoric and the Jew Harry Geduldig’s imitations in order to create amusement about individual Nazis and the Third Reich. The film also mocks Nazi language by attempting to give new meanings to Nazi phrases and terms. Both Hitler and Goebbels are mostly portrayed as angry, ranting speakers. In summary, the orator mytheme drives the plots and is also used to characterize the films’ protagonists. It is a common theme throughout both films and is apparently employed to generate laughter. The following discussion will show that both filmmakers – despite their desire to do otherwise – fail in portraying the orator mytheme vastly differently than it is commonly remembered. They certainly fail to demythologize this very important element of the Hitler myth. Consequently, instead of challenging the prevalent memory of Hitler and, especially, the functions the orator mytheme has for contemporary German society, both *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ

60 Levy drafted the character of Grünbaum after Paul Devrient, a German opera tenor, who accompanied Hitler on his election campaign in 1932 and instructed him in intonation, voice-leading, and gestures. The Nazis employed Devrient because Hitler’s excessive speaking and flawed breathing techniques resulted in the overstraining of his vocal cords. Levy was amused by the knowledge that Hitler received rhetorical instructions and believes that this historical fact automatically contributes to Hitler’s deconstruction as a born orator (“Director’s Point” 226). While it is certainly important to realize that Hitler trained for his speaking performances, it does not sufficiently explain Hitler’s success as a speaker. After all, Devrient did not instruct Hitler until 1932; Hitler’s rhetorical career, however, already begun in the 1920s. His main strategies of how to win over his audience are already laid out in 0HLQ.DPSI (particularly 421-436). It seems that Levy makes reference to Devrient to degrade Hitler and emphasize his pathetic character traits rather than to demonstrate his calculating considerations in employing Devrient. Prior to Levy, Bertold Brecht brilliantly debunks Hitler the speaker through the training that the gangster Arturo Ui receives from a run-down actor in'HUDXIKDOWVDPH$XIVWLHJGHV$UWXUR8L (scene 6 and beginning scene 7, 45-58). The idea to make Grünbaum a Jewish character stems from George Tabori’s 0HLQ.DPSI and his protagonist

Schlomo Herzl, who takes the young artist Adolf Hitler under his wings. Referring to Herzl, 0HLQ)KUHU implies on different occasions that Grünbaum already trained Hitler prior to 1933 and, thus, contributed to his rise.

50

)KUHU contribute to and further substantiate the prevalent understanding of Hitler, his closest followers, and the Nazi past. First, both tragicomedies acknowledge the significance of the orator mytheme by portraying Hitler and Goebbels as talented speakers and by making a direct connection between these Nazis’ rhetorical aptitude and their power. While certain statements and actions are probably supposed to be funny, Wessel decided against turning Goebbels and, 61 especially, Hitler into simple buffoons. In *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, Jürgen Schornagel’s depiction of Hitler and Ulrich Mühe’s portrayal of Goebbels are reflective of the characterizations that original Nazi images as well as Knopp’s documentaries generally provide.62 Schornagel’s performance of Hitler is, in fact, reminiscent of the description Ulrich Kühn gives of the historical Hitler and, thus, of the prevalent understanding of 63 Hitler the orator in present-day German culture (cf. 369; cf. chapter 3). In *RHEEHOVXQG

*HGXOGLJ, Hitler is, in fact, the personification of the Hitler myth. Wessel’s Hitler is fond of animals – he tells Harry First World War anecdotes of his terrier Foxl – and fond of children – he enjoys Goebbels’s children singing birthday songs.64 Hitler, as the orator, preaches and rants to Harry about the atomic bomb, an invention that was apparently stolen by Jews from the Germans and is now built in America. He salivates and sweats,

61 This decision, one can argue, reflects on Germans’ scepticism toward making comedies about the Nazi past. In Wessel’s film, the taboo of joking about Nazis is still in place, at least in regards to Hitler and, to a lesser extent, to Goebbels as well. 62 It is worth noticing that Ulrich Mühe plays Goebbels and, of course, Harry Geduldig in *RHEEHOVXQG

*HGXOGLJ. However, he also performs the role of Adolf Grünbaum in 0HLQ)KUHU. Likewise, Katja Riemann plays Eva Braun in both films. Apparently, it is not unusual that the same actor or actress plays the same or similar Nazi henchmen. Ulrich Noethen was Heinrich Himmler in 0HLQ)KUHU and, previously, in 'HU8QWHUJDQJ. Götz Otto has played several Nazi characters in his career: in *RHEEHOVXQG

*HGXOGLJ, Otto represented SS-officer Brenneisen; in 'HU8QWHUJDQJ, he was SS-Sturmbannführer Otto

Günsche; and Otto also played an unnamed SS-guard in 6FKLQGOHU¶V/LVW (1993). One can argue that, as a result of representing the same Nazi repeatedly, the actors’ images gradually replace the historical agents. There is perhaps also the possibility that these films suddenly appear to be a more historically accurate representation, because the audience experiences feelings of recognition. 63 In many ways, Bruno Ganz’s Hitler in 'HU8QWHUJDQJ actually conforms to Schornagel’s portrayal (for instance, the shaking hand hidden behind Hitler’s back, the haunted look, fits of rage). 64 It is an interesting fact that the film built the story line around Hitler’s birthday. These occasions were regularly used by Goebbels to celebrate the Hitler myth (cf. chapter 2). In other words, even the film’s time setting seems to relive the making of the )KUHUwithout deconstructing it.

51 takes a deep breath, and raises his right hand – over and over again – to prove his point: he lives a life of an unmarried man as a sacrifice to the Germans, and he will fight to his death. The contemporary viewer experiences the materialization of the Hitler myth: the last image of Hitler is his face, angry, fiery eyes, and unflinching. “My existence is fighting,” he shouts. Wessel chose to represent Hitler mostly as the incarnation of evil, the seducer and )KUHU who will perish with the rest of the world. Likewise, Goebbels agitates against the Jews and dreams of the (QGVLHJ (National Socialism’s final victory). Harry, thought to be Goebbels, experiences the full extent of Nazi power when speaking in front of a large audience. One can argue that even scenes that mock Goebbels actually only reflect our traditional view of the propaganda minister: for instance, the film targets Goebbels’s sex life and drive repeatedly, yet Germans already joked about his numerous affairs during his lifetime (cf. chapter 2). In summary, in *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ, both Hitler and Goebbels’s portrayals conform to Germans’ current, mainstream conception of them as talented, mesmerizing, diabolical orators who came to power as a result of their speaking skills. Particularly in the case of Hitler, the film’s representation is another fictional materialization of the Hitler myth and, especially, the orator mytheme.

In 0HLQ)KUHU, Goebbels, played by Sylvester Groth who rightly won praise for his diabolical ironic performance, also mirrors Germans’ common image of the propaganda minister as “the man behind Hitler,” the “Brandstifter” (incendiary) or “Anstifter” (agitator). Gobbels’s eloquence ensures his power and dominance over other Nazi myrmidons who do not question his authority. Likewise, the film characterizes the propaganda minister as a philanderer.65 Consequently, the film does not attempt to debunk Germans’ traditional image of Goebbels. Although Helge Schneider represents Hitler as a fool throughout much of the film,66 the film emphasizes from the beginning

65 In the original version, Goebbels had an affair with Eva Braun. Levy cut this story line later on. 66 Many critics felt that the choice of Helge Schneider for the role of Hitler was not only a risky but an inappropriate choice (cf., for example, 3UHVVHVSLHJHO). Schneider is known for ballyhoo entertainment; in his performances, he combines music with slapstick comedy and has also made a variety of movies. Schneider’s work prompted a national debate about the (poor) state of German humour in the mid-nineties.

52 that this is not Hitler’s normal condition. In fact, the entire story line centers on the attempt to UHVWRUH Hitler to his former self as a skilled orator and, at the end, Hitler almost accomplishes this goal. At first, Hitler finds himself in a rather pitiful state; he suffers from low self-esteem and self-doubts, showing symptoms of mental illness. His ailing condition finds expression in his physical appearance: he is “[a] horrible sight. Sunken, lifeless and sad beyond belief” (35).67 His voice is “fragile” (35), and – instead of speaking clearly and dominantly – he imploringly whines for help. “I’m no longer the Führer,” admits Hitler (35). Indeed, he is unaware of his nation’s political situation and has no knowledge about his ministers’ activities. The request to deliver a speech on New

Year’s Day is thus forthright rejected by Hitler: “[EDUNVVXGGHQO\] No, I refuse to speak. By no means. The thousand-year Reich could fall a thousand times, as long as I’m not fit ...” (36). By portraying Hitler as speechless and, thus, powerless, the film, by implication, actually corroborates the notion that Hitler as a capable orator is also a strong leader. Moreover, Hitler gradually wins back his oratory skills and, hence, his confidence and physical well-being. Shortly before making the speech on New Year’s Day, Hitler, as a result of Grünbaum’s therapy, has “a healthy, bronzy look, his hairs placed and fixed accurately” (148). Simultaneously, he shows an increased interest in politics and begins to re-establish his authority over his immediate staff. In the end, Hitler loses his voice one more time, which results in Grünbaum speaking in place of the dictator. However, this incident should not be understood as a sign of a weakened speaker: after all, Hitler’s voice loss is due to a fit of rage, which suggests that he is his former powerful self again. Furthermore, when actually delivering the speech, Hitler has Grünbaum speaking in place of him but he is still the one who personifies the orator, and that with the aid of well-

While some felt that Schneider’s ballyhoo background therefore further contributed to trivializing Hitler, others believed that Schneider helped to deconstruct the dictator (cf. 3UHVVHVSLHJHO). (For readers who are unfamiliar with the film, it may be of interest to know that Schneider wore an extensive mask to look like Hitler.) 67 When quoting from the film 0HLQ)KUHU, I used Levy’s published script as well as the film’s English subtitles, which were provided by courtesy of Dani Levy.

53 known gestures. This speaker, however, mirrors Hitler’s traditional characterization as an orator and is thus also a reflection of the orator mytheme. The notion that oratory talent equals control – which is, of course, a central theme of the orator mytheme – is also substantiated by Goebbels’s portrayal. By suggesting that a Nazi in power is equivalent to a speaker in control,68 the film seems to validate what the orator mytheme has been signifying for the last seventy years.

To summarize, both *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU essentially depict both Hitler and Goebbels in line with the characteristics of the orator mytheme and as powerful speakers. Since Levy characterizes Hitler only in direct contrast to an authoritative orator, he does not convincingly question the orator mytheme but rather corroborates its validity. In the end, both films maintain the correlation between Nazi speech and power. The belief that Hitler and Goebbels possessed the ability to hypnotize their audiences is neither ridiculed nor debunked. By depicting oratory talent as a character trait (or a mytheme), both films moreover suggest that rhetorical success solely lies with the individual orator. This implies, however, that a speaker’s listeners have no influence on his rhetorical career. And, indeed, as the following section will show, both films fail to seriously question the role that the German audience played in Hitler and Goebbels’s (self-)portrayals as orators.

7KH$XGLHQFH

The previous conclusion does not imply that these films do not depict audiences. In fact, they include the well-known mass events in their plots. However, the way both tragicomedies represent Nazi followers reinforces common, yet questionable perceptions of the Nazi past and of the role that Nazi speechmaking played in Hitler’s rise to power. In either case, both films attribute seductive qualities to the respective speakers, yet say

68 The power of rhetoric is further emphasized by the fact that both Harry and Grünbaum experience victory over their captors when holding their speech.

54

little about the basic prerequisite of the audience’s =XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW, which is required to make any orator successful (cf. chapter 3). For example, the audiences in

*RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU are homogenous, always enthusiastic masses. Individual fascination and approval, or rejection and disagreement have no place in these scenes of mass enthrallment. The images of enthusiastically cheering people are reminiscent of the crowds depicted in Leni Riefenstahl’s films and commonly recycled in Knopp’s documentaries. They are another element of the orator mytheme that the filmmakers have simply adopted. 0HLQ )KUHU characterizes the audience as a crowd of smitten, imbecile people who – like lovelorn teenagers – enthusiastically yell “Heil Hitler! Heil Hitler! Heil Hitler!” (147) and, later as a result of Grünbaum’s instructions, “Heil myself!” (163).69 This scene, one can argue, implies that Germans followed Hitler irrespective of the contents of his speeches. The act of listening to Hitler the orator results in total indifference and unawareness; Goebbels aptly defines this as “staged reality”

(32). In *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, Goebbels, whilst wrongfully imprisoned and thought to be Harry, fails in raising support and enthusiasm from Hertha Haase, a fervent Nazi and wife of the concentration camp commander, when ranting about Jews: “Either Jews or ‘final victory.’ That’s all you ever think of! What has become of you, Harry?!” The exchange between Hertha and Goebbels implies that anti-Semitic baiting did not contribute to the Nazis’ success. Neither did Germans’ desire to win the war. The film suggests that Germans had no interest in this type of Nazi propaganda – a suggestion that mirrors one of the many reasons why the orator mytheme enjoys such great popularity in contemporary German culture. Consequently, *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU do not scrutinize the German public’s – and certainly not the individual’s – role in Hitler’s rise to power and their responsibility for the Holocaust. Both films provide no

69 Grünbaum’s instructions have ambiguous meaning in German. The word “Heil” in “Heil Hitler!” means that one wishes Hitler well and a long life; this address is reminiscent of traditional greetings used to honor kings. “Heil” is also the imperative of the verb “heilen,” which means “to heal.” The play on words is supposed to further ridicule the Nazis and may also be understood as Levy’s attempt to question the pathological fascination Germans had with Hitler.

55 explanations about the reasons why Germans were fascinated by the Nazi movement and, especially, Hitler’s speeches. It remains unclear why Germans gave their support to Hitler and his followers – indeed, both films imply that the German jubilations resulted from Hitler and Goebbels’s seducing qualities. By emphasizing Nazi speeches’ hypnotizing qualities and Germans’ ignorance as well as alleged unwillingness, both films suggest that the German people, in fact, were the Nazis’ first victims but not the origin of Nazi power and certainly not perpetrators.

Another scene in *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, which is also a reflection of the orator mytheme, further corroborates the previous conclusion (which hints at a certain reluctance to represent and analyze Germans’ accountability). While Harry is speaking to a spellbound audience, a sudden Allied bomb attack on Nürnberg forces everyone to flee in panic. This scene is problematic for two reasons: the representation of the audience and the depiction of the bombers. First, the group of fleeing Germans are mostly comprised of women and children, which is again reminiscent of Riefenstahl and Knopp’s images of cheering, intoxicated females with their kids. In the context of the bomb attack, these Germans, thought to be the most vulnerable and innocent citizens, are literally victimized twice: they are hypnotized by the wrong Goebbels and then bombarded by the Allies. In other words, the bombing seems to emphasize what the orator mytheme already symbolizes: Germans are more victims than perpetrators. This implication is perhaps further substantiated by the fact that Wessel relies on historic footage to portray the air raid.70 The inclusion of actual material lends authenticity to this aspect of the story line. As a result, the film, in the context of a Nazi speech, depicts the German public foremost as victims, and not as perpetrators.

70 This is the only scene that is depicted with such material.

56

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Lastly, both *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU do not dismantle Nazi speechmaking because both films – in their effort to ridicule Nazis and their ideology – fail to expose Nazi language. In both tragicomedies, the attempt to scrutinize Nazi lingo is doomed to failure as Nazi terms and agitation are often carelessly repeated, yet not confronted and unmasked. In order to explicate this argument, especially in view of the following discussion of other representations of the orator mytheme in contemporary 71 German culture, it is helpful to draw on Charlie Chaplin’s 7KH *UHDW 'LFWDWRU, which 72 clearly served both directors as a source of inspiration. Chaplin’s 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU is one of the most felicitous satires of the orator mytheme and its diverse attributes. In the film, its protagonist Adenoid Hynkel – a brilliant mockery of Hitler – is introduced by closing in on him from behind while he agitatedly speaks to a large crowd. Chaplin, as Hynkel, mimics Hitler’s body language, imitates his use of arms and hands, and ingeniously mocks his speech pattern by uttering guttural, mostly unintelligible and alienated German sounds that are nonetheless reminiscent of Hitlerian language.73 As a result of rendering Hynkel’s speech mostly meaningless, Chaplin evades the risk of re- circulating Nazi propaganda and of giving National Socialism a platform. Yet, by simultaneously keeping it characteristic of Hitler, Hynkel’s statements and diction remain a symbol of Nazi aggression. A case in point for this correlation between Nazi rhetoric and actual violence is the depiction of the persecution of Jews. Chaplin highlights the interconnectedness between speech and action by showing storm troopers harassing

71 Chaplin’s film was not publicly shown in Germany until 1946 (Lindner 83), and it was not widely distributed until the late 1950s. 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU did not enjoy success with its German audience until its re-release during the 1970s (cf. Krämer). Only the first Hitler wave made a rediscovery possible. 72 Levy calls Chaplin, as well as Lubitsch, “his intellectual fathers” (“Dani Levy” 177). Ulrich Mühe admits that Wessel and he himself saw role models in Chaplin, Lubitsch, and Roberto Benigni. 73 The innate likeness between Hitler and Chaplin already provided topics of conversation during both men’s lifetimes. Both were of the same age and symbolized the “little man,” a role that their moustaches expressed best (cf. Lindner 87).

57 inhabitants of the Ghetto immediately after Hynkel’s public appearance.74 At the end of the film, Chaplin explicitly debunks Nazi rhetoric as well as the functions speeches had in Hitler’s regime when he steps out of his role as the victimized Jewish barber and directly addresses the film’s real-life audience asking them to speak out against National Socialism and its leader. Claudia Schmölders describes this final speech, which is often called “Look up, Hannah”-speech, as “cathartic,” at least compared to Hynkel’s (+LWOHU¶V

)DFH 157). Ultimately, Chaplin, by exposing the connection between rhetoric and action without reiterating Nazi jargon, and by countering Hitler with a speech that preaches the opposite of Nazi ideology, directly attacks and unmasks Nazi language and challenges the orator mytheme.75 While both Wessel and Levy’s representations of Hitler the orator are reminiscent of Hynkel, they clearly differ from Chaplin’s performance insofar as Nazi speech is always intelligible in both tragicomedies. Neither film attempts to imitate Hynkel’s guttural, garbled jargon. Consequently, there is the danger of reiterating Nazi propaganda without contextualizing and deconstructing it. In other words, contemporary films may – although unintentionally – circulate, substantiate, or introduce certain dubious beliefs. By carelessly using Nazi language and by not explicating Nazi terminology, such films may

74 Of course, these observations do not imply that Chaplin’s representations of the Ghetto and the persecution of Jews correspond with the reality of Jewish life in the Third Reich. Chaplin also acknowledged this by stating that he would not have filmed 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU if he had known about the genocide of the European Jews (cf. Lindner 96). Yet, as Sander Gilman points out, 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU “presents a critique of Fascist racism that historically prefigures the Shoah” (287). Consequently, “[n]o reference to the Shoah is possible in such films” (Gilman 287). While the film obviously could not depict the Holocaust, it does capture Nazi aggression, their rhetoric, and the atmosphere of fear that were significant components leading up to the extermination of the Jews. Chaplin set out to expose Fascist racism and, in particular, Hitler, a goal he, for example, accomplished by focusing on the orator mytheme. In regards to this mytheme, Chaplin certainly managed to give a glimpse of the interconnectedness between Nazi rhetoric and violence, which escalated in later years. Cf. also Kopperschmidt, “War Hitler” 199. 75 Chaplin did what he requested from his listeners: he candidly took a stand against the Nazi regime. In real life, Chaplin had to face Nazi supporters who hoped to prevent the filming and distribution of the 7KH

*UHDW'LFWDWRU (Lipman 89). He also became increasingly politically involved in the fight against Hitler after producing 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU and enjoying success with the film (Lindner 84). One may also argue that Chaplin’s refusal to clarify rumours about his alleged Jewish ancestry represents a form of confrontation with the Nazi regime, which frequently used the director as a scapegoat in their anti-Semitic propaganda.

58 foster misleading ideas about the Nazi past and actually contribute to the emergence of a more positive image of this era and, especially, Hitler while failing to provide the necessary historical background. A survey conducted by Wilhelm Hofmann and Anna

Baumert showed that people judged Hitler in more favourable terms after viewing 0HLQ 76 )KUHU (142; cf. Baumert, Hofmann, & Blum 49, 51). Interestingly, this was particularly the case if viewers’ political attitudes belonged to the right-wing spectrum (Hofmann & Baumert 142; Baumert, Hofmann, & Blum 49, Fig. 1 on page 49, 52).77 Their level of education also influenced people’s perception of the dictator: “Participants with high-school diplomas indicated fewer positive feelings toward Hitler than participants without high-school diplomas” (Baumert, Hofmann & Blum 49).78 The study also concluded that the film did not give its audience reasons to further learn about the Nazi past (Hofmann & Baumert 143). As a result of these possible effects of films, one can argue that Nazi language should be handled with care. If it is made use of, such terminology should be contextualized and deconstructed. In view of incidents such as the re-use of one of Hitler’s sayings by fire fighters (cf. chapter 3), it is likely that there still exists a lot of ignorance about Nazi terminology – members of the fire department as well as many others appeared to have been unaware of the motto’s origin (Meiritz & Wittrock). Unfortunately, both Wessel and Levy fail in their attempts to debunk Nazi language through humour.

A case in point is the rendition of the Madagascar Plan in 0HLQ )KUHU. The Madagascar Plan describes the Nazi government’s idea to relocate by force millions of European Jews to the African island. This proposal was one of many considerations that

76 The authors come to the same conclusion regarding the effect of 'HU8QWHUJDQJ (Hofmann & Baumert 142). Moreover, less-patriotic viewers tended to agree with the statement that “Hitler is a human being like everyone else” after viewing the film, while people with a similar attitude in the control group were strongly opposed to this assessment (138). 77 The fact that these contemporary films find favour with groups from right-wing scenes is probably best demonstrated by their interest in 'HU8QWHUJDQJ. A number of neo-Nazis took the opportunity to play a part in the film as extras and enjoyed “‘the authentic atmosphere’” and Hitler’s handshake (“Als Hitler mir”). 78 The analysis of viewers’ understanding of Hitler after seeing 'HU8QWHUJDQJ moreover showed that the lesser the educational level of the audience the more they were affected by the film (138).

59

dealt with the so-called -XGHQIUDJH (Jewish Question) and presented an apparent solution for the Nazis to deport Europe’s Jews. 0HLQ )KUHU makes reference to the Madagascar plan on two occasions. First, a revitalized Hitler admits to an aggrieved Grünbaum: The Final Solution of the Jewish Question was not completely my idea. I had other plans. Why not send the Jews to the desert? Madagascar, for example. (125)

In this scene, Hitler is represented as having only limited authority and control over governmental affairs and, more significantly, over the course of the (QGO|VXQJ (Final Solution). In view of this characterization, one can argue that Levy’s Hitler suggests that the Madagascar scenario would have been an acceptable, life-saving alternative to the

(QGO|VXQJ but that he was unable to implement his ideas. The film repeatedly emphasizes the notion that Hitler’s priority was not the extermination of the Jews. Not Hitler, but Goebbels and Himmler are in charge of the Holocaust. While Goebbels and other Nazis hate the Jewish professor with a vengeance, Hitler develops a friendship with Grünbaum. The dictator orders Grünbaum and his family’s return from the concentration camp Sachsenhausen and, later on, frees the professor’s wife and children. Hitler does not kill Grünbaum and is “full of pain” in the face of the latter’s death (164). In his final speech at the end of the film, Grünbaum picks up Hitler’s words: “But do we have to do this [exterminate the Jews]? Why did we not send them to Madagascar where the Negroes would have had to put up with them? No, it was an absolute necessity, the final solution!” (160).79 Grünbaum’s statement in connection with Hitler’s earlier remark implies that

Madagascar would have been a more humane alternative to the (QGO|VXQJ. Most likely, Levy included both Hitler and Grünbaum’s remark about Madagascar to create comic relief. It is perhaps an attempt to bring out the “comedic potential” of Hitler’s “babble” (“Director’s Point” 213). Utilizing Nazi terminology in

79 Interestingly, the English script, which I have on hand, does not feature this part. (The quote is thus my own translation.) The script also depicts a more supportive German audience who cheers Hitler on by calling “Go on!” Most likely, a comparative analysis would result in finding further discrepancies. Such a detailed examination, however, goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

60 such a way, namely without contextualizing it historically, is problematic for more than one reason. First, one can assume that the majority of Levy’s audience is unaware of the significance that the term “Madagascar” denoted within the Nazi regime.80 This assumption seems to be safe to make, since, in the year 2000, approximately three million Germans were already unaware of the meaning of Auschwitz (Silbermann & Stoffers 48). At that time, every fifth German teenager, that is 21.9 %, was unable to answer the question “Who or what is Auschwitz?” (Silbermann & Stoffers 50). In view of the ubiquity of the Holocaust in contemporary Germany, this knowledge gap is certainly surprising. It suggests, however, that far more Germans would not be able to respond correctly to the question “What is the Madagascar Plan?”81 If one assumes that most viewers of 0HLQ)KUHU have no knowledge of the historical dimension of this issue, they will, in all probability, believe that Hitler’s comment is indeed just “chitchat” – a perception that Grünbaum’s final words almost certainly substantiate. Hence, Levy runs the risk of not only trivializing the role of the Madagascar Plan but also of Hitler’s responsibility for the Holocaust. In case one has no idea about the meaning of Madagascar, one may come to the conclusion that the Jews’ deportation to the African island may have prevented the Jewish genocide. Besides implying that the Madagascar Plan may have been a reasonable option, both Hitler and Grünbaum’s comments moreover entail that this particular Nazi 82 policy and the (QGO|VXQJ share no connection. However, these ideas downplay the

80 I would like to point out that I believe that Levy’s viewers have mostly no idea about the Madagascar proposal but that this assessment certainly does not include Levy himself. 81 The assumption that most people are unaware of the Madagascar Plan is, for instance, corroborated by a review written by a non-professional reviewer who saw the need to point out its historic truth: “he [Hitler] suggests that the plan to deport the Jews to Madagascar (which was an actual proposal) . . .” (Grabfelder).

In a way, Levy also suggests that Germans need more educational enlightenment about the Nazi past: 0HLQ

)KUHU ends with interviews of Germans who share their knowledge and ignorance about Hitler (and Grünbaum). The film’s production company also provides educational material for the movie (Conrad). 82 cf., for example, Raul Hilberg who demonstrates the similarities and relationship between the

Madagascar Plan and the (QGO|VXQJ (416-421). Since the war with France prevented the Nazis from gaining access to the island, the (QGO|VXQJ – from the Nazi regime’s point of view – represented the next, logical step.

61 impact that the execution of this proposal would most likely have had on European Jews as well as the historical realities: “[t]he Madagascar Plan already reveals the real plans of the National Socialists, which were soon implemented with the ‘Endlösung’” (Gutman et al. 917). As they later orchestrated the deportations and killings in the camps, SS-guards were also supposed to realize and oversee the resettlement and newly established “Island Ghetto.” The climate, the habitat, and the infrastructure would have presented a drastic change for European Jews as well. The consequences such a relocation would have had on the Jewish population were (and are) not foreseeable – not to mention the fate of Madagascar’s native population (the “Negroes,” in Grünbaum’s words). Instead of being a separate operation from the Holocaust, the Madagascar Plan must rather be understood as one, even decisive step toward the realization of the extermination of Europe’s Jews. While it is true that this Nazi project is primarily based on the premise of expatriation, its outcome, of course, cannot be known. The implication that a resettlement to Africa would not have resulted in similar results as the (QGO|VXQJ ultimately has is a rather questionable way of causing laughter. This supposedly comic appropriation makes the Madagascar Plan appear harmless.83 Furthermore, the way in which Levy makes use of the Madagascar Plan belittles Hitler’s responsibility for the Holocaust, since it downplays the danger this relocation would have posed for Jewish lives as well as Hitler’s eliminatory intentions. The historical Hitler was certainly not interested in saving Jews when abandoning the Madagascar project; he only worried about the well-being of the German military

(Hilberg 417). In 0HLQ )KUHU, Hitler is, however, portrayed as a friend and saviour of

83 The following observations of one moviegoer illustrate why such a trivialization is problematic and objectionable: “I found the reactions of the audience oppressive, which demonstrated that, for many, the image of the Jew has not changed since 1933, how much hatred and rejection still exists and one is still inclined to rather expatriate him [the Jew] to Madagascar” (Roberto). One indeed does not need to know the meaning of Madagascar to secretly agree with the idea that this would be a good solution and also a place where foreigners, in this case Jews, really belong. The term “Madagascar” then works as a general site: it mirrors slogans like “Let’s send the Turks back to Turkey” or “Ausländer raus!” (Foreigners Out!). The message is always the same: non-Germans have no right to stay in Germany.

62 the Jews; he is the only friendly and humane Nazi (cf. p. 55). When taking the overall depiction of Hitler as well as his light-hearted comments about Madagascar in consideration, the film implies that Hitler had no crucial role in the Holocaust. This characterization reflects on Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal that he was not aware of criminal activities by his Nazi inferiors and that he was indeed the protector of the weak and poor (cf. chapter 2).84 In conclusion, Levy’s use of the Madagascar Plan and Hitler’s personal friendship with Grünbaum trivialize the responsibility of Hitler and thus validate the positive elements of the myth. It also alludes to a common German claim that one – just by listening to Hitler – could not have known about the eliminatory plans of the Nazis or even anticipated any violence against Jews. By failing to historically contextualize the Madagascar proposal and by downplaying Hitler’s hatred of Jews, 0HLQ

)KUHU utilizes Nazi language without debunking it. By not calling Nazi speech and Hitler’s secrecy about the extermination of the Jews into question, Levy permits Nazi propaganda to circulate uncontextualized and even – to some degree and most likely unintentionally – lends support to Nazi rhetoric.85

*RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ features a comparable approach in its attempt to debunk

Nazi language but, like 0HLQ )KUHU, ultimately only echoes and corroborates anti- Semitic propaganda. In fact, both Hitler and Goebbels’s statements generally mirror their historical role models’ manner of speaking as represented and materialized in the orator mytheme. On the one hand, they mostly rant angrily about the despicable, treacherous

Jews and Germany’s (QGVLHJ and make other such belligerent comments. On the other hand, they kindly chat with children (Goebbels) or about them (Hitler). Since their film language basically conforms to Germans’ traditional image of these leaders’ speaking

84 In an “online” discussion between two friends, one of them speaks of similar associations: Hitler’s portrayal reminded him of the well-known saying “If only the )KUHU knew about that!” (Otto). 85 There is, of course, also the scenario that 0HLQ)KUHU’s audience is familiar with the meaning of the Madagascar reference. Since the viewer is then certainly aware of its trivialization, one can assume that most people tend not to laugh about this reference; it is simply not funny. This assumption is, for example, corroborated by the reaction of Otto and Grabfelder. Most reviewers criticized Levy for trivializing Hitler

(cf. 3UHVVHVSLHJHO).

63 style, Hitler and Goebbels in Wessel’s tragicomedy do not unmask the orator mytheme through their own characterization. Consequently, the film has to challenge these Nazi leaders’ statements through the portrayal of other characters and the story line in general. Wessel mainly attempts to do so by utilizing the popular Nazi stereotype that Jews stink; this Nazi prejudice, of course, implies that Aryans smell good, a notion the film also picks up. By questioning the validity of this propagandistic stereotype, the film also tries to undermine Hitler and Goebbels’s anti-Semitic speech and attitudes. Ultimately – as the following analysis will demonstrate, the film fails in debunking this particular stereotypical Jewish characterization and, thus, also in dismantling Hitler and Goebbels’s racial, hateful language. In order to show the problematic implications inherent in the attempt to deconstruct this stereotype through humour, I will first turn to Ernst Hiemer’s anti-

Semitic children’s book 'HU *LIWSLO] HLQ 6WUPHUEXFK IU -XQJ XQG $OW (The Poisonous Mushroom: a Stürmer book for the Young and the Young at Heart) published in 1938.

Hiemer’s book, which was illustrated by the 6WUPHU’s most notorious cartoonist Philip Rupprecht,86 is a selection of anti-Semitic stories that instruct children about the dangers of Jews, the so-called “Jewish toadstools.” Sixty-thousand copies of 'HU *LIWSLO] were printed in its first year of publication, and Hiemer’s book soon became teaching material in German schools. “Just as it is often hard to tell a toadstool from an edible mushroom, so too it is often very hard to recognize the Jew as a swindler and criminal...,” the mother 87 of young Franz begins her instructions in 'HU *LIWSLO]. While being on a mushroom foray with her son – of course, in one of Germany’s rather idyllic forests, as pictures and accompanying text emphasize – the mother of young Franz lectures her son about “the devil in human form”: “Just as a single poisonous mushroom can kill a whole family, so a

86 The 6WUPHU was an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper published by Julius Streicher. It was also a publishing house. 87 The copy of Hiemer’s book, including translations, that I will be using is online available at the German Propaganda Archive at . Page numbers are not given.

64 solitary Jew can destroy a whole village, a whole city, even an entire Volk [people].” In order to fight the “Jewish menace,” “German youth must learn to recognise the Jewish poison-mushroom.” Recognition, however, often proves challenging because Jews disguise their real identity, just as poisonous mushrooms mimic edible ones. Hiemer’s

'HU *LIWSLO] aims to shed light on “the many shapes the Jew assumes” and instructs its readers about alleged Jewish characteristics, for example distinctive physical features, by which one can apparently recognize any Jew, even in disguise. Observant readers, for example, learn that “Jews often have an unpleasant sweetish odor. If you have a good nose, you can smell the Jews.” As experienced gatherers can differentiate mushrooms by their distinct smell, trained Nazis can seemingly also tell apart Jews and gentiles based on their body odour. Knowing one’s native mushrooms – in other words, being able to identify the “Jewish toadstool” prospering in the midst of German society – is an essential skill that every good Nazi must master, as 'HU*LIWSLO] repeatedly stresses.

In *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ, Magda Goebbels emerges as the one Nazi who finally exposes Harry’s scheme by similar means than the ones described by Hiemer in 'HU

*LIWSLO]. Like 'HU*LIWSLO]’s introduction, Wessel’s tragicomedy begins with a mushroom hunt. On April 17, 1944, the cheerful Goebbels family, along with their SS cohort, takes pleasure in an excursion to the vernal German countryside. When Goebbels and his son emerge from a hike through Germany’s woods, triumphantly holding their magnificent find, an enormous parasol mushroom, Magda greets them happily: “The Führer makes everything grow, even the parasol mushroom at Easter.” “A giant,” exclaims her husband, looking proudly down on his wife and daughters who, all dressed in white, sing a hymn for Hitler in the midst of blossoming meadows. While one can assume that this scene is mostly a reference to Goebbels’s shortness as well as his sex life, which were both common objects of ridicule during the Third Reich (cf. chapter 2) and are prevalent themes throughout the film, the mushroom incident – in view of 'HU*LIWSLO] – allows for quite another, less amusing interpretation. Besides commenting on Goebbels’s deficient size and hyperactive sex drive, this episode moreover introduces the Goebbels family as

65 connoisseurs of mushrooms – and, by implication, as experts on German and Jewish identity. Before Magda eventually applies her nose to convict Harry of his fraud, the issue of Jewishness and gentileness is raised by Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler’s personal photographer, and SS Adjutant Brenneisen as well as Harry’s concentration camp doctor in the film early on. All believe in the possibility of differentiating between Jews – that is Harry – and gentiles – that is Goebbels – based on their specific body odour. Shortly after Harry successfully assumes Goebbels’s place, Brenneisen voices the concern that the minister in the back of his car may not be the real Goebbels but his doppelganger. Hitler’s personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, puts Brenneisen’s mind at ease: “I can smell a Jew at a distance of 200 yards. And if this is a Jew I’ll move into a concentration camp.” Likewise, sniffing Goebbels, the doctor dismisses Goebbels’s claim that he indeed is the propaganda minister with the following statement: “Harry, I can smell a Jew at a distance of 100 yards. And you are one.” Since both Hoffmann and the doctor are mistaken in their assessment of Harry and, respectively, Goebbels’s identity, the film seemingly ridicules the notion that body odours of Jews and gentiles are distinctly different. However, one can argue that the film subverts its own attempt to undermine this particular Nazi stereotype by its portrayal of Magda Goebbels. In contrast to Hoffmann and the doctor, Magda Goebbels is not deceived by her sense of smell. Goebbels’s wife detects slight oddities in Harry’s behaviour and soon suspects her husband’s doppelganger of foul play. Body odour becomes the means of detection. The very first time Magda meets Harry, which takes place a day after the latter has managed to escape from the camp, she noisily smells at him. Her facial features show her discontent with the encountered odour. “He smelled so strange,” Magda confesses to Eva Braun right away. When thereupon confronting Harry with his real identity, Magda says: “Did you really

66 think you could deceive me? You stink like a concentration camp!”88 Ultimately, Magda Goebbels’s fine nose and Harry’s apparent Jewish body odour prove to be the deciding factors that result in the discovery of Harry’s doppelganger status. The theory of good- smelling Germans and bad-smelling Jews is further strengthened by Harry who awakes from Magda’s comforting, fragrant odour. Although the film features two scenes in which the correlation between Jewishness and odour is certainly questioned, it eventually proves this anti-Semitic theory because Magda is right in her assessment of Harry’s identity. Since Magda embodies the ideal female Nazi,89 her correct statements weigh certainly more than the wrong observations of two minor Nazis who moreover stand out by making other, rather silly comments. The fact that the film ends on this note and that Harry’s remark lends support to Magda’s assertions prevents a deconstruction of Nazi language. In the end, a keen sense of smell can indeed differentiate between odorant

Germans and malodorous Jews, just as Hiemer’s *LIWSLO] has claimed all along. *RHEEHOV

XQG *HGXOGLJ horribly fails in dismantling anti-Semitic propaganda and, thus, in debunking Nazi speech. It may, in fact, trivialize the significance such stereotypical concepts had in the Third Reich.

88 One can argue that the statement “You stink like a concentration camp!” does not logically and exclusively refer to Jews, since the sentence in itself has no reference to Jewishness and people of other religious and ethnical backgrounds were also incarcerated in Nazi camps. However, I believe firmly – for a number of reasons – that it is far more likely that a German audience would associate this statement with the subject matter of Jewish identity. First, any previous references dealing with odour and identity in the film were directly related to Harry and, explicitly, addressed the connection between smell and Jewishness (this remains the case even if this particular stereotype turned out not to be true in these scenes). Secondly, as mentioned, Magda’s first impression of Harry is his smell. Thirdly, Magda accuses Harry of fraud immediately prior to uttering her camp remark. The image of the treacherous Jew is, of course, another Jewish stereotype – one that the Nazis used abundantly. Fourthly, Germans generally associate Nazi camps (“Lager”) with Jewish inmates. Almost eighty-eight percent of participants responded “Jews” to the question “Which groups of people were brought into concentration camps?” in Silbermann and Stoffers’s survey (67). The next group that followed was “dissidents and oppositionals,” which only 21.8 % of subjects named (67). These results corroborate the assumption that most Germans associated camps with Jewish inmates. For these reasons, I think one can certainly read Magda’s comment as another reference to Jewishness. 89 Magda and Joseph Goebbels with their six children form a special unit in the film: they are the poster family of the Nazi movement and the most outspoken anti-Semites. They are Germans’ role models, which is exemplified by the admiring reactions of the concentration camp commander and his wife as well as their six (!) children.

67

In conclusion, both 0HLQ)KUHU and *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ miss the opportunity to demythologize the orator mytheme in detail. In both tragicomedies, the relationship between power and oratory skills remains intact, which is best expressed in Hitler and Goebbels’s body language and speech. The Nazi protagonists’ oratory talent is also found in themselves rather than bestowed by others. Their audiences do not seem to contribute much to their rhetorical success other than constant cheering, and they also do not support these speakers because of Nazi ideology. The two filmmakers’ attempts to unmask Nazi language and ideology clearly backfire as Wessel and Levy ridicule but do not dismantle Nazi concepts effectually. In both films, joking about Nazis certainly reaches its limit when anti-Semitism becomes the target of ridicule. On the one hand, both filmmakers hope to expose the absurdity that is inherent in Nazi ideology. On the other, they want to avoid trivializing anti-Semitism and the consequences it had for millions of Jews. Unfortunately, both tragicomedies generally fail to find a (comical) balance between these different aspects and do not realize their producers’ intention – in the end, the films’ humour is incapable of debunking the orator mytheme and all it entails.

,FKKRFNLQPHLQHP%RQNHU

In his first comic about Adolf, the Nazi pig, German writer Walter Moers explains that Hitler is the perfect protagonist for a comic-strip artist, “because Adolf Hitler is so easy to draw. One only needs six small ingredients: nose, eyes, mouth, moustache, ear, 90 hairdo” ($GROI ± bFK ELQ ZLHGHU GD (Adolf – I’m back) 1). There seems to be some truth to this assessment, since, in 2006, Moers’s third adventure of Adolf, who has returned to Europe after fifty years of hiding in Germany’s sewer system, was released –

90 Moers’s list of ingredients is accompanied by the respective drawings to clarify his point (and to create his protagonist).

68

91 along with the animated song ,FK KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU. With regard to the orator mytheme, Moers’s video clip, which he created in collaboration with musical cabaret artist Thomas Pigor, offers further insight into the way Hitler is portrayed in present-day

German humour. ,FK KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU gained most of its popularity on the Internet.92 As a result, it was eventually released as a single and even made it into the German music charts. The clip features Moers’s cartoon Hitler in the washroom of his bunker contemplating about (non-)capitulation. Naked Adolf, while sitting on the toilet and, later on, sharing a bath with his German shepherd Blondi, sings about “cyanide capsules,” the military status quo, and his prospects for the future: “the Luftwaffe is kaput, the Messerschmitt is afar, the Second World War isn’t fun anymore, surrender, no, it’s not my cup of tea.” Little rubber ducks with Hitler faces respond in unison: “Adolf, you bloody Nazi pig, won’t you finally capitulate.” The clip ends with Hitler expressing hopes about Germany’s still possible (QGVLHJ. Over the past years, Moers has been repeatedly criticized for reducing Hitler, and, by implication, his actions, to a laughing stock. At the same time, he has also received praise for humanizing and unmasking the dictator. Moers’s animated Adolf personifies this twofold perception as well. As a result of this two-sided characterization, Moers only partially demythologizes Hitler – an observation that Moers’s representation of the orator

91 In 1997, Moers created his Adolf for a short story, which was published in Germany’s leading satiric magazine 7LWDQLF. The first volume,$GROI±bFKELQZLHGHUGD, narrates Hitler’s return to present-day

Germany where the country’s modern lifestyle takes its toll on Adolf; the second comic, $GROI±bFKELQ

VFKRQZLHGHUGD (Adolf 2 – I’m already back again!) (1999), continues to narrate about Hitler’s rather awkward experiences. The third one, $GROI'HU%RQNHU(LQH7UDJLNRP|GLHLQGUHL$NWHQ (Adolf. The Bunker. A Tragicomedy in three Acts) (2006), differs from the first two comics insofar as it is written like a play. The book features, besides the video clip (including a karaoke version), the option to create finger puppets, which one can detach from the book. Moers’s protagonist must survive numerous adventures, which take him all across the world. He meets modern celebrities, like Michael Jackson and Prince, he has several awkward sexual encounters, and either saves or (almost) destroys the world. The first part was particularly successful. Rosenfeld reports that the first two volumes sold over 400,000 in only two years (cf. 267), which is quite amazing for a comic book. Moers’s seems to have been able to realize his primary goal to profit financially from ridiculing Hitler (cf. Jung 239; Rosenfeld 262). 92 Taking different video sharing websites into account, ,FKKRFNLQPHLQHP%RQNHU has been viewed close to six million times to date. The clip became so popular that Pigor also uploaded an English and, later on, a French version.

69 mytheme illustrates. In addition to the comic books, the animated Adolf also has an audible voice, namely Thomas Pigor’s. While the comics portray Hitler with a thick jolly Austrian accent, Pigor’s rendering is not reminiscent of Hitler’s original voice nor his dialect. In fact, Hitler sounds like “the next door neighbour,” and a friendly one at that. This is also the case because Moers – as the previously quoted verses exemplify – does not rely on Nazi language to characterize his Adolf. The fact that this animated Hitler sings is certainly of significance as well, since it contradicts any common sound recording of Hitler that we are generally exposed to. Normally, the orating )KUHU shouts, yells, and rants. By stripping Hitler of his voice, style of speaking, and rhetoric, Moers dismantles the )KUHU’s power and appeal as an orator.

Adolf’s gestures, however, still evoke our conventional idea of the )KUHU – and, in fact, not just of Hitler but of Hitler the orator. Moers’s Adolf folds his arm while standing in front of the mirror, shakes his – notorious – right hand while sitting on the toilet, and bangs the right fist into the bath water so that the look-a-like rubber ducks sink to the bottom of the tub. All the while, he sings about refusing to capitulate and fumes about the Allies, bombs, and Churchill. Although these gestures are clearly imitations of Hitler’s orator posture and body language, they certainly do not have the same effect on the viewer. First, as already indicated, Moers deconstructs Hitler’s voice, speaking style, and language. Secondly, Adolf literally has no visual resemblance with Hitler other than those “six small ingredients” (Moers, $GROI±bFKELQZLHGHUGD 1) – the moustache and hairdo guarantee that Moers’s audience recognizes his cartoon figure as Hitler. More importantly, Adolf’s nakedness is a stark contrast to traditional, authentic images of Hitler in uniform and leather coat as well as are the surroundings in which he utters his complaints. Instead of speaking in a stadium, Moers’s Hitler delivers his speech singing in his private bathroom. In contrast to cheering, mesmerized masses of Germans, Adolf has only one loyal listener, namely Blondi, and, apart from that, a number of non- agreeing rubber ducks. Ultimately, Moers humanizes Hitler and, thus, demythologizes him, since his Adolf possesses none of the typical, audio-visual elements of the orator mytheme. They are either non-existent in the first place, or Moers twists the meaning of

70 these features right around. Adolf, the Nazi pig, is certainly – at no time during the clip – a personification or even reflection of Hitler as the incarnation of absolute evil.

Like his previous portrayals of Hitler, Moers’s ,FK KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU, however, is problematic insofar as it not only humanizes Hitler but essentially also trivializes him. Moers not only does not include any Nazi language but the clip also contains no reference to the Holocaust or other atrocities committed by Germans. While one can praise Moers for choosing not to portray Hitler in terms of absolute evil, one can certainly question the total absence of issues and events that lie at the core of National Socialism and distinguish the Third Reich from other historic periods. In this regard, Moers’s Adolf is the complete materialization of Rentschler’s “imaginary signifier, a sign with an uncertain referent” (188). By ascribing character traits and behaviour to Hitler that resemble a stubborn child, Moers downplays Hitler’s actual obstinacy, which guided his decisions and, thus, led to a prolongation of the war as well as to more unnecessary suffering, killing, and dying. While Adolf makes no reference at all to the Holocaust, the clip certainly depicts Hitler’s – that is Germans’ – distress.93 The war, which provides the setting for Moers’s story line, is a war in which Allies attack Germany; Hitler and, hence, Germany are not depicted as the aggressors. Moreover, since Hitler has no German audience, Moers ignores another important aspect of Hitler’s rise to power. One can argue that he acknowledges Germans’ participation in the form of the rubber ducks that look like Hitler. However, while this may be the recognition that many Germans were also “little” Hitlers, the emphasis is on the past tense: at this time, they call Adolf “pig” and implore him to capitulate. This idea reflects on Germans’ contemporary understanding of the final days of the Third Reich; it does not, however, portray the relationship between Germans and Hitler in all its complex aspects. For all these reasons,

93 In view of not mentioning the Shoah, Moers’s choice to have Adolf sing “I’ve got cyanide capsules and plenty gasoline” adds to the problematic portrayal of Hitler and emphasizes the omission of the Holocaust.

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Moers fails in debunking the orator mytheme in its entirety and essentially belittles Hitler’s role in the Third Reich. In summary, Moers, on the one hand, successfully demythologizes Hitler the orator by turning him into the singing Adolf who, as a result of this characterization, also represents the little man. On the other hand, the depiction of Hitler in ,FKKRFNLQPHLQHP

%RQNHU trivializes his responsibility and the influence he had on the Nazi regime and its activities. In the end, the second portrayal prevails, and Gavriel Rosenfeld’s assessment of the first two Moers’s comics seems also to apply to the clip (as well as the third book): “Moers shrinks him [Hitler] down to the status of a buffoonish schlemiel, whose bumblings and misadventures the reader can readily empathize with” (263). Being able to relate to Moers’s Hitler may start with activities such as singing while taking a bath and end with feelings of pity for a )KUHU who is being attacked by the Allies. As a result of Moers’s belittling characterization of Hitler as well as the absence of any of the main characteristics of the orator mytheme, one is ultimately left with the question why Hitler became the myth, the mesmerizing powerful speaker, he has been since he entered Germany’s political and cultural life decades ago.

:LWWPDQQ6RPXQFX WKH)URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO

The following section will then take a closer look at Florian Wittmann’s +LWOHU

/HDVLQJ (2005). Afterwards, Serdar Somuncu’s cabaret shows $XV GHP 7DJHEXFK HLQHV

0DVVHQP|UGHUV ± 0HLQ .DPSI and -RVHSK *RHEEHOV 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH ³:ROOW

LKU GHQ WRWDOHQ.ULHJ"´ as well as the satirical group )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO, which was founded in 2004, will be discussed. Unlike *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ )KUHU as well as Moers, these instances of humour are more successful in reaching their goal of exposing Hitler and Goebbels, respectively, and of questioning today’s

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU through ridicule. One can argue that they succeed in their attempts to demythologize for the reasons that Wessel, Levy, and, to a lesser extent, Moers fail: they attack the relationship between Hitler and his audience, question the significance of Nazis’ (self-)portrayal as eloquent speakers, and deconstruct Nazi language.

72

+LWOHU/HDVLQJ

Since being released on

Riefenstahl’s 7ULXPSIRIWKH:LOO, which depicts Hitler speaking in front of a large crowd, and combined these images with an audio excerpt from Gerhard Polt’s cabaret piece “Die Hölle” (The Hell).94 The remixed clip shows an irritated Hitler ranting about his car leasing contract with the company Ismeier as well as about the following lawsuit.95

While +LWOHU /HDVLQJ features the well-known images of a shouting, wildly gesticulating Hitler – and therefore evokes the same familiar anticipations in its viewer, Polt’s monologue quickly undermines these expectations. Like Chaplin, Wittmann therefore does not rely on Nazi ideologically charged language to debunk Hitler. Consequently, he does not run the risk of repeating anti-Semitic propaganda without deconstructing it. However, despite avoiding original Nazi speech, Wittmann exposes Hitler through the interaction between images and language, which demythologize our common perceptions of both Hitler’s rhetoric as well as use of body language. Polt’s monologue substantiates and, simultaneously, contradicts Riefenstahl’s images.

94 Polt is a cabaret artist from Bavaria. His targets of ridicule often include Bavarian society and lifestyle as well as issues concerning Sweden (Polt studied Scandinavian Studies). He has received several awards for his work. Wittmann used approximately the first two minutes of Polt’s seven-minute piece “Die Hölle.” After his rant about the car leasing contract with the company Ismeier – the part that Wittmann used – Polt continues his harangue by railing at the general degeneration of mankind, the absence of religion and knowledge in contemporary society, and the failings of the church. Although Wittmann only concentrated on the first part of “Die Hölle,” the rest of Polt’s piece also carries similarities with Hitler’s diatribes. Polt’s statement that the “antichrists and car dealers” are “vermin and Mafiosi” is certainly reminiscent of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda (“Die Hölle”). (This latter observation is not supposed to imply that Polt had similar intentions or opinions as the Nazis.) 95 A number of comments posted in response to this video demonstrate that some people are actually unaware that this is not actually Hitler’s voice. On the one hand, it shows how well Wittmann managed to capture the dictator by merging Riefenstahl’s images and Polt’s dialogue. On the other hand, it also points to the problem of re-creating Hitler and relying on original images: fiction may appear to be more authentic than the original.

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According to Wittmann, the clip draws its humour from “blending of the ordinary, trivial banality ‘leasing’ with the demonic nature of Hitler” (“Das Florians-Prinzip”): The lamentation of the car company Ismeier’s client, who believes that he was fleeced regarding the financing of his car, has the manner of performance in common with Hitlerian speeches. Audio and image are inconsistent with one another, but they also correspond with each other. Two men filled with bitterness have their say and, respectively, are shown, one of them whiny-voiced, the other feisty. Hitler’s haughty gestures contrast with the wretchedness of the petite bourgeoisie. Polt’s Bavarian dialect is reminiscent of Hitler’s Austrian vernacular. One can take the one thing for the other, the characters temporarily melt together. (“Das Florians-Prinzip”)

While Wittmann may be right in arguing the clip’s wit is derived from a balance between contrast and analogy, it seems moreover that this blend between Riefenstahl and Polt particularly results in dismantling the Hitler myth. Wittmann’s Hitler has lost his seducing features and no longer symbolizes absolute evil. Polt’s dialect, which is indeed reminiscent of Hitler’s, yet, significantly, not Hitler’s voice, and rant about the car lease, which brings to mind Hitlerian tirades, achieve this demythologization because they humanize Hitler. The transformation into a human being – or, to be more precise, into the “little man” – is perhaps best expressed in moments when Hitler furiously shakes his fists while railing about the car lease and the dealership. Instead of the fighter Hitler who apparently struggles for Germans unflinchingly – a claim that is substantiated by Hitler’s “right hand[,] . . . the one to vow, to prove, to strike” (Kühn 369), the clip’s viewer faces a human being who tries to make himself heard about the trivial nuisances of his daily life. This person wants to be heard desperately, his petty anger is emphasized through his body language. As a result, Wittmann’s Hitler shows little traces of the earth-shattering, evil greatness that the )KUHU’s superhuman (self-)portrayals generally personify. In order to actually debunk Hitler and the orator mytheme, one must first realize that Hitler was a human being, and not a monster. Kopperschmidt argues that this process of humanization is necessary to understand the close relationship between normality and monstrousness (“Darf einem” 21). For, “[g]reat crimes may certainly happen without

74 great criminals!” (Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 21). In this context, Kopperschmidt rightly refers to Hannah Arendt’s (LFKPDQQ LQ -HUXVDOHP $ 5HSRUW RQ WKH %DQDOLW\ RI

(YLO (Kopperschmidt, “Darf einem” 21). Arendt’s thesis of the “banality of evil” originates in Eichmann’s normality: Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as “normal” – “More normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him,” one of them was said to have exclaimed, while another had found that his whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends, was “not only normal but most desirable.” (25-26)

[or] Despite all the efforts of the prosecution, everybody could see that this man was not a “monster,” but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown. (54)

While the reference to Arendt is not supposed to suggest that Eichmann and Hitler were necessarily motivated by the same desires, it does provide the insight that Nazis, including Hitler and Goebbels, may have been driven to mass murder by rather banal, mundane reasons. By highlighting this connection and Hitler’s humanity, +LWOHU/HDVLQJ challenges not only our common understanding of the Nazi past but also questions Hitler’s self-conception. Although Wittmann’s technique humanizes Hitler, it does not ignore the dictator’s agitation and his desire for destruction. Polt’s anger about the “adhesion contract” with the “criminal” car company is reminiscent of Hitler’s tirades about the “6FKDQGYHUWUDJ” (Treaty of Shame), the Treaty of Versaille. Polt cannot cancel the contract more than Hitler could the Treaty. The Allies expected to receive Germany’s reparations as much as Ismeier wants its payment for the leased car. Both Hitler and Polt feel betrayed and unfairly treated by their partners. The latter, in either case, are berated as criminals, as scum – irrespective of their innocence. Polt’s rant about the “mob” Ismeier – a company that was cleared by a judge – mirrors Hitler’s diatribes about the Jews who transformed into scapegoats for literally any occasion. As a result of +LWOHU/HDVLQJ’s inherent, subtle reflections on Hitler’s ideological convictions, Wittmann does not neglect Hitler’s weltanschauung nor does he trivialize Hitler’s speeches. The comparison between anger

75 about a car lease and the consequences of signing it and political issues prevalent during the 1920s and 1930s exposes the groundlessness and inanity of Hitler’s hatred for Jews and his populist incendiarism. Wittmann also implies that both these themes may receive a similar popular response from the general public. By highlighting this underlying relationship, +LWOHU

/HDVLQJ addresses the aspect aspect of =XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW: he demonstrates that the reasons why one relates to annoyance about a car leasing contract may be similar in nature and origin to the anger many felt about the issues that the Nazis exploited. For example, the common ground between these two issues includes feelings of betrayal, inequity, and powerlessness. Polt’s “And I was on a first-name basis with this guy [the owner of the company Ismeier]!” alludes to Hitler’s allegations of Jewish treason. In either case, the validity of both claims is of no significance but rather the attitude of the speaker and his audience’s ability to relate and share his feelings are of concern and, ultimately, of consequence. By remixing Riefenstahl’s images of Hitler’s audience with the laughter of Polt’s listeners, Wittmann not only humanizes Hitler but, more significantly, turns the masses of anonymous Germans, who appear to be hypnotized and act as if in a trance, into individuals, who suddenly seem to be able to think freely and laugh accordingly. Instead of the monotonous “Heil Hitler!”-cries, Wittmann’s audience is able to differentiate between distinct nuances of laughter.96 The different intensity of joy points to the individual’s freedom of choice and one’s ability to choose the amount of approval one is willing to give to any speaker. Through the laughing response of Hitler’s audience, Wittmann explicitly questions the crucial element of the orator mytheme that one had no influence on one’s reaction to Hitler. As a result of Wittmann’s approach to debunking the orator mytheme, one can agree with Henryk M. Broder’s assessment that +LWOHU

96 The ability of laughter to characterize individuals is also reflected in Serdar Somuncu’s recording of one of his readings of 0HLQ.DPSI. In response to the first wave of laughter from his audience, Somuncu addresses one listener with the following words: “Wicked laugh” (7DJHEXFK).

76

/HDVLQJ may provide greater insights into Hitler’s character than most “antifascist” films (qtd. in Martenstein).

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Another case in point of humour about the orator mytheme is Serdar Somunucu’s cabaret programs about Hitler and Goebbels.97 In 1996, the German-Turkish cabaret artist first came to fame with the show $XV GHP 7DJHEXFK HLQHV 0DVVHQP|UGHUV ± 0HLQ

.DPSI. Four years later, Somuncu continued his examination of the Nazi past and

Germans’ 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ in 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH ± ³:ROOW ,KU GHQ

WRWDOHQ.ULHJ"´ As a result of these two programs, Somuncu received the 3UL[3DQWKHRQ 98 in 2004; the German newspaper WD] voted him “Man of the Year 1996” to reward his

0HLQ.DPSI-performances. In view of this study on the orator mytheme, Somuncu is of particular interest because he relies on two well-known texts originally composed by Hitler and Goebbels, respectively. In 7DJHEXFK HLQHV 0DVVHQP|UGHUV, Somuncu scrutinizes Hitler’s main text

0HLQ .DPSI and, in 'LHVH 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH Goebbels’s 6SRUWSDODVWUHGH. Both shows have a similar structure: Somuncu reads excerpts from 0HLQ .DPSI or the

6SRUWSDODVWUHGH; he then interprets the introduced section by commenting on the text, by providing historical information, or by relating the content to contemporary issues.99

97 Somuncu also focuses on Hitler and German 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ in two other, more recent shows: +LWOHU.HEDE and an English version of the 0HLQ.DPSI-readings, 'LDU\RID0DVV0XUGHUHU0HLQ

.DPSI (which is simply not as recommendable as the original). Both of these shows will not be included in this analysis. The reason is that both these programs are based on 7DJHEXFKHLQHV0DVVHQP|UGHUV and

6WXQGHGHU,GLRWLH. Somuncu recycles themes from his older shows but also focuses on questions of German and German-Turkish identity, which is not a key concern for this analysis of humour about the Nazi past. 98 The Prix Pantheon is one of Germany’s most recognized awards for cabaret shows and artists. On a yearly basis, comedians compete in different categories. The final competitions are also broadcasted on television. 99 Somuncu modelled his program on Helmut Qualtinger’s readings of 0HLQ.DPSI. In commemoration of the 40th anniversary of Hitler’s seizure of power, the renowned Thalia Theatre in Hamburg staged different events dealing with the Nazi past, amongst others Qualtinger’s performance. Qualtinger only reads from Hitler’s main text, without providing any extra commentary, but he imitates Hitler’s voice and intonation. Trumpet horns and a final comment about the number of people who read the book during the Third Reich

77

When reading Hitler and Goebbels’s works, Somuncu mimics their voices and specific style of speaking – the imitation is certainly more pronounced and congruent in the case of Hitler but neither replication can be mistaken for the original. Although Somuncu closely copies Hitler and Goebbels’s words, he nonetheless dismantles the meaning and implication of each cited passages as a result of contextualizing and questioning these original parts.100 This approach caused one journalist to call him an “educator” (Koelbl 65). To challenge the notion that Hitler was an articulate orator as well as an equally talented writer, Somuncu highlights gibberish, inconsistencies, or blatant lies in 0HLQ

.DPSI. He draws attention to passages that can only be described as absolute nonsense: for example, “the eggs of Columbus lie around by the hundreds of thousands, but the

Columbuses are met with less frequency” (7DJHEXFK). On different occasions, he directly confronts Hitler’s mythological image cultivation. For instance, he cites – speaking in his Hitler voice – the dictator’s biographical account about his time in Vienna. Hitler wrote that he lived there in poverty. This (self-)portrayal as a poor man who worked his way up to the top is a crucial element of Hitler’s )KUHU persona – it emphasized his status as the protector of the weak and poor and corroborated his qualification to be the leader of the German people. After citing from Hitler’s experiences in Vienna, Somuncu discloses

end the show. The performance emphasizes passages that show Hitler’s aggressiveness, hatred, and anti- Semitism. It also identifies sections that are simply nonsense (Somuncu basically uses these passages as well). Any laughter is thus only derived from Hitler’s own words. In contrast to Somuncu, the show, however, was not conceived to be a cabaret, and it does not seem to be its main goal to cause laughter. Qualtinger’s reading certainly gives one the creeps: he exposes Hitler by relying on his own text, which contradicts itself and is telling on its own. Yet, the imitation may also provoke fascination. Depending on the audience’s knowledge and attitude toward the Nazi past, the extent of exposing Hitler may not be as far-reaching as Qualtinger intended. However, both Qualtinger as well as Somuncu must be credited for familiarizing contemporary Germans with 0HLQ.DPSI. One can argue that the fact that it is punishable to print, sell, or buy the book in Germany rather contributes to its mystification and ignorance about its content and, thus, also to the Hitler myth. 100 Consequently, the $VVRFLDWLRQ5HODWLYHjOD7pOpYLVLRQ(XURSpHQQH’s decision to cancel a broadcast of one of Somuncu’s readings because of “‘right-wing extremist propaganda’” does not seem justified (the Bayrische Rundfunk (Bavarian Public Radio) also did not broadcast the program; the reasons are not known.) (Scheper 15). As will be discussed in chapter 5, Somuncu, in fact, is a common target of neo- Nazis. This assessment certainly is more fitted to apply to Qualtinger’s performance.

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Hitler as a liar by quoting contemporary research on Hitler’s as well as the average person’s income during this period. Hitler, in fact, was quite well off, Somuncu concludes. By doing so, his readings contrast the myth with reality. Somuncu also explicitly targets the orator mytheme. A case in point is his explanation about the process of creating 0HLQ .DPSI and the possible implication this particular origin may have had on the readability of the book. First, he provides historical background information: Hitler dictated parts of the book to his fellow prisoners Emil

Maurice and Rudolf Heß during their imprisonment in the 1920s. 0HLQ.DPSI, Somuncu argues, is therefore “a recorded speech” (7DJHEXFK). In order to demonstrate that Hitler’s oratory skills may have been less eloquent and certainly less intriguing than most Germans generally tend to believe, Somuncu targets the style of writing and punctuation prevalent in Hitler’s work. He starts by citing a passage from 0HLQ .DPSI, speaking clearly at the beginning. Normal reading gradually turns into fast yelling. Somuncu’s Hitler voice becomes louder and more and more inarticulate – the final rendering is reminiscent of Hynkel’s speech in 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU. “[Unclear speech] ... this sentence goes on [continues with unclear speech] ... still goes on [continues with unclear speech] ... anyway, I’m just going to shorten this. At the end of the sentence – after two-and-a- half pages – it says: et cetera ... period ... hyphen” (7DJHEXFK). In the following analysis of this section, Somuncu first jokes about this awkward manner to end a rather long sentence – the length, of course, alludes to Hitler’s well-known tendency to rant in seemingly endless monologues. Simultaneously, he explicitly questions Hitler’s eloquence by contrasting his shouting and showmanship with Hitler’s self-assessment (the parts of speech that are understandable are Hitler’s own words)101: “[Incomprehensible, harsh gibberish] ... My character reserved ... [incomprehensible, harsh gibberish] ... My speech cultivated” (7DJHEXFK). Somuncu then continues to interpret Hitler’s particular way of ending a sentence in further detail. He suggests that

101 Hitler describes himself as follows: “My character reserved ... My speech cultivated” (7DJHEXFK).

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Hitler expects the reader to know the rest of his thoughts – in which case there is no need to buy the book (cf. 7DJHEXFK). Another possibility, according to Somuncu, is that Hitler simply ran out of ideas: he concludes, “[t]hen he shouldn’t write it ... or shout ... or dictate” (7DJHEXFK). Eventually, Somuncu tells his audience that Rudolf Heß, who obediently wrote Hitler’s tirades down, was incapable of keeping up with Hitler’s speed. Both realized: “[o]ne cannot repeat these sentences. Nobody is going to read this book. We did it for our own amusement; thus, [they decided on]: et cetera. Period. Hyphen”

(7DJHEXFK). By contrasting Hitler’s claims with his own words, present-day research, and common sense, Somuncu dismantles the orator mytheme and discloses the extent to which the Nazis constructed the )KUHU persona and invented other features of the Hitler myth. As a result of this deconstruction and opinionated interpretation, Somuncu also frees Hitler of his commonly perceived demonic features as well as of his likable traits. This result is also achieved through contrasting absurd, nonsensical passages with excerpts that display Hitler’s hateful, destructive weltanschauung. Ultimately, Somuncu relies on Hitler as well as Goebbels’s own words to expose Nazi speechmaking. However, since he explicitly questions their accounts and language, Somuncu actually debunks Nazi speech without trivializing it. Besides attacking Hitler and Goebbels, Somuncu especially targets the audience and its role in our understanding of the orator mytheme. When one audience member asked if Hitler may happen again in Germany, Somuncu responded: “Hitler was only a poor devil, but what kind of people made him into whom he was?” (qtd. in Koelbl 65). In his program 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH, Somuncu discusses the enthusiastic response of

Goebbels’s listeners as part of his analysis of the 6SRUWSDODVWUHGH. After giving a detailed description of the composition of the spectators, he clarifies the present-day popular notion that the Nazis coerced reluctant Germans into passionately screaming their support: And then these people roar and shout, as if staged, but they are invited guests only, no one had to do a lot of persuading, as people still think today, when they attribute ingeniousness to Goebbels, and these people cheer and shout and stamp, thus staged? ... Murderer! Hypocrites!

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Hang them! This is what Goebbels, exactly at this moment, wants to feed to the channels abroad. The German exultation for their own destruction. The collective mass murder, which Goebbels conjures here and with whom everyone agrees, as if they didn’t know what he is actually saying, as if they can’t count one plus one, as if Stalingrad had never happened and never touched them emotionally,

so that they cannot remember it. (6WXQGH)

In this scene, Somuncu explicitly addresses the issue of Germans’

=XVWLPPXQJVEHUHLWVFKDIW. By challenging the idea that Goebbels relied on force to engage his audience, Somuncu puts emphasis on the important role that Germans played in Hitler and his myrmidons’ rise and the continuation of the war. According to Somuncu, “the hour of idiocy”102 includes Goebbels as much as his audience. A section of the live recording of the 6SRUWSDODVWUHGH, in which Goebbels asks his ten well-known questions regarding Germans’ willingness to support a total war, serves as a final proof that highlights the audience’s assent. In contrast to Wessel’s film and Joseph Vilsmaier’s 'LH

*XVWORII, Somuncu uses the historical material to challenge present-day Germans’

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU: he shows that the audience “did not freak out because the rhetoric was indeed ingenious, but because they wanted to be convinced” (Somuncu qtd. in Pieper 48). By shifting the focus from speaker to audience, Somuncu dismantles the idea of the seduced, unwilling Germans and, thus, a basic component of the orator mytheme. Reminiscent of Charlie Chaplin’s “Look up, Hannah”-speech, Somuncu calls for his audience’s active participation in the process of remembering and in the fight against neo-Nazism. Their contribution is essential because they VSHDN the same ODQJXDJH as the perpetrators. By comparing Goebbels’s claims and anti-Semitic agitation with contemporary common, derogatory statements about foreigners living in Germany, Somuncu questions the notion that Nazi language and its possible effects perished with

102 The phrase “This hour of idiocy” stems from Goebbels’s diaries. After delivering his speech successfully, Goebbles noted about the event: “This hour of idiocy. Had I said, jump out of the third floor of the Columbus House, they would have done this as well” (qtd. in Somuncu, 6WXQGH).

81 the downfall of the Third Reich. As a result of requesting his audience to recognize these similarities between the past and the present, Somuncu also draws parallels between the function of Nazis and neo-Nazis’ audiences, between then and contemporary ordinary Germans. Hence, Somuncu virtually demythologizes the myth by moving it from the past into the present, by showing that the orator mytheme still has significance and influence today. In this way, it is not Hitler’s myth that has come back to life but rather the danger he and his ideology has posed all along.

)URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO

In order to conclude this discussion about humour about the orator mytheme in contemporary German culture, the following section will analyze present-day ridicule of neo-Nazism. A case in point is the organisation )URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO (FDÄ), “a national initiative against the foreign infiltration of the German fruit crop and rotten loitering 103 windfall.” The )'b, or $SIHOIURQW (Applefront), an artistic group under the management of Alf Thum, was founded in Leipzig in 2004 in response to the high percentage of votes that the right-wing extremist 1DWLRQDOGHPRNUDWLVFKH 3DUWHL 104 'HXWVFKODQGV (NPD, National Democratic Party of Germany) received. The group’s name is a response – a clever pun – to the Saxon 13'’s leader Holger Apfel, one of Germany’s more prominent neo-Nazis. And, of course, the apple, like the Boskoop, is the typical German fruit. Parodying Nazi hierarchical and political structures, the )'b is also subdivided into so-called *DXH (Nazi term for district) and features sub-organisations like the youth group 1DWLRQDOHV )ULVFKREVW 'HXWVFKODQG (NFD, National Fresh Fruit

103 The German original is “Nationale Initiative gegen die Überfremdung des deutschen Obstbestandes und gegen faul herumlungerndes Fallobst.” “Faul” means “rotten” as well as “lazy.” “Fallobst” (windfall) denotes neo-Nazis. 104 The election for the /DQGWDJ (Parliament of the %XQGHVODQG (province)) of Saxony in 2004 resulted in

9.2% of the votes for the 13', almost has much as the Social Democrats received. The 13'’s success, which became part of a /DQGWDJ for the first time since the late sixties, caused much public outcry and the (perhaps temporary) realization that neo-Nazism has become acceptable among mainstream Germans.

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Germany) or the women association %XQG ZHLFKHU %LUQHQ (BWB, Federation of Soft

Pears). Of course, the $SIHOIURQW also has a “Führer,” Alf Thum, a leader who is shrouded in myth: for instance, it is said that he is the 82nd reincarnation of the boskoop apple, as entries in the group’s own encyclopaedia, %RVNRSHGLD, reveal (“Der Führer”). The propaganda minister, Hermann von Gloster, coordinates the group’s party line and provides propagandistic material, available at )'b’s website. In order to oppose right- wing extremism, the )'b mostly attends neo-Nazi demonstrations and other such political gatherings. When doing so, members of the group dress up in their uniform, made up of black suits with a red armband featuring a black apple on a white circular background in the middle – the )'b’s logo – on the left arm, and adopt a posture, which copies neo-Nazis’ typical bearing. As their notorious counterparts, )'b’s associates also march in groups, often goose-stepping, carrying flags and banners and chanting their demands.

By parodying neo-Nazism, the $SIHOIURQW directly targets the orator mytheme.

Besides imitating Nazis’ hierarchical organisation, the )'b especially makes a mockery of Nazi ideology and speech. The group utilizes Nazi language, their style of speaking, and their ideological weltanschauung and applies it to the subject of fruit-growing.

Comparable to Wittmann’s +LWOHU /HDVLQJ, the $SIHOIURQW takes an everyday issue that has no relation to National Socialism at all and contextualizes it within the Nazi belief system. The appropriated issue is then rephrased in Nazi language (cf. Table 1, column 1). Although Nazi ideology and speech is applied to a non-related, trivial topic, the newly emerging meanings never lose their original significance and still evoke genuine Nazi associations. Exaggeration leads to exposure (cf. Alf Thum qtd. in %RVNRSLVPXV). A comparison between the “central demands” of the $SIHOIURQW, the 3RLQW 3DUW\

3URJUDP RI WKH 1DWLRQDOVR]LDOLVWLVFKH 'HXWVFKH $UEHLWHU 3DUWHL (NSDAP, National

Socialist German Workers’ Party) and the 3DUW\ 3URJUDP RI WKH 13' shows this relationship and illustrates the )'b’s approach:

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7DEOH ¢¡¤£

$SIHOIURQW ([FHUSW16'$3 ([FHUSW13' 1. No foreign infiltration of 4. Only Nationals The diversity of peoples the German fruit crop (9RONVJHQRVVHQ) can be must be maintained. anymore! In the past, pure Citizens of the State. Only German fruit varieties were persons of German blood again and again can be Nationals, regardless contaminated as a result of of religious affiliation. No engrafting foreign species. Jew can therefore be a We demand an end to it! German National. 2. Southern fruits – Get out! 8. Any further immigration Germany must become It is completely of non-Germans is to be German again! unacceptable that German prevented. We demand that children grow up with all non-Germans who bananas and oranges and do entered Germany after Stop foreign workers! not know anymore how to August 2, 1914, be forced (Fremdarbeiter stoppen!)106 appreciate the nutritional to leave the Reich without value of a good German delay. apple or a pure juicy pear. Therefore: Close the borders for Southern fruits! 3. Away with rotten 10. It must be the first duty National democrats reject windfall! More and more of every Citizen to carry “self-fulfillment” and – rotten windfall loiters out intellectual or physical which comes hand in hand underneath our German work. Individual activity with the former – unlimited trees. No matter if it ever must not be harmful to the egoism, both of which put hung on German trees, it public interest and must be every collective at risk.107 finally must be used in a pursued within the way that is beneficial for framework of the the entire people’s national community and for the community. Turn windfall general good. into mush!

)URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO 3XQNWH3URJUDPP 3DUWHLSURJUDPP13'

16'$3

105 The translation follows the one provided by the Jewish Virtual Library at . 106 A recent election poster by the NPD featured this slogan. The term “Fremdarbeiter” is – because of its Nazi usage – considered to have a derogatory meaning in Germany and generally not used anymore. 107 Since “windfall” (Fallobst) refers to neo-Nazis, it is important to realize that the )'b turns Nazi rhetoric against Nazis and neo-Nazis themselves.

84

)'b’s “pure German fruit varieties” are the “9RONVJHQRVVHQ” (nationals), “the persons of

German blood” (3XQNWH3URJUDPP16'$3). The slogan “Southern fruits – Get out!”

()'b) implies “We demand that all non-Germans who entered Germany after August 2,

1914, be forced to leave the Reich without delay” (3XQNWH3URJUDPP 16'$3), which, today, denotes “Germany must become German again!” (3DUWHLSURJUDPP13'). By choosing an agricultural subject matter and linking it to the Nazis’ racial weltanschauung, the $SIHOIURQW challenges Nazi concepts, such as 9RON (people),

UDVVLVFKH 5HLQKHLW (racial pureness), hEHUIUHPGXQJ (foreign infiltration),

6FKlGOLQJVEHNlPSIXQJ (pest control), or 6WRO] (pride). Despite the different context, these ideas can still be comprehended. As a result of transferring the key implications of Nazi language and appropriating them for an unproblematic subject, the )'b’s does not simply reiterate their original meanings or trivialize these particular Nazi concepts. Instead, this approach highlights the inhuman, pseudo-scientific, and misanthropic ideas that lie at the core of National Socialism as well as neo-Nazism. “By mocking Goebbels’s speeches and the party programs of the NPD, we decipher them as propagandistic bundle,” says the “Führer” Alf Thum (qtd. in %RVNRSLVPXV). Most significantly, the

$SIHOIURQW’s utilization of Nazi language not only debunks the Third Reich’s original speech but also sheds light on the use of these words by neo-Nazis in present-day Germany. As a result, it identifies the contingencies between past and present and dismantles the orator mytheme’s significance, especially in regards to language, in the contemporary context of right-wing extremism and the strengthening of nationalism.

Lastly, the $SIHOIURQW especially mocks Hitler and his mythological image cultivation, which the orator persona perfectly embodied, by impersonating him. Thum, the “Führer,” mimics Hitler the orator: he copies Hitler’s specific style of speech, his tendency to strongly emphasize certain terms, his words: “The Führer declares that the years of struggle (Aufbaujahre), for which many of you have given their blood, sweat, tears and endless amount of time, are finally over. The )URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO is the only national force” (Thum qtd. in %RVNRSLVPXV). Thum and his followers rely on megaphones and podiums to spread their message about German fruit and to physically oppose right-

85 wing extremists. Claudia Lehnen’s description of Thum’s speaking performances are reminiscent of Hitler the orator and Nazi mass events: “The Führer’s chin is craned toward the evening sky, clear eyes stare through black framed glasses, a good dozen eyes 108 hang on his lips.” Like Hitler and leaders of the 13', Thum is the “Führer” of a movement, the “Boskopismus.” By creating a discipleship, the organisation points out how contemporary neo-Nazis like Holger Apfel and Christian Worch109 rely on the orator mytheme to capture contemporary Germans’– especially teenagers’ – attention. “Führer”

Thum, however, attempts to fight the 13' and their recruiting efforts with a similar approach. “You are the youth, you are the future, you are this country, this city, this world,” he says to his audience after a demonstration of neo-Nazis was successfully deterred from marching through Leipzig (qtd. %RVNRSLVPXV). Members of the )'b physically exemplify through their own behaviour what they expect from ordinary Germans: active commitment in the fight against right-wing extremism, which Thum believes to be “a real danger” (qtd. in %RVNRSLVPXV). By impersonating Hitler and, particularly, emulating his speech in a satirical manner, Thum humanizes – yet does not belittle – Hitler and reclaims the orator mytheme and its inherent symbolism for the

$SIHOIURQW’s purposes. To summarize, the )'b, like Somuncu, situates populist Nazi language and the Nazi movement’s )KUHU cult into the present and, thus, demythologizes its existence as a feature of an absolute evil that has – allegedly – disappeared a long time ago. In conclusion, in contrast to Wessel, Levy and, to some degree, Moers, the examples of humour about the orator mytheme discussed in this last part of this chapter actually pick Hitler the orator apart and are more successful in debunking the use of Nazi speechmaking during the Third Reich as well as in contemporary Germany. Although

108 Thum, at these staged events, is always accompanied by other members of the group who represent his disciples, thus Hitler’s followers. 109 Worch is a well-known, militant neo-Nazi who is very active in the right-wing extremist scene. Among other things, he organizes marches, demonstrations, and holds speeches.

86

Wittmann, Somuncu, and the $SIHOIURQW approach the issue quite differently, they all target similar aspects of the orator mytheme, namely Nazi language, Hitler’s (self-) portrayal as a narrator as well as his admirers – the die-hard ones as much as the ordinary followers. While these different approaches humanize Hitler and disempower Nazi speech, they do not trivialize the Third Reich, the )KUHU, or his contemporary fans. With the previously made observations about the orator mytheme in contemporary humour in mind, the final chapter will discuss a few concluding remarks about the role of present- day ridicule of Hitler and the Nazi past.

87

&KDSWHU)LYH&RQFOXVLRQ

The starting points of this thesis were the general questions of ZK\ Germans currently feel the need to laugh about Hitler as well as ZKDW they are laughing – or supposed to laugh – DERXW. In the context of German (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU and

9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ, it seemed – and still is – more significant to find answers to these problems than to debate the controversial issue if Germans are DOORZHG WR ODXJK about Hitler, since – at this point in time – the cultural taboo that prohibited Germans to make a mockery of their former )KUHU for decades has long been broken. Mocking Hitler is now an integral part of Germans’ culture as well as of their commemoration of the Third Reich. The previously discussed examples of German humour about the Nazi past, namely Kai Wessel’s *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ, Dani Levy’s 0HLQ )KUHU, Walter

Moers’s ,FK KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU, Florian Wittmann’s +LWOHU /HDVLQJ, Serdar

Somuncu’s 7DJHEXFK HLQHV 0DVVHQP|UGHUV and 6WXQGH GHU ,GLRWLH as well as the activities of the )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO illustrate this circumstance and corroborate these observations. As has been argued from the beginning, Germans, however, do not ridicule the actual historic individual Hitler but the myth that the Nazis skilfully constructed of their leader early on and that Germans appropriated for their own needs after the end of the Second World War. Since the Hitler myth has been personified by Hitler in his role as a natural-born speaker or, after 1945, in representations thereof, the so-called orator mytheme – the mythological trait that denotes Hitler’s speechmaking, the accompanying

Nazi image cultivation as the )KUHU of the German nation, and the post-war perception of Hitler as the incarnation of evil and insanity – has largely dominated our contemporary understanding of Hitler and his role in the Third Reich. Present-day portrayals of the

)KUHU are thus generally depictions of Hitler the orator. Consequently, modern ridicule must be understood as a reaction to these prevalent images and descriptions of the orating Hitler. Yet, while the orator mytheme has played a significant role in defining the relationship between Germans and the dictator both during the 1930s and 1940s as well as in the past decades, there is at least one crucial difference in Germans’ view of Hitler

88 the speaker today. During the Third Reich, this particular element of the Hitler myth – in contrast to other features of Hitler’s mythological (self-)portrayal – was not a cause of Germans’ laughter. In contemporary German culture, Hitler the orator, however, is constantly made a mockery of – a finding that, to some degree, answers the question of what Germans are laughing – or supposed to laugh – about. As a result of this change in Germans’ perception of Hitler, it was moreover argued that present humour about the orator mytheme and its implications would yield the most insight into the problems that were posed at the outset of this study. After having discussed several examples of such humour in the previous chapter, one can arrive at a number of conclusions about the role that present-day ridicule of Hitler plays in contemporary German culture. To summarize, the mere existence of German humour about Hitler the orator suggests that mocking Hitler is generally a reflection of our modern understanding of the dictator as well as a response to Germans’ conventional memory of Hitler since 1945. Ridiculing Hitler the orator as well as Nazi speechmaking is first of all a reaction to prevalent, traditional representations and common practices of remembering the Nazi past. For instance, Levy’s 0HLQ )KUHU and Moers’s %RQNHU-clip were created in opposition to the representation of Hitler by Bruno Ganz in 'HU 8QWHUJDQJ, and Wittmann’s use of film footage originally created by Leni Riefenstahl stands in contrast with Knopp’s usage of her images. The decision to make a mockery of Hitler often arises from the honest desire to seriously contribute to the deconstruction of Hitler’s power, to dismantle his ongoing, unbroken allure, and to challenge well-established, often misleading ideas about the Nazi past. In this regard, deriding Hitler is the attempt to demythologize our understanding of the dictator and, by implication, of the Third Reich. By comically disclosing the incongruities between reality and appearance, humour can debunk the Hitler myth and can provide insight into the inner workings of the Nazi regime, as the approaches of Wittmann, Somuncu, and the $SIHOIURQW have demonstrated. In view of these successful examples of demythologization, Levy’s enthusiastic belief that “comedy is able to do more” than dramatic or documentary means of expression can accomplish seems to have been justified (qtd. in 3UHVVHVSLHJHO 41).

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Since humour has the ability to expose and to challenge ideas, convictions, or behaviours, it is used by contemporary Germans to unmask and oppose present-day neo- Nazism and its obstinate followers. As Nazis and their customs then gave an abundance of opportunity for mockery, many Germans find equal amusement in neo-Nazi image cultivation and readily attempt to reveal the similarities between then and now. In order to attack the continuing glorification of the Third Reich, its leader, and ideology,

Germans, such as Serdar Somuncu and the )URQW'HXWVFKHUbSIHO, mock the Nazi past as well as the neo-Nazi present. Nazi speech and neo-Nazi symbolism are a common point of attack. While contemporary Germans imaginatively ridicule right-wing extremists in all possible ways, anti-Nazi groups and organisations also utilize satire that was already 110 created by Hitler’s coevals. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the $SIHOIURQW, for instance, manages to highlight and unmask Nazi language, its significance for the

13'’s party program, as well as the inherent inhumanity of Nazi concepts through parody. Today, ridicule about the Nazi past and neo-Nazi present has become an irreplaceable, peaceful weapon in the fight against right-wing extremism. However, this war against neo-Nazism that is waged with satire is already the first indication that we may expect more from humour than it can deliver. As during the Third Reich, making a mockery of Hitler or his followers does not automatically cause people to think less of National Socialism, its leader(s), or their weltanschauung. People – even if they share right-wing values – can still identify with a mocked Hitler, as research about audience reaction to Levy’s 0HLQ)KUHU has shown (cf. Baumert, Hofmann, & Blum; cf. Hofmann & Baumert; cf. chapter 4). Thomas Jung reports that neo-Nazis reacted rather annoyed than angry toward Walter Moers’s $GROI (251; cf. Rosenfeld 267). Asked by journalists about the )URQW 'HXWVFKHU bSIHO, neo-Nazi Christian Worch responded with

110 A case in point is the publication of the audio book series “Laut gegen Nazis” by the organisation of the same name. Among other texts, prominent artists read, for example, from Werner Finck’s cabaret program. Finck was one of Germany’s most popular cabaret artists during Hitler’s lifetime. He was arrested and sent to a concentration camp for six weeks in 1935 after Nazi officials shut down his cabaret .DWDNRPEH.

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good humour (%RVNRSLVPXV). Worch, however, reacted less friendly when also finding out that anti-Nazi demonstrators, the $SIHOIURQW actively among them, had forced police into breaking up the neo-Nazi rally and, thus, had – again – prevented the right-wing extremists from marching through Leipzig. Somuncu’s greatest success in debunking neo-Nazism and its followers did not occur when he simply ridiculed them for an audience who was well-disposed towards his mockery. It did, however, happen when a group of such fellows disturbed his show and seized the stage. By directly confronting them and allowing them to speak for themselves, Somuncu most likely had a greater effect in exposing them than any of his mockery had before. This is perhaps especially the case since this incident in Dippoldiswalde found its way onto the Internet.111 Ultimately, one can only fight Hitler and his modern admirers by – as Alf Thum says –

“going within touching distance of the enemy” (qtd. in %RVNRSLVPXV). One can therefore only hope that present-day Germans not only adopt anti-Nazi satire but also the lesson that humour on its own – despite its ability to debunk – did nothing to stop Hitler and, apparently, does little to prevent the popularity of neo-Nazism today. In the end, humour has its limits. If one just jokes about Hitler, yet is not actively involved in any other capacity, one may act for similar reasons as ordinary Germans did under the rule of Hitler. As in the past, mocking Hitler can still “serve as a psychological alibi” (Speier 1395).112 Irrespective of its usage, contemporary Germans’ mockery of the Nazi past is undoubtedly a sign of normalization. The term “normalization” implies that a certain aspect of history, which has traditionally been treated as an exceptional event, is gradually considered to be no less extraordinary or anomalous than other historic occurrences. By ridiculing the Third Reich and, especially, Hitler, the past is looked upon

111 Over the years, Somuncu’s shows have repeatedly become the target of such “attacks.” On some occasions, he only performed under police protection. A short summary of the Dippoldiswalde incident is available here: . 112 I, of course, acknowledge that the consequences of being actively engaged in the fight against right- wing extremism in no way compare to the realities that Hitler’s opponents had to face during their lifetime.

91 in more neutral, non-judgemental terms, instead of in moralistic ones. In the context of

(ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU, “the process of normalization may be understood to commence when a dominant moralistic view of the past begins to lose its privileged status within popular consciousness and is challenged by dissenting views that are less committed to perceiving it from an ethically grounded vantage point” (Rosenfeld 17). The crucial difference between humour that circulated during Hitler’s lifetime and ridicule that has emerged after 1945 is, of course, our knowledge of the Holocaust.113 In the shadow of the Shoah, making a mockery of Hitler was therefore considered to be an absolute taboo in Germany, a moral transgression that always came up against fierce outrage and public condemnation. During this period, Hitler the orator, the seducer, dominated Germans’ culture of remembrance. The fact that Hitler is now the target of many jokes is reflective of an ongoing process of normalization, which, in turn, is further accelerated by laughter. Normalizing means humanizing Hitler who is therefore perceived less in terms of absolute evil. Simultaneously, it brings about the relativization of the significance of the Holocaust within German culture. A case in point is Adolf, the Nazi pig, who is probably still the most humanized representation of Hitler to date (cf. Rosenfeld 263). Moers’s ,FK

KRFN LQ PHLQHP %RQNHU is an extreme example of humour that simply ignores the Holocaust and Hitler’s responsibility. As a result of this process of normalization, the popular notion that Germans were Hitler’s victims rather than his supporters and fellow perpetrators has found more and more acceptance in recent years. While the Holocaust and Germans’ responsibility were in the fore of public commemoration during the 1990s,114 Germans’ focus on

113 The fact that the Shoah changed the relationship between humour and Hitler is certainly well reflected in the previously mentioned statement by Charlie Chaplin that he would not have filmed 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU if he had known about the genocide of the European Jews (cf. Lindner 96). Also, while Mel Brooks’s remake

(1983) of Lubitsch’s 7R%HRU1RW7R%H to a large extent conforms to the original, Brooks added to the story line the rescue of a group of Jewish refugees to acknowledge the Holocaust. 114 Of particular significance in this regard are the 'DQLHO*ROGKDJHQ'HEDWH (Goldhagen’s book, +LWOHU¶V

:LOOLQJ([HFXWLRQHUV, caused Germans to confront the involvement of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust), the :HKUPDFKWVDXVVWHOOXQJ (the German Army Exhibition, which concentrated on war crimes committed

92 remembering the Nazi past began to gradually shift from the role of Germans as perpetrators to the representation of Germans as victims at the end of the last century. This change was mostly initiated by Martin Walser’s comments about Auschwitz being a

“Moralkeule” (moral cudgel), Günter Grass’s ,P.UHEVJDQJ (Crabwalk)(2002), and Jörg

Friedrich’s 'HU%UDQG (The Fire) (2002). Films such as 'HU8QWHUJDQJ and 6RSKLH6FKROO

±'LHOHW]WHQ7DJH (Sophie Scholl – The last days) (2005) or television productions such 115 as 'LH )OXFKW (The Flight) (2007) or 'LH *XVWORII as well as the debate about the construction of the =HQWUXP JHJHQ 9HUWUHLEXQJHQ (Centre Against Expulsions) are further, continuing signs of the current tendency in Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU to emphasize their status as victims of either the Nazi regime or the Allied Forces.116 The renewed interest in German suffering117 has moreover contributed to the notion that the majority of Germans were opposed to Hitler from the very beginning of his regime, which the )OVWHUZLW] myth – the idea that the Nazi regime treated every joke teller and listener harshly – wrongly corroborates (cf. chapter 2). As a result of this relativized view of the Nazi past, Germans generally differentiate between Nazis, the perpetrators, and ordinary Germans, the victims.118 By classifying Hitler’s coevals into these distinct

by the :HKUPDFKW during the Second World War), and the debate and construction of the 'HQNPDOIUGLH

HUPRUGHWHQ-XGHQ(XURSDV (Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe) in Berlin. 115 7KH*XVWORII is arguably the one film that takes the Germans-as-victims theme the furthest. In his review, Christian Buß calls the film “a risky step backwards” (the focus on Germans’ victim status mirrors Germans’ approach to the Nazi past during the late 1940s and 1950s): “Toot-toot, here comes the victims’ boat . . . [the film] suggests an outrageous assumption: a nation of innocent people drowns here.” While the film also fails to mention the Holocaust in any way, it uses imagery that is reminiscent of Holocaust representation: instead of Jewish children behind barbed wire, the viewer sees German children behind barbed wire, who are left behind to defend themselves against the advancing Russian troops. Moreover, historical footage is used to substantiate Germans’ victimization. 116 Interestingly, Wessel mirrors this development in the topic of his films. In 1999, he received acclaim for filming the diaries of the Jewish literary critic and author Viktor Klemperer who described in detail Jewish life under the Nazis. *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ followed, then 'LH)OXFKW. 117 Contrary to common belief, Germans, in fact, already discussed their victim status quite strongly during the late 1940s and 1950s. Arguments that emphasize the need to finally turn to Germans’ suffering because one was reportedly never allowed to speak about them previously are therefore simply misleading. 118 Films such as 'HU8QWHUJDQJ, 'LH)OXFKW, or 'LH*XVWORII clearly mirror this division.

93 groups, contemporary Germans consciously dissociate themselves from the former collective.119 Humour about the Nazi past mirrors and contributes to this general development in Germans’ (ULQQHUXQJVNXOWXU. As shown in chapter 4, Wessel, Levy, and Moers do not portray ordinary Germans as perpetrators. *RHEEHOV XQG *HGXOGLJ particularly echoes this view of the Nazi past when Harry’s audience is being bombarded by the Allies during his speech, especially since the bombardment was authentic footage. Since none of these examples of humour about the Nazi past effectively and lastingly dismantle the orator mytheme, they also fail in questioning Germans’ role in Hitler’s rise to power as well as their reasons for attributing such great significance to Hitler the orator after 1945. The process of distancing Germans from Nazis allows the former, the in-group, to ridicule the latter, the out-group: one can laugh at the other’s stupidity, ignorance, mishap, et cetera. The shared laughter of the in-group that emerges in response to such humour further strengthens their social ties as well as their mutual views; it builds group cohesion.120 As a result, mocking Hitler may actually further consolidate misleading beliefs about the realities of the Nazi past and, especially, about Hitler’s bond with the German people. In this regard, contemporary German humour has a similar function as the )OVWHUZLW]H during the Third Reich: ridiculing Hitler today has a stabilizing effect insofar as it does not challenge inconvenient truths, such as ordinary Germans’ responsibility for the Holocaust or their devotion for Hitler. Turning Hitler into a laughing stock signifies disrespect, a sign that one is supposedly no longer mesmerized by Hitler’s positive mythemes or his speechmaking and certainly rejects his

119 The idea that Germans were both supporters and then victims is rarely emphasized or represented. Generally, there is a strict division between supporters and victims, which most likely helps to create laughter. 120 The social aspect inherent in laughter has engaged researchers for centuries. “Humor is primarily a social phenomenon,” Morreall explains (7DNLQJ /DXJKWHU 114). According to Morreall, “[l]aughter . . . has a cohesive effect. Laughing together unites people” (7DNLQJ /DXJKWHU 115).

94 weltanschauung. This function of humour may also explain why Hitler is a common target of ridicule, yet his ordinary admirers are rarely mocked by contemporary Germans. Contemporary laughter about Hitler, Goebbels, and daily life in the Third Reich moreover offers Germans the possibility to temporarily free themselves from the responsibility of the Nazi past. “For Germans who have long felt the immense psychological burdens of the Nazi past, laughter no doubt provides welcome relief” (Rosenfeld 268). Laughing about Hitler is thus a sign of liberation: it momentarily reduces the stress of belonging to the perpetrator society and of adhering to a number of cultural rules and taboos that regulate the memory of this era. The relief theory of humour captures this liberating function: “in truth any taboo can set the stage for relief laughter”

(Morreall, 7DNLQJ /DXJKWHU 22). Mocking Hitler allows Germans briefly to experience normalcy, to be like other, “normal”121 nations. Finally, so the argument goes, we, too, get to behave like non-Germans, who already have been making fun of Hitler for decades.122 The desire to be like others is also implied by the current prevalence of ridicule about Hitler the orator. As present-day artists choose a topic that Hitler’s German coevals mostly avoided in their attempts to make fun of their )KUHU, they align themselves with the tradition of humour of the Allies and their ancestors, and the choice

121 In the context of the Nazi past, becoming, or being, a “normal” nation generally means that the Holocaust and, especially, Germans’ responsibility as perpetrators no longer overshadows virtually every political, social, and cultural aspect of German society. It suggests that Germans, as other European nations, have finally embraced democracy but are also allowed and able to express their national pride and belonging. 122 When discussing the question if one is allowed to laugh at Hitler and answering in the affirmative, Germans commonly refer to several examples of foreign humour about the dictator, starting from Chaplin’s

7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU to the )DZOW\7RZHUV’s episode “The Germans” (1975) or +RJDQ¶V+HURHV (1965-

1971), ending, for example, with Roberto Benigni’s /LIHLV%HDXWLIXO or Mel Brooks’s and Susan Stroman’s

7KH3URGXFHUV (1965; 2005). It seems, however, that the notion that Germans are amused by humour about the Nazi past in the same way as other nations are – or have been in the past – is simply misleading. As mentioned before, 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU did not cause laughter among a German audience until the 1970s (cf.

Krämer). Likewise, )DZOW\7RZHUV’s “The Germans” was the only episode of the show that was not released in West Germany in the 1970s or in the GDR in the 1980s, and +RJDQ¶V+HURHV was not shown until the 1990s. While *RHEEHOVXQG*HGXOGLJ and 0HLQ)KUHU were positively received abroad, they did not do as well in Germany. See also Gilman who makes the argument that the national and ethnic background of filmmakers influences their ability to use the comic as a style of expression and also impacts their works’ reception.

95 of mocking Hitler is thus a clear indication of the wish to be simply a people among others.123 Appropriating foreign humour about Hitler the orator is thus a sign of normalization and dissociation from the past, and laughing like others provides the long- sought relief. Such laughter, one can argue, is also partially caused by feelings of superiority. The superiority theory of humour, which constitutes the oldest explanation of causes of laughter, assumes that we laugh at others because, in comparison, we believe we have a superior personality, live a better life, or act in a better way. Thomas Hobbes defined amusement as “sudden glory arising from some conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly” (qtd. in 124 Morreall, 7DNLQJ/DXJKWHU 5). In other words, mocking Hitler and Goebbels, especially as orators, and Nazi speech in general allows Germans to express their superiority over their former leaders as well as over their former selves without actually explicitly acknowledging the past. One can argue that the superiority theory enables one to transfer one’s moral judgement about the Nazi past from the sphere of the serious to the realm of the comic. Therefore, laughter that is caused by experiencing feelings of superiority is most likely generated by portrayals of Hitler that either strictly conform to conventional mythologized representations or that have been transformed into the myth’s exact opposite. Florian Wittmann makes use of this type of laughter when turning Hitler into the little man. One can also argue that, in the context of 9HUJDQJHQKHLWVEHZlOWLJXQJ, this type of laughter is only effective when we also laugh at our former “Nazi” selves. Otherwise, it seems that one has not confronted one’s past.

123 The prevalence of American and British television shows has also contributed to the development of German humour about Hitler in the past years. Hitler is a common target of ridicule on animated American shows like 7KH6LPSVRQ or )DPLO\*X\. Charlie Chaplin’s 7KH*UHDW'LFWDWRU has certainly led to the (re-) discovery of Hitler’s speaking performances as an ideal object of ridicule. 124 Hobbes definition already points at the incongruity theory, since one can essentially only feel superior if one first notices differences between oneself and the target of ridicule.

96

In order to make a final observation about the present function of humour about the Nazi past, it is necessary to take up the subject of relief laughter again. This type of laughter not only provides relief from the responsibility of the Holocaust but it also offers the opportunity to articulate one’s secret desires and wishes about the Nazi past and, especially, Hitler. In his study -RNHV DQG WKHLU 5HODWLRQV WR WKH 8QFRQVFLRXV, Sigmund Freud differentiates between two main types of jokes, between “innocent” and “tendentious” jokes. The latter are expressions of our unconscious desires and fulfil the function to satisfy some of these psychological needs: “The pleasure in the case of a tendentious joke arises from a purpose being satisfied whose satisfaction would otherwise not have taken place” (117).125 In other words, Germans, one can argue, joke and laugh about Hitler because humour is the only medium that enables them to articulate suppressed desires and thoughts they have about the Nazi past and that they are normally not allowed to express within a serious setting.126 For instance, stating in a serious discussion that one would not mind if the Jews had been shipped to Madagascar or the Turks back to Turkey may cause a scolding from others. Laughing about such a remark or a comment that evokes such associations – especially when made by Hitler – will most likely have no consequences. If Eva Herman had just joked about the beneficial family policies of the 16'$3, she probably would not have lost her job as a news anchor. This may also explain why Nazis’ sexuality and libido is a constant target of ridicule (cf.

125 In contrast to tendentious jokes, innocent ones do not serve the fulfillment of our unconscious desires. 126 The following joke perfectly illustrates the function of tendentious jokes (it was not included in the main analysis, however, because it does not relate to the orator mytheme): “Yeltsin, Clinton, and Schröder [Germany’s chancellor from 1998 until 2005] meet one another at the North Sea. They wager on which submarines have the biggest gas tanks. Yeltsin calls Moscow to order a Russian submarine. Upon arrival, it gets re-fuelled and leaves. After a week out at sea, it returns. Clinton ponders: ‘Gee! This won’t be easy!’ He calls Washington and asks for an American submarine. Upon arrival, it gets re-fuelled and leaves. After a month out at sea, it returns. Schröder thinks: ‘Crap! What am I gonna do? This will never work!’ Suddenly, a submarine emerges, a man gets off and says: ‘Heil Hitler! Where can I get fuel?’” The gag reflects on the idea that the Nazi regime had its merits. While any serious statement that praises Hitler’s soldiers, expresses regret about the loss of the German military’s greatness, or conveys the need to restore the vigour of the armed forces would entail a public outcry, this joke enables its listeners to reminisce of bygone times of military hegemony without the risk of getting reprimanded. This joke is, for example, available at: (15 Dec. 2007).

97

Wessel, Levy, Moers). Humour, in short, makes it possible for Germans to articulate their repressed desires as well as feelings of loss without needing to face any serious backlashes. After all, one can always argue that “it is only a joke.” To conclude, ridiculing Hitler and the Nazi past is, at this point, no longer a rare occurrence but a fundamental component of contemporary German culture. When witnessing the mockery of Hitler, Germans no longer faint, cry, or exclaim “it is not funny for us, not for any German people,” as Basil Fawlty’s “German” guests did in the face of his Hitler imitation (“The Germans”). While Germans no longer outright reject humour about the Third Reich and its leaders, concerns about the appropriateness as well as outright scepticism have not become a thing of the past. Simultaneously, satire about Nazis enjoys great popularity, and many Germans actively engage in mocking and laughing about Hitler. In many ways, the nation is at war with itself regarding the laughter about the dictator. German humour about the Nazi era and its functions mirror this inner conflict, which – as a result of being the perpetrator nation – is a uniquely German experience. The previous analysis, based on the representation and mocking of the orator mytheme, has shown that Germans joke about Hitler and his myrmidons for a number of reasons. Since Germans remember Hitler mostly in his role as the )KUHU, that is, as the orator, contemporary humour is a response to the prevalent image that Germans have of Hitler. By shedding light on the incongruities inherent in Hitler, Goebbels, and the Nazi regime, Germans ridicule the Nazi past to demythologize, humanize, and debunk Hitler, to strip him of his power and appeal. They make a mockery of him, his speech, and posture to satirize the Nazi past and present-day right-wing extremism. However, Germans also joke and laugh to distinguish themselves from his regime, his atrocities, and his responsibilities. Through humour, they can present themselves as victims and clearly dissociate themselves from their perpetrator role. Laughter about Hitler is a sign of relief, of normalization and the wish to be normal, of superiority and of longing for bygone times. Since humour about the Nazi past, about Hitler, and about the orator mytheme takes many different forms and has many different functions in contemporary German culture, one can say that laughter about Hitler debunks and

98 challenges but also consolidates and strengthens the Hitler myth. Consequently, it does not seem likely that Germans will soon stop mocking Hitler. In the end, Henryk M. Broder’s conclusion that “[a]n end to the Hitlerite cult is not foreseeable” (171) can also be applied to mockery about Hitler and the Nazi past.

99

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