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DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL N° 415 THE IMPACT OF A ‘SODA TAX’ ON PRICES. EVIDENCE FROM FRENCH MICRO DATA Nicoletta Berardi, Patrick Sevestre, Marine Tepaut and Alexandre Vigneron December 2012 (revised version may 2016) DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DES ÉTUDES ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES THE IMPACT OF A ‘SODA TAX’ ON PRICES. EVIDENCE FROM FRENCH MICRO DATA Nicoletta Berardi, Patrick Sevestre, Marine Tepaut and Alexandre Vigneron December 2012 (revised version may 2016) Les Documents de travail reflètent les idées personnelles de leurs auteurs et n'expriment pas nécessairement la position de la Banque de France. Ce document est disponible sur le site internet de la Banque de France « www.banque-france.fr ». Working Papers reflect the opinions of the authors and do not necessarily express the views of the Banque de France. This document is available on the Banque de France Website “www.banque-france.fr”. The impact of a ‘soda tax’on prices: Evidence from French micro data Nicoletta Berardi, Patrick Sevestre, Marine Tépaut, and Alexandre Vigneron Berardi: Banque de France, SAMIC-DEMS-DGEI, 31 rue Croix des Petits Champs,75001 Paris, France (e-mail address: [email protected]); Sevestre: AMSE-GREQAM, Aix- Marseille Université, Chateau Lafarge, route des Milles, 13290 Les Milles, France (e-mail address: [email protected]); Tépaut: Université de Paris I - Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hôpital, 75013, Paris, France (e-mail address: [email protected]); Vigneron: Université Paris- Est Créteil, Faculté de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 61 avenue du Général de Gaulle, 94010 Créteil Cedex France (e-mail address: [email protected]). The authors wish to address special thanks to Prixing, the start-up that provided the data used in this paper and in particular Eric Larchevêque, the owner and CEO of the company. Thanks also to Christine Boizot-Szantal, Céline Bonnet, Clément Carbonnier, Claire Chambolle, Pauline Givord, Stéphane Gregoir, Vincent Réquillart, and Julio Rotemberg, as well as participants to seminars at Banque de France, GREMAQ (University of Toulouse), INRA-ALISS (Ivry), and to conferences (JMA, Nice, June 2012; AFSE and LAGV, Marseilles, June 2012; 18th International Conference on Panel Data, Paris, July 2012). Errors and shortcomings are our own. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their institutions. 1 Résumé: A partir d’une base de données constituée de plus de 500,000 observations sur le prix de boissons non alcoolisées, nous évaluons l’impact de la ‘taxe soda’,instituée depuis le 1er Janvier 2012 en France. L’approche retenue, en "différence de différences", nous permet de montrer que la taxe a progressivement été répercutée dans le prix des boissons contenant du sucre ajouté ou des édulcorants. Six premiers mois après son intro- duction, la taxe était totalement répercutée dans le prix des sodas et presque totalement pour les boissons aux fruits, tandis que de façon partielle pour les eaux aromatisées. Nous montrons également que l’impact de la taxe sur les prix a été différent selon les marques de boissons et les groupes de distribution. Mots-clés: Taxe d’accise, boisson, sucre ajouté, incidence, ajustement de prix Codes JEL: E31, D40 Abstract: Based on an original data set of more than 500,000 non-alcoholic beverage price records, we evaluate the impact on consumer prices of the ‘soda tax’,an excise on drinks with added sugar or sweetener, introduced in January 2012 in France. We adopt a difference in differences approach and find that the tax was gradually passed through. 6 month after its introduction the tax was fully shifted to soda prices and almost fully shifted to prices of fruit drinks, while the pass-through for flavored waters was incomplete. We also find that the pass-through was heterogeneous across brands and retailing groups. Keywords: soda tax; pass-through; tax incidence; excise tax. JEL classification: E31, D40 2 1 Introduction Since January 2012 a ‘soda tax’has been introduced in France, based on the claim that drinks containing added sugar or sweetener are unhealthy and that their consumption should be discouraged. A similar tax already existed in some countries, like Denmark, Finland and Hungary and in many US states (OECD, 2012; Bridging the Gap Program, 2011). The excise concerns all non-alcoholic beverages with added sugar or sweetener, like sodas, but also flavored waters and fruit drinks. It amounts to 7.16 cents per liter,1 but a full pass-through of the soda tax would amount to a price increase of 7.55 cents per liter, given that VAT applies to the excise. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the French soda tax on the price of the three main product categories of concerned drinks: (i) flavored waters, (ii) fruit drinks and ready-to-drink teas, and (iii) sodas (including colas, energy, tonic and other soft drinks). Because the tax was not necessarily immediately and fully shifted to prices, our analysis allows for gradual price reactions over time. We also consider the possibility of heterogeneity in the tax pass-through across retailing groups and beverage brands. This paper contributes to the still sparse literature on the impact of sugar sweetened beverage (SSB) excise taxes on prices. Despite the increasing interest in the impact of SSB taxes on soft drinks consumption and, consequently, on health or obesity (e.g., Brownell et al. 2009; Dharmasena and Capps, 2012; Finkelstein et al., 2013; Jacobson and Brownell, 2000; Lin et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Fletcher et al., 2010), there is still little evidence regarding the impact of an SSB tax on soda prices. Actually, most often the impact of a soda tax on obesity and health has been simply estimated under the assumption of full pass-through of the tax to prices. The theoretical literature regarding the impact of excise taxes on prices in markets with perfect competition is unambiguous: in standard cases (i.e., upward sloping supply curve and downward sloping demand), the tax is under-shifted to prices (i.e., prices increase by less than the tax). In particular, the smaller the elasticity of demand and the larger the elasticity of supply, the larger the pass-through of the tax to prices. Only if demand is totally inelastic or if the supply curve is infinitely elastic (i.e., marginal costs are constant), the tax is fully passed-through to prices (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002). However, when goods are sold on markets where imperfect competition prevails, depending on the characteristics of demand and on those of production costs, excise taxes may be either under-shifted, fully shifted or even over-shifted to prices. Since non-alcoholic beverages can be considered highly differentiated products, no- 1 Law number 2011-1977, passed on December 28th, 2011 (the government initial project was to set the tax at 3.58 cents per liter and only for beverages with added sugar). 3 tably differing from each other in terms of taste and quality and since we focus on the impact of the soda tax on prices over the months just following its introduction, we may here restrict our attention to results regarding the short-run impact of excise taxes on prices on markets with differentiated products.2 Anderson et al. (2001) show that in the case of differentiated products, if firms compete in prices and if the elasticity of demand is constant, an excise tax is over-shifted to prices. Taking into account product differentia- tion in a context of spatial competition (i.e., the intensity of competition is stronger with firms selling ‘close’products than with those selling ‘far distant’products), Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) show that an excise tax is fully passed-through to producer prices and over-shifted to consumer prices (as long as an ad valorem tax also applies). Are theoretical predictions corroborated by existing empirical studies regarding the impact of SSB taxes on prices? The few empirical assessments of the pass-through of a soda tax to prices available until now suggest that the soda taxes would rather be over-shifted to prices. Bergman and Hansen (2013) evaluate the impact of various excise tax variations on alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverage prices in Denmark. Based on the analysis of micro price data used by Statistics Denmark to compute the Danish Consumer Price Index, they conclude that the two increases in the soft drink tax that occurred in 1998 and 2001 were strongly over-shifted to consumer prices. Using a quite different approach, Bonnet and Réquillart (2013) come to the same conclusion. They specify a structural model where competition is horizontal (among producers on the one hand and among retailers on the other hand), as well as vertical (between producers and retailers) and show using simulations that an excise SSB tax is likely to be over-shifted to prices. Beyond these two studies, a few empirical studies consider the more general question of the impact of specific consumption taxes on prices. Besley and Rosen (1999) have considered the impact of sales taxes on a large number of products in US. They also outline an over-shifting of these taxes to soda prices. Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) find under-shifting of gasoline sales tax changes, while Marion and Muehlegger (2011) full pass-through in the US. Carbonnier (2007) shows that French VAT changes in the new car and housing repair services sectors were under-shifted. The conclusions that can be drawn from other studies devoted to the impact of excise taxes on prices of alcoholic beverages or cigarettes are also diverse. Although Kenkel (2005) and Young and Bieliska- Kwapisz (2002) also conclude to over-shifting of taxes to alcoholic beverage prices, as do Hanson and Sullivan (2009) regarding cigarette prices, De Cicca et al.