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Informe De Cuba Contra El Bloqueo Julio 2019 2019 Julio Bloqueo Cuba Contra El Informe De 135 / Conclusions

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Informe De Cuba Contra El Bloqueo Julio 2019 2019 Julio Bloqueo Cuba Contra El Informe De 135 / Conclusions INFORME DE CUBA SOBRE LA RESOLUCIÓN 73/8 DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS. “NECESIDAD DE PONER FIN AL BLOQUEO ECONÓMICO, COMERCIAL Y FINANCIERO IMPUESTO POR LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA CONTRA CUBA”. CONTENIDO CONTENT TABLE DES MATIÈRES 5 / INTRODUCCIÓN 55 / INTRODUCTION 97 / INTRODUCTION 8 / 1. CONTINUIDAD Y RECRUDECIMIENTO 57 / 1. CONTINUITY AND THE TIGHTENING OF 99 / 1. POURSUITE ET DURCISSEMENT DE LA DE LA POLÍTICA DEL BLOQUEO THE BLOCKADE POLICY POLITIQUE DE BLOCUS 1.1 Vigencia de las leyes del bloqueo 1.1 Validity of the laws of the blockade 1.1 Maintien des lois du blocus 10 / 1.2 Principales medidas del bloqueo adoptadas a 58 / 1.2 Principal blockade measures adopted as of June 100 / 1.2 Principales mesures de blocus adoptées partir de junio de 2018 2018 depuis juin 2018 13 / 1.3 Aplicación de la Ley Helms-Burton 61 / 1.3 Application of the Helms-Burton Act 103 / 1.3 Application de la Loi Helms-Burton 16 / 2. EL BLOQUEO VIOLA LOS DERECHOS DEL 64 / 2. EL BLOCKADE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS 106 / 2. LE BLOCUS VIOLE LES DROITS DU PUEBLO CUBANO OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE PEUPLE CUBAIN 2.1 Afectaciones a los sectores de mayor impacto 2.1 Repercussions on sectors having the greatest 2.1 Préjudices causés aux secteurs à plus forte social social impact incidence sociale 23 / 2.2 Afectaciones al desarrollo económico 70 / 2.2 Repercussions on economic growth 112 / 2.2 Préjudices causés au développement économique 29 / 3. AFECTACIONES AL SECTOR EXTERNO DE 75 / 3. REPERCUSSSIONS ON THE FOREIGN LA ECONOMÍA CUBANA SECTOR OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 117 / 3. PRÉJUDICES CAUSÉS AU SECTEUR EXTÉRIEUR DE L’ÉCONOMIE 3.1 Afectaciones al comercio exterior 3.1 Repercussions on foreign trade CUBAINE 32 / 3.2 Afectaciones a las Finanzas 76 / 3.2 Repercussions on finance 3.1 Préjudices causés au commerce extérieur 35 / 4. EL BLOQUEO VIOLA EL DERECHO 80 / 4. THE BLOCKADE VIOLATES 119 / 3.2 Préjudices causés aux finances INTERNACIONAL. APLICACIÓN INTERNATIONAL LAW. EXTRATERRITORIAL EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION 122 / 4. LE BLOCUS VIOLE LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. APPLICATION 36 / 4.1 Afectaciones a entidades cubanas 4.1 Repercussions on Cuban entities EXTRATERRITORIALE (Ejemplos) (examples) 123 / 4.1 Préjudices causés à des entités juridiques 38 / 4.2 Afectaciones al sector bancario y financiero 82 / 4.2 Repercussions on the banking and financial cubaines (exemples) (Ejemplos) sector (examples) 124 / 4.2 Préjudices causés aux secteurs bancaire et 5. RECHAZO UNIVERSAL AL 83 / 5. WORLD OPPOSITION TO THE financier étrangers (exemples) BLOQUEO BLOCKADE 125 / 5. REJET UNIVERSEL DU BLOCUS 5.1 Oposición en los Estados Unidos 5.1 Opposition in the United States 5.1 Opposition aux USA 44 / 5.2 Oposición de la comunidad 87 / 5.2 Opposition by the international community internacional 130 / 5.2 Opposition de la communauté 93 / CONCLUSIONS internationale 50 / CONCLUSIONES CUBA’S REPORT AGAINST THE BLOCKADE JULY 2019 THE BLOCKADE JULY REPORT AGAINST CUBA’S RAPPORT DE CUBA CONTRE LE BLOCUS JUILLET 2019 INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 2019 JULIO BLOQUEO CUBA CONTRA EL INFORME DE 135 / CONCLUSIONS INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 INTRODUCCIÓN Desde abril de 2018 hasta marzo de 2019, para el desarrollo de todas las potencialidades período que abarca el presente informe, el de la economía cubana, para la implementación recrudecimiento del bloqueo continuó siendo del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y el eje central de la política del gobierno de Social del país, así como para la consecución de los Estados Unidos (EE.UU.) hacia Cuba, con la Agenda 2030 y sus Objetivos de Desarrollo efectos cada vez más notables en su aplicación Sostenible. extraterritorial. La estrategia estadounidense Desde abril de 2018 hasta marzo de 2019, se enfocó en consolidar la confrontación y el bloqueo ha causado pérdidas a Cuba en el la hostilidad, tanto en el plano declarativo orden de los 4 mil 343, 6 millones de dólares. como en la ejecución de medidas de agresión económica contra el país. El clima de hostilidad en las relaciones bilaterales ha estado fuertemente marcado por el incremento de la retórica agresiva del gobierno estadounidense contra Cuba. Como parte de esta escalada, EE.UU. intentó 4 343 600 000 DÓLARES introducir 8 enmiendas al proyecto de resolución contra el bloqueo presentado por Cuba el 1ro de noviembre de 2018 en la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas. El significativo impacto negativo de la El objetivo de su maniobra era modificar la aplicación de las medidas adoptadas naturaleza del texto y fabricar pretextos para la recientemente por los Estados Unidos para continuidad y el reforzamiento de su política recrudecer el bloqueo contra Cuba no está genocida, recurriendo a falsas alegaciones en contabilizado en el presente informe, por materia de derechos humanos. exceder el cierre del periodo analizado. Esta información estará recogida en el A pesar de las fuertes presiones ejercidas por los documento que se presentará el próximo EE.UU., la comunidad internacional rechazó año. sus propuestas, al tiempo que expresó una vez más, su apoyo abrumador a la resolución de condena al bloqueo. DAÑOS ACUMULADOS El presente informe evidencia cómo el bloqueo 138 843 400 000 económico, comercial y financiero impuesto DÓLARES contra Cuba, continúa representando un freno 5 INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 A precios corrientes, los daños acumulados enfrentan colosales obstáculos en sus o individuos cubanos o de terceros países se sustenta, estas sanciones califican como durante casi seis décadas de aplicación de actividades comerciales y financieras en que se relacionen comercialmente con acto de genocidio a tenor de la Convención esta política alcanzan la cifra de 138 mil 843, muchos países del mundo. propiedades nacionalizadas en Cuba en para la Prevención y Sanción del Delito 4 millones de dólares. Tomando en cuenta de Genocidio de 1948 y como un acto de El Departamento de Estado de los EE.UU., la década de 1960. Esta decisión puso fin la depreciación del dólar frente al valor del guerra económica según lo establecido en la amplió en tres ocasiones la “Lista de a la práctica asumida desde 1996 por los oro en el mercado internacional, el bloqueo Conferencia Naval de Londres de 1909. Entidades Cubanas Restringidas” que gobiernos estadounidenses anteriores, ha provocado perjuicios cuantificables por son objeto de sanciones adicionales a demócratas y republicanos, y por el propio En la actual coyuntura, con más razón más de 922 mil 630 millones de dólares, las impuestas por las regulaciones del Presidente Trump en sus dos primeros años que nunca antes, se impone el reclamo al valor que representa un decrecimiento bloqueo. Esta medida ha ocasionado daños de mandato, quienes habían suspendido gobierno de los EE.UU. de que cumpla del 1,2 por ciento con respecto al período considerables a la economía del país, por cada 6 meses esta posibilidad. con las 27 resoluciones adoptadas por la anterior, debido a la disminución del precio su efecto intimidatorio sobre la comunidad del oro en 1,6 por ciento. empresarial internacional. A ello se sumaron las disposiciones de la Oficina para el Control de Activos Extranjeros La Ley Helms-Burton constituye un instrumento PREJUICIOS (OFAC) del Departamento del Tesoro y jurídico de coerción política que dispone acciones CUANTIFICABLES del Buró de Industria y Seguridad (BIS) del de presión económica lesivas a la soberanía de Cuba Departamento del Comercio de los Estados “ 922 630 000 000 y de terceros países, con el propósito de asfixiar a la DÓLARES Unidos de eliminar, a partir del 5 de junio de 2019, las licencias generales para los economía cubana e incrementar las carencias de la viajes educativos grupales “pueblo a pueblo” población. Busca perpetuar el clima de hostilidad y de negar licencias a las aeronaves no entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos y negarle a la Transformar el costo del bloqueo en comerciales y embarcaciones de pasajeros y capacidad de pago del país, permitiría recreativas en estancia temporal, incluyendo nación cubana el derecho a la autodeterminación. disponer de una fuente de financiamiento los cruceros, lo que impacta severamente Sus regulaciones son contrarias al Derecho adicional, sustantiva y sostenida que el número de visitantes al país. Todas estas Internacional, a los principios de la Carta de las acciones fueron tomadas con el objetivo otorgaría un mayor dinamismo a los Naciones Unidas y a las reglas establecidas por programas inversionistas vinculados a los deliberado y declarado de causar daños sectores estratégicos del Plan Nacional de económicos y privar a Cuba de recursos la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Esta Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta el 2030. financieros. normativa ha suscitado el contundente rechazo de “ De esta manera, se crearían las condiciones Una demostración sin precedentes del numerosos actores de la comunidad internacional necesarias para lograr gradualmente ritmos recrudecimiento de la política anticubana y de representantes de organismos internacionales. sostenidos de crecimiento del Producto del gobierno estadounidense, fue la Interno Bruto (PIB) anual. decisión de permitir la posibilidad de que, al amparo del Título III de la Ley En el período analizado, el fortalecimiento Helms-Burton, se puedan tomar acciones El bloqueo constituye una violación masiva, comunidad internacional en el marco de la de la aplicación extraterritorial del sistema judiciales en tribunales de los EE.UU. ante flagrante y sistemática de los derechos Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas y de sanciones contra Cuba se reflejó en ponga fin, sin condicionamiento alguno, a demandas presentadas por ciudadanos o humanos de todas las cubanas y cubanos. constantes afectaciones a las empresas, Por su declarado propósito y el andamiaje su política de bloqueo contra Cuba. entidades estadounidenses contra empresas bancos y embajadas cubanas, las cuales político, legal y administrativo en el que 6 7 INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 INFORME DE CUBA CONTRA EL BLOQUEO JULIO 2019 1.
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  • November 25, 1956 the Granma Sets Sail from Mexico
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