DOCSLIB.ORG

Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation: Differentiated Integration in Uncertain Times

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation: Differentiated Integration in Uncertain Times Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 100–109 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3338 Article Nordic Security and Defence Cooperation: Differentiated Integration in Uncertain Times Rikard Bengtsson Department of Political Science, Lund University, 221 00 Lund, Sweden; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 12 June 2020 | Accepted: 28 August 2020 | Published: 3 November 2020 Abstract A decade ago, Nordic cooperation on security and defence matters gained momentum, having been largely absent from the map of Nordic cooperation during the Cold War and its aftermath. This article analyses developments along three di- mensions of Nordic cooperation: military defence (focusing on the Nordic Defence Cooperation), civil security (in the form of the ‘Haga’ process), and political cooperation (through the implementation of the Stoltenberg report). Three observa- tions stand out as a result: First, that the three dimensions are intimately related against the background of a common Nordic conceptualization of security; second, that there is simultaneously variation in significant respects (such as driving forces, scope, and degree of institutionalization); and third, that Nordic security and defence cooperation has developed in the context of European and transatlantic security dynamics and cooperation. The second part of the analysis seeks to interpret this picture from the analytical perspective of differentiated integration. The article ends with a set of reflections on the future of Nordic security and defence cooperation in light of the Coronavirus pandemic. Keywords civil security; cooperation; defence; differentiated integration; Haga process; NORDEFCO; Nordic; security; Stoltenberg Issue This article is part of the issue “Rediscovering Nordic Cooperation” edited by Anne Elizabeth Stie (University of Agder, Norway) and Jarle Trondal (University of Agder, Norway/ARENA University of Oslo, Norway). © 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction Cold War saw the formation of the Nordic Council in 1952, a permanent treaty on Nordic cooperation in 1962, The last decade has seen a surge in Nordic coopera- and the Nordic Council of Ministers, established in 1971. tion in the area of security and defence. This is all Sometimes overlooked due to its relatively weak insti- the more surprising given the absence of such cooper- tutional foundations, Nordic cooperation advanced dur- ation during the Cold War and the different security- ing the first decade of the Cold War to include things political orientations and institutional linkages of the such as a passport union (1952), a common labour mar- Nordic countries: with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland ket (1954), and a reciprocal social security arrangement being North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mem- (1955). Later advances included a language convention bers whereas Sweden and Finland remained non-aligned, and the Nordic Investment Bank. and with Denmark, Finland, and Sweden being European Having said that, the Cold War period also contained Union (EU) members while Norway and Iceland opted for major failures of cooperation, most notably the idea of a non-membership cooperation. Indeed, Nordic coopera- Nordic single market and the Nordic Economic Community tion and integration was in many ways a success story (NORDEK); in the latter case a reflection of Denmark’s during the Cold War, with intensifying cooperation and and Norway’s decision to opt for the European Economic even integration in a number of societal fields. As ex- Community instead (although in Norway’s case, the gov- plored further below, security and defence was however ernment’s proposal to join was defeated in a referendum). not part of this process. Described by Forsberg as the Deliberately, foreign, security and defence policy co- “golden era of Nordic cooperation” (2013, p. 1163), the operation was not made part of the mandate for the Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 100–109 100 Nordic Council as it would have made Finnish member- (NORDEFCO). Founded in 2009, NORDEFCO’s aim is to ship in the Council impossible given Finland’s special re- “strengthen the participating nations’ national defence, lationship to the Soviet Union. Moreover, following the explore common synergies and facilitate efficient com- failed negotiations for a Nordic defence alliance in 1949 mon solutions” (NORDEFCO, 2020). While the aim re- and Denmark’s, Norway’s, and Iceland’s decision to join mains the same, the motivation for Nordic defence coop- NATO, regional security and defence cooperation was eration has changed fundamentally, from economic rea- not really deemed politically feasible or of great value- sons (cost-effectiveness) to managing the Russian chal- added by anyone in the region. lenge, to security in the Baltic Sea region. How did we During the Cold War, then, Nordic defence cooper- end up here? ation was essentially limited to cooperation in the con- The end of the Cold War implied substantial changes text of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. The Nordic to the Nordic security situation, as Sweden and Finland states, apart from Iceland, established the NORDSAMFN joined the EU and engaged in close collaboration with forum in 1963 as a group for Nordic cooperation on mil- NATO. This is reflected in examples of closer cooperation itary UN matters. This was supplemented the following among the Nordic countries in military affairs, such as year by a joint Nordic stand-by force at the UN’s disposal joint armaments projects, cooperation in NATO-led op- (NORDBERFN). In 1997, these arrangements were re- erations in Afghanistan and the Balkans, and the estab- placed by NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement lishment of the Nordic Battle Group in the EU context. for Military Peace Support, later to become an inte- The process of closer collaboration can be traced gral part of today’s cooperation scheme—see further back to 2006–07 and a Swedish–Norwegian bilateral ini- Forsberg, 2013, p. 1167). Nordic cooperation in the con- tiative for cooperation (on exercises and education as text of UN peacekeeping can be understood as a way of well as on maintenance and upgrading of equipment) as balancing different security-political orientations (NATO a way to cope with the increasingly challenging economic membership and non-alignment, often referred to as ‘the situation (rapid cost development of equipment in paral- Nordic balance’) and a common small state security iden- lel to sliced defence budgets as a result of a conducive se- tity (reflected in UN-mandated international activism). curity environment). In 2008, a trilateral working group Today, the situation is fundamentally different in im- (Sweden–Finland–Norway) identified as many as 140 ar- portant respects, as cooperation in security and defence eas of potential bilateral and trilateral cooperation—40 has not only been introduced but has arguably risen to of which could have been initiated more or less im- the top of the agenda of Nordic cooperation. Still, certain mediately (Bailes & Sandö, 2014, pp. 12–13; Forsberg, structural preconditions remain, notably the different in- 2013, pp. 1167–69; Saxi, 2019, p. 663). Finland’s rea- stitutional linkages. Three inter-related dimensions make son for joining Norway and Sweden was “the very great up security and defence cooperation among the Nordic challenges facing the country’s defence economy” (Saxi, countries today: military defence cooperation, civil secu- 2019, p. 664). rity cooperation, and a political process for advancing co- In November 2008, then, the five Nordic states operation on foreign policy, security, and defence. This signed a memorandum of understanding establishing article aims to map this evolving landscape of Nordic se- NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures) as a curity and defence cooperation and critically examine new scheme for cooperation. A year later NORDSUP the nature and dynamics of cooperation in this sphere was combined with two other existing formats for co- utilizing scholarship on differentiated integration, com- operation (NORDAC—Nordic Armaments Cooperation plemented by the concepts of security community and and NORDCAPS—Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for stable peace. Military Peace Support) to become NORDEFCO. The idea Before exploring the different dimensions of cooper- was to “produce national military capabilities in a more ation, a note on terminology is necessary: Non-military cost-efficient way by means of multinational coopera- security and defence cooperation features under an ar- tion” (Röksund as cited in Saxi, 2019, p. 665). ray of labels in academic scholarship as well as in Nordic Hence by 2009, a pan-Nordic framework for military and European politics—civil defence, civil security, emer- cooperation was in place, driven by an economic ratio- gency preparedness/management, crisis readiness, civil nale and initiated from within the defence forces, but protection etc. For reasons of conceptual clarity, this arti- widely supported by Nordic politicians and the Nordic cle will reserve the term defence for military defence and public (according to a study by Oxford Research, re- primarily use the label civil security when discussing non- ferred in Saxi, 2019, p. 665). It is to be noted, how- military aspects of security and defence. Civil defence ever, that for a number of years it remained primar- may still
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Ultimate Balancing Act
    THE ULTIMATE BALANCING ACT WORK AND FAMILY IN THE NORDIC REGION THINK-PIECE 1 THE ULTIMATE BALANCING ACT Work and family in the Nordic region Iselin Løvslett Danbolt ISBN 978-92-893-4752-5 (PRINT) ISBN 978-92-893-4753-2 (PDF) http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2016-780 ANP 2016:780 © Nordic Council of Ministers 2016 Layout: Gitte Wejnold Photo: norden.org, unsplash.com, Scanpix Print: Rosendahls Copies: 160 54 7 1 45 TRYKSAG Printed in Denmark This publication has been published with financial support by the Nordic Council of Ministers. However, the contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views, policies or recommendations of the Nordic Council of Ministers. www.norden.org/nordpub Nordic co-operation Nordic co-operation is one of the world’s most extensive forms of regional collaboration, involving Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland. Nordic co-operation has firm traditions in politics, the economy, and culture. It plays an important role in European and international collaboration, and aims at creating a strong Nordic community in a strong Europe. Nordic co-operation seeks to safeguard Nordic and regional interests and principles in the global community. Common Nordic values help the region solidify its position as one of the world’s most innovative and competitive. Nordic Council of Ministers Ved Stranden 18 DK-1061 Copenhagen K +45 33 96 02 00 www.norden.org 2 THE ULTIMATE BALANCING ACT WORK AND FAMILY IN THE NORDIC REGION THINK-PIECE ISELIN LØVSLETT DANBOLT 4 CONTENTS
    [Show full text]
  • Management Challenges at the Centre of Government: Coalition Situations and Government Transitions
    SIGMA Papers No. 22 Management Challenges at the Centre of Government: OECD Coalition Situations and Government Transitions https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml614vl4wh-en Unclassified CCET/SIGMA/PUMA(98)1 Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques OLIS : 10-Feb-1998 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Dist. : 11-Feb-1998 __________________________________________________________________________________________ Or. Eng. SUPPORT FOR IMPROVEMENT IN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (SIGMA) A JOINT INITIATIVE OF THE OECD/CCET AND EC/PHARE Unclassified CCET/SIGMA/PUMA Cancels & replaces the same document: distributed 26-Jan-1998 ( 98 ) 1 MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AT THE CENTRE OF GOVERNMENT: COALITION SITUATIONS AND GOVERNMENT TRANSITIONS SIGMA PAPERS: No. 22 Or. En 61747 g . Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine Complete document available on OLIS in its original format CCET/SIGMA/PUMA(98)1 THE SIGMA PROGRAMME SIGMA — Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern European Countries — is a joint initiative of the OECD Centre for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition and the European Union’s Phare Programme. The initiative supports public administration reform efforts in thirteen countries in transition, and is financed mostly by Phare. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is an intergovernmental organisation of 29 democracies with advanced market economies. The Centre channels the Organisation’s advice and assistance over a wide range of economic issues to reforming countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Phare provides grant financing to support its partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe to the stage where they are ready to assume the obligations of membership of the European Union.
    [Show full text]
  • 9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
    Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nordic Council of Ministers: Aspirations for More Political Relevance
    Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 11–20 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i4.3381 Article The Nordic Council of Ministers: Aspirations for More Political Relevance Tobias Etzold Department of Historical and Classical Studies, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norway; E-Mail: [email protected] Submitted: 19 June 2020 | Accepted: 28 August 2020 | Published: 3 November 2020 Abstract Due to changing circumstances and new challenges, the Nordic Council of Ministers underwent an incremental process of change and some modest transformation since the 1990s. However, there has never been a major overhaul of structures and contents owing to considerable inertia. The most recent modernisation process, aiming at more political relevance and flexibility, has been ambitious but whether it has been a success remains unclear thus far. Weaknesses and limits in cooper- ation in the Nordic Council of Ministers are obvious, i.e., no majority voting or ‘opting-out’ system, a lack in supra-national structures and policies and no common immigration, foreign, security and EU policies. Nonetheless, the organisation has at least some relevance and meaning for the Nordic countries and the potential to promote and facilitate cooperation in policy areas in which common interests exist, such as environment, climate, research and social affairs. Therefore, rather than constituting a common political order of its own, Nordic cooperation, as it is conducted within the Nordic Council of Ministers, is best characterized by differentiated integration, promoting full integration only to a limited extent but respecting integration to different extents and speeds by fostering cooperation and coordination of certain policies where possible and desired.
    [Show full text]
  • The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a US City
    Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City Ever since the United States lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons in 1949, the possibility of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil has been regarded as the gravest of all imaginable threats to U.S. national security. Today, nonstate terrorist actors such as al Qaeda have pledged to carry out an “American Hiroshima” of a significantly greater magnitude than the attacks perpetrated against the United States on September 11, 2001. Armed with the recognition that prevention offers by far the best protec- tion against nuclear terrorism, the U.S. national security establishment has long sought to ensure that nuclear weapons and fissile materials do not fall into new and threatening hands, especially those of terrorists. Through ini- tiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar program, which has provided U.S.-funded assistance to the former states of the Soviet Union to secure and dismantle their nuclear weapons programs, Washington has led international efforts in cooperative threat reduction resulting in the deactivation of more than 7,000 nuclear warheads since 1991. In spite of these successes, the threat of a nuclear attack against the United States has not yet been eradicated, nor has the spread of weapons of mass de- struction been effectively curtailed. The serious setbacks to nuclear terrorism prevention in recent years are particularly disturbing, as evidenced by North Korea’s new nuclear weapons arsenal, Iran’s unchecked nuclear developments, continuing political risk in nuclear-armed Pakistan, and inadequately safeguard- ed weapons and fissile materials still remaining in Russia and elsewhere.
    [Show full text]
  • The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture
    THE END OF NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING MOVING TO A W E I DETERRENCE-ONLY V E R POSTURE E R U T S O P R A E L C U N . S . U E V I T A N September 2018 R E T L A Dr. Bruce G. Blair N Jessica Sleight A Emma Claire Foley In Collaboration with the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture an alternative u.s. nuclear posture review Bruce G. Blair with Jessica Sleight and Emma Claire Foley Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University Global Zero, Washington, DC September 2018 Copyright © 2018 Bruce G. Blair published by the program on science and global security, princeton university This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial License; to view a copy of this license, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 typesetting in LATEX with tufte document class First printing, September 2018 Contents Abstract 5 Executive Summary 6 I. Introduction 15 II. The Value of U.S. Nuclear Capabilities and Enduring National Objectives 21 III. Maximizing Strategic Stability 23 IV. U.S. Objectives if Deterrence Fails 32 V. Modernization of Nuclear C3 40 VI. Near-Term Guidance for Reducing the Risks of Prompt Launch 49 VII. Moving the U.S. Strategic Force Toward a Deterrence-Only Strategy 53 VIII.Nuclear Modernization Program 70 IX. Nuclear-Weapon Infrastructure: The “Complex” 86 X. Countering Nuclear Terrorism 89 XI. Nonproliferation and Strategic-Arms Control 91 XII. Conclusion 106 Authors 109 Abstract The United States should adopt a deterrence-only policy based on no first use of nuclear weapons, no counterforce against opposing nuclear forces in second use, and no hair-trigger response.
    [Show full text]
  • A Nordic Model for Scotland?
    A NORDIC MODEL FOR SCOTLAND? Scottish-UK relations after independence Nicola McEwen ESRC Senior Scotland Fellow University of Edinburgh KEY POINTS . Existing UK intergovernmental forums would be insufficient to manage Scottish-rUK intergovernmental relations if the Scottish government’s independence vision was realised. The Nordic example illustrates that intergovernmental cooperation, formal and informal, between neighbouring sovereign states is commonplace in many policy areas. Formal cooperation is most evident where it produces clear ‘added value’ for each party. Formal structures of intergovernmental cooperation nurture policy learning and encourage the networking that facilitates informal cooperation, but senior official and ministerial buy-in can be difficult to secure. European integration has limited the incentive for separate Nordic cooperation initiatives, though Nordic governments continue to cooperate over the implementation of EU directives. The Nordic countries do not usually act as a cohesive regional bloc in the EU – national interests prevail. Intergovernmental coordination among the Nordic countries offers useful insights for Scottish- rUK relations in the event of independence, but the Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers offer limited opportunities for an independent Scotland, either for direct engagement or as a model for Scottish-rUK cooperation. ***** INDEPENDENCE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS For the Scottish government and Yes Scotland, independence would mark a new ‘partnership of equals’ between the nations of these islands. The independence vision, set out in the White Paper, Scotland’s Future, incorporates a variety of proposals for sharing institutional assets and services with the rest of the UK. These include, for example: . Sterling currency union . Research Councils UK . Joint venture between a Scottish Broadcasting .
    [Show full text]
  • Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats
    Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats FY 2018–FY 2022 Report to Congress November 2017 National Nuclear Security Administration United States Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 Message from the Administrator The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2018 report, Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats, outlines DOE/NNSA’s plans and programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear and radiological incidents around the world. The report is a companion to the Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which describes DOE/NNSA’s activities to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and maintain its foundational capabilities and infrastructure. In keeping with our commitment to transparency, updated versions of these reports are published each year. Maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and reducing global nuclear threats—two missions that are often thought to involve different technical expertise and pursue disparate goals—are far more interconnected than they may appear. Many activities within these two DOE/NNSA mission pillars are mutually reinforcing and supportive of common objectives. The facilities and scientific knowledge that underpin stockpile stewardship, for example, are harnessed for a range of nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions, from assessing foreign weapons programs and potential terrorist devices to managing the proliferation risks posed by civil nuclear applications. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world yields considerable benefits for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Nordic Council – Our Council the Nordic Council – Our Council © Nordic Council, 2012 ISBN 978-92-893-2372-7 DOI ANP 2012:737
    The Nordic Council – our council The Nordic Council – our council © Nordic Council, 2012 ISBN 978-92-893-2372-7 DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.6027/ANP2012-737 ANP 2012:737 Editors: Silje Bergum Kinsten and Heidi Orava Design: Jette Koefoed Photos: Karin Beate Nøsterud; Ingram; Image Select; Ojo; Søren Sigfusson; Ludwig Ehlers/Landesarchiv Berlin; Photos from “50 år Nordisk Råd 1952–2002” Copies: 1500 Print: Rosendahls-Schultz Grafisk, Albertslund Printed in Denmark Nordic co-operation Nordic co-operation is one of the world’s most extensive forms of regional collaboration, involving Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland. Nordic co-operation has firm traditions in politics, the economy, and culture. It plays an important role in European and international collabora- tion, and aims at creating a strong Nordic community in a strong Europe. Nordic co-operation seeks to safeguard Nordic and regional interests and principles in the global community. Common Nordic values help the region solidify its position as one of the world’s most innovative and competitive. Nordic Council Ved Stranden 18 DK-1061 Copenhagen K Telefon (+45) 3396 0200 www.norden.org The Nordic Council – our council Council Nordic The This brochure will provide you with a deeper insight into what the Nordic Council is all about. You will discover that the work of the Council exerts an influence on your life. Perhaps you would like to help exert influence on the Council. 4 The Nordic Council – our council Introduction 7 Out of the ashes 8 The first steps 10 Timeline 10 What issues does the Nordic Council address? 14 Closer to the people 17 Facts about the Nordic Council 22 It is also important that the people of the Region continue to consider the Council relevant to their lives.
    [Show full text]
  • The History of Nordic Labour Law
    The Roots – the History of Nordic Labour Law Ole Hasselbalch 1 Scandinavian Societies and Law-Tradition …………………………….. 12 2 Relics of Feudalism and Rise of the Individual Contract ……………… 14 3 The Collective Dimension ………………………………………………... 15 3.1 Denmark ……………………………………………………………. 16 3.2 Norway ……………………………………………………………… 18 3.3 Sweden ……………………………………………………………… 19 3.4 Finland ……………………………………………………………… 21 4 State Intervention in Labour Relations………………………………….. 22 4.1 Welfare Legislation and Social Security ……………………………. 22 4.2 Rise of Responsibility for Social Security on The Job ……………… 24 4.2.1 Health and Safety at Work and Industrial Injuries …………. 24 4.2.2 Loss of Wages During Employment ………………………. 26 4.2.3 Unemployment and Protection Against Dismissals ……….. 28 4.2.3.1 Protection Against Dismissals ……………………. 28 4.2.3.2. Unemployment Insurance ………………………... 29 4.2.3.3 Labour Exchange ………………………………… 29 5 Integration: Co-Influence and Co-Determination ……………………… 30 6 Turbulence: Growing State-Intervention, Internationalisation, Market-orientation and Reorganisation ………… 33 References in Non-Scandinavian Languages …………………………..………. 35 © Stockholm Institute for Scandianvian Law 1957-2009 12 Ole Hasselbalch: The Roots: The History of Nordic Labour Law The term “the Nordic model” has been widely used by international labour lawyers to indicate special features which characterise Scandinavian labour law. This article outlines the history of the Nordic model, thereby demonstrating the reasons for using the term Nordic Model to indicate common Scandinavian trends in this particular field of law. 1 Scandinavian Societies and Law-Tradition Traditionally, the Scandinavian countries have close mutual ties, which is owing to their common cultural and linguistic background. To a large degree their social development have followed identical paths too. Thus Scandinavia today forms a common area of language and culture and the various functions of societies are based on a common tradition.
    [Show full text]
  • Nordic Communities a Vision for the Future
    Nordic Communities a vision for the future Johan Strang Nordic Communities a vision for the future Johan Strang Centre for nordiC StudieS, univerSity of HelSinki 1 Content Foreword 4 Summary 6 1 · The Nordic community and Nordic Communities 16 i. The Nordic Region in the world and in Europe 20 ii. The Stoltenberg and Wetterberg models 23 iii. Nordic Communities 25 iv. The democratic challenge 27 v. The Nordic community 29 2 · Key policy areas 34 i. Foreign and defence policy 36 ii. EU policy 40 iii. Economic and welfare policy 42 iv. Environmental and energy policy 46 v. Research, innovation, education and training 50 vi. Culture and language 52 vii. Law and legislation 55 2 3 · Official Nordic ­­co-operation 60 i. The Nordic Council of Ministers 63 ii. The Nordic Council 69 iii. A Nordic network think tank 74 iv. The Nordic institutions 76 v. Unofficial and official co-operation 77 vi. Informal co-operation at the official level 78 4 · The Nordic brand 84 List of people involved in the re search for this book 90 3 Foreword Although commissioned to mark the 60th anniversary of the Nordic Council in 2012, this is no run-of-the-mill commemorative publica- tion. Rather than taking a retrospective approach, it looks to the future of Nordic co-operation, following up on the debate rekindled by the Swedish historian Gunnar Wetterberg’s book United Nordic Federation (2010) and the Stoltenberg report (2009) on working more closely together on foreign and security policy. In spring 2011, the Nordic Council commissioned the Centre for Nordic Studies (CENS) at the University of Helsinki to conduct a study and to pre- sent proposals for strengthening Nordic co-operation.
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 Sartorius Christopher Ma
    UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS Norman, OK 2018 WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY ___________________________ Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair ___________________________ Dr. Colin M. Barry ___________________________ Dr. Deven E. Carlson ___________________________ Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza ___________________________ Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite © Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 All Rights Reserved. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to protecting our great nation and our allies. Acknowledgements Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge. This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of countless individuals. At the most personal level, I would like to thank my wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and for her care and love over the past 25 years. I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches. I also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in me the value of a great education. I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU and Dr.
    [Show full text]