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Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats

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Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats FY 2018–FY 2022 Report to Congress November 2017 National Nuclear Security Administration United States Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 Message from the Administrator The Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Fiscal Year 2018 report, Prevent, Counter, and Respond—A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats, outlines DOE/NNSA’s plans and programs to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, counter the threat of nuclear terrorism, and respond to nuclear and radiological incidents around the world. The report is a companion to the Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which describes DOE/NNSA’s activities to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and maintain its foundational capabilities and infrastructure. In keeping with our commitment to transparency, updated versions of these reports are published each year. Maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile and reducing global nuclear threats—two missions that are often thought to involve different technical expertise and pursue disparate goals—are far more interconnected than they may appear. Many activities within these two DOE/NNSA mission pillars are mutually reinforcing and supportive of common objectives. The facilities and scientific knowledge that underpin stockpile stewardship, for example, are harnessed for a range of nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions, from assessing foreign weapons programs and potential terrorist devices to managing the proliferation risks posed by civil nuclear applications. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons around the world yields considerable benefits for the U.S. nuclear posture. By limiting the number of nuclear- capable states and preventing terrorist access to materials and technology that can threaten the United States and its allies, global stability is broadly enhanced and the range of potential threats facing the nation is thereby constrained. DOE/NNSA’s nonproliferation and counterterrorism activities extend the nation’s defenses far beyond America’s borders. The United States’ long experience in securing special nuclear materials is being shared with partners around the world in ways that promote international nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. Similarly, DOE’s national laboratories and production plants, leveraging stockpile-related facilities and knowledge, provide nuclear safeguards training and technology to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to help detect diversion of nuclear materials and verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Prevent, Counter, and Respond report describes how DOE/NNSA’s nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and emergency response programs apply the scientific and technical capabilities and highly-skilled workforce of the nuclear security enterprise to execute critical national security missions. The report also underscores the necessity of repairing and recapitalizing DOE/NNSA’s aging infrastructure, some of which dates to the Manhattan Project era. Providing quality workspace to DOE/NNSA’s workforce is crucial to recruiting and retaining the world-class talent on which our nuclear threat reduction missions depend. This report addresses the requirement in 50 U.S.C. § 2575—which was added by Section 3132 of the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act—for DOE/NNSA to produce a Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Management Plan. This report, along with a separate classified annex, is provided to the following Members of Congress: The Honorable John McCain Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services The Honorable Jack Reed Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services Prevent, Counter, and Respond––A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2018–FY 2022) | Page i Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 The Honorable William “Mac” Thornberry Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services The Honorable Adam Smith Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services The Honorable Bob Corker Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations The Honorable Ben Cardin Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations The Honorable Edward R. Royce Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs The Honorable Eliot L. Engel Ranking Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs The Honorable Thad Cochran Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Patrick Leahy Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Lamar Alexander Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Senate Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Dianne Feinstein Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Senate Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Rodney P. Frelinghuysen Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Nita M. Lowey Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Michael K. Simpson Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development House Committee on Appropriations The Honorable Marcy Kaptur Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development House Committee on Appropriations If you have questions about this plan, please contact me or Nora F. Khalil, Associate Administrator for External Affairs, at (202) 586-7332. Sincerely, Frank G. Klotz Page ii | Prevent, Counter, and Respond––A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2018–FY 2022) Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 Message from the Secretary Among the Department of Energy’s (DOE) most solemn responsibilities are the jobs of keeping the American people safe from global nuclear threats and ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This report describes the Department’s central role in the international effort to reduce nuclear and radiological dangers, chiefly performed through the work of DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In particular, this report details the “prevent-counter-respond” framework for establishing a defense-in-depth strategy against current and emerging nuclear threats. At DOE, we strive to prevent terrorists and proliferant states from developing nuclear weapons or obtaining weapons-usable materials and technology. We counter efforts by both groups to acquire or develop these capabilities. And we prepare to respond to nuclear incidents whenever and wherever they occur. This model, part of a whole-of-government approach to reducing nuclear dangers, reflects our best understanding of the nuclear threat and the means to address it. The Department, in close cooperation with its interagency partners, continuously monitors the international security landscape to ensure the United States adapts to shifting threats, evolving technologies, and other developments that may imperil U.S. security. Our task to reduce the threat is not without challenges. For instance, nuclear and radiological materials residing in regions of concern along with stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials around the world will require increased and constant security. Growing worldwide interest in civil nuclear power and associated facilities will require greater attention to countering potential nuclear proliferation and terrorism dangers. Furthermore, new technologies and manufacturing processes are emerging which have possible nuclear proliferation consequences that must be addressed. We conduct this essential work against the backdrop of a range of geopolitical developments, not least of which is the existence of significant terrorist activity around the world. The expanding volume of global trade, together with the growing sophistication of illicit procurement networks and diffusion of knowledge on the internet, dictate that we work diligently to prevent malevolent actors from acquiring nuclear materials and technology. Each of these developments may disrupt traditional approaches to nonproliferation and counterterrorism, requiring constant agility to respond to nuclear threats. The scientific expertise resident in DOE/NNSA’s national laboratories, production plants, and other sites is a national treasure and indispensable to the nation’s efforts to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear threats. Ensuring that the nuclear security enterprise has the resources, modern facilities, and intellectual capital needed to perform these vital missions is among the highest priorities of this Department. The Department will continue to protect the nation, as it has for decades, by executing a comprehensive strategy that integrates provision of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile with focused actions to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear threats across the spectrum. Sincerely, Rick Perry Prevent, Counter, and Respond––A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2018–FY 2022) | Page iii Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 This page intentionally left blank. Page iv | Prevent, Counter, and Respond––A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2018–FY 2022) Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration | November 2017 Executive Summary For nearly six decades, the United States, working with its allies and the broader international community, has pursued a global strategy to reduce dangers to the Nation from the spread of nuclear weapons and from nuclear and radiological terrorism.
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